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François Ier et Henri VIII. Deux princes de la Renaissance (1515-1547)

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Roger Mettam
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Charles Giry-Deloison

Henry VIII's Foreign Policy and the Tudor Cult of Chivalry

S. J. Gunn

Texte intégral

  • 1 Jean DU BELLAY, Ambassades en Angleterre de jean du Bellay. La première ambassade (septembre 1527- (...)

1At first sight the foreign policy of Henry VIII appears spectacularly ill-conceived. A ruler with basic annual revenues of around £100,000 - by the 1520s perhaps a fifth the size of those of the king of France, a quarter those of the king of Castile - spent £4,000,000 or more on four wars against Scotland, three against France, and one against the Netherlands. He made no permanent gains of Scottish territory and forged no lasting influence over Scottish government. His brief confrontation with England's traditional ally and trading partner the Netherlands ended amidst protests by unemployed clothworkers, leaving French councillors to excuse Henry's failure to prosecute the war effectively with the patronizing observation that they «understand well that over here [in England] they cannot properly be masters of their people»1. Henry's most determined and expensive efforts concentrated on France, and led to the capture of three towns, Thérouanne, Tournai, and Boulogne. The first was immediately given away to Henry's feckless ally the Emperor Maximilian; the second was sold back to the French five years after its capture, for less than the cost of the new fortifications Henry had built there and the English garrison that had manned them; and the third was still in English hands at Henry's death, but was returned to French control within four years, once again for a price that just covered the cost of its fortification, but was dwarfed by the £1,000,000 or more spent on its defence in the six years since its capture.

  • 2 Michael L. BUSH, «Tax reform and rebellion in Tudor England», History, t LXXVI, 1991, p. 379400.
  • 3 Roger S. SCHOFIELD, «Taxation and the political limits of the Tudor state», in Law and Government (...)
  • 4 Christopher E. CHALLIS, The Tudor coinage, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1978, p. 303-3 (...)

2Henry's efforts to fund these ventures were forceful and ingenious, but alarming for his contemporaries and damaging to his successors. Innovations in taxation caused revolts in 1513 and 1525 and contributed to widespread rebellion in 15362. More insidiously, repeated levies brought a noticeable decline in the accuracy of assessment by the end of the reign: in one sample, assessments of taxpayers' wealth for the subsidy declined from 48,7 % of the valuation of their goods at death for probate in 1524-1542, to 32,2% in 1546-15473, and this «decay of the subsidy» went on to dog Henry's children and their ministers. Extensive lands and sumptuous goods were confiscated from the monasteries, only to be dissipated almost at once on fruitless campaigns. England's medieval legacy of high-quality coinage was abandoned in a brief orgy of debasement, lowering the silver content of the current issues from 92,5 % in 1541 to 25% in 1551, and generating economic and commercial disruption and steep inflation4. When combined with large-scale borrowing at high interest rates on the Antwerp money market, the result of all these measures was a short-term financial crisis which English governments struggled to surmount for two decades after Henry's death, and a longer-term incapacity to fund sustained warfare or expanding government, on which many historians have blamed the collapse of the monarchy in the mid-seventeenth century. Henry has a great deal to answer for; and there is little, it would seem, to be said in his defence. It is as though Louis XIV had fought all his wars with their attendant ill-effects, failed to establish the Bourbons in Spain, and left France's frontiers exactly as he found them, with the exception of capturing Lille, only for it to be sold back to the Habsburgs in 1718 with its Vauban citadel included in the price.

3Moreover, Henry clearly chose to make war. As he showed in 1536, it was quite possible for him to stay out of the conficts between Francis I and Charles V as they struggled for mastery of continental politics in general and Italian politics in particular. The kings of France were happy to pay substantial pensions to Henry and his councillors to secure their neutrality in the conflict between Habsburg and Valois, as they had to Henry's predecessors since 1475; and they rarely even considered threatening England's possession of her remaining continental outpost at Calais. Even when frontier disputes or attempts to enforce English hegemony over her neighbour drew Henry into war with the Scots, it was not impossible to separate France from her ancient ally Scotland and avoid war on two fronts, as he showed in the small border war of 1532-1534 and the continuation of the war in Scotland after the Anglo-French peace of 1546. Henry chose war; but why?

