The Politics of Silence
|Part One. Religious and ethnic dimensions of Myanmar NGOs
Texte intégral
- 4 Ministry of Information, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), article 34 : (...)
- 5 “The special place envisaged for Buddhism and the Myanmar language seeks to continue the exclusion (...)
- 6 Timo KIWIMAKI and Morten B. PEDERSON, Burma, mapping the challenges and opportunities for dialogue (...)
1The Union of Myanmar hosts a number of different ethnic groups, each with their own history, language and religious practices. Although the 2008 Constitution provides for freedom of religion4, Buddhism continues to play a dominant role5, as mentioned in article 361: “The Union recognises the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the huge majority of citizens”. To simplify a complex reality, the main ethnicity, the Bamar – predominantly Buddhists – are located in its seven central divisions whereas ethnic minorities are more numerous in ethnic states; Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan, and others. Some of these minorities are mainly comprised of Buddhists; Kayin, Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. The seven periphery states are predominantly Christian or Muslim due to the history of population settlement. Along with religious divisions, ethnic diversity has also been source of schisms and tensions which were particularly exacerbated after Independence, when the central state was not able to generate a strong enough cohesion among the various groups. Political tensions since Independence can be analysed through a conflict sensitive lens: “The irreconcilable nature of the conflicts is compounded by the fact that the issues have become entangled in the broader views of history and mythologies of each side. While the military insists that the Union of Burma has existed since ancient times and only was divided by the British colonialists, ethnic nationalists maintain that the Kayin, Kachin, Shan and other minorities are nations in their own right with historic homelands and rights of self-determination”.6
- 7 Guillaume ROZENBERG, “Etre Birman c’est être Bouddhiste”, in Gabriel DEFERT (ed.), Birmanie contem (...)
2In contemporary Myanmar, ethnicity, religion and politics are intertwined. The centralised authoritarian political system, that has a legitimacy that is partly reliant on Buddhism, constantly attempts to homogenise the multifaceted ethnic and cultural mosaic into a national, unified, Bamar entity. Decades of implementation of this strategy, also known as “burmanisation”, has resulted in a “Myanmar” identity, in which Bamar nationalist identity and Bamar Theravada Buddhist beliefs and practices are intermingled.7 Burma hosts a number of Buddhist missionary groups that attempt to convert those of a different faith. This homogenisation is generally not welcomed by those among the ethnic minorities who are non-Buddhist. For some, religion has become part of their political identity, a sign of opposition. Many among the religious minority groups feel the pressure of Buddhism as a controlling influence from the central government, as well as a rejection of their ethnic identity, in response project a political dimension as a more or less passive resistance.
- 8 Helmut K. ANHEIER (ed.), The Civil Society Diamond: A Primer, Civicus Index on Civil Society Occas (...)
3In this study, we will use the following definition of civil society, “the sphere of institutions, organisations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests.”8 In Myanmar, this term tends to be used to categorise any group or initiative that is not directly piloted by the government. The common assumption that NGOs are leading the civil society movement can be explained by the fact that they are more visible, vocal and self-defined as a group than other components of civil society. Although, a wide range of groups of monks, teachers, businessmen, youth can occasionally get directly involved with NGOs, as was the case after Cyclone Nargis.
In the present document, the acronym “NGO” – unless contrarily mentioned, in some quotations for example – refers to the Myanmar based and led NGOs. The definition of NGO is framed by the following criteria:
1. Independence from the government and political parties.
2. Clearly stated mandate/vision to influence social and/or economic, and in certain cases political, models.
3. Non-profit organisations.
4. Work and adhesion on a voluntary basis for the supporters but operating with salaried employees.
5. Activities based in the wide scope of development and/or relief and/or social work.
6. Size demonstrated with an annual budget above 50,000 US Dollars and an operational presence in several townships.
The term “NGO” used throughout this study is irrelevant to the official and registration status of the organisations. Preliminary research identified common characteristics across NGOs, including: a vision to change/influence their socio-political environment, governance structure with centralised decision making process relying on one leader, and ways to navigate in a hostile political space. Some will be developed further.
4Assuming that NGOs reflect to some extent Myanmar society as a whole, a majority of Buddhists from the Bamar ethnic group should be represented in the NGO sector. In reality, a quick observation of NGOs would show that the prevailing religion in Myanmar NGOs is not Buddhism but Christianity, and that the Bamar are under-represented at various levels. For example, Christian NGOs and affiliated groups appear to be more visible than Buddhist organisations, the density of projects is higher in non-Bamar areas and employees are often selected from ethnic minorities. This is a legacy of the colonial period, as the British administrators were more likely to work with Christianised organisations.
5A more detailed analysis of the ethnic and religious characteristics of Myanmar NGOs will be mapped, before elaborating on the context, as well as the consequences of the emergence of these social actors during the fifteen last years. Finally, Myanmar NGOs’ increasing ability to develop and influence local and central power will be discussed.
1 - Myanmar NGOs: a multifaceted civil society dominated by ethnic and faith based organisations
- 9 “According to the doctrine of the Myanmar way to socialism, not only political parties, but also m (...)
- 10 David I. STEINBERG, “A void in Myanmar: Civil society in Burma”, in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and T (...)
6After 1948, the context of the post-Independence and the Parliamentary periods was a space that allowed the burgeoning of nongovernment groups that would later be targeted by Ne Win and the military regime as a threat to the country’s stability. Ne Win’s military government, in power from 1962 to 1988 relied on “The Burmese way to socialism”, a doctrine where Buddhism, Bamar identity and notions of socialism were linked and presented as the path towards a prosperous nation. It paved the way for a highly centralised state, with a military regime that increasingly used repression and terror to exercise and maintain its rule.9 During the socialist period, independent organisations were forbidden by the government. For three decades, associations of individuals beyond the junta, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), were not allowed.10 For the past 15 years, following a student uprising in 1996 and several cease-fire agreements in ethnic areas, NGOs have been progressively tolerated in certain geographic areas, allowed to work in ring-fenced sectors. They have had access to some degree of formal authorisation to operate through a range of agreements, from informal oral clearances to the formal signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the government. As a consequence, a particularly relevant factor influencing the way NGOs work is the type of relations they have established with the government. This determines the degree of trust officials can have in a given NGO and, as a consequence, the scope of activities that can be undertaken more or less officially.
- 11 Anonymous, “Myanmar allocates 1/4 of new budget to military”, Associated Press Yangon, May 10, 201 (...)
- 12 Ibid.
7Since their inception, these organisations have aimed at coping with shortages in the social, economic and political systems which have resulted in poverty and unequal access to resources and opportunity. The often quoted official figures of spending in key welfare sectors such as health care and education (1.3% and 4.13% of the budget, respectively)11 compared to the part of the budget allocated to the armed forces (23.6%)12 illustrates the critical state of public services. All interviewed NGO directors stated that political and economic mismanagement was a source of frustration that incited them to get involved in NGO activities. They generally perceive the current system as unfair and wish to change it in the long term, although their longterm vision is generally not openly stated for safety reasons, as the government tolerates NGOs as long as they stay away from formal political involvement.
- 13 “INGOs need to change to do more capacity building. The rules of engagement still see local NGOs a (...)
- 14 “A newly arrived INGO country director remarked that ‘civil society organisations here seem to be (...)
- 15 Such as the allegory of the beauty (Aung San Suu Kyi) and the beast (Tatmadaw) as an allegory of i (...)
8Today, NGOs in Myanmar generally benefit from a positive image in the international community's eyes. Internationally, INGOs, UN and government agencies tended to view NGOs as working to improve standards of living, which is perceived as necessary, and overall is appreciated. Some interviewees among the Myanmar citizens, who are not working with or in NGOs, believe that NGOs target minority ethnic and/or religious groups and expressed negative judgment about this practice. Among some members of the international humanitarian community in International NGOs or United Nations agencies in Myanmar, two prevailing attitudes can be observed towards Myanmar NGOs. Firstly, they consider NGOs as not fully capable agents but useful as service providers where international agencies have no access.13 This attitude became obvious in the Cyclone Nargis relief operation. Secondly, for those among the international community who have a political agenda, NGOs are a means to an end. They are the vehicle to drive the democratisation process. Overall, NGOS seem to be perceived by international stakeholders as a relatively homogenous group willing to offer social and political alternatives to the regime. They believe that NGOs genuinely embody positive values and are able to trigger a long awaited political transition.14 As NGOs are perceived as systematically opposed to the regime by outsiders, in a simplistic Manichean vision, they are always on the side of good.15 This study aims to demonstrate that NGOs use a variety of strategies, with various motivations in order to achieve their own political agenda without explicitly voicing it.
9Since the mid-2000s, NGOs’ identity has evolved as these organisations became more strategic and self-aware. This has been accompanied by an increase in funding and professionalization of the sector. NGOs have gradually started to identify themselves as being part of an entity, representing or even embodying, the whole of civil society.
10The poem below was written by the director of a NGO and has been widely circulated in civil society fora in Yangon:
“I… Myanmar Civil Society
I have… mythical land and cornucopia trees
Grow with suppleness and passive resistance;
I… live and life through grassroots and
Bridge heaven and earth;
I… reconciling the fractured land
Deposit myself for verdant generation;
I… guardian of chances for youthful future
Dancing with uncertain fire inside of the havoc's games;
I… vibrate solo of peace and delightful lyric
Singing among the world of children;
I… raft when flood of misery
Propel to space of opportunity;
I… dissolving the weakness and
Sustain to nurture to stand on their own;
I… hug people to be aware of
How Mother Nature loves you and to respect her;
I struggle every single instant and
Keep on flowing for Endless journey.
I … Myanmar Civil Society.”
11Above are some obvious references to the territory, civil society is depicted under the features of Mother Nature and the notion of ambition and maturity. Before elaborating on the relevant component of the actual identity of NGOs, including their ethnic, religious and political characteristics, a description of the methodology of the study is developed below.
1.1 - Methodology of the study
12After clarifying the data collection methodology and highlighting the limits of such an approach, the term “NGO” will be defined in the Myanmar context. Then, emerging trends in the sector will be presented.
