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The Kachin Conflict

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Carine Jaquet

Chapter 4

The peace process deadlock

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“Everyone is delighted by hearing [the word] ‘peace.’”KIO public relations officer, Laiza, interview by the author, June 2013.

“What do you mean by peace? What is peace? Of course, people want to stay peacefully. But they can’t give up their dreams and their expectations. They want to see a political solution that is acceptable and brings Kachin [representatives] into the Parliament in Nay Pyi Taw.” Resident of Laiza, interview by the author, June 2013.

  • 74 See Annex C, “The Peace Talks – Chronology.”

1While both sides have publicly stated that they want to achieve a peaceful settlement, paving the way to a lasting peace has proven particularly difficult. Firstly, KIO/KIA leaders desperately want to avoid the kind of “deception,” as they call it, by government representatives that they experienced after the 1994 ceasefire. Kachin leaders today single out the flaws and inequitable aspects of the former agreement as one of the causes of conflict, and seem determined to extract solid government guarantees. They have also indicated that they prefer to remain in a state of conflict rather than going for a quicker settlement that would not address their political grievances in a sustainable manner. On the government side, this is a new political era and recent success stories of several ceasefire agreements with other ethnic armed groups seem to have increased their confidence.74 The agreement reached in May and October 2013 with the KIO created optimism, but the situation remained fragile with ongoing fighting reported in a number of locations, especially in Northern Shan State, while, as of July 2014, the peace talks stalled.

2A number of factors may explain the duration of the conflict and the failure so far to achieve constructive dialogue between the two parties, including two central impediments to comprehensive agreements. The first, and main, issue for the KIO/KIA is that the government may not be able to guarantee that they will adhere to the agreement after the deal is reached, especially when it comes to military arrangements. The second issue is the nature and extent of actual incentives for protagonists to lay down their arms. To understand the challenging environment of Kachin peace talks and the reasons for their repeated failures, the following section examines four sets of obstacles to peace, which are identified as main impediments. These include: the divergent notions of peace; suitable timing for a peace agreement; the military’s pre‑conditions in the negotiation process; and finally, initial mistrust on both sides in the peace process. The latter part focuses on a set of political and stakes economic held by parties to the conflict, including the role played by China.

1 - Impediments to Peace

Different shades of peace

  • 75 See, among others, Kachin Women’s Association in Thailand 2013: 5. The term “genuine” peace was als (...)
  • 76 Burgmann Tamsyn, September 7, 2013, states that an advisor to President Thein Sein blamed the KIA f (...)

3Parties to the conflict do not share a common conception of the notion of a peace process. On one hand, the KIO have requested a “genuine” political dialogue to achieve peace.75 This term demonstrates the need to rebuild trust and it implies that peace in itself is insufficient; it also implies that further political dialogue and settlement is required. On the other hand, the government side reportedly finds this request groundless and considers that the Kachin are creating unnecessary difficulties.76 An interviewee who had spent several years in Kachin State and is currently involved in peace support within the Kachin community told the author:

  • 77 Interview in Yangon, April 2013.

“Some observers think that the KIO wants a war, and is creating difficulties to avoid sitting at the negotiating table. But this is a wrong perception. What the Kachin want is a real peace, based on a political solution, whereas all proposals from the Bamar so far are about a ceasefire only.”77

  • 78 International Crisis Group (2013:10).

4Some details in the interaction modalities during the peace negotiation have led to serious defiance, or mutual misunderstanding. Some cases of inadequate behaviors contributed to the continuation of the conflict, and, overall, seem to have supported the perception that the KIO was keen to continue fighting. For example, during peace talks held on October 30, 2012, the Myanmar military sent senior commanders to participate, but the KIA sent only lower- level KIA representatives, so that according to protocol, military discussions could not be held. This event is related as follows in an international think–tank report: “It was interpreted as a snub by the military and left government negotiator U Aung Min undermined as he had worked hard to convince the army to send a very senior army commander to attend the talks in China, only for him to be stood up [in effect, by the KIA].”78

  • 79 Interview in Laiza, August 2013.

5In contrast, a peace advisor to the KIO explained to the author his understanding of the situation: that the government negotiation team did not reveal its composition prior to the meeting and outnumbered the KIO representatives. He also argued that, as the Tatmadaw was launching an armed offensive at the time, the KIA’s chief of staff could not travel.79

  • 80 Interview by the author with a member of the MPC, August 2013.

