URL originale : https://books.openedition.org/irasec/1068
Chapter 2. A Comparative Analysis of the Different Perceptions of Borders and of the Cost-Benefit Assessment Between the Thai Government, Shan Migrant Workers, Thai Employers and Informal Brokers
p. 31-66
Texte intégral
1 - Human Security and Migration
1.1 - Human Insecurities in Burma as Factors in Migration
“People move because of some threat to security or to improve their security. In so doing, they are often seen as a threat to the security of the receiving population, or at least sections thereof, particularly if the movement is large enough in numerical terms or dissimilar enough in qualitative terms.” (Graham, 2000)
1In Wongboonsin’s work on Human Security and Transnational Migration, she points out that the transnational migration of labourers in Thailand is induced by the problem of human insecurity within the countries of origin and results in a widening and deepening scope of human insecurity in both sending and receiving countries.17 At this point, I would like to clarify the dimensions and extent of threat and security in the above argument which is also referred to in this research. To Shan migrant workers, insecurity can be visible or perceivable only when the previous or current conditions of life are threatened. When people perceive threats to their immediate security, they often become less tolerant. The oppression and perceptions of injustice of Shan people inflicted by the Burma military, who invade their villages, take their food and land-the first two priorities in their hierarchy of needs-have led to a violent protest and armed conflicts against authoritarianism between the Shan and Burmese armies. These situations have also motivated Shan local people to migrate to where they believe they can broaden their range of choices in terms of economy, food, health and personal/political security. Moreover, their destination needs to be a place where they believe they can exercise these choices safely and freely, where they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today will not be totally lost tomorrow.18
2In the case of Shan migrant workers, migration is also driven by the many images and messages emitted particularly from Thailand through the development of global communications and entertainment networks. Shan migrant workers mostly receive outside information through radio and television. Personal networks also play a significant role through the accounts of returning migrant workers of life outside Burma. It has helped to expand awareness of life beyond the borders and to create the image of a more civilized and secure lifestyle in Thailand. “Imagination and Hope of Betterment” (according to Shan informants corresponds to the comparatively higher number of choices at the destination) and is the push factor influencing Shan migrant workers’ cost and benefit assessment of migration.
3However, whether Shan migrant workers can achieve the aim of widening their choices and whether a new form of insecurity must be traded off for the achievement of another will be discussed in the following section.
1.2 - More Human Securities or Less Human Insecurities? The Post-Migration Situation in Thailand
4Labour movements from the Shan State into Thailand create multi-dimensional impacts on both source and destination countries at micro and macro levels, affecting not only the migrant at an individual level, but also their family and community, and at national and regional levels. This issue is raised in order to explain how the forms and conditions of human insecurity change after the migration process.
1.2.1 - At the Individual Migrant Level
5Due to their illegal status and lack of skills, in the short term perspective, illegal Shan migrant workers are at risk of poor and abusive working conditions, coupled with irregular income. This economic insecurity causes both the unplanned or extended migration time frame in Thailand and their chronic migration after returning to the Shan State. In the short term, some may enjoy higher wages, but in the long run, some may end up in an unsustainable professional life in Thailand fraught with not only financial problems (debt repayments for migration fees and relatively higher living costs), but also with fewer opportunities in terms of skill development or even, in some cases, basic education. In this situation, it can be argued that the freedom of migrant workers’ in professional terms is defined by different actors such as the military government in Burma, Thai brokers, Thai employers and the Thai government. In terms of health insecurity, their hope of gaining a higher number of socio-economic choices has led to their assessment of health risks from poor working conditions as a mere trade-off for their higher income in Thailand.
Most Shan migrant workers believe that it is more secure to work in Thailand than in Burma. The way in which they perceive securities varies from one life condition to the other at a given place and time. Their insecure professional life in Burma is expressed through the lack of freedom in selecting jobs, in daily life and in managing their income.19 However, conditions of insecurity in Thailand exist in different forms.
“At home we are treated by the Burmese government unequally. We are forced to behave and follow the government’s unjust rules and orders. We cannot refuse the military if they want to take our agricultural products and possessions. Moreover, we are prohibited to teach and learn our Tai Yai language. I once was arrested by the military on this unfair charge and forced to sign a document stating that we will not continue to study our language.”
“Although it is easier to live and work in Thailand, we are treated unequally by Thai employers. We are often threatened to be fired and sent back to Burma if we ask for holidays or sick leave
Source : พรสุข เกิดสว่าง (บรรณาธิการ), คนทอตะวัน : สิบบทสนทนากับผู้ลี้ภัย และแรงงานอพยพจากประเทศพม่า, เชียงใหม่, ไทย, เพื่อนไร้พรมแดน, 2545, หน้า 5-6, 13-14.
Pornsuk Kerdsawang (ed.), Kon Tor Ta Wan: Ten Conversations with Refugees/Displaced Persons and Migrant
Workers from Burma [In Thai] (Chiang Mai, Thailand, Pern Rai Pom Dann, 2002), pp. 5-6, pp. 13-14.
“The broker system manages the chronic selling of migrant workers. This means that migrant workers go from one broker to the other until one of them manages to sell them to an employer for the highest price. This chronic selling causes the chronic debt to each new broker. As a result, an amount is deducted from their salary each month in order to pay the broker’s fee. Consequently, the possibility of acquiring savings to expand their choices and opportunities becomes almost unattainable. Most are unaware of their rights and describe their circumstances as sheer bad luck. After a certain period of time, some of them choose to save money in order to move back to their original country.”
Source: A MAP (Migrant Assistance Programme) Foundation Staff, interviewed by the author at the MAP Foundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand, February-March 2008
6To summarize the issue of Shan migration in relation to human security, the number of choices and the opportunity to utilize these choices are indicators of improved conditions at the destination, not only for the individual but also for his/her children and the rest of the family back in the Shan State.
