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Back to Old Habits

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Renaud Egreteau
, 
Larry Jagan

Chapter One. Isolation chosen or endured? A Burmese history of isolationist withdrawals since Independence

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Texte intégral

  • 4 Here the English language makes the distinction between the term “Burman” (or Bama’r), designating (...)

1Like many States throughout History, Burma had since its Independence in 1948 conducted a foreign policy guided by its geography. At the crossroads between the Indian Subcontinent, the Chinese world and the rest of continental Southeast Asia, Burma undoubtedly boasts a profound strategic position. However, it is also suitably encircled by a protective horseshoe of mid-range hills, which are inhabited by ethnic minorities and tribal groups who have always acted as a buffer between the Burman4 historical centre of the country (which had never been territorially unified as it is today compared to before British colonisation) and the rest of Asia (China, Thailand, India). On the ground, Burma thus appears to be more inward-looking and isolated that its situation on a map could reveal.

Burma and its Strategic Neighbourhood

Burma and its Strategic Neighbourhood

1 - Neutralism, Insurgency and Autarchy: Burma’s uneasy relations with the outside world (1948-1988)

  • 5 For an in-depth analysis of Burma’s strategic culture, see TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Myanmar: Myanmar- (...)
  • 6 THOMSON (John S.), “Burmese Neutralism”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 2, June 1957, p. (...)

2Historically, Burma has always feared its neighbours, whether Siamese, Manipuri, Mongols, Chinese or Europeans. A peculiar geography, colonial legacies and a strategic culture that has always given priority to the development of a continental-type power to the detriment of maritime expansion5, has led successive Burmese kingdoms to consider their immediate neighbours as well as the other great powers (especially the naval ones) quite fearfully and to develop a strong inward-looking nationalism. After the Second Anglo-Burmese war in 1853, the Court of Ava was indeed relatively satisfied with keeping control of the heart of the Burman land around Mandalay, despite losing Lower Burma and all access to the Indian Ocean to the British. As J. S. Thomson already noted in 1957, the “topography of the country and its isolation from trade routes tended to make the [Burman] people look inward rather than outward (...)”6.

3In the aftermath of Independence in 1948 and the definitive separation from the British Crown, these inward-looking tendencies were reflected in an openly neutralist diplomacy. Given the sensitive position of Burma, between a rising Nehruvian India and the new People’s Republic of China born in 1949, and also East Pakistan and Thailand (two strategic pro-US militarized countries by that time), Burma’s first Prime Minister U Nu chose the Buddhist-inspired “middle path” of Neutralism, Asian Solidarity and later Non-Alignment. He was very careful however, not to seriously alienate Burma from its immediate neighbours, primarily India and China. Indeed, the main resource of the country being its rice exports (Burma, partly with Thailand, was then known as the “rice-bowl” of Asia), it had to establish good relations with any power willing to buy and import its main agricultural asset. Half a century later, the same logic still prevails: Burma still needs to maintain good neighbourly relationships to benefit from the commercial dynamism and economic opportunities offered by China, Thailand, and also gradually India, and further south Malaysia and Singapore, in order to sustain its still under-developed economy.

  • 7 A few thousand Chinese troops from the Kuomintang (KMT) entered Northern Burma in 1949 fleeing Mao’ (...)
  • 8 MAUNG MAUNG, “The Burma-China Border Settlement”, Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1961, p. 38-43

4Thus, the first Rangoon governments tried to befriend both India and China through U Nu’s personal links with their respective leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou En Lai. It managed to solve the “Kuomintang troops” issue7 and settle the Sino-Burmese border delineation in 19608. It also accommodated India, which nevertheless still remained in the Burmese collective psyche a source of hatred -- the colonial legacies and the enrichment of Indian communities brought into Burma by the British -- had left deep scars. It also tried to pursue a soothing policy with the archrival Thailand, in spite of years of reciprocal distrust and the rise of civil war in French Indochina throughout the 1950s.

