Version classiqueVersion mobile
OpenEdition Books

East-Timor

 | 
Frédéric Durand
, 
Christine Cabasset-Semedo

Part 3. Politics, legitimacy and electoral processes

Crisis and Nation-building in Timor-Leste

Sara Gonzalez Devant

Texte intégral

  • 208 CAVR (2005) 7.3.7. paragraph 74.

1In 1999, the United Nations, under UNAMET, supervised a popular consultation in which 78.5% of the population of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia. Following this, the Indonesian army withdrew from East Timor, ending a twenty-four year long occupation, but leaving behind it militias trained to destroy and intimidate the population. The militias carried out a devastating scorched-earth campaign decimating 70 per cent of the country’s infrastructure, and displaced three quarters of its population. Of these, about 250,000 were forcibly deported across the border into Indonesian West Timor, where they remained under militia control208.

  • 209 Vieira de Mello was killed in the bombing of UN Headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, where he served as (...)
  • 210 Chopra J. 2002. Building State Failure in East Timor, p. 981.

2In response to the post-consultation mayhem, the United Nations Security Council approved the first of several peacekeeping missions, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on October 25, 1999 (S/RES/1272). The UN mission launched an unprecedented form of international administration. The international community restored the institutional vacuum left by the Indonesian withdrawal, taking executive, legislative and judicial authority in the mission, and appointed the charismatic Sergio Vieira de Mello as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator209. In reality, the body corporate of the intervention [UNTAET] would inherit the status of sovereignty – something that had not happened at the international level since the fall of the Holy Roman Empire and the 1648 Treaty Westphalia. In effect, it would be state-building through UN statehood210.

  • 211 UN missions in East Timor to date are: UNAMET (June-October 1999), mandated with ensuring a free an (...)
  • 212 International Crisis Group (ICG). 2006. Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, p. 17.
  • 213 Wolfowitz P. 2006. Closing Press Conference in Timor-Leste (10 April 2006). World Bank (2006), Clos (...)

3UN administration was intended to phase out gradually211. The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was a political mission while its predecessors had integrated institutional support and peacekeeping. UNOTIL’s mandate was due to expire on May 20, 2006, to be replaced by a minimal UN support mission212 (actually UNOTIL’s mission was extended after violence broke out in April 2006, and was in fact succeeded by a strengthened UN mission, UNMIT). Donors were convinced that UN support had achieved its goals as late as April 2006 when the World Bank President, Paul Wolfowitz, stated in a closing press conference in Timor-Leste, April 10, 2006: 'The bustling markets, the rebuilt schools, the functioning Government – and above all the peace and stability – attest to sensible leadership and sound decisions'213.

  • 214 Violence erupted in some neighbourhoods against Easterners following Xanana Gusmao’s address to the (...)

4As Wolfowitz made this statement in Dili’s top hotel, crowded buses transported the first internally displaced persons (IDPs) of the 2006 crisis out of the capital and into the Eastern districts of Timor-Leste214. And a profound crisis developed in Timor-Leste, bringing the success story to an abrupt ending. The crisis was triggered by a confrontation between security forces, collapsing state institutions and undermining the achievements of the entire state-building effort.

  • 215 Cramer Christopher. 2006. Civil war is not a stupid thing, p. 7.

5This paper explores the impact of the crisis on nation-building in Timor-Leste from the perspective of society. It argues that the international community’s intimate involvement in ushering the nation into statehood has narrowed down what the crisis is “about” to institutional failure, without taking into account the social dimensions of the crisis. This paper addresses the need for conflict analysis to, in Christopher Cramer’s (2006) words, steer between over-rationalizing and mystifying the conflict: 'The great challenge, in trying to explain and make sense of violence and war, and their relationship to profound societal changes at local, national, regional and global levels, is to steer between mystifying and over-rationalizing'215.

