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The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia

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Éric Frécon

Chapter 6. Initial Reactions of the Multi-Lateral Players

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Asie du Sud-Est

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1At the outset, it has to be accepted that private shipping companies, troubled by the competition that they face, have not always shown enthusiasm in their common initiatives that are few and far between. The questions, formulated in 1995 by the magazine Intersec, on behalf of ship owners, continue to be pertinent. They illustrate the relative importance given by companies to piracy, since they only perceive it in terms of immediate cost/profit ratios: how many days per year are the boats actually in risky zones and would new routes be less expensive? Given the current downsizing of crew, who ought to be in charge of safety on board? Since most pirate attacks take place at night, what is the cost of the overtime incurred for vigilance activities? Would not a floating fortress lose in terms of manœuvrability and its potential assailants be tempted to use more violent methods?

2Apart from their contribution to the IMO, (see below), members of the shipping industry do not seem to be very motivated to cooperate in the anti piracy war. It is therefore up to the multilateral bodies to take up the major task of prevention.

6.1. Informative Approach

6.1.1. The initiatives of the International Chamber of Commerce

3The Commercial Crimes Services (CCS) is a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in charge of commercial crimes. Its activities include:

  • ICC Cyber Crime Unit;
  • ICC Commercial Crime Bureau (CCB);
  • ICC Counterfeiting Bureau (CCB);
  • ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

4It is the IMB that is in charge of maritime piracy and its work serves as a reference today. Founded in 1981, under the impetus of Eric Ellen, former Commissioner in Chief of London Port and former President of the International Association of Air and River Police, this organisation had promptly received the support of the IMO, a maritime wing of the UNO.

  • 335 Concept of Anglo-Saxon law that certifies good faith, even the good morality of a body, of a compa (...)
  • 336 David – Anthony Delavoet, 1995, p. 82.

5The functioning and financing of the IMB are guaranteed by its member companies. Since 1985, it was given the special status of a bona fide335 organisation by the British Government. This feature allows it to rightfully collaborate with British Police forces and the Interpol. Moreover, the Bureau maintains privileged relations with the Lloyd’s Register and the Lloyd’s Maritime Information Service336.

  • 337 www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_bureau.asp

6IMB’s mission in matters of piracy consists basically of reducing risks and of helping enforcement agencies. In order to do this, the IMB attentively follows the movement of goods by verifying their arrival in ports337. Linked to these different objectives, IMB’s activities appear to be diverse:

  • Identifying dubious loading documents and other fraudulent documents;
  • Circulating information on maritime crime collected from various commercial, national and international sources especially through the publication of a bi-monthly bulletin;
  • Offering victims of fraudulent transactions the means of obtaining a compensation;
  • Offering legal counsel in case of litigation;
  • Creating awareness among institutions about dangers of maritime crime;
  • Verifying references of ship owners before their ships are chosen for loading;
  • Implementing the Shiploc system that enables the follow-up of several vessels through satellites. This procedure makes it possible for the shipping companies to locate the exact position of their ships and as a consequence, it enables them to detect suspicious deviations and possible hijacks. The device, the size of a shoebox, costs less than 300 dollars a month. A comparatively modest cost when one recalls, that in spring 2000, 100,000 dollars were offered to get information on the Global Mars, which had disappeared338.

7As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, the major innovation proposed in conjunction with the IMB, the IMO (see below) and Inmarsat (International Mobile Satellite Organisation) is the creation of a Regional Centre for Piracy (RCP). Inaugurated on 1st October 1992, it is based in the offices of the IMB for the Far East. Its present Director, Noel Choong, hopes to be able to systematise sharing of data on piracy with specialised agencies in the concerned countries. His desire is to facilitate exchanges within a group of countries that have come together since the meeting that was held in Tokyo in spring 2000.

8The marine detectives of this institution track down information on the wharfs of ports as well as in the world of triads, which by definition is difficult to access. The various crime groups implicated in the hijacking of vessels seem to be aware of the danger. The proof of this being that the Centre recently had to shift premises, mostly for reasons of safety.

  • 339 www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_piracy.asp

9The RCP has the objective of “furnishing help to investigation teams which react immediately to acts of piracy” and “to collect proof for enforcement bodies339”. Moreover, it should help in locating vessels intercepted by pirates, contribute to retrieving stolen merchandise, help justice apprehend aggressors, help owners and crew who have been attacked.

