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Eaux, pauvreté et crises sociales

Habib Ayeb
Thierry Ruf

Encarts spéciaux. Témoignages des ONG

Water Access Constraint in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)

Basema Bashir

Texte intégral


1As this paper is prepared for publication, the second Intifada, which erupted on September 28th, 2000, will be entering its sixth year. The already brutal Occupation in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) has further magnified in this second Intifada, under the usual pretenses and lead by ideology and policy that together seek to control maximum Palestinian land. The intensification of land and resource control by the Occupation in the 1967 OPT has had an overwhelming impact on all Palestinian natural as well as socio–economic resources. Violations of Palestinian rights are being carried out on daily—in fact, in each passing moment-basis included in which is the right to clean and ample water as well as adequate sanitation and hygiene that are affected in a very clear way and in all Palestinian communities during the current situation. The violation of this essential right, which since 1948 and then again since 1967 has been systematically assaulted, is directly causing a social and public health crisis, which is only one of the major sectors affected during occupation and more severely during the current Intifada. The large-scale expansion and creation of new settlements, particularly since the Oslo Accords, are synonymous with Occupation appropriation of Palestinian lands and water resources, and which is only accelerating with the building of the Wall.

2The Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), as a leading Palestinian NGO working in the water sector, has undertaken the responsibility of monitoring the impact of the current crisis on the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WaSH) situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip examining the extent to which this sector could be affected under the deteriorated, political, social and economic conditions in the OPT. Therefore, in June 2002, PHG has launched its Monitoring Program (MP) in order to define the main constraints facing Palestinians. Such constraints can be grouped under three subtitles, natural, political and economic constraints respectively.

3The natural constraints are represented in the natural water scarcity in the region in general and in the OPT in particular. Total groundwater replenishment capacity is nearly 672 mcm/Year in the West Bank, as agreed under Oslo Interim agreement (1994) and it is nearly 60 mcm/Year in Gaza.

4The political constraints represented in the Israeli control of both ground and surface water resources in the OPT. Despite the fact that nearly 50% of the regional groundwater potential (nearly 1.5 bcm) occurs in the West Bank, Palestinians are allocated only 25% of such potential. In the meantime, they are not allocated any drop from the Jordan River, while previous allocation plans (i., e. Johnston – 1955) allocated the West Bank some 200 mcm/Year. Furthermore, the current restrictions imposed on access to water supply, destruction of water infrastructure occurred during the past five years, the physical limitations imposed on the supply infrastructure and the water confiscation, resulted from the construction of the Separation Wall, have all negatively influenced the water availability to Palestinian people.

5The economic constraints represented in the increasing unemployment rate and the drop in GNP which is caused by the current Israeli restriction on movement and access to job. This in turn has increased the number of Palestinian families who are not able to pay their water bills which led to increase the debt of the local councils toward the bulk water suppliers and hence, weakened their capacity to upgrade and operate the water infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza efficiently. The unaccounted for losses are still more than 45% in some areas.

6Furthermore, the unavailability of wastewater collection and treatment systems in the rural areas and some 40% of urban areas increases the potential threat of water quality deterioration of the limited resources. Furthermore, the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank are discharging the untreated wastewater into the nearby valleys and open spaces which worsen the situation further.

7Having listed such constraints, it is expected that per capita fresh water availability may not exceed 250m3/year in the OPT under any optimistic scenario of water allocation. This rate classifies the OPT as a region with absolute water stress, where water unavailability is considered a limiting factor of social and economic development, Falkenmark (1993). Furthermore, meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, where the largest-ever gathering of the world leaders took place, will be a very challenging task, if possible at all.

8This paper focuses on the recent acceleration of water control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and its implications on the Palestinian communities and their access to clean, ample water.

Carte 1. Water sources in Palestine

Carte 1. Water sources in Palestine

Current status of water supply in Palestine

9Communities that are both connected and not connected to water networks face difficulties in access to major sources of water in Palestinian 1967 Occupied Territories. It should be emphasized here that in communities connected to water networks, the conditions of old networks are a major issue, and where the problem precedes the current Intifada, spanning the duration of the Israeli occupation of the 1967 OPT as the water sector was completely neglected by the Israeli Occupation. This is reflected in the severe neglect of the water infrastructure and networks during the past several years. In general, water networks need regular maintenance in order to function properly and as networks age, their quality diminishes significantly, especially without necessary upkeep. However, for Palestinian communities and during the current crisis, more often, maintenance teams were not able to reach communities to perform necessary work mainly due to the access restrictions imposed by Israeli forces (curfew and closure).

10According to survey conducted in the past year, it was realized that 69% of the communities are connected to water supply networks. However, network coverage is not fully in most of these communities. 165 communities have leaking water networks, 5 communities with leaking and bad water networks, in addition to 87 communities with water networks in bad condition. In addition, most of the surveyed communities reported poor conditions of the water networks. The average age of water networks in these communities is about 18 years. Some 39% of them have water networks of over 20 years old. Figure 1 shows the different communities with various ages of network in the West Bank and Gaza.

Figure 1. Age of water network in surveyed communities

Figure 1. Age of water network in surveyed communities

11Meanwhile, communities that have water networks face continued problems due to the control by and forced dependency on the Israeli water supplier, Mekorot, which routinely cuts services and limits supply to Palestinian communities (see Figure 2). People in these communities expected that this situation will worsen and affect even more communities during the 2005 summer months. As this was in fact the case, more communities relied on water tankers. Mekorot controls Palestine’s confiscated water resources and severely restricts the amount of water available to the majority of communities. According to Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), the total quantity of water supplied to Palestinian communities by Mekorot is approximately 32.1 mcm/year, which is equivalent to 53% of the total quantity supplied to Palestinians in the West Bank. About 13.8 mcm of this water supply actually comes directly from wells within the West Bank (9.22 mcm come from WBWD wells and 4.6 from Israeli wells in the WB), while the remainder (including supply to settlements, about 21.86 mcm) comes from wells drilled on the western side of the Green Line but taps the Western Aquifer Basin that is replenished mainly from the West Bank (PWA, 2002).

12Through the Joint Water Committee (JWC), the Israeli Occupation Forces continue to veto most Palestinian permit requests for water and sanitation projects. Hence, Palestinians are unable to access West Bank water resources and in general no permits are being given for the drilling of new wells. There are currently around 150 water and sanitation projects still pending JWC approval because of “technical and security reasons”. Donors are increasingly discouraged from funding this sector due to the threat of new infrastructures being destroyed by the Israeli military because of lack of “permits”, in addition to the long and complicated procedure of applying for permits through the JWC.

Figure 2. Reduction in Mekorot supply in Palestinian communities (June 2002 – July 2003)

Figure 2. Reduction in Mekorot supply in Palestinian communities (June 2002 – July 2003)

Note* Impact may shift over time. These figures reflect levels at some point during the reporting period.

13In communities that have no water networks, almost 31% of the 1967 OPT, rainwater harvesting in cisterns has become a main source of water supply. Although sufficient water was collected this winter due to a higher rainfall compared to recent years, the quality of this water remains a major concern taking into consideration that many cisterns still require rehabilitation. Water shortages, as in previous years, were greater during the summer months (July to September) where many communities, often the poorest, were forced to rely on more expensive water tankers. With no improvement in the economic situation, many Palestinian households are increasingly unable to pay their water bills or buy supplies from tankers. Limited domestic supplies inevitably adversely affect the health and hygiene of communities.

14It is worth noting here that in the 1967 OPT and during the current Intifada, reliance on agricultural production and livestock has increased, especially after complete closure and the cessation of work for Palestinian laborers in the Israeli market. Therefore, Palestinians have been forced to rely on agriculture as a major source of income for families whereas, in general, income has been dramatically decreasing in the West Bank and Gaza as poverty noticeably increases.

15Furthermore, the number of available water tankers owned by Local Councils is not enough to provide needed quantities of water for the community. This leaves the delivery of water in the hands of private tanker owners. The current political hardship and closure have complicated the water transport via tankers. It often encountered some life risks of the drivers and they were obliged to follow much longer roads to fetch water form any available source. This in turn has caused substantial increase in the water price. Figure 3 below illustrates the significant price increases that have occurred over the first three years of the current Intifada. The impact of such increase is even more dramatic when combined with the decrease in employment and income. According to the PCBS, poor households amount to 58.1% in the OPT. The number of poor Palestinians is more than 2.2 million: approximately 1.27 million in WB and 945,000 in GS. Every working individual supports 6.4 none-employed persons.