“There is nothing here to compare to the big roads and department stores in Chiang Mai at all. I know many people who moved to work in Thailand and later decided not to go back to the Shan State because they started getting used to the modern life in the big cities. I think they just can not stand the simple life back here. There is nothing to buy.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who lives on the Burma side of the border with Thailand where she has worked for 10 years until now, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008
“Everything in Rayong is better than the conditions back home. We earn more money more easily here, so we can save enough money to send back home every month. Moreover, there are a lot of “massage parlours” here, too.”
Source: A 17-year-old Cambodian male migrant worker, interviewed by the author in Rayong province, February-March 2008
7Thus, in this sense, it is not necessarily the greater availability of commodities at the destination, but rather the command over goods and services, whether self-produced or otherwise, that attract migrant workers. Choices, to Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in terms of commodity possession. The more money they earn, the more commodities they can obtain, coupled with the relatively higher living standard in Thailand.
“In the Mae Suai District, only two percent of Shan people are involved in crime or illegal drug trade. To us, we feel neutral towards Shan people. Most of them work and live a simple life, without causing so many problems compared to hill tribes. If we compare Shan migrant workers to Thai workers who are at a similar socio-economic transition, we think the former develops their economic status much better than the latter. This might be explained by the stronger need for Shan migrant workers, whose status is alien here, to improve their socio-economic conditions and by their willingness to struggle.”
Source: A policeman from Mae Suai police station, Chiang Mai, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Chiang Mai, August-September 2008
8Nevertheless, Shan migrant workers seem to ignore the costs of this so-called betterment, often demanding higher investment, such as bribes to local Thai policemen as a guarantee to ignore their illegal status in Thailand.
“It is difficult to bring a charge against Thai employers when migrant workers do not receive the full amount of their salary. It is widely known that bribery exists between Thai employers and local authorities, not to mention the informal agreement between informal brokers and Thai employers regarding debt collection (bribery fee and broker fee), deducted from the employee’s salary.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has now moved back to Tachilek, Burma, interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
9In conclusion, there seems to be some recklessness in the assessment of costs and benefits on the part of Shan migrant workers, since they mostly assess improved conditions by the value of money they can earn from working in Thailand. On the contrary, they forget to take working conditions and the availability of merely temporary jobs into account. As a result, they can not live on a regular basis and rely more and more on the notion of chance.
1.2.2-At the Household Level
10Improved human security at the household level can be expected from migrant remittances. Many Shan migrant workers perceive the contribution of their migration to their household back in the Shan State merely in financial terms. However, the remittance may not improve their family’s living and economic conditions. In this research, we may find that most Shan migrant workers are subject to recruitment fees.
“The most common practice of human trafficking is the phenomenon of bringing Shan migrant workers from their hometown in the Shan State to the Burma-Thailand border via informal brokers, who either demand payment of travelling fees at the place of origin if funds are available, or collect it as a debt at the destination. After that, they will be taken to find jobs. Although the broker’s fees start at a fixed rate, the Shan migrant workers are not informed of the other costs that will be incurred, nor are they made aware of the specific place they will be taken to, who they will work for, their salary details, the terms of employment or the debt that often follows. When they left their homes, none of the Shan migrant workers knew exactly how much the trip to Thailand would cost, nor did they learn of the specific patterns of the travelling route. As a result, most of their savings they made from working in Thailand are spent to reimburse the recruitment fee.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has now moved back to Taung Gyi, Burma, interviewed by the author in Taung Gyi, February-March 2008
11As a result, these remittances become the main source of funding to pay back debts and interests. The financial burden created by the migration determines how long the migrants work in Thailand, depending on each informant’s situation. However, for some families, remittances play a prime role in minimizing household economic poverty and improving housing, education and healthcare.
“I migrated to Thailand about 40 years ago because I think it is easier to earn money and to make a living in Thailand than in Burma. After I had worked for a certain period of time and had gathered some savings, I bought a piece of land and put my daughter’s name on the title deed, as I did not get Thai nationality, but my daughter who was born in Thailand did”.
Source: A 65 and 60 year-old Shan couple in Bann Rom Po Thong, Tha Ko Town, Mae Suai District, Chiang Rai, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Chiang Rai, February-March 2008
12Even though the real benefits of these remittances are often questionable as to whether they are spent towards a productive investment or wasted on luxury non-productive consumption, remittances can help provide a stimulus for local suppliers and local industry.
13However, outward migration from the Shan State is also likely to cause family problems. The sizeable number of Shan female workers migrating to work in Thailand has produced a social and cultural gap of gendered contribution in the private sphere in Burma, creating a distortion in family- and child-care.
As people leave with the expectation of socio-economic benefits at the destination, the demographic trend of Shan-Thai people from old Shan villages in north-eastern Shan State and rural areas in northern Thailand has resulted in an aging society. On the other hand, upon examining the recent Shan migrant workers in Thailand overall, specifically in urban areas, its demographic trend is increasingly full of young and working-age migrant workers.
Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
1.2.3 - At the Community Level
14Even though remittances may represent a considerable contribution to some families and even their community, they may also increase, and therefore worsen, the income gap between people and households within a certain community.
“The problem that has recently surfaced in our community is the lack of human resources within social work. The media and the neighbours who receive remittances give new meanings to money and its value, which then have a profound influence on young Shan people’s perception of money. Their lack of choices and cases of successful migrant workers in Thailand considerably push them to struggle for higher education or more money-making jobs, thus leaving their former identity.”
Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008
“Their friends and relatives networks that are currently working or used to work in Thailand have a considerable influence on their decision to migrate. A simple story of better infrastructure, higher wages and higher purchasing power effectively attracts Shan local people to migrate with the expectation of experiencing the same things. Bad experiences of migration to Thailand within their social networks are assessed by this group as unavoidable bad luck.”
Source: Local authorities who work at Tachilek police station in Burma, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008
15The examples of successful Shan migrant workers induce more migration from the Shan State to Thailand.
1.2.4 - At the National Level
16-Boosting economic growth in the labour receiving country-
17Thai employers can enjoy cheaper Shan labourers, helping to fill the gaps in 3D (Dangerous, Dirty, Difficult) tasks avoided by domestic workers. Also, Thailand, as the labour-importing country, can use the availability of Shan migrant workers as a tool to keep a lid on rising wages.20 This means consumers generally benefit from cheaper goods and more affordable services, such as cheaper Shan maids who an increasing number of Thais are employing. Semi and unskilled jobs, which are mostly performed by Shan migrant workers, have contributed to higher production with lower costs for the export market and have come to be associated with the increase of the Thai national income. Thus, Shan migrant workers’ mobility can be seen as a variable boosting Thai economic activity.21
18Nevertheless, there are still concerns and dissatisfaction among domestic workers who are afraid that the influx of Shan migrant workers is synonymous with the displacement of local workers and the depression of their wages.
“We treat both Thai and migrant workers all the same. However, I think other Thai employers prefer to hire Shan migrant workers due to the cheaper wages. They are easy to control and order. At least they can understand Thai better than Burmese or Karen migrant workers can.”
Source: A Thai employer who owns an agricultural farm and hires Shan migrant workers, interviewed by the author in Chiang Mai, Thailand, February-March 2008
19-Negative impacts on long-term economic development-
20The unsystematic flows of Shan migrant workers not only lead to the failure of the Thai government to control the invisible flows of labour migration, but also affect the possibility for Thailand and Burma to reach higher capacities for their national economies and, especially in the case of Thailand, to upgrade its international competitiveness. According to the ADB22, Thailand is classified as a middle-income country moving towards more skill-intensive activities and production. Thus, as a result of the great influx and availability of low-skilled Shan migrant workers, both the governmental and private sector are less motivated to invest in more productive human resources, which is the main factor in gaining higher competencies in the world market. This has minimized the country’s ability to move into higher value-added economic activities. In the short term perspective, it may seem that Thailand gains huge benefits from cheap Shan labour. However, in the long run, the country will not be able to avoid facing severe competition from countries with high technological capacities and labour-intensive strategies of development, given the fact that the number of industrial countries with outsourcing market strategies is greatly increasing.23
21In turn, Burma, being the country that is sending its labour force elsewhere, is also losing the opportunity to develop its human resources of people of working age. Adequate human resources would have enabled the country to optimize its economic capacity and to be included in the category of middle-income countries at a further stage.24 Furthermore, with the minimal opportunities to develop labour skills while working in Thailand, these Shan migrant workers remain low-skilled labourers and unavoidably become part of the aging population, thus carrying a financial burden to society, rather than building a productive workforce. Unless awareness of this circle of circumstance is raised, the economic drive of the entire ASEAN region toward acquiring the sustained opportunities and choices for people to lead their daily lives and achieve the basic human needs of food, shelter, clothing, education and healthcare to their highest potential, may take too long.
1.2.5 - At the Regional Level
22-Regional cooperation on international migration in ASEAN-
23Labour-exporting countries are keen to lower the barriers to international labour migration, while labour-importing countries have asymmetrical policies that regard the import of unskilled/semi-skilled workers as politically and socially sensitive, and are more inclined to favour flows of professional/skilled workers and business persons.25
24This situation is reflected in ASEAN cooperation. Prospects of an ASEAN free labour market remain remote as the vision for the ASEAN Economic Community, which is hoped to be realized by 2020, includes only free movement of skilled labour. Cooperation is still limited on the core migration issues, such as orderly recruitment of migrant workers, protection of migrant workers’ rights, acceptance of asylum seekers, compensation for the loss of skilled workers and the facilitation of circular migration and remittance flows. However, in reality, the influx of unskilled labourers within ASEAN is increasing heavily and the Thai government is failing to systematically manage its flow in accordance with legal procedures. My concern is that the lack in addressing this unsystematic migration movement represents an important barrier for ASEAN to reach the goal of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in 2015 regarding the regulation of international migration flow.26 These failures are partly due to the low level of collaboration between governments and employers, especially to the reluctance of employers in labour-importing countries to commit themselves to improve the migrants’ working conditions and skills.
25What is still missing in the regional context is an institution established to formulate labour migration policies and to implement these on a regional level. I believe that the analysis of the perceptions of borders and the migration costs and benefits assessment of each actor involved constitute the essential ingredient that can lead to a new framework of human migration, borders and human security for policy-makers to approach and use in identifying the migration problem.
2 - Three Actors’ Perceptions of Borders, Their Cost-Benefit Assessment and the Migration of Shan Migrant Workers
2.1 - The Thai Government’s Perception of Borders: Legal Borders vs. Social Borders
26The objective of this section will be to identify how the different perceptions and functions of borders between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers, and informal brokers shape the migration behaviours of Shan migrant workers and perpetuate the illegal migration phenomenon. In order to do so, we will engage in an in-depth analysis on how the various definitions and functions of borders according to the Thai nation-state and its active body, the Thai government, were formed and have effectively influenced governmental immigration policies at both macro and micro levels.