  • 340 Programme of 23rd March 2001 telecast on Europe 1 on the expedition of La Boudeuse on the trail of (...)

10The activities resulting from these various missions are manifold. The RCP of Kuala Lumpur maintains a permanent vigil to account for the suspicious movements of certain vessels as well as for acts of piracy signalled all over the world. Everyday, at midnight local time, the Centre transmits bulletins reporting attacks in East Asia through satellite (thanks to the SafetyNet service of Inmarsat-C). They are “pirate weather bulletins” to quote an expression of the journalist Yves Calvi340.

  • 341 They are accessible on the site of the Centre: www.icc-ccs.org

11Every week, these daily reports are reproduced “verbatim”341. Every quarter, other more synthetic reports are made available to the concerned institutions. Finally, every year, the IMB publishes a digest on all the reports of the Centre titled “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”.

12In order to finance its activities, the Centre exclusively relies on voluntary contributions from maritime transporters or insurance companies and on the aid of the International Transport Workers Federation. While it cannot offer them total autonomy of action, this makes it possible for them to offer free services to all boats irrespective of their owners or their nationality.

6.1.2. Involvement of the IMO

13The IMO was created in 1948, following a maritime conference of the UNO, organised in Geneva. But it was only in 1958 that it really became functional. A neighbour of the IMB – it is also based in London-, it is in charge of problems connected to the safety of navigation from a statutory point of view. It has to analyse the dangers that threaten commercial traffic and maritime economic interests in order to adopt the necessary resolutions. The members of the IMO are classified according to their contribution to world navigation. For instance, France figures in category B which groups together eight Nations that are the “most concerned by international maritime trade”-and hence by piracy.

14The IMO is composed of an assembly, a council and five committees:

  • The Marine Environment Committee;
  • The Legal Committee;
  • The Technical Cooperation Committee;
  • The Facilitation Committee;
  • The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).

15Alerted by a note from Sweden to the MSC, the IMO assembly adopted a resolution (A 545-13) in November 1983 detailing precise measures to be taken against piracy. The renewed outbreak of attacks in the ports of Western Africa had caught the attention of the organisation, which then described the situation, as “alarming”. The resolution has highlighted the risks threatening navigation as well as the environment. It has already invited Governments, organisations of ship owners and sailor unions to get a true perspective of the problem.

16In April 1984, the MSC elevated piracy and armed robbery at sea to the level of an “independent issue” and treated them as such in its agenda. The first step was to establish a general panorama of piracy. In order to do this, the IMO compiled the various reports supplied by member countries. Today, these reports circulate every month, accompanied by quarterly and annual summaries. All reports received at the secretariat are transmitted to various port authorities as well as to the countries. In 1991, the IMO adopted a resolution (A. 683-17) titled Prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels. Once again, all the countries were asked to communicate all the incidents recorded in their waters, to the organisation.

17In 1992, at the initiative of the Secretary General of the IMO, William O’Neil, a work group composed of experts from ten member Nations and NGO representatives was constituted to tackle the problem in Southeast Asia. Between February and March 1993, numerous missions and enquiries were launched in the straits in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

18On its return, the group published a report suggesting various measures to be taken:

  1. Creation of a system of coordinated information;
  2. Organisation of clandestine operations in order to infiltrate the world of pirates;
  3. Constitution of joint patrols composed of sailors and customs officials;
  4. Implementation of legal amendments permitting countries to avail themselves of the right to continue their pursuit into territorial waters of another country.

19The last point is probably the most important and still remains greatly debated.

20In May 1993, following the 62nd session of the MSC, two documents were drafted. A circular for the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels (MSC/Circ. 622) and a Guide for the attention of ship owners, maritime operators, captains and crew for the prevention of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels (MSC/Circ. 623).

21In the same year, a new resolution (A 738-18) adopted by the assembly recommended additional measures against piracy. Far from being revolutionary, they largely tally with the suggestions of the IMB:

  1. Report attacks immediately to the nearest rescue and coordination centre;
  2. Ask these coordination centres to immediately warn vessels, and at the same time inform the local security forces;
  3. Equip boats with a special signal to be used in case of an attack342.

22In March 1994, the shifting of the epicentre of piracy to the South China Sea constrained the IMO to send a mission to Hong Kong, Philippines and China. Experts sought to meet with the concerned Government officials, despite some opposition from Peking.