13This study has been documented by various sources in an attempt to include different perceptions, experiences and opinions of individuals regarding the growing NGO sector in Myanmar. The data collection was mainly conducted between October 2010 and May 2011, using the following methodological tools:
- Interviews in Myanmar language (and in some cases in English) of various informants, including junior and senior employees of NGOs, Myanmar and international practitioners, academics working with/on civil society, Myanmar individuals having various types of contacts with NGOs, and civil servants interacting with NGOs.
- Field visits in two ethnic states with the purpose to identify local NGOs and to interview their leaders, employees, beneficiaries but also individuals who are not directly engaged with NGOs.
- Focus individual or group discussions in Myanmar in cities, towns and villages where NGOs implement projects to reflect on their image and common practices, with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, NGO employees, and local authorities when possible.
- Review of primary sources, including NGO websites, public communication document, press statements, reports when available, and other documentation.
- Review of relevant literature and secondary sources including recent academic writings on ethnic conflict, civil society, political development but also local and international press and media.
14Names of interviewees and organisations are not mentioned to preserve anonymity as interviewees often feel very nervous about sharing information in Myanmar for fear of negative repercussions. Although there are obvious signs of opening in Myanmar nowadays, the political engagement of NGOs remains controversial and for some sectors of society, taboo. Failing to respect discretion could result in negative consequences to those who facilitated the collection of study material.
15Several interviews have been facilitated thanks to the efficient support of Daw May Myat Noe who has been a considerable support in brainstorming ideas, debriefings and discussing the key findings of this study.
16Several filters hindered the data collection during interviews. The main challenge was to point out the unformulated motivations in order to gain clarity on organisational agendas beyond relief and development work. Individual narratives and observations, in a country where safety means operating with low profile, can also inform an understanding of how personal aspirations and experiences are articulated within organisational strategies. As a NGOs’ lifespan depends on the ability to be seen as non-politically partisan or to be protected by government connections, in spite of obvious indicators of political involvement, most of the stakeholders were not keen to discuss sensitive topics openly. The reluctance of some informants to share their ideas can be understood as the agenda is not explicitly stated and as it depends on the space that is made available (depending on the context of the moment, connections with/protection from the government, location and degree of sensitivity of the work). Those interviewed feared that they would be in danger if others knew some of their strategic directions. Most NGOs strategize as they go and do not have detailed long terms plans. They might adjust and make ad hoc decisions so as to make the best use of their influence. As they are used to working in a fluid political context, they do not often elaborate future plans but rather adopt an opportunistic approach. This has two main advantages: it is safer and more likely to appear nonthreatening to the government and furthermore, it allows flexibility.
- 16 Meanwhile, many members of civil society are simply getting on with the job of helping vulnerable (...)
- 17 The police Special Branch, also known as the ‘SB’ in Myanmar, is utilized by the state to monitor (...)
17In some cases, when interviewees were not senior employees, they were afraid to break the chain of command. Some of these barriers could gradually be overcome with trust building through repeated meetings and informal discussions. It also seems that some respondents were simply not informed of the silent longer term objectives of the NGOs, especially the junior employees.16 Information was sometimes channelled indirectly through what they were told by other people or staff from other organisations. Written documentation on a potential role in political transition is seldom shared. Such documents could compromise the mere existence of the given NGO if it came into the possession of the police Special Branch17. Nonetheless, some documents produced by NGOs are meaningful as they are the vehicle of their political views; those collected through open sources are cited in this study.
- 18 As highlighted in the Dave Matthieson’s presentation on Human Rights study methodology at the Burm (...)
18It was easier to carry out research in urban areas like Yangon18, compared to rural areas, and it was easier to gain trust in towns. In Yangon, where NGO employees were more used to interacting with foreigners and researchers, NGO staff displayed greater confidence, however, they also demonstrated that they had learned how to answer questions without disclosing any indication of their ethnic, religious or political views, probably as they have an awareness of the potential dangers involved in this type of information sharing.
19Many interviewees stated that they were engaged in NGO work because they were striving for positive change in achieving economic or political changes to people's lives. Generally these NGO employees explained that their commitment to work towards poverty reduction had started among their own communities, and that they were guided by the aspiration to foster a more equitable and just system for the distribution of resources. In their conception, this new system goes together with a new political order. They assess the capacity of the government to reform itself as limited. As a consequence, they believe that political change is a necessary step, although not necessarily always an end in itself. Practically, there seems to be a difference between their long term vision and short term reality. NGO employees do not consciously pursue a given political agenda when they accomplish daily basic tasks. They mainly consider their activity as a livelihood, and often do not expect a concrete impact as a consequence of their immediate actions. They look for progressive changes, enabling their organisation to earn some ground for example in influencing policies with the local government, in order to scale up and exercise some pressure to facilitate more social and political transformations at regional level.
- 19 Such as the American Center in Yangon is able to because it is a foreign entity, with diplomatic s (...)
20NGOs developed their own codes to communicate in the restrictive political context. The use of a specific vocabulary illustrates how NGOs have been working within the boundaries of tolerance set by central authorities. For example, instead of implementing projects of “peacebuilding”, NGOs based inside the country use the terms “community harmony” or “reconciliation”. These terms do not imply that there is a conflict, which would sound too political. “Protection” can be mentioned, but not “Human Rights”. Instead of “journalism”, NGOs would organise “mass media” training, and instead of “community mobilisation”, they support “community based projects”. They work on “capacity building” instead of “empowerment”. If a given NGO wants to provide education services with the objective to develop analytical skills, instead of calling it “critical thinking”19, it will call it “general skills” or “English Learning” in the project documentation, using a government friendly vocabulary to shape reality.
- 20 The Government prior to the 2010 General Elections is referred to as Government of the Union of My (...)
- 21 See http://www.themimu.info
- 22 A NGO based in Yangon providing training and other capacity building services to NGOs. CBI itself (...)
21The present study focuses on the NGOs based and/or operating in Myanmar under Myanmar management. Out of an estimated 300 to 400 large scale and above ground NGOs working in Myanmar, a maximum of 10 per cent are registered with the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (GRUM)20, according to the United Nations’ Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU)21. No comprehensive list of NGOs is available and it is difficult to accurately quantify the NGO growth phenomenon in Myanmar. The Capacity Building Initiative (CBI)22 produced a Directory in 2000 that has been annually updated since 2004. It is a key document to monitor the evolution of NGO numbers over the years. In 2001, it recorded 31 NGOs, 62 in 2004 and increased up to 88 in 2009, as depicted in the table below. These figures are likely to be a conservative estimation of the real figures.
Table 1: Evolution of the number of NGOs participating to the data collection of the LNGO directory between 2001 and 2009
Source: CBI Directories
- 23 NGOs were required to meet the following criteria to be included in the 2004 Directory: “non-profi (...)
- 24 Interview by the author, Yangon, January 2010.
- 25 The rapid growth of religious NGOs here could be attributed to a more tolerant approach adopted by (...)
22The LNGO Directory is not comprehensive as many NGOs are not taken into account, whereas some Government Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs) are included23 although they appear to be unconnected and working with different values, mandates and methods than NGOs. According to a NGO director: “We [Myanmar NGOs] do not cooperate with GONGOs. Our organisation values the political neutrality of civil society. Civil society should stand on the direct engagement with community in a participatory and moral manner. Otherwise, it will lead to a downward spiral for the reputation of civil society in the eye of community we aim at serving”.24 Typologies of information slightly vary over the years, hindering systematic comparison. Nonetheless, these directories enable quantification of general emerging trends. For example, it highlights the number of NGOs identifying themselves as religious.25 The weight of the education sector is noticeable and symptomatic of the substitution role to public services by NGOs in some geographic areas.
Table 2: Evolution of NGOs’ sector of intervention between 2004 and 2009
Note: One NGO can be active in several sectors.
Source: CBI Directories 2004 and 2009.
Not all the existing NGOs in Myanmar could be considered in the present study as several hundred meet the criteria and interviews could only be conducted with a number of representatives. Remarkably, most of the findings can be expanded to a reasonable number of NGOs. The NGO sector remains dominated by the oldest ones that have a greater legitimacy but the above figures show a quick progression. The notions and vocabulary related to NGOs have been imported, as have those pertaining to civil society. The etymology of the such vocabulary in the Myanmar language leaves no doubt, for example, civil society “” [people’s group] and NGOs “” [the groups that are not the government] are the literal translation of the English language terminology.
- 26 A bus ticket is around 3,500 MMK from Pathein, the main city of this division and Laputta, a town (...)
- 27 Sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union and Australia on Myanmar do not allow train (...)
23The nature and the modalities of the relations between NGOs and the government are both complex and fluid. In order to function, NGOs have established relations with authorities at different levels, depending on their size, activities, and legal status. Relations with government agents are often considered as a threat to an NGOs’ autonomy. For government officials, the main concern is the potential of NGOs to support political opposition movements. To circumvent this possibility NGOs must abide by a system of periodic reporting to Ministry of Home Affairs, with regular monitoring visits to NGO offices and areas of operations. Today, it is generally acknowledged that the surveillance system is not flawless. The main limiting factor appears to be the lack of skills and resources available to the authorities. For example, at the time of writing, some employees of the Ministry of Agriculture based in the Ayeyarwady Division reportedly had a budget of 300 Kyat (approximately 50 cents in USD) per month to conduct their field visits.26 Needless to say, these civil servants do not visit many project sites unless NGOs support their expenses. In this geographic area, where significant funds were injected into the humanitarian response after Cyclone Nargis, NGOs often had more resources than the local government. Training of civil servants by NGOs appears like an innovation in the post-cyclone relief effort.27 It was actually an opportunity for some NGOs to establish trust with the authorities to prevent hindrances to their work. For example, NGOs were able to obtain authorisations to organise meetings, work, and travel, through enhanced relationships.
- 28 In some townships affected by Cyclone Nargis, relations between NGOs and local authorities were sm (...)
- 29 Interview by the author, Yangon, October 2010.
