Introduction

1Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, geopolitical developments have initiated a reorientation of the geopolitical centre of gravity southwards and eastwards, alongside a process of growth spurred by globalisation in emerging countries. Brazil has been one of the leading emerging countries in this period, as has South Africa, on the opposite edges of the South Atlantic basin. In parallel, in recent decades, Brazil has extended its jurisdictional rights over a vast maritime area with a potentially high level of natural resources. On both sides of the South Atlantic, expectations of economic development linked to maritime activities have risen. Brazil, South Africa and the Gulf of Guinea have begun to be configured as economic and political poles in a basin bordering a new continent – Antarctica – to be appropriated along with its waters.

2In geopolitical terms, the tropical Atlantic presents a marked political and geographical asymmetry between the South American and African coasts. The former is characterised by the territorial domination of a single country, Brazil, with an expansive continental and maritime area. The southeast Atlantic, on the other hand, is bordered by a mosaic of relatively small countries, with the exception of Angola and Namibia. Another geopolitical characteristic of the tropical Atlantic is its islands, which include: (1) a block of microstates in the northwest (Caribbean islands); (2) Brazil’s oceanic islands in the centre of the tropical basin; and (3) the presence of islands that are colonial remnants, which creates large jurisdictional zones around territories of non-coastal (former colonial) countries in the tropical belt.

3The maritime economy has enormous potential for development, particularly in the field of energy resources (Brazil and the Gulf of Guinea), biological resources – traditionally exploited by exogenous fishing powers – and the construction of port infrastructure, currently of little relevance, but which is set to grow, particularly in western Africa, in connection with the strong development potential of the Gulf of Guinea.

4At present, ocean governance in the South Atlantic is conditioned and limited by the lack of institutional development of coastal states, especially in the southeastern Atlantic basin, which is still dominated by fragile states, and in the southwestern basin, with its high number of island micro-states with limited ocean management capacity. In this context, Brazil, the largest maritime state in the region and the one with the greatest technical and institutional capacity to develop ocean governance, has the highest potential for leadership.

5The objective of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which the governance of the South Atlantic basin – where the expectations are high and the unknowns are many – could lead to the construction of a transatlantic community in the Southern Hemisphere, overcoming institutional structures with fragile transatlantic political, cultural and economic links. Although to date a strong network of common interests has not been built in the South Atlantic – unlike the Atlanticism in the North Atlantic – jurisdictional expansion requires coastal states to adopt maritime policies commensurate with the extent of territorial authority acquired. This chapter focuses on the maritime space that spans the two tropics, from the shores of Brazil to the coasts of the Gulf of Guinea. As in the case of the North Atlantic, the western edge is occupied by countries with a large geographical extent compared to the eastern edge, which is composed of mainly smaller countries, including the largest concentration of landlocked states in the world.

6The first section provides a description and analysis of the geomorphology of the tropical Atlantic, and the second discusses the existing maritime policies on each edge of the South Atlantic basin. A particular focus is given to the importance of maritime development and the degree of cohesion that may be possible for maritime governance in this tropical basin.

The geopolitical seascape of the South Atlantic

7Over the last 25 years, Brazil, other South American countries, and the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOPs) (Angola, Cabo Verde¹, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea, which recently adopted the language) have forged closer horizontal relations, with the aim of increasing cooperation and reducing asymmetries in areas of strategic interest, such as the South Atlantic. These relations are even closer in the maritime sphere, due to the entry into force on 16 November 1994 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows coastal states to acquire rights to use and protect living and non-living resources in their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and extended continental shelf (ECS).

8Many of the PALOPs are located near the Gulf of Guinea, an area characterised by the existence of hydrocarbon basins and other natural and mineral resources. At the same time, piracy and other transnational illicit activities, commonly referred to as “new threats”, occur all along the West African coast. These factors make them susceptible to being controlled by states with greater systemic power (Marroni, Castro and Violante, 2018). Brazil is included in this geopolitical equation, as the West African coast is part of Brazil’s eastern maritime frontier and also involves almost 95% of Brazil’s foreign trade conducted by sea (Brasil, 2020).