6Later, in April 2013, the peace talks were delayed because the KIO refused to participate without international witnesses, arguing their presence would be a guarantee for favorable dialogue and a compelling factor for the government to keep its promises. At first, both Myanmar and China were not keen on inviting foreign witnesses. China, the only foreign power that has been directly involved in peace brokering, for several months refused further international participation, as it perceived the presence of foreign witnesses as an intrusion in its sphere of influence. It finally accepted these conditions but when the negotiation teams met in May 2013, the KIO/KIA leaders demanded that the international observers (Chinese, United Nations representatives, and seven other ethnic armed groups) be physically present in the main negotiating room, as agreed, not just in an adjoining room where they had previously been seated by the government. Such behavior was perceived by Bamar leadership as the KIA creating unnecessary obstacles.80

  • 81 Lintner Bertil, December 18, 2012.

7Finally, vastly differing notions of peace exist on both sides. The journalist Bertil Lintner has suggested that “peace” has different meanings according to the side pronouncing it: “Clearly, peace means different things to the government and the ethnic rebels. The former want the latter to accept the 2008 non-federal constitution and convert their armed forces into so-called “Border Guard Forces” under the command of the Myanmar Army. Peace for the Kachin, on the other hand, means a new, or at least fundamentally amended, Constitution that gives ethnic states a large degree of autonomy.”81 Although the government has since dropped its demand for the KIA to merge into the BGF, deeper disagreements over the mere definition of peace have certainly made talks more complicated.

A right time for peace?

  • 82 Lambrecht 2013. KIA General Gam Shawng noted that throughout the previous ceasefire the military go (...)

8The KIO/KIA and the government also differ sharply in their perceptions of the definition of the right time for peace. For seventeen years, the KIO built up expectations, waiting for a democratic government to be elected, in order to discuss political matters and, in the longer term, achieve greater autonomy.82 Because the KIO feels it has been consistent in its demands over the last decades, it often cites its own version of history to justify its demands for political dialogue before any ceasefire. But this kind of multiphase and linear approach stands in contrast to the new government’s desire to turn the page and move on with its overall reform process. In this context, it is not surprising that the government’s nationwide ceasefire agreement plan initially scheduled for 2013 was considered premature by the KIO. The Kachin leadership did not believe that they would have sufficient guarantees from the government, in terms of future political settlement (and mainly about the Kachin’s status and degree of autonomy, the future of KIA troops, and other issues). They later softened their position and agreed to meet the government peace negotiators, which at least paved the way for further negotiations and crucial new signs of cooperation on both sides.

  • 83 New Light of Myanmar, August 13, 2011.

9On the government side, it seems that the perception that the Kachin create delays and show unwillingness to compromise prevails. To make public its willingness to meet the KIO/KIA and discuss peace, the government highlighted its views in the state media. As reported in the New Light of Myanmar on August 13, 2011, “Government Already Acceded to Peace Proposals of KIO to Most Possible Degree.”83 Following this, the state media stated twice that President U Thein Sein announced a halt to military offensives that did not materialize as military attacks continued, creating a situation in which both parties blamed the other. These episodes not only contributed to further mistrust, but, more worryingly, hinted that the civilian government and the Tatmadaw may have divergent views on how to achieve peace. Some Kachin openly questioned the actual role of the government, especially in the peace talks, considering that, as they hold the Tatmadaw responsible for military decisions, negotiations should be primarily held with the military, and not the civilian leaders who do not appear to have the authority to maintain a ceasefire.

The government’s and Tatmadaw’s “peace” strategy

10The government claimed in late 2013 that it was willing to sign a ceasefire agreement with KIO representatives as soon as possible. But various indicators demonstrated that the Tatmadaw remained reluctant to give up its hold in Kachin areas and attacks were reported during and after peace talks, hinting at a division between the Tatmadaw and the civilian government. Continuing into 2014, the Tatmadaw continued with lesser but persistent military operations against the KIA in Kachin and Shan States. Without adequate willingness to compromise on either side, however, the signing of any peace agreement would appear less acceptable than victory of the military conflict. Hence, hardline elements on both sides seem determined to achieve a clear-cut military victory. As mentioned by a KIA representative, before the conflict resumed:

  • 84 Euro-Burma Office (2010).

“General Gam Shawng [of the KIA] said that he had little hope of a political settlement while the Tatmadaw held the upper hand in the field. The militarys mentality is to arouse fear in others and then demand what they want without any compromise… Unless fear is in their minds, they cannot be pressured to do anything… [According to this line of thought] the KIA has been unable to put fear in the minds of the Myanmar military so they have refused to compromise.”84

  • 85 Kachin News Group, October 23, 2013.