“In the indigenous polity in which the power field of a supreme overlord radiated like a candle’s light, the tiny tributaries were always located in the overlapping arena of the power fields. In the indigenous interstate relations, the overlapping margin of two power fields was not necessarily considered a problem unless it served as a bridge for the enemy to invade. For a modern state, however, the overlapping frontier is not permissible. The division of territorial sovereignty between states must be clear-cut at the point where both power fields interface. To transform a pre-modern margin to a modern territorial interface, or to create a modern edge of a state out of a pre-modern shared space, there could be more than one possible boundary, and all of them would be equally justified because the boundary could be anywhere within the overlapping arena, depending on how the sovereignty of a tributaries was decided.”
27In the wake of modern state boundaries, administration, boundary demarcation and mapping are equipped to keep boundaries fixed and sovereignty exclusive.27
28“There has always been a tension between the fixed, durable and inflexible requirements of national boundaries and the unstable and flexible requirements of people. If the principle fiction of the nation-state is ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then borders always give the lie to this construct.”28 According to Anderson29, borders (which Anderson refers to as frontiers) are both institutions and processes. In order to maintain state sovereignty and rights to individual citizenship, borders were institutionalized and employed by state governments. Borders function through the imagination of each individual within the state boundaries. Borders, thus, are made capable to control the people within them. Given this, they create a sense of both political and social separateness and otherness. This function of borders simultaneously excludes people who live in the border areas from national society. Borders emphasize people’s heterogeneity and create the phenomenon that distinguishes them from homogeneous and powerful zones at the state core. In other words, borders are also recognized by Anderson as the markers of political and socio-cultural identities of both the people and the modern state.30
29In an era of the cultural globalization and internationalization of economics and politics, the modern idea of defined legal borders has appeared, as opposed to the traditional concept of fluid borders. My concern is that globalization and liberalization have opened the border and eased state controls="true" for high-skilled workers, but have limited the movements of low-skilled workers, including their goods, capital and information. It is controversial that the nation-state in the era of capitalism demands a greater number of cheap labourers to fulfil its economic objectives, while it imposes selective immigration policies on migrants, especially low-skilled workers. In the case of the Thai government, they have to balance the needs of the nation’s two public entities: the Thai employers’ demand for cheap labour and the Thai working-class opposition to surpluses of foreign workers who increase competitiveness within the labour market. The government has to control potential effects on national unemployment, a drain on public and private funds, and public dissatisfaction, while maximizing its national economic capacities and interests. Borders for the Thai government sometimes serve as a tool to define the eligibility of required cheap migrant workers, and often act as a screen or filter which functions through a defensive legal wall. Borders, in this sense, determine who is eligible for the governmental protection of human security.
30However, many studies on borders and boundaries with regard to migration, when tracing the evolution of national and international boundaries and examining their structures and functions, are mostly focused on the formal arrangements made between states, often failing to take into account the needs, desires and other realities of the people who live at the borders, as well as the cultural significance of borders to the people living there.31
31The Thai government’s perceptions of physical and geographical borders can not solely explain the perpetuating illegal migration phenomenon. Addressing how the definition of social borders among the locals influence their migration will attempt to supplement the yet-lacking correspondence of border perceptions between state and non-state actors, which is the main barrier to decreasing the degree of illegal and unsystematic migration. Social borders, in the case of Shan migrant workers, are interpreted according to their socio-economic benefits. They simply perceive the border areas along the Shan State of Burma and northern Thailand as “the same social borders where individuals are aware that they share a common status, that they are a single social category.”32 The transfusion of racial, linguistic and other cultural characteristics of the Tai ethnic group who live primarily in the Shan State and northern Thailand has formed a cultural homogeneity for the sake of socio-economic benefits. However, the legal borders imposed by Burma and Thai legislation have become a significant factor in separating insiders from outsiders in terms of both legal status and social identity. I would like to conclude that perceptions of social borders among Shan migrant workers overlap each other when it comes to determining their migration behaviour.
2.1.1 - Benefits
32In conclusion, borders according to the Thai government serve as both a geo-political and economic line dividing two nation-states that practice two different legal systems and economies. Borders are formalized as a mechanism to create a sense of superiority towards the other and unity among their own, whereby a status of inferiority is attributed to illegal migrant workers, such as the Shan, who are considered an economic threat to Thailand due to decreasing job opportunities. Imagined borders are also utilized to formulate governmental immigration policies, which fluctuate between restrictive and welcoming ones depending on the economic demand of cheap migrant workers.
33Furthermore, borders defined by the nation-state lead to the emergence of local powers governing access to social and public services in Thailand. Thai local authorities, such as border patrol policemen or local government officers, at the border areas exploit the virtual existence of border lines and deportation laws as a means to gain both power and money from illegal Shan migrant workers.
2.1.2 - Costs
34The differences and lack of common perceptions of borders between the Thai government and non-state actors (Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers) are the main factors perpetuating the illegal and unsystematic flow of Shan migrant workers to Thailand. This situation is costly for the government both directly and indirectly. In financial terms, huge national budgets are spent on preventing and deporting illegal migrant workers. At the same time, the government fails to organize the national budget on social welfare for the unnumbered migrant workers.33
According to the Thai national budget in 2008, 43.4 percent of 19.6 percent of the national budget in general administration was allocated to national security.
41.9 per cent of the national budget was spent on the community-education, public welfare and social work.
35It is controversial that the national budget on community and social welfare, which is supposed to be allocated for Thai citizens, is largely consumed by migrant workers by means of social services such as public health and education. This problem remains ineffectively managed mainly due to the unavailability of reliable statistics on migrants and their consumption in Thailand. Furthermore, as a consequence of illegal and unsystematic migration, border problems such as the trafficking of humans, drugs, and illicit goods have risen and have become more severe over time. In an effort to control this, the state allocates a greater number of human resources to patrol the borders.
