Conclusion
A Strong Movement to Bring Japan and Vietnam Closer
p. 119-127
Texte intégral
1The past decade has seen the two countries come closer, not only in the area of trade, but also culturally and politically. This rapprochement was the result of a deliberate strategy on Japan’s part; a strategy in line with the Fukuda doctrine of the seventies, and, at the same time, due to Vietnam’s desire “to be friendly with everybody”, as one of its Prime Ministers put it.
2Evidently, Japan and Vietnam are now “friends”. Speaking in Singapore on 14 January 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi further reaffirmed this: “I think Japan has contributed to strengthening the ASEAN countries. At the time of the Asian financial crisis, it stepped in to attenuate its effects, following the old adage, ‘It is in times of adversity that you know your true friends’.”
3This friendship has, however, particular aspects that must be emphasised. It is based on Japanese generosity, to a considerable extent. Yet, as General de Gaulle was wont to say: “A country does not have friends, it only has interests”. If we fall in with his line of thought, what are the interests of each of these countries at the dawn of the 21st century?
4We have already shown that Japan’s motivation concerning the Vietnamese cannot be limited to its economic interest: strictly speaking, this interest is now extremely limited. It must, however, be pointed out that the Japanese have amply demonstrated their sense of the long term. In fact, the consistency of their actions with respect to Vietnam must be emphasised: Their aid plan took shape as soon as the War ended, was implemented in 1992, and has been maintained since then. Japan, therefore, most likely conceives its aid to Vietnam in the perspective of several decades; something Japanese diplomats and politicians allude to
5in their discourses all the time. In any case, it is certain that Japan envisages its relation with Vietnam in a much longer time frame than it does for most other countries.
A Model to be Followed?
6Secondly, we can wonder if Japan is trying to propose its own development model as a template, by participating in Vietnam’s reconstruction, transition, and global opening. This question obviously calls for a qualified reply. First of all, we have understood that the respective governments play a vital role in the relation between the two countries, with political contact being established at high levels on both sides. More vitally, the continuity of the cooperation policy is a consequence — as we see it, and as seen from the Japanese angle — of its being established by the Japanese administration. The very great instability of Japanese governments over the last decade must also be taken into consideration, with respect to the constancy of development aid programmes.
7Despite that, the development aid policy conducted by the Japanese administration has not explicitly tried to impose a development model on Vietnam. In the exchanges that took place within the framework of the Ishikawa programme, we may note that, on many occasions, the Japanese distanced themselves from an industrialisation model based on heavy industry, which also made a deep impression on Vietnam’s concept of development. Furthermore, the Japanese often suggested that the Vietnamese give more thought to the Chinese transition experience, by studying, in greater detail, the manner in which they had sustained their agricultural development. The Japanese, with their highly pragmatic approach, very subtly proposed a vision of development and global opening up that, if closely observed, frequently distances itself from the dogmas now enforced by most international bodies.
8Japan’s emphasis on the reconstruction of infrastructure is thus based on a very Keynesian concept of development, in which the State plays a key role. This insistence on the State’s role can also be seen in JICA’s intention to support the Vietnamese administration’s reforms. The Japanese have also often called into question the integration of the Vietnamese economy into the international market, drawing Vietnam’s attention to the need to proceed cautiously in the opening up of their economy. They did so, for example, during the 1997 financial crisis, by including Vietnam in the sphere of Asian countries that were to benefit from Japanese aid, and also by inviting the Vietnamese to open up their capital markets only very gradually. Lastly, they also advised Vietnam during its negotiations with the WTO, and assisted with the detailed study of several important sectors in Vietnam’s economy, including agriculture. This approach was one that Hanoi leaders found most suitable, especially in 1996 and 1997, when they became aware of both the overheating of their economy and the risks that weighed down the Asian economies by the opening up of capital markets.
9At the same time, Japan participated actively in the geographical reorientation of Vietnam’s external trade that, in the first years of the decade, took place mostly with Eastern countries. It also contributed, as we have said earlier, to the significant development of this trade. Do we see a contradiction in this? Not necessarily, for the Japanese concept of development was that trade opening could be viable if at least two essential conditions were fulfilled at the same time: a modernisation of the structure of production and an improvement in the State’s efficiency. In fact, today, the Japanese place more emphasis on the reform of Vietnamese public enterprises than they did a few years ago.