6The first section critiques the dominant top-down understanding of the crisis and its limitations. The second section situates crisis knowledge along a hierarchy of credibility and proposes an alternative approach to the relationship between the crisis and nation-building. The third section illustrates the social dimensions of the crisis, exploring leaders’ reliance on violence experts during the crisis, an issue that has escaped much prevailing analysis. The final section approaches the relationship between the conflict and nation-building, scrutinizing the sovereignty, impersonality and legitimacy of the Timorese state, as well as the challenges they face.

1 - The crisis and nation-building: the top-down approach

  • 216 Philpott S. 2006. East Timor’s Double Life: Smells like Westphalian Spirit.

7After the outbreak of the violence in 2006, international actors acknowledged that UN missions had faced serious challenges in Timor-Leste. Firstly, reliance on donors meant that short UN missions had to factor in an uncomplicated exit in their mandates. Secondly, effective public administration was undermined by too many functions to perform, particularly in the first critical phase under UNTAET216.

  • 217 Op. cit. Chopra J. 2002, p. 256.
  • 218 Op. cit. Chopra J. 2002, p. 980.

8Timor-Leste was razed to the ground in 1999. And the international community espoused the “ideological reflex” of a blank slate once Indonesia withdrew217, because the very exercise of state-building as part of a broad emergency response presumes that the state stands above society. However, critics such as Hohe (2002) and Chopra (2002) have argued that the Timorese population retained latent systems of authority and legitimacy from the liberation struggle and thereafter, which the international community failed to recognize: “social structures of indigenous communities invariably generate sources of political legitimacy according to their own paradigm218. These indigenous systems of legitimacy have continued to evolve throughout Timor-Leste's history and into the present, despite their continued relevance being obscured by the international community’s need to reaffirm its role in statebuilding.

  • 219 Spyer P. 2006. Some Notes on Disorder in the Indonesian Postcolony, p. 188.
  • 220 Op. cit. Spyer P. 2006. p. 194.

9Two interrelated problems arise when the production of knowledge originates at the heart of the nation-building effort: an emphasis on institutions and politics induce a top-down approach; and epistemological risks are involved “when the very same terms used to describe the aims of government serve also as the analytical apparatus deployed by sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and the like219. In short, literature born in the state-building context tends to have an innate inability to look beyond itself; analysis born out of state-building participates in the state-versus-society perspective. Consequently, the literature is too grand and far-removed from the everyday experience of conflict220.

10This perspective dominates the production of knowledge about Timor-Leste, and has unintentionally distanced society from the state, both conceptually (in crisis analysis) and in reality (making the state more abstract and distant from people’s everyday aspirations and desires). Despite the failings of the UN administration in Timor-Leste, its expansive mandate and limited lifespan, the crisis was not exclusively, nor even predominantly a result of institutional failure. Nor was the humanitarian crisis a mere consequence of the political crisis. The persistence of displacement, the inability to contain low-level violence, and the emergence of regional identities attest to the fact that shifting social realities have not only prolonged the crisis but have become its organizing features. These crisis dynamics are essential in understanding that the state is embedded in society, and that these dynamics, however destructive, play a role in articulating the conflict and therefore, in how the state resolves it.

2 - Locating crisis knowledge along a hierarchy of credibility

11In order to escape falling into the chronic narcissism of nationbuilding literature, this section explores the production of knowledge during the crisis. It contrasts authoritative accounts, such as the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report, with rumor, a localized form of knowledge.

  • 221 Becker in Hall S. et al. 1978. Policing the Crisis: "Mugging" the State and Law and Order.
  • 222 Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007. Displacement in the 2006 Dili Crisis: Dynamics of an Ongoing Conflict.
  • 223 Op. cit. Hall et al. 1978. p. 58.

12Although taken from a different context, a “hierarchy of credibility”221 is perhaps the best way to locate the production of crisis knowledge in Timor-Leste222. In a hierarchy of credibility, those in powerful or high-status positions in society who offer opinions about controversial topics will have their definitions accepted, because such spokesmen are understood to have access to more accurate or more specialized information on topics than the majority of the population223.