5The parliamentary periods (1948-1958, 1960-1962) were certainly post-independence periods when Burma was least isolated from the rest of the world. It became a leading voice of the Non-Aligned and Asian Solidarity movements. Rangoon was then one of the most respected leading governments in the region, and much appreciated by the Western chanceries. The nomination of U Thant (a former counsellor to U Nu and a deeply revered nationalist scholar) to the prestigious post of Secretary General of the United Nations (1961-1971) illustrated this high regard. However, the country’s elite had to deal more carefully with its neighbours both to tackle the ethnic insurgencies rising along its borders since the independence, and to expand its vital maritime trade. The Burmese central authorities indeed gradually found it difficult to control the all of Burma’s territory inherited from the British in 1947 in the face of a full-scale civil war, from the late 1950s onwards.

  • 9 VON DER MEHDEN (Fred), “The Burmese Way to Socialism”, Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 3, April 1963, p. (...)
  • 10 AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979: Socialism with Foreign Aid and Strict Neutrality”, Southeast Asian Studie (...)

6The establishment of military rule in Rangoon in March 1962 brought Burma’s non-aligned and neutral ideals into an awkward paroxysm. General Ne Win, chief of the Tatmadaw since 1949 -- and one of the Thirty Comrades who entered Burma as “liberators” with the Japanese in 1942 -- anchored the country in more than 25 years of self-imposed autarchy. Following an indigenous “Burmese Way to Socialism”, mixed with a strong xenophobic and nationalistic policy, Ne Win’s Burma literally withdrew itself from the international scene9, shunning most of the diplomatic contacts established during U Nu’s period. It even stunningly left the Non-Aligned movement in 197910.

  • 11 HOLMES (Robert), “Burmese Domestic Policy: the Politics of Burmanization”, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No (...)

7The Revolutionary Council that Ne Win formed in 1962 to govern the country and instil this new socialist and autarchic ideology enacted several laws clearly aimed at reducing any foreign influence over Burma’s economy and society. The first targets were the foreign minorities that had remained in Burma after the independence despite the first waves of “Burmanization” of the country during the Japanese invasion in 1942 and then independence in 194811. The nationalisation programme launched in February 1963 by the military government directly affected the Indian, Chinese, Anglo-Burmese and Western agricultural, trade and banking communities, most of them were forced to flee the country. The English language was even prohibited in educational programs in 1966.

  • 12 For a perspective written in the 1970s: SINGH (Uma Shankar), Burma and India (1948-1962): A Study i (...)
  • 13 BADGLEY (John), “Burma’s China Crisis: the Choices Ahead”, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 11, November 1 (...)
  • 14 SMITH (Martin), Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Bangkok, White Lotus, 1999, p. 98 (...)

8Burma thus swiftly broke away from its two big neighbours: India and China. It opted for “quiet” neutrality during the October 1962 Sino-Indian war. India then watched with some bitterness the rise of a popular “indophobia”, cheered by the new Burmese military regime12. Rangoon consequently lost a strong economic partner and diplomatic friend. China, whose minorities settled in Burma were violently targeted in 1967 during nation-wide anti-Chinese riots13, gradually stigmatized Ne Win as a “neo-fascist”, despite his strong socialist outlook. At the end of the 1960s, more than a 300,000 Chinese, Indian and Anglo-Burmese “foreigners” had left the country14.

  • 15 BUTWELL (Richard), “Ne Win’s Burma-At the End of the First Decade”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 10, (...)
  • 16 AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979…”, p. 93-117.

9Moreover, by refusing to be involved in ASEAN (formed in 1967) and staying out of the war-torn Indochina imbroglio, Burma sank deeper and deeper into isolation, as well as into a severe economic recession. Indeed, after a decade of Ne Winism, the country had collapsed into disastrous socio-economic devastation15. Realising that foreign assistance from the West (USA, Germany) as well from the Soviet Bloc (USSR, Eastern Europe) could prove to be vital for the country to avoid complete chaos, the Burmese military government began to establish a few calculated diplomatic links with the outside world, though very discreetly16.

  • 17 SILVERSTEIN (Josef), “The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 2 (...)

