Indonesia’s Upcoming 2024 Presidential Election: Political Binarism and its Impact on Democracy
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Abstract
Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy and generally considered as Southeast Asia’s democratic beacon, will have its general election on 14 February 2024, where 206 million eligible voters will vote for the president, representatives in the national and local parliaments, and senators. Incumbent President Joko Widodo is ineligible to run for a third term due to the term limits established by the Indonesian constitution. For the moment, the coalitions remain open. Local elections will also be held on 27 November 2024 across 548 regions: 37 provinces, 415 regencies and 98 cities. This commentary discusses the prospect of various aspects of the Indonesian 2024 presidential election, including the candidacy, political polarisation and what we can expect of Indonesia’s politics going forward.
Index entries
Mots-clés: binarisme politique, électeurs musulmans, PDIP, Gerindra, polarisation
Geographical index: Indonésie
Keywords: political binarism, PDIP, muslim voters, polarisation, substantive democracy
Full text
1The years 2022-2024 are political years for Southeast Asia, in which many countries have held and will be holding general elections. Given that almost all Southeast Asian countries are hybrid regimes—or stuck between full democracy and authoritarianism—it is not surprising that these elections have shown mixed results. Malaysia’s election in November 2022, for example, demonstrated a reflected the smooth functioning of democratic institutions when the reform-minded opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was finally appointed prime minister after winning in the election which ended three years of tumultuous political crisis. In Thailand, a new anti-junta opposition party has resoundingly won the May 2023 election. Yet after several weeks, the democratic victory did not translate into political renewal, due to political manoeuvring by the military and pro-royalist camp, but the electoral success gives progressives hope of change in the years to come (cf. article of Sawasdee in this volume). A year before, however, most voters in the Philippines, despite it being the region’s oldest democracy, had again opted for a “strongmen” leadership by electing the son and namesake of their former dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. as the new president. Marcos Jr. succeeded Rodrigo Duterte, also democratically elected in 2016, yet whose punitive populism and hard-handed approach in the “War on Drugs” has earned his administration a disrepute in the national and international human rights circles. The above cases show how elections can either produce democratic triumphs or become a façade of persistent authoritarianism. Despite these mixed results nonetheless, there is something to be said for the fact that elections are still seen as a yardstick for democracy across the region, including in the socialist Vietnam and Laos.
2Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy and generally considered as Southeast Asia’s democratic beacon, will have its general election on 14 February 2024 followed by local elections on 27 November 2024. With 206 million eligible voters, this will be the world’s largest one-day election that year. It will also be a simultaneous election wherein voters will vote for the president, representatives in the national and local parliaments, and senators. Of all these elections, voters will likely focus on the presidential one. Learning from the 2019 election, the latter will potentially create a serious rift in the society as voters fervently support and rally behind the candidates of their choice.
3Still more than three months away, excitement has been building up as the manoeuvres of political parties and speculations on who will be the presidential and vice-presidential candidates embellish the daily media reports. This commentary discusses the prospect of various aspects of the Indonesian 2024 presidential election, including the candidacy, political polarisation and what we can expect of Indonesia’s politics going forward.
Indonesia’s Electoral Politics: Political Parties and their Non-Ideological Coalitions
4It is noteworthy that Indonesia’s political party spectrum is not ideological: most of the parties are “nationalist” (which in Indonesia is understood as “non-religious”) even when some are officially Islamic parties, with the exception of the more Islamist-inspired Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Albeit having the largest Muslim population in the world—87% of its 274 million citizens are Muslims—, Indonesia it is not an Islamic country, meaning that Islam is not the religion of the state. In fact, Indonesia sanctions six religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism) and officially gives them equal protection.
5The general “absence” of ideology in party politics means that the latter is largely shaped by the common aspiration to secure governance in order to benefit from the spoils of office. Consequently, the country only has two political “camps”: the government’s and the opposition’s, the latter being a minuscule and fragmented group consisting of only the above Islamist-inspired PKS and the nationalist Democrat Party. The rest of them, twelve nationalist and Islamic parties, formed the government coalition, which is led by the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP), the country’s largest nationalist party.