13In nation-building contexts authoritative accounts have the added pressure of being policy-relevant, preferably informing best practices and lessons learned. The COI stands at the apex of the hierarchy of credibility: mandated by the Security Council to clarify facts, it effectively arbitrated crisis knowledge in Timor-Leste, establishing where all other readings of the crisis ought to be located (below) in the hierarchy of credibility. Its mandate enabled it to access privileged information (through interviews and special privileges) in order to do so.

  • 224 United Nations-COI. 2 October 2006. Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of (...)
  • 225 Op. Cit. UN-COI. 2006. p. 48, 51.

14Although the report referred to the human and social impact of the events of April and May 2006,224 the COI’s mandate obliged it to focus on events that provoked the breakdown of the state, the role and criminal responsibility of individuals, and on making recommendations on holding those criminally responsible accountable for their actions. In executing this mission, it established an authoritative narrative of events and legitimized the incumbent government. While not exonerating President Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, the report recommended the prosecution of, among others, ousted Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato225. The report entrenched a top-down perspective of the crisis by virtue of its high-profile mandate – it focused on the Timorese state rather than its society in relation to nationbuilding.

15Although it was the most persuasive account of the conflict, the COI report was by no means the only interpretation. In fact, the men, women and children displaced or carrying out the violence engaged in knowledge production through continuous conflict interpretation. Furthermore, the population also reacted to this localized form of knowledge, based on past experience and on the ongoing interpretation of the uncertainty of the present. These interpretations in turn spurred on further arson and violence and increasingly articulated the violence along East/West lines – the "language” of the 2006/07 conflict.

16The turmoil that overran Dili in the early months of the crisis provides a classic example of a shifting climate of insecurity where a population can entirely ignore authoritative accounts, be it because they are inaccessible or because the circumstances make them unreliable. In Timor-Leste, the virtual paralysis of public administration meant that an array of different interpretations were able to compete for credibility. Amidst social chaos and a climate of insecurity, rumor, anticipatory practices and new network affiliations (such as regional identification) all played and continue to play their part.

  • 226 Op. cit. Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007. p. 41-42.

17Localized knowledge is not merely an instance of misinformation that contrasts with the fact-finding established at the apex of the “hierarchy of credibility”. Rather, the nature of this form of knowledge production makes it an interesting feature of the conflict. Some instances carry a hidden agenda, while others recall insights from past conflicts and are manifest in behavior such as anticipatory displacement226. This form of crisis knowledge originates in society, in the lived experiences of the population that is involved in the violence. These local, intersubjective forms of crisis knowledge can and have greatly shaped what the conflict was about, a fact lost to most state-building literature.

  • 227 Op. cit. Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007. p. 8, 48.
  • 228 Op. cit. Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007.
  • 229 Trindade Jose, Castro Bryant. 2007: Technical Assistance to the National Dialogue Process in Timor- (...)

18A different but related way to understand these localized forms of knowledge are through “crisis dynamics”227. Crisis dynamics shape the nature of the conflict, and its meanings; and are both the consequences and substance of the conflict. Crisis dynamics fundamentally shift social realities because they create renewed possibilities of conflict. Low-level normalized violence, ongoing displacement, and the emergence of regional identities have been key crisis dynamics to date228. They are organizing dynamics of the crisis because they inadvertently determine what is at stake. Crisis dynamics are rooted in the past and draw their histories into future peace and conflict. Thus, a crisis that originated in the F-FDTL during the first years of independence toppled a government and generated “ethnic polarization” in 2006/7229.

  • 230 See Chandler J. 2005, p. 23 on the case of Bosnia.

19While analyses near the top of the “hierarchy of credibility” establish authoritative accounts, they do so only to the extent that they seek to speak to all members of society on a more or less equal basis. During the conflict, authoritative accounts were directed at the international community and the political elite in Timor-Leste, because they responded to an international agenda of good governance and capacity-building. Although internationally these appear as domestic questions, domestically they appear as external matters.230 Moreover, in the crisis context, the need to establish the country’s position in relation to these principles is particularly urgent. Localised forms of knowledge are lost in the process of establishing authoritative, outwardly objective, accounts. The detachment between the two extremes of the hierarchy of credibility calls for a different approach to the crisis and its relationship with nation-building.