11Another interviewee, reporting a discussion with a person close to the government leadership in early 2013, said that the Myanmar military would not negotiate peace from a position of weakness. He argued that only if military campaigns to capture the hills near the KIA headquarters of Laiza were successful would negotiations be fruitful. As for the Tatmadaw’s position in 2010, in a particularly rare statement, U Hla Swe, a former army commander and Upper House representative of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, said in an interview with the Democratic Voice of Burma, "It is said that if the [KIO] cant be extended an olive branch, then we should send them bullets instead… So I said: how did the Second World War end? Because two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, forcing them to come and sign a peace treaty."85 This mindset has serious implications as the Tatmadaw was still trying to gain ground in KIA-controlled areas in early 2014 even though the government and KIO recognized there had been a de-escalation of violence and were keen to pursue peace talks.

  • 86 Colonel Zau Tawng, the head of the KIA's Strategic Studies Department, claimed that by December 201 (...)
  • 87 Kachin News Group (2011): “Reverend Laphai Shing Rib, Pastor of Laiza Baptist Church: It is impossi (...)
  • 88 Davis Anthony, January 30, 2013.

12In order to ensure a clear military victory, the Myanmar Army used disproportionate military power that climaxed with artillery bombardments and air strikes of KIA strategic positions in late 2012.86 The Tatmadaw was hoping to lead a “flash war” inflicting considerable losses, with limited resources. Consequently, it opted for the deployment of asymmetrical power – in strategic studies, an asymmetric conflict opposes a formal military and a non-state, less equipped, but often resilient opponent. Indeed, the size of the KIA and Tatmadaw forces, arsenal, and equipment capabilities are disproportionate. The KIA has fewer troops (approximately 10,000 according to the highest estimates among local sources with a few additional thousands designated as reservists) in comparison with the Myanmar military (estimated at over 450,000). The Tatmadaw also boasts a superior arsenal of weaponry including an air force against a KIA with limited arms and no air capability nor sophisticated anti‑aircraft equipment. Nonetheless, the KIA has maintained its control over a number of territories as its combatants understand and know their environment better, and their strongholds are strategically located near the China-Myanmar border, making it difficult for the Tatmadaw to attack without posing a security threat for China.87 Furthermore, the Tatmadaw’s lack of technical competence to operate newly-acquired military assets and low morale have also been cited by analysts as contributing factors to the Tatmadaw’s unexpected lack of military progress for several months in 2012.88

13In order to build a more conducive environment for peace, both sides must agree on a number of prerequisite points. Yet, not only do they differ in their understanding of the concepts of “peace” and what an agreement should entail, they also have contrasting views on how a prolonged delay in reaching an agreement could affect the peace process.

Peace talks and mistrust

14Among hindrances to the peace talk process, the first appears to be the extremely low level of trust among the parties. This is common in most early stages of peace processes in any war. According to KIO sources, the government’s appointment of different successive negotiators through 2011 and 2012 was confusing as a team led by U Aung Thaung was replaced by U Aung Min in 2012, which undermined its credibility with the KIA/KIO as trust had started to be built and the KIA had different perceptions of the political clout of the negotiators. The ensuing talks were further undermined by the fact that key negotiators for the government side clearly lacked decision-making powers. Even though they were mandated by the president, these negotiators did not seem to have any authority over the military and could not commit to any decision interfering with military chains of command. As a consequence, such attempts damaged, more than supported, the building of trust among the parties. As a KIO official noted about the 2011 and 2012 talks, “The negotiations were a game in which nothing significant was ever discussed.” According to a press interview in 2013, General Gam Shawng claimed the government only wanted to discuss a ceasefire:

  • 89 Lambrecht (2013).

“We asked them many times verbally and in writing if they would engage in a political dialogue. […] When we finally came close to a political dialogue with their delegate, Aung Thaung, the government replaced him with Aung Min and limited his authority to that of a mediator. Talks then became “informal discussions.” Although Aung Min confessed a desire to discuss politics, he claimed the government had instructed that all political discussions must occur in parliament within the framework of the 2008 Constitution.”89

  • 90 Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Defence Press Release (2013).
  • 91 Kachin News Group, “Thein Sein's orders for Burma army to halt Kachin offensive are worthless”, Jan (...)

15The replacement of the U Aung Thaung from the first high-level government negotiating team by U Aung Min, a President’s Office Minister at the time of writing, supported by the Myanmar Peace Center, in May 2012. This was initially considered a welcome move for the KIO due to his good reputation and successes in other peace negotiations. A shrewd but diplomatic negotiator, he appears to have won trust from the KIA and other Kachin leaders, who have commended his initial efforts. At the same time, the real issue, as many observers note, is that while U Aung Min can speak for the central government, he has seemed to lack authority to speak for the Tatmadaw and is considered to have less influence over them than his predecessor, U Aung Thaung. Several incidents marred the efforts of the peace negotiators. Both parties blamed each other for the skirmishes and armed attacks that occurred after the talks.90 By late 2013, the civilian government’s authority and credibility had suffered more than that of the KIO/KIA in the eyes of Kachin people. While U Aung Min was seen generally as “sincere,” many interviewees mentioned their doubts about the president’s authority over the most fundamental point—military strategy—as they remained convinced that the Tatmadaw was still in control of the country or at least did not have to act in accordance with presidential dictates.91

  • 92 See the transcripts of May and October 2013 Agreements, in Annex B.

