Chapter 7

Strategy, Diplomacy and Official Development Aid

p. 103-120


Texte intégral

Assistance

1Development aid plays a very important role in Japan-Vietnam relations, and, as we have mentioned earlier, cannot be solely allied to Japanese companies’ desire to promote their interests in Vietnam. Other issues come into play. First of all, the currently implemented development aid is based on major strategic choices made by the Japanese government more than 30 years ago, and foremost amongst them was the intention to organise Southeast Asian countries within the ASEAN. Aid, therefore, constituted a measure contributing to Vietnam’s economic development in order to ensure political stability. In the case of Vietnam, as far as development aid is concerned, we find the same thematic and sectorial priorities that Japan had with respect to other Southeast Asian countries. Two major objectives can be clearly perceived: firstly, favouring Vietnam’s integration into the ASEAN and secondly, giving an impetus to active cooperation among countries along the Mekong river, including the Chinese Yunnan province. Lastly, while Japanese aid policy aims at contributing to the reconstruction of Vietnam’s economy, it also favours Vietnam’s integration “over land” with neighbouring countries, and “over the sea” with other ASEAN countries.

Assistance as an Extension of the Fukuda Doctrine

2A development aid policy always has multiple objectives: to enhance the donor country’s influence, strengthen economic, trade and cultural ties, as well as to deal with geopolitical and strategic issues. In Japan’s case, aid to Vietnam must be viewed with respect to a historical and geographical context. The aid policy implemented in the early 1990s is clearly an extension of the Fukuda doctrine (see Chapter 4). The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 had forced the Japanese leaders to set aside this doctrine, but its main principles would be reemployed, and served more or less as the template for Japanese aid to Vietnam, and more generally, to the Indo-China peninsula.

3In the early 1990s, Japan had already given significant aid to the ASEAN countries: the amounts exceeded 3.5 times what China had received, Indonesia being the primary beneficiary. Former Indo-China countries, with the exception of Laos, were not included (see table on facing page).

4Since it had to deal with Vietnam, Japan had to take into account a complex local and regional reality. Vietnam still maintained very close ties with the USSR, from which it received considerable aid. It also had a military presence in Cambodia, very limited relations with Western nations, and practically ignored its ASEAN neighbours, that it regarded as its longstanding enemies. Further, the American embargo on Vietnam considerably restricted the Japanese leaders’ scope for manoeuvring. In a book published in 1989, a Japanese specialist on Southeast Asia, Juichi Inada, discussed, at length, the chances of resumption of Japanese aid to Vietnam.1 He particularly felt that this implied both the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, and a sort of nihil obstat on the part of the ASEAN. So the Japanese leaders would undertake a “nemawashi”, which literally translates to “preparing the soil before planting a tree”. In other words, they would engineer all the informal meetings that would prepare the ground for taking decisions at the regional and international level, in order to steer their aid policy towards Vietnam. As we have shown earlier, Japanese leaders had taken measures to simultaneously encourage stability in Cambodia and the resumption of political contact with Vietnam. In many ways, what is particularly striking about the Japanese approach in this matter is that it strove to take into account both the typical characteristics of the Vietnamese economy and the regional environment.

Japanese aid to ASEAN countries and to China in 1991 and 1999 (in millions of dollars)

1991 1999
Value % of ASE Value % of ASE
Burma 84.52 4.1 18 0.5
Brunei 2.96 0.1 0 0
Cambodia n.a n.a 87 2.3
Indonesia 1065.70 51.9 1604 42.0
Laos 20.56 1.0 133 3.5
Malaysia n.a n.a 0 0
Philippines 458.92 22.3 413 10.8
Singapore 15.98 0.8 0 0
Thailand 406.17 19.8 880 23.1
Vietnam n.a n.a 680 17.8
Total ASEAN 2054.8 100 3815 100
China 585.29 1225

Sources: Japan Foreign Affairs Ministry, www.mofa.go.jp; GMS (Greater Mekong Subregion) portal of the Asian Development Bank website.