4Some degree of aggression towards the continental powers might be justified by the maxim that attack was the best means of defence. Henry VII had mounted large though abortive campaigns against France in 1492 and Scotland in 1497, and indulged in sabre-rattling in the last years of his reign, apparently with the primary aim of deterring foreign interference in his domestic political security or the succession of his son. Such interference, ranging from mild favour to pretenders to full-scale invasion, had been all too frequent in the troubled politics of later medieval England-in 1216, 1326, 1399, 1470-1471 and 1485 - and would come close again in 1553 and in the Spanish-backed plots against Elizabeth. Under Henry VIII the threat of foreign support for Yorkist claimants was not dead, and at least in wartime Richard de la Pole, the «White Rose», received French support and showed some signs of stirring trouble in his native East Anglia before his death at Pavia. Yet the scale of Henry's foreign ventures was far out of proportion to the threat to internal stability represented by the Yorkists; and when England's security was genuinely menaced by the rapprochement between Francis I and Charles V in 1538-1540 and the plans for a crusade against Henry's schism, his reaction was profoundly defensive: he spent vast sums fortifying the coastline and sought otherwise distasteful alignment with the German Lutherans.

  • 5 Paul L. HUGHES and fames F. LARKIN, ed, Tudor Royal Proclamations, New Haven and London, Yale Univ (...)
  • 6 Sir John HACKETT, The Letters of Sir John Hackett 1526-1534, ed. Elizabeth F. ROGERS, Morgantown, (...)

5At times Henry's militancy served a comprehensible role in his broader diplomatic aims. His plans to attack the Netherlands in 1527-1528 were an extension of economic warfare calculated to produce an internal collapse in the Habsburgs' most vulnerable territories, and thus force Charles V to relent in his opposition to Henry's divorce from the Emperor's aunt Catherine of Aragon. Likewise his military cooperation with Charles in 1543-1544 served as a conspicuous rehabilitation of the Defender of the Faith (and Supreme Head of the Church of England) as an acceptable ally for the Catholic King and Holy Roman Emperor, rather than the schismatic pariah he had been in 1538-1540. For that reason it had to be seen to be done with enthusiasm and effect. On occasion Henry also thought in terms of using England's military resources to inhibit the establishment of an unhealthy dominance by one continental power or the other. In 1512-1513 he denounced the «inordinate appetite» and «damnable ambition» of Louis XII5, while in the later 1520s he reckoned it, as acute observers in the Netherlands noted, «not convenient for the wealth of Christendom» that Charles V «should have all his will and mind of the king of France and elsewhere, like as he desires to have, for he should wax too great a lord»6. Yet Henry was no dedicated exponent of balance-of-power politics, as he showed in 1525. His first reaction to Pavia was not to swing his support behind a stricken France, but to propose her partition with Charles V.

  • 7 Edward POWELL, Kingship, law and society: criminal justice in the reign of Henry V, Oxford, Claren (...)
  • 8 Colin F. RICHMOND, «1485 And All That or what was going on at the battle of Bosworth?», in Richard (...)

6Perhaps it is wrong to evaluate war solely as an instrument of foreign policy: does Henry's reign demonstrate that it was a function of Primat der Innenpolitik? The experience of his predecessors might suggest it Henry V linked the organization of his French campaigns intimately with his drive to impose justice at home, composing feuds between noblemen and gentlemen and drawing them together in military comradeship, prosecuting them for their offences but offering them pardons in return for their service in war7. In 1472 a royal spokesman in Parliament made the connection between war abroad and peace at home quite explicit: «And be it well remembered how that it is not well possible, nor hath been since the Conquest, that justice, peace, and prosperity hath continued any while in this land in any king's days but in such as have made war outward»8. He followed this general assertion with no fewer than eight historical examples. Henry's wars, for the most part stately processions across France culminating in long and tedious sieges, could not substitute for the excitements and profits of violent territorial disputes at home in the same way as the chevauchées of the Hundred Years War. Yet they did provide employment for some of the potentially disruptive elements in society, such as the runaway apprentices who sought adventure in the skirmishes around Calais in the 1520s, and for many of Henry's greater subjects they gave opportunity for loyal and effective service which smoothed their relationship with the king.

  • 9 The Gardyners Passetaunce..., op. cit., p. 27.
  • 10 John SKELTON, The Complete English Poems, ed. J. SCATTERGOOD, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983, p. 359 (...)
  • 11 There is, to my knowledge, no modem edition.