Table 1. Median monthly income, ninth round: April-June, 2004

Table 1. Median monthly income, ninth round: April-June, 2004

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004. Statistical Monitoring of the Socio-Economic Conditions of the Palestinian Society, (Second quarter, 2004). Ramallah - Palestine

16In the case of communities that are supplied with water through a water network, a high percentage of families in almost all of these surveyed communities cannot afford to pay their water bills, in many cases the percentage of these people has reached 100% or 99% of the households. On the other hand, the impact of closure and curfew on water shortage is particularly felt in communities that are not connected to a water network which usually buys water with a price several times higher than water through network.

17Average increase of water price at these communities is estimated at 8% of the median family income. This percentage has been calculated based on the following assumptions:

  • average family size is 7;

  • per capita water use is 50 l/c/d;

  • average increase in the price of one cubic meter of household water is 15 NIS/m3.

18Therefore, many communities are suffering from the very limited supply of water and the drop in per capita water use from the average daily per capita domestic water use of 50-70 liters to 7 l/c/d in Ad Deirat, Kharsa, and Al Heila in the Hebron Governorate.

Figure 3. Changes in cost of tankers before and during the Intifada (NIS) in surveyed communities

Figure 3. Changes in cost of tankers before and during the Intifada (NIS) in surveyed communities

No access to water: checkpoints and curfews

19Checkpoints and curfew have been, since the start of the Occupation but having particularly worsened since Oslo and now the second Intifada, the cause of severe restriction to movement, affecting water access and sanitation services in almost all Palestinian communities.

20During the current Intifada, the consequences of the scarce availability and cost of water tankers were tremendously felt, as tankers are the ones that transport water to communities that do not have water networks as well as to those communities that though having water networks are provided with insufficient and limited quantities of water through the network. This limited available water to communities with water networks is caused by either the reduction of the Occupation Mekorot-controlled water quantities that communities are forced to purchase (from confiscated water sources in most cases from the 1967 Occupied Territories); or when the available source of water managed by Palestinian entities is insufficient.

21Checkpoints are often central means in which the Occupation assaults and endangers health and hygiene in Palestinian communities. The majority of Palestinian communities do not have wastewater networks, and therefore depend predominantly on vacuum tankers for evacuation of wastewater from septic tanks and cesspits, to be evacuated in wadis or manholes of other communities that do have wastewater networks. Checkpoints cause delays and in many cases completely prevent the passage of these tankers—as well as tankers transporting solid waste—forcing them to turn back or find other alternative roads including dirt roads that are in bad condition and hard on vehicles. The risk faced by drivers on their lives and the longer route they are obliged to use have caused an increase in the price of water through tankers and the accumulation of solid waste nearby communities. Checkpoints are often the main cause of people’s inability to reach Public Health Centers, therefore affecting the entire public health situation.

22Checkpoints can be fixed or mobile. Fixed checkpoints are permanent military stations where all movement of people and vehicles is inspected and wholly limited in mobility. It affects all, including children, the elderly, the ill and disabled. Fixed checkpoints are visible throughout the 1967 Occupied Territories. Random criteria, unknown to Palestinians, are normally used to allow—or, that is, not allow—people and vehicles to pass. At times the Occupation criteria are related to age or acquisition of certain permits. Mobile or “flying” checkpoints on the other hand are put at any place and at any time and for different periods. Curfew is another form of restriction and humiliation, where people are forced to stay inside their homes as they are completely banned from movement, be it for several hours, days, or sometimes weeks.

23As a consequence of these restrictions on movement, people are forced to use secondary roads that are in most cases dirt roads and are hard on vehicles, making it difficult to reach the needed destination. This has had a direct effect on water prices through tankers and on wastewater evacuation. With the current high percentage of unemployment and poverty in the 1967 OPT, this has meant a serious and direct effect on the ability of people to get the required quantity and quality of water, therefore affecting the general hygiene and health situation in Palestinian communities.