6Yet, such formation can change in the next months as parties will hop on and off of the coalitions following which presidential candidates, they will endorse in 2024. The Elections Law stipulates that a party or party coalition may nominate its presidential ticket (consisting of a pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates) if in the previous election it has acquired 20% of the national votes or 15% of the parliamentary seats. The only party fulfilling this requirement is PDIP, thus the only party that can nominate its own presidential candidate without having to form a coalition with others. Herein lies the gist of Indonesia’s party politics: the absence of clear party ideology means that most parties are prepared to form very broad and heterogeneous coalitions consisting of both nationalist and Islamic parties to endorse a popular presidential ticket.
7Although seemingly superficial, the polarisation caused by such non-ideological political cleavage can be seriously aggravated by identity politics. The 2019 election showed that the two opposing camps has used religion and/or religiosity as a tool to mobilize votes. As a result, the campaign period which lasted for several months were filled with religious mobilisation and largely devoid of any discourse on important governance issues such as the anti-corruption efforts, accountability, and rule-of-law. This reflects the general reluctance of the political elites to address the country’s important democratic challenges, opting instead to treat election as a mere tool for power succession, without taking this opportunity to examine and improve governance.
8The 2019 electoral politics and its superficial polarisation that was based on religious issues/identity-politics will likely underpin the politics approaching the 2024 election. The current manoeuvres by political parties have already reflected the same prioritisation of securing power in the election and neglect of the more substantive issues of democratic challenges. The next section discusses the 2019 election and its polarisation and how this polarisation will shape Indonesia’s electoral politics in 2024.
Indonesia’s 2019 Election and the Religious Binary Politics
9With 193 million voters, 809,500 polling stations and around 6 million recruited election workers, Indonesia’s 2019 election was the world’s largest and arguably most complicated election. Despite it being a simultaneous election in which voters voted for their president, local and national representatives, and senators, voters mostly focused on the presidential election. This election was dubbed “the most polarized election” in Indonesia’s post-reform politics, creating a serious and long-standing rift in the society (Simandjuntak 2022).
10Binary oppositions, or polarisation, refers to the divergence of political attitudes into two ideological extremes (DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, 1996; Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). In binary politics, ‘third’ alternatives are less accommodated. US politics, for example, often only allows two parties to participate substantially in governance, leading to binary stances of “Liberal vs Conservative” or “Left vs Right” or disputative issues such as “pro-Life vs pro-Choice.” There are typically two levels of polarisation: elite and mass. Elite polarisation refers to the polarisation of the political elites, whereas mass polarisation signifies the societal polarisation of the electorate or the public (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2016). The 2019 presidential election has indeed formed a semblance of political polarisation, at that time between the more Islamic camp and the more religiously “pluralist” camp. The incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo represented the “pluralist” camp as he was supported by a coalition led by the non-religious party PDIP. The opposition candidate Ret. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, is the populist leader of the nationalist Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra). As Prabowo was also supported by the Islamist-inspired PKS, he was subsequently touted as the representative of the Islamists although he himself was not religious.
11The competition between the so-called Islamism vs religious pluralism camp had begun in 2016, when some conservative groups organized massive protests against the Chinese-Christian Jakarta’s former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). The latter had quoted a verse from the Islamic Holy Book during his re-election campaign and this has angered the conservatives and their supporters. Consequently, in 2017, in the most acrimoniously sectarian gubernatorial election, these groups, supported by Prabowo, launched a massive anti-Ahok movement which not only successfully prevented his re-election, but also jailed him for blasphemy1. The gubernatorial candidate whom the conservatives have supported and eventually won the election was Anies Baswedan, a former minister of Education and Culture in Jokowi’s 2014 cabinet, yet who was discharged in 2016 allegedly for deviating from the President’s vision2. Anies, whose paternal grandfather was a prominent Arab-Indonesian activist, has suitable credentials to receive support from the conservative Islamic groups. These group, dubbed the “212” movement, later became a semi-consolidated anti-government movement.
