Entrevue avec Thongchai Winichakul
Réalisé le 8 décembre 2009 à Bangkok, par Jacques Ivanoff et Arnaud Leveau en marge d’un dîner débat intitulé « Thailand in Transition : A Historic Challenge and What’s Next ? »
p. 93-96
Texte intégral
1I try to be systematic but I cannot. I published a diagram on Thai democracy in the Journal of Contemporary Asia in 2008. In this diagram, I represent the history of democracy in Thailand in 3 series:
1/ From absolute monarchy to “democracy”: monarchists versus commoners (1868-1949). Central issue: The role and power of the monarchy in democracy. Result: the monarchy is politically “above” (= out, beyond, away from politics)
2/ Military versus Parliamentary democracy (liberals + royalists) (1938, Phibun – May 1992)
Central issue: The role and power of the military as opposed to parliamentary politics (Oct 1973 was the turning point and the beginning of the end of military rule)
3/ Popular democracy versus “Thai style” democracy (Oct 1973 – today) The legitimacy of electoral democracy with corrupt politics: either strong governments or weak and unstable governments under a strong and active monarchy. The monarchists returned in 1973, and have exerted their hegemony since 1992.
2People do not buy it yet or maybe they do not care. So far I do not think that people are looking at it in the 3 series perspective. People tend to talk about linear historical moments of democratization with historical landmarks such as 1932, 1973, 1976 to 1992. I don’t think that’s enough, as this methodology fails to explain many things. Due to this simple kind of thinking, especially among liberal historians, people cannot see beyond the fight against the military, which is an important historical phase but is not the whole story. They can’t see the role of the monarchy, nor can they see the political dynamism of the rural sector that has been taking place since the 1980s.
3In my view, the first period was the result of the structural changes from late 19th to early 20th century. These changes made many commoners, who wished for participation, to want a new system that would enable them to participate or to have a greater share of power. Of course the absolute monarchy resisted. Then we get to 1932. The main issue was where, how or how much power should the monarchy have? That is the first series.
4The second series started in the middle of the first one, which is after 1932. The military played an important role because they are the ones who executed and protected the 1932 revolution. But as in many other revolutions in the world, although they did a good job protecting the revolution, they ended up being dictators. The issue within this series is the military dictatorship versus Parliamentary democracy. It is a period of modernization in which a huge army of educated and middle class people emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Over time, these people wanted to have a share in power and a political system that would be open to them. Most of the liberal Thais that grew up and belonged to this second series do not understand democracy beyond the issue of this series. They do not understand the role of the monarchy or the underlying social changes. This series ended in 1992 but, within it, the monarchy came back as a powerful political force, and popular democracy emerged strongly as well. So since 1973 up to now, we are in the third series in which the popular and elected democracy faces a historical challenge: where do we put the monarchy in Thai democracy. Or we may say that the monarchy tried to shape popular democracy in its own way. They say that the monarchy is “above” politics. What do they mean by “above”? To the monarchists, it means that the monarchy is a higher authority, commanding over the normal political system. Thai democracy needs this kind of moral authority. This is how Thai monarchists think. It is like the Hindu-Buddhist cosmography, isn’t it? This is the structure the monarchists want. But this may not be what people want.
5Since the mid-1980s, Thailand has been going through a fundamental socioeconomic change. The export-oriented economic boom and globalization have resulted in a huge change in rural society and its relationship with the urban one. The majority of the population is no longer the poor uneducated peasants. Their livelihood is part-urban and more closely connected with the non-farm socio-economy. They found in the regular elections a way to access political power and their share of resources. Elections increasingly matter to their livelihood. Rural people started becoming more active and no longer submissive or willing to submit to “paid” electorates.
6The urban educated people do not understand this fundamental change. They do not understand that democracy is not a formula that can be taught or that rural people need to learn how to vote. Democracy means that people can participate to get their share of power. They do not have to understand democracy from a textbook. They only have to protect their interests, and to go through a process to negotiate with others. This is not the kind of democracy the urban middle class understands. For them, it is still about having a kind of moral political system run by good people, with clean, polite and obedient politicians. I am not saying that there is no corruption but the electoral system provides people with an access to power and resources instead of being servants to bureaucracy. This is how election is an expression of democracy for them and they are right.
7Thailand is still very much under the domination of royal nationalism and royalist history. Many believe in the virtues of the monarch to guide democracy. The rise of rural people as a political force is seen as a threat to the moral authority of “good people”. We need to go beyond this “Thai-style democracy”. I do not mean that we have to get rid of the monarchy. I do not think it will happen any time soon. But we must try to find a proper place and role for the monarchy.