24Earth mounds are another form of continuous harassment and purposeful obstacles placed by the Israeli Occupation Forces on Palestinians. On average, almost each Palestinian community suffers from this kind of closure, either directly at the entrance of the community or in nearby communities. This, of course, includes the closure by earth mounds of roads that lead to major urban areas; such roads are common and directly serve smaller communities throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

25The results of the survey conclude that mobile checkpoints were most severe in the northern West Bank and the central and southern parts of the Gaza Strip. In addition, one checkpoint can have consequences on water tankers, maintenance teams, as well as on access to Public Health Centers by community residents. It was found that 51%

26(331) of the WaSH MP surveyed communities were affected by mobile checkpoints, and that 10% (66) were affected severely by these checkpoints. It was also found that 31% (198) of the surveyed communities were affected by earth mounds, 15% (100) of which were highly/severely affected. Communities affected by curfew constitute about 37% (239) of the surveyed communities, and 9% (55) were highly affected.

Table 2. Sample of fixed checkpoints and communities affected during the survey period of the WaSH MP.

Table 2. Sample of fixed checkpoints and communities affected during the survey period of the WaSH MP.

Note* Impact may shift over time. These figures reflect levels at some point during the reporting period.

Military targeted destruction and settler brutality

27Occupation Forces incursions, destruction and damage to infrastructure, and settler harassment are all major parts of the daily reality of Palestinian life, particularly during the past five years of the Intifada, affecting all aspects of life. The water, sanitation and hygiene sector was overwhelmingly and severely targeted during this time.

28Although some improvements were seen in the overall water and sanitation situation in the 1967 OPT during 2005 with the relative decrease in widespread Israeli Occupation military destruction and damage of water and sewage networks through massive incursions, the cumulative effect of the destruction since the start of the Intifada, especially in Gaza and the northern part of the West Bank, continues to seriously affect water supplies and quality in numerous areas. Therefore, providing emergency water supplies and repairing damages, in addition to meeting basic Palestinian water needs, remain just as much a priority. Meanwhile, settler violence continues unhindered and is a major cause of destruction and damage in the 1967 OPT. Palestinians living nearby Occupation settlements are the most vulnerable and threatened by settler harassment and brutality. Settlers aim at forcing Palestinians to leave their lands and houses, with the goal of taking over and controlling further land and resources.

29Incursions into the Gaza Strip were constant during the past year of the survey. In the case of the wide-scale incursion into Beit Hanun in the Gaza Strip (population of about 31,000 capita), which began on July 28th 2004 and ended on August 5th 2004, massive damage was caused to the community. During the same period, incursions also took place in Beit Lahiya (Tal Al Za’tar) and Jabalya areas. During the incursion into Beit Hanun, all entrances to the area were shut down by the Occupation, which imposed a strict curfew on virtually the entire area, but particularly harshly in the southern and western parts of Beit Hanun. At the time and due to the incursion, there was a serious water shortage, which severely affected the following areas: the western area including Al Sekka street, Al Sultan Abdul Hameed area, and the western entrance of Beit Hanun near Salah Al Deen street; the eastern parts including Al Fartah, Al Nazazah, Al Masryeen street, Al Amal neighborhood, and Sharrab area; and the southern entrance of Beit Hanun in addition to the industrial area.

30Often, settler brutality can have the same consequences as checkpoints and even worse. Though there are endless examples of general violations to Palestinian lives in the face of settlements in relation to water and sanitation, the WaSH MP partially monitored this overwhelming reality in order to highlight their impacts. During the survey period, settler harassment was particularly harsh for the communities nearby the settlements of Shave Shomron and Qedumim in Nablus and Qalqiliya Governorates respectively, settlements built on the confiscated lands of many of these same communities. The Halmish settlement settlers continue to control the water supply of Bani Zeid Algharbyah community in Ramallah Governorate. The water supply of Bani Zeid Algharbyah services the following communities: Beit Reema, Deir Ghassaneh, Kufor Ein, Qarawet Bani Zeid, and An Nabi Salih with a total population of about 10,000. The water supply is controlled by/comes through Mekorot from a main line that runs nearby Halmish settlement while the Halmish settlers control the valve-opening on the water line and therefore completely determine the water supplied to all of the above communities.

