Chapter 4
From Reunification to doi moi
p. 50-62
Texte intégral
Renewal

Reunification and the Fukuda Doctrine
1According to Masaya Shiraishi,1 a specialist on Vietnam and Professor at Waseda, the Paris Accord of January 1973 ushered in a new era in Japan’s Indo-China policy. This was engendered by the casual attitude of the Americans, who surprised their allies by announcing President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in early 1971. This sudden change in America’s strategy described as the first Nixon “shock”2 caught the Japanese government unawares, as it had always lent support to Washington in its Taiwan policy, with respect to Beijing. Hanoi and Tokyo were likewise, surprised. This Sino-American rapprochement gave rise to a deep distrust amongst North Vietnamese. The Sato government did not endure these setbacks for long and was followed by the Tanaka Kakuei government that was much more determined to maintain a distance from its American ally. Tanaka’s first diplomatic visit was to Beijing in September 1972, with a view to resuming diplomatic relations. But before Sato’s leaving the government, a first unofficial contact had been arranged between Japan and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Tsuboi Yoshiharu, Vietnamese specialist and Professor at Waseda, described the episode in these terms:
On the evening of 8 February 1972, an aircraft of the UNO’s surveillance commission leaving from Vientiane in Laos landed in Hanoi. Miyake Wasuke, Director of the first Southeast Asia department in the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry (Foreign Affairs Minister’s son-in-law) and his deputy, Inoue Kichinosuke were on board. At that time, Tokyo recognised the South-Vietnamese government (Republic of Vietnam) and did not have any diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic (North Vietnam). So Miyake and Inoue who were in charge of Vietnam at the Ministry made a secret visit to the enemy capital. Their mission was not official but they were acting under the instructions of higher authorities: Prime Minister Satô Eisaku, Foreign Affaires Minister Fukuda Takeo and his administrative deputy minister Hogan Shinsaku. The Japanese government saw the Vietnam conflict coming to an end and a political decision had been taken on the necessity of rapidly establishing friendly relations with Hanoi. This was the mission of the Miyake-Inoue duo.3
2The Japanese emissaries received a very warm welcome at Hanoi. Their mission, accompanied by another in April 1973, and the negotiations between the two governments — respectively represented by Nakayama Yoshihiro, Ambassador of Japan in France and Vo Van Sung, the temporary Vietnamese Chargé d’affaires — would take off in a more official manner in Paris that July, to culminate in diplomatic recognition in September.
3In the new context that emerged with the war coming to an end, the Japanese authorities recognised the urgent need to establish good relations with North Vietnam, the obvious “leader of the three Indo-Chinese countries (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), region indispensable for the prosperity and stability of East and Southeast Asia”.4 Immediately after the Paris accord was made known, a huge banner was displayed in front of the Democratic Liberal Party headquarters at Tokyo: “Congratulations on the ceasefire in Vietnam — In future, let us work together for reconstruction and development.”
4But behind the laudable Japanese declarations, the Tanaka and Miki governments continued to support South Vietnam by way of economic aid (around $61 million from 1971 to 1975), while the Archipelago’s companies continued with their investments in South Vietnam. Thus, Japanese investments went up by $2.5 million in 1972 and, increased by an additional $2 million from 1973 to 1975, due to liberalisation. A Japanese economic report in 1973 spoke highly of the advantages of the South Vietnamese market for the investors of the Land of Rising Sun: “The Vietnamese are remarkable people. They are intelligent, industrious and quick because they remember things well. Perhaps, in this matter, they come just after the Chinese as a superior nation.”5
5We can therefore understand why the North Vietnamese refused any exchange of diplomats and openings of embassies. In Japan, from 1973, the fervour of anti-Vietnam war movements subsided. Hanoi treaded cautiously with the Japanese, especially preoccupied with their economic offensive in Southeast Asia, where Japan already occupied a predominant place.
6Though their economic successes were incontestable, the Japanese suffered bitter setbacks in diplomatic matters. Consequently, Tanaka Kakuei’s visits to Thailand and Indonesia in January 1974 were received with violent anti-Japanese demonstrations.
7With Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, the objective of Japanese policy was to establish harmonious relations with both the ASEAN countries and the communist countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, in order to promote regional stability and to maximise their economic interests. The Japanese approach became more discreet and cautious so as to gild Japan’s tarnished image in this part of the world.
8To set itself apart from its American ally during this embarrassing period, Tokyo took an independent line. According to Tsuboi: “Tokyo clearly showed that it had its own vision of post-war Vietnam.”6 Japan’s recognition of Hanoi was hastened by its internal situation, such as the presence of a permanent delegation of Kyôsantô, the Japanese communist party that enjoyed quasi-diplomatic status in the Vietnamese capital; something causing great displeasure to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Meanwhile, the Japanese diplomats tried their best to regain the monopoly of their country’s representation in Vietnam as quickly as possible.
9With the reunification of Vietnam, the quantum of trade with the Archipelago rapidly increased. From $123 million in 1975, it went up to more than $216 million the following year, thanks to a leap in Japan’s exports. The Japanese were the first to sign a non-governmental commercial pact with Vietnam, followed by a $16.6 million loan for reconstruction in 1976. After their trade offensive in the early 1970s, the Japanese began one of charm towards the end of the decade. In 1977, Fukuda’s7 official visit to Burma and five ASEAN countries provided him the opportunity to clearly state Japan’s stand in a famous speech on 18th August at Manila on Southeast Asia’s Age, when he announced the three fundamental points of Japan’s relations with the countries of the region. Later, this declaration would be known as the Fukuda doctrine. Firstly, Japan reaffirmed that it would not be a superpower and would not possess nuclear weapons. Secondly, it would encourage heart-to-heart association with Southeast Asian countries. Thirdly, it would strive to improve its relations with these countries, thereby contributing to regional peace. This speech was also accompanied by a generous cheque of $1.55 billion for all the countries of the region.
10After the Fukuda doctrine came the Takeshita doctrine in 1989, on Cambodia and the strategy of development aid in Asia. In 1997, this, in turn, was replaced by the Hashimoto doctrine, which laid the guidelines for future relations between Japan and the ASEAN countries. More recently, in January 2002, during his visit to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Prime Minister Koizumi announced Japan’s new doctrine, on the lines of that of Fukuda, his political mentor.
11Several months after Fukuda’s announcement, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Van Dong expressed the hope that his country and Japan could, on an equal footing, develop economic, scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, for mutual gain. He added that he gave lot of “importance to relations with Japan, at the State as well as the people’s level”, given that “there are many similarities between the Vietnamese and Japanese people”.8 Relations between the countries promise to be lastingly fