Summary and Conclusion
p. 67-74
Texte intégral
1 - From the Solid Meaning of Borders by the Nation-State to the Different Perceptions of Borders by the Locals
1“Ever since the creation of the modern nation-state, borders and their regions have been extremely important symbolic territories of state image and control. Yet border cultures are not constructed solely by national centre. In fact, most state borders have been places where people’s interaction on the one hand with the forces of the state, with its top-down notions of national culture, and on the other hand with peoples across the borderline, who are in their own contest over their “national culture”, have helped to fashion distinctive national societies and culture.”49
2This research has attempted to tackle the issue of borders by examining the dynamics of lives and routines experienced by various actors involved in the migration phenomenon, namely border people or Shan migrant workers, the Thai government, Thai employers and informal brokers. Moreover, it has attempted to point out how the perceptions of borders of the three entities differ from one another in their construction and influence each other in various ways. At the same time, this research discusses why the top-down governmental policies do not work effectively at the local level in managing illegal migration flows from Burma to Thailand.
3An era of commodity-defined needs creates economic dependencies on wages, driving people with low access to capital to move to other economic spaces where access to it is higher. In the capital-oriented economy in the age of the nation-state, human mobility depends on the availability of “transportation”, and no longer on feet and open frontiers50. After the colonial period, the movement of humans and goods across the nation-state’s borderlines had to proceed within the state’s legal framework, with the required documentation. “Whether “legal” or “illegal”, “official” or “unofficial”, the would-be crosser must enter into dialogue with the agents of the state and engage in practices ultimately determined by the state: either directly through compliance with and acceptance of state regulation, or indirectly, through avoidance, dissimulation and concealment.”51
4“Invisible” borders, before the emergence of the nation state, were made “visible” and “measurable” after the state’s foundation. Modern state borders serve as a guard to their human and natural resources. They are politically and socio-economically strategic and symbolic to the state. Throughout this research, particularly in Chapter One, the notion of borders was discussed and illustrated by a historical and contemporary account of the Thai state’s relations with the Shan State of Burma. Borders transform the socio-economic structure of people living along the borders, while governmental immigration policies have been developed separately from the lives of border people.
5Since borders are used to mark the differences between “us” and “them”, borders can be both bridges and barriers for more opportunities in another political and socio-economic space. Whether and how Shan migrants’ border crossings will create opportunities or close them off to various actors involved in migration will be concluded in the border perceptions approach that is to follow.
6This research has attempted to illustrate the concept of borders according to three definitions and functions from three separate entities. Firstly, to the Thai government, borders are politically defined, delimited, and demarcated. They are simultaneously employed as a means to separate the Thai state from others and to join the trend of emerging nation-states. Given this particular function, borders are employed to maintain state control over the movement of people, goods and information, by those who are in a position of power at the state’s core and who may have never even visited border areas, but whose decisions affect the lives of border people. Immigration policies, which are formulated based on this top-down perception of borders, thus create loopholes and are ineffective in controlling the illegal flows of Shan migrant workers from the Shan State to Thailand.
7Secondly, to border people or Shan migrant workers, borders are not perceived as political frontiers or territorial zones which are standardized as a periphery in the geographical landscape, the people, and culture. Borders, on the other hand, imply the meaning or are symbolic of a centre for job opportunities and for socio-cultural variety. On the micro level, borders are constructed and function through a cultural perspective which transcends political borders. Social interactions give meaning to borders since border people cannot infer or deduce knowledge from the political and economic borderline defined by the state. Borders, to local people, however, function within two overlapping meanings of borders; the first being that the very existence of borders defined by the state creates frontier socio-economic activities for the locals, and second being that of social borders which are mainly discussed in Chapter Three.
8Thirdly, with regard to Thai employers and informal brokers, they seem to be a group of people who are hidden from the discussions of modern nation-state border issues, while quietly gaining the benefits. They obtain their definition of borders from both previously mentioned entities-the Thai government and Shan migrant workers-and apply them separately or/and mutually depending on the situation. On the one hand, by using the macro definition of borders, Thai employers and informal brokers make use of the non-stringency and inconsistency of immigration laws and policies to take advantage of potential migrant workers both in the process of migration and work. On the other hand, they take into account and exercise the local meanings of borders to create and maintain their informal broker business in accordance with the Thai employers’ demand for cheap Shan migrant workers.
9According to the above perceptions of borders, I would like to conclude that borders function like a sponge whose features are flexible and absorbent. In the same way, modern borders can take some people in and/or exclude these people out of their territorial space. Its features and functions vary depending on whether and how it shapes the perception of those involved.