3 - The role of personal loyalties and violence experts

  • 231 Bertrand J. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 24.

20This section aims to better understand the conflict from the perspective of society by examining the role of leaders and the activity of loyalty networks during the crisis. The conflict may best be understood as occurring at what Bertrand (2004) calls a critical juncture, where “the predictability of the institutional environment [was] lost and the stakes [rose] dramatically231. The conflict opened the opportunity for reconfiguring narratives of resistance, in effect the building blocks of Timorese nationalism, which had lost their force with the end of Indonesian occupation. Resistance – to the Indonesian occupation, to Fretilin authority, to foreign (UN) presence – has now been re-interpreted in order to redefine the relationship between the Timorese state and its people.

21An example of how the conflict reconfigured the relationship between the state and society was the role of personal loyalties and violence experts during the crisis. The link between state-society on the one hand, and personalised loyalties on the other, is obscured in topdown accounts. A report commissioned by USAID (2006), for example, explains “disagreements and rivalries amongst Timor-Leste’s elite”, a root cause of the conflict, as:

  • 232 Brady C., Timberman D.G. 2006. The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and Options for Conf (...)

22Largely due to institutional dysfunction and weaknesses, and in some cases due to a flagrant disregard for the new democratic ‘rules of the game’, the elite struggle evolved from a legitimate contest for political control into a battle of personalities and individual influence. It also ensnared the general population in a test of personal loyalties and the propagation of both longstanding and petty grievances232.

  • 233 The recruitment process of the F-FDTL, independent Timor-Leste’s armed forces, was highly controver (...)
  • 234 “Veterans” is a deceptive term. Violence experts range across the sexes and generations. A timely r (...)

23In reality, the highly personalised nature of the political crisis was not just a top-down process, as described above. Such reports ignore the fact that the pledging of loyalties to individual leaders was reciprocated by leaders’ reliance, and not just use of, “violence experts”. The nature of the Timorese struggle for liberation meant that individuals in the general population were trained and acclimatized to violence. This conflict know-how remains in independence. The large pool of “violence experts” that had been active during the liberation struggle could not be easily assimilated into a peaceful Timorese state. Some, but not all, were formally co-opted into the body of the state in government (Xanana Gusmao for one) and the security forces233. Reliance on civilians and other violence experts to carry out the violence to begin with, and to contain it later, was a fundamental aspect of the 2006 conflict. The prominent role of civilian ex-guerrillas (veterans), or those assimilated into the security forces; and youths organized in gangs (or a combination – veteran youths organized in gangs) marked the conflict from the onset234.

  • 235 Op. cit. AusAID. 2006. p. 4.
  • 236 Op. Cit. COI. 2006. p. 23.
  • 237 Op. Cit. AusAID. 2006. p. 4.

24The group Colimau 2000, “seen as a sort of rent-a-mob”235, is a case in point. Colimau 2000’s spokesperson Ozorio Leki’s speech incited violence to secure a change in government during the April 2006 petitioners’ protest outside the Government Palace236. However, the group is conversely believed to have been peaceful and disciplined during the violence sparked by the arrest of Major Reinaldo in Caicoli (Dili) although the group was camped close by in Matadouro237. AusAID lists other groups that like Colimau 2000, had grievances from the past towards the Fretilin government: CPD-RDTL, Sagrada Familia, and Orsnaco. It was a deliberate policy by the transitional crisis government to attempt to co-opt the sometimes-violent groups in order to curb the violence.