10Despite its “go it alone” credo (Josef Silverstein17), during the 1970s Burma opted for a tactical opening-up towards any power that could help the country survive, including its Indian and Chinese neighbours, largely through personal visits by General Ne Win. The Burmese Supremo negotiated new economic and strategic cooperation along the Indo-Burmese borders with the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during his successive official trips to India in 1967, 1969 and 1984, while he paid a landmark visit to Beijing in 1980, meeting the post-Mao leadership under Deng Xiaoping.

11These well-thought out compromises with the original autarchic ideology cleverly enabled the Burmese regime to keep a balance between the West and the Soviet Union (avoiding involvement in any of the Cold War conflicts), as well as between the neighbouring rivals India and China: beside Ne Win’s refusal to define any clearcut position on the Sino-Indian rivalry, Burma remained out of the Indochina imbroglio. But despite these irregular contacts, forty years after its Independence Burma was effectively estranged from its immediate neighbourhood, the latter missing out on the opportunity to get a strong foothold into a strategic region by letting Burma slip out of the Asian picture until the end of the 1980s.

2 - Enter the SLORC: a tactical breaking out of isolation throughout the 1990s

  • 18 GUYOT (James), “Burma in 1988: Perestroika with a Military Face”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1989, p. (...)

12The changing of guards within the Burmese Military in 1988 and the “retirement” of General Ne Win after the SLORC’s September 18 coup considerably changed the regional geopolitical configuration. After forty years of neutralism or autarchic isolationism, Burma swiftly slid into China’s large and growing strategic sphere of influence. This was quite predictable though, following the then new rising Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Rangoon in 1978. This strategic shift also marked a policy change, with the SLORC adopting a new economic approach. It was indeed willing to drop the socialist-oriented autarchic political economy established by General Ne Win after 1962, and deliberately chose to embrace a more liberal and open strategy to modernise and develop the country (as well as its military forces) following the Chinese and other Southeast Asian booming models18.

  • 19 QI (Pan), “Opening the Southwest: An Expert Opinion”, Beijing Review, Vol. 28, No. 35, September 2n (...)

13Already, China had openly unveiled its ambitions in continental Southeast Asia and acknowledged the strategic interests Burma could offer to its landlocked South-western provinces. In September 1985, in an article published in the official Beijing Review19, the Chinese leaders had sketched the role Burma could play in developing the local economies of Yunnan and Sichuan, as well as giving the rising China economic power a greater global reach. The main idea was to open-up south-western China, by creating a trade corridor southwards, towards the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, primarily through the Irrawaddy River, thus reviving the ancient paths of the Southern Silk Road. Northern Burma could also be a valuable and close economic outlet, especially as a strong SinoBurmese community was nevertheless still present in the border regions and in Mandalay, despite the violent anti-Chinese riots of the late 1960s in Burma and the residual anti-Rangoon Communist Party of Burma (CPB) buffer forces which were stationed along the borders.

14China's second objective in Burma (in the very long-run) was to ensure a truly secure gateway and a permanent sea access to the Indian Ocean, next to the one it had gained through an all-weather strategic friendship built-up with Pakistan since the early 1960s. A military rapprochement with Burma, which like Pakistan, shares a long land and sea border with the potential Indian long-term “rival”, could also prove to be strategically significant. Even if it was not the primary goal, Chinese thinkers had supported the theory of being potentially able to exercise a stronger influence in South Asia from its Eastern borders and why not, to counterbalance India’s domination in the Indian Ocean. After gradually establishing closer cooperation and economic partnerships with India’s neighbours (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka), an alliance with Burma on the Eastern flank of India would enable Beijing to exert some pressure along India’s north-eastern borders as well as in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, where there are abundant natural resources. Consequently, it suited Beijing -- and the Kunming provincial authorities -- to take over the modernization of the Burmese infrastructures in order to facilitate their use by Chinese traders and exporters and, if the case arose in the longer-term, by the Chinese Military.