9In sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil is focusing on economic and military rapprochements with South Africa, Nigeria and Namibia, as well as with the PALOP countries, through the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). Brazil is also forging bilateral relations with South Africa within the Southern African Development Community and the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBAS) Forum established in 2004.

10Brazil’s presence in the CPLP can be analysed as having two advantages: (1) for Brazil, it can extend its interests abroad, while seeking to maximise all possible resources, including occupying larger spaces than other nations in this community; (2) for the other states, Brazilian foreign policy in conjunction with the CPLP can address global interests that would be impossible to achieve individually (Miyamoto, 2009).

Relations in the South Atlantic

11The current interest in the resources and potential of the South Atlantic Ocean is not an isolated fact, and even less a global novelty. On the contrary, this interest is part of a system of expansionism by great powers, which globalises actions in the geopolitical, economic and environmental context. Historically, the Atlantic Ocean, now politically divided into North and South to justify the sharing of natural resources, sea routes and naval power, has had a significant impact on the international system. The geostrategic shift to the new oceanic sphere in the South has led to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the continental shelf and a sea-based economy, with new investments in job training and naval technology (Marroni, 2013).

12In this regard, Brazil, Angola, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau – all members of the CPLP – as well as Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa, acquired greater potential relative power in the international system with the adoption of UNCLOS in 1994. Brazil and the coastal states of West Africa have shown that they possess privileged strategic positions, able to control large maritime expanses full of living and non-living resources.

13Yet the increase in the sovereignty of these states has made them more susceptible to new threats, including piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking and other international crimes, in addition to the constant threats from extra-regional powers. This new and evolving geopolitical context has led to proposals that the countries of the South Atlantic incorporate precepts related to their internal policies (internal sovereignty) and their external policies (external sovereignty) to safeguard defence and security. The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) is a good example of how this area is projecting itself in world geopolitics through the formation of treaties and political integration between Africa and South America. This zone, created in 1986, has also established fruitful relations with Argentina (Violante, 2017).

14In the 1990s, negotiations on a collective security pact along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) resurfaced in the South Atlantic basin, under the name of the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO), an idea that had been initially proposed in 1976 by the United States, Argentina and South Africa. In both periods, the Brazilian government of the time did not think that any external influence or deepening of military alliances at the regional level would contribute to national strategic objectives.

15In line with the development reality of emerging countries, according to Hill et al. (2011), multilateral cooperation in its various forms is on the agenda of large economic blocs in search of a new global governance – which would include ocean policy. However, from a conceptual point of view, the strategy of blocs or countries illustrates the same tension between efforts to strengthen effective multilateralism on the one hand, and efforts to establish privileged bilateral partnerships with various great powers on the other. Thus, in a globalised world, the United States and Russia, as well as Japan, China, Canada and India, are actual or potential strategic partners.

16The term BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) was coined in 2001 to describe emerging powers seen as poised to achieve a considerable degree of stability and prosperity in the coming decades. These countries were and (in most cases) are undergoing a historical transition that is shifting the locus of the global economy, changing the world in order to reflect a greater diffusion of power with the emergence of new major powers. The G20, formed in 1999 to replace the G8, was an important political step in the changing hierarchy of global interests, which is beginning to rebalance the world order with the weight of BRICS plus other countries with growing power (e.g. Australia, South Korea, Indonesia and Turkey).

17Today, Brazil is gaining visibility as a strategic player in the global energy sector. It is likely that non-renewable energy consuming countries will shift their interests to the fossil fuel resources of the South Atlantic. This would lead to a shift in the geographic axis from the oil-rich Middle East, troubled by various ethnic and political conflicts, to the South American continent. This may lead to a “flight to the South” of large industrialised countries of the Northern Hemisphere, a “course alteration” that may establish a “new Atlanticism” (Marroni, 2014).

Maritime space: jurisdictions

18It is important to look at the jurisdictional structure of the South Atlantic maritime space to better understand its political and geographical organisation. The distribution of maritime space under national jurisdiction and beyond, as well as the zones of the coastal states and political blocs of the region, allow the characterisation of this maritime picture and its configuration as a political sphere, as well as its impacts on the governance of the South Atlantic.