25In addition to the involvement of organized violent groups, the conflict prompted the emergence of many key actors – civilians and defectors – such as Major Alfredo Reinaldo (military police), Gastão Salsinha (spokesperson for the petitioners, employed by the PNTL but operating and armed under F-FDTL), Major Tara (F-FDTL officer) Vicente da Conceição “Rai Los” (ex-guerrilla and discharged from F-FDTL since 2003), and Abilio Audian “Mausoko” (a former resistance leader, as well as a police commander and leader or “warga” of the group PSHT, a youth group identified with PSD and PD parties), among others. The emergence of these actors, individual and group, caused a network of loyalties to kick in when the state lost its monopoly of the legitimate use of force.

  • 238 Alkatiri resigned on 26 June 2006.

26The political elite established an ambiguous relationship with “violence experts”, who, whether operating at the centre or margins of formal structures of power, were readily mobilized in the crisis. Rai Los and his paramilitary group played a notorious role in the crisis. Armed and uniformed by the Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato, Rai Los came clean and pledged his allegiance to Xanana Gusmao, but only after attacking a patrol of F-FDTL soldiers killing five and seriously injuring two (Taci Tolu/Tibar on May 24, 2006). This disclosure mounted pressure on Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri to resign238. Ironically, Rai Los and his men achieved a kind of emblematic status and, despite their civilian status and questionable role in the crisis, marched in the inauguration ceremony of the interim Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta.

27The case of another “violence expert”, Major Alfredo, is just as interesting and marked by ambiguity. He escaped with his men from the downtown Dili prison in a walk-out in broad daylight. Various attempts to recapture the Major proved fruitless. Reinaldo was defiant in hiding, and attempted to negotiate his outlaw status with the authorities until the end. For the authorities, the inability to bring him into the formal justice system and his popular support base make him an inconvenient liability. The Major was shot dead after allegedly attempting to assassinate President Ramos-Horta and ordering an attack on Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao on February 11, 2008. The President was seriously injured in the attack.

28Reliance on violence experts illustrates how indigenous systems of authority were at work when public institutions disintegrated. Loyalties persisted and were re-forged outside this public realm, but these collaborations affected the institutional set-up of the state. The difficulty arises for the post-crisis government that is anxious to demonstrate its commitment to good government and transparency externally, because it may be unable to handle violence experts on these terms. The relationship between the state and violence experts is therefore tenuous, but it is important to note that this relationship does not vanish in the absence of conflict. Top-down approaches remain silent about the sanctioned actions of violence experts who operate on the margins of the public sphere.

4 - Sovereignty, impersonality and legitimacy—The three crises of the Timorese State

29The 2006/07 crisis challenged the sovereignty, legitimacy and impersonality of the state of Timor-Leste. These challenges, although interrelated, can be considered separately for analytical purposes as three distinct crises.

  • 239 Barker Anne. 27 May 2006. “Total madnessas gangs fight in Dili ABC Australia.

30Timor-Leste experienced challenges on several fronts. The first was a crisis of sovereignty, the principle of the supremacy of the state. In Weberian terms, the state is defined as a set of institutions that hold the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a population in a fixed territory. The 2006 conflict struck down the state’s ability to do this. The disintegration of and confrontation between, and within, security forces provoked a generalized breakdown of law and order, in the words of one witness, “East against West, soldiers against soldiers, police against soldiers, everyone against everyone… It’s total madness239.

31The rapid disbanding of security forces exposed loyalties and affiliations to different political players, revealing the second crisis: a crisis of impersonality. In an ideal modern state, persons act in an official capacity in name of the state, and are obeyed to the extent that they safeguard and embody the principles of, broadly speaking, the constitution. The political stand-off between President Xanana and Prime Minister Alkatiri not only revealed their differing national projects, but redefined the configuration of the army and the police – some of whom defected, while others continued to operate, armed and clandestinely, outside Dili.

  • 240 Op. cit. Chopra J. 2002.

32The third crisis was a crisis of legitimacy. The legitimate state is one where the state has supreme authority because its population tacitly wills it so. By means of a healthy contestation of government decisions, the democratic process and dialogue with civil society reaffirm the legitimacy of the state. However, Timor-Leste’s society had undergone a number of alienating processes since the exit of the Indonesian occupation. The first was the failure of the UN administration to include the Timorese in state-building240. The second was the Fretilin party’s exclusionary politics. Both processes of alienation led to the disjuncture between nation-building and state-building.