12Despite the acrimoniously sectarian mobilisation in 2017 and 2019, compared to the established political polarisation in the US between the Republicans and the Democrats, where significantly contentious social issues are profoundly connected to the ideological divergence between the two, Indonesia’s 2019 political binarism was transitory and superficial. There was no discussion on what the government would look like if one or the other camp won the election. The Islamist camp, for example, did not have a clear idea of how they would govern the country, except for a vague agreement with Prabowo that he would prioritize the interests of the Muslims if he won the election. The incumbent also did not seem to offer anything new other than the continuation of the ongoing government programs. The 2019 election was thus only about the political cleavage, or the boundary between the two competing camps.
13Both camps’ strategies also relied heavily on populism, with Prabowo criticising the government elites’ alleged incompetence in managing state budget while portraying himself as representative of the suffering “people”, and Jokowi promising potential voters of the implementation of various health and education projects—some of which he eventually fulfilled. Prabowo’s populism, however, also included criticisms on government’s decision to allow many Chinese investments in Indonesia which included a massive influx of Chinese workers. Focusing on China’s economic dominant is not an unusual electoral strategy in Southeast Asia, with opposition leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia winning elections in the past after criticising their incumbent governments’ pro-China policies3. Yet in Indonesia, this strategy bore a considerable risk. While this criticism resonates with Indonesian voters who were increasingly apprehensive of Chinese workers, this was a precarious strategy as voters could associate Chinese businesses with the long-time predominance of Chinese-Indonesian businesses in the country and this could have inflamed anti-Chinese Indonesian sentiments.
14Still, religious mobilisation was the main campaign strategy in 2019 as this strategy was not only utilized by the Islamist camp. The incumbent camp, which was considered to support religious pluralism, also benefitted from a religious “card.” In a last-minute move, the incumbent President Jokowi decided to appoint Ma’ruf Amin, a prominent conservative cleric of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, as his vice president candidate. This appointment was aimed at first, at “shielding” the president from being accused by the opposition camp of having downplayed the Islamic interests in his political platform, and second, splitting the Muslim votes. Religious voting was then unavoidable. An exit poll4 conducted on the day of the election revealed that 97% of the voters with minority religious voted for Jokowi. However, Jokowi’s strategy of getting a prominent Islamic cleric as running mate successfully split the Muslim votes: 51% of Muslim voters voted for Prabowo. Such division also closely mirrored the overall election result which was won by the incumbent, who gained 55.5% against the opposition, who gained 44.5% with a difference of 11% or almost 17 million votes5.
15When the 2019 election was won by Jokowi, the “pluralist” camp was elated, as it was considered as a victory for the more “democratic” Indonesian polity. Yet democracy is not about which “label” won the election, but whether the governance afterwards fulfil the prerequisites of substantive democracy which includes rule of law and fulfilment of civil liberties. As is evident in the president’s second tenure, the government is not without its own democratic challenges. Even though the Islamist camp lost the 2019 election, religious mobilisation, particularly the question of to which degree the government should prioritize the Islamic interest, has created such a bitter polarisation in the society that the president decided to appease Prabowo’s supporters by appointing him as his cabinet’s minister of Defence. In a similar gesture a year later, the President also appointed Prabowo’s former running-mate Sandiaga Uno as minister of Tourism and Creative Economy. As both Prabowo and Sandiaga are leaders at the opposition Gerindra party, with this move the government has coopted the Gerindra into the ruling coalition, thus further shrinking the already diminutive opposition and subsequently posing a problem in the checks-and-balances mechanism that is important for a democratic governance.
16A similar electoral polarisation, albeit transitory and superficial, will likely embellish Indonesia’s electoral politics approaching the 2024 election. The next section discusses the current political party manoeuvring pertaining to the potential presidential candidates.
2024 Presidential Election: Party Politics and Potential Candidates
17The official presidential nomination was finalized at the end of October 2023 and there are three pairs of candidates: Ganjar Pranowo, the current Central Java province governor with his running-mate Mahfud MD, former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court and current Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs; Prabowo Subianto, the current Defence Minister with his running-mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, President Jokowi’s son and current Mayor of Solo city; and Anies Baswedan, the current Jakarta governor with his running mate Muhaimin Iskandar, Chairman of the National Awakening party (PKB).