19Although the geographic delimitation of maritime regions may be based on purely objective elements (e.g. latitude), it is usually functionally defined by political factors. For example, the North Atlantic (including the so-called “Atlantis”) is closely linked by a political alliance, of which 16 of the 29 members are not on the shores of that ocean and four are landlocked countries.

20For our purposes here, the South Atlantic is defined as the maritime area south of the Tropic of Cancer, consisting of the southwest Atlantic and West African waters, i.e. excluding the Southern (Antarctic) Ocean and the Greater Caribbean (fig. 1). The context is a basin flanked by blocs or alliances, such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) (western Atlantic) and the African Union (eastern Atlantic)². A total of 29 countries, with a population of approximately 1.1 billion (844 million in Africa and 258 million in South America), are unequally distributed around the two coasts bordering this maritime area: 24 in Africa compared to 5 in South America. This asymmetry is also reflected in the distribution of waters under national jurisdiction (table 1): 7.8 million km² (South American coast) versus 6.1 million km² (African coast). In terms of jurisdictions, compared to the Atlantic basin as a whole, the South Atlantic has 26% of the basin’s EEZs, 12% of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles and 74% of the high seas (table 2), which represents a greater presence in areas beyond national jurisdiction, i.e. the Southern Hemisphere commons (figure 2).

Figure 1. South Atlantic regions

Figure 2. Jurisdictions and marine regions

21What really distinguishes the South Atlantic from the North Atlantic is the significant presence of the jurisdiction of European states over waters, which represents 28% of the jurisdictional space (fig. 3), predominantly by the United Kingdom, due to its island territories (Ascension, St Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Falklands, South Georgia, Sandwich Islands). The geopolitical distribution of jurisdictions divides the basin into three major zones (fig. 4): the two edges adjacent to the two continents and the central zone occupied by European island territories, favouring the integrity and political cohesion of the maritime basin.

22Although there is a certain regional balance – the South American coast, the central islands, the African coast – the asymmetry is very pronounced in terms of the number of countries in each zone, which introduces potential difficulties in the decision-making process, since national institutions have sovereignty in international and regional bodies, with distinct tasks related to ocean governance.

Figure 3. Distribution of maritime jurisdictions in the South Atlantic

Figure 4. Overseas territories

23Fishing activity is managed by organisations, notably by regional fisheries bodies (fig. 5).

Figure 5. Regional fisheries bodies

24Regional fisheries bodies provide a framework for ocean governance, although national limitations and knowledge gaps may reduce their capacity to act. The Fragile States Index (FFP, 2019) (fig. 6) shows the location and relative position of the maritime spaces most exposed to political-institutional shortcomings, particularly in terms of territorial control. This highlights the asymmetry around the South Atlantic basin.

Figure 6. Fragile states

25In summary, the maritime political space reveals three main points:

• Uneven maritime authority. In the South Atlantic basin, the surface area beyond national jurisdiction is twice that of the space subject to sovereignty and jurisdictional rights. The 29 coastal states exercise responsibility over nearly 20 million km², but with a very uneven and somewhat unique distribution: the country with the largest area of maritime space under national jurisdiction is actually located in the North Atlantic, the United Kingdom (5 millions km²), followed by Brazil (table 1). The Democratic Republic of Congo has the smallest area (1,050 km²), although it is the third largest country in terms of population (after Brazil and Nigeria).

• Cohesion versus fragmentation of maritime authority. South America shows a certain concentration of maritime territorial power, with five countries controlling 42% of the space under national jurisdiction, while in Africa 24 states control 32% of the maritime space subject to sovereignty and jurisdictional rights – a significantly more fragmented situation. This is of direct relevance to maritime safety (shipping lanes) and national security, as authority is distributed between a large number of countries with very different levels of institutional development.

• Transoceanic integration. A comparison of the northern and southern maritime hemispheres shows the different levels of integration between the eastern and western edges. While north of the equator a political, economic and cultural alliance has been consolidated (although not without criticism), the south still lacks sufficiently strong links between countries to build a similar alliance. In this context, the existence of a third maritime jurisdictional bloc with extra-regional authority may be relevant, although difficult to specify.