2.2 - Shan Migrant Workers’ Perception of Borders: Borderless or Ethnic Borders-An Interpretation of Socio-Economic Demand
36A Border commonly refers to the modern concept of nation-state boundaries, which is a static dividing line, developed and employed by political geographers. These kinds of national boundaries deal with its form, rather than its functions. This is a systematic accompaniment to the building of modern nation-states. An individual state is forced to form the more specific definitions of the locations of boundaries in order to claim the nation’s wealth and political unit contained within that defined territory.34
37The borders, which are the main subject of this section, can not be understood in the above definition of boundaries. It can not be denied that modern boundaries constitute a formidable legal barrier in terms of migration. Nonetheless, in the societies along the borders of the Shan State and northern Thailand, this research has found that Shan people do not wholeheartedly perceive or commit themselves, whether economically and culturally, to either the Shan State or Thailand. Socio-economic assessment has become the significant factor in defining their social identity.35
According to a Thai-Shan informant who lives in Tachilek, a border town along the Thai-Burma border, some Shan villagers hold identification cards from both countries. This dual ownership is mostly acquired through official paper fraud among local networks. Their social identity, formally approved by their legal paper identity, fluctuates and is defined based on socio-economic benefits.
38Over the period of boundary demarcation, the individual nationstate attempts to integrate as many frontier peoples as possible in order to accumulate human resources, natural resources and land.36 Deprived of ethnic and social trust, the resistance from the Shan army and the quiet social conflicts among Shan individuals toward the Burmese government has risen during this process. The extremely unequal distribution of income and social welfare at the place of origin creates an impetus that drives Shan migrant workers to move near or across the borders where there may have perceivably greater socio-economic opportunities.
39The existence of national boundaries creates concepts of cross-border activities, such as human migration, and requires the establishment of a governing administration. In other words, the movements of migrants need to be approved by both the sending and receiving states by means of formal administration. An individual person’s identity and travelling rights are defined by passports, passbooks, visas, and work permits. The governmental definition of boundaries as the legal spatial delimitation of nations is applied to people on both sides of the Thai-Burma border, neglecting sociological attributes.
40“Few people cross many boundaries, and when they compare one boundary with another they naturally consider their own personal experience; they usually have little opportunity and less inclination to perceive the many functions which boundaries serve today and to discover what the boundary means in the lives of the people concerned, especially those who live nearest to the frontier.”37 Borders to Shan migrant workers and local people, therefore, are various cultural zones or spaces, independent from formal boundaries. This perception is out of tune with the governmental view on the issue of migration.
“I think there is a very simple reason why most Shan people choose to go and find jobs on the Thai side of the border. Wages in the Shan State are very low and jobs are rare. People living along the Burma-Thailand border simply view the action of movement as a day-to-day practice. No one really perceives that they are two different countries. Many who are currently working or used to work in Thailand bring their friends or relatives to work at the same workplace afterwards.”
Mrs. A: A Shan woman who has been living and trading along the Tachilek (in Burma) and Mae Sai (in Thailand) border for more than 10 years, interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
41As mentioned earlier, the existence of artificial nation-state boundaries is more recognized than its functions for local people. It can be explained that people in each delimited territory would not necessarily recognize the status of the boundaries that have been agreed to both by the individual state and its neighbours. “The recognition of one state as an international unit by another state does not necessarily assume that the recognizing state acknowledges the status of the boundaries of the recognized state.”38
42The following case study supports the above idea and the main argument that the different perceptions and functions of borders among the different actors and the lack of correspondence between them perpetuate the flow of illegal migration.
43The migration of people residing in the border areas is distinct from that of ones staying farther inland from the borders. Shan migrant workers from the Shan State clearly demonstrate their exclusive perceptions of borders. Since they do not recognize the legal existence of delimited boundaries, Shan migrant workers perceive the action of border-crossing as a general movement, not international migration, derived from the evolution of modern boundaries. Consequently, they lack the concept of committing their movement to formal state immigration policies and legislation. Furthermore, the nature of the borders39 virtually facilitates their ability to move, while making the everyday informal deportation of Shan migrant workers by Thai border patrol authorities at the border ineffective.
Due to the nature of the terrain such as non-patrolled forests and the long narrow rivers separating the two countries, movement can be relatively free for both legal and illegal migrant workers.
Therefore, people living along the border on both sides can just go back and forth freely and easily every day.
The everyday informal practice of deportation by the receiving country and punishment by the original country along the border does not correspond with the Thai governments’ immigration policies.
For example, on the Burma side, local authorities normally release the deported migrants with no formal recording, but instead take bribes from them. And in some cases, they allow or even help the arrested migrant workers to cross back into Thailand.
Source: A local authority from the Human Trafficking Department in the Tachilek area, interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
44Their behaviours in informal migration, such as cyclic migration, daily migration, become illegal in the eyes of Thai government. This is because there is a lack of correspondence between the borders defined by these two different entities. Shan migrant workers acknowledge the nature of borders more as cultural zones where the movement of people along the borders implies a hidden meaning in their lives’ securities. Examples of these securities are trading, working and earning money on the other side of the border, thus affirming their economic securities at both individual and household levels.
45The functions of borders from a local perspective regarding to the movements of humans and goods fluctuate between the informal and formal governance of local authorities, which is somewhat conditioned by local corruption and the connections between local authorities and people.
46On the other hand, the Thai nation-state perceives the concept of state borders more in terms of a delimitation of geographical boundaries-the invisible lines that separate the Thai state from others, whereby “boundaries in the state mind are paper walls created by the contractual relations with the mutual agreements among modern nation states.”40
2.2.1 - Benefits
47According to the above case study on Shan migrant workers, the border between Burma and Thailand is perceived as an indicator of their potentially expanding choices in terms of income, benefitting from the currency exchange rate from the expensive Thai Baht to the cheap Burma Kyat, and access to public services such as education and health care, which are inadequate in the district of origin.