  • 241 Simonsen S.G. 2006. The authoritarian Temptation in East Timor.
  • 242 Siapno Jacqueline. 2006. Timor-Leste-On the Path of Authoritarianism?; Simonsen S.G. 2006, Op. Cit.

33Fretilin’s expertise in administration and public management put it at a clear advantage above other parties, and its historical legacy made it the natural heir to UN sovereign rule in the fledgling country. The constitutional set-up strengthened Fretilin’s position in power through a parliamentary majority and a semi-presidential system, but simultaneously fuelled disaffection among the young intelligentsia and confronted Prime Minister and President241. Apart from the problematic institutional set-up, the popularity of Xanana’s persona alone was sufficient to challenge the notion that Fretilin’s historical hegemony legitimised what was widely perceived to be exclusionary politics242.

  • 243 Chandler J. 2006. The Empire in denial: The politics of State-Building, p. 1.

34These three crises outlined here reveal the complex relationship between (institutional) state-building and (ideological) nation-building. Whereas state-building is an act of “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security”243, nation-building is a broader process which does not necessarily run in sync with institutional development. Nation-building is understood broadly to be the product of aligning collective claims with a given institutional set-up. It may also result in the creation of new institutions. Nation-building is an evolving process, the link between the institutional make-up of the state and a mobilised political force that embodies “the restoration of community, assertion of identity, emergence of new cultural practices” – nationalism as described by Edward Said (1994:263). The tension between statebuilding and nation-building explored here provides the final key to reinterpreting the role of the crisis in the nation-building process.

Conclusion

35Some accounts, which lie high up in the hierarchy of credibility tend to interpret the 2006/07 conflict as a symptom of state-failing. This is partly because Timor-Leste’s sanctioned forms of authority broke down rapidly, to be replaced by informal, personalized networks of loyalty. The breakdown of law and order was also expressed with social meaning: the crisis was interpreted by those involved in it. The reliance on “violence experts” revealed that indigenous systems of authority continue to determine the relationship between state and society in Timor-Leste. Accounts that privilege the institutional set-up of the state are ill-equipped to analyze this conflict, because the literature implicitly separates state from society, the public realm from the private realm. It also disregards localized forms of crisis knowledge, partly because they may be forms of misinformation, but partly also because they arise from the subjective experience of violence, both past and present. Yet these forms of knowledge, and how the population reacts to them, determine what the crisis is about.

36Rather than being an instance of “state-failing”, the 2006/07 conflict was a manifestation of challenges to the sovereignty, impersonality and legitimacy of the state of Timor-Leste. These three crises reveal the social embeddedness of the state. More broadly, the confluence of issues purporting to be what the crisis was “about” (situated at different levels of the hierarchy of credibility) exhibited the disparity between statebuilding and nation-building in Timor-Leste. Approaching the conflict not as Timorese state-failing but rather as Timorese society engaging in nation-building can help avoid both mystifying and over-rationalising the 2006/07 conflict. Whether or not the state will overcome the conflict soon will depend on its ability to recognise that social realities have fundamentally shifted since March/April 2006, as have the stakes of the conflict. Realigning a mobilised political force to a collective national project and institutional set-up is the greatest problem faced by Timor-Leste again, or rather, still.

Notes

208 CAVR (2005) 7.3.7. paragraph 74.

209 Vieira de Mello was killed in the bombing of UN Headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, where he served as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative after leaving Timor-Leste.

210 Chopra J. 2002. Building State Failure in East Timor, p. 981.

211 UN missions in East Timor to date are: UNAMET (June-October 1999), mandated with ensuring a free and fair ballot. UNTAET (October 1999-May 2002) ushered the nation to independence and was succeeded by support missions UNMISET (2002-2005); and UNOTIL (2005-2006). The current mission, UNMIT, was established in 2006.