The blue economy

26As regards the South Atlantic maritime economy, we must first choose how to define this. The term “blue economy” can have different meanings (Silver et al., 2015), as it can refer to a particular school of economic thought (the so-called “circular economy”), whose main representative is Gunter Pauli, but has also been adopted by the European Union (EU) in its strategy to develop the maritime economy (European Commission, 2012, 2017, 2018). While for some specialists and organisations focused on the environment, the blue economy means the sustainable use of the sea and its resources in line with economic development, for others it is a broad concept, referring to all marine economic activities, whether sustainable or not. Here, we use the approach that the EU and other international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) (Blue Growth Initiative) take in defining the maritime economy: considering all sectors in the maritime economy that can contribute to the creation of prosperity, jobs and the eradication of major social problems (poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, etc.)³.

27While not exhaustive, this section will examine the importance of the sea and its resources for the coastal states in the South Atlantic, assessing the potential of this marine environment for the creation of wealth and employment and its link with sustainable and environmentally sound development. It looks at both the role played by “traditional” economic activities (exploitation of living marine resources, offshore hydrocarbons, port activities, maritime industry, maritime transport, coastal tourism) as well as emerging or innovative activities (renewable energy, marine biotechnology, mining, desalination, environmental protection, defence and security, research and education).

28Since the 1970s, the South Atlantic has been considered by its coastal states as a marine area of enormous economic potential. This has led to growing strategic and economic interest in this oceanic region, both because of the presence of certain major emerging powers (Brazil and South Africa) and for strictly economic factors (importance of maritime routes and marine resources, especially fishery resources and offshore hydrocarbons) (Greño Velasco, 1976; Brainard and Martínez-Díaz, 2009).

29The “Shackleton Report”, an economic survey of the Falkland Islands conducted by Britain in 1976, highlighted the significant potential for fisheries and hydrocarbons in the waters surrounding the archipelago – territory disputed by Argentina (Greño Velasco, 1977). Subsequent studies have also highlighted the importance of fisheries in the southwest Atlantic and on the African Atlantic coast, as well as the existence of large, as yet untapped, hydrocarbon reserves on the Brazilian continental shelf. In terms of fisheries, catches in 2016 were around 1.5 million tonnes (1.7% of the world total) in the southwest Atlantic (FAO Major Fishing Area 41) and around 1.7 million tonnes (1.85% of the world total) in the southeast Atlantic (FAO Major Fishing Area 47) (FAO, 2018a).

30Briefly, several important differences between the two sides of the South Atlantic can be highlighted.

31The situation in South American countries is generally much more socio-economically developed. Maritime economy projects are emerging strongly in these countries: for example, in Argentina, where the blue economy is seen as important for the national economy (Baruch and Drucaroff, 2018), and includes innovative activities such as algaculture, deep-sea mining and renewable energy production (Pauli, 2017). In Brazil, marine economic activities account for about 19% of GDP and are seen as having a very promising economic and geopolitical future, given the country’s intention to extend its continental shelf (this extension request is currently under review by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) to take advantage of its significant resources. Uruguay is another country in the region with efficient (and growing) infrastructure and port traffic, while the Guianas cover a small territory heavily dependent on foreign trade and thus on maritime traffic.

32Compared to the maritime economies of South American countries bordering the South Atlantic, those of the coastal states of Africa represent a more “critical” or at least contradictory situation. Most of these countries have much more fragile economies and face enormous social and demographic challenges, the consequences of which are difficult to manage in many cases. While these African countries can be considered relatively emerging states, they still suffer from important shortcomings: lack of adequate infrastructure, very low maritime traffic, limited or no development of innovative maritime activities, development of an extractive (hydrocarbon) sector that is subject to conflicts, and the low positive impact of economic activities on the general well-being of the population. Other disruptive factors include illegal fishing and trafficking, generating insecurity and piracy in the waters of some countries (leading to “failing seas”), for example. On a more positive note, the existence of underexploited marine resources is motivating the recent interest of many African countries to rethink the basis of their development. Different management strategies are therefore being put in place, making the blue economy a realistic possibility to fight hunger and poverty and creating a certain climate of optimism (United Nations/Economic Commission for Africa, 2016). Several African countries are turning to the blue economy and putting in place policies and institutions (ministries, agencies, etc.) to plan and diversify their economies in this sense, taking into account the untapped potential of the sea.