  • 20 LINTNER (Bertil), “Rangoon’s Rubicon: Infrastructure Aid Tightens Peking’s Control”, Far Eastern Ec (...)
  • 21 See two Indian perspectives on it: GHOSHAL (Baladas), “Trends in China-Burma Relations”, China Repo (...)

15Hence, China promptly seized the opportunity given by the regime change in Rangoon in 1988, and offered the newly-formed SLORC the opportunity of a sole and valuable global partnership, at a time when it was almost completely ostracised by the rest of the International Community after the pro-democracy crackdown of August-September 1988. From 1989, China rapidly undertook the building (or rebuilding) of many roads, bridges, power plants throughout Burma, as well as port facilities along the Burmese coast20. The Chinese strategy in Burma paid off quickly and in just a few years, China became Burma’s sole patron in the region, its main commercial partner and its strongest diplomatic and military supporter, enabling the junta to consolidate its control over the country throughout the 1990s21.

16China’s thrust into Burma and the de facto rejection of the traditional equidistant policy of Burma towards India, China and the rest of Asia therefore increasingly fuelled serious concern among the other regional powers, unenthusiastic at the idea of seeing a rising China entering a region in which it never had a traditional foothold. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and also Japan, Taiwan and gradually India, viewed the sudden Chinese presence in Burma as a potentially threatening geopolitical configuration as the Southeast Asian strategic theatre was witnessing a watershed in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the Indochinese conflicts.

  • 22 LINTNER (Bertil), “Different Strokes-Divergent reactions to Rangoon’s instability”, Far Eastern Eco (...)
  • 23 Mainly Oil & Gas multinational firms; see STEINBERG (David), “International Rivalries in Burma – Th (...)

17Most of those powers had at first defined a strong opposition policy vis-à-vis the new Burmese junta that took power after the crackdown on the 1988 democratic uprising. with India being then one of the most vocal opponents to the SLORC22. Despite a few tentative approaches initiated by Japan and a few foreign companies in 198923, the SLORC refusal to honour in 1990 the overwhelming victory of the democratic opposition in the May 27th elections it had organised, led to further condemnations of the Burmese junta by the International Community and broke the engagement policy proposed by Tokyo, Bangkok or Singapore as early as February 1989.

  • 24 STEINBERG (David), “Myanmar 1991: Military Intransigence”, Southeast Asian Studies, 1992, p. 221-23 (...)
  • 25 As proposed by the Indian scholar STOBDAN (P.), “Myanmar: Breaking out of Isolation”, Strategic Ana (...)

18In 1992, after four years of authoritarian and undisputed governance, the SLORC and the military system it has inherited from General Ne Win did not show any sign of internal weakening. It remained fully in control of the military and political scene, overcoming internal purges (such as in April 1992 when the junta chief, General Saw Maung, was deposed by his second-in-command General Than Shwe and his followers), as well as external pressure. Deeply entrenched, it appeared to many observers that it was in a strong political position; far from being on the verge of collapse or handing over power to the civilian and democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been under house arrest since July 198924. Therefore, new diplomatic reactions to this concrete situation arose in the region, especially from India and a few ASEAN countries determined to deal with Rangoon’s military government. Steadily, regional powers decided to redraw their position towards the Burmese generals, showing a clear tendency of gradually courting them while the SLORC itself attempted to break out its own isolation25.

  • 26 Interview, Rangoon, June 1992.
  • 27 Personal discussion with Preet M. S. Malik, New Delhi, April 19, 2007.

19Fearing a new potential Chinese threat on its doorstep -- especially as the SLORC had revived in its official propaganda and some of the old Burmese indophobic sentiments during the 1988-90 crisis -- India began to review its diplomatic approach towards its neighbour. A more pragmatic Indian ambassador, G. Parthasarathy, was posted to Rangoon in 1992. He had been a key advisor on China to the assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and understood the need for a fresh approach26. He had indeed replaced the warmongering and openly pro-NLD PMS Malik, India’s ambassador from 1990 to 199227.