16After several unsuccessful attempts to jumpstart peace talks in 2012 and into 2013, the seven-point agreement signed by KIA and government representatives on May 29, 2013 created hope on both sides.92 Though symbolic, this initial agreement showed that all parties to the Kachin conflict were keen to achieve peace. This was the first time that KIO/KIA senior officials were able to travel to Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, since the conflict resumed in mid‑2011. The government also agreed to the KIO’s long-term demand for international observers, with representatives of the United Nations and China present at these talks. Representatives of seven other ethnic armed groups were also allowed to attend as observers at the request of the KIA.

17Dichotomy between hopes created during the peace talks and the reality of the continued attacks led to a degree of skepticism among the KIA leadership. Thus, the need for further confidence-building measures remained clear. One frequently raised issue has been the continuation of armed attacks, allegedly decided by the Tatmadaw’s highest leadership, and in some cases by private militias that operate according to the Tatmadaw’s interests (mainly small sized ethnic armed groups that made ceasefire with the then-junta in the 1990s and retained their arms) stationed in Northern Shan State. A KIO public relations officer explained the KIA’s position as of September 2013:

  • 93 Interview in Laiza, August 2013.

“Since the last negotiations in Myitkyina, the KIA had fully adhered to the seven-point agreement. But the army violated those agreed points and is currently attacking our posts in Putao [in northern Kachin State]. They also attacked positions in Chipwi region on August 17, 2013[…]. The Tatmadaw constantly puts military pressure upon the KIA troops. That’s why it is very difficult to trust them.”93

  • 94 Interview in Bhamo, August 2013.

18The agreement signed in May 2013 generated different opinions. According to a Kachin religious leader from the government-controlled area in Kachin State, “The seven-point agreement is good for the government to show off and to get attention from the international community.” Another religious leader, also living in this area, expressed more hope: This time it is different, whatever we said they didn’t believe and whatever they said we didn’t believe. There is no trust in each other. This is why the seven-point agreement is there; we are trying a new approach. Our people are really optimistic.”94 Not long after, however, skirmishes were reported in Northern Shan State (on August 19, 2013) and by September, fighting was reported in several areas in Kachin State, including Putao, Chipwi, and Mansi areas.

  • 95 Interview with an observer, Yangon, July 2014.

19The most important achievement of the agreement signed on October 10, 2013 was the consent by the KIO leadership to participate in nationwide ceasefire discussions, after consultations were held with other ethnic armed groups in an unprecedented meeting held in Laiza. During the Laiza conference held in November 2013, nearly all ethnic armed group leaders reviewed the proposed Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement draft and commented on it. They then established the NCCT, the negotiating platform of the armed ethnic groups. A few days later they met with the UPWC (in charge of reaching peace agreements with ethnic armed groups and chaired by Vice-President U Sai Mauk Kham) in Myitkyina to provide their feedback. Several meetings were held between the NCCT and the UPWC, and progress was made in the wording of the ceasefire draft. However, as of July 2014, the KIO considered that only time and further discussion will enable the two groups to come to a common agreement.95

2 - Economic, political, and military incentives for conflict

“A few people do not really want peace, such as some KIO officers and business people. They do not pro-actively try to spoil the peace process; they just ignore discussions related to peace without attempting to stop the peace talks. So, they are only indirectly spoilers.” Religious leader interviewed in Myitkyina, August 2013.

  • 96 Interviews by the author in Myitkyina in May 2013 and in Bhamo in August 2013.

20While field research showed that, overall, the KIO/KIA’s conflict narratives were widely assimilated and apparently accepted by the local population, the government’s positions were less frequently exposed, and hence were more difficult to grasp. One tangible consequence of this lopsided understanding of the motivations for war is lack of clarity on all sides about what the government really wants, leaving room for various interpretations. Several interviewees felt that, as much as President Thein Sein should be supported in his economic and political reform efforts, the decision by many Western governments to ease sanctions in 2013 was premature and may have overly encouraged and given confidence to the Tatmadaw as well as the government, resulting in lower incentives for peace. Many Kachin felt it demonstrated that business interests prevailed over their safety and minorities’ political claims.96

Securing access to natural resources

21As previously mentioned, accumulation of wealth was one of the key criticisms concerning some leaders of the KIO/KIA during the 1994‑2010 ceasefire period. Some leaders, who engaged in lucrative business relations with parties closer to the then-military government, were accused of “cronyism” by others. The ceasefire allowed them to obtain large swathes of lands and extract and trade jade, teak, and other natural resources (Woods 2011).The current conflict also enabled them to protect their business interests.