  • 343 Donald Urquhart, “S’pore, M’sia Making Great Efforts”, The Shipping Times, 20th March 2001

23Following the financial crisis that shook Southeast Asia, a mission was sent this time to the Malacca Straits (October 1998). It was to encourage the political decision makers to act at a national level as well as on a regional scale. In February 1999, a seminar was held in Singapore. According to the IMO, the interaction between countries was frank and open, each of them was able to discuss its reservations. Finally, in March 2001, an officer of the IMO, Admiral Mitropoulos, visited the heart of the Malacca Straits. He took the opportunity to congratulate Malaysian and Singaporean efforts, regretting the fact that on an average of three incidents, only one was reported343.

24In May 1999, the conclusions of the IMO were recalled during the 71st session of the MSC. On this occasion, the Committee had drawn up an interesting inventory of the major problems pertaining to the piracy issue, in Southeast Asia as elsewhere. Here, thus proving once again its obsession for enumerations, it highlighted:

  1. the economic situation prevailing in the regions victimised by pirates;
  2. the problem of resources for the organisations in charge of tackling piracy;
  3. the lack of cooperation and communication between agencies and concerned administrations;
  4. the time taken to react after every incident;
  5. the general problem concerning the recording of the incident.
  • 344 For the activities of the IMO, in general, the circulars and reports are available on the web site (...)

25In order to face these numerous issues, it was necessary to review investigation procedures, the apparatus of enforcement and the terms of regional cooperation344.

6.1.3. Initiatives of specialised NGO’s

  • 345 Numast Telegraph, 25 (7), July 1992, p.i.
  • 346 Michael Pugh, 1993, p. 11.

26In 1993, the National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers-(NUMAST) had reminded English leaders that obligations and diplomatic speeches should not prevent concrete action being taken against the reality of the danger that threatened British nationals in Southeast Asia345. In the early 90s, NUMAST decided to send an enquiry officer, to East Asia. Singapore and Indonesia would have then appeared highly co-operative346.

27The efforts of the Nippon Foundation on their part go well beyond simple official missions. Since 1968, this organisation has been directly implicated in traffic management in the Malacca Straits. It financed several projects aimed at facilitating navigation and enhancing safety in the region. Project OSPAR – Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Plan-is one of the best examples. Besides, supported by the Nippon Foundation, the Japan Association for Maritime Safety financially supports the Malacca Strait Council, established in 1969.

28On the one hand, these initiatives demonstrate Japan’s interest in the Malay Straits, and on the other, its capacity to influence the local scenario. It also highlights its dependence as far as supplies are concerned. After the disappearance of the Tenyu (refer to boarding incident 8), the Nippon Foundation also decided to establish a direct link with countries to collect information on piracy. Let us note that the special personal connections of its officer with certain Government members was not without influence on the measures initiated by Keizo Obuchi, the Japanese Prime Minister who suggested the Tokyo meeting in 1999.

29The initiatives of the Nippon Foundation are in line with a progressive approach: intensification of data collection followed by a press conference given in January 1999 in order to create an awareness in the media. Since then, the organisation has not failed to inform journalists. Generally desirous of obtaining information, it also interviews Japanese companies on damages incurred by them due to piracy.

30These measures have ended in a series of consultations with the Japan Association for Marine Safety and the Japanese Shipowners’Association. The outcome was a lesson which is worrying to say the least: the number of piracy cases would be ten times higher than the number recorded, which is once again an eye-opener as to the level of under estimation of the pirate phenomenon.

31As a result, the Nippon Foundation organised a meeting in July 1999. Three major orientations were determined:

  1. To promote exchange of information concerning damages and counter-measures related to piracy. In this perspective, the Nippon Foundation has set up a data-base and linked it through its home pages on the Internet;
  2. To develop a new model of a warning system to protect vessels against possible “intrusions347”;
  3. To create an awareness about the pirate menace amongst the general public.

32During the Kuala Lumpur meeting in November 2000, it seemed pertinent for the Nippon Foundation to propose the creation of an Organisation for the Cooperative Management of Safety in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. This initiative aimed, amongst others, at the sharing of the financial burden between the concerned countries. It was thus in keeping with article 43 of the Montego Bay Convention that obliged coastal countries of a strait to come to an agreement with each other in order to manage issues linked to safety and environment in the best possible way. By proposing the creation of a specific organisation, the private sector-represented in this case by the Nippon Foundation – tried once again to supplement States, generally less imaginative on this issue.