7Such opportunities may have been especially useful in the context of the renegotiation of the relationship between crown and nobility implicit in much of Henry's domestic policy, as in that of his father: the centralization of justice in the royal prerogative courts, the tighter regulation of retaining, the continuing expansion of direct contact between the crown and the county élites of gentry, the exploitation of noblemen's debts to the crown as a tool of political control, the decline of the Great Council as a consultative body, and the exclusion of peers from automatic access to the restructured Privy Council Meanwhile, among a wider public, Henry's warmongering may have reinforced the tendencies towards the consolidation of a national state most evident in the break with Rome. His wartime propaganda may seem crass to us, ranging from the none too subtle symbolism of The Gardyners passetaunce Touchyng the outrage of Fraunce (1512) - in which the «freshness and most pleasant odour» of the red rose is contrasted with the evil smell of the presumptuous lily, which «noyeth the smellers as they by him walk»9 - to the rambling abuse of John Skelton's Howe the Douty Duke of Albany lyke a cowarde knyght, ran awaye shamfully with an hundred thousande tratlande Scottes and faint harted Frenchemen (1523)10. Yet such works probably had at least as much public appeal as the equally rumbustious polemic of the early Protestant reformers, and for the more sophisticated reader there were Latin treatises justifying resistance to Louis XII's schism (the conciliabulum of Pisa in 1511) earlier in the reign, and later the humanist Richard Morison's Exhortation to Styrre all Englyshemen to the Defence of theyr Countrye (1539)11. Englishmen who occasionally rioted against foreigners and generally agitated against any plans for a royal marriage which might result in a foreign king-as in 1527-1528, 1553-1554 and 1579 - provided an attentive readership for such material. Yet their reluctance te pay wartime taxes and their tendency to desert from Henry's armies suggest that the mobilization of national feeling through war was patchy at best.

8If the drive to weld a nation through war was not a dominating factor in Henry's policy, perhaps the need to satisfy those influential about the king himself was. Certainly some of his intimate servants and ministers benefited from his wars. Some did so directly: William Compton, groom of the stool and head of the Privy Chamber staff, fitted out a ship to prey on French commerce in 1513. More usually the rewards were indirect, in the patronage which military command made available to the councillors and courtiers who led Henry's armies and fleets and stacked them with their friends, relations and clients; or in the king's gifts to his generals. The latter included promotion within or into the peerage, from the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk created in 1514 for their roles in the battle of Flodden and the capture of Tournai, to Lord Poynings, ennobled in 1545 on his appointment as lieutenant of Boulogne. More material rewards were also available, as Suffolk found in 1545 when his three years of campaigning against Scotland and France were recognized by the special favour of buying monastic lands from the crown at one-third the normal price. Yet Henry's commanders in wartime were also his leading councillors in peacetime, and were significantly rewarded for less martial services: they had no overwhelming interest in urging Henry into war. Painstaking attempts to reconstruct the political history of Henry's court find it hard to identify clear war and peace parties except at the margins of politics, as among the pacifist humanist intellectuals of the early years of the reign. And in any case, what little clear evidence does survive about Henry's decision-making suggests that the king took a clearer and better-informed role in matters of foreign affairs than in any other business of state, religion occasionally excepted. To understand Henry's wars we must examine his attitude to war and the culture that shaped it, a culture largely shared and reinforced by the courtiers, councillors and commanders who surrounded him.

9The court in which Henry grew up was the centre of a major revival of the cult of chivalry. In the last years of Henry VII's reign, when the future Henry VIII was aged between ten and seventeen, there were at least thirteen tournaments at court Many featured young courtiers who would emerge as royal favourites in the next reign, and latterly some included Henry, Prince of Wales himself. Long before, in 1494, Henry had been created earl marshal, the national arbiter in questions of honour: initially this was doubtless a ploy of Henry VII's to keep a sensitive post under close royal control, but as the prince grew into his dignities it may have awakened his interest in such matters. By the end of his father's reign even his younger sister Mary was drawn into the world of courtly chivalry, presiding over jousts as Lady of the May and receiving poems in the idiom of courtly love pledging loyalty to the Tudors, like those penned by the swooning courtiers of Elizabeth I. For the grim usurper Henry VII such foibles must have been reckoned worthwhile in terms of political expediency, exploiting the ideals of loyal service among a chivalrous nobility to underpin the stability of his house, and advertising his might to observers at home and abroad in the international language of Burgundian magnificence. But there are also clear signs that Henry VII's chivalry was more than a tool. He provided equipment and prizes for feats of arms even when they served no overtly propagandist purpose, and often judged tournaments even though he - a prematurely aged and profoundly worried man in his last decade - did not fight in them as his son did. Moreover, those who did participate in Henry VII's tournaments, often with manic enthusiasm, included his closest intimates at court, men who had shared his exile in Brittany and France (some themselves Bretons), men who hunted with him and at times carried out trusted tasks in his government.