22Some KIO/KIA leaders own businesses, provide services mainly to Chinese and Myanmar businesses such as security, protection, and the issuance of licenses and concessions to exploit timber, mining, and other resources. These business enterprises also raise taxes from companies as well as from individuals, some of which is reinvested in the fighting effort. Funding for the conflict has both military and humanitarian implications. The political scientist Macartan Humphreys (2002) identified several channels that fund and prolong conflict worldwide; three of these can be seen in KIA methods of fundraising. The KIO/KIA is often associated with logging, jade mining, and other natural resource extraction and trade. They also get benefits from agro-business that include large banana and rubber plantations that are visible in the vicinity of Laiza (Woods 2011). Finally, according to interviews, the KIO raises funds from (more-or-less) “voluntary taxes.”

23Several interviewees reported that the conflict had not halted natural resource-related businesses by key military actors and that some areas of the state were being even more intensively exploited as a result of the conflict. A Kachin humanitarian worker based in May Ja Yang, in the KIO-controlled areas, and interviewed by the author in September 2013, explained:

“Illegal logging in areas between Bhamo and Lweje has never been as intensive as for these last two‑and‑a-half years. There are currently more than fifty trucks blocked at various check points as they couldn’t pay the bribes. Before the war, smugglers had to give a lot of under-the-table money to the Tatmadaw in order to get through check points. Yet, it was still a limited taxation. […] Now, they are freer to move around as long as they pay informal taxes to the soldiers. The road is still under the government control. The soldiers are discreet as they are afraid to be seen taking economic profit of the situation. On the other hand, the KIO does not ask for money, they do not need it as they had already set up a systematic tax system.”

24Other testimonies also suggest that logging of teak and other expensive trees is on the rise throughout the state, and that the KIO has a monopoly in some areas. According to an interviewee in Bhamo area, August 2013:

“Two years into the conflict, KIA soldiers earned a lot of money because of logging, thanks to the conflict. There were no more Tatmadaw check-points in some areas, as they have been destroyed. So, no more government tax is collected there and the KIO gets loads of money. Both parties are selling trees, security, and cross-border services. They levy tax in return for permission to log. Then they get their supporters hired, so both KIO as an organization, and its members as individuals, can make money out of the conflict.”

25As a consequence, some large companies are still reportedly able to operate with the protection of warring parties. As a Kachin member of a civil society organization told to the author in May Ja Yang in September 2013:

“Before the fighting there were many small-scale traders but after the fighting had broken out, there were only big companies left. Actually most of the check-points along the way to the Chinese border were established during the war and their number increased quickly. This increases the costs for business people as they have to pay much more bribes and taxes than before. So only those who have deep pockets can access this area greasing palms at each check-point. Small dealers started losing their livelihoods as small businesses cannot pay at all of the newly established check-points. When I spoke with loggers and truck drivers, they mentioned that there were at least 300 fully loaded trucks per day waiting to cross the Chinese border.”

  • 97 Author’s field visit notes.

26Jade and underground resources are considered differently as the jade mines of the Hpakant were recently evacuated due to the nearby fighting. During this period, big companies withdrew while the mines were left for months to smaller-scale miners. As of mid-2014, the Tatmadaw has regained control of the mines and companies are expected to resume their work soon. On the political side, the Kachin continue to harbor suspicions about government motivations and some believe the real incentive to fight is to secure access to Kachin State’s natural resources. This economic issue has serious ramification for local governance and even non-KIO supporters worry about wealth-sharing. During a public meeting at Myitkyina City Hall between members of the Kachin State Government and members of the local civil society, in June 2012, the first question raised was about increased Bamar – and central government – involvement in local natural resource extraction and trade in the area.97