Aid to Vietnam

5While they prepared to implement their aid policy, the Japanese leaders identified three major challenges before Vietnam:2 targeting general long-term development, a systemic transition to market economy, and lastly, integration within the regional economic environment, particularly the ASEAN. Japan reckoned that if the other donors concerned themselves with the objective of systemic transition (installing market economy mechanisms, and framing corresponding laws and regulations), for its part, it wanted to further privilege the objective of economic development. In this context, support to infrastructure and the power sector were essential priorities for the Japanese. Japan’s stand was therefore clearly in line with Keynesian principles, by which the ODA funds helped satisfy the total Vietnamese demand on the one hand, and, on the other, contributed to increasing the economy’s productivity.

6At first, Japan supported Vietnam’s return to the international financial community. Japan and France together drew up a financial plan that would allow Vietnam to repay its debts to the IMF, thereby facilitating borrowing from the organisation in the future. At that very time, Japan was to participate in an important European Union programme for the repatriation and reintegration of the Vietnamese boat people. It officially resumed its aid policy in November 1992, with a loan of 45.5 billion yen (around $380 million), at an annual interest rate of 1 per cent. More than half this amount was used to repay Vietnam’s debt to the OECF, while the rest was earmarked for the purchase of goods. In January 1994, Japan signed an agreement with Vietnam for the construction of two thermal plants, a hydro-electric project, renovating the Hai Phong port and National Highways No. 1 and No. 5 (see infra). So, clearly, from the very outset, the emphasis was on rebuilding infrastructure.

7Although at the start Japan granted financial commitments to the tune of $536 million, the actual amounts disbursed were much less; not only from Japan, but also from the other donors. As a result, Vietnamese authorities found it very difficult to define their priorities and coordinate their projects. This discrepancy between commitments and disbursements arose in the first place because certain projects were spread over several years, and also because there was often a time lag between the commitment date and the project implementation date. It can be noted, however, that this gap between commitments and disbursements has narrowed in recent years. The lifting of the American embargo in 1994 would enable the World Bank and the IMF to resume disbursing funds to Vietnam. The aid flow would therefore increase to account for 3 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2000.

Development Aid received by Vietnam (1993–2000) (millions of dollars)

Year Total Commitments Total Disbursements** Aid from Japan (commitments) Aid from Japan (disbursements) % of Commitments
1993 1,810 274 536 29.6
1994 1,910 625 662 79 34.7
1995 2,260 612 810.7 170 35.9
1996 2,430 985 818.7 121 33.7
1997 2,400 1,100 745 232.5 31
1998 2,700 1,430 872.3 388.6 32.3
1999 2,800 1,400 1049 531 37.5
2000 2,400* 1,690 870

Notes: * provisional.
** the difference between the commitments and the disbursements arise because certain projects are spread over several years, and also because there can be a time gap between the commitment date and the project implementation date. We note, however, that the difference between the commitments and the disbursements has narrowed in recent years.

Sources: The “Vietnam Economy” site, www.vneconomy.com.vn (for total aid) and the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam, Japan-Vietnam Fact sheet, www.vn.emb.japan.go.jp (for Japanese aid).

8Within a few years, Japan became Vietnam’s main bilateral sponsor, far ahead of France, that came second with 63.78 million euros in 2000. In 1999, Vietnam became the 4th largest beneficiary of Japanese aid after Indonesia, China and Thailand. Japan provided aid through two institutions, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, which primarily gave technical assistance in the form of donations, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, which granted long-term loans at concessionary interest rates.3 It will be noted that the bulk of Japanese aid took the form of long-term loans, accounting for 96 per cent of total aid in 1993, and again, nearly 91 per cent in 1999. Japan also provided multilateral financing through its contribution to the Asian Development Bank and also through contributions to the multilateral agencies, the World Bank and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).

