Hun Sen’s Election in 2023
p. 57-68
Résumé
This article explores the political landscape in Cambodia, focusing on the last legislative election in July 2023. It examines the dominance of Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and their strategies to maintain power and eliminate opposition. The article highlights the history of political turmoil in Cambodia, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) dissolution, and the exclusion of the credible opposition Candlelight Party (CLP) from the election. It discusses the implications of the absence of a genuine challenger to the CPP and the disenfranchisement of Cambodian voters. Additionally, the article explores the restrictions imposed on civil society organizations and the media, including laws and regulations that curtail their activities and control their operations. It also sheds light on the allegations of electoral manipulation, such as gerrymandering and voter intimidation, which undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Finally, the article briefly updates about Hun Sen's son's successor, Hun Manet, and highlights a few challenges he will face when assuming his position. Overall, the article accentuates the challenges to democracy and human rights in Cambodia and raises concerns about the prospects for a multiparty democracy.
Entrées d’index
Mots-clés : Cambodge, Parti du peuple cambodgien, Hun Manet, Parti de la bougie, loi sur les associations et organisations non-gouvernementales, coalition des communautés de fermiers cambodgiens
Keywords : Cambodia, Cambodian People’s Party, Hun Manet, Candlelight Party, Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations, Coalition of Cambodian Farmers Community
Index géographique : Cambodge
Texte intégral
1Cambodia had its legislative election in July 2023. Elections in Cambodia, however, have been a subject of controversy and criticism. The election has been merely seen as a tool to convince local people that the kingdom is a democratic country, and members of the elite ruling class widely share this narrative. Public discourse is shaped to present the illusion of choice and citizen participation in decision-making. Behind the façade of democratic elections, the reality often reveals a different story. The electoral landscape is seen as heavily dominated by Hun Sen, one of the world’s longest-serving leaders (1985-1993; 1998-2023). As a Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) leader, Hun Sen has used political strategies to manipulate the electoral process and weaken political opposition in Cambodia for decades. He has cracked down on political opposition, civil society organisations, and independent media, limiting freedom of expression and assembly. However, there are signs that opposition to Hun Sen’s rule is growing, and the government’s crackdown on opposition and civil society is unlikely to lead to long-term stability or prosperity for the country, even though Hun Sen successfully managed to replace himself with his son, Hun Manet. This article will discuss how Hun Sen uses political strategies to eliminate his competitors from the election contest and maintain his political power to steer Cambodia into a closed authoritarian country.
Cambodia’s Political Landscape
2Cambodia has a long history of political turmoil, with numerous power struggles and regime changes over the years. After gaining independence from France in 1953, the country has experienced periods of monarchy, military rule, civil war, and, worst of all, the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that claimed millions of Cambodian lives in the 1970s. The election in 1993, however, marked a significant turning point as the formation of a multiparty system reemerged. Unfortunately, a violent coup in 1997 resulted in the consolidation of power by the Cambodian People’s Party, currently led by Hun Sen.
3The Prime Minister, Hun Sen, has held power for 38 years in total, making him one of the world’s longest-serving leaders. His Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has dominated the political scene for decades and controls almost every level of government. Under his leadership, Hun Sen has been accused of leading the country toward authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights abuses.
4Cambodia has never been labelled as a “Free” or “Partly Free” country by Freedom House for the last decades. The country was consistently marked as a “Not Free” regime. Political rights and Civil liberties scores remain low, at 5/40 and 19/60, respectively. The latest report from V-dem Institute (2021: 11) suggests that Cambodia is in the autocratising moment. Cambodia, in all areas captured by V-dem, indicates severe democratic deficits. Deliberative and Electoral Indices experienced a significant setback if we compare the score in 2011 with 2021.
5The Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) emerged as a serious challenger to the CPP in the 2013 and 2017 elections, securing 44% of the vote in both instances. However, the CNRP was dissolved in 2017 by a controversial court ruling that accused the party of plotting the illegal overthrow of the government. CNRP leader Sam Rainsy was forced to exile in France, and the other leader, Kem Sokha, was sentenced to 27 years under house arrest on treason charges.