  • 12 Gordon KIPLING, The Triumph of Honour: Burgundian origins of the Elizabethan Renaissance, The Hagu (...)
  • 13 David R. STARKEY, ed., Henry VIII: a European Court in England, London, Collins & Brown, 1991, p. (...)

10In its style, early Tudor chivalry was an import from the court of Burgundy, but in its substance it drew heavily on England's own past. Henry VII's great palace at Richmond was decorated with statues of English kings «appearing like bold and valiant knights»12, and in Henry VIII's reign the Tudors' martial predecessors loomed larger still. He was an enthusiastic patron of Edward Ill's Order of the Garter, attending its ceremonies, stressing the knightly credentials of those elected into membership, and - a real sign of commitment in a king who loathed paperwork - altering a draft of revisions to the statutes in his own hand. Yet as a model for Henry VIII, even Edward III was outshone by Henry V. Iconographic evidence for Henry's identification with his namesake has been found in the Garter's register, where the Lancastrian king is depicted with the Tudor's features, an honour accorded to other royal paragons to whom Henry VIII liked to compare himself, notably King David in Henry's private psalter13. Many of Henry's actions point in the same direction: he imitated Henry V to mould himseif as another triumphant son of a troubled usurper. Like Henry, he began by mercifully reconciling dynastic rivals to his rule, but on the eve of his invasion of France in 1513 he executed the imprisoned Yorkist Edmund de la Pole in an echo of the fate of the Southampton plotters of 1415. On campaign he walked round his camp at night encouraging the watches, as Henry was recorded to have done; after his conquest of Tournai he distributed French estates to his lieutenants, in this case a castle to Charles Brandon. He invited the Emperor of his day to visit England, as Henry had welcomed Sigismund, and set himself up as a defender of the Church, if needs be of the English church against papal power, as Henry had backed the Council of Constance and resisted Beaufort's elevation to the cardinalate. He used the Lancastrian red rose rather than the red and white Tudor rose in his war propaganda, and he even seems to have staged a confrontation with John Colet’s Christian pacifism to mirror that of Henry V with St Vincent Ferrer. The message seems to have caught the imagination of his subjects. Henry was presented with an English translation of a Latin biography of his namesake in 1513; by the 1530s the Calais garrison was holding an annual procession to celebrate Agincourt; and twice in that decade a poem about the same battle found its way into print.

11Looser parallels might be drawn with Edward III, and perhaps were by Henry and his contemporaries. Edward had besieged Tournai and failed; Henry did better. Edward had cultivated an international retinue of chivalrous heroes, Germans and Flemings as well as his own English and Gascon subjects, to reflect his own prowess; for similar reasons Henry made much of such men as Guyot de Heulle, «an esquire of Burgundy», who took part in feats of arms at his court, received knighthood at his hands, led troops in five English armies between 1511 and 1523, and was granted in reward a pension of £100. Likewise, Henry rewarded many of the mercenary captains who served in his last wars, establishing a network of English pensioners among the international military fraternity.

  • 14 Walter C. TREVELYAN, ed, «Accounts of Henry VIII's expedition into France, A.D. 1513», Archaeologi (...)
  • 15 Edward HALL, Hall's Cronicle, ed. Sir Henry ELLIS, London, J. Johnson, 1809, p. 609.
  • 16 John SKELTON, op. cit., p. 111.

