Introduction

Thailand

The Southern Border Provinces of Thailand (Songkla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat)

Main Incidents in Southern Thailand

1It was one of these landmark special programs at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, on the top floor of the Maneeya Centre Building, in the upscale commercial heart of Bangkok, where Major General Pichet Wisaijorn was the exclusive guest speaker on that evening of November 2009. Many of the journalists, both Thai and Foreign, were present and Khun Roong and the other staff at the bar were working non-stop, dropping pizza here and glasses of dark beer there. Expectations were high. Pichet was the Fourth Army Region commander, which includes the three “problematic provinces” of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, plus a few unruly districts in the Songkhla province. Since 2003, thousands of people, rubber tappers, insurgents, traders, school teachers, civil servants, police officers, military personnel and some foreigners had been killed in a maelstrom of violence linked to what was officially called the “separatist insurgency” by the authorities as well as linked to the mafia culture prevailing in this region. The trafficking of women, drug peddling, extortion, smuggling of palm oil and cheap electronic items from Malaysia have always been rife in the deep South. This mafia culture is prevailing in many of Thailand’s 77 provinces, but the total breakdown of law and order in the South makes it worse.

2Many in the audience were thinking that General Pichet would deliver some answers to the most important questions which have puzzled journalists, businessmen and other residents for years: who leads the insurgency? What are their objectives? How the movement is structured, or is it even structured at all? What is the division of power between the Southern Border Provincial Administrative Committee, the armed forces, the local administration and the central government? Have there been any attempts to negotiate with the insurgents? But the presentation of Pichet was rather disappointing. What is the direction of their policy? Pichet repeated the royally endorsed recipe: khao chai, khao teung, pattana (“understand, reach out and develop”). With its supreme and unquestioned wisdom, this “magic formula” is supposed to throw the listeners in deep awe and reverence.1 But the mantra had long become a poor PR tool to answer the questions of journalists and diplomats on field visits in sam changwat pak tai, the three provinces of the South.

3Pichet also spent a large amount of time explaining the virtues of some organic fertilizer which is doing miracles in Southern rubber trees plantations. Then, if trees can grow stronger and faster than anywhere else, why should the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand be unhappy? What crisis? Everything is getting back to normal thanks to this organic fertilizer and royal wisdom.

4That same year, as Thai military were doing strenuous efforts to fertilize the three provinces ungrateful soil, more than 1,000 people were killed, in connection, according to the police, to the insurgency. But things were never that straightforward. For instance, the killing of an old monk and two pagoda’s boys in October 2005, in a Buddhist temple in the Panare district of Pattani province, had been presented by the Thai media, especially the TV – all controlled by government and military except the public channel Thai PBS – as an audacious attack against Buddhism by Muslim separatists. Local sources had another explanation: one of the pagoda’s boys had a personal conflict with a Malay Youth who was among the raiders. But these factual circumstances were lost somewhere between the Panare Temple and the Bangkok editorial offices. For the average Thai Buddhist, watching the Thai TV channels without questioning the validity of the source, Buddhism was besieged.

5Even if we consider that half of the violent incidents are actually crime related and have no actual connection to politics, the number of killed is still staggering: over 4,500 people between January 2004 and February 2011, according to deep South Watch; a Pattani-based independent organization monitoring the violence. The question that must be asked is why Pichet, who receives a huge budget to solve the “Southern issue”,2 was speaking about this organic fertilizer and not about the military strategy to counter this wave of political killings? More than merely cynicism, it was probably a desire to project a “positive image”, to save face.

6It reminds me of a Public Relations Department (basically, the propaganda tool of the government) sponsored trip in the three provinces in 2007. We – a group of around thirty Thai and Foreign journalists – were taken in a red zone, where, according to officialdom, the implantation of militants is the deepest. There, we were given a guided visit of a “sufficiency economy project” in a Malay Muslim village of Narathiwat province where fish ponds, pig dung powered lighting and aromatic rice were creating a harmonious existence. “As you see, said one of the charming and helpful PRD ladies, these villagers are happy. They are used to a simple life, and they just need what is necessary for their daily life. They are not interested in politics”. As we were about to leave, one of the Malay villagers summoned his courage and told us, in full view of Thai military officers: “Don’t believe them. They are just lying. The situation here is terrible”.

7The policies elaborated by the Thai State to confront the unrest in the Southern provinces have been based on the perception and assessment of the situation by the central authorities. And, as is often the case, perceptions are creating their own “reality”. It is only when we see these policies implemented on the ground that the misconceptions and weaknesses they contain become visible. It is the experiences drawn from these hard lessons that are supposed to be used in order to improve future policies. This study aims at reviewing the policy documents on the South of the successive governments, from 1978 to 2010, and to analyze the implementation of these policies.

8In the first chapter, we will expose and discuss the seven demands introduced in 1947 by the local Muslim leader Haji Sulong. Although the history of the troubled relationships between the region and the Thai central State goes back much further into the past, this event marked the first time the demands of local Malay Muslims were clearly and formally articulated. This starting point will serve us as a reference for the following chapters and allow us to see how far the central State, in each period, has been able to take into account the local viewpoint. We will also describe the different power structures – political, administrative and religious – relevant to the southernmost provinces. The second chapter deals with the period between 1978 and 1998, when the successive policies concerning the Southern border provinces were elaborated by the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC). The next chapter takes into account the change in approach of the National Security Council in its 1999-2003 policy paper.

9After 2003, the National Security Council stopped to write a specific policy document on the Southern border provinces, but only dealt briefly with the issue in its general National Security Policy documents. In parallel, the government of Thaksin Shinawatra took the lead from 2002 in establishing and implementing policies in the South. Thus chapter four is divided in two parts: a first section analyzes the general policies of the National Security Council as well as a confidential assessment document produced by the military in 2006; the second section focuses on policy implementation.

10Chapter five will consider the policies after the 19^th September 2006 coup d’Etat which overthrew Thaksin, with one section devoted to the administration of military appointed Prime minister Surayud Chulanont and the later section devoted to the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, formed in December 2008. Finally, in the last chapter, we will review a few initiatives of civil society groups which are trying to contribute to finding a solution to the conflict.