24Smaller NGOs surveyed tended to avoid relations with the government as much as possible. Being more mobile and less visible, some have chosen to work “below the radar”, with no legal status but with only the acknowledgement of local authorities. The director of a small scale NGO working in the Delta in Ayeyarwady Division28 spoke about his experience: “In the project sites, we don’t have any problem, no visits from the government. As long as we are transparent with local communities and they have ownership over the project, it is ok [...]. Our organisation operates with the lowest visibility possible and is regularly reporting to the local authorities who grant us a township level registration, so we are legally authorized to work.”29 The strategy to rely on cordial relations with local populations to gain favour from local government agents and to avoid monitoring was stated several times by interviewees. NGOs also work in collaboration with traditional leaders such as elders, or monks so that there will be “less interference from the authorities” according to another director of an NGO operating in the same area.
- 30 A registered NGO has to report annually or bi-annually on their activities and finances. Funds are (...)
- 31 Public statement during a meeting held in Bangkok in August 2010 about the emergency of civil soci (...)
- 32 For example, local authorities are invited and greeted as the most important guests at a school op (...)
25NGOs elaborate diversified strategies to create and maintain their operational space. All interviewees acknowledged that good relations with local authorities is key to being able to function efficiently and most agree that cordial relations with the central government allow the sustainability and growth of their NGOs.30 According to a presentation made by a group of 20 Myanmar NGO representatives: “The ability to maintain and extend an NGOs’ working space is dependent on their legitimacy coming from the trust of the communities and the local authorities, the choice of a non-sensitive or non-threatening vocabulary and their ability to engage with the military.”31 NGOs also mentioned the importance of sharing credit to government officials for the tangible outputs of their project.32
26Among the several factors identified in shaping space for NGOs to operate, other key factors include: the location (urban/rural areas, centre/periphery); the sensitivity of the sector of activity (what is the potential link to politics?) and finally the benefits the government (at local, regional or national level) can take from the projects. Several NGOs reported that they have been invited to manage projects in urban areas or in the Dry Zone in Magwe Division (where many generals are from) by the authorities and felt like they had to comply in order to maintain good relations. In some cases, NGOs reported that they had to hand over innovative projects to the authorities for management at the request of the local administration.
- 33 In the early 2000s, the government used to be in the denial of the epidemics and wasn’t supportive (...)
27Some sectors are more likely to generate official suspicion than others. For example, HIV/AIDS used to be very sensitive until the early 2000s. Prior to that, the government had denied the scale of the epidemic and there was no room for NGOs to work on this issue.33 Today, there is a National Strategic Plan, drafted by the National AIDS Program (under the Ministry of Health) in collaboration with UNAIDS, and with civil society inputs and participation. HIV/AIDS is seen as less threatening sector, compared to the period before 2004.
- 34 Interview by the author, February 2011, Yangon.
- 35 Recently, some more relations were established with NGOs to re-build schools in the context of pos (...)
28According to an interviewee who worked for several years in this sector: “NGOs can influence policies through networks. For example, the HIV networks in 2004, there was no voice at all in the thematic working group for NGOs. Decisions were made at the higher level (GRUM, INGOs and UN). But in 2010, NGOs have three representatives sitting on the table to establish the country coordinating mechanism supported by the Global Fund. The HIV National Strategic Plan was written after consultation with the Strategic Plan Committee (that included NGOs)”.34 Other sectors, such as formal education, still cannot be tackled directly by civil society groups as they remain too sensitive. As a consequence, very few NGOs have attempted to establish relationships with the Ministry of Education, and most education projects are cautiously implemented within a limited scale.35 These projects tend to target education for young children under the umbrella of other activities, such as religious projects.
29Although a point that most Myanmar NGOs have in common is that they define themselves as independent from the government, they all have to maintain relations with the authorities to some degree. The NGO sector displays a great amount of heterogeneity, while operating under the scrutiny of the regime and having only recently expanded. NGOs have different sizes, capacities, mandates, methodologies, and areas of intervention, but this complex reality is often eclipsed by the domination of a handful of larger NGOs that are over-represented in the international humanitarian community fora, and in some cases claim to represent the whole of civil society. A concise overview shows that overall NGOs’ identity is generally structured around ethnic and/or religious lines that help to shape their longer term, silent agendas.
1.2 - Religious and ethnic trends framing Myanmar NGOs and solidarity networks
- 37 Young Rakhine woman from Rakhine State, in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, op. cit, p. 63.
“Being Buddhist, we are disconnected from NGOs, because here in Yangon, most NGO leaders are Christian and so are connected to people from the outside. Church organisations have many connections”. 37
30After a brief overview of the ethnic and religious trends in Myanmar, their impacts on the NGO sector will be shown, in the light of their recent history, and according to their geographic and ethnic context. This paper will briefly describe the situation of NGOs in each ethnic state.
- 38 Figures according to the latest Census carried out in 1983.
31Myanmar hosts a majority of Bamar ethnic people, said to be roughly 70% of the population.38 Figures for breakdowns of the population by religion are sensitive and official figures are acknowledged as generally inaccurate and potentially biased. It is generally estimated that the total population is composed of: Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (including: Christian Protestant 3%, Roman Catholic 1%), Muslim 4% and Animist 1%. The table below illustrates the disproportion of the religious group in the total population.
Table 3: Religions in Myanmar
Source: from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, 2011.
- 39 See Jean A. BERLIE, The Burmanization of Myanmar's Muslims, White Lotus, Bangkok, 2008, 156 p.
- 40 Buddhists missionary groups are very active in Myanmar. The International Theravada Buddhist Missi (...)
- 41 Paragraph 70, Progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanma (...)
32The pressure to “Burmanize” the population39 is recurrent among ethnic groups. There are regular allegations of attempts to convert minorities by Buddhist missionary groups.40 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights pointed out that: “While a failure to accommodate ethnic minority needs is thwarting the adaptability principle, there is some disturbing evidence of the Government using State resources to promote Buddhism through the Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National Races and Municipal Affairs”.41
33In this context, the figures, actual location and evolution of the religious minorities are seen as politically controversial. The observation of the geographic concentration of religious and ethnic groups shows an obvious correlation.
Map 1. Major Ethnic Groups of Myanmar
Source: from Martin Smith, Burma - Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 1991.
- 42 Brian HEIDEL, The Growth of Civil Society in Myanmar, 2006, p. 12.
- 43 LNGO directory 2009, The directory of local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) in Myanmar, Eng (...)
34Ethnicity and religion have implications in many aspects of Myanmar social and political life, and the NGO sector is no exception. Among the faith based organisations, the Christian groups seem to have developed in greater number and have achieved legitimacy, gaining power in ethnic regions where the Christian population is more numerous. Some are operating under the umbrella of a Church, but many groups do not openly display their religious identity as they worry that this could invite the antipathy of the authorities. One report noted that “Many NGOs have formed out of each of the major religions. However, data from this research clearly shows that the proportion of Christian NGOs was much larger than the proportion of Christians in the population, while the number of Buddhist NGOs was much smaller. The number of Hindu and Muslim NGOs was closer to the population ratio for those religions.”42 In the 2009 LNGOs Directory, out of 88 organisations, there are 14 faith-based Buddhist organisations and 18 Christian (including 10 Baptist, 2 Catholic and 6 non-specified). In total, 13 NGOs display explicit missionary mandates (including both Buddhist and Christian).43
- 44 Former armed ethnic groups in these two states have signed peace agreements after years of civil w (...)
- 45 See www.themimu.org
35Apart from the main urban centres where many NGOs can be found, there is a singular overlap between ethnic and religious minority concentrations and NGOs’ project locations. For example, NGOs are numerous in the Kachin (the void in the northern part of Kachin is explained by the low density of population in this mountainous area) and Chin States, although these are remote and sparsely populated areas.44 This contrasts with the situation in some other areas that happen to host greater Buddhist populations, where there is a void of projects and NGO presence45.
Map 2. Number of LNGOs per township (May 2010)
Source: based on Myanmar Who/What/Where, Myanmar Information Management Unit, 2010.
- 46 This map is not comprehensive as only partial information could be collected by a few INGOs workin (...)
- 47 The higher concentration in the Delta is due to the response to Cyclone Nargis with many NGOs depl (...)
36This map46 shows that the presence of NGO’s is unevenly concentrated in some parts of the territory.47 Among the factors explaining this disparity, history of population settlement is a determining factor. In central Myanmar, social support among the members of the community was been traditionally managed by the Buddhist community; hence the presence of NGOs remains limited there. This gap has apparently been noticed by the central government that reportedly invited NGOs to work in these areas. More recently, Cyclone Nargis, that devastated the southern part of the Ayeyarwady Division, generated a large influx of funds and international attention, allowing a greater NGO presence.
- 48 “There are also a large number of community-based welfare organisations [...]. Many of these group (...)
37Since 1988, the substantial reduction of armed insurgency in many ethnic areas has been favourable to the growth of ethnic-based organisations including ceasefire groups, political parties, and a variety of civil society organisations located in ethnic states.48 Here is the breakdown of NGO projects per ethnic state:
Table 4: NGOs projects in ethnic states
Source: CBI Directory 2004.
38Whereas numerous NGOs are present in Kachin, Shan, Mon and Chin States, the number of NGOs present in Kayah and Rakhine States is lower. Nonetheless, in both of these areas, humanitarian needs are notorious. Factors of implementation of NGOs appear not to be primarily the needs of the population but their ability to access a zone that is a result of the local history. A concise overview of inception contexts of NGOs at the state level provides a sense of their diverse backgrounds and sheds light on religious and political dynamics.
- 49 Mary P. CALLAHAN, Political authority in Burma’s ethnic minority states: devolution, occupation, a (...)
- 50 The KIO has been active in relief activities after the signature of the cease-fire with the GoUM. (...)