12Henry, then, was a king engaged in a double contest for honour. He felt himself to be in competition with his contemporaries - above all with Francis I, with whom his relationship veered from undying brotherhood to deadly feud as though they were two knights in a romance - to be acclaimed as «the most valiant prince under heaven»14, as an enthusiastic reporter on the 1513 campaign hailed him. But he also felt the need to prove himself against his predecessors, to be «the most goodliest prince that ever reigned over the realm of England» in the words of the chronicler Edward Hall15, «king most sovereign / That ever England had» in those of the poet John Skelton16. In Henry's mind, as no doubt in that of other rulers of his day, the wild individualism of chivalry, which had largely been tamed amongst his subjects and channelled into the service of the state, was allowed free rein.

  • 17 State Papers, King Henry the Eighth, London, Record Commission, 1830-1852, 11 vol., vol. I, p. 135
  • 18 BL, Cotton MSS, Vespasian CIV, f° 140 (L.P., vol. IV, 2, no 3152).

13Henry's historically-minded sense of honour led him to lay particular stress on his duty to recover the French lands lost by his forbears. Those around him looked back not just to the disasters of Henry VI's reign, but over three centuries to the French conquest of Normandy from King John, and Henry responded by frequent discussion of plans to attack Normandy and Guienne rather than the more accessible area north of the Somme. In 1523, indeed, in proposing the more practical alternative, Wolsey had to counter Henry's inclinations with the argument that «all that is on this side the water of Somme... should be as honourable and beneficial unto His Grace, and also more tenable, than all Normandy, Gascony and Guienne»17. Like Edward III, Henry was prepared at the right price to trade away such inherited claims, even that to the French throne, but their recurrence nevertheless set his relations with France, regularly paired with the Scots in his public pronouncements as England's «ancient enemies», on a very different footing from those with the Habsburgs. In his one military confrontation with the latter house, he found his own ambassador in Spain reminding him in shocked tones that «this amity between the houses of England, Burgundy and Castile is ancient and hitherto inviolate, founded upon long line in old blood, in which being evermore to this day devoid of all quarrels and demands, for none of them hath against the other any titles, cannot be a matter of breach and dissension, specially to mortal war»18. That Henry took such claims seriously is also suggested by his behaviour in 1513, when he surrendered Thérouanne to Maximilian as a Burgundian possession, but kept hold of Tournai under his own claim to the French throne. By the end of his reign, however, realism does seem to have been creeping into his diplomacy and strategy alike: in 1543 he offered to exchange his title to Guienne for Charles V's claim to the Somme towns, and in 1544 he calmly forgot his promises to advance on Paris in concert with Charles, and concentrated on the capture of Boulogne instead, imitating the many allies who had pursued their own ends at his expense in the past In the scales of honour, even the righting of ancient wrongs was outweighed by glorious conquest.

  • 19 State Papers, King Henry the Eighth, op. cit., vol. I, p. 168.

14Less martial aspects of Henry's foreign policy also met the demands of honour, notably his attempts to arbitrate peace among his brother monarchs in 1518 and 1526-1528. In 1526 Wolsey, the manager of these diplomatic campaigns, assured the king that to «have in your hands the conducing of the universal peace in Christendom» [would be] «to your great merit, high laud, and perpetual renown»19. Similarly, it pleased Henry to pose as the protector of the Netherlands in 1513 and 1522, combining the honour of official recognition of his powerful benevolence towards England's continental neighbour with the practical benefits for trade and alliance against France. In Scotland too, Henry liked to be seen as a kindly protector of the best interests of his sister Queen Margaret and nephew James V, though James found Henry's advice on how to run his country insufferably patronizing, sensing behind it the ancient claims to English overlordship that Henry reasserted in time of war. Honour might thus be pursued by peaceful means, but was ultimately hard to divorce from military achievement; all the more so for Henry, who did not have opportunities to establish a military record in defence of his throne as his father had done in 1485, 1487 and 1497.

  • 20 L.P., vol. 1,2, no 1884.
  • 21 State Papers, King Henry the Eighth, op. cit., vol. I, p. 281.

15The demands of honour not only drove Henry towards war, but gave his wars that bloated quality so evident in their cost. Honour did not admit of half-heartedness: as Henry's ambassador Sir Robert Wingfield told Maximilian in 1513, Henry was not «so light or of so little resolution as to arm... at all pieces, and then call for a pillow»20. Even wars entered reluctantly must be fought on a respectable scale: as Henry himself told Wolsey in 1528, «seeing he must algates [in any case] to the war, he would do it substantially, and as it should be done»21. In such a scheme of values, to campaign in splendid force was itself an achievement, a display of princely magnificence comparable to the construction of a palace or the celebration of a Field of Cloth of Gold. Meanwhile Henry's fascination with military technology, and especially with shipbuilding, made war as much an exercise of the royal intellect as were his ventures into theology.