33In short, the South Atlantic is a very diverse and uneven maritime area, with substantial differences between its two shores, but with significant economic potential. The possibility of offering an alternative maritime trade route to the Persian Gulf–Red Sea–Suez–Mediterranean route, the existence of a belt of hydrocarbon reserves off the coasts of Argentina and Brazil and in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the exploitation of marine resources to obtain clean energy or biotechnology products all point to a future of blue growth, especially for countries willing to innovate and manage these marine areas rationally. The establishment of regional cooperation initiatives in and between Africa and Latin America in favour of blue growth could be a useful starting point to address these challenges.

Maritime policy and planning: Brazil and West Africa

Maritime development in Brazil

34Despite its uneven economic and political evolution in recent years, Brazil’s growth, geographic and demographic weight, and maritime expansion make it a key player in the southern hemisphere. Brazil occupies a central position both in South America and in the South Atlantic basin, so any cooperation initiative between the western and eastern Atlantic will be conditioned by the circumstances of this country.

35Since the early 1970s, maritime policy has represented a new face of Brazilian development, through a number of initiatives to formulate national policies for the sea. This takes considerable importance in the case of a large emerging power like Brazil. The strategic position of Brazil in the South Atlantic provides excellent conditions for an analysis of changing sea policy (Morris, 1979).

36During the 2000s, Brazil experienced a phase of economic growth that translated into economic and social development, which in turn required government initiatives such as job creation, improvement of workers’ income and social protection. The growth of the state was accompanied by opportunities for new investments in various sectors of the Brazilian economy, including an entire segment of marine-related businesses and jobs. Historically, Brazil has long had a coastline with significant navigational possibilities, and its waters have also been a source of fishing and natural resources valuable for the country’s development. However, today oil exploration on the Brazilian continental shelf is the coveted target of investors, national or foreign (Marroni, 2013).

37The political regulation of the use of maritime resources and coastal spaces in Brazil became a growing concern in the 1970s, as did environmental planning at the federal level. International pressure to preserve the country’s environmental heritage led Brazil to create, in 1973, the State Department of the Environment (SEMA), linked to the Ministry of the Interior, as a first step in integrated government planning aimed at the conservation of Brazilian biodiversity. One year later, by Decree No. 74,577 of 12 September 1974, the Interministerial Commission on Marine Resources (CIRM) was created with the aim of coordinating topics that would lead to a national policy for the Brazilian coastal region (Marroni and Asmus, 2005).

38Since the passing of Decree No. 5377 of 23 February 2005, Brazil has had a specific public policy on marine issues. The first version of the National Policy for Marine Resources was produced in 1980. Following that came more than 25 years of continual revisions of the Sectoral Plans for Marine Resources (PSRM), alongside important changes in the national and international context related to seas, oceans and coastal or transitional areas. Since the 2005 decree, this policy has been updated through a series of instruments that guide the management of marine resources. Of these, the Multiannual Plan 2004–2007, also known as “A Brazil for All”, served as the basis for marine policy in Brazil.

39During the revisions of the PSRMs, discussions contributed to structuring political thinking regarding the sea and generated knowledge about the marine environment and the sustainable use of its resources, emphasising the socio-economic dimension. Within the framework of institutional cooperation, the governance of marine areas is based on the political, economic and environmental management of government activities in these areas. The understanding gained from an initial study of the coastal zone, in accordance with the strategic importance of the South Atlantic for Brazil, as well as Brazil’s interest in maintaining a research base in the Antarctic, reaffirmed the country’s commitment to the sea.

40Currently, the tenth PSRM (2020–2023) (Brasil, 2019) is in force, which aims to promote the training and resources for education professionals, community leaders and other opinion makers to develop educational programmes on the role of the oceans for the economy, quality of life and health of all, in order to improve the capacity of future generations to contribute to the development of the blue economy.