31On August 15, 2004, settlers in Halmish completely closed the valve and therefore shut down the water supply to Bani Zeid Algharbyah. Settlers, protected by the Occupation Forces, prohibited the Bani Zeid Algharbyah municipality maintenance team from opening the valve to supply the needed water to the communities. The maintenance team was detained for several hours and their IDs as well as the keys for the main valve were confiscated. At the same time, settlers decreased the main line’s diameters from 4” to 3” to ensure a decreased supply of water to the Bani Zeid Algharbyh villages. The municipality contacted Mekorot to prevent this from happening; although on August 22 Mekorot opened the valve, immediately after its technicians left the scene, settlers closed it again. This was not the first time settlers closed the valve. During the same period, Mekorot claimed that they were doing maintenance work on the network and as well cut the supply to the communities.

32The case of these communities is not at all unique as many other communities that are supplied with water controlled by nearby settlements throughout the West Bank face the same problem: control of supply by Mekorot and settlers. Residents of these communities justifiably worry that in the near future, or at any time, the supply to them will be completely halted, which is especially assured in areas affected by the construction of the Apartheid Wall.

Table 3. Sample of water infrastructure damages during the past year of survey.

Table 3. Sample of water infrastructure damages during the past year of survey.

The WALL: confiscation, destruction, access and control

33One of the greatest disasters facing Palestinians is the construction of the WALL. Its effects are on all Palestinians and every aspect of their daily lives. Along with the massive construction itself, gates and permits are central elements of the Wall project in which the Occupation magnifies the closure and siege policy while forming, on the ground, the Palestinian open-air prisons that are to ensure massive land confiscation and mark the worsening reality of life under Occupation.

34Israel claims that the WALL is a temporary structure erected for “security purposes”, but overlay of the map of the WALL on a map of the West Bank's aquifers will clarify Israeli future plans. The path of the WALL runs with the main basin of the Western Aquifer; therefore, complete control over water resources is one of the major purposes of this WALL. To satisfy future needs, the Western Aquifer is the center of focus for Israel in relation to resource control. Consequently, the Israeli Occupation authorities have all along prohibited Palestinians from digging wells in those areas. Since 1993, only one Palestinian-controlled well was given a license to be dug in the Western Aquifer; on the other hand, Israeli officials publicly stressed the importance for Israel to maintain control over the mountainous regions of the West Bank located exactly over the Western Aquifer.

35The Western Aquifer is under the most fertile lands in the West Bank, thus water usage in the area is closely linked with agriculture production. With complete Israeli control over the Western Aquifer, Palestinian agriculture is to be — is already — targeted in the northern areas of the West Bank, leaving farmers with no choices. Communities living on or near the WALL’s path have been most tragically hit by the WALL in relation to access, water, sanitation and hygiene services. Most of the affected villages are unable to survive; and many are forced to become cheap labor in the nearby settlements or to look for alternative employment in other Palestinian communities. Nazlat ‘Isa, Baqa ash Sharqiya, ‘Khirbet Jubara, and many other communities affected by the WALL are facing the greatest suffering. Jayyus for example, just east of Qalqilya, has lost 72 percent of its irrigated land to the WALL, seven groundwater wells, and 300 families have lost 100 percent of their income. Therefore, the Israeli goal of control over Palestinian land is completely supported by these actions. All the while, communities isolated from their lands by the Wall face inaccessibility to the lands because of the WALL which has deemed these lands dry and useless.

36The impacts on water supply in the communities around the WALL are also of serious concern. The climate of Palestine is semi-arid, and water sources are precious. In villages around Qalqiliya and Tulkarem, more than 36 wells were lost due to the WALL’s construction. These wells, located in the Western Aquifer Basin, were dug before the 1967 Occupation. This loss of water resources due to the Wall has meant an 18 percent loss of available water quantities to Palestinian communities.

Conclusions and recommendations

37It can be concluded that complete and comprehensive ends to the Occupation, including the Palestinian control and rights over their water resources, in addition to the full removal of the WALL, are the basic solutions to all problems related to water access in the OPT.