Election Without Opposition
6In the July 2023 election, 18 political parties have competed with the CPP. There have been approximately 9.8 million voters, with 53% of them being female. The number of new voters is estimated to be around 600,000. Unfortunately, the most credible opposition, Candlelight Party (CLP), was excluded from the contest. In the wake of the CNRP’s dissolution, CLP formed as an unofficial successor, inheriting many of its members and policies. Despite facing intimidation and harassment, the CLP managed to secure 22% of the vote in the 2022 local election, positioning itself as the sole credible challenger to the CPP. The National Election Committee (NEC) disqualified the CLP from participating in the upcoming national election, citing a paperwork issue as the reason for the decision. According to the NEC, the party failed to provide the necessary documents for registration, specifically, a certified or notarized copy of the party’s original registration letter from the Ministry of Interior, which was lost during a police raid in 2017. One would wonder why such a letter was not required in the local election in 2022. NEC declined to explain such a different decision.
7Following the disqualification, the Candlelight Party filed an appeal with the Constitutional Council, asking for the decision to be overturned. However, the Council upheld the NEC’s decision, deeming the party’s complaint unlawful and making the decision final and unappealable. Hun Sen has warned that any demonstration against such a decision would lead to death or detention (Samean, 2023). A legal amendment was made to ensure that CLP cannot call for their supporters not to vote in the election, or they will lose their rights to stand as a candidate to run future elections for up to six years.
8Several implications can be made following the disqualification of CLP. First, with the CLP barred from participating in the elections, the CPP has faced no real challenge, as the only remaining contenders are either aligned with the CPP or small, obscure parties that lack a national presence. This situation raises concerns about the fairness and legitimacy of the electoral process, as well as the prospects for a multiparty democracy in Cambodia. Second, the disqualification has also prevented millions of Cambodian voters from choosing their preferred candidates. As a spokesperson for the Candlelight Party stated, “The absence of the Candlelight Party from the election means the voices of the people are dismissed. Such a move would never occur in a real democratic country” (Chheang, 2023). Finally, the disqualification paved the way for Prime Minister Hun Sen to consolidate power further and establish a political dynasty with his eldest son, army chief Hun Manet, and other relatives.
Restrictions On Civil Society and Media
9In recent years, Cambodia has faced increasing restrictions on civil society organisations (CSOs) and media outlets, raising concerns about the country’s shrinking space for freedom of expression, assembly, and independent voices. Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party have implemented various measures that curtail the activities of civil society groups and impose control over the media landscape.
Restrictions on Civil Society
10Several regulations have imposed barriers on CSOs, targeting those working on issues such as human rights, democracy, and social justice. For example, the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) was enacted in 2015 with burdensome registration requirements, extensive reporting obligations, and broad discretionary powers to authorities to suspend or dissolve organisations deemed non-compliant. Harassment and intimidation were also noticed toward CSOs critical of the government. Reports of arbitrary arrests, criminal charges, and even violence against activists have led to self-censorship and fear within the civil society sector. The suspension of the Coalition of Cambodian Farmers Community (CCFC) marks the latest crackdown on CSOs since its leaders were arrested, and some were at large under the accusation of plotting a “peasant revolution.”
11Tax-related laws were also imposed to restrict international funding for CSOs. Organisations must seek government approval for funding sources and face scrutiny over their financial activities. Both service delivery and advocacy non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Cambodia face a similar threat. A recent study with 106 NGOs in Cambodia indicates that Cambodian authorities target both kinds of NGOs because they are worried about political activity (Springman et al., 2022). The study discovers that the authority pressures the NGOs until they can confirm their avoidance of political activities. The findings also suggest that standard forms of government repression effectively minimize NGOs’ political advocacy but also result in reductions in non-state service delivery.
12Simultaneously, the Cambodian government has intensified its efforts to coopt civil society and establish compliant civil society organisations (CSOs). This includes the creation of the Civil Society Alliance Forum (CSAF) through sub-decree 128 ANKr.BK, which was issued on June 22, 2016. CSAF, often referred to as a government-organized non-governmental organisation (GONGO), is known to receive funding from the Chinese government or Chinese GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organisations). CSAF’s main office is located within the government cabinet and receives funding from it.
13The labour union is also divided, with some unions maintaining their independence while others are perceived as affiliated with or controlled by the CPP or employers. This division raises concerns about the extent of genuine representation and the ability to advocate for the rights and interests of workers. Furthermore, CPP has relied on its youth wing, the Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia (UYFC), registered as an NGO. According to LANGO, an NGO will not be able to do activities as UYFC is doing. In contrast, the UYFC plays a role in recruiting new followers for the party and imposing restrictions on freedom of speech in educational institutions, including schools and universities. Under this arrangement, UYFC members, known as “class monitors”, monitor their fellow students and teachers/lecturers, potentially creating an atmosphere of surveillance and self-censorship. In some cases, the UYFC has undermined or coopted the activities of local and international NGOs working on youth empowerment. They have participated in NGO dialogues, training, and capacity-building initiatives, preventing other, more independent youth from accessing these programs. This strategy allows the CPP to influence youth activities and limit the space for alternative voices and independent youth movements.