Brazil’s maritime expansion: leadership in the tropical Atlantic

41Global governance of the oceans has become dependent on the internationalisation of knowledge about the sea and several expansionist actions derived from external political processes, through the agreement of international organisations that manage mechanisms to organise this space (such as the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf). In the case of developing countries, the narrow boundaries of their maritime jurisdictions were typically inherited from the former colonial powers. Newly independent countries were not yet fully aware of the importance, especially economic, of the seas adjacent to their coasts. To a large extent, the industrialised countries tried to preserve the freedom of action of their military fleets, merchant ships, fishing vessels and scientific expeditions.

42Until 1970, only Latin American countries, some African and Asian countries and Iceland had extended sovereign or jurisdictional rights over adjacent waters in one way or another. Latin America initiated the process of extending national maritime jurisdictions. Several Latin American countries were the forerunners in maritime expansion: Argentina in 1946, and Chile and Peru in 1947, setting the extension of adjacent waters at precisely 200 nautical miles and proclaiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over this territory (Castro, 1969; Marroni, 2013).

43In this context, the meetings prior to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, adopted in 1982) and, in particular, the action of some Latin American countries, had two fundamental consequences on the content of the convention: (1) they limited the proposal of the two superpowers at the time (USA and USSR), in a conference with a limited agenda, where the pressure against the expansion of national maritime zones was particularly strong; (2) they removed the issue of the definition of coastal state jurisdiction from the specific scope of negotiations on the common heritage of humanity. The political/diplomatic picture this presented was worrying to Brazil, which was seriously considering the 200-nautical-mile option. On the one hand, developing countries would, in principle, have an interest in assigning broad geographical boundaries in international waters. On the other, the maritime powers were keen to prohibit measures – so far adopted by a minority of member states – to extend national jurisdictions over maritime waters. While there were political/diplomatic factors that would justify Brazil’s decision to extend its maritime domain, there was the very real prospect that this move would provoke a strong negative reaction from traditional maritime powers, with which the country had friendly relations and a good understanding. Nevertheless, it was concluded that the political/diplomatic cost would be tolerable and absorbable.

44This 200-nautical-mile zone did not only concern the issue of free transit over the seas, but also the possession of underwater mineral wealth. This area of territorial sea adopted by Brazil was the result of a set of factors or forces that prompted the government to assert its decision-making autonomy in national foreign policy within the framework of “Brazilian power” desired by the military. Leading up to this time (during the late 1960s and early 1970s), scientific research projects aimed at discovering the potential of the sea were already being conducted. Politically and diplomatically, there was also an interest in uniting Brazil with Latin American countries to extend the 200-mile zone, a desire for recognition of Brazil as an emerging power, and a strategic objective of rapprochement with African countries. African solidarity with Brazil’s unilateral decision to extend its maritime domain in the South Atlantic has been an important asset in multilateral forums (Castro, 1989; Marroni, 2013).

45In this way, Brazil and other countries have offered resistance to the hegemony of global powers, challenging this and increasing their bargaining power in the forums that shape the international system. Brazil, abandoning its diplomatically conservative position, adopted a more decisive stance to defend its rights over the natural resources adjacent to its coastal zone. It based its policy decision for a 200-nautical-mile territorial sea on Latin American precedents (as stipulated in Decree No. 28,840 of 8 November 1950). Among other reasons, the increase to 200 nautical miles was recommended as this would serve as an incentive to increase the size of the naval force according to the maritime area and thus Brazil’s strategic position in the South Atlantic. The perception of international trends and national interests informed this unilateral claim over a large maritime area adjacent to the country’s coast.

46The extension of Brazil’s territorial sea was welcomed by Latin American countries that had already extended their maritime jurisdictions, as Brazil’s adherence to the 200-nautical-mile limit strengthened their international position. Solidarity with neighbouring countries was not the main reason Brazil extended its maritime domain; it followed the example of these countries in accordance with its own national interests. But once this decision was taken, Brazil’s unilateral act could be justified as a political gesture of solidarity with the Third World.

Maritime planning in the Gulf of Guinea

47The Gulf of Guinea is a maritime region of particular importance, concentrating economic and political elements that give this space a certain geopolitical cohesion and identification: a regional reference in the vast marine sphere of the South Atlantic. Together with Brazil, this is an emerging oceanic area, a new geopolitical reality in the vast marine basin between the Arctic and Antarctic.