39Kachin State has been the cradle of an impressive number of NGOs. Case studies of two of these NGOs that grew to become among the largest (in terms of political power, scope of implementation and budget) will be developed in the second part of the present study. The two main Kachin armed groups, namely the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)’s armed group, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) signed ceasefires respectively in 1994 and 1989 after negotiations to gain access to some areas of governance (i.e. border guard forces, authorization for delivering social services, etc.). After many years of armed conflict that left populations in great need, the Christian churches have been acting as the main service provider. Nowadays, more than one third of the estimated 1.4 million residents of the Kachin State are said to be Christian49, with a majority of Baptists. Bamar and Shan populations, generally Buddhists are also numerous there. As the southern part was historically the land of Christian missionaries, Kachin religious leaders, educated in the missionary traditions, have maintained international connections and facilitated access to funds for development and pastoral activities over the years. A degree of autonomy from the central government as well as financial support allowed religious NGOs to implement projects aimed at coping with the shortcomings of public services such as education, health. Kachin NGOs do often have a Kachin centred ideology (generally based on a strong nationalism and the resistance to the “Bamar oppressor”) that is getting more radical with sensitive issues such as the massive spoliation of the natural resources by Myanmar and Chinese companies. According to interviews conducted in this region, Baptist NGOs are very influential and maintain close links with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)50.
- 51 Kachin Baptist Shop keeper, Interview by the author, Myitkyina, May 2011.
“As a Baptist, I didn’t know there were Catholic NGOs here. I know there are Baptist ones. Baptists must be less organised as they are always looking for funds within the community”. 51
- 52 The KNU objects to the burmanisation of the word Karen to “kayin” – as a consequence they only use (...)
- 53 See Ashley SOUTH with Mali PERHULT and Nils CARTENSEN, Conflict and Survival: Self-protection in s (...)
40The Kayin have a population of between 4 and 7 million based all over Myanmar. Their main ethnic nationalist armed group, the Karen National Union (KNU)52 has been at war with the Myanmar government since 1949.53 The KNU leadership largely consists of Christians, particularly Baptist and Seven Day Adventist denominations. Due to the protracted armed conflict, many Kayin went in exile and have established strong relations with international NGOs and supporters. Historically, Kayin enjoyed a special status under the British rule, and at that time many converted to Christianity, so they have been able to maintain links with Christian advocacy groups based abroad, to plead their cause and attract international attention. NGOs close to the KNU are numerous in Thailand where they have better access to funds and media. In Kayin State as well as in the neighbouring Kayah State, NGOs often legitimate their actions using religious principles, also relying on strong ethnic nationalist feelings. There again, Christian groups appear to be dominating in number and influence with reported contention between the different Churches. In spite of the general perception that the majority of Kayin are Christian, the greater portion of the population is actually Buddhist. A significant proportion of the Kayin live in Bamar majority areas, including in the Ayeyarwady Division.
- 54 Older Kayin businessman, in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from insid (...)
“If Kayin nationals want to do a programme, they can do it under the church umbrella [...]. They have meetings in the church compound; there they can do it! Within religious organisations it is very free. Outside, government organisations can watch”. 54
- 55 UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human right (...)
- 56 The lack of public infrastructures and services has recently been the object of questions in the f (...)
41The remote and mountainous Chin State is one of the poorest areas of the country, with a population of about 500,000 individuals the majority of whom are Christian. Infrastructure is minimal in spite of the heavy presence of the Myanmar Army since the end of the 1980s. SPDC troops have redefined the local leadership and, according to interviewees, development expectations are fulfilled predominantly by the Church. The scarcity of education opportunities has been recently highlighted out by a Special Rapporteur assigned to Myanmar by the UN55 and the lack of an effective communications infrastructure discussed at the first Parliamentary session in 201156. Chronic poverty and lack of public services has resulted in migration out of the State. Local Christian communities have relations and linkages with international Churches and organisations. Youth from Chin NGOs are regularly invited to various trainings in other countries (i.e. India and Philippines) by Church groups. In spite of this challenging environment, several Chin NGOs were created and the Chin ethnicity seems to be overrepresented among employees in the NGO sector. During a large scale cyclic rat infestation in 2008, a committee called “Chin for Chin” was established to raise awareness and find solutions and resources to the cope with the losses. This committee mobilised several influential Chin active among NGOs in Yangon, and this highlighted the concentration of Chins in this sector.
- 57 Older Chin man from southern Chin State in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Vo (...)
“As NGOs and INGOs have formed, our youngsters can get jobs easily because Chins are Christians and they have learned English. This is one way in which Christianity has supported us. In the southern Chin State, every priest has to have a building for educating youngsters. As boarders, they are trained in religion and education. Good students will be sent on for further education”. 57
42The pluri-ethnic Shan State, where the majority of the population is Buddhist, has not produced such a large number of NGOs in comparison to the above mentioned ethnic states, relative to their population. For geographic reasons, some Shan NGOs are based in Thailand (the Thai national language is close to Shan language) and operate from there in sectors such as media, Human Rights advocacy, education, and health. Many members of the Shan elite in exile advocate for their cause from Western capitals. This is the case as well for the Mon who are also mainly Buddhist and can operate in Myanmar through Buddhist monastic networks, and with culture and literacy groups.
- 58 The Northern Rakhine State is partly populated with a Muslim population called “Rohingya” who are (...)
43In the Rakhine State, a void of NGOs was reported in the North58 where a Muslim minority called the Rohingya live and who are highly discriminated against by other ethnic groups in Myanmar. More recently, Rakhine NGOs seem to have developed in the Southern part of the State, based on Buddhist charitable pillars. Several NGOs specialized in environmental projects and prevention of disasters. The recent emergency operations following Cyclone Giri on the 22nd and 23rd of October 2010 showed that very few NGOs from this area were operational or prepared for large scale relief.
- 59 Bamar NGO worker from Yangon, about his experience of work in the Cyclone Giri affected area, inte (...)
“Working with local people was a great benefit for implementation of project. We found that there are many local youths who want to do community work but no space for them. When we were distributing rice, local volunteers were very active in working with us and useful for dealing with local residents where Rakhine and Chin ethnic languages are used. They also work until late night and carried rice bags”. 59
- 60 Martin SMITH, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of civil society in Burma”, in BURMA CENTER NETHE (...)
44Foreign evangelization by Christian groups had often taken place prior to the emergence of civil society groups, and had in many cases generated the formation of NGOs in ethnic areas. The country’s border areas have seen more contact between Myanmar inhabitants and foreign missionaries since the 17th century. Evangelizations took place through pastoral activities by Christian missionaries and were generally mixed with social projects. This evangelization carried foreign norms and values to the local populations. Later, after years of war between ethnic groups and the state, the role of engaged religious NGOs to alleviate suffering might have created favourable conditions for faith-based organisations’ creation and development. Today, their ability to deal effectively with internationals is clear. As noted by Martin Smith: “In Christian communities especially, the understanding and coordination with international NGOs has often been easier to establish.”60 Not only is the contact with missionaries a strength of Christian NGOs, but more so are the broader international connections and greater education opportunities.
45Buddhist groups active in social work can be found all over the country. Like the Christians, some Buddhist monasteries have been established in remote areas of the ethnic states where they host and provide access to education for orphans. One Buddhist missionary organisation named Sitagu collaborated with Christian communities in the Cyclone Nargis affected areas. They gained exposure to international aid agencies. In addition, Buddhist organisations are traditionally specialized in development and often play a pivotal role in transmitting cultural heritage. For example, culture and literacy groups promoting education of local languages and traditions are often Buddhist. Interestingly, these organisations were not shut down during the socialist period, but were heavily monitored and constituted of government staff.
- 61 Young Kachin working for a NGO, interview by the author, Yangon, February 2011.
“Are we a NGO? Are there more NGOs nowadays? How could I say? I don’t know about the Bamar side but, for sure in minority ethnic groups, more than hundred and the number is growing. But for our Christian society, all I can say is that before we never knew we were a NGO, because this is a very broad term. You can do what you want and call it as you like! For example, when I was young, we were active in the “Baptist Youth Fellowship”, this was exactly like a NGO. We were a small group but we did something for our community. Today I am still organising some of these groups, but in Yangon. These groups gather roughly 150 youths. We call it English Learning Group and we are hosted by some international umbrellas but our discussions go much beyond just learning English. It is about critical thinking. When the term “NGO” became much more popular, we didn’t apply it, but others did. This also came to the Buddhist groups. Of course, some [religious] groups have their own services, but they don’t call them NGOs”. 61
In isolated geographic areas, traditionally more difficult to access for the central authorities, the history, culture, religion differ from the Bamar dominated mainland. In parts of central Myanmar, where the majority of the population is Buddhist, and have not been exposed to such external influences, the term NGO itself might be alien. Supporting the poorest members of the community is the duty of the monastery thanks to in-kind and cash donations made by followers. According to some Buddhist NGOs values, donations doled out to those in need in the community (, Ahlu in Myanmar language) with the best of intentions, as a final objective that is for the donor to acquire spiritual merit, and this is not always compatible with international donors’ requirements and values. As these groups are generally not familiar with international standards required by donors, they struggle to meet them. Some values even appear to be contrary to Buddhist principles, for example, an interviewee highlighted that Buddhist NGOs were few in number because Buddhist monks are not supposed to record good deeds or take any kind of pride from their compassionate actions, hence they are not used to documenting and reporting project results. He thought it could be delicate to request Buddhist monks to report in detail on their activities, capturing their impact on the beneficiaries and critically evaluate it, as donors would expect. This explanation remains superficial and there might be many other factors that would explain why Buddhist NGOs often remain disconnected from mainstream channels of international aid.
- 62 The Sangha ((...)
- 63 Zunetta LIDELL, “No Room to Move: Legal Constraints on Civil Society in Burma”, in BURMA CENTER NE (...)
- 64 Martin SMITH in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society (...)
46In spite of their social influence, Buddhist NGOs remain generally unconnected to the international community and are mainly funded by their community of followers, at the local level. Because some of its members have organised and supported opposition movements against the military junta, the Sangha62 has been under close scrutiny for the last thirty years.63 In addition, as noted by Smith when comparing the Christian groups’ work: “By contrast, the involvement of Buddhist groups in this deeply religious land has been more limited. Partly this is due to the greater political problems in the country at large, where a number of monks and monasteries have been involved in antigovernment protests since 1988; thus the organisations and practice of the Buddhist Sangha remains a sensitive issue. But partly too, there is no tradition for Buddhist monks in Burma to become involved in the same array as NGO and development projects as today exists in, for example, neighbouring Thailand".64
47Myanmar NGOs, motivated by the same will to bring about what they consider as positive societal and political change, interact with the government to gain official support, while attempting to maintain their independence in a system where the state aspires to a monopoly of power. In ethnic areas, where the relation to central authority and repartition of power are complex, religious, ethnic groups and NGOs have been taken on various humanitarian and development roles. In the national context, the history of NGOs is characterised by fluctuating relationships with the government that resulted in alternating periods of support, tolerance and retaliation. This has also resulted in the current strategy adopted by most NGOs, to enter the politics of silence.