14These actions by the Cambodian government and the CPP have raised concerns about civil society organisations’ genuine independence and autonomy, labour unions, and youth organisations. The ruling party’s co-option and control of these entities undermine the principles of a vibrant and diverse civil society and impede the development of a genuinely democratic and participatory society in Cambodia.
Restrictions on Media
15The media landscape in Cambodia has also faced significant challenges, with growing restrictions on press freedom and the independent operation of media outlets. In addition to the law on media, adopted in 1995 following several amendments, the sub-decree in February 2021 on the National Internet Gateway has further tightened control of the internet and expanded online surveillance of internet users. This has led to a heightened sense of fear and self-censorship among journalists and media outlets. Several media platforms, such as Radio Free Asia, the Cambodia Daily, and Voice of America, were closed down in 2017 under the accusation of not paying taxes. The latest closure of Voice of Democracy (VOD) earlier this year has deepened the concerns about the prospects of democratisation and the erosion of fundamental democratic values. VOD has been at the forefront of investigating and reporting crime and violations mostly related to corruption and human rights issues. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported lately that Cambodia’s media was in a “perilous state” (UN Human Rights Office, 2022).
16The restrictions imposed on civil society and media have significantly impacted Cambodia’s overall freedom of expression and assembly. Several arrests and convictions of individuals for their online activities have been recorded, including those who criticize the government’s ways of work or express support for opposition parties. This has created a chilling effect on public discourse and dissenting voices in the country. Furthermore, peaceful protests and assemblies have been effectively outlawed, with the government using the Covid-19 law as a tool to shut down the rights of civil society organisations working to promote human rights in Cambodia. This further narrows the space for the country’s fundamental freedoms and civil society engagement.
Electoral Manipulation
17Elections in Cambodia have been marred by allegations of electoral manipulation, including gerrymandering, voter intimidation, and vote buying. There have always been reports of irregularities, such as the removal of voters from electoral rolls and the presence of ruling party officials at polling stations, in addition to the legal amendments limiting civil society’s freedom to participate in the election campaign that has been highlighted above (COMFREL, 2022). Independent experts and human rights organisations have raised serious allegations of electoral manipulation and irregularities in the 2022 commune elections, which serve as a precursor to the national elections. Reports suggest that ballot forms were tampered with, votes were not correctly counted and reported, and there were widespread instances of intimidation and harassment of opposition party observers.
18Human Rights Watch (2013) also noticed a systematic problem undermining Cambodia’s free and fair elections. These include, first, the unequal access to media. It is noted that the CPP maintains a near-monopoly on broadcast media, giving it a significant advantage over other parties and limiting access to information for voters. This has led to biased reporting, with state-owned and private stations favouring the ruling party while criticising or ignoring opposition voices. The second marks that Cambodia’s national and local electoral apparatus is heavily influenced by the CPP, leading to claims of bias and corruption. The National Election Committee (NEC), responsible for overseeing the electoral process, has been accused of being politically biased and lacking credibility. The NEC’s recent decision to exclude CLP and support Hun Sen’s latest initiative to amend the election law, which bars those who do not vote from contesting in the future election, has further fuelled concerns about its impartiality. The third issue plaguing Cambodia’s electoral process is the need for an independent and impartial dispute resolution mechanism. The NEC has consistently rejected opposition complaints and sided with the CPP, often without any indication of a serious investigation into allegations of election irregularities. International observers and experts have called for an independent election tribunal or court to address this issue, but the Cambodian government has yet to act on these recommendations. Finally, officers of Cambodia’s security forces and officials of the state civil service have been openly campaigning for the CPP and Hun Sen. This partisanship has created an intimidating atmosphere for voters, with opposition leaders and activists expressing fears that the military and police could be ordered to suppress them if they pose a threat to the ruling party.
19Before the national election of 2023, countries such as the United States, European Unions, France, and Japan expressed their reluctance to send electoral observers or provide assistance; the legitimacy of the election process, therefore, has been called into question. The absence of such observers raises concerns about the credibility of the election result. As Sam Kunteamy, executive director of the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections (NICFEC), stated, “They might not have confidence that the election will be free and fair” (RFA Khmer, 2023). Despite these, Hun Sen won the 2023 election in Cambodia, securing 120 of 125 parliamentarian seats. He quickly appointed his son as his successor and urged his old comrades to step down. A new cabinet was established with the former ministers’ sons, daughters, and relatives. For example, the Ministry of Interior was given to Sar Keng’s son, Sar Sokha, and the Defence to Tea Banh’s son, Tea Seiha. However, Hun Sen is still believed to be powerful behind his son as he is the President of the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council to the King.