10Without ever coming into conflict with other sponsors, the Japanese continually proposed orientations that were quite far removed from those that were internationally fashionable in development aid at the time. On the question of the war against poverty, Japanese experts thus proposed alternative approaches several times. While the World Bank often offers programmes specifically targeting the most deprived populations, Japan, instead, recommended the logic of general economic development, based on the strengthening of a certain number of key sectors and on the improvement of competitiveness.
Supporting Vietnam’s Regional Integration
11By adopting a regional perspective, in the case of the Mekong programme, we have been able to show that Japan’s approach to Vietnam was, for the most part, easier to understand if it was placed in the regional or sub-regional context. The Japanese strategy in Southeast Asia is one with a “strong tendency” towards the regional context, as the strengthening and expansion of ASEAN plays a crucial role in it. Thus we can better understand why both the settling of the Cambodian conflict and the lifting of the American embargo were instrumental in the resumption of Japanese aid to Vietnam. In this regard, we may note that Japan rightly anticipated the normalisation of relations between the Unites States and Vietnam, a foresight which enabled it to take important stands.
12Such an attitude was in no way obvious, if we regard it in the context of the years 1992 to 1994. Nevertheless, it allowed a number of Japanese companies to gain a foothold in the Vietnamese market long before their American competitors, who are now trying to make up for lost time.
13In the beginning of the new decade, we can consider Japan’s Vietnam strategy to be a success, though with qualifications, for, meanwhile, two events contributed to making profound changes in the geopolitical environment. First, the Asian financial crisis, which is characterised, as far as our interest is concerned, by the triumph of the American positions on the management of Asian economies (cleaning up financial systems, bringing integrity to economic life by fighting corruption, and the opening up of certain markets heretofore protected to non-Asian companies).
14The second event is incontestably China’s entry into the WTO, which confirmed the rising power of this country at the regional and global level. Their emergence is concomitant with what appears to be a certain withdrawal of the Japanese presence, or at least a slowdown of the expansion of Japanese firms in the region, as a consequence of recession in the Japanese economy. In reality, Japan’s exchanges with ASEAN are still at a much higher level (two and a half times more) than China’s. Yet China is particularly well-placed in Vietnam. Since 2000, bilateral trade has registered a very strong growth and has now reached 55 per cent of the value of Nippo-Vietnamese business exchanges. This progression foretells an equally rapid development in Chinese investments, as well as cooperation extended to all other countries in Southeast Asia.
15There is no doubt the danger of Sino-Japanese rivalry in this part of the world. But, for the moment, in every area — trade, investment and aid — Japan indisputably occupies a predominant position. As a result, it continues to shoulder the major responsibility of developing and maintaining security in this region; also still taking part in leadership, through dialogue and cooperation with Korea and China. It is the same with ASEAN “+ three”, in which Japanese and Chinese stands have gradually become resolute.
16The projects or propositions pertaining to a larger perspective, with the objective of establishing a free-trade zone extending to the whole of East Asia, such as the China-ASEAN Free-trade Agreement, the Japan-ASEAN project of general economic partnership or the Nippo-Korean Free-trade Agreement, together work for the same objective. In this context, it is still necessary to confer privileged treatment on the four new members of ASEAN (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) who have lagged behind in development and whose internal political situation is, at least for certain amongst them, still fragile. During his tour of Southeast Asia early in 2002, the Japanese Prime Minister clearly reasserted that “Japan will continue to cooperate in the development of the Greater Mekong Sub-region, in order to enable the acceleration of the economic expansion of Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam.”
