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Back to Old Habits

 | 
Renaud Egreteau
, 
Larry Jagan

Chapter Two. The entrenchment of the Burmese junta: the return of nationalist hardliners since 2003

Texte intégral

  • 42 JAGAN (Larry), “A year after Suu Kyi’s release, little has changed”, Inter Press Service, May 5, 2 (...)
  • 43 Interview with Ambassador Dato Ismail Razali, Kuala Lumpur, September 20, 2005.

1Fifteen years after its 1988 military coup, the Burmese regime seemed confident enough to open its doors to the International Community and released the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi on May 6, 2002. Yet, without any concrete dialogue afterwards, or any serious intention to establish a credible political agenda to start the much-needed transition process, the second liberation of the prodemocracy opposition leader was seen as a complete failure42. The efforts and concessions made by General Khin Nyunt and his Military Intelligence Services (or “MI”) during the 2000-2002 secret talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, her political party (National League for Democracy, or NLD), and the United Nations’ Special Envoy for Myanmar, Ambassador Dato Ismail Razali (April 2000 – January 2006) soon became a burden for the Burmese military top leaders43.

  • 44 Three factors contributed to the weakening of the ethnic threat by the Burmese Military throughout (...)

2In retrospect, the rupture sparked by the Depayin crackdown of May 30th, 2003 is no surprise. After a year of uncertainty caused by Aung San Suu Kyi’s numerous trips throughout the country and the audiences she attracted after her release, compounded by the attention of the international media that idealizes her, the SPDC chose to return to its old habits. Now that the strategic partnerships with its Indian, Chinese or ASEAN neighbours were in place and the ethnic insurgencies seriously weakened since the mid-1990s44, the Burmese junta was now in position to truly keep control of its internal affairs and the SPDC gradually opted for a tactical “entrenchment” from the outside world. The marginalization of a civilian opposition, often stigmatized by the official press as a “minion” of the international community – especially the US, was then a crucial part of this policy.

1 - Depayin crackdown and its regional implications (2003)

  • 45 See for instance the Preliminary Report of the Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre (Burma), Bang (...)
  • 46 E-mail exchanges with Lt-Col Hla Min,, Information Officer, Defence Ministry, June 6th, 2003.

3On May 30th, 2003, barely a year after Aung San Suu Kyi’s second release from house arrest, the Depayin incident marked a brutal return to Burma’s policy of intransigence that had characterized the regime’s conduct in the early 1990s. Travelling in North-western Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy largely made of NLD members and pro-democracy supporters was attacked by an orchestrated mob of the military regime’s sympathizers near the town of Depayin, in Monywa’s Township. While official statements announced a death toll of four people, exiled activists and Human Rights organisations put the toll much higher, between 50 and 80 killed45. Later a regime’s spokesman however admitted that the death toll was probably around 20 and three times as many injured46. Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo (Vice-president of the NLD) and dozens of opposition leaders were then taken into “protective custody” by the local military authorities, most of them were eventually brought back to Rangoon. Hundreds of other activists were arrested in the aftermath, as the authorities cracked down throughout the country.

4Whether manipulated or not by the Burmese authorities, the Depayin incident and the third time Aung San Suu Kyi’s was arrested, provoked a massive international outcry. It was also a serious setback in the reconciliation process initiated by the “secret talks” between Aung San Suu Kyi and General Khin Nyunt’s “MI” (2000-2002). Depayin constituted the first stage in the slow renunciation within the Tatmadaw of Khin Nyunt’s pragmatic political approach. Under the aegis of General Than Shwe, the most nationalistic elements of the junta clearly stopped the process which they saw as a sign of weakness on the part of the Burmese Military. For many observers, all potential political compromise between the junta and the civilian opposition in the past two decades has been jeopardized by the inability of each party to find a middle ground as this would imply giving concessions, and in doing so, showing weakness. A military mindset that cannot consider the idea of a winwin situation still prevails on both sides. Even more surprisingly for the opposition, though led by former military officers (U Tin Oo, U Aung Shwe, U Lwin…).

  • 47 Phone interview with Dato Ismail Razali at the end of his visit on June 10th, 2003. For further of (...)
  • 48 Interview, Ambassador Ismail Razali, Kuala Lumpur, September 20th, 2005.
  • 49 The Hindustan Times, India asks junta to free Suu Kyi, June 19th, 2003.
  • 50 The New York Times, Myanmar: Japanese Press Junta, June 24th, 2003.
  • 51 Interview, Embassy of Japan in Burma, Rangoon, January 24th, 2005. The death of a Japanese photogr (...)