9To be very fair, we must also include JETRO in the operators of Japanese aid, since this body contributes by promoting bilateral trade, but the amounts involved are much lower than those provided by JBIC and JICA. Japan participates in the various coordination structures for aid received by Vietnam and especially in the Consultant Groups organised every year under the aegis of the World Bank. It has, however, privileged relations with the Vietnamese authorities, particularly the Planning and Investment Ministry, and has set up various co-operative structures, in the political domain and in specific fields. We have earlier shown how Japan has positioned itself in the Vietnam Government’s decision-making process, especially in the transport infrastructure sector, where it co-chairs the Sponsors’ group. This helps Japan play an instrumental role in the formulation of development strategy by the Vietnamese authorities, and in directing development aid.

Financial Aid and “Conceptual” Aid

10Japan financed a series of big projects, an approximate outline of which is shown below. One part was financed within the framework of bilateral aid, while the other was earmarked for projects of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region programme (see infra).

Some large projects financed by Japan (November 2002)

Project Amount of loan (billions of yen)
Power Phu My Electric Power Station 61.9
Pha Lai Electric Power Station 72.8
Ham Thuan Hydro-electric Power Station 53
Rehabilitation of the Da Nhim Electric station 7
Transport Rehabilitation of Highway No. 5 20.9
Rehabilitation of bridges on Highway No. 1 35.8
Urban Development Hanoi Urban Infrastructure-Phase I 11.4
East-West Expressway at HCM City, construction of a tunnel 4.2

Sources: Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), JBIC ODA Loan Assistance to Vietnam, JBIC (Hanoi, 2000): 4–10.

11In addition, the Japanese wanted to give the Vietnamese “conceptual aid” to facilitate the formulation of macroeconomic and sectorial strategies. In 1995, Do Muoi, the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party visited Japan and signed an agreement on a Nippo-Vietnamese research project, headed by Shigeru Ishikawa, a Japanese Academic from Hitotsubashi University. The project, spread over six years, was to comprise various sections, all of them related to aid for the formulation of Vietnamese development strategies.

12Japan would thus participate in the preparation of Vietnam’s sixth 5-year plan covering the period 1996–2000. It would also offer its advice in the key areas of Vietnam’s economic development, such as making the preliminary arrangements for the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), or negotiations to access the WTO. After the 1997 Asian crisis blew up, Japan would also advise Vietnam on the question of financial liberalisation. Lastly, the Japanese would participate in the preparatory work for the seventh plan, covering the years 2002–2005, and for the ten-year strategy, covering the period 2001–2010.

13To understand the importance of this cooperation, it must be noted that key documents such as plans or strategic documents are instrumental in a country like Vietnam, because of the State’s role and also the importance of international aid, as mentioned earlier. Quite signi-ficantly, these documents serve as the basis for negotiations with donors, so when decisions are to be taken, influence enables or facilitates the awarding of certain projects to a country or its corporate sector.

Major sector-wise Japanese aid to Vietnam

Source: Japanese Embassy in Japan <www.vn.emb-japan.go.jp>.

14In early 1999, the Miyazawa initiative was launched. Named after the Japanese Finance Minister, it was an appeal for the creation of a Japanese aid fund to support, amongst others, ASEAN countries facing the financial crisis. This was how Vietnam, although less affected, benefited from an extension of aid originally intended for Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus, in September 1999, Vietnam and Japan signed an agreement according to which a loan of 20 billion yen (around $190 million) would be given to help the Vietnamese Government pay for imports, and for sustaining ongoing economic reforms. Apart from financing Vietnam’s balance of payments, this credit also went toward technical assistance in areas such as formulating a support programme for the private sector, financial diagnosis for a number of public enterprises, and the conversion of certain non-tariff barriers into customs tariffs.