16In one sense, then, conquest was irrelevant to the accumulation of honour, as Francis I's comment after his crushing defeat at Pavia - that he had lost everything save his honour and his life - neatly demonstrated. Yet victories and territorial aggrandizement did matter, and were eagerly sought. Major annexations of French territory proved impossible for Henry, but his hopes were perhaps not as unrealistic as we might think. The English position in 1327 and 1413, at the accessions of Edward III and Henry V, had been not much stronger than that in 1509: the earlier kings retained a rump of Guienne but did not dispose of financial resources on the scale of Henry's, while the construction of Charles V's unwieldy but vast empire promised a revolution in continental politics from which Henry might well hope to profit Provincial disaffection of the sort recurrently reported to Henry from Normandy, Brittany and Guienne, or noble revolt of the sort attempted by Bourbon, seemed as ripe for Henry's exploitation as they had been for that of his predecessors. In 1523 indeed, despite Bourbon's ineffectiveness, Henry's army broke through the line of strongpoints on the Somme and threatened Paris, only for mutinies, freezing weather and bickering with Charles's forces from the Netherlands to cripple the campaign. There was always enough prospect of success to convince Henry's hard head - he predicted all the disasters that afflicted the invasion of 1523 - to follow his quixotic heart.

  • 22 Christopher LLOYD and Simon THURLEY, Henry VIII: Images of a Tudor King, Oxford, Phaidon Press, 19 (...)
  • 23 Stephen GARDINER, The Letters of Stephen Gardiner, ed. James A. MULLER, Cambridge, Cambridge Unive (...)
  • 24 David S. CHAMBERS, Cardinal Bainbridge in the Court of Rome, 1509 to 1514, Oxford, Oxford Universi (...)
  • 25 Bernard S. CAPP, Astrology and the Popular Press: English almanacs, 1500-1800, London and Boston, (...)

17Henry may also have been cheated of conquests by the stress on the glories of open battle among contemporary chivalrous theorists. His armies tended to wander aimlessly through France waiting for an Agincourt, Crécy or Poitiers which his opponents were not willing to provide, and his only consolation was to make an enormous fuss of the battle of the Spurs, his one victory over the French in the open field, commissioning at least two surviving panel paintings depicting the event22. If he were to conquer by unromantic siegecraft, however, he was well aware of the most suitable target. He contemplated a siege of Boulogne in 1513, 1514, 1522 and 1523, just as he demanded its cession in negotiation with the French in 1525 and 1543. In 1544 he made very sure of its capture, detailing two of his senior commanders to pursue a forlorn siege of Montreuil merely to screen his own activities from the enemy. His success gave him, in Bishop Gardiner's words, the «name, fame, honour and renown»23 he craved, qualities Francis I and Henry II were evidently keen to deny him by a rapid reconquest; qualities he was determined to preserve by fighting Francis to a costly draw even after Charles V abandoned the war in the treaty of Crépy. The capture of Boulogne gave the ageing king the glory that he had last tasted following the victories of 1513. Then he had looked for the plaudits of Europe and received them in the assurance from Rome that «his glory is... esteemed to be immortal»24. Now he won recognition from the chorus of history, not in the dry profit-and-loss accountancy of modem academics, but in the celebrations of national achievement absorbed by the subjects of his seventeenth-century successors. In the chronological tables of the printed almanacs which were the staple reading of that age, the capture of Boulogne was by far the most frequently cited event of Henry's reign. Often it was the only event mentioned between those more recognizable landmarks of 1066 and 158825. Henry would doubtless have felt vindicated by such statistics; for those of us who question even the significance of 1066 and 1588, he would have had nothing but pity or scorn.