5The United Nations and Western powers were the first to robustly react to the SPDC’s move and strongly denounced the crackdown at Depayin and the threat to the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner’s life. A week later, the UN Special Envoy Razali arrived in Rangoon to meet the Burmese government and was allowed to visit Aung San Suu Kyi in her “protective custody” – in Insein Prison. This went some way to reassuring the International Community about her well-being47. At the time, Razali detected a serious rift between General Khin Nyunt and his superiors, though hopes of overcoming it had still not vanished48. The region was much slower to react, but ASEAN members condemned the Depayin attack two weeks afterwards, while India essentially endorsed the line taken in the Association’s official statement on June 18th, 200349. Japan even sent its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tetsuro Yano, to Rangoon, on a rare visit to the country by a global power. Tokyo was extremely uncomfortable with the lack of progress in Burma’s internal affairs, and the Japanese authorities were ready to “reconsider [their] relations” with Rangoon given this setback50. Indeed, two weeks later, Japan announced it had suspended all its assistance programmes to Burma and since then has never really recovered from the Depayin rupture51.

  • 52 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma on diplomatic offensive, little effect so far”, Inter Press Service, July 8t (...)
  • 53 Personal discussions with Thai and Indonesian foreign ministry officials in Bangkok (July and Augu (...)

6In the face of the international media coverage and the political outcry Depayin generated throughout the world, in late June and July 2003 the Burmese junta launched a diplomatic offensive of its own aimed at reassuring its most vital partners, notably its Asian allies. Snubbing the Western world and UN organisations, Rangoon sent its Foreign Affairs Minister, U Win Aung, and his Deputy U Khin Maung Win only to “friendly” capitals to explain the crisis Burma had faced and pledged to stabilize the internal situation and revive the reconciliation process52. Bangkok, Singapore, Beijing, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo were consulted in a broad charm overture. In the letter from General Than Shwe to his regional counterparts, he told them that the Burmese opposition movement had planned an “assignation campaign” to coincide with Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday (on June 19th). The foreign ministers in these Asia countries were also presented with an embossed bound album containing a series of pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi meeting senior representatives of the junta – meant to prove their goodwill to the opposition leader and blame her for the collapse of the reconciliation process53.

  • 54 Burma’s military rulers obviously fears Nuremberg-style trials; General Than Shwe told the Timor L (...)

7However, as soon as international pressure gradually subsided, the Burmese military leadership recovered the initiative in August 2003. What happened within the junta during this month remains unclear. Obviously, after the Depayin setback, which was a clear signal of the top leadership’s disapproval of Suu Kyi’s release in 2002, Khin Nyunt tried to play his last political card. By proposing a well-constructed “Road Map to Democracy”, inspired by other more or less successful transitions from military rule to a civilian administration (Indonesia, South Korea or even Chile), this political programme was meant to be the Burmese Military vision of the future and the outline of the conditions for the transition. The Tatmadaw was to control its path and predict its outcome by leaving the upper hand in the one institution that has dominated Burma’s political landscape since Independence. In Khin Nyunt’s eyes, if the military leaders wanted to remain involved in the country’s political and internal affairs, without being brutally toppled and persecuted afterwards54, they had to cleverly shape the transitional process, which was essential after the Depayin gridlock.

  • 55 In WILSON (Trevor) (Ed.), Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation, ISEAS Publications, Sing (...)
  • 56 BOYD (Alan), “China’s brazen Myanmar move”, Asia Times, August 21st, 2003.
  • 57 Interview with Dr Zhai Kun, Asia-Pacific Centre, China Institute for Contemporary International Re (...)

8The eminent British scholar Robert Taylor argues that Khin Nyunt retook the initiative in August 200355. But the fact that he lost the crucial position of SPDC’s Secretary 1 and had to be content with being appointed Prime Minister by General Than Shwe, appears with hindsight as a demotion. Moreover, General Maung Aye, Vice-president of the SPDC since 1992, made an official trip to China a week before the announcement of the government reshuffle and Khin Nyunt’s Road Map56. Apart from the usual financial loans, commercial and military agreements, what Maung Aye was told and said to his Chinese hosts at this crucial time remain vague. The diplomatic and commercial leverage Beijing had on the Burmese leaders might have convinced them to accelerate the internal political reforms and follow Khin Nyunt’s transition-agenda57.

  • 58 TAYLOR (Robert), “Myanmar: Road Map to Where?”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2004, pp. 171-184.
  • 59 Interview of Surakiart Sathirithai, Bali, July 5, 2003.

9But with Khin Nyunt in charge of government, the military junta then found the necessary tool to shape and control the future of Burma’s political landscape. With this 7-point Road Map towards a “flourishing disciplined democracy” (as officially depicted), the SPDC drew up an agenda that outlined its own political transition and would be based on the global principles and objectives it has pursued since the May 1990’s electoral failure58. The Road Map sowed confusion among the international community. Most of Burma’s Asian partners, including Russia and Pakistan, adopted a “wait and see” attitude, putting their cautious trust in the Burmese regime’s initiative. Thailand even proposed an international conference involving regional and global powers that had key-interests in Burma. The “Bangkok Process” proposed by the Thai Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirithai was first muted in July 2003 at the ASEM foreign ministers summit in Bali, and aimed at supporting and monitoring the evolution of the Burmese model for reform59.