48The geographic area of the Gulf of Guinea can be defined as the vast region of the African continent stretching from Guinea-Bissau to Angola (fig. 7), totalling 16 coastal states, with a population of about 400 million inhabitants, 14,087 km of coastline, and a surface area of almost 6.7 million km². According to these boundaries, the marine space included in this region covers more than 9 million km², with a total surface area reaching 15.7 million km². Including the landlocked countries, this area would exceed 20.4 million km² and about 475 million inhabitants.

Figure 7. Geography of the Gulf of Guinea

49Politically, the Gulf of Guinea benefits from institutions that give it cohesion as a marine region, and which are essential for the development of supranational policies on the maritime economy to combat piracy and illegal activities in its waters.

50The African Union (established in 2001), heir to the former Organisation of African Unity (established in 1963), is Africa’s largest political organisation. Its main objective is to accelerate the integration of the continent in order to meet the challenges of globalisation and promote Africa’s role as an international actor. In recent decades, market expansion has emerged as a factor for regional integration. In the Gulf of Guinea region, organisations have been established such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). In 2001, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was established in Libreville, Gabon, and started its activities in 2007. The GGC is composed of eight countries: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria. In the Gulf of Guinea, there are four Commonwealth states (table 7).

51The weakness of political institutions in Africa south of the equator – particularly in coastal countries – inevitably transfers, and to an even greater degree, to the maritime space over which the sovereignty and jurisdictional rights of coastal states are extended. Territorial control, which is already weak on the continent, is even more difficult to exercise over a maritime territory of more than 2 million km², including 1.17 million km² of territorial sea of the nine coastal states on the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra.

52Maritime security is essential to secure the income of coastal states, as well as activities that contribute to the livelihoods of these economies, including fisheries, aquaculture, shipping (which also affects landlocked states), tourism and marine ecosystem services. In addition to national and regional impacts, maritime security has a clear international dimension related to oil and maritime trade, which affects the energy supply of other countries and regions, investment in the oil industry and the transport sector. The continent of Africa is attracting increasing interest from the international community. Since the 2010s (with the exception of the period of the COVID-19 health crisis), its growth rate has hovered around 5%. Africa is generally considered to be an area with high potential, which explains why it is subject to strong global competition (Vedrine et al., 2014). West Africa is considered a “rising geopolitical star”, yet some studies have shown that although this region is considered more attractive than East Africa, it is less so than Southern Africa and is somewhat overlooked in the investments of large multinationals (Damon and Igué, 2003).

53The European Union considers Africa an area of economic interest of great strategic value, including the Gulf of Guinea and its energy resources. As a result, EU policies address a wide range of issues relating to the continent, including development, but also governance, human rights, trade, regional integration, climate change, food security, migration and, in recent years, conflict management through participation in peace operations in various countries.

54Since 2007, the EU’s relationship with Africa has been built on the “partnership” outlined in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2007. The JAES provides the overall framework for political relations between the two continents, although the EU has created other regional instruments. For example, all North African countries are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which includes a financial instrument (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, ENPI).

55The West Africa–Gulf of Guinea region is part of a larger partnership between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Cotonou Agreement, which was revised for the second time in 2010. This instrument provides a legal framework for political dialogue and economic cooperation between the EU and ACP countries, for which the European Development Fund (EDF) exists. When the actions to be developed are of a local nature, only one financial instrument is available, the Instrument for Stability, which makes it possible to address situations of high strategic interest. This is applicable to the issue of piracy in certain areas, such as the Gulf of Guinea. This instrument has been in force since 2007 and is used in complement with other regional instruments. The Instrument for Stability is useful when transnational regional instruments cannot be applied and is mainly aimed at security-related situations (and the link between internal and external security), although its drawback is its small financial package (Roy, 2012).

Conclusion

56Specialists on the Atlantic devote part of their efforts to discovering new economic, geopolitical and geo-maritime interests that could lead to a new world order for the oceans. Cooperation and the development of a long-term strategic vision depend on the ability to mobilise human resources and foster social commitment. There is a need for policies that can assess power trends in the global political system, maximise available resources and implement strategies that prioritise alliances, institutions and networks in the ocean governance context.