15Japan also organised interfaces for cooperation and exchange with Vietnam, for both academic and strategic considerations. Regarding economic strategy, it initiated an exchange programme with the National Economics University of Hanoi, which allowed Japanese and Vietnamese experts to carry out basic work on sectors such as steel, textiles, and the software industry.4

16In addition to the fields mentioned above, Japan also initiated a major cooperation programme for Vietnam’s Human Resource Development. It also helped in the field of Health (rehabilitation of the Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi, and the Cho Ray Hospital in Ho Chi Minh City, anti-AIDS programme). It participated in the reconstruction or rehabilitation of schools and universities (University of Can Tho in the Mekong Delta, for example). Lastly, it financed various programmes to assist the populace residing in underprivileged zones.

17Scientific and cultural exchange was also facilitated when Japanese experts were sent to Vietnam and Vietnamese trainees were received in Japan: in 1999, 300 Vietnamese were studying in Japan, 2,500 were in France in 2001 and about 500 are now in Russia.

Integrating Vietnam into its Regional Environment: The “Greater Mekong Sub-Region” Programme

18A major feature of Japanese aid to Vietnam is that from the very beginning, it was conceived with the regional context in mind. In the early 1990s, Japanese aid to Thailand was noteworthy. Programmes were undertaken in Laos, and Japan intended to launch an assistance programme in Cambodia as an extension of the Paris Accords. It was in this context that Japan launched the GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region) programme. The main elements of the programme had been drawn up during the Vietnam War itself, and more or less finalised by the Asian Development Bank in 1992. The key concept of the programme was to give equal importance to all countries sharing the Mekong river — Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the Chinese Yunnan province. Its aim was to plan and implement the development of the sub-region in a concerted manner. The project’s promoters laid emphasis on the fact that many natural obstacles (mountains, rivers) were a major constraint for development. They also considered that various natural resources, such as hydraulically generated electricity in the case of Laos, were not given enough importance owing to lack of investments and also the lack of outlets.5

19In fact, trade exchanges were much reduced in the early 1990s. As for the three “Indo-Chinese countries”,6 Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, they were caught up in a process of transition to market economy.

20By the inclusion of Thailand, Japan clearly showed its intention of establishing a link between Vietnam and the ASEAN.7 The presence of Yunnan province, apart from its geographical situation, probably arises from the desire of the Japanese leaders not to induce the Chinese leaders to view the GMS programme as a diplomatic structure potentially against China’s interests.

21Laos’ electricity production largely exceeds its consumption and the surplus is exported mainly to Thailand. The use of the term “Indo-Chinese” in the economic literature on the region deserves a separate study. The Japanese seem to have not had any difficulty about a somewhat outdated, loaded notion, as can be seen form their creation of the “Forum for Indo-China’s overall development”. The other donors have always preferred the abbreviation CLV, for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

22Concerning Burma, Japan adopted a similar stand of trying to integrate it into the ASEAN. After the coup d’état following events in 1998, Japan however suspended aid. This aid should have been resumed upon the release of Aung San Suu Kyi was released but it remained considerably reduced, to the order of $18 million per year.

23Coordinating projects at the regional level is a bold initiative: the countries in question jealously guard their independence and often consider themselves rivals with respect to the donors. Moreover, the interests of countries situated upstream of the Mekong do not coincide with those of the downstream countries as far as Mekong water management is concerned. Decision-making processes are therefore complex and render cooperation difficult. The Mekong Commission, created at the time of the Vietnam War, has experienced this bitter reality many times over. Nevertheless, the programme gradually took root in the course of the decade.

The First Actions: An Emphasis on Infrastructure

24When the GMS was launched, emphasis was laid on transport infrastructure. The projects entailed laying out three main road links. The first was meant to connect Thailand to South Vietnam via Cambodia (Project R1, see map on p. 113). The second envisaged a horizontal link connecting Thailand to Laos, then to Central Vietnam (Project R2). The purpose of the third was to ensure a vertical link between Thailand and China’s Yunnan Province (Project R3). Work commenced, chiefly using funds provided by the ADB combined with those from Japan.