17Beijing is also forging close links with a few countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula by contributing to the construction or renovation of infrastructure. China is thus giving its assistance, particularly to Burma, in road construction, and getting involved in big projects around the Mekong basin.1 For professor Ebashi Masahiko of the Meiji Gaikuin University, “These countries are the ‘weakest cog’ in the whole of Southeast Asia.”2
18Beijing and Tokyo are united in thinking that their development and stability are truly indispensable in the pursuit of a harmonious regional integration. As Hugues Tertrais rightly notes: “Considering the Asia-Pacific realities, ASEAN today remains an imperfect tool of economic integration and the Pacific Rim countries are trying to consider it in a broader perspective.”3 Koizumi’s proposition, which takes up anew an old Japanese concept of placing Asia in a wider set-up — often defined by the term “Asia-Pacific” — is once again on the agenda, with the East Asian Development Initiative.4 This would involve a community encompassing East Asia, but extending up to Australia and New Zealand. With this project, the Japanese hope to regain the lead in the diplomatic game being played in this part of the world. But this does not exclude other associations. The United States has not been forgotten; Prime Minister Koizumi said in his speech in Singapore in January 2002: “The United States especially has an indispensable role to play, because of its contribution to the region’s security and its economic interdependence with it. Japan intends to further strengthen its alliance with the United States.”
19Amidst speculation that the Japanese era was coming to an end, the Land of the Rising Sun has made a comeback with a new project for the entire region. According to this, Japan can exercise a new form of leadership more in keeping with its diplomatic style, which aims to establish bridges between the various consenting countries in the region through its friendly relations with every one of them. So with that, we return to the “bridge diplomacy” mentioned in the Introduction, as well as the longstanding bid for diplomatic autonomy from the American ally and mentor. Today, the Japanese have fully attained one of their major political objectives in the field of international relations: that of diplomatic autonomy (Jishu Gaikô). Paradoxically, this objective was attained at a time when China made a noteworthy entry on the international economic scene. In this big game of Go with “a China more ambitious that ever, a Japan keen on maintaining its pre-eminence”5 and with Americans returning to the region, we can wonder about the future architecture of this geographic zone, marked by the rivalries of the biggest powers of the Pacific Rim. Owing to the work it accomplished over several decades in all the Southeast Asian countries, Japan can justly claim to have restored confident, friendly relations with countries in the region, in this changing environment. As far as Vietnam is concerned, the Japanese have clearly demonstrated that they were trustworthy, if not indispensable partners. With its Chinese neighbour, however, it is quite a different story.
20In the words of Jean-Luc Domenach: “Beijing’s policy in Vietnam is emblematic. The two countries are close from every point of view, but their size is very different…. Relations between them gradually became normal and close. But they are still delicate. Hanoi, on entering ASEAN in 1995 and establishing ties with Europe and the United States, did not find the means to balance the economic and political influence of the neighbouring giant: It put up with it with bad grace. And the bilateral relations remain poisoned by the dispute on maritime borders. Vietnam is indeed the main victim of the Chinese thrust towards the Southeastern seas.”6
21On the economic scene too China represents a threat, as Benoit de Tréglodé observed: “Not a week passes without the Vietnamese Press devoting an article or a dossier to the economic and social risks of the absence of regulation of trade relations with China. In the integration of the PRC into the WTO, Vietnam sees an eventual threat to its economy.”7 While Japan’s policy is no longer handicapped by any ambiguity, China’s is confused to say the least, considering its strategy in the Southeast China Sea and its initiatives for a free-trade zone with the region. As much as Japan pushes for integration and strengthening the bonds between ASEAN countries, “Chinese manoeuvres assume a division of ASEAN.”8 The United States admittedly seeks to regain a central role, with a very strong military base in the Pacific and with the intervention of the APEC, an organisation which seems in many ways to be instrumental in its economic policy in this part of the world. The Americans find it difficult, however, to wipe from people’s memory the “drastic remedy” imposed via the World Bank and the IMF on countries that were victims of the Asian crisis. Besides, the military objectives of the world’s police have the Asians worried about the consequences for their region.
22In this context, Japan’s apparently timid diplomacy is quite reassuring. Further, Tokyo has given proof of its goodwill, and nobody believes that Japan will attempt re-militarisation, even though it has declared its intention of maintaining a military presence in the zone just to protect the sea routes against pirates and terrorists. This kind of proposition is welcomed by Asian nations that see in it an additional proof of Japan’s desire to take on all its regional responsibilities.