  • 348 AFP, “Asian Ship Owners Hail China’s Death Penalty for Pirates”, The Shipping Times, 27th December (...)
  • 349 “Shipmasters Call for Steps to End Piracy”, Business Recorder, 1st June 2000

33If, individually, shipping companies do not react openly to the pirate phenomenon, the Asian Shipowners Forum – (ASF) organises meetings on this theme. During its ninth forum, which was held in Seoul in May 2000, it nevertheless reiterated the responsibility of States348. It was joined in this issue by the International Federation of Shipmasters Association (IFSMA) which, during its 26th General Body Meeting in London, formulated a resolution for IMO members, also reminding countries of the necessity to patrol and to be equipped with material as well as with legal tools to counter piracy349.

  • 350 Alan Chan, The Dangers of Piracy and Ways to Combat it, and speech of 22nd October 1999 at the sem (...)

34On its part, the Singapore Shipping Association organised along with the Society of International Law a seminar on piracy in October 1999. During his speech, Alan Chan, President of the company Petroship Pte. Ltd. proposed the establishment of a “Tobin piracy tax”; the idea being to set up a financial contribution based on the tonnage of vessels that would make it possible to accumulate the necessary funds to counter the phenomenon350. This attempt however, did not meet with the expected response.

35Finally, due to their importance in the world shipping industry, the initiatives of the two other organisations should be mentioned here. BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council), which represents 60% of the world’s commercial fleet, intervened on several occasions against Chinese authorities at a time when they played an ambiguous role (see above). The organisation calls for a better cooperation at an international level. It also seeks to warn its members about recent attacks so that they can take adequate measures in highrisk zones. Finally, the BIMCO directly approaches Port authorities and Transport ministers to highlight the necessity of developing safety measures for docked vessels.

36The action of the International Maritime Committee (IMC) is more qualitative since it is a study conducted on national legal tools. On 15th May 1998, its Assembly approved the establishment of a Joint International Working Group on Uniformity of the Law of Piracy. The issue is precisely formulated in these words, that is, whether “the promulgation of a model of national legislative measures on piracy by the concerned organisations, under the sponsorship of the IMC would be a useful tool to fight piracy”. The first meeting took place on 8th July 1998. Members of the IMB, the IMO, BIMCO and Interpol amongst others participated in it.

6.1.4 The work of academics: the case for a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

37The diplomatic exchanges in Asia-Pacific are characterised by their emphasis on a “Part II” which, dear to the Asean countries, consists of informal meetings between top Government officials or academics to study the possibility of cooperation in the region. These discussions are held simultaneously with conventional Government meetings.

  • 351 Senator Amanda Vanstone, “Closing Address”, in Joint Meeting of the CSCAP Working Groups on Mariti (...)

38The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) constitutes one of the rare forums where the exchanges are in principle, rarely subjected to political constraints. A laboratory for various diplomatic initiatives, it is a space for free thought, susceptible to inspire the regional decision makers. In this capacity, it must contribute to the unity and stability of the region. Following the “Asean way”, these informal discussions, a preliminary step necessary for any formal meeting, enables the calming down of tensions and often results in a consensus. Piracy is part of the CSCAP agenda, due to the danger that it poses to regional safety. The Council includes five working groups, two of which for maritime cooperation and for trans national crime, are sponsored by Australia351.

6.2. The Violent Approach: Resorting to the “New Mercenaries”

39The measures taken by the IMB and the IMO and the initiatives of various specialised organisations have led to a better perception of piracy and the tools that are necessary for its eradication. Various organisations have started preparatory work that makes it possible to envisage a better grip on the issue by the countries. However, some did not have the patience to wait for a reaction from the Governments. Sailors have approached private companies, reminiscent of the distant times of mercenaries of the India Company and the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Company)-Dutch Company in the Malay Archipelago.

  • 352 Michel Klen, “Le Retour des mercenaires”, in Etudes, no. 3914, October 1999, p. 319; Richard Baneg (...)