Notes

1 Jean DU BELLAY, Ambassades en Angleterre de jean du Bellay. La première ambassade (septembre 1527-février 1529), correspondance diplomatique, éd. Victor-Louis BOURRILLY et Pierre DE VAISSIÈRE, Paris, A. Picard (Archives de l'histoire religieuse de la France), 1905, p. 266. General surveys of Henry's foreign policy include Richard B. WERNHAM, Before the Armada: the growth of English foreign policy, 1485-1588, London, Jonathan Cape, 1966 and John J. SCARISBRICK, Henry VIII, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968. Most of my argument in this paper is substantiated at greater length in the following articles, where fuller references will be found: «The French wars of Henry VIH» in The Origins of war in early modern Europe, ed. Jeremy M. BLACK, Edinburgh, John Donald, 1987, p. 28-51; «Chilvary and the politics of the early Tudor court», in Chivalry in the Renaissance, ed. Sydney ANGLO, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 1990, p. 107-128; «Wolsey's foreign policy and the domestic crisis of 1527-8», in Cardinal Wolsey: church, state and art, ed. S. J. GUNN and Phillip G. LINDLEY, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 149-177; «The courtiers of Henry VU», EHR, t CVIII, 1993, p. 23-49.

2 Michael L. BUSH, «Tax reform and rebellion in Tudor England», History, t LXXVI, 1991, p. 379400.

3 Roger S. SCHOFIELD, «Taxation and the political limits of the Tudor state», in Law and Government under the Tudors: Essays presented to Sir Geojfrrey Elton on his retirement, ed Claire CROSS, David LOADES and John J. SCARISBRICK, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 250.

4 Christopher E. CHALLIS, The Tudor coinage, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1978, p. 303-306.

5 Paul L. HUGHES and fames F. LARKIN, ed, Tudor Royal Proclamations, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964-1969, 3 vol., vol. I, no 73. The Gardyners Passetaunce (c. 1512), ed. Franklin B. WILLIAMS Jr., London, The Roxburghe Club, 1985, p. 3.

6 Sir John HACKETT, The Letters of Sir John Hackett 1526-1534, ed. Elizabeth F. ROGERS, Morgantown, West Virginia University Library, 1971, p. 98.

7 Edward POWELL, Kingship, law and society: criminal justice in the reign of Henry V, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.

8 Colin F. RICHMOND, «1485 And All That or what was going on at the battle of Bosworth?», in Richard III: loyalty, lordship and law, ed. Peter W. HAMMOND, London, Richard III and Yorkist History Trust 1986, p. 187.

9 The Gardyners Passetaunce..., op. cit., p. 27.

10 John SKELTON, The Complete English Poems, ed. J. SCATTERGOOD, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983, p. 359-372.

11 There is, to my knowledge, no modem edition.

12 Gordon KIPLING, The Triumph of Honour: Burgundian origins of the Elizabethan Renaissance, The Hague, Leiden University Press, 1977, p. 59.

13 David R. STARKEY, ed., Henry VIII: a European Court in England, London, Collins & Brown, 1991, p. 95; Pamela TUDOR-CRAIG, «Henry VIII and King David», in Early Tudor England: proceedings of the 1987 Harlaxton symposium, ed. Daniel T. WILLIAMS, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 1986, p. 183-205.

14 Walter C. TREVELYAN, ed, «Accounts of Henry VIII's expedition into France, A.D. 1513», Archaeologia, t XXVI, 1836, p. 476.

15 Edward HALL, Hall's Cronicle, ed. Sir Henry ELLIS, London, J. Johnson, 1809, p. 609.

16 John SKELTON, op. cit., p. 111.

17 State Papers, King Henry the Eighth, London, Record Commission, 1830-1852, 11 vol., vol. I, p. 135.

18 BL, Cotton MSS, Vespasian CIV, f° 140 (L.P., vol. IV, 2, no 3152).

19 State Papers, King Henry the Eighth, op. cit., vol. I, p. 168.

20 L.P., vol. 1,2, no 1884.

21 State Papers, King Henry the Eighth, op. cit., vol. I, p. 281.

22 Christopher LLOYD and Simon THURLEY, Henry VIII: Images of a Tudor King, Oxford, Phaidon Press, 1990, p. 4449.

23 Stephen GARDINER, The Letters of Stephen Gardiner, ed. James A. MULLER, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 180.

24 David S. CHAMBERS, Cardinal Bainbridge in the Court of Rome, 1509 to 1514, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 50.

25 Bernard S. CAPP, Astrology and the Popular Press: English almanacs, 1500-1800, London and Boston, Faber & Faber, 1979, p. 218.

Auteur

Merton College, Oxford

© Publications de l’Institut de recherches historiques du Septentrion, 1995

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