38Other specific findings and recommendations:

  1. Ample and good quality water, at least of the minimum quantities assigned by the World Health Organization, must immediately be made available to all Palestinian communities. All checkpoints, fixed and mobile, must be removed in order to assure access to necessary water supply and other resources.

  2. Immediate attention must be directed toward the health crisis facing numerous Palestinian communities related to the poor and insufficient water supply. The currently devastating water and sanitation, hygiene situation has a direct impact on health in Palestinian communities. Reports of considerably high percentages of water-related diseases exemplify the need for a swift response to Israeli policies of closure, siege and the denial of resources and rights.

  3. All communities currently unconnected with water and wastewater networks, or with networks that are not functioning, must be equipped with functioning networks. Cisterns should only be seen as a secondary tool for water management since, in most cases, the quantity of water is only enough for part of the year (basically during winter time).

  4. The fact that large percentages of the Palestinian communities depend on Mekorot as a main water supplier, render them as vulnerable. The frequent water supply reductions to those communities need to be stopped. Until rights over water management are handed back to Palestinian control, Mekorot Water Company must increase supply levels in light of community needs and population increases. Mekorot Water Company “normal” water quantities to Palestinian communities have been the same since 1967 until before the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000, when the Company began reducing the supplied quantities and even completely stopping supply in some cases. Taking into consideration the increase in population, needs and standard of living, the “normal” quantities must be increased.

  5. The construction of the Separation WALL confiscated more than 36 Palestinian groundwater wells and hence reduced the available water to Palestinians by nearly 7 mcm/year. This of course is in complete negation of target # 10 of the MDG #7. In the time that this target calls for increasing the amounts of water supply and the percentages of served communities, the Israeli practice on the ground reduces available quantities further. Therefore Construction of the Wall must be stopped immediately, sections already built must be dismantled and people must be compensated for damages to land and resources lost. The WALL is a new version of an old plan, based on discrimination and land resource confiscation. The Western Aquifer, located almost entirely in the West Bank and among the most valuable water resources in the region, must be under Palestinian control in order to ensure consistent water supply to Palestinians.



Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 2004 – Statistical Monitoring of the Socio-Economic

Conditions of the Palestinian Society, (Second quarter, 2004). Ramallah-Palestine. Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG). Water and Sanitation, Hygiene Monitoring Program (WaSH MP)

Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), 2003 – Closure and Siege on the Occupied Palestinian Territories,

Over two Years of Devastation to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. Ramallah, Palestine. Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), 2004 – Water For Life, Israeli Assault in Palestinian Water, Sanitation and Hygiene During the Intifada. Ramallah, Palestine.

Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), 2002 – Water Supply in the West Bank for Year 2001.

UN Millennium Project, 2004 – Health, Dignity, and Development: What Will it Take?. Final Report of the Task Force on Water and Sanitation. New York.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs / occupied Palestinian territory website.

Table des illustrations

Titre Carte 1. Water sources in Palestine
Fichier image/jpeg, 80k
Titre Figure 1. Age of water network in surveyed communities
Fichier image/jpeg, 40k
Titre Figure 2. Reduction in Mekorot supply in Palestinian communities (June 2002 – July 2003)
Légende Note* Impact may shift over time. These figures reflect levels at some point during the reporting period.
Fichier image/jpeg, 64k
Titre Table 1. Median monthly income, ninth round: April-June, 2004
Légende Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004. Statistical Monitoring of the Socio-Economic Conditions of the Palestinian Society, (Second quarter, 2004). Ramallah - Palestine
Fichier image/jpeg, 52k
Titre Figure 3. Changes in cost of tankers before and during the Intifada (NIS) in surveyed communities
Fichier image/jpeg, 28k
Titre Table 2. Sample of fixed checkpoints and communities affected during the survey period of the WaSH MP.
Légende Note* Impact may shift over time. These figures reflect levels at some point during the reporting period.
Fichier image/jpeg, 264k
Titre Table 3. Sample of water infrastructure damages during the past year of survey.
Fichier image/jpeg, 51k


Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), Ramallah, West Bank – Palestine
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