  • 28 KUMAR, Dinesh, “Sino-Myanmar ties irk Delhi”, The Times of India, November 20th, 1992.
  • 29 MANCHANDA (Rita), “Reasons of State”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6th, 1993, p. 12.
  • 30 For a full analysis of the gradual courting of the Burmese junta by India and its motivations in th (...)

20Above all, the revelation in September 1992 of Chinese monitoring activities on the Burmese Coco Islands (a few nautical miles away from India’s Andaman Islands) clearly irritated the Indian military authorities28. Unwilling to see the Chinese wandering into India’s traditional sphere of maritime influence, the Indian security circles proposed a new approach of the Burmese issue. As a consequence, the official visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary, J. N. Dixit, to Rangoon in March 1993, marked a turning point in Indo-Burmese relations; India had decided from now on to cautiously engage the Burmese Military and dropped its isolating policy and open support for the Burmese civilian opposition29. As Rangoon wished to gradually break its over-dependency on China with its second biggest neighbour, this policy-shift was welcomed and it paved the way for a new Indo-Burmese strategic partnership. For New Delhi policy makers, who had unveiled new ambitions for India since the 1991-liberalisation reforms and the launch of a Look East Policy towards the dynamic Asian economies, India had to take advantage of the geostrategic position of Burma as a continental gateway to Southeast Asia. It also had to benefit from a closer military cooperation with the Burmese Army so as to both gain a foothold in a country where China’s strategic thrust became obvious, and to get a friendly military assistance in the insurrection-torn Northeast of India30.

  • 31 MUNRO (Ross), “China’s Waxing Spheres of Influence”, Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, p. 585-605.

21On the ASEAN side, the Burma issue also appeared crucial as early as 1992. In a post-Cold War regional context where China slowly flaunted itself as the regional hegemon-to-come, the ASEAN countries watched the spread of its influence in Southeast Asia as a source of both concern and profit31. If the Chinese commercial dynamism was welcomed by the Asian developing economies, the military and naval threat a rising China could pose to Southeast Asia worried many of them. Reinforcing the ASEAN Club by integrating the three Indochinese states as well as Burma would then potentially enable the Association to contain the Chinese expansion southwards and keep them out of Beijing’s orbit. At least, that was the view of the six original ASEAN members.

  • 32 LINTNER (Bertil), “Murmurs in the Ranks”, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18th, 1993, p. 20.

22Troubled by Burma obviously being a major Chinese arms transfer recipient, the ASEAN consequently began tentative negotiations with the SLORC, which on its side agreed on this opportunity. Internal differences had appeared within the Burmese junta regarding the quasi-infeudation of China on Burma, and more specifically the Tatmadaw since 198832. Thus, with a respected diplomatic overture from Southeast Asia and at the same time the offer of another opportunity (along with the Indian option) to counterbalance the Chinese influence, was promptly welcomed by the most nationalistic elements of the SLORC.

  • 33 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98), Bangkok, September 27, 20 (...)
  • 34 CRIBB (Robert), “Burma's Entry into ASEAN: Background and Implications”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 22 (...)

23Despite a vigorous debate within the ASEAN members33, diplomatic self-confidence and a strong economic dynamism led the ASEAN to overlook its concern about the possible exposure to criticism by its Western partners in the 1990s’context, and to embrace the Burmese Generals in July 1997. By that time, the SLORC (which soon after changed its own name into a softer-sounding State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, through another internal purge in November 1997), clearly bet on the ASEAN card to increase its respectability in the region as well as open more windows to economic assistance and investments opportunities in a clear “breaking-out of isolation” process34.

24In the 1990s, the SPDC was willing to be part of the regional diplomatic scene, and enthusiastically responded to the region’s powers courting it: first China, then India, ASEAN, and to a lesser extent Japan and South Korea. The regime’s leaders were keen to take refuge from the effect of the hostile Western pressure on them, as a result the negative international image it had because of the 1988 and 1990 crackdowns on the country’s democratic opposition pampered by the West. By 2000, the SPDC had effectively extended its own strategy of looking for international alliances and allies, and gradually forming a strategic protective umbrella. In this strategy Burma reached out to other regional or global powers, including Russia, Pakistan, Israel and even Saudi Arabia and North Korea.