Chinese interests

27Regional trade and China’s interest in natural resources have also influenced Kachin politics for at least three centuries. In the 1950s, the academic Leach observed that the jade mines, operating since the eighteenth century, had a “major impact on the Kachin politics” in the words of Leach (1954: 241). Chinese border demarcation claims on both Chinese and Kachin sides were among the causes of the first Kachin conflict. Chinese authorities remained publicly silent about border politics following the first ceasefire. But their attitude shifted as concerns grew over instability along the border during tensions between the Tatmadaw and Kokang ethnic militia (the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army located in Northern Shan State) in 2009 (Egreteau and Jagan 2013: 282-285). During this episode, as well as the current conflict in Kachin State, a dichotomy could be observed between the silent but supportive approach of local authorities at regional level and a firmer stand at the national level. As people belonging to the Jinghpaw ethnic group and other Kachin sub-groups were present on both sides of the Chinese border, China’s local authorities initially closed their eyes to legal and illegal border crossings by people fleeing the conflict. Some Yunnan-based Chinese helped provide those who fled to China with assistance, protection, and/or accommodation (Human Rights Watch 2012). Meanwhile, Beijing closely monitored the situation with the Myanmar government. Asian politics researcher Nicholas Farelly noted that “The overarching priority is the stability and the relative freedom of commerce and trade that benefited them [the Chinese] so much during the ceasefire period” (Farelly 2012: 65). According to various local sources, Chinese investments in raw materials and commodities extraction directly affect the war economy in Kachin State. As noted by a civil society organization member interviewed in May Ja Yang in September 2013, “The KIO sold rare earth metals concession permits to Chinese companies because they have to raise funds to feed their soldiers and supply weaponry.”

28In an increasingly risky business environment in Myanmar, particularly in Kachin State, Chinese companies have striven even harder to secure local and government guarantees for deals and projects, as described by a civil society organization member in May Ja Yang in September 2013:

“These big companies are mainly from China. Even though they have enormous capital, they still can’t operate and do their business directly. That’s why they have selected many local brokers as their handymen. Most of these local people are just daily workers. In this border area, although many businesses titles belong to local businessmen, they are mostly backed by Chinese companies. Chinese businessmen provide capital to local businessmen who back smugglers to bribe both the KIA and Tatmadaw in order to carry jade or teak to China. [This occurs] as law enforcement is very weak, especially during times of conflict.”

29In September 2011, President Thein Sein surprised the world with a decree suspending construction of the massive, Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam hydropower project, located at the confluence of the Meika and Malikha Rivers, and the larger Ayarwaddy (also known as Irrawaddy) River. The move was particularly striking as the government had not previously informed the Chinese company in charge of the project, China Power Investment. The suspension was widely seen as the result of intense advocacy work from civil society organizations, Burman nationalist sentiment concerning the river seen as the lifeblood of the nation, and also as an expression of Thein Sein’s willingness to try to address some local Kachin grievances. Yet, this sign of goodwill came too late and was considered too marginal to address the root causes of the conflict. The Chinese company and government were left with little choice but to try to persuade the president to change his mind while accepting this decision. However, the Chinese government would soon perceive direct security threats to China from fighting close to and spilling over its border with Myanmar, and adopted a firmer approach to the conflict.

  • 98 Wong Edward, August 23, 2012.
  • 99 Robinson Gwen, January 2018.

30In August 2012, Chinese authorities, after several notifications to the KIO, dismantled Kachin refugee camps in Yunnan and sent thousands of mainly Kachin and Shan refugees back to Myanmar.98 Later, Chinese authorities enforced stricter border controls amid the perceived increase of threats to China’s national security resulting from escalating conflict in Kachin State. Chinese territory was within mortar and airstrike range of Myanmar’s military forces, and at least two mortar shells fell inside China’s Yunnan Province in December 2012 and January 2013.99 From then, Beijing actively pressured both the Myanmar Government and KIO/KIA leaders to stop fighting and hosted the first major – albeit unsuccessful – peace talks between them in the Chinese border town of Ruili, in late 2012. Since then, China assigned an envoy to attend all peace talks between the KIA and the government.

Post-war uncertainties

“The solution [to the conflict] is to include ethnic groups, and religious leaders including the non‑Kachin. 1994 was a kind of success, but during the ceasefire, both the KIO and government became corrupt. It was a lull period and there was no active fighting during these years. Yet no problem was resolved. I did not see any positive outcome from this period.Religious leader interviewed in Bhamo in August 2013.

31Today, many Kachin elders are skeptical about the new political system that could bring about more equality for all ethnic groups in the shorter term. Although the KIO has supported the idea of federalism for decades, many are unclear about the modalities of such a system. According to an interview with a Kachin politician in September 2013, “We don’t have any experience of federalism here in our country. What would it be? Maybe this is only possible after all natural resources are gone from the ethnic areas.” Setting up a federal model – a long-coveted goal for many ethnic armed group participants involved in talks over a possible nationwide ceasefire – presents various challenges. The KIO is requesting establishment of a federal system as a solution to its political grievances. Yet, it has articulated relatively little about the type and form of federalism it desires, reinforcing the impression that very little has been discussed about the nature of federal arrangements. Central to a future federal system in Myanmar is the issue of the restructuring of the armed forces and the future of the KIA. Regardless of its past, the Tatmadaw, as the only legitimate national armed force according to the 2008 Constitution, intends to monopolize control of the security sector. This does not allow for ethnic armed groups to control large swaths of territory. The only long-term settlement the state envisages is one in which its military controls the whole country.