  • 60 Interviews with foreign diplomats of various countries involved in the Bangkok Process (France, In (...)
  • 61 The Nation, Bangkok Process just a sideshow for junta, April 25th, 2004.
  • 62 Whose Special Envoy Ambassador I. Razali had not been allowed to re-enter Burma since March 2004.

10In December 2003, the first meeting was organized in Bangkok, attended by twelve Asian and European countries, plus Burma and the United Nations Special Envoy60. However, the second meeting planned five months later in April 2004 was cancelled when the Burmese refused to attend, insisting that they were too busy with their internal priorities including implementing the first step of the Road Map, the reconvening of the National Convention in May 200461. As the very essence of the “Bangkok Process” (a Thai initiative) meant an external monitoring of Burmese internal affairs, the military regime withdrew its participation preventing its own Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to participate, even though they had been more than willing to defend the Road Map internationally. The SPDC’s leadership expressed its reluctance to have external mediation or influence in its own political programme, even if the recommendations or monitoring came from the neutral United Nations62. Gradually, the internal process launched the first session of the National Convention which opened on May 17th, 2004, but proved to be totally under the control of the military authorities. And at the same time the regime leaders began a concerted clean-up of the elements within the Army that were most connected to the influence of the outside world, starting with Khin Nyunt’s Military Intelligence Services.

2 - Khin Nyunt’s sacking and the purge of the “MI” (2004)

  • 63 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s generals now have the upper hand”, Inter-Press Services, September 22nd, 2 (...)
  • 64 HHe even admitted that Khin Nyunt feared for his future in 2004, and had thought of fleeing Burma; (...)

11For some, the nomination of Khin Nyunt as Prime Minister in August 2003 was the first steps of his slow descent, as he soon lost the crucial post of Secretary 1 of the SPDC (he was replaced by General Soe Win). After Burma’s refusal to participate in the second meeting of the “Bangkok Process”, the sacking of the Burmese Foreign Minister U Win Aung by the SPDC leadership in September 2004 clearly illustrated the first cracks in the edifice63. Since his nomination in 1998, Win Aung was well-known and appreciated in Asian diplomatic circles. A close associate of Khin Nyunt, under whom he rose as a military intelligence officer, he was a former Burmese Ambassador in Bonn and London, fluent in English, always smiling and jovial. But he was gradually regarded as too outspoken and open to the outside, too frank in talks with his counterparts during ASEAN meetings, especially when he repeatedly promised the release of Aung San Suu Kyi after Depayin64.

  • 65 JAGAN (Larry), “Power Struggle Intensifies Uncertainty”, The Bangkok Post, January 31st, 2005.

12Then came the watershed: Khin Nyunt’s own demise on October 19th, 2004. This was followed by a wholesale purge of his intelligence structure, the Military Intelligence Services he had (re) built under General Ne Win’s orders in 1984. This process was tantamount to the Burmese Army turning on its self: it was a form of “cannibalism” according to many senior military officers, the “Army eating its own flesh65. The purges that lasted over several weeks were seen as necessary for the regime to survive by getting rid of the internal elements threatening the cohesion, the integrity, and somehow the purity of the Burmese military elite. Khin Nyunt was perceived as too influenced by the outside; himself ethnic Chinese, fluent in English and willing to travel to explain his political views, he was aided in its daily tasks by dozens of intelligence officers and political counsellors with the same background. Rumours were rife in Rangoon that he was following his own political agenda for Burma, that included becoming the country’s top civilian leader after the transition to “controlled and disciplined” democracy.

  • 66 Various discussions with former Burmese MI officers and Chinese diplomats, Bangkok and Beijing, 20 (...)
  • 67 Conversation with a relative of Maj-Gen Kyaw Win (who might have been appointed Deputy Intelligenc (...)

13Perhaps the “kiss of death” for him was when the Chinese leaders playfully dubbed him the “Deng Xiaoping of Burma”. On his final visit to China in June 2004 he reportedly told the Chinese politicians he met that he planned to be Burma’s first President under the new constitution that was being drawn up at the time66. That may have been the last straw for General Than Shwe when he heard about it from Khin Nyunt’s deputy (Major General Kyaw Win) who accompanied him on the June 2004 trip67. At the same time as the junta top leader became increasingly disillusioned with Khin Nyunt and doubted his loyalty, many senior officers within the Tatmadaw began to resent the privileged position of the Military Intelligence wing and their growing economic wealth. It was seen as a threat to the rest of the Army, especially the prestigious Infantry led by General Maung Aye and his second General Thura Shwe Mann, who might have convinced the Senior General to move against Khin Nyunt.

  • 68 Or “MI” Tin Oo, not to be confused with U Tin Oo, former Defence Ministry and Tatmadaw Chief of St (...)
  • 69 For a detailed analysis of the 1983 events: TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Burma in 1983: From Recovery to (...)
  • 70 Interview with Nyo Ohn Myint, grand-nephew of General Tin Oo, Chiang Mai, January 13th, 2005.
  • 71 The Nation (Bangkok), Three explosions in Rangoon, May 8th, 2005.
  • 72 AFP, Deadly bomb blasts in Myanmar split military: dissidents, May 9th, 2005.

14Strongman of the junta since 1992, Than Shwe thus followed the same successful policy that Ne Win had been famous for during the 1962-88 era. Just like Ne Win sacked in 1983 by its most popular contender General Tin Oo68, Than Shwe swept out a potential internal threat he had been watching grow suspiciously. The forced resignation and trial of “MI” Tin Oo and the purge of its Intelligence staff in May 1983 indeed presents many parallels with that of Khin Nyunt’s69. The purges of the potential rival and apparent heir to the supremo were conducted in the same way and, for the same reasons in 1983 and 200470. Both also led to the fatal dismantling of the intelligence apparatus given the fateful consequences witnessed soon afterwards. Just as Rangoon was hit by the North Korea bombings in October 1983, the city was rocked few months after Khin Nyunt’s Mis were purged by a series of bombs in May 2005 that officially left 11 dead and four times as many injured71. Rumours even spread suggesting the possible involvement of Khin Nyunt’s loyal followers72.

  • 73 Various interviews of Burmese soldiers (retired or in service) and their relatives conducted in Bu (...)

15With hindsight, the October 2004 purge appears perfectly logical, though still very surprising. Sacking the head of the powerful Military Intelligence without him moving against or preventing it, was clearly a political feat. It has often been said that Khin Nyunt was a General without an Army. True, as he had no real combat experience, and he was a spook, and not a soldier. The Tatmadaw rank-and-file soldiers manifestly despised Khin Nyunt and his intelligence officers and were not unhappy to see him go73. Though supporting his political ideas, many senior Tatmadaw officers clearly expressed they had no allegiance towards him as a man or army commander.

  • 74 TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Neither Inheritance nor Legacy: Leading the Myanmar State since Independenc (...)

16But the sacking is evidently another illustration of the persistent tradition within the Burmese military regime of purging threatening elements since the formation of the Tatmadaw, with the example of General Smith Dun, the first (Karen) Commander-in-Chief deposed by Ne Win in 1949, Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, one of the Thirty Comrades sacked in 1957 for his alleged communist sympathy or Brigadier Aung Gyi, evinced by Ne Win in 1963 for his rightist views. As the Singapore-based Burmese academic Tin Maung Maung Than demonstrates it, suspicion among military leaders helps survival of the regime since it is holding political power74.

  • 75 JAGAN (Larry), “Gains by hardliners could isolate Burma further”, Inter Press Service, November 16 (...)
  • 76 KYAW YIN HLAING, “Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2005, pp (...)

17Consequently, the hardliners of the Burmese military elite were back after 200475. But the 2003 “Road Map to Democracy” was interestingly still on schedule, as it had survived its own creator. General Than Shwe’s entourage, though less prone to any compromise realised that it was the only political card the SPDC could continue to safely play. The top leader might have indeed been anxious to exert more direct personal control of the process. It was clearly a return to keeping it all in indigenous hands, as no foreign influence (like the Bangkok Process) or pressure (from UN Special Envoy Razali or Western countries) would be tolerated. While the spirit of the Roadmap was clearly a “MI” initiative – it was senior intelligence officers under Khin Nyunt who thought-out and prepared the plan in the early 2000s -- the Road Map process, with the National Convention and a new Constitution at its pinnacle, was maintained. The hardliners, who then chose to control every internal development, as well as the pace, obviously had the upper hand76.

  • 77 Interview with U Win Aung, Phuket, April 2004.
  • 78 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s Military: purges and coups prevent progress towards democracy”, in WILSON (...)

18Consequently, they were in no hurry to rush the process after the massive internal reshuffle, contrary to the wish of the “pragmatists” (as Khin Nyunt’s MI entourage was labelled). “Because we have a 7-stage Road Map doesn’t mean it will take seven years to complete”, the former Burmese Foreign Minister Win Aung said during a bi-lateral meeting with his Thai counterpart in Phuket in February 2004. “But the first steps are the most difficult and time-consuming” he conceded77. The Tatmadaw old-guard, trained under Ne Win’s autarchic era then enriched under Than Shwe’s nationalistic decade was evidently not prepared to be goaded by the international community or be stampeded into any rapid progress towards political liberalisation or opening-up78. Entrenching itself in a newly built and reclusive capital would then be of considerable advantage.