10The analysis of borders perceptions drives me to question whether and how illegal migration would be possible to control, given that the Thai state should try to balance the migrant workers’ fruitful economic contribution and their numbers. The Thai government has faced and answered to the dilemma that borders must remain business-friendly and “open” to cheap labour. However, it has failed to control an oversupply of low-skilled migrant workers from the last decade. The recent immigration controls="true" by the Thai government attempt to curb migration the flows of low-skilled workers52 from three countries, namely Burma, the Lao PDR and Cambodia, rather than support and recognize the opportunities they have to offer. The lack of collaboration and correspondence at the borders, between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers has led to inconsistent immigration policies, as demonstrated in the migrant registration process from 1992-2005.53 Instead of adopting a mutualistic symbiosis approach, the Thai government employs one of parasitic symbiosis toward Shan migrant workers, thus creating a gap between the ambition of policy-makers and the actual situation. The parasitic symbiosis approach employed in the migration policy formulation (for policies implemented in post-migration) is the perspective that the Thai government loses its national benefits, while only Shan migrant workers are able to take advantage from the migration phenomenon. This is opposed to the actual relation between the Thai government and Shan migrant workers who can both gain benefits from the one another’s existence, also known as a mutualistic symbiosis relation. However, we can not take mutualistic and parasitic symbiosis approaches into account in analysing pre-migration policies as they have been neglected in the process of policy formulation, which is influenced by the government’s realization that Shan migrant workers contribute greatly to the Thai economy. The lack of coherence in policy-making may stir up anti-immigration feelings among the public, as well as among migrant workers who believe that the government is unable or unwilling to solve the problem.
11The contemporary trends in migration control take on two forms: external and internal. For external controls, receiving countries are more concerned about border security and attempt to encourage sending and transit countries to perform a more strict surveillance against irregular migration. This is found to be unsuccessful due to the lack of local perspectives in immigration and security policy formulations within both the sending and receiving governments. When external controls="true" fail, the receiving government tries hard to establish internal controls="true" over the undocumented migrants after their entry. Controls on workplaces are normally ineffective since it displeases Thai employers and could entail economically and politically detrimental consequences. Moreover, informal relations and networks among local authorities, Thai employers and informal brokers are important factors in determining how successful the immigration policies from the central government would be. Therefore, “another option is to control undocumented migrants’ access to social services. Immigration status is increasingly used to restrict access to welfare provisions, but this policy meets resistance: it is questionable from a human rights perspective, as it generates even greater exclusion for migrants and contradicts the inclusive nature of the welfare system”54
2 - Recommendations
12Regarding the characteristics of border controls="true" at the micro level, I would like to conclude that they are more a matter of symbols than of activities yielding actual results. The roles of local authorities are formally designated by the central government, but also informally influenced and directed by the nature of border people and border areas. The formation of national identity and authority by the central government does not completely work either for border authorities or people. This research tries to prove that this leads to a self-perpetuating process: the lack of mutual understanding of border perceptions and functions between various entities creates more problems for border controls="true" implemented by the government. This may result in more human trafficking and illegal migration, which then call for further control. In this respect, border controls="true" are policies that merely determine the status of “legal” or “illegal”.
2.1 - Inclusion of the Different Perceptions of Borders in Policy Formulation
13It is worth noting that governmental immigration policies need to be reconsidered and adjusted in accordance with local situations in order to limit the number of illegal migrants. To achieve this, the government (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Interior and Office of Foreign Workers Administration) needs to work collaboratively and to consider the other different perceptions of borders in order to formulate locally-oriented immigration policies. Furthermore, the government needs to be more concerned about the administrative system such as the transparency of the immigration process and the mechanisms of cross-checking among bureaus. In addition to these macro controls, it would be also more effective if the Ministry of Labour simultaneously made immigration and migration information more available at a local level both to potential migrants in the sending country (Burma) and to legal and illegal migrant workers in the receiving country (Thailand). Moreover, it is necessary for the Ministry of Labour to provide attractive benefits to informal brokers in order to encourage them to perform their roles within a legal framework. I would also like to emphasize that the more efforts the Thai government will make to pull Shan migrant workers into the legal area, the less human insecurities these people may face throughout the migration process.
2.2 - The Need to Accelerate the Legal Process and to Create Coherence in Immigration and Registration Policies
14In contradiction to the immigration law of 1978, the process of migrant registration (please refer to Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter One) may only take place after the alien’s entry. As a result, it leads to the creation of loopholes when it is put into practice. Thai employers make use of this legal provision to register illegal migrant workers after hiring them. Accelerating the immigration process and creating coherence between immigration and registration policies are necessary steps to systematize the migration flows by means of the locally-oriented measures suggested above.
Immigration Policies according to the Law on Immigration 1978
1. Regarding an alien who has not entered to the Kingdom yet |
2. Regarding an alien who has already entered to the Kingdom |
1.1. An alien who wants to enter to the country with the purpose of working shall require a “Non-Immigrant Visa” delivered from the Thai consul or embassy in the country of origin. |
2.1. An alien who has been permitted entry to work in the Kingdom under the law on investment promotion or other laws shall submit an application to the Director-General or official entrusted by the Director-General within thirty days from the date of his/her entry into the Kingdom. |
1.2. Subject to the law on immigration, any person wishing to employ an alien in his/her business in the Kingdom may submit an application on behalf of the alien to the Director-General or official entrusted by the Director-General. |
2.2. An alien who applies for a work permit must possess the following qualifications: |
Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration, Thailand.
Notes de bas de page
49 Donan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State
50 Illich, Shadow work
51 Donan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State
52 Pecoud and Guchteneire, Migration without Borders: Eassay on the Free Movement of People, UNESCO and Berghahn Books, p. 2.
53 Please refer to Tables 9 and 10: The registration policies of migrant workers in Thailand during 1992-2005.
54 Cohen et al. (ed.), From Immigration Controls to Welfare Controls, London, Routledge.
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