25In 1998, the GMS promoters offered the riparian countries the opportunity to launch integrated development projects known as eco-nomic corridors. A “corridor” is a geographical zone in which infra-structure improvements are linked to production, trade and related aspects of economic life, in order to promote economic development and cooperation among regions or border countries. The first corridor corresponds to the East-West trunk road that has been mentioned earlier. This is a highway roughly 400 km long, which has been allotted a budget of $350 million. Among other things, it should facilitate the speeding up of traffic, which in turn will enable an increase in trade. The products traded are construction materials, fuels, wood and related products, manufacturing equipment, food products, textiles and livestock. The work is now complete.

Priority highway projects in the Greater Mekong Sub-region

Source: ADB website, www.adb.org/GMS/gmsmap.gif.

26For road infrastructure, the following table is only for information purposes. It does not claim to be exhaustive, for an original move of the GMS was the inclusion of works carried out by the member nations in its name and procedures. So it is very difficult to distinguish between what was the responsibility of the programme itself and the initiative of the member States.

Transport Infrastructure projects in the GMS Region

Sub-programme Project
North-South Corridor Improvement of the road between Kunming and Hanoi
Improvement of the Lashio-Loilem-Kentung Road
Improvement of the road between South Laos and Sihanoukville
Renovation of the Phnom Penh port
Rangoon Port and Thilwa Port
Cambodia: renovation of the Phnom Penh and Siem Reap Airport
Burma: Improvement of Mandalay airport and construction of an airport at Hanthawaddy
Improvement of the road between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh-City
East-West Corridor Bridge over the Mekong and construction of Highway No 9 to Laos
Improvement of the road between Chiang Rai (Thailand) and Kunming (Yunnan)

Source: Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) portal of ADB website, http://www.adb.org.

27As for energy, many experts had identified the considerable hydroelectric potential of the region as early as in the 1950s. During the 1990s, its capacity was estimated at 40,000 MW, of which only 1 per cent was in use.

Main projects in the energy sector

Project Date of Completion
Laos: Theun Hinboun Hydro-electric Power Station April 1998
Laos: Nam Leuk Hydro-electric Power Station On-going
Laos: Nam Ngun Electric Transmission Network Feasibility study
Trans-Asian Gas pipeline 2020

28The GMS promoters also decided to extend cooperation in infrastructure to the installation of an integrated electricity production and distribution network. Hydroelectric stations were thus constructed in Laos. Studies were carried out to overcome natural constraints. Therefore, it so emerges that for some countries, the option of buying electricity from a neighbouring country is more advantageous than indigenously producing and distributing it. There is a longstanding Purchasing Power Agreement between Laos and Thailand and a similar agreement is also being negotiated with Cambodia.

29The GMS also wanted to install or strengthen the telecommunication networks in the region. Recently, Japan committed itself to financing a programme through the ADB, aimed at homogenising procedures and exchanges among the member nations.

30Amongst the GMS’ ideas, we therefore find elements of interest to Japan in the area of development: construction of infrastructure, development of ports to encourage external trade and development of telecommunications. Further, we find this truly Japanese obsession for cooperation, which is seen especially in the installation of sophisticated institutional mechanisms.

An Institutional Mechanism Finalised

31The GMS is not a new political organisation like the ASEAN or APEC. Rather, it works like a flexible coordinating mechanism for aid projects with a regional dimension on the one hand, and national projects on the other. It is heavily dependent on Japanese and ADB financing.8 Each country has set up a national coordination committee. The programme’s secretarial work is taken care of by a special department of the ADB that also provides it technical know-how. Working groups covering a wide range of subjects are regularly organised, many of which deal with electricity production and distribution, telecommunications, transport, the environment, human resources, investment, tourism and trade facilitation. The GMS promoters have, in particular, tried to strengthen the programme’s political dimension by organising ministerial-level conferences amongst member nations every year.

32It was during the course of improving infrastructure that promoters realised there were problems that they had not necessarily anticipated, such as the mutual recognition of driving licenses or customs procedures that slowed down goods trade. Because of this, the working groups’ responsibilities included an increasing number of regulation considerations that complement construction projects, sector by sector.