3 - Naypyidaw’s transfer and the isolation within

  • 79 JAGAN (Larry), “Fearing invasion, junta plans a new capital in the hills”, Inter Press Service, Ju (...)

19As the Burmese chairmanship of the ASEAN (planned for the year 2006) was looming, further tensions arose within the military top leadership. Many feared there was still too much involvement of the regional and international community in Burma’s internal political affairs. Once Khin Nyunt was out, the issue of the chairmanship had been the key bone of contention the junta had to cope with in the early months of 2005. The strategic option chosen was then to go a step further back into the isolation, by preparing a calculated withdrawal to a new capital. This was clearly seen as Than Shwe’s unilateral decision to move the complete political and administrative SPDC’s centre of power as well as the Tatmadaw’s Headquarters from the old colonial-inherited strategic base of Rangoon to a new reclusive nerve centre in the heart of the “Burman” country79.

  • 80 JAGAN (Larry), “Uneasy lies the crown in Myanmar”, Asia Times, April 3, 2006.
  • 81 See for instance MYA MAUNG, “The Burma Road to the Past”, Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2, March-Apri (...)
  • 82 JAGAN (Larry), “Myanmar’s generals build their ‘Xanadu’”, Asia Times, July 22, 2005.

20Both ideological and strategic reasons prompted the regime’s move. At first, as chauvinistic nationalism and a great deal of idealisation of ancient royal times have been the foremost ideological credo of the Tatmadaw, the need to revive the old monarchic traditions of building new centres of power at each renewal of leadership became evident. Mixing karmic Buddhism, historical mysticism and nationalist pride, the Burmese junta needed to reproduce the prestigious Burman history in order to fit in it and be the latest incarnation of it80. As the ancient capitals surrounding Mandalay prove it (Ava, Amarapura, Sagaing, and Mindon, Mandalay being itself the most prestigious Burman capital, beside Pagan), every new royal power had to erect a new capital to praise its glory. Many Burmese academics have focused their work on these socio-cultural and political phenomena81, demonstrating that those behavioural patterns are not peculiar to the SLORC-SPDC’s two decades, but were also observable during Ne Win’s time or during the colonial era with the rise of the Burmese nationalism or the Saya San Rebellion (1930-32). Just to illustrate it, the junta named its new capital “nay-pyi-dtaw” (Naypyidaw) or “Royal City” in Burmese82.

  • 83 JAGAN (Larry), “Government on the run-Burma’s generals are planning to head for the hills”, The Ba (...)

21The decision of the current regime also responded to strategic considerations. Not only did the Tatmadaw need new and Burmesebuilt “bunkerised” headquarters to replace the aging Rangoon/Mingaladon base, but the new capital also had to be at the very heart of the country, far away from the sea (and potentially less vulnerable to foreign invasion) and closer to the strategic peripheral areas, where border trade, underground militias and ethnic insurgency were to be watched. The region of Pyinmana, 370 kms north of Rangoon, was then chosen, especially for the quasi-mystic legendary fame it gained during the Second World War. But the site for the new capital, a few kilometres away from Pyinmana, had to be entirely reclusive, virgin and highly protected unlike Rangoon. By escaping from the “rebel city” – for many current rulers evidently feared future mass protests or uprisings like that in 1988 (and two years after the decision, the September 2007 monk-led demonstrations proved to comfort the regime in its choice), the junta intended to move away from the potential contestation -- students, monks, Burmese elite linked to foreigners through embassies, NGOs and the like. The armed forces and civil servants, who are the core of regime, were thus to be effectively insulated from “contamination” of rebellious civilians83.

  • 84 Several discussions with foreign diplomats, UN officials or NGO representatives who were “brought (...)
  • 85 For a more detail analysis, see MAUNG AUNG MYOE, “The Road to Naypyitaw: Making Sense of the Myanm (...)
  • 86 JAGAN (Larry), “New Capitol comes complete with Generals’ mansions”, Inter Press Service, November (...)

22The new government complex and military base swiftly constructed included the most modern equipment, bunkers, airport, and hi-tech telecommunications. It is a truly well-protected army base, where it extremely difficult to get access or information, unless you are invited to do so84. It therefore secures the SPDC’s greatest objective of entrenching its power85. Astrologers had also their say in the process, as the exact date of transfer illustrates (November 7th, 2005, at 6:37 am86). Beside the 2007 mass protests which left Naypyidaw unaffected, the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 also served to confirm Than Shwe’s perceptions of the need to move away from Rangoon, away from the threats of the Burmese coasts, the possible foreign invasion and misfortunes coming from the sea as demonstrated by the Indo-British colonialism in the 19th century.