212 International Crisis Group (ICG). 2006. Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, p. 17.

213 Wolfowitz P. 2006. Closing Press Conference in Timor-Leste (10 April 2006). World Bank (2006), Closing press conference in Timor-Leste with Paul Wolfowitz April 10 2006. Available: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTOFFICPRESIDENT/0,,contentMDK:20882055~menuPK:51175739~pagePK:51174171~piPK:64258873~theSitePK:1014541,00.html

214 Violence erupted in some neighbourhoods against Easterners following Xanana Gusmao’s address to the petitioners (27 March 2006). See op. cit. ICG. 2006. p. 8.

215 Cramer Christopher. 2006. Civil war is not a stupid thing, p. 7.

216 Philpott S. 2006. East Timor’s Double Life: Smells like Westphalian Spirit.

217 Op. cit. Chopra J. 2002, p. 256.

218 Op. cit. Chopra J. 2002, p. 980.

219 Spyer P. 2006. Some Notes on Disorder in the Indonesian Postcolony, p. 188.

220 Op. cit. Spyer P. 2006. p. 194.

221 Becker in Hall S. et al. 1978. Policing the Crisis: "Mugging" the State and Law and Order.

222 Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007. Displacement in the 2006 Dili Crisis: Dynamics of an Ongoing Conflict.

223 Op. cit. Hall et al. 1978. p. 58.

224 United Nations-COI. 2 October 2006. Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry (COI) for Timor-Leste, p. 42.

225 Op. Cit. UN-COI. 2006. p. 48, 51.

226 Op. cit. Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007. p. 41-42.

227 Op. cit. Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007. p. 8, 48.

228 Op. cit. Gonzalez Devant Sara. 2007.

229 Trindade Jose, Castro Bryant. 2007: Technical Assistance to the National Dialogue Process in Timor-Leste, p. 2

230 See Chandler J. 2005, p. 23 on the case of Bosnia.

231 Bertrand J. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 24.

232 Brady C., Timberman D.G. 2006. The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation, p. 8.

233 The recruitment process of the F-FDTL, independent Timor-Leste’s armed forces, was highly controversial. Rees (2004) explains that there was a trade-off between Falintil guerrilla High Command and the UN administration, UNTAET. The former cooperated in retiring the majority of Falintil combatants in exchange for a free hand in selecting new recruits. (60) This is crucial to understanding the origins of the East/West split and the 2006 crisis.

234 “Veterans” is a deceptive term. Violence experts range across the sexes and generations. A timely report by AusAID (2006) noted that youth organizations play a crucial role in engaging this disenfranchised demographic. When I refer to “gangs” I refer to violent martial arts groups, although it is important to note that the role of violent groups is complex and predates the conflict. See AusAID. 2006. A survey of gangs and youth group in Dili.

235 Op. cit. AusAID. 2006. p. 4.

236 Op. Cit. COI. 2006. p. 23.

237 Op. Cit. AusAID. 2006. p. 4.

238 Alkatiri resigned on 26 June 2006.

239 Barker Anne. 27 May 2006. “Total madnessas gangs fight in Dili ABC Australia.

240 Op. cit. Chopra J. 2002.

241 Simonsen S.G. 2006. The authoritarian Temptation in East Timor.

242 Siapno Jacqueline. 2006. Timor-Leste-On the Path of Authoritarianism?; Simonsen S.G. 2006, Op. Cit.

243 Chandler J. 2006. The Empire in denial: The politics of State-Building, p. 1.

Auteur

Sara Gonzalez Devant is a freelance writer and Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo (AECID) scholar. She worked in Timor-Leste between 2005-2006. She has also published 'Displacement in the 2006 Dili Conflict: Dynamics of an Ongoing Crisis' (2008), Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper 45, University of Oxford. Contact: sara.gonzalez.devant@gmail.com

© Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine, 2009

Conditions d’utilisation : http://www.openedition.org/6540

Lire

Freemium

open access

Offert par L’éditeur de ce site