2 - Religion and ethnicity in Myanmar NGOs: Historical factors and contemporary facts
- 65 Young Kayin female INGO employee in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices fr (...)
“Sometimes I see the help that comes through international organisations. It comes maybe because the local organisation’s mission and vision coincides with their political or religious interests. If your organisation is based on church or religion, OK. But if your organisation has a free base, then it is better not to be coloured by that kind of thing [...]. Sometimes there are other groups that would like to help us, but they also want to have some kind of influence. I want to see pure intentions. A pure secular opportunity... [but] People want to know, who is the person behind you?” 65
48The authoritarian nature of power exercised by the colonial government as well as after the parliamentary period from the 1960s shaped the operational context and had impacts on the identity of Myanmar NGOs. After an almost exhaustive interdiction to exist, NGOs were reformed and developed in a coercive system, where since the early 1990s they often highlighted the shortcomings of the central authorities. The over representation of ethnic and religious minorities, who largely consider themselves as discriminated against and marginalised by the centralisation process, is a likely catalyst for opposition ideas within the contemporary NGO sector. It is worth questioning the motivation of the government in tolerating them at the price of their silence.
49An overview of the history of NGOs in Myanmar will shed some light on the roots of their religious and ethnic identities. There have been three waves of development of modern, professional NGOs: the ceasefires in the late nineties, the discrete emergence of new political ideas aiming at setting a just political system in the early 2000s and finally the boom generated in the aftermath of the Cyclone Nargis. After describing the initial struggle of NGOs, we will turn to an examination of the case of the largest deployment in NGOs in the Myanmar history.
2.1 - From the first modern professional NGOs to the emergence of a Myanmar civil society
- 66 LNGO directory 2009, ibid.
50During the colonial period, religious organisations could be established under the Patriotic Act. The first established NGOs in the second half of the 19th century in Burma were Evangelists.66 The very first one was the Kayin Baptist Home Mission Churches Association that was used as an umbrella by a few organisations such as the Yangon Kayin Baptist Women Association created in Yangon in 1857. Their objective was to spread Baptist faith. The Myanmar Baptist Churches Union, which was then called “The Rangoon Myanmar Baptist Association”, was established in Thonze, Bago division in 1860. The creation of numerous regional and national Baptist associations followed over the years. The Myanmar Baptist Convention (MBC) was established in 1865, by the first Baptist Missionary couple that arrived in 1813 in Myanmar. MBC’s mission is: “To spread and propagate the gospel of Jesus Christ and labour for the ministry and the growth of the Church in Myanmar and throughout the world”. Then in 1910, the Kachin Baptist Convention was formed, soon followed by the Kayin Baptist Convention in 1913. These organisations are today active in various sectors (ranging from HIV/AIDS to relief, support to opium cultivators in the Golden Triangle, etc.). In 1914, the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC) was established by foreign missionaries. Their main goal was: “To unify all the Christian Churches in Myanmar”. Today this organisation is still involved in the promotion of the faith and implements educational and social activities. It is one of the rare NGOs often cited for having an official registration with the government.
51The reported first non-Christian organisation was formed in 1906 in Yangon, called the Young Men’s Buddhist Association. It embodied the growing nationalist anti-colonialist values that spread along with increasing discontent with the colonial regime. The Burmese nationalist movement that would lead to Independence established its legitimacy through its Buddhist identity.
- 67 Cherry THEIN, “Jivitadana Hospital marks 70th anniversary”, Myanmar Times, May 17-23, 2010.
52In the middle of the twentieth century, a number of free dispensaries were opened that could be labelled as the predecessors of health NGOs. They were often managed by retired civil servants and had relatively close relations with government officials (authorising their existence while the context was not conducive to such initiatives). This is the case of the Jivitadana Sangha Hospital, a free dispensary established by a retired commissioner U Ba Aye in 1940 offering in-patient accommodation for monks and nuns.67 In 1937, the Muslim Free Hospital was created in downtown Yangon. In 1956, the Guru Nanak free Dispensary and Eye Hospital opened under Hindu management. According to the mandate of these organisations, health care was provided based on the needs of the patients, regardless of religion or ethnic origins.
53Several education-focused NGOs were established during the same period. These organisations, often Buddhist, were set up by individuals or groups close to the government. Under Bamar leadership, they had clearly stated missionary objectives, as a response to the evangelization that missionaries had conducted in ethnic areas. This was the case with the Nan Oo Education and Parahita School (1958) whose mission is “Buddha’s teachings must spread and reach the remote areas of every state and division of Myanmar through educating young nationalities”. The Patauk Shwewar Monastic Primary School (1958) and the Pyinnya Theikpan Monastic School (1958-1959) also opened in this period with the objective to improve the quality of education in line with the views of the central government. The Pyinnya Tazaung Association was established in 1952 by the retired Deputy Education Commissioner U Tun Aung, with the support of some employees from the Department of Education. The emergence of these Buddhist associations is a concrete expression of the post-Independence nationalist movement.
54Muslim and Hindu religions have not been as productive in creating NGOs as the Christians or Buddhists. They also started to use this type of social organisation later, with a tendency to focus on health and education. Their later inception might be due to the fact that they were not comfortable or familiar with the NGO model and because there were more restrictions on people of Indian ethnicity at the beginning of the 20th century as Bamar increasingly asserted their majority influence. The first reported Muslim NGO was the Muslim Free Hospital and the Medical Relief Society, registered in 1937, while the All Myanmar Hindu Federation was created in 1953.
- 68 David I. STEINBERG, “A void in Myanmar” in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, S (...)
55When General Ne Win oversaw the implementation of the doctrine of the “Burmese way to socialism”, NGO space dramatically diminished. According to Steinberg: “Civil society died under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP); perhaps, more accurately, it was murdered”.68 All political dissent was then crushed and mistrust spread through the population due to constant repression, intensive surveillance, and constant fear. Only welfare and religious organisations were allowed to maintain their activities as long as they kept far from politics and maintained a low profile. In rare cases new organisations were formed during this period, but they had to demonstrate they were not a threat to the BSSP and their autonomy was severely limited with much greater scrutiny than during the colonial period.
- 69 See NETWORK FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, USDA: How the white shirts will become the new face of (...)
- 70 See, among others: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, The role of Civil Society, Asia Report 27, Bangkok- (...)
56Under the post 1990 regime, called the State Law and Order Reconciliation Council (SLORC), the few NGOs that survived the BSSP had to maintain a low profile and their ability to expand was marginal. Nonetheless, an expanded space appeared in some limited geographic areas, mostly in the cities. Later in the 1990s, it would also be the case in some ceasefire areas. The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) was founded on 15th September 1993.69 It remains the biggest GONGO in the country, with over 22 million reported members including students, civil servants and business men.70 Although all members are not necessary active or willing, the power of USDA is not negligible due its capacity to mobilise large groups of people. A vast majority of its members seem to take part in activities as they are afraid to be reported as opponents of the regime if they do not. They also seek to gain access to some protection in return. The USDA mandate was to support the activities and policies of the military and the Chairman of the SLORC, including social welfare activities. The USDA along with local authorities exercise some surveillance on the population. As a consequence, NGOs had to maintain good relations with USDA leaders, who are invited to official gatherings such as school opening ceremonies for example. In Preparation for the 2010 General Elections, the USDA became a pro-regime political party, called the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). It won with a large majority; up to 95% of the votes in the Bamar areas and around 60% in ethnic areas. Generally, apart from the Red Cross and some medical organisations such as the Myanmar Medical Association (MAA), the interactions between GONGOs and NGOs are limited.
USDA logo.
- 71 Martin SMITH in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society (...)
- 72 Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Association Fancois-Xavier B (...)
- 73 Martin SMITH, op. cit, p. 22.
- 74 Cease-fires were signed then with Wa, Kachin, Palaung and Pa-O armed groups.
- 75 David I. STEINBERG, “A void in Myanmar” in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, S (...)
57Since the early 1990s, the government progressively allowed NGOs and some International NGOs to resume working in Myanmar, especially in the health sector such as World Vision and Médecins Sans Frontière Nederland after 1991. In 1995, according to Martin Smith71, there were at least 15 international NGOs in the country, some operating without any official authorisation but still tolerated by the government.72 These INGOs were invited to work in targeted geographic areas, mainly in ethnic regions, which were perceived as having special and more acute needs. “So are there any lessons in this for international NGOs with a working interest in Burma? Certainly there are – especially in ethnic minority areas and for those proponents of civil society who support the notion of institutional pluralism, human rights and community bridge-building as ways to encourage and stabilise reform”73. For Myanmar NGOs that have generally maintained their relief programmes in ethnic conflict areas, cease-fires offered a favourable context to extend the scale and scope of their activities in health, education and support for resettlement.74 In 1996, Steinberg wrote that: “The immediate future for civil society remains bleak”.75 But, unexpectedly, the late nineties created more NGO space. NGOs created during this period enjoyed legitimacy with local populations, were recognised by the government and hence became key players. In many ethnic areas, people enjoyed a greater freedom to associate than in the previous decades, which has led to a growth in the number of NGOs. Many cease-fire organisations and religious groups were launched while existing organisations became more vocal. They carried out relief and development projects.