  • 87 According to the Chiang Mai-based dissident Irrawaddy News Group: The Irrawaddy-On-Line, Burma’s N (...)

23From the military’s point of view, it proved to be quite a smart move. Though many naval bases have been reported as greatly affected by Nargis (Hainggyi, Seikkyi, Coco) as well as Rangoon Air Force and telecommunication equipments, the core of the newly-built military structure of Naypyidaw remained untouched87. Consequently since 2005, and as far as internal matters are concerned, the control of a few top Tatmadaw officers and SPDC leaders over the whole regime and the political-military system is now more secure from Naypyidaw. Every order, decision or initiative either originates or passes through the new centre of power. It is a “perfect entrenchment” that has many implications for the whole internal and external policymaking process.

  • 88 Interview, Embassy of China in Burma, Rangoon, March 7th, 2006.
  • 89 Various interviews with Chinese diplomats in Rangoon, Bangkok and Beijing (2005 and 2008).
  • 90 Interviews, American Embassy in Rangoon, November 9th, 2007 and Thai Embassy in Rangoon, February (...)

24Even the Chinese were taken aback88 and within twenty-four hours of the start of the move in November 2005, they sent an envoy from Beijing to see the Burmese top leaders to express their concerns, especially at not having been given prior notice of the move. Many believe their influence and leverage over the Burmese leadership and Army officials dipped significantly after Khin Nyunt’s removal. The “MI” had indeed definitely had the best connections and personal relationships with the Chinese establishment, compared to the more nationalistic, and perhaps even sinophobic, new hardliners. At the time, China lost many of its networks within Burma, but since 2005, the Chinese have made a concerted effort to re-establish their position, though successes are limited89. Other foreign representations in Rangoon were also greatly surprised at the move. The Thais and Americans, having planned huge and expensive new embassies in Rangoon (the former on Pyay Road, the latter on University Avenue, officially opened in 2007), were especially upset90. None of the 30-odd foreign diplomats based in Rangoon has however publicly expressed their intention to move themselves too in Naypyidaw, apparently much to the delight of the Burmese leaders.

  • 91 JAGAN (Larry), “Back to chauvinism, xenophobia: Burma’s military rulers are opting for isolation a (...)
  • 92 JAGAN (Larry), “Power expected to pass to next-generation generals”, Inter Press Service, June 30, (...)
  • 93 Interview with Major Kyaw Win, then Deputy Chief of Burmese Intelligence, Shan State, March 2004.
  • 94 Within the Army, as within the junta. For instance, Generals Khin Nyunt, Soe Win and Thein Sein fo (...)

25Entrenchment has consequently given the SPDC many cards to play. It has given the top leaders greater control over internal rivalries while moving the heart of power to a more controllable centre. Since Khin Nyunt’s sacking in October 2004, there has been a spate of articles focusing on the rivalry between General Maung Aye, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the supremo Senior-General Than Shwe91. While all these internal rivalries certainly exist, they have been perfectly managed by the top leadership since 2005. The hierarchy prevails, with Than Shwe and Maung Aye (the last two Mohicans of the September 1988 coup d’état) maintaining a flexible equilibrium between their own clan92. There is an evident and strict discipline within the Tatmadaw – orders are instinctively carried out without question, and this loyalty has been a key element in explaining why the Burmese armed forces were to become the sole structured and organised institution of the country to be able to count, intervene and be present (for better or worse) throughout the country since the independence (and not only since 1962). “Burmese soldiers do not question their superior officers and obey their orders unquestioning”, once said Major General Kyaw Win93. Although senior officers are sacked and their supporters purged on a regular basis (in a vital purification and self-preserving behaviour), there is an undisputed understanding among the Tatmadaw chain of command that the hierarchy94 (within the Army or within the junta) helps maintain the country’s stability, integrity and unity (as it is one of the motos tirelessly repeated by the official propaganda).

  • 95 JAGAN (Larry), “Power struggle stalls constitutional reforms”, Inter Press Services, February 16, (...)
  • 96 JAGAN (Larry), “Crisis looms for Myanmar’s riven junta”, Asia Times, March 27, 2008.
  • 97 DAVID (Roman), HOLLIDAY (Ian), “Set the Junta Free: Pre-transitional Justice in Myanmar’s Democrat (...)
  • 98 And it is fairly admitted by most of the NLD or NCGUB representatives abroad. They however let the (...)