  • 35 LINTNER (Bertil), “Burma: the Islamabad link”, India Today, September 10th, 1989, p. 60-61.
  • 36 KUPPUSWAMY (C. S.), “China-Pakistan-Myanmar: the Triangular Relationship Needs Careful Watch”, Sout (...)
  • 37 Interviews, Embassy of Pakistan in Burma, Rangoon, December 4, 2002 and April 25, 2005.

25Moscow in particular became a serious commercial partner through substantial assistance, extensive training programmes and trade deals (including in the nuclear sector). Russia also became a major arms supplier (including the sale of Mig-29 combat aircrafts squadron in 2001 and military transport helicopters in 2005). Pakistan too -- a close China ally and India’s archrival -- rapidly entered into Burma’s strategic field. As early as 1989, military connections between Islamabad and Rangoon were revealed in reports of ethnic rebels seizing Pakistan-made weapons along the Thai-Burma borders35. But it was only in June 2000, with General Khin Nyunt’s first official trip to Islamabad that this relationship began to flourish. It was furthered in May 2001 by the Pakistani President General Musharraf’s landmark visit to Burma, an official trip which fully revealed Pakistan’s interests in the still ostracized Burmese junta36. Although it only had a tiny diplomatic and business community in Burma, Pakistan is one of the non-regional powers that developed cordial relations with the Burmese, as a result of high-level military-to-military contacts37.

  • 38 ASHTON (William), “Myanmar and Israel Develop Military Pact”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, (...)
  • 39 The International Herald Tribune, North Korea and Myanmar restore diplomatic ties, April 26th, 2007
  • 40 ASHTON (William), “The arms keep coming-but who pays?”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 2004.
  • 41 A “reaching out to the World” strategy for GANESAN (N.), “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out (...)

26Beside Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore (the three ASEAN members that have invested the most in Burma since the 1990s), Israel38, North Korea39, Ukraine, Slovakia or Yugoslavia also became new economic or military partners upon which the SPDC was openly happy to rely on40. The SPDC adopted a clever policy of courting powers that usually dissociate politics from business, unlike the moral-oriented Western States41, which enabled the SLORC-SPDC to maintain a safe security environment around Burma, without seeing international or regional organisations, the West and other potential “destructive elements” (as the official rhetoric presents them) too involved and influential in the region.

Notes

4 Here the English language makes the distinction between the term “Burman” (or Bama’r), designating the ethnic group which today constitutes two thirds of Burma’s 55 million-large population, mainly inhabiting the Irrawaddy valley and delta, and the term “Burmese” which is more inclusive, designating the citizenship, language or any country’s aspect as a whole.

5 For an in-depth analysis of Burma’s strategic culture, see TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Myanmar: Myanmar-ness and Realism in Historical Perspective”, in BOOTH (Ken), TROOD (Russell) (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Basingtoke, MacMillan Press, 1999, p. 165-181.

6 THOMSON (John S.), “Burmese Neutralism”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 2, June 1957, p. 269.

7 A few thousand Chinese troops from the Kuomintang (KMT) entered Northern Burma in 1949 fleeing Mao’s People’s Liberation Army. They remained in the Shan States, Eastern Laos and Northern Thailand (the “Golden Triangle” region) to continue their struggle with a welcome American support. See LINTNER (Bertil), Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, Chiang Mai, Silkworms Book, 1999, p. 111-113.

8 MAUNG MAUNG, “The Burma-China Border Settlement”, Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1961, p. 38-43.

9 VON DER MEHDEN (Fred), “The Burmese Way to Socialism”, Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 3, April 1963, p. 129-135.

10 AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979: Socialism with Foreign Aid and Strict Neutrality”, Southeast Asian Studies, 1980, p. 112-114.

11 HOLMES (Robert), “Burmese Domestic Policy: the Politics of Burmanization”, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1967, p. 188-197.