58The 1988 demonstrations, followed by the 1996 student movements led to the departure of many political activists, student leaders and intellectual elites. Many of them established groups in neighbouring Thailand, which became a staging ground to launch their campaigns calling for the junta to leave power and restore democracy. In each of the states located on the Thai-Burmese border (namely: Kayin, Kayah, Mon and Shan States), cross border relief was organised by exiled Myanmar nationals and international supporters. Many of these groups are Christian and they all have stated political agendas. The exile groups played a critical role in denouncing human rights violations and drawing international attention to the plight of the Myanmar people. Some members of political organisations linked to Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), or armed ethnic and political groups inside the country have joined NGOs to produce a wealth of reports detailing human rights abuses. They also engaged in lobbying foreign governments and advocating for isolation of the regime, through economic sanctions. These exiled NGOs do not attempt to change the political system progressively but want to overthrow the government. They used to criticise any form of engagement with the government whereas Myanmar NGOs based inside the country increasingly consider that pragmatism is more efficient. Most NGOs in Myanmar envisage political change through dialog and the progressive establishment of a new system. As a consequence, whereas both exiled and insiders’NGOs have the common long term objective of a more inclusive and fairer political system, there is deep disagreement on the most appropriate approach to change the system that has resulted in a long-standing schism.
59The early 2000s set a context more conducive to the development of NGOs and civil society on the whole became progressively more organised. New ideas germinated in the minds and some leaders wanted to be involved in political change in a quiet way, and created their own NGOs. More organisations were authorised by a government that might have seen the advantages in allowing these groups to operate (for example, an improved image internationally, balancing ethnic tensions in some cases, and saving money). External factors, not directly related to the government’s willingness to allow NGOs, set up a new landscape. The first of which, was the fall of General Khin Nyunt in 2004, followed by the dismantling of the Military Intelligence (MI) services that never recovered their initial ability to paralyze masses with fear. This left some space for NGOs to carry out their activities with looser monitoring. Individuals who were not identified as potential trouble makers by authorities felt less pressure in their daily life; minders disappeared from tea-shops, tailing became rare, as did the house checks in the night. As a consequence, a wider range of subjects became safe to discuss in public and the confidence to speak up also increased. Furthermore, since the move of the capital from Yangon to Nay Pyi Daw in November 2005, the presence of military in the streets of Yangon, where most of NGOs headquarters are located, is obviously less visible, leaving more room for gatherings in urban centres. This led to the emergence of increased mutual trust between individuals and groups. In ethnic areas, where cease-fires were maintained, NGOs could work in broader geographic areas on increasingly ambitious projects. Finally, the remarkable amplification of communication means, such as the spread of internet and mobile phones, enabled more information sharing and mobilisation.
60With less fear and more room to foster their new initiatives, NGOs started mushrooming. Interviews show that the latest generation of NGOs is not based on religious ideals and maintain some distance from cease-fire groups. They generate new ideas, being more openly politically engaged when they can find safe space to make their voices heard. In spite of the 2007 Sangha demonstrations, the disappointment with the results of the referendum in 2008 and the 2010 elections, most of the interviewed NGO leaders said that they were optimistic for the future. They believe that the space allowed for NGOs is increasing. This is the context in which Cyclone Nargis hit the county and the Ayeyarwady Division became the theatre of the biggest emergency response ever in Myanmar. The aftermath of the Cyclone was favourable to the development and the multiplication of NGOs at an unprecedented level.
2.2 - Cyclone Nargis: disaster or opportunity for Myanmar NGOs?
- 76 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “I want to help my own people”, State Control and Civil Society in Burma after (...)
“Under-appreciated positive legacy of the cyclone response: the development of a group of new, truly independent and experienced civil society organisations in Burma, which now seek to use their skills to address other humanitarian challenges in the country.” 76
- 77 Senior Myanmar NGO employee, interview by the author, Yangon, January 2011.
“In 2002, an INGO employee told me ‘Burma seems very sexy’ in the eyes of the international community. Of course, it was. But today, it is the sexiest! As most people would say, Nargis was the strongest force for people to emerge. Among NGOs, you had relief groups, food distribution groups, etc. This didn’t exist before. After that, it mushroomed. Another good example is the relief operation in Cyclone Giri. Not many NGOs were known there before. There civil society organisations would have worked in a traditional way, with low profile on sectors such as funeral services, education of the local language and culture and others. So the cyclone supported the creation of NGOs. When we go in Sittwe now, we meet here and there people who want to tell us about their various projects for the community. It created a push for the civil society to come NGOs!” 77
- 78 The four cut strategy aimed at isolating population hosting insurgent of four items ‘food, finance (...)
61It is now a cliché in Yangon to state that the Cyclone Nargis tragedy also enabled the emergence of Myanmar civil society. The modalities and implications of faith and ethnicity of the humanitarian NGOs deployed after the disaster provide an illustration of the stakes on the ground. Cyclone Nargis struck the Ayeyarwady Delta on the night of 2nd to 3rd May 2008, devastating the rice bowl of the country. Populated mostly with Bamar and “Pwo” Kayin, this region did not benefit from much interest from the central government since Independence, except for pockets of KNU insurgency that were wiped out by the Myanmar Army in the nineties. Due to the success of the “Four cuts policy” designed at cutting supply to armed groups initiated under Ne Win, once the KNU were routed out of the area, it remained relatively peripheral although geographically close to Yangon.78
Table 5: Evolution of the total number of NGOs before and after the Cyclone Nargis
Source: BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma, possibilities and dilemmas for international NGOs, 1999; CBI directories.
62The above table shows the constant growth of the NGO sector since 1996. Whereas INGOs are generally more vocal, they appear to be fewer in number. LNGOs creations and official recognition occurred later and at a slower pace at first but grew quicker in the 2000s. It is worth noting that numerous post-Nargis NGOs didn’t register officially and their boom is in reality much larger than the above presented figures.
- 79 According to the Capacity Building Initiative (CBI) Directory there were a total of 41 development (...)
- 80 28 out of the 81 recorded NGOs in the CBI Directory in 2009 (LNGO Directory 2009, op. cit.).
63Before Nargis, very few NGOs were working in the Ayeyarwaddy Division,79 this included Metta Development Foundation and a few Christian churches organisations. They mainly implemented livelihoods and health projects. Following the cyclone, the number of NGOs working there exploded80, as international funds poured in the country. Most of these NGOs had no experience in relief and none had ever had to face a large scale disaster. They were also new to the cultural and ethnic context of the Ayeyarwaddy Divison.
- 81 TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, Post-Nargis Social Impact Monitoring: June 2009, Yangon, 2009, p. 43-44.
64After Cyclone Nargis, international aid agencies’perceptions of local NGOs slowly shifted from being suspicious of their possible alignment with the regime or radical opposition forces, to consider them a worthy source of local knowledge. NGOs played the strategic role of intermediaries between local groups and beneficiaries, as they channelled aid when International NGOs’ access was restricted. Their work was less visible as they usually did not flag banners at each project site and were absent from formal coordination meetings lead by International NGOs and UN agencies. NGOs tended to judge these meetings as non-inclusive (because they were conducted in English) and time-consuming. NGOs’ presence was tolerated by the local authorities without any official authorisation, under the condition that their efforts remained very low key (no logo, limited communication about the project, no advocacy). As a consequence, capturing NGOs’ inputs as well as their social and political impacts was relatively challenging, however, some trends could be identified. For example, according to various International NGO reports, their response generated the reaffirmation or the redistribution of pre-existing social and political powers at the village level. Village leaders ended up playing the role of intermediaries with aid providers. This re-legitimised their leadership position and strengthened it. In other villages, previously powerful individuals passed away and new leaders had to be identified. Women’s roles significantly changed in some villages as they suddenly became formally involved in decision-making processes where they were only privately consulted by the men of their families before.81
Officials’ role is highlighted but the disaster should not eclipse the coming referendum for the Constitution. (The New Light of Myanmar, “Special Issue:
Nargis”, Vol. XVI, No. 22, May 10, 2008)
Source: ACTION Aid, [Voices of Communities towards aid agencies], Yangon, 2010
- 82 For instance, in South Eastern Myanmar where the Christian population suffered from food shortages (...)
- 83 TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment: July 2008, Yangon, 2008, p. 40.
- 84 CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from inside: Myanmar civil society’s r (...)
65Religious organisations traditionally play an important role in providing social services and have their own specialties; Buddhist monasteries provide education, churches provide early childhood care and support for livelihoods, for example. In a humanitarian setting as well, they play a crucial role, especially in conflict affected areas.82 After Cyclone Nargis hit, churches and monasteries provided relief. Places of worship that had not been destroyed were made available as public shelters and distribution points. Religious leaders became focal points to interact with outside aid providers and access financial and material support. Religious organisations based in urban centres collected funds and organised transportation to the villages. Different religious NGOs ran large scale relief operations and collaborated with each other for the first time. This has been described by NGOs and international observers as a positive, albeit unexpected, outcome of this humanitarian response. The Myanmar government echoed this idea through the Tripartite Core Group made up of the United Nations, Association of South East Asian Nations and the then Government of the Union of Myanmar: “Many Buddhist monks from all over the country also went to the affected difficult to access areas and disbursed substantial quantities of cash and relief materials to the villagers using the local monastery as base. Likewise, religious leaders and members of all other faiths in the country contributed substantially to the relief efforts”.83 Local actors also congratulated each other for the collaboration between groups. “We didn’t care if people were Kayin or Buddhist or Myanmar, we made no distinction. Before Nargis there was a lot of discrimination between religious groups, especially, Christian, Muslim and Buddhist. When Nargis happened, no one could stay in the house. Everyone came out to work for the affected people and people didn’t want to stay alone. People don’t see religion and race they just see human beings. These things came out, that spirit. The response to Nargis crossed all ethnic lines”.84
66NGOs employees, originally from other parts of the country, went through an unprecedented cultural shock. A Christian Chin employee newly appointed manager in Lapputta explained to the author how difficult it was at first for him and his team to adapt. He did not know how to address to the Buddhist monks. His organisation had previously assigned him to take contact with some Kayin pastors to collect information and be accepted by the local community. He then found out, that he would have to deal with the local Buddhist community too. Delta inhabitants were not used to meet visitors from other states of the country.
- 85 These employees were generally working out of their native region for the first time and were prob (...)
- 86 Interview by the author, Yangon, October 2010.
“Although they could all speak Myanmar, it was difficult to understand each other’s accent. We felt a high level of suspicion at the beginning. The other employees were also feeling homesick and I had to persuade my team to stay. It took about four weeks for them to feel accepted by local communities”. 85 This NGO’s first action has been to rebuild a temporary church. Meetings to assess needs were held in the church. “Discussions on aid started only after singing prayers”.86
- 87 According to an international consultant working for a faith-based NGO after the Cyclone, Christia (...)