33Thus, in 2000, the member nations of the GMS signed a trans-border agreement on the East-West corridor, the main objective of which was banning discriminatory treatment in trade and promoting transparency in regulations and procedures. At the same time, the GMS extended its scope to research programmes on far-reaching issues such as anti-AIDS campaigns or education.

What is the impact on the economic situation of member nations?

34Today, the Greater Mekong Sub-region development plan can lay claim to many undeniable successes, whether at the practical or institutional level. The programme’s first success was the capacity to coordinate programmes among several countries. Traditionally, development aid framework is essentially bilateral and consultant groups meet country-wise. The same can be said of setting up the ensuing finances and negotiations. The GMS has undeniably aided optimising projects by laying out project-wise programmes and financing with regard to specific countries.

35Secondly, it can be said that the GMS has effected better coordination among member Nations. When we look at the highway programmes, for example, we realise that the nations themselves were responsible for a large part of the work, either through their own finances, or with aid credit or even private finances with BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) contracts. Co-ordination with the GMS takes place through sector-wise working groups. The achievements of the GMS cannot be solely seen as the setting up of a new means of garnering Japanese aid, but also in outlining projects from several countries.

36Lastly, the GMS succeeded in establishing better co-ordination among development aid agencies, whereas it is well known that these agencies jealously guard their independence and the transparency of their actions. Thus, in 2000, the GMS signed an agreement with the Mekong Commission, a body that has less scope than the GMS, since it is limited to Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Besides, representatives of the World Bank and the United Nations participated in the GMS meetings in different capacities, which goes a long way in helping avoid duplication, which is a regrettable but nonetheless frequent phenomenon in the world of development aid. Similarly, “passage ways” have been established to link certain ASEAN resolutions and decisions to GMS projects.

37From this point of view, and taking into account Japan’s implication in the various structures that were set up (JICA or JBIC have a representative in all the working groups), this programme undeniably represents a success for Japan and the Asian Development Bank.

Trade between Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (exports + imports in millions of dollars)

1991 1995 1999 2000 2001
Vietnam-Cambodia 11 118.6 150.4 180.4 283.2
Vietnam-Laos 7 108.3 204.8 362.7 176.4
Vietnam-Thailand 142 541 968.9 874.5 1183.2
Total 160 767.9 1324.1 1417.6 1624.8

Sources: General Statistical Office (GSO), Statistical Yearbook (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House) Years consulted: 1986–99; ADB, Economics and Development Resources Center, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, 28 (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 426.

38The evaluation of the GMS’s macroeconomic impact is, however, more delicate. It is certain that infrastructure improvement has contributed to each country’s development. However, it is difficult to separate the effects related to national policies and those that arise specifically from the GMS. The information given below shows major progress in trade. Vietnam’s total foreign trade with Laos, Cambodia and Thailand thus increased tenfold, going from $160 million to $1.6 billion from 1991 to 2001 (see table on p. 116). As for Vietnam, an examination of the trade structure shows a strong tendency towards Japan, China, Europe and the United States. The volume of trade with riparian countries remains low: $200 million between Vietnam and Cambodia, for example, which is less than 1 per cent of Vietnam’s foreign trade.

Prospects of Japanese Aid to Vietnam

39For more than ten years, the relation between Japan and Vietnam has been based on considerable amounts of aid being granted. The aim of the Fukuda Doctrine was Japan’s active contribution to establishing stability in Southeast Asia. This stability was to have been achieved through the gradual reduction of disputes troubling the region, and through economic development. Also within the doctrine’s scope was encouraging Vietnam to get a firm footing in its regional, political and economic environment. Have these objectives been attained?

