Introduction
p. 7-10
Texte intégral
1In the first decade of the twenty-first century Thailand entered a deep and prolonged transition crisis that questions not only most state institutions, but the kingdom’s whole sociopolitical framework. The passing of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1927–2016) after a seventy-year-long reign, and its expected emotional shock, is only one of the most tangible elements of this painful and ongoing process. A world mostly built on late-nineteenth to early-twentieth-century foundations is struggling to cope with new expectations from a more informed, more politically aware, and less submissive population. Fossilized institutions, which have repeatedly postponed dealing with the challenges of adaptation to change, have their backs to the wall.
2One of these major institutions is Thailand’s sangha or monastic community, with around 290,000 monks, and until recently, mainly divided into the Mahanikai and the royally-founded and sponsored Thammayut orders.1 Since the Sangha Act of 1902 centralized and reorganized the monastic community along bureaucratic lines, the sangha hierarchy has mirrored that of the civil service; in a way, it has become an extension of the Thai state, and has largely lost touch with local communities. Monks ascend the ladder of the national religious hierarchy through a system of honorific titles (samanasak) granted by political authorities rather than the former practice of ecclesiastic titles being awarded by local monastic communities, based on directly witnessed personal attributes and behavior.
3Successive Sangha Acts in 1941 and 1962 (the latter amended in 1992 and 2016) did not fundamentally alter this centralized system, even if the Sangha Act of 1941 could appear on the surface as more “modern.” 2 Regionally diverse forms of Buddhism, with their use of local titles—such as khruba in northern Thailand—and local scripts for sacred texts, were marginalized by the reforms. These forceful centralization policies imposed on the sangha and, in parallel, on the civilian administration, met locally with stern resistance, particularly in the northeast, with what is known as the “Holy Men rebellions,” and in the north (see Box 3 on Khruba Srivichai). Once detached from their local communities, senior monks have sought to climb the state-sponsored hierarchy and receive honors and financial support—a competition hardly different from that of any bureaucratic or political organization.
4Apart from the sangha’s leaders, who are often little known to the people, villagers have continued to revere and support local monks for their powers of meditation, divination abilities, mastery of magic rituals,3 or moral authority.
5The weakness of the sangha could explain in part the recent flurry of scandals—with monks embroiled in sexual misconduct, leading luxurious lifestyles, conducting business ventures or even committing embezzlement—although this apparent increase in wrongdoing is largely due to the media’s active tracking and exposure of errant monks. Such transgressions are as old as Buddhism itself, of course, and allegedly the very reason the Buddha established monastic discipline or vinaya. 4 The fragile state of the Thai sangha may explain why errant monks are not punished swiftly according to the monastic rules, however. Many senior monks, trapped in a race for power and prestige, seem to have lost the moral authority and even the wisdom to manage the sangha and resolve disputes. The case of Phra Yantra (b. 1951) in 1995—a monk who had multiple sexual relationships, including with minors, was accused of rape, and of being a regular customer of brothels and night clubs—is perhaps the most telling example. The Supreme Sangha Council—the twenty-member council of highest-ranking elderly monks—did not take any measures against him. Instead it was the media’s coverage that resulted in government pressure on Yantra that made him quit the monkhood.5
6The sangha has also been deeply affected by the sharpened divisions in Thai society since the rise to power in 2001 of businessman-turned-politician Thaksin Shinawatra (b. 1949). Extreme hierarchization within the sangha and its elders’ lack of accountability towards the mass of monks at the bottom of the ladder only served to aggravate this polarization.
7The sangha’s politicization has also been exacerbated by the rising influence of Buddhist groups outside the official hierarchy, in particular, Santi Asoke and Wat Phra Dhammakaya. Although limited in influence, the ascetic group Santi Asoke, whose leader Bodhirak (b. 1934) was expelled from the sangha in 1989, has been active in the anti-Thaksin (Yellow Shirt) movement since the coup of 2006. (This was a complete reversal in attitude, as Santi Asoke had supported Thaksin up to the beginning of that year.) Far more influential has been the rise of the wealthy and politically connected Dhammakaya Temple, targeted by Yellow Shirt activists and conservative politicians and bureaucrats as well as activist monks such as Phra Buddha Isara (b. 1956) for its association with Thaksin, as well as its unconventional Buddhism.6 Criticism against the temple was at first doctrinal and disciplinary, but it has taken on clear political overtones. The rise of Wat Phra Dhammakaya is probably the most important development in Thai Buddhism in the last three decades, and the temple’s power is now such that, as we will see, accusations against it directly impinged on the nomination of the new supreme patriarch, the leader of the sangha, after 2013.
8This book will also examine the ongoing campaign by a large number of monks and some Buddhist groups to make Buddhism the national religion of Thailand. This campaign is not new, but seems to have intensified and to have met with more success since the beginning of the transition crisis in 2005. The violence plaguing the Muslim-majority provinces closest to the border with Malaysia has provided new arguments to these conservative groups, who claim that Buddhism is under threat and needs special protection. Parallel to these claims, the growing irrelevance of a weakened sangha for Thai society is feeding anxiety among these religious conservatives who wish to see Buddhism redefined in narrower and more exclusivist terms, and its cumbersome links to the state strengthened even more.
Notes de bas de page
1 Sangha in this book refers only to the main Thai sangha. There are two other Buddhist monastic communities, namely the Chinese and Vietnamese sangha, but they represent a tiny fraction of Thailand’s total monastic population, which at the end of 2014 comprised 290,015 monks, excluding novices.
2 Louis Gabaude, “Politique et religion en Thaïlande: dépendance et responsabilité,” Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest 32, no. 1 (2001): 159.
3 Barend Jan Terwiel, Monks and Magic: Revisiting a Classic Study of Religious Studies in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2012).
4 Donald S. Lopez Jr, The Story of Buddhism: A Concise Guide to Its History and Teachings (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 130.
5 Interview, Louis Gabaude, July 2016.
6 Not to be confused with the Vijja Dhammakaya Meditation Institute opened in 1982 in Ratchaburi province. Although it shares its origin with the Pathumthani Dhammakaya Temple, i.e. the Pak Nam Phasi Charoen temple in Thonburi, unlike the Pathumthani temple, the Institute has never been involved in controversy.
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
Malaisie - Chine : une « précieuse » relation
David Delfolie, Nathalie Fau et Elsa Lafaye de Micheaux
2016
L'Or Blanc
Petits et grands planteurs face au « boom » de l’hévéaculture (Viêt Nam-Cambodge)
Frédéric Fortunel et Christophe Gironde (dir.)
2014
Le Soft power sud-coréen en Asie du Sud-Est
Une théologie de la prospérité en action
Hui-yeon Kim
2014
Investigating the Grey Areas of the Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia
Proceedings of the Symposium organised by IRASEC at the Hotel Sofitel Silom (Bangkok) on January 2005, 6th and 7th
Arnaud Leveau (dir.)
2007
State and Media in Thailand During Political Transition
Proceedings of the Symposium organized by the French Embassy, the German Embassy, the National Press Council of Thailand and Irasec at the Thai Journalist Association Building on May 2007, 23rd
Chavarong Limpattamapanee et Arnaud Leveau (dir.)
2007
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Initiative
Analysis and Assessment of India’s Engagement with Greater Mekong Sub-region
Swaran Singh
2007