26But rivalries over the Road Map initiated by Khin Nyunt in 2003 do persist within the top leadership, as many military officers fear the prospect of a new future where the armed forces will be swept out of Burma’s political, and above all, economic landscape95. They see it as a “leap into the Dark96. What if the whole transitional process slips out of the Army hands? What if a revengeful civil opposition gains power after the parliamentarian elections planned by the fifth point of the Road Map? Many top army officers are indeed very afraid not only of losing the financial backing and economic networks they have built through nepotism and tight control of Burma’s state natural resources and formal economy since 1988, but also of a possible “witch hunt” once a powerful opposition of Burman and ethnic “revanchists” access civilian power and got external backing from Western chanceries or hardline exiled groups. They need further assurance both from inside (from the leaders in favour of a gradual withdrawal of the Tatmadaw from the political scene) and from outside. Few scholars and diplomats have put the taboo issue of amnesty on the table--talks of reconciliation by forgiving (but not forgetting) in a truly Buddhist spirit97. Escaping avenging justice after transition is indeed a crucial element that needs to be addressed by all parties concerned98.

27Internal rivalries managed, civil and ethnic oppositions marginalized, the entrenchment of the military regime has conferred it a greater control over the Burmese political landscape, as during General Ne Win’s time. “Back to the old habits”, would say the Tatmadaw old guard that has been formed under the fanciful dictator who died in December 2002. But the junta obviously does not appear as isolated, autarchic and inward-looking as one could imagine from an outsider perspective. The Burmese military is indeed well aware of the state of the World surrounding it. The consolidation of its power since 2003 enables it to now skilfully play the politics of “isolationism without isolation”.

Notes

42 JAGAN (Larry), “A year after Suu Kyi’s release, little has changed”, Inter Press Service, May 5, 2003.

43 Interview with Ambassador Dato Ismail Razali, Kuala Lumpur, September 20, 2005.

44 Three factors contributed to the weakening of the ethnic threat by the Burmese Military throughout the 1990s: (1) a skilfully bargained cease-fire policy with 17 groups initiated by the MI, (2) a strengthened Tatmadaw able to contain the military force of any ethnic guerrilla along the border areas, (3) a “divide and rule” strategy applied to the strongest rebels groups, especially the Shans and the Karens.

45 See for instance the Preliminary Report of the Ad hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre (Burma), Bangkok, July 4, 2003.

46 E-mail exchanges with Lt-Col Hla Min,, Information Officer, Defence Ministry, June 6th, 2003.

47 Phone interview with Dato Ismail Razali at the end of his visit on June 10th, 2003. For further official details see The New York Times, Critic of Burmese Junta Not Hurt, Envoy Says, June 11th, 2003.

48 Interview, Ambassador Ismail Razali, Kuala Lumpur, September 20th, 2005.

49 The Hindustan Times, India asks junta to free Suu Kyi, June 19th, 2003.

50 The New York Times, Myanmar: Japanese Press Junta, June 24th, 2003.

51 Interview, Embassy of Japan in Burma, Rangoon, January 24th, 2005. The death of a Japanese photographer during the crackdown on the “Saffron Revolution” on September 27th, 2007 furthered the estrangement between two countries that had though enjoyed friendly relations since the end of the Second World War. During the past five years, Tokyo had all the difficulties in getting back a foothold in Burma; interview, Embassy of Japan, Rangoon, February 29th, 2008.

52 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma on diplomatic offensive, little effect so far”, Inter Press Service, July 8th, 2003.

53 Personal discussions with Thai and Indonesian foreign ministry officials in Bangkok (July and August 2003) and at the ASEAN Bali Summit (November 2003).

54 Burma’s military rulers obviously fears Nuremberg-style trials; General Than Shwe told the Timor Leste leader Xanana Gusmao, of his fears when they met. Interview with Xanana Gusmao in Bangkok, October 2004.

55 In WILSON (Trevor) (Ed.), Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation, ISEAS Publications, Singapore, 2006, page 4.

56 BOYD (Alan), “China’s brazen Myanmar move”, Asia Times, August 21st, 2003.

57 Interview with Dr Zhai Kun, Asia-Pacific Centre, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, July 22nd, 2004.

58 TAYLOR (Robert), “Myanmar: Road Map to Where?”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2004, pp. 171-184.

59 Interview of Surakiart Sathirithai, Bali, July 5, 2003.

60 Interviews with foreign diplomats of various countries involved in the Bangkok Process (France, India, Japan, China and Singapore), Rangoon, between April and May 2004.

61 The Nation, Bangkok Process just a sideshow for junta, April 25th, 2004.

62 Whose Special Envoy Ambassador I. Razali had not been allowed to re-enter Burma since March 2004.

63 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s generals now have the upper hand”, Inter-Press Services, September 22nd, 2004.

64 HHe even admitted that Khin Nyunt feared for his future in 2004, and had thought of fleeing Burma; personal discussions with ASEAN foreign ministers and the UN envoy Razali who met the Burmese foreign minister in Jakarta. See JAGAN, (Larry), “Junta prepares to hold on to power”, the Bangkok Post, September 18th, 2004.