23Vietnam today is still a poor country, with a coveted but restricted market. Nevertheless, it has the drive and all the features to become “the” nation that counts in Southeast Asia. This is clearly understood by the Japanese, who pinned all their 20th century hopes on Indonesia, the regional giant rich in oil and other raw materials needed for Japan’s economy. In the 21st century, natural wealth will no doubt remain important, but other forms of wealth, such as human resources, will play an elemental role. In this regard, the Vietnamese have a particularly promising potential with respect to economic, scientific and cultural development. And in this respect, they are very much like the Japanese, with whom they share a number of values. But in the end, the great strength of the Vietnamese lies in the fact that they are at ease with combining Chinese, French and American legacies with Japanese experience.
Fact Files: Vietnam and Japan
| Vietnam | Japan |
| General Information | |
| Area: 331,690 km2 | Area: 377,835 km2 |
| Population: 85,262,356 (July 2007 est.) | Population: 127,433,494 (July 2007 est.) |
| Capital: Hanoi | Capital: Tokyo |
| Government: Single party | Government: Constitutional Monarchy |
| Political Information | |
| Head of State: President Nguyen Minh TRIET (since 27 June 2006) | Head of State: Emperor Akihito |
| Prime Minister: Prime Minister Nguyen Tan DUNG (since 27 June 2006) | Prime Minister: Shinzo ABE (since 26 September 2006) |
| Secretary General of the Communist Party: Nong Duc Manh | |
| Official language: Vietnamese | Official language: Japanese |
| Main religion: Buddhism | Main religion: Buddhism |
| Economic Information | |
| GDP (PPP): $262.8 billion (2006 est.) | GDP (PPP): $4.218 trillion (2006 est.) |
| Growth Rate: 8.2% (2006 est.) | Growth rate: 2.2% (2006 est.) |
| Per Capita GDP: $3,100 (2006 est.) | Per capita GDP (PPP): $33,100 (2006 est.) |
Currency: Dong (1 Dollar = 16,235 Dong as on 17 August 2007) (1 Euro = 21,788 Dong as on 17 August 2007) |
Currency: Yen (1 Dollar = 112 Yen as on 17 August 2007) (1 Euro = 150 Yen as on 17 August 2007) |
| Annual inflation rate: 7.5% | Annual inflation rate: 0.3% |
Budget: $15.42 billion [of which 2.5% (2005 est.) for Defence] |
Budget: $1.411 trillion [of which 0.8% (2006 est.) for Defence] |
| Main Trade Partners (2006): | |
| Exports | |
| 1.USA: 20.7% | 1.USA: 22.8% |
| 2.Japan: 12.0% | 2.China: 14.3% |
| 3.Australia: 9.2% | 3.South Korea: 7.8 % |
| 4.China: 5.6% | 4.Taiwan: 6.8% |
| Imports | |
| 1.China17.2% | 1.China20.5% |
| 2.Singapore12.6% | 2.USA12.0% |
| 3.Taiwan11.2% | 3.Saudi Arabia6.4% |
| 4.Japan9.5% | 4.UAE5.5% |
Notes de bas de page
1“China’s economic influence in Asia is growing because of Japan’s weakness”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 September 2002.
2Masahiko Ebashi, Ajia Keizai Handobuku (Tokyo, 2003), p. 85.
3Hugues Tertrais, Asie du Sud-Est: enjeu régional ou enjeu mondial ?, Gallimard (Paris: Collection Folio-Le Monde actuel, 2002), p. 203.
4The French translation of the complete text of Koizumi Junichiro’s speech can be read in Cahiers du Japan (Autumn 2002), pp. 15–18.
5Tertrais, 2002, p. 11.
6Jean-Luc Domenach, Où va la Chine, Fayard (Paris, 2002), p. 219.
7Benoît de Trèglodé, “Un théâtre d’ombres: le Vietnam entre la Chine et l’ASEAN au lendemain de la crise asiatique”, Les etudes de CERI, no. 68 (August 2000): 29
8Jean-Luc Domenach, 2002, p. 220.
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