- 88 When interviewed by the authors, bigger-sized NGOs would systematically deny such practices, thoug (...)
67The use of religious connections to channel aid to the affected community, although widely spread and reported as logistically efficient, was problematic in some religiously heterogeneous villages.87 While the early weeks and months after the Cyclone were perceived as a fruitful collaborative time of support between various ethnic groups and faith groups, some tensions were detected as time moved on from the disaster and aid resources dried up. The traditional ethnic and religious conflict dynamics were in some cases exacerbated by what was seen as unequal access to aid. A few cases of faith-based targetted aid creating tensions have been reported. Most of the religious organisations recruited their employees from their own community88. In addition, some practices of religious groups, not necessarily meaningful for the protagonists, carried strong exclusionary messages to others. For example, in a few villages, people reported that they did not dare to go to distributions held in worship places of other religions although the organisation processing the distribution claimed that any villager was entitled to receive aid items, regardless of faith or ethnicity.
68In many villages, the monastery or church was the most solid building of the village and was used as a shelter, storage and distribution point. To access outsiders’ support, those affected had two options: either to stay passively with the hope of being identified when NGOs deployed their employees in the region or to proactively use their own social and religious networks to attract attention to their needs. Most of the religious leaders opted for the second option. In some cases, collaboration with groups sharing the same faith enabled the development of closer relations between NGOs and their beneficiaries, enabling more information sharing and more involvement in aid delivery, hence reducing aid dependency syndromes.
69Aid delivery was partly conditioned by NGOs’ ability to collect funds. Christian groups had developed more expertise in fund raising, for the historical reasons mentioned in the previous section. This can be a factor for their wider and longer term presence in the recovery phase. As there was no centralised information system and most of the local actors operated under the radar, international donors often used traditional channels and networks. In practice, more funds were channelled to Christian NGOs without the donors’ community full awareness of the complex interethnic and religious dynamics at work, potentially exacerbating antagonisms. Actors’ positions can be contradictory. According to the Archbishop of Yangon:
- 89 Public speech, Yangon, March 2011.
“The Baptists work for the Baptists, the Anglicans work for the Anglicans, but the Catholic Church works for all. Our Catholic people do not get aid form others. Our aid workers were human, so human that their own people were left out, too busy to help others. This is one issue for the respect of the Rights to dignity for the Church followers. We need more regular cooperation with NGOs, we need to have the systems in place. After Cyclone Giri, many NGOs rushed there to get a place. There were some catholic villages, although picked during the coordination meetings by seven, non-Catholic, NGOs. I visited one month later and our people were still waiting for the necessary items (rice, water, etc.). This is what I see.” 89
- 90 This picture has been taken in a Kayin Christian community affected by Cyclone Nargis where Baptis (...)
Christian Kayin ladies in their village after Nargis.
Source: Photo by the author, Ayeyarwady Division, May 2009.90
- 91 The TCG was the body mandated to coordinate aid by the Myanmar government between June 2008 and Ju (...)
- 92 TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, Post-Nargis Social Impact Monitoring: June 2009, Yangon, 2009, p. xi.
70With time, some tasks fell back to religious groups’ responsibility depending on their traditional approach and areas of expertise. “In the aftermath of the cyclone, all kinds of religious leaders were involved in the aid effort. A year later, as the immediate emergency had dwindled, Buddhist monks appeared to have focused on providing support for education and other realms. Christian and Muslims religious leaders continued to be involved in day-to-day recovery activities”.91 The withdrawal of the monks from rehabilitation work is presented as a fullfilment of their tradtional role of “education providers”. According to the Tripartite Core Group: “This is consistent with Buddhist teaching: monks are expected to separate themselves as much as possible form the secular affairs, something that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as a cyclone emergency, would circumscribe day-today involvement in aid-related activities but allow for involvement in education, a realm in which they continued to be involved”.92
- 93 Martin SMITH, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of civil society in Burma”, ibid.
71Interfaith, and to a certain extent interethnic, work established temporary bridges over ethnic and religious gaps, at a small scale and there is no indication that such collaboration could be reproducible at this scale elsewhere in the county. More prevailing was the risk to expand cultural and religious divisions by international actors’ lack of understanding of the conflict sensitivities. As noted by Smith, 15 years ago: “If aid is given only to one sector, faction or group within such culturally diverse communities, not only can this politically, socially, or religiously divisive, it could actually fuel even deeper grievances and misunderstandings. This has been privately acknowledged within many ethnic minority communities and, in the longer term”93 and Cyclone Nargis related aid showed that progress remain to be seen. Although the Cyclone will last in the memories as a huge tragedy, the relief operation provided more long term space for NGOs in the country. As such, it is a pivotal date in the contemporary history of Myanmar civil society.
72Between the repression of the regime and the ethnic and religious complications, NGOs developed and grew despite these constraints, making them somewhat vocal, with varying degrees of closeness to the regime. Voicing the concerns of the silent majority, and more particularly minority groups, they nonetheless developed an identity over two decades and became influential players in local, regional and national politics. The NGOs that have the freedom to verbally articulate their long term agendas are very few. Nonetheless, political agendas can be inferred within this silence. This is what we will argue in the following part, with focusing on NGOs’ modalities of intervention, personal testimonies of engaged individuals as well as tangible political impact.
Notes
4 Ministry of Information, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), article 34 : “Every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practise religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution”.
5 “The special place envisaged for Buddhism and the Myanmar language seeks to continue the exclusion of minorities”, in Yash GHAI, The 2008 Myanmar Constitution: Analysis and Assessment, p. 37.
6 Timo KIWIMAKI and Morten B. PEDERSON, Burma, mapping the challenges and opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation, Crisis Management Initiative, Martti Ahtisaari Rapid Reaction Facility, Brussels, Feb. 2008, p. 10.
7 Guillaume ROZENBERG, “Etre Birman c’est être Bouddhiste”, in Gabriel DEFERT (ed.), Birmanie contemporaine, IRASEC-Les Indes savantes, Bangkok, 2008, p. 29-52.
8 Helmut K. ANHEIER (ed.), The Civil Society Diamond: A Primer, Civicus Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 1, Issues 2, July 2001, p. 3.
9 “According to the doctrine of the Myanmar way to socialism, not only political parties, but also many social and religious organisations were declared illegal, the free press was eliminated, schools were nationalised, and even the traditionally independent Buddhist monastic order (the Sangha) was attempted brought under state control”, in Timo KIWIMAKI and Morten B. PEDERSON, op. cit, p. 25.
10 David I. STEINBERG, “A void in Myanmar: Civil society in Burma”, in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma, possibilities and dilemmas for international NGOs, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1999, p. 1-14.
11 Anonymous, “Myanmar allocates 1/4 of new budget to military”, Associated Press Yangon, May 10, 2011.
12 Ibid.
13 “INGOs need to change to do more capacity building. The rules of engagement still see local NGOs as subcontractors because their capacity is weaker”, according to Aung Tun Thet, senior advisor to the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Myanmar, in Anonymous, “MYANMAR: Call to build up local NGOs”, IRIN News, 1 March 2011.
14 “A newly arrived INGO country director remarked that ‘civil society organisations here seem to be values driven’, an observation echoed in reports about the rise of civil society after Cyclone Nargis, and existing strong social cohesion”, in LOCAL RESOURCE CENTER and OXFAM, Progressing through partnerships: how national and international organisations work together in Myanmar, Yangon, March 2010, p. 33.
15 Such as the allegory of the beauty (Aung San Suu Kyi) and the beast (Tatmadaw) as an allegory of international community perception of the political issues in Myanmar, developed by Prof. Hans-Berndt Zoellner in a book to be published at the end of 2011 under the tentative title: A History of the Conflict between the Military and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma/Myanmar Set in a Global Context, 1988-2010.
16 Meanwhile, many members of civil society are simply getting on with the job of helping vulnerable populations cope with the pressures of everyday life. They may not always have a broader vision, but they all recognise that local communities have to work together to cope, whatever happens politically. See Timo KIWIMAKI and Morten B. PEDERSON, op. cit, p. 83.
17 The police Special Branch, also known as the ‘SB’ in Myanmar, is utilized by the state to monitor activities of opposition groups and individuals, and civil society groups. The military intelligence was dismantled after the arrest of Secretary 1 and Intelligence head, General Khin Nyunt. As a consequence the Special Branch is now under the control of the Home Ministry and a new military intelligence service has been created with less capacity.
18 As highlighted in the Dave Matthieson’s presentation on Human Rights study methodology at the Burma Studies Conference, Marseilles, July, 10th 2010.
19 Such as the American Center in Yangon is able to because it is a foreign entity, with diplomatic status.
20 The Government prior to the 2010 General Elections is referred to as Government of the Union of Myanmar (GoUM). After November 2010, it is referred as the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (GRUM). When a continuity is observed and both governments are concerned, the term “government” is used through this study.
21 See http://www.themimu.info
22 A NGO based in Yangon providing training and other capacity building services to NGOs. CBI itself is not registered as a NGO but as a project according to an interview with the Director.
23 NGOs were required to meet the following criteria to be included in the 2004 Directory: “non-profit, voluntary initiative, independent, self-governing, socially accountable, human welfare aims, acting as intermediary, socially progressive, voluntary values, willingness to participate, clear leadership to contact, multiple sites of work or areas of beneficiaries, Yangon office”.
24 Interview by the author, Yangon, January 2010.
25 The rapid growth of religious NGOs here could be attributed to a more tolerant approach adopted by the government over the years towards these actors, as they seem not to be engaged in political opposition activities. As a consequence, NGOs would be less reluctant to define themselves as religious.
26 A bus ticket is around 3,500 MMK from Pathein, the main city of this division and Laputta, a town that was largely swept away by Cyclone Nargis where many NGO based their temporary field office.
27 Sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union and Australia on Myanmar do not allow training of senior civil servants from government offices.
28 In some townships affected by Cyclone Nargis, relations between NGOs and local authorities were smoother as the central government generally acknowledged the need for aid, but this observation could not apply to other geographic areas.