18From the three candidates, Ganjar and Anies are the ones with somewhat clearer political platforms. Ganjar is a long-time PDIP cadre and has recently been endorsed by the main government party, making him, for millions of President Jokowi’s supporters, the obvious successor of the incumbent government. Ganjar also has a similar background with the president: he is Central Javanese, has the experience of governing an important administrative region, and more importantly for Jokowi’s minority religions support based, Ganjar, like Jokowi, exhibits a moderate Islamic outlook which promises the upholding of religious harmony.
19Although Ganjar seems to embody Jokowi’s political stance, the fact that Jokowi’s son Gibran is running as Prabowo vice-presidential candidate has indicated that the President might have always favoured Prabowo, rather than Ganjar, to continue his legacy. Many observers, however, lamented Gibran’s controversial nomination, dubbing this an effort to cement Jokowi’s political dynasty. Gibran’s candidacy was preceded by a controversial ruling by the Constitutional Court removing a minimum age requirement of 40 for presidential or vice-presidential candidates, on the condition they have been elected to regional posts, clearing the way for the 36-year-old mayor of Solo city to run for vice president in 2024. Added to this controversy was the fact that Jokowi’s brother-in-law, thus Gibran’s uncle, is the Constitutional Court Chief Justice who presided over the ruling. It remains to be seen how this suspected “ethical violation” will be handled by the Constitutional Court.
20At the other end of the so-called political spectrum, Anies, whose victory in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election was gained by riding the wave of Islamic mobilisation, is largely seen as representing the Islamic conservative aspiration and the opposition camp. Interestingly, the first party which declared their support for him was not the Islamist-inspired PKS, but rather a former government party the National Democrat party (Nasdem) in 2022. Its controversial declaration of support for Anies then removed Nasdem from the government coalition. Recently, the PKS and the National Awakening Party (PKB) together with Nasdem officially declared support for the Jakarta governor. The PKB joined the coalition as their leader Muhaimin Iskandar became Anies’ runing-mate. These declarations have cemented Anies’ position as the candidate of the opposition camp and the more Islamic polity.
21So far, the two opposite camps of the political spectrum have already gotten their men. What about Prabowo? Herewith lies the quintessence of the country’s non-ideological politics. From the three candidates, Prabowo is the one with the most flexible political persona. Table 1 shows the quadrant of potential voters’ perception of the candidates’ characteristics. While Ganjar and Anies have limited support bases, Prabowo is also the only one that can appeal to both the supporters of the government and those of the opposition. In 2019, Prabowo had fronted the conservative religious camp which launched the most bitter sectarian electoral politics in Indonesia’s post-reform history, yet he also self-proclaimed of being not religious6. After losing the election he even gladly accepted President Jokowi’s offer to become the minister of Defence, and thus has very good relations with the president. Prabowo was a general during Suharto’s authoritarian regime and also the latter’s son-in-law. He was allegedly involved in orchestrating the riots which took place right before Suharto stepped down in 1998, which earned him a disrespect in the national human rights circles. Yet in 2019, as a populist he portrayed himself as part of the people and could gain the trust of many conservative Muslim voters.
Table I. How the candidates cater to different types of supporters
Pluralism | Conservative Islam | |
Jokowi’s supporters | Ganjar Pranowo | Prabowo Subianto |
Opposition | Prabowo Subianto | Anies Baswedan |
22Indonesians are getting ready for the three-horse race in the 2024 election with Ganjar, Prabowo and Anies as presidential contenders. Political parties’ manoeuvres also seem to indicate such tendency. Ganjar has now officially supported by a coalition consisting of PDIP, an Islamic party United Development Party (PPP) and two smaller parties with no representatives in the parliament, the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura) and the Indonesian United Party (Perido). With PDIP being the only party that can put forward its presidential ticket without actually having to form a coalition with others, PDIP has the final say of who will be Ganjar’s VP candidate, and it has chosen Former Constitutional Court Justice Mahfud MD.
23PDIP was essentially interested in making Prabowo the VP candidate for Ganjar, that is why President Jokowi, who was supported by PDIP, sought to create what he termed as a “grand coalition,” which would pull together the parties that support Ganjar and those that support Prabowo in one big coalition. If Prabowo had ditched his presidential ambition and was willing to run as Ganjar’s VP candidate, PDIP would reap the benefit of having both a presidential candidate who carries Jokowi’s qualities and a VP candidate who can cater to the opposition’s (and the Islamic) interests. Persuading Prabowo to accept being only a VP, however, was not an easy task, as the latter is more senior than Ganjar and has harboured presidential ambition since 2009 when he ran as Megawati’s VP candidate. Yet the fact that he had run with Megawati before means that politically his party Gerindra has no qualms with cooperating with Megawati’s party PDIP, much unlike Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Democrat party which is consistent in being in the opposition.