40As far as the economy is concerned, the figures are unambiguously affirmative. In 1990, Vietnam’s annual per capita GNP was to the order of $200. Today, this figure stands at $417. Vietnam’s total GNP places it just behind Morocco and Ukraine, and ahead of Tunisia and Guatemala. Vietnam’s economy has opened up to such a great extent that with an export figure of $15 billion in 2001, the proportion of exports in the GDP is 45.6 per cent. Vietnam fared better after the Asian financial crisis than its Southeast Asian neighbours: In 2001, its growth reached 4.8 per cent, as against a total average of 2.4 per cent for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.9 Also, leading agencies attributed an improved rating to Vietnam. Thus the International Country Risk Guide agency gave Vietnam an index of 60 in 1998, and this changed to 70 in 2001. The situation improved at the social level too: the proportion of the population below the poverty line (per capita expenses) fell drastically from 58 per cent in 1992/93 to 37 per cent in 1997/98. Of course, credit for these positive results cannot all go to Japan, but it is certainly true that long-term Japanese strategy has achieved its main objective in this regard.

41In the field of politics too, Japanese strategy has yielded irrefutable results. Vietnam joined the ASEAN in 1995 and plays an increasingly important role in this association. Similarly, the GMS programme has become a reality, and should favour a strengthening of exchanges and a better mutual understanding between Vietnam and its Southeast Asian neighbours. Lastly, in 1998, Vietnam joined the APEC. Yet another element that can be added to these results, and ascertained from various Japanese official declarations and documents, is Tokyo’s intention to act as a coordinator.

42During the last decade, we have witnessed a significant increase in Japanese aid to both the ASEAN (more than 50 per cent) and China (more than 100 per cent). At present, Vietnam receives 22 per cent of the aid to ASEAN. If we interpret this from a narrow economic angle, it might lead us to believe that Japanese aid budgets should diminish. This prognosis must however be qualified. Firstly, we must remember that aid programmes have “by nature”, a certain momentum that makes it almost impossible to stop them immediately. The programmes for the next three years have been or are being finalised now.

43Secondly, the prognosis must take into account Japan’s macro-economic constraints. From this point of view, two forces should act in opposing directions. Restrictions faced by the Japanese economy should, in time, constrain the development budgets from developing further. However, we must acknowledge that giving Asia priority is unlikely to change significantly with respect to the general objectives of Japanese leaders, since this has been a strong trend in international relations in this part of the world since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, we are likely to see redeployments within the region in question. Very recently, Japan announced a reduction in its aid to Indonesia. This new development, along with the probable reduction in aid budgets to Thailand should enable Japanese leaders to keep up their interest in Vietnam in the coming years.

44All in all, in the Vietnamese context, we can only speculate on the relevance of a relation that depends to such an extent on development aid. Vietnam, like many countries developing through aid, has a very elaborate strategy to attract foreign aid. It knows how to play its donors against each other, and it is not sure that Japanese aid permits a true mutual understanding, even if the indices are very positive in this field.

Notes de bas de page

1Juichi Inada, “Japan’s Aid Freeze to Vietnam: Historical Process and its Diplomatic Implications”, in Indochina in transition: confrontation or co-prosperity (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International affairs, 1989), p. 256.

2Grips, Japan’s Development Cooperation in Vietnam: Supporting Broad-Based Growth with Poverty Reduction, Grips Development Forum, National Graduate Institute for Policies Studies (Tokyo, May 2002), pdf document, www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e, p. 32 (March 2004).

3The JETRO (Japan Trade Organization) also pursues operations of cooperation in Vietnam.

4Results of this programme can be consulted on the website www.neujica.org/vn (in English and Japanese).

5The electricity production of Laos exceeds widely its consumption and the surplus is mainly exported to Thailand.

6The Japanese use the terms “Indochina” and “Indo-Chinese”, although a little dated as for example in the “Forum for the Global Development of Indochina”. Today, the abbreviation CLV, for Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam tends to replace the term “Indochina”.

7Japan adopts a similar position on Burma, consisting in trying to integrate it within the ASEAN. Further to coup d’état of 1998, Japan suspended its assistance.

8The GMS has a portal on the ADB site. See: www.adb.org/GMS [April 2004].

9“Vietnam Economic Monitor, Spring 2002”, World Bank.


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