40Today, there is a general tendency for private “security” companies to develop. They offer their services primarily in Africa, to countries whose police and army lack the means or infrastructure. Multinationals can thereby build up a veritable private army for the defence of their mines, and even their oilrigs. In Southeast Asia, the authority of the States is likely to be questioned due to rampant crime be it urban, rural or maritime. Where its sovereign duties are too poorly or too inadequately discharged, one can observe the return of the mercenaries352. The weariness of ship owners as well as the anxiety of yacht owners in the face of an outbreak of piracy, offers a new market to these professionals of conflicts and insecurity. Several companies are directly involved in the anti-piracy war, subscribing to the principle of answering violence with violence.

  • 353 “Firms Cool to Gurkha Solution”, The Shipping Times, 28th February 2000.
  • 354 “Gurkhas Hired by Cruise Lines as Pirate Deterrent”, The Shipping Times, 25th April 2000.

41In February 2000, a U.K. based company, the Anglo-Marine Overseas Service Ltd offered the services of a private force composed of the former Gurkhas of the British Army353. Their mission was to protect docked vessels against any attempt of boarding. In order to do this, they did not resort to firearms but rather to martial art techniques. Several Japanese shipping companies transiting through the Malay Straits have evinced their interest. The promotional brochure of the British venture specified that companies such as P & O Princess Cruises, Radisson Seven Seas, Star Cruises, and Barber were amongst its major clients. In 2000, 375 Gurkhas functioned as stewards or security guards on 75 vessels belonging to sixteen companies354. Since then, the Anglo-Marine Overseas Service Ltd has been conducting its activities more discreetly.

42Satellite Protection Services (SPS), a Dutch company founded in Heereveen in 1997 and a specialist in safety of maritime and air transport offered its services directly to the IMB. In August 1999, it announced its intention to establish an operation centre at Subic Bay, in the Philippines before setting up new centres in Curacao and Gambia. Its activity is classified under four divisions, one of them being the Satellite Maritime Security, which offers its services to ship owners. It also established maritime security teams, whose members are recruited from amongst Dutch and British anti-terrorist units like the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, the Special Boat Squadron or the British Special Air Services.

  • 355 “Piracy on the Rise in Malacca Straits”, The New Straits Times, 19th June 2000.
  • 356 Richard Banegas, autumn 1998, p. 181.

43In late June 2000, Sandline International, a company led by a British mercenary, Colonel Tim Spicer, offered efficient methods to ship owners to tackle piracy and organised crime355. This British company not only offered to train the crew to face high risk situations but also to collect information about the instigators of the assaults. In the nebulous structure of mercenaries, Sandline International holds an important place since it happens to be a branch of a vast holding—Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC). It has several companies, sometimes based in tax havens, and coordinated in London within the Plaza 107 group356.

44Another example: that of Dave Kellerman, Director of the Special Ops Associates (SOP). In early June 2000, he reiterated that insurance officers advised travellers to cooperate with pirates if they happened to climb aboard. Most often, only jewellery and cash interest them and it was not worth aggravating the incident. Just like the Kingswood project of the United Kingdom and the Security Professionals Academy in Italy, this security company offers enforcement bodies as well as marine professionals safety training programs at sea. Therefore, escorts do not represent the only imaginable solution. In fact, preparation of crew and alertness of sailors in safety issues would lead to reducing the dangers.

  • 357 www.marinerisk.com
  • 358 John Dalby, “Response to Piracy”, reader’s mail, Lloyd’s List, 19th May 1999.

45Finally comes one of the most active security agencies, Marine Risk Management (MRM)357. In 1999, confronted with a growing number of kidnapped or killed sailors, its Director regretted that the IMB and the IMO were only resorting to vague and abstract “international solutions” or “government initiatives” which were based far too much on negotiation358. Far from the soft-pedalling debates of the IMO and the IMB, Captain John Dalby talked about the various services of his company based in Kuala Lumpur. After an initial promotion of Shiptrac, a satellite system that permits the detection of suspicious deviations of vessels, MRM then offered to organise interventions at very short notice due to its rapid reaction service: Maritime Asset Recovery and Protection service (MARAP) which had developed considerable skills in tracking, locating and boarding hijacked boats. MRM envisaged the creation of an investigation bureau for Southeast Asia.

  • 359 Richard Banegas, autumn 1998, p. 194.
  • 360 Richard Banegas, autumn 1998, p. 194.