12 For a perspective written in the 1970s: SINGH (Uma Shankar), Burma and India (1948-1962): A Study in the Foreign Policies of Burma and India and Burma’s Policy towards India, New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., 1979.

13 BADGLEY (John), “Burma’s China Crisis: the Choices Ahead”, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 11, November 1967, p. 753-761.

14 SMITH (Martin), Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Bangkok, White Lotus, 1999, p. 98 and p. 219

15 BUTWELL (Richard), “Ne Win’s Burma-At the End of the First Decade”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 10, October 1972, p. 901-912.

16 AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979…”, p. 93-117.

17 SILVERSTEIN (Josef), “The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 3, March 1982, p. 285.

18 GUYOT (James), “Burma in 1988: Perestroika with a Military Face”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1989, p. 107-133.

19 QI (Pan), “Opening the Southwest: An Expert Opinion”, Beijing Review, Vol. 28, No. 35, September 2nd, 1985, p. 22-23.

20 LINTNER (Bertil), “Rangoon’s Rubicon: Infrastructure Aid Tightens Peking’s Control”, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 11th, 1993, p. 28.

21 See two Indian perspectives on it: GHOSHAL (Baladas), “Trends in China-Burma Relations”, China Report, Vol. 30, No. 2, April-June 1994, p. 187-202 and SINGH (Udai Bhanu), “Recent Trends in Relations between Myanmar and China”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 1, April 1995, p. 61-72.

22 LINTNER (Bertil), “Different Strokes-Divergent reactions to Rangoon’s instability”, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23rd, 1989.

23 Mainly Oil & Gas multinational firms; see STEINBERG (David), “International Rivalries in Burma – The Rise of Economic Competition”, Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 6, June 1990, p. 587-601.

24 STEINBERG (David), “Myanmar 1991: Military Intransigence”, Southeast Asian Studies, 1992, p. 221-237.

25 As proposed by the Indian scholar STOBDAN (P.), “Myanmar: Breaking out of Isolation”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 11, February 1995, p. 1341-1352.

26 Interview, Rangoon, June 1992.

27 Personal discussion with Preet M. S. Malik, New Delhi, April 19, 2007.

28 KUMAR, Dinesh, “Sino-Myanmar ties irk Delhi”, The Times of India, November 20th, 1992.

29 MANCHANDA (Rita), “Reasons of State”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6th, 1993, p. 12.

30 For a full analysis of the gradual courting of the Burmese junta by India and its motivations in the 1990s, see EGRETEAU (Renaud), Wooing the Generals – India’s New Burma Policy, New Delhi, Authorspress, 2003, 234 pages.

31 MUNRO (Ross), “China’s Waxing Spheres of Influence”, Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, p. 585-605.

32 LINTNER (Bertil), “Murmurs in the Ranks”, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18th, 1993, p. 20.

33 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98), Bangkok, September 27, 2005.

34 CRIBB (Robert), “Burma's Entry into ASEAN: Background and Implications”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1998, p. 49-62.

35 LINTNER (Bertil), “Burma: the Islamabad link”, India Today, September 10th, 1989, p. 60-61.

36 KUPPUSWAMY (C. S.), “China-Pakistan-Myanmar: the Triangular Relationship Needs Careful Watch”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper n ° 401, January 29th, 2002.

37 Interviews, Embassy of Pakistan in Burma, Rangoon, December 4, 2002 and April 25, 2005.

38 ASHTON (William), “Myanmar and Israel Develop Military Pact”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1st, 2000.

39 The International Herald Tribune, North Korea and Myanmar restore diplomatic ties, April 26th, 2007.

40 ASHTON (William), “The arms keep coming-but who pays?”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 2004.

41 A “reaching out to the World” strategy for GANESAN (N.), “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, in TAYLOR (Robert) (ed.), Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Social Imperatives, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005, p. 30-55, or a “search for security strategy” for JAMES (Helen), “Myanmar’s International Relations Strategy: the Search for Security”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 3, December 2004, p. 530-553.

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