Hun Manet Assumes Control
20Hun Sen’s son has been groomed and positioned as a successor in the Hun’s reins of power. In December 2021, the CPP central committee endorsed Hun Manet, Hun Sen’s eldest son, as a likely prime minister candidate in the future. The perceived dynastic succession has drawn criticism from domestic and international observers, who argue that it undermines democracy, political pluralism, and fair competition within Cambodia’s political landscape. Sam Rainsy (2023) used to argue that Manet is immature and lacks charisma like his father. He further predicted that it was also impossible for the CPP’s future generations to work together as their father’s comrade did. David Hutt (2023), a columnist, also cited several sources that may hinder the succession plan. This may originate from the internal friction among CPP senior members.
21Despite its outward appearance, the CPP is characterized by internal divisions and diversity that are not readily apparent. These differences within the party may become more pronounced under the leadership of Hun Manet, particularly between those who advocate for modernisation and those who view the CPP as a means for personal gain and the consolidation of power through patronage networks. Another challenge for the future leader lies in the generational shift that his ascension implies, as Hun Sen has emphasized that along with his retirement, other long-serving party members must also step aside. This transition is likely to generate resentment among certain members of the older generation who may feel that Manet’s seemingly unearned promotion has thwarted their aspirations for higher positions of authority. Al Jazeera (2023) quoted a political analyst suggesting that “there is much unease and unhappiness—expressed privately—among party members that Hun Manet was elevated to the top job despite having no proven track record in Cambodian politics”. Nevertheless, it is believed that as long as Hun Sen is there, friction will not likely be a significant challenge for Manet.
22External factors are not also very conducive to the power that has been transferred. The increasing influence of China in Cambodia has raised questions about the extent of support from the Chinese government for Hun Sen’s succession plan. As noted by Hutt (2023), some sources suggest that Beijing may harbour reservations about fully trusting Hun Manet and could potentially favour an alternative successor. However, China is the first country, including North Korea’s Prime Minister Kim Tok-hun, to congratulate Manet on becoming the Cambodian prime minister.
23The United States, in contrast, welcomed the 2023 election with punitive measures, citing that the election was “neither free, nor fair” (Miller, 2023). According to the State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller, the Biden administration will impose visa restrictions on individuals undermining democracy. However, the names of the persons were not revealed. Western countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada expressed similar disappointment over the election, but specific measures to ensure democratic development have not been highlighted yet.
A Shaky Democratic Future
24The question of hope for Cambodian democracy in the future is complex and multifaceted. Planting a democratic seed in Cambodia takes time; maintaining hope is even more critical. The situation is evolving, and several factors can foster the chance to sustain and deepen the democratic space. There is a need for concerted efforts from the international community that signed and witnessed the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) in 1991 and Cambodian citizens to uphold democratic principles and human rights. The democratic ideals spelled in the PPA and the Cambodian Constitution shall be reviewed and questioned.
25International pressure is still relevant and necessary. Cambodia will only survive long with the US or EU’s market despite the effort to diversify and build resilience for its economy by expanding its trade relationship with countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN member states. The scrutiny and criticism from the international community, including human rights organisations and foreign governments, can help maintain pressure on the Cambodian government to respect democratic norms and practices. International assistance and cooperation in capacity-building for democratic institutions, promoting good governance, and protecting human rights can contribute to the long-term development of a robust democratic system in Cambodia.
26The other key factor that will shape the future of Cambodian democracy is the engagement and mobilisation of the Cambodian people. Civil society organisations, human rights activists, and grassroots movements continue to play a vital role in advocating for democratic principles, defending human rights, and demanding political reforms. These groups are instrumental in raising awareness, promoting civic participation, and holding the government accountable. Additionally, the younger generation’s involvement is crucial for the future of Cambodian democracy. Young Cambodians, with their energy, ideas, and aspirations, can drive change and push for a more inclusive and participatory political system. Empowering youth through education, access to information, and opportunities for political engagement can help shape a new generation of leaders committed to democratic values.
Bibliographie
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Bibliography
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Auteur
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Chandarin Chum
Chum Chandarin is a freelance consultant. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration Science from Budapest and has a strong background in public policy and good governance. His research interest is in democratization and public policy.
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