48The number of choices and the migrants’ capability to utilize these choices indicate the improved conditions of human security at the destination. According to Amartya Sen41, “capability of a person is a freedom or ability of the person to choose the desired function of a commodity and his command over it.” In the case of Shan migrant workers, the higher capability or freedom, according to Sen’s definition, expected through migration is not only for the individual, but also for his/her children and the rest of the family back in the Shan State. Migration, thus, is done with the expectation of expanding their capability in their command over goods and services, in exchange of cash which is not allowed at the place of origin under the authoritarian regime.
2.2.2 - Costs
49Choices, in the case of Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in terms of the purchase and possession of commodities. The more money they earn, the more commodities they can obtain, in addition to a relatively higher living standard in Thailand. Yet Shan migrant workers seem to ignore the costs of this so-called betterment. New forms of economic and individual insecurity may appear from the beginning of their migration process.
50The degree of costs incurred by each migrant depends on the main actors involved, therefore on Burma and/or Thai informal brokers, Burma and Thai local authorities, the Thai government and Thai employers. They unavoidably pay the price of becoming migrant workers through the invisible health risks, unexpected accidents42, unstable working conditions, the temporary nature of available jobs (farming, construction, etc…), legal trouble, fraud, and bribery burden.
Mrs. B’s hands are contaminated with pesticides from working on the orange farm. However, she decided not to speak out about her health problem as she was worried she would get fired. Her costs and benefits assessment of being a migrant worker in Thailand was calculated with hope and fear, the hope to maintain her working status, and the fear of losing her job due to her health problem.
To Shan migrant workers, economic security comes before health in the short term perspective. Besides some technical problems, such as the language barrier and money shortage, the long term and short term risks help explain this assumption. Or in other words, their health problem presents too few symptoms to make them aware of it in the short term, although it is an actual risk for the future.
Source: Mrs. Saowanee Auitakoon, a registered nurse at the Health Department for migrant workers mainly from Cambodia and Burma, Rayong Hospital, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Rayong, February-March 2008
Based on this fact, questioning on how to promote health security for migrant workers is a need for concern. Dr. Kittisak Klabde, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Public Health of Thailand, has expressed that failing to provide migrant workers with basic services will ultimately burden the health system and national well-being.
Hence, this issue is another significant problem to which the Thai government and society need to pay more attention, for each year a huge amount of the governmental budget acquired from Thai peoples’ taxes has been spent on health services for migrant workers for the sake of everyone’s health security, but the results of preventing and improving migrants’ health conditions have not been effective.
Source: Mrs. Saowanee Auitakoon, a registered nurse at the Health Department for migrant workers mainly from Cambodia and Burma, Rayong Hospital, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Rayong, February-March 2008
Shan migrant workers on an orange farm
51“Functioning”, according to Amartya Sen, of Shan migrant workers in pre-and post-migration is different. “Functioning or the use of a commodity may determine the state of a person.” (Sen, 1992) Here, the state refers to the utility or satisfaction met by using the commodity in a specific way. Shan migrant workers might lack the freedom or ability to choose the desired function of a commodity or/and to function their possessed commodity at the place of origin.
52Due to political coercion, forms of exploitation limiting the potential functioning of commodities at the place of origin have manifested themselves in the post-migration destination in different ways. The essence is that their commodities and forced commitments to the Burma military at the pre-migration situation are transferred to different actors in post-migration. Commodities, such as agricultural products, and the commitment to the military in the form of unpaid labour, are replaced by new forms of exploitation such as bribes or gifts to Thai local authorities and the new commitment to Thai legal requirements or employers’ demands.
53In conclusion, their potential to expand their commodities in Thailand depends on informal brokers and Thai employers, while their freedom or ability to utilize these commodities, such as education or healthcare, as a migrant worker is stipulated by the approval of the Thai government.
2.3 - Thai Employers’ and Informal Brokers’ Perception of Borders: Economic Advantages from the Multi-Perceptions of Borders
54Although human movements predate the globalization process, the scale and scope of human migration have expanded to unprecedented levels. The movement of people is, thus, one of the most fundamental aspects of the idea of a shrinking world, where transactions, trade, economic and cultural intercourse are conducted with fewer barriers of physical distance.43
55However, labour movements still seem to be the only feature excluded from any free movements facilitated by the spirit of globalization and liberalization. “There is a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls="true" for the flow of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization. But when it comes to immigrants and refugees […] the national state claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders.”44 “Labor remains grounded by state boundaries and policies. In the case of labor import, national boundaries have traditionally been employed by the state in the interests of core capital to regulate the quality and quantity of alien labor with scant interference from the exporting government.”45 Ironically, too many restrictive immigration policies lead to the increase in numbers of cases of alien smuggling. This is because the recent restriction policies46 contradict each other over national boundaries: to a certain extent, they open borders to international capitals and information, while failing to manage and legalize a pool of foreign labourers who make use of the features of globalization, such as the availability of transportation and linkages in the migration system47, in seeking and migrating to the location where their labour can be exchanged for more desirable wages and living conditions.
56In the regional and global free market, labourers become the most popular commodities that function through middle non-state actors, such as informal brokers, who the conventional state actors fail to take into account in the migration phenomenon. They become a significant entity in facilitating the illegal process of migration over the years. They represent a legal grey zone48 both in the labour market and in border areas to run the broker business of informal recruitment, a process that had never existed in traditional human movements before the drawing of nation-state boundaries. Informal brokers somewhat perceive the theory of static clear-cut lines, as defined by the nation-states, but simultaneously take advantage of the practice of fluid movements in border areas.
2.3.1 - Benefits to informal brokers
57Informal brokers benefit from the process of informal recruitment, allowing them exclusive rights to dictate the conditions of repayment and employment. First, concerning the repayment of broker fees, the nature of the non-written contract between the broker and the Shan migrant worker leads to trickery through the imposition of broker and transportation fees, coupled with unstable and unfair interest rates. Furthermore, informal brokers profit greatly from the chronic selling of Shan migrant workers who are mostly incapable of paying off their huge debts to their Thai employers. Second, being in command of their employment status, informal brokers’ have the negotiating power for the price of labourers, which varies according to the employers’ need for cheap migrant workers and the availability of qualified labour. In order to continue reaping the benefits from the broker business, informal brokers accept to pay a certain amount of money to local border authorities to guarantee their status outside legal lines.
“An amount was deducted from our salary on a monthly basis. We were told by our broker that it was deducted for transportation and broker fees that we could not afford in the first place, but he did not tell us how long these deductions would last. After I had worked one year at my first job, the same broker brought me to another workplace in Mae Hong Song (northern province of Thailand). It was an entertainment bar. I later realized that I was sold to the bar owner and expected to work as a sex worker. I could not stand those conditions for long. After two months, I escaped back to the Shan State with another broker.”
Source: A Shan migrant worker who used to work in Thailand and has moved back to the Shan State, interviewed by the author, February-March 2008
2.3.2 - Benefits to Thai employers
58Thai employers view borders as a means to ensure the availability of cheaper cross-national labourers. The hiring and use of Shan migrant workers, a relatively cheaper commodity, is profitable for business. In the agricultural sector, Thai employers not only cut costs by hiring cheap Shan migrant workers, but also increase productivity by using pesticides which have a highly detrimental effect on their health. Moreover, low-standard accommodation and working conditions are commonplace in any low-skilled migrant job sector. The practice of informal recruitment and the existence of legal grey zones are at the root of these working conditions, allowing Thai employers to enjoy a privileged space of non-commitment to migrant lives.
“It is easy to find and hire migrant workers from Burma in this area. Many Shans who live along the Burma-Thailand border just walk across the Mae Sai River and find jobs mostly at construction sites or agricultural farms in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai or Mae Hong Son.”
A border patrol policeman at Tachilek police station, Shan State, interviewed by the author in Tachilek, February-March 2008
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“It is widely known that every orange farm in Chiang Mai uses a lot of pesticides. It is understandable. We just need to make sure that each year our productivity is sufficient enough to earn profits.”
A Thai employer who owns an agricultural farm in Chiang Mai, interviewed by the author in Chiang Mai, August-September 2007
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“It is difficult for Burma migrant workers in Thailand to make any requests to their Thai employers to claim their basic rights at work because they are hired illegally. There is no legal protection that guarantees their safety over there.”
A policeman at the Human Trafficking Department, Taung Gyi, Shan State, interviewed by the author in Taung Gyi, February-March 2008
2.3.3 - Costs to informal brokers and Thai employers
59While informal brokers and Thai employers are reaping the benefits from these various perceptions of borders, the legal risks of trafficking and employing illegal Shan migrant workers come at a cost. Bribery and voting for local authorities and politicians, such as village and township heads, are thus common practices for many employers as a means to manage these risks. Furthermore, nearby communities and the surrounding environment are affected by contamination from the use of pesticides on farms. Ironically, the contaminating products are distributed in the market where the buyers are Thai employers themselves as well as other Thai people.
“Thai immigration legislation clearly stipulates that a Thai employer who intends to hire a migrant worker from Burma, the Lao PDR or Cambodia needs to accompany the migrant to apply for his/her visa and work permit. Furthermore, the amount of migrant workers they intend to hire must not exceed a designated quota. An employer who refuses to obey the law shall be arrested and fined.”
A government officer at the Provincial Labour Office of the Foreign Workers Administration in Chiang Mai, interviewed by the author in Chiang Mai, August-September 2007
2.4 - The “Acquiescent Reciprocity”: A factor in the migration phenomenon
60In addition to the different perceptions and functions of borders, socio-economic acquiescent reciprocity between the three entities is another significant factor that characterizes 1) The trend or changes in Thai immigration control 2) The migration behaviours of Shan migrant workers and 3) The degree of adherence to the law of Thai employers and informal brokers.
2.4.1 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government, Thai employers and informal brokers
61The Thai government’s immigration policies can not be formulated without the consideration of the Thai employers’ demand for cheap labourers, since the latter’s economic performance sustains and affects the national economy. Thus, the Thai government to a certain degree formulates and implements open immigration policies, not only to serve the previously mentioned purpose, but also to decrease the illegal broker business. However, Thai employers recognize that they must abide by the law to a certain extent in order for the Thai government to maintain and/or formulate open immigration policies.
2.4.2 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government and Shan migrant workers
62Due to the large scale of employment of cheap migrant workers from Burma, the Thai government realizes the extent of Shan migrant workers’ contribution to the Thai GDP. Immigration policy formulation is, therefore, highly influenced by this. Shan workers’ migration behaviours are, on the other hand, shaped by the Thai government’s immigration policies. Their life strategies after their migration to Thailand are formulated and adopted based on their need for social welfare and legal status. For example, they acquiesce to practicing bribery due to their illegal status or they acquiesce to a high price for a fake alien card because they are desperate for healthcare services.
2.4.3 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers
63Because of their desperation for cash income, Shan migrant workers also acquiesce to the low standard of working conditions provided by Thai employers. On the other hand, Thai employers realize that they have to provide Shan migrant workers with basic needs such as accommodation or shelter, regardless of their quality in order to guarantee the availability of cheap migrant workers.
3 - Differences in the Perceptions of Borders and the Perpetuation of Illegal Migration
64Based on the borders approach, I would like to conclude that differences in the perception of borders between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers, in addition to each actor’s cost-benefit assessment, not only perpetuate the flow of illegal migrant workers from the Shan State to Thailand, but also create human insecurities for Shan migrant workers.
Notes de bas de page
17 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21st Century Centre of Excellence Programme “Policy Innovation Initiative: Human Security Research in Japan and Asia”, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, Japan, 2004).
18 พรพิมล ตรีโชติ, ชนกลุ่มน้อยกับรัฐบาลพม่า, กรุงเทพฯ: สำนักงานกองทุนสนับสนุนการวิจัย และมูลนิธิโครงการตำราสังคมศาสตร์และมนุษยศาสตร์, 2542, หน้า 51-90.
Trichot, The Burmese Government and the Ethnic Minority Groups [In Thai] (The Thailand Research Fund and The Foundation for The Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, Bangkok, 1999), pp. 51-90.
19 Such as their commitment to military provisioning and unpaid labour.
20 Martin, The Economic Contribution of Migrant Workers to Thailand: Towards Policy Development, International Labour Organization (ILO) Sub regional Office for East Asia, ILO/EU Asian Programme on the Governance of Labour Migration, ILO/Japan Managing Cross-border Movement of Labour in Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 2007, pp. 15-16.
21 The Institute of Asian Studies, Migrant Workers from Burma to Thailand, for a seminar “Reviewing Policies and Creating Mechanisms to Protect Migrant Workers”, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 2003, pp. 17-19.
22 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook 1998, Manila, 1998, cited in Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand, Keio University, Japan, 2004, p. 21.
23 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21st Century Centre of Excellence Programme “Policy Innovation Initiative: Human Security Research in Japan and Asia”, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, Japan, 2004), pp. 21-25
24 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Outlook 1998, Manila, 1998, cited in Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand, Keio University, Japan, 2004, p. 22
25 Wongboonsin, Human Security and Transnational Migration: The Case in Thailand (The 21st Century Centre of Excellence Programme “Policy Innovation Initiative: Human Security Research in Japan and Asia”, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University, Japan, 2004)
26 United Nations (ESCAP: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific), Ten as One: Challenges and Opportunities for ASEAN Integration, Bangkok, 2007. The Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) establishes several areas of cooperation as the following: 1) Investment and Financial Flows; 2) Trade Integration; 3) Management of International Migration Flows; 4) Control of Communicable Diseases and their Spread across Borders; 5) Environment Sustainability; 6) Energy Security; 7) Information Infrastructure; 8) Transport Infrastructure.
27 Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 100-101.
28 Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 1994
29 Malcom Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World, 1996
30 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 5.
31 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 11.
32 Merton, ‘Social Theory and Social Structure’, in “Social Borders: Defintions of Diversity”, Current Anthropology, vol. 16, no. 1, 1975, pp. 53-72
33 Although statistics are provided in Table 4, the government numbers are not reliable as the migration flow fluctuates from one day to the other.
34 Petras, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in Cohen, Robin (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, pp. 494-500.
35 Please refer to Shan informants in Table 6 in Chapter2 Tinker, ‘Burma’ s Northeast Borderland Problems’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 29, no. 4, 1956, pp. 324-325.
36 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, p. 15.
37 Boggs, International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems, p. 3
38 Cukwurah cited in Petras, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in Cohen (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, op. cit., p. 496.
39 Interview with a local authority in the Human Trafficking Department in the Tachilek area.
40 Petras, Elizabeth, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in Cohen, Robin (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, US, 1996, p. 496.
41 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, 1992, p. 9
42 Interview with Mrs. Saowanee Auitakoon, a registered nurse at the Health Department for migrant workers mainly from Cambodia and Burma, Rayong Hospital, Thailand, interviewed by the author in Rayong, February-March 2008
43 Graham ‘The people paradox: Human movements and human security in a globalizing world’ in Graham and Poku (eds.), Migration, globalisation and human security, pp. 186-187.
44 Sassen, S., ‘Losing Controls? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization’, in Pecoud and Guchteneire Migration without Borders, UNESCO and Berghahn, p. 13.
45 Petras, Elizabeth, ‘The role of national boundaries in cross-national labor market’ in Cohen, Robin (ed.), The Sociology of Migration, Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, US, 1996, p. 495.
46 Please refer to Tables 9 and 10: The registration policies of migrant workers in Thailand during 1992-2005. The unstable immigration policies lead to ineffective policy formulation and implementation.
47 Family and personal networks, the most influencing network to Shan migrant workers, represent one of linkages between sending and receiving countries which favour chain migration. Fawcett in Cohen (ed.) Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism, pp. 16-26.)
1) In the category of tangible/family and personal linkages, it refers to remittances and written or face-to-face communications flowing between migrants at the destination and their family or village members back home.
2) In regulatory/family and personal linkages, it can be explained by the culturally-based family obligations of migrant workers. Person-to-person obligations among relatives and fellow ethnics dictate the condition of sponsorship of potential migrants by former migrants.
3) For relational/family and personal network linkages, the socio-economic disparity at the micro level is a great motivation force for potential migrants. “Successful” Shan migrant workers serve as role models, while “failure” of return Shan migrant workers are seen as simple bad luck to the desperate.
48 A legal grey area in the border zones is where law enforcement fluctuates between the informal and formal governance of local authorities based on the relationship between informal brokers and border authorities.
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Perceptions of Borders and Human Migration
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