65 JAGAN (Larry), “Power Struggle Intensifies Uncertainty”, The Bangkok Post, January 31st, 2005.

66 Various discussions with former Burmese MI officers and Chinese diplomats, Bangkok and Beijing, 2005-2006.

67 Conversation with a relative of Maj-Gen Kyaw Win (who might have been appointed Deputy Intelligence chief by Senior-General Than Shwe to monitor Khin Nyunt’s work and ambitions), Bangkok, 2005.

68 Or “MI” Tin Oo, not to be confused with U Tin Oo, former Defence Ministry and Tatmadaw Chief of Staff (1974-76) who became NLD Vice-president and Aung San Suu Kyi’s closest partner in 1988.

69 For a detailed analysis of the 1983 events: TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Burma in 1983: From Recovery to Growth?”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1984, pp. 116-119.

70 Interview with Nyo Ohn Myint, grand-nephew of General Tin Oo, Chiang Mai, January 13th, 2005.

71 The Nation (Bangkok), Three explosions in Rangoon, May 8th, 2005.

72 AFP, Deadly bomb blasts in Myanmar split military: dissidents, May 9th, 2005.

73 Various interviews of Burmese soldiers (retired or in service) and their relatives conducted in Burma between 2002 and 2004.

74 TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Neither Inheritance nor Legacy: Leading the Myanmar State since Independence “, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 15, No. 1, June 1993, p. 24-63.

75 JAGAN (Larry), “Gains by hardliners could isolate Burma further”, Inter Press Service, November 16, 2004.

76 KYAW YIN HLAING, “Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2005, pp. 231-256.

77 Interview with U Win Aung, Phuket, April 2004.

78 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s Military: purges and coups prevent progress towards democracy”, in WILSON (Trevor) (ed.), Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation, Singapore, ISEAS Publications, 2006, p. 29-37.

79 JAGAN (Larry), “Fearing invasion, junta plans a new capital in the hills”, Inter Press Service, July 20, 2005.

80 JAGAN (Larry), “Uneasy lies the crown in Myanmar”, Asia Times, April 3, 2006.

81 See for instance MYA MAUNG, “The Burma Road to the Past”, Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2, March-April 1999, p. 265-286, or in French language: DE VIENNE (Marie-Sybille), “La Birmanie en quête de rois », Outre-Terre, No. 6, 2003, p. 127-140.

82 JAGAN (Larry), “Myanmar’s generals build their ‘Xanadu’”, Asia Times, July 22, 2005.

83 JAGAN (Larry), “Government on the run-Burma’s generals are planning to head for the hills”, The Bangkok Post, November 8, 2005.

84 Several discussions with foreign diplomats, UN officials or NGO representatives who were “brought in” by the Burmese authorities for official meetings, between 2005 and 2008.

85 For a more detail analysis, see MAUNG AUNG MYOE, “The Road to Naypyitaw: Making Sense of the Myanmar Government’s Decision to Move its Capital”, Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 79, Singapore, November 2006.

86 JAGAN (Larry), “New Capitol comes complete with Generals’ mansions”, Inter Press Service, November 18, 2005.

87 According to the Chiang Mai-based dissident Irrawaddy News Group: The Irrawaddy-On-Line, Burma’s Navy Suffers strategic losses, May 26th, 2008 available at <http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=12285>.

88 Interview, Embassy of China in Burma, Rangoon, March 7th, 2006.

89 Various interviews with Chinese diplomats in Rangoon, Bangkok and Beijing (2005 and 2008).

90 Interviews, American Embassy in Rangoon, November 9th, 2007 and Thai Embassy in Rangoon, February 27th, 2008.

91 JAGAN (Larry), “Back to chauvinism, xenophobia: Burma’s military rulers are opting for isolation amid increasing division”, The Bangkok Post, June 30, 2005.

92 JAGAN (Larry), “Power expected to pass to next-generation generals”, Inter Press Service, June 30, 2006.

93 Interview with Major Kyaw Win, then Deputy Chief of Burmese Intelligence, Shan State, March 2004.

94 Within the Army, as within the junta. For instance, Generals Khin Nyunt, Soe Win and Thein Sein followed the same path through hierarchy: from SPDC Secretary 2, to Secretary 1, to Prime Ministership…

95 JAGAN (Larry), “Power struggle stalls constitutional reforms”, Inter Press Services, February 16, 2006.

96 JAGAN (Larry), “Crisis looms for Myanmar’s riven junta”, Asia Times, March 27, 2008.

97 DAVID (Roman), HOLLIDAY (Ian), “Set the Junta Free: Pre-transitional Justice in Myanmar’s Democratisation”, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 2006, p. 91-105.

98 And it is fairly admitted by most of the NLD or NCGUB representatives abroad. They however let the issue remain in Aung San Suu Kyi’s hands, the sole icon able to reconciliate every party according to them. Various interviews of Burmese opposition leaders, Thailand or France, 2005-2008.

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