29 Interview by the author, Yangon, October 2010.
30 A registered NGO has to report annually or bi-annually on their activities and finances. Funds are supposed to be solely channelled through the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank.
31 Public statement during a meeting held in Bangkok in August 2010 about the emergency of civil society organised by a donor organisation. In this statement, the military means the military government prior to November 2010.
32 For example, local authorities are invited and greeted as the most important guests at a school opening ceremony and are thanked for allowing the NGO to build the school.
33 In the early 2000s, the government used to be in the denial of the epidemics and wasn’t supportive of any intervention in prevention or treatment of the disease. Cf. Anonymous (R. H.), “A new epicenter, Burma ignores its AIDS crisis”, Time Asia, Vol. 156, No. 15, October 16, 2000.
34 Interview by the author, February 2011, Yangon.
35 Recently, some more relations were established with NGOs to re-build schools in the context of post Cyclone Nargis reconstruction, and the Ministry of Education allowed targeted material support: construction work, furniture and material purchases.
36 Young Rakhine man working in a NGO in Yangon, in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from inside: Ethnic people speak, Phnom Penh, 2010, p. 154.
37 Young Rakhine woman from Rakhine State, in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, op. cit, p. 63.
38 Figures according to the latest Census carried out in 1983.
39 See Jean A. BERLIE, The Burmanization of Myanmar's Muslims, White Lotus, Bangkok, 2008, 156 p.
40 Buddhists missionary groups are very active in Myanmar. The International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Yangon (http://www.itbmu.org.mm) has reportedly close links with the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
41 Paragraph 70, Progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, 7th March 2011.
42 Brian HEIDEL, The Growth of Civil Society in Myanmar, 2006, p. 12.
43 LNGO directory 2009, The directory of local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) in Myanmar, English and Myanmar version, Yangon, 2010, 101 p.
44 Former armed ethnic groups in these two states have signed peace agreements after years of civil war with the Myanmar Army and the states host large non-Buddhist minority populations.
45 See www.themimu.org
46 This map is not comprehensive as only partial information could be collected by a few INGOs working with NGOs. Myanmar NGOs were generally not keen to share their information with the MIMU. This is reportedly due to a lack of trust and the fear to appear on a map in an area where no formal authorization to work has been granted by the GoUM.
47 The higher concentration in the Delta is due to the response to Cyclone Nargis with many NGOs deployed at the time of the mapping exercise.
48 “There are also a large number of community-based welfare organisations [...]. Many of these groups are associated with or operating in the space created by the ceasefires (particular in Kachin State amongst Jingphaw whose clan-based society has unusually strong community networks), but civil society is emerging even in some conflict-affected areas. The main exceptions are eastern Shan State, where few above-ground civil societies exist due, in part at least, to a hostile political culture that includes non-state actors, and the northern Rakhine State, whose mainly Muslim Rohingya population faces extreme repression by the Myanmar authorities. Ethnic civil society groups also operate in the cities and towns of central Burma” (Timo KIWIMAKI and Morten B. PEDERSON, op. cit, p. 72-73).
49 Mary P. CALLAHAN, Political authority in Burma’s ethnic minority states: devolution, occupation, and coexistence, East-West Center Washington, Singapore, 2007, p. 43.
50 The KIO has been active in relief activities after the signature of the cease-fire with the GoUM. They organised the first immunization program in the Kachin hilly region, resettled 10,000 refugees from China, implemented intensive forest replanting since 1997 and lead with the government an opium eradication program.
51 Kachin Baptist Shop keeper, Interview by the author, Myitkyina, May 2011.
52 The KNU objects to the burmanisation of the word Karen to “kayin” – as a consequence they only use the name “Karen”.
53 See Ashley SOUTH with Mali PERHULT and Nils CARTENSEN, Conflict and Survival: Self-protection in south-east Burma, Chatham House, Asia Programme Paper ASP PP 2010/04, London, September 2010, 72 p.
54 Older Kayin businessman, in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from inside: Ethnic people speak, op. cit, p. 62.
55 UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, by Quintana Tomás Ojea, A/HRC/16/59, March 7, 2011, New York, paragraph No. 74: “Although the right to education begins with free, compulsory primary education, the right applies also to older children and adults. However, there appears to be a serious shortage of education opportunities above primary school. For example, there are only 49 high schools and no higher learning institution such as college or university in Chin State. High school graduates must continue their higher education outside of Chin State, a considerable additional financial burden for parents, and thus an added barrier to educational access for Chin students”.
56 The lack of public infrastructures and services has recently been the object of questions in the first regular session of the Pyithu Hluttaw. See, among others: Anonymous, “U Ngon Moung of Haka Consitituency submitted a motion ‘Transport facilitation in Chin State by the Union Government’”, The New Light of Myanmar, 11 March 2011, p. 9, and Anonymous, “"Health Minister replies to the proposal of U Paul Hlyan Lwin of Chin State Consistency – 9" to issue Sa Ma to graduate Chin male doctors as soon as possible and send them to the region of Chin State which are in need of doctors”, The New Light of Myanmar, 17th March 2011, p. 12.
57 Older Chin man from southern Chin State in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from inside: Ethnic people speak, op. cit, p. 62.
58 The Northern Rakhine State is partly populated with a Muslim population called “Rohingya” who are not recognized as genuine populations by the vast majority of the Myanmar people. They are not listed among the 135 national races. Only a couple of international NGOs are periodically allowed to carry out activities in the part of the country. For more information, see Francis ARCARO and Lois DESAINE, La junte birmane contre “l’ennemi intérieur”: répression ethnique et exil des réfugiés rohingya, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2008, 230 p.
59 Bamar NGO worker from Yangon, about his experience of work in the Cyclone Giri affected area, interview by the author, Yangon, January 2011.
60 Martin SMITH, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of civil society in Burma”, in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma…, op. cit, p. 44.
61 Young Kachin working for a NGO, interview by the author, Yangon, February 2011.
62 The Sangha () is the community of the Buddhist monks.
63 Zunetta LIDELL, “No Room to Move: Legal Constraints on Civil Society in Burma”, in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma…, op. cit, p. 44.
64 Martin SMITH in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma…, op. cit, p. 15-53.
65 Young Kayin female INGO employee in CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from inside: Ethnic people speak, op. cit, p. 67.
66 LNGO directory 2009, ibid.
67 Cherry THEIN, “Jivitadana Hospital marks 70th anniversary”, Myanmar Times, May 17-23, 2010.
68 David I. STEINBERG, “A void in Myanmar” in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma…, op. cit, p. 8.
69 See NETWORK FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, USDA: How the white shirts will become the new face of Burma’s dictatorship, Mae Sariang, 2006, 90 p.
70 See, among others: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, The role of Civil Society, Asia Report 27, Bangkok-Brussels, 6 December 2001, 37 p.
71 Martin SMITH in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma…, op. cit, p. 52.
72 Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Association Fancois-Xavier Bagnoud, Australian Red Cross, Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ), Care International, Groupe de Recherche et d’Échange Technologique (GRET), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of Eye Bank, International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), Leprosy Mission International, Médecins du Monde, Population Services International, Sasakawa Foundation, Save the Children UK, World Concern according to Martin SMITH, ibid.
73 Martin SMITH, op. cit, p. 22.
74 Cease-fires were signed then with Wa, Kachin, Palaung and Pa-O armed groups.
75 David I. STEINBERG, “A void in Myanmar” in BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS and TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, Strengthening civil society in Burma…, op. cit, p. 13.
76 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “I want to help my own people”, State Control and Civil Society in Burma after Cyclone Nargis, New York, May 2010, 102 p.
77 Senior Myanmar NGO employee, interview by the author, Yangon, January 2011.
78 The four cut strategy aimed at isolating population hosting insurgent of four items ‘food, finance, intelligence and recruitment’ to weaken the rebellions. See Patricia HYNES, Country Guide: Burma, Forced Migration Organisation, 2003, 38 p.
79 According to the Capacity Building Initiative (CBI) Directory there were a total of 41 development projects in the whole Division in 2004. These projects ranked from funeral services to English classes, or support to farmers to improve crop harvests (LNGO Directory 2004, The directory of local non-governmental organisations in Myanmar, English and Myanmar version, Yangon, 2005, 162 p.).
80 28 out of the 81 recorded NGOs in the CBI Directory in 2009 (LNGO Directory 2009, op. cit.).
81 TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, Post-Nargis Social Impact Monitoring: June 2009, Yangon, 2009, p. 43-44.
82 For instance, in South Eastern Myanmar where the Christian population suffered from food shortages, Churches have been supporting IDPs with relief distributions.
83 TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment: July 2008, Yangon, 2008, p. 40.
84 CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Listening the Voices from inside: Myanmar civil society’s response to Cyclone Nargis, Phnom Penh, 2009, p. 34.
85 These employees were generally working out of their native region for the first time and were probably recruited less for their skills than for their religious orientations in most of the observed cases.
86 Interview by the author, Yangon, October 2010.
87 According to an international consultant working for a faith-based NGO after the Cyclone, Christianity was perceived by Buddhist inhabitants as a “foreign religion”.
88 When interviewed by the authors, bigger-sized NGOs would systematically deny such practices, though it appears that smaller NGOs – who are less exposed to international norms such as ethnic inclusiveness – admit giving priorities to those whom they consider as “their own people”, feeding mistrust between religious groups at local level.
89 Public speech, Yangon, March 2011.
90 This picture has been taken in a Kayin Christian community affected by Cyclone Nargis where Baptist NGOs distributed food and first aid in the church (interestingly, it was the first building to be repaired after the Cyclone). In surrounding villages, Buddhist Bamar interviewees expressed their frustration as aid was at first delivered exclusively to Christian minority community by faith-based organization channels. The picture is taken from the village pier that is the main entry point of the village. Obviously, no visitor can ignore the villagers’ religious orientation.
91 The TCG was the body mandated to coordinate aid by the Myanmar government between June 2008 and July 2010. It was composed of members from the Association of South East Asian Nations, the United Nations and Myanmar Government.
92 TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, Post-Nargis Social Impact Monitoring: June 2009, Yangon, 2009, p. xi.
93 Martin SMITH, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of civil society in Burma”, ibid.
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