24Nonetheless, Prabowo seemed to be reluctant to run if not as a presidential candidate7. In June, there were reports that Gerindra, the country’s second strongest party Golkar, the moderate Islamic party National Awakening Party (PKB) and a modernist Islamic party the National Mandate Party (PAN) had created a coalition to nominate Prabowo. However, as always with Indonesia’s politics, coalitions can still change following political calculations. To recapitulate, Ganjar will be supported by PDIP, PPP, Hanura and Perindo, Prabowo by Gerindra, Golkar, Demokrat, and PSI, while Anies by Nasdem, PKB and PKS.
25Another reason why PDIP was interested in pairing Ganjar with Prabowo, in addition to the benefits of attracting two opposite support bases, was also because a two-round election, which would likely happen if there are three pairs running, would actually be dangerous for the government camp. Indonesia follows a majoritarian two-round system in its presidential elections, meaning, the winner is the one who can garner 50% plus 1 vote. If no one can get 50% plus 1 vote in the election, then an election run-off (or second round) is conducted. The fact that the three candidates are similarly popular leads to the possibility that if the three of them become competitors, then no one would be able to get 50% plus 1 vote in the election. Thus, a second round will have to be conducted between the two candidates who have gained the most votes. Observers speculate that these two candidates would most likely be Ganjar and Prabowo. This would be precarious as Ganjar could lose if he goes head-to-head with Prabowo in the second round, the voters who had voted for Anies in the first round would likely vote for Prabowo in the second round. Again, this is because Prabowo could easily attract the opposition votes as he had fronted the opposition camp in 2019.
Perspectives for the Country’s State of Democracy
26Polarisation will continue to embellish Indonesia’s politics. Regarding polarisation, Haggard and Kaufman have argued that it can lead to democratic regression as deep polarisation hinders the government from functioning efficiently (Haggard and Kaufman 2021), resulting in popular disaffection and distrust of institutions. Second, parties in a deeply polarized setting are either captured by extremist elements or displaced by populist movements; and third, the “us” versus “them” competition is a common trait of populism, and this is ultimately illiberal. Yet, Haggard and Kaufman’s polarisation regards the situation where political elites and publics become divided over public policy and ideology. As argued in this paper, however, Indonesia’s electoral politics is not ideological, moreover, it is unclear whether the opposition would issue different public policies if they had won the 2019 election. Yet, the fact that Indonesia’s political binarism is transitory and superficial is perhaps what prevents the country’s (hybrid) democracy from further deconsolidating, as polarisation will intensify mostly only during politically sensitive periods such as the elections. Beyond these periods, it is politics as usual and political elites can change coalitions to suit their power interests.
27As mentioned earlier, Indonesia’s government faces democratic challenges such as transactional politics, the issuance of controversial laws which curb the freedom of speech, labour rights and anti-corruption efforts, rampant dynastic politics, and the shrinkage of oppositional politics. However, an Indikator survey has indicated that more than 77% of Indonesians still believe that democracy is “the best system for Indonesia, even though it is not perfect.”8 In addition, ISEAS 2022 Indonesia National Survey Project indicates that the public satisfaction with the president has risen from 68% in 2017 to 71.8% in 20229. Similarly, a Kompas survey shows that 70.1% respondent have claimed that they were “satisfied” with the government’s performance10.
28Yet the controversial ruling which paves the way for Jokowi’s son to run for vice president despite his young age could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back concerning people’s support for democracy. The public so far sees Gibran’s nomination as nepotistic and this could undermine Prabowo’s chances, if his camp does not come up with ways to revamp Gibran’s political image soon.