8So what changes will ensue from today’s political turmoil? I am not sure how it is going to end. I do not know what will be the results of the struggle right now. I cannot forecast anything. But fifty years from now, I believe that history will be written in this way--since 1980 there was a structural change in society, namely in the rural/urban relationship. The rural people wanted more participation and their share of power but the elites resisted this change. Those urban elites, including the royalists, resisted the change. What would be the outcome of the conflict today? I do not know.
9The monarchy may stay. But stay in which way? I believe the royalists have to change, allowing the electoral system of popular democracy and rule of law to run.
10Many including the educated people have a very conservative concept about “self-interest”. It is often said that self-interest is a bad thing. A type of democracy in which people protect their self-interests is bad. We should encourage people to transform, negotiate their self-interests within the boundary of rules and process.
11I do not know if the Yellow versus Red can change something yet. The Red/Yellow is also the concrete illustration of this deep structural change. I simply do not know and cannot predict the outcome of the a,b,c,d of this change. It is history in the making. How will they fight, in what way? I do not know. History is not smooth. If it were smooth we would not have seen Nazism, fascism, and we would not be able to take a step back. Taking a step backwards is possible. If you ask me about the long term, we will see the change for sure. But I do not know medium or short term outcomes or whether people would kill each other or not.
12The structural change in rural society is not going to reverse. No way! Once it starts, it is already too late to resist the change. We just cannot tell how the change will affect us in five years, in ten years, how many steps to move backwards, how many to move forward, or how far… But that structural change, the fact that people want more participation in the political system and want more power, these are not going to change.
13People might think we are economic determinists. We are not deterministic in the sense that we know what is going to happen. No, we do not. We are just saying that structural change and political dynamism are like a train. The train has already left the station. You cannot bring it back to the station.
14The trouble with the current state of politics is that people only see the concrete, the present, or the “now”, they do not see the structural or the long term effects. Even many academics do not take this structural change seriously enough. That is frustrating. In a way, you can spend a lifetime wondering if Thaksin is right or wrong, if the constitution should be changed or not. But once you step back to see the big picture of structural change, these kinds of issues will go away. We just do not know how bad or how good things will be until these issues will go away.
Auteurs
Ethnologue au CNRS depuis 1992, il travaille sur les populations des frontières, les dynamiques migratoires, les résiliences ethniques et sociales. Il a vécu pendant plusieurs années avec les Austronésiens moken, nomades marins de l’archipel Mergui, en Thaïlande et en Birmanie. Il a récemment coordonné Thaïlande contemporaine avec Stéphane Dovert (Bangkok-Paris, Irasec-Les Indes savantes, 2011) et publié un ouvrage sur le Sud de la Thaïlande (The Cultural Roots of Violence in Malay Southern Thailand, 2 vols, Bangkok, White Lotus Press, 2009 et 2012) expliquant la dynamique culturelle de la rébellion. Enfin, il a copublié deux « Carnets » de l’Irasec concernant les trafics humains : La Monnaie des frontières (2009) et Thaïlande : aux origines d’une crise (2010), ce dernier expliquant les facteurs socioéconomiques et les archaïsmes culturels qui ont provoqué la crise dite « des Jaunes et des Rouges ».
Arnaud Leveau a effectué une partie de ses études à Beijing avant de débuter sa carrière professionnelle à Hong Kong et à Hô Chi Minh Ville. Il a été responsable du département Asie de l’Icosi (Institut de coopération sociale internationale) et a cofondé l’association Asie Pacifique Recherche. Basé en Asie du Sud-Est, il a été correspondant de presse pour plusieurs titres français et internationaux avant d’être directeur adjoint de l’Irasec de 2006 à 2010. Il est l’auteur de Le Destin des fils du dragon (L’Harmattan-Irasec, 2003). Actuellement à Séoul, il finalise une thèse de doctorat (Institut d’Asie orientale-École normale supérieure de Lyon) sur les relations entre la Corée du Sud et l’Asie du Sud-Est avec une bourse de terrain de la Korean Foundation et le soutien d’Eads.
Professeur d’histoire de l’Asie du Sud-Est à l’université de Wisconsin-Madison. Il est notamment l’auteur de l’ouvrage Siam Mapped : A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (University Press of Hawai, 1997, 280 p.).
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