Introduction

1The history of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is part of the longstanding tradition of political Islam in Indonesia. Born in 1912 with the foundation of the Union of Muslim Traders (Sarekat Dagang Islam) this trend dominated the emerging nationalism in the Dutch East Indies for nearly twenty years.

2This initial momentum lies at the the origin of the two-dimensional Islamist1 project: to islamicise society by cleansing Islam of all practices considered to be impure; to mobilise the electorate by invoking Islamic values and their necessary implementation. Indeed, the birth and development of political Islam was closely linked to the reformist Muslim movement which in religious, cultural and social matters attempted to face the colonial challenge through a religious surge. In Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, and the Persatuan Islam, founded in 1923, provided most of the early generations of activists. During the decade after independence, militant Islam played a leading role in Indonesian politics. Between 1945 and 1960, the Masjumi party, which brought together most Muslim organisations, was one of the main government components and thereby constituted the matrix of political Islam in Indonesia to which the current generation of activists still refer. The discussions conducted within this party, especially the delicate compromises made between divine law and people’s democracy, preconfigured the present debates conducted by Islamic parties. Like the current leaders of the PKS, this first generation of “government Islamists” was also confronted with economic and social modernity issues such as those related to the role of the West in this process. As the two following contributions remind us, its failure is mainly due to domestic reasons that in turn heavily influenced the way Indonesian Islam later considered these issues. Banned by President Sukarno and marginalised by the emerging New Order, the proponents of militant Islam had no choice but to withdraw from conventional politics. Here the organisational model of the Muslim Brotherhood (also repressed in several Arab countries) as well as the financial resources and literature made available to them by Wahhabi Islam networks contributed to the radicalisation of their discourse. The two terms Dakwah (preaching) and Tarbiyah (education) were therefore used to describe a movement based on the conviction that the re-Islamisation of Indonesian society was the essential precondition for its return to the political scene.

3Paradoxically, after the initial phase of repression, it was the New Order that favoured this agenda. From the early 1990s, some of the networks born from the Islamic revival were instrumented by a power lacking support and looking for scapegoats (Sino-Indonesian Christians...) on whom to deflect public anger. However, most student associations from the Tarbiyah movement did not let themselves be dragged into this trend and, true to their moral position, joined the opposition against the declining Soeharto regime. From this movement the Justice Party (PK) was born in 1998 (later transformed into the Prosperous Justice Party, or the PKS).

4As explained by Ahmat Norma Permata’s contribution to this volume, the PKS contributed to the renewal of Indonesian political life in several ways. Firstly, unlike most other parties, Tarbiyah networks made it possible for it to benefit from the commitment of staunch and well-trained activists. Secondly, and this also distinguishes it from other political organisations, the PKS leaders were new personalities and were not involved in the New Order. Through several symbolic acts (such as refusing "envelopes"), they showed that the party’s moral discourse as well as its ideals of justice were not merely slogans. In an Indonesia that, with the Reformasi, experienced a smooth transition characterised by a limited break with the previous political regime, this novelty ensured the sensational debut of the PKS on the political scene. All the more since, between the 1999 and 2004 elections, the party skillfully smoothed the rough edges off its programmes. The PKS’ success fuelled the anxieties and suspicions of its competitors as well as those of many observers: Many questioned whether its participation in parliamentary democracy was sincere or whether it disguised a hidden agenda to seize power.

5This study will no doubt contribute to demystify the recent history of political Islam in Indonesia, and that of the PKS in particular. By tracing the history of different trends and by analysing the debates that were conducted within the party, it shows how the religious factor ought to be examined alongside other elements. The invocation of a divine norm and the prospect of a State based on Islamic principles are not sufficient to define a clear and substantial policy. This is partly because Islamic laws are subject to interpretation, and partly because democratic life implies an amount of attention directed towards voters, whose choices bear on these very same debates. It becomes apparent that linking the importance of these political issues to the cultural aspects of Islamic revival mentioned by Najib Kailani allows for a more distanced analysis of the last Indonesian elections. This also offers explanations on the ostensible paradox of the decline of Muslim parties despite a more visible presence of Islam in Indonesian political culture.