29The fact that Indonesians still wholeheartedly support democracy despite the deteriorating democratic fundamentals, for Jefferson Ng, shows the discrepancy of the perception of democracy by Indonesians as compared to the understanding of democracy by international rating agencies11. He mentions that for Indonesians, “democracy success is measured not by the robustness of its checks and balances but by its ability to deliver on concrete policy outcomes”. Indonesians are satisfied with the current government’s track record in infrastructure development and its social welfare initiatives, and they connect these with a democratic triumph.
30Although this “instrumental” logic of democracy seems to brush aside the deterioration of democratic fundamentals such as accountability, civil liberties, and checks and balances, for Indonesians the system still guarantees effective redistributive policies. The fact that political polarisation is transitory also means that the competing parties can easily “move on” from the divisive electoral competition for the government to focus on implementing policies. In the long run, however, Indonesia has to encourage the opposition to perform its function of checks and balances, promotes accountability and safeguard democratic freedoms in order to foster a more substantive democracy.
Bibliography
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Footnotes
1 Deasy Simandjuntak, “Faced with a troubling blasphemy verdict, Ahok at least left Jakarta a legacy of reform,” Channel News Asia commentary, 11 May 2017, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/commentary-ahok-left-jakarta-legacy-of-reform-8836708, retrieved on July 3, 2023.
2 Ayomi Amindoni, “Jokowi’s new cabinet announced,” The Jakarta Post, 27 July 2016, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/27/jokowis-new-cabinet-announced.html, retrieved on July 3, 2023.
3 Deasy Simandjuntak, “Jokowi’s triumph in the 2019 presidential election and the future of binary politics,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southeast Asia, 6 June 2019, https://th.boell.org/en/2019/06/06/jokowis-triumph-2019-presidential-election-and-future-binary-politics#_ftn14.
4 Callistasia Wijaya, “Siapa saja yang memilih Jokowi dan Prabowo berdasarkan exit poll dan quick count?” [Who voted for Jokowi and Prabowo according to exit polls and quick counts?], BBC News Indonesia, 24 April 2019, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-48019930, retrieved on July 3, 2023.
5 Wim Tohari Danielaldi, “Scrambling for Jokowi’s Blessing,” Kompas, 20 June 2023, https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/06/18/en-berebut-restu-jokowi, retrieved on July 3, 2023.
6 Marlinda Oktavia Erwanti, “Prabowo: Ilmu Islam saya kurang, tapi…” [Prabowo: I lack Islamic credentials, but…], Detik, 27 July 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4137520/prabowo-ilmu-islam-saya-kurang-tapi, retrieved on July 5, 2023.
7 Agus Raharjo, “Prabowo tolak jadi cawapres Ganjar, Sekjen PDIP: tidak ada kawin paksa” [Prabowo refuses to be Ganjar’s VP candidate, PDIP’s General Secretary: there is no forced marriage here], Republika, 24 April 2023, https://news.republika.co.id/berita/rtm8ki436/prabowo-tolak-jadi-cawapres-ganjar-sekjen-pdip-tidak-ada-kawin-paksa, retrieved on July 5, 2023.
8 Indikator, Trust terhadap institusi politik, isu-isu mutakhir, dan dinamika electoral jelang pemilu serentak 2024 [Trust of political institutions, current issues, and electoral dynamics approaching the 2024 simultaneous elections], National Survey, 11-12 February 2022, https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/RILIS-03-04-22_Survei-Nasional_2022_3_APRIL_2022.pdf
9 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Hui Yew-Foong, and Siwage Dharma Negara, “The Indonesia National Survey Project 2022: Engaging with Developments in the Political, Economic and Social Spheres”, ISEAS Trends in Southeast Asia (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/TRS3_23.pdf
10 Bestian Nainggolan, “Survei litbang “Kompas”: kepuasan meningkat, faktor “Jokowi” menguat?” [Kompas survey: satisfaction increases, the “Jokowi” factor strengthens?], Kompas, 22 May 2023, https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2023/05/22/survei-litbang-kompas-kepuasan-meningkat-faktor-jokowi-menguat?open_from=Tagar_Page
11 Jefferson Ng, “The rise of performance politics in Indonesia?”, New Mandala, 21 March 2023, https://www.newmandala.org/the-rise-of-performance-politics-in-indonesia/
Author
Deasy Simandjuntak is Assistant Professor at National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taipei, Visiting Researcher at National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Jakarta and Associate Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
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