32The question of reforming the ethnic armed groups was first publicly stated at the national level when the government’s BGF plan was released in 2009, which triggered the recent conflict in Kachin State. A KIO public relations officer in May Ja Yang explained to the author in September his perspective on the central government’s BGF proposal. Under the plan “BGF have to locate themselves only at the border posts but not in other regions within the country.

33And all the [Kachin] battalions would be strictly limited to the border points with China and India.” Such curbs on the mobility of troops proved a major stumbling block to KIO/KIA acceptance of the ultimatum, for two reasons. For one, KIA battalions are stationed in a number of areas within Kachin State, away from the border (for example in the strategic resource-rich areas of Hpakant and Tanai). On top of this, the notion of handing control of border administration to the central government had obviously negative financial implications for the KIO/KIA, which would also be giving up its taxation of border trade activities.

34Furthermore, under the plan, there is no future provision made for the senior officers of the ethnic armed groups in the BGF structures. As outlined by the Brussels-based think-tank, Euro-Burma Office, in a report released in 2010.

  • 100 Euro-Burma Office (2010: 3).

35Lieut-General Ye Myint told the KIA to transform into seven battalions of the BGF, under the command of the Tatmadaw, the Burma Army. Each battalion would be composed of 18 officers and 326 soldiers: the highest rank in the BGF would be a mere major and each battalion would have 3 majors, 5 captains and 10 lieutenants. The age limit for the BGF is between 18 and 50, which means that all the officers whose current ranks are higher than major and senior officers older than 50 years of age will be forced to resign. Moreover, each battalion would include at least 3% of officers from the Tatmadaw. These Burmese officers would then control key positions of the BGF, such as logistics and others.100

36Another pivotal issue was the proposed chain of command that would ultimately see KIA troops reporting to the Myanmar military. According to a KIO representative interviewed in May Ja Yang in September 2013 – who provided different information on battalion composition from the above quoted report:

“There would be 100 combatants in each BGF battalion, each comprising seventy KIA soldiers and thirty Tatmadaw soldiers. […]The battalion commander would be a KIO officer while the second battalion commander would be a Tatmadaw officer within the BGF. But in fact those Tatmadaw officers will occupy all the critical ranks of the battalion, for example commanding the rations, supplies, and logistic sectors. That’s why KIO had stated that they would accept the BGF proposal only when decent transformation planning would be proposed but that it couldn’t accept the BGF proposal at this stage. Since then, tensions between KIA and Tatmadaw have increased. […] Even though the chiefs of battalions are our KIA members, they [the Bamar] would take all the critical positions from second commander to ration collector. So we would be like the living dead. We would have very little space to move, and we would be totally under their control. That’s why the KIO Central Committee has determined that the proposal would bring no benefit for [the KIA] and thus decided to resist it firmly.”

  • 101 Interview with a NGO worker by the author, Laiza, August 2013.

37Since the its inception, there has been no opportunity for soldiers of ethnic minority origins to occupy senior positions within the Tatmadaw, hence the BGF criteria was perceived as the continuation of the current monopoly held by Bamar personnel within the army. As a solution, some Kachin civilians have suggested that “Integration and reinsertion of the troops can take place but it needs to be within a federal system, with the creation of Kachin regiments within a federal army. Chief of staff should be of an ethnic nationality background.”101 The army has, so far, remained silent about this issue, and appears rather unlikely to accept such a proposal. General Aung San and the British agreed on something similar in the Kandy Agreement of 1947 in which the Burma armed forces were to incorporate ethnic battalions that had previously fought the nationalists on the side of the British including the Karen, Chin, and Kachin Rifles. But soon after Independence, elements of these battalions split off in the 1950s and ‘60s and took up arms against the Burmese government. The Tatmadaw still has this painful experience in mind and such an arrangement seems certainly unsustainable to the current leadership.

38Furthermore, the question of the age limit and social security (such as retirement schemes and reintegration of combatants) of BGF also became an issue. As a member of the Peace Creation Group stated during an interview in Myitkyina in September 2013, “The age for service is limited between eighteen and fifty. But nothing had been mentioned about the pension after retirement.” Some interviewees mentioned that suggestions were made to the effect that those above fifty years old should focus either on business or politics. The current most-senior KIA officers are all directly concerned. A more comprehensive approach with incentives for the leadership would be required for them to support and trust a future potential integration process.