46The challenge posed to countries by these companies is real. For Richard Banegas, a specialist on mercenaries, the big powers hope, as in the past, to combine “a maximum of liberty and a minimum of responsibility359”. However, by accepting this easy solution tacitly, they would place themselves in the same dilemma faced by the Heads of States in the seventeenth century against corsairs and leading trading companies: “How to check these agents and at the same time give them sufficient freedom necessary for them to be effective and how to incite them to take up the risks of the commerce of war360

  • 361 AFP, “Spotlight on Rising Scourge”, The Shipping Times, 21st March 2000.

47The IMB and the IMO are also concerned about paramilitary solutions and prefer to turn towards nations361. These organisations reject the escalation of violence all the more because the boats they protect are not designed to withstand exchange of fire.

48Maritime companies are themselves not necessarily satisfied by the solution offered by the mercenaries as expressed by the following narration of a French officer in a shipping transport company based in the Malay Archipelago.

  • 362 Interview with the author on 13th November 2000.

“After the tug passes by, canoes or even speed boats, let themselves drift towards the barge in tow, 200-300 meters behind it, hence invisible to it. Pirates climb on to the barge and remove transportable and valuable equipments. Generators, hydraulic pumps, electric boards, optic blocks, rear view mirrors etc. In order to try to reduce damages, we have resorted to armed militia. A non-official mission that can at any moment degenerate. (…) All said and done, it proves to be more difficult to handle if pirates are affected and if they are agents of the local authorities-police, customs, army362.”

Notes

335 Concept of Anglo-Saxon law that certifies good faith, even the good morality of a body, of a company, of a legal entity or a person.

336 David – Anthony Delavoet, 1995, p. 82.

337 www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_bureau.asp

338 www.shiploc.com/modes.htm

339 www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_piracy.asp

340 Programme of 23rd March 2001 telecast on Europe 1 on the expedition of La Boudeuse on the trail of Bougainville.

341 They are accessible on the site of the Centre: www.icc-ccs.org

342 A circular (MSC/Circ. 805 in 1997) was published to encourage the States to follow these measures.

343 Donald Urquhart, “S’pore, M’sia Making Great Efforts”, The Shipping Times, 20th March 2001

344 For the activities of the IMO, in general, the circulars and reports are available on the web site www.imo.org. Also read Edward Agbakoba, The Fight against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, IMO, London, 1998, and Focus on IMO: Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, IMO, London, 2000.

345 Numast Telegraph, 25 (7), July 1992, p.i.

346 Michael Pugh, 1993, p. 11.

347 Hiroshi Terashima, The Role of NGOs in Dealing with Piracy at Sea, Society of International Law, Singapore, February 2000.

348 AFP, “Asian Ship Owners Hail China’s Death Penalty for Pirates”, The Shipping Times, 27th December 1999.

349 “Shipmasters Call for Steps to End Piracy”, Business Recorder, 1st June 2000

350 Alan Chan, The Dangers of Piracy and Ways to Combat it, and speech of 22nd October 1999 at the seminar in Singapore organised by the SSA and SIL.

351 Senator Amanda Vanstone, “Closing Address”, in Joint Meeting of the CSCAP Working Groups on Maritime Cooperation and Transnational Crime, University of Wollongong, Australia, 8th November 1999. Also refer Sam Bateman, “Conference Report: Maritime Security in East Asia”, in International Commercial Law, www.anu.edu.au, 1996.

352 Michel Klen, “Le Retour des mercenaires”, in Etudes, no. 3914, October 1999, p. 319; Richard Banegas, “De la guerre au maintien de la paix: Le Nouveau Business mercenaire”, in Critique Internationale, Autumn 1998, p. 179.

353 “Firms Cool to Gurkha Solution”, The Shipping Times, 28th February 2000.

354 “Gurkhas Hired by Cruise Lines as Pirate Deterrent”, The Shipping Times, 25th April 2000.

355 “Piracy on the Rise in Malacca Straits”, The New Straits Times, 19th June 2000.

356 Richard Banegas, autumn 1998, p. 181.

357 www.marinerisk.com

358 John Dalby, “Response to Piracy”, reader’s mail, Lloyd’s List, 19th May 1999.

359 Richard Banegas, autumn 1998, p. 194.

360 Richard Banegas, autumn 1998, p. 194.

361 AFP, “Spotlight on Rising Scourge”, The Shipping Times, 21st March 2000.

362 Interview with the author on 13th November 2000.

© Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine, 2008

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