39Although the government has now dropped the demand to fold the KIA into a proposed BGF, the question of reform, and potential integration of KIA combatants into an armed force sanctioned by the state will be an unavoidable issue that will need to be negotiated. There is a widespread feeling in the KIA that the Tatmadaw will not back away from its insistence on either dismantling ethnic armed groups or turning them into regular army personnel. But this reform process, and any broader reform of the entire security sector itself, cannot take place in such a mistrustful context. The ethnic armed groups are afraid that this is another strategy to divide them. As mentioned in a report by the national media outlet Burma News International in 2013:

  • 102 Burma News International, (2013a: 33).

“Many believe that the BGF scheme is a strategy by the government to control ethnic armed groups by using compliant armed groups already transformed into BGFs or PMF [People Militia Forces] to fight against them. For example: using the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army transformed BGF to fight against non-ceasefire Karen groups like the DKBA brigade-5 and Karen National Union. In addition, the New Democratic Army Kachin transformed into a BGF and was used against the KIA. Pitting ethnic armed groups from the same area, or ethnicity, and against each other has made many groups and civilians even more distrustful of the government’s intentions.”102

40Effective security sector reform will have to ensure that information channels are clear to bring these groups – with their potentially conflicting agendas – into the same fold. Local security needs must be carefully identified and adequate solutions formulated by the central government, in accordance with ceasefire signatories. Given the widespread conviction among local populations in Kachin State that the KIA is more reliable and protective than government troops, the Tatmadaw’s image and relationship with them will also need to drastically improve.

41Finally, KIO/KIA and other ethno‑nationalist movements find unity and support from within, the public, and other armed ethnic groups, during periods of conflict (Robinne 2007).A lasting peace will have to provide mechanisms for sustaining and institutionalizing some of the KIO’s local political power. Integration of its leaders will be required so that they, as individuals, also perceive incentives for change. As an interviewee noted when discussing the future of the KIO/KIA, in September 2013, the KIO may be negotiating more than its own legitimacy in this conflict: “The main question is: ‘Will KIO survive?’If the government was to win, if it wants to stop all the illegal trade, KIO will suffer a lot. The KIO will have to go back to war.”

Notes

74 See Annex C, “The Peace Talks – Chronology.”

75 See, among others, Kachin Women’s Association in Thailand 2013: 5. The term “genuine” peace was also mentioned by a number of interviewees, including representatives of the KIO and the PCG.

76 Burgmann Tamsyn, September 7, 2013, states that an advisor to President Thein Sein blamed the KIA for the lack of progress in the peace process. It also quotes Nyo Ohn Myint, of the Myanmar Peace Center, saying his organization’s members were “confused” by the KIA people’s view that the government is insincere. “That's their view, because there is illiteracy in those areas.”

77 Interview in Yangon, April 2013.

78 International Crisis Group (2013:10).

79 Interview in Laiza, August 2013.

80 Interview by the author with a member of the MPC, August 2013.

81 Lintner Bertil, December 18, 2012.

82 Lambrecht 2013. KIA General Gam Shawng noted that throughout the previous ceasefire the military government “deferred political discussions again and again, stating it was only a caretaker government and that only when a legitimate government came to power could political issues be discussed.

83 New Light of Myanmar, August 13, 2011.

84 Euro-Burma Office (2010).

85 Kachin News Group, October 23, 2013.

86 Colonel Zau Tawng, the head of the KIA's Strategic Studies Department, claimed that by December 2012 three of the Tatmadaw's regional commands were engaged in major operations on five fronts involving 132 infantry battalions and an artillery brigade.

87 Kachin News Group (2011): “Reverend Laphai Shing Rib, Pastor of Laiza Baptist Church: It is impossible for us to defeat the Burmese Army, which has much stronger manpower and weapons than we Kachin, without the help from Almighty God.”

88 Davis Anthony, January 30, 2013.

89 Lambrecht (2013).

90 Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Defence Press Release (2013).

91 Kachin News Group, “Thein Sein's orders for Burma army to halt Kachin offensive are worthless”, January 19, 2012.

92 See the transcripts of May and October 2013 Agreements, in Annex B.

93 Interview in Laiza, August 2013.

94 Interview in Bhamo, August 2013.

95 Interview with an observer, Yangon, July 2014.

96 Interviews by the author in Myitkyina in May 2013 and in Bhamo in August 2013.

97 Author’s field visit notes.

98 Wong Edward, August 23, 2012.

99 Robinson Gwen, January 2018.

100 Euro-Burma Office (2010: 3).

101 Interview with a NGO worker by the author, Laiza, August 2013.

102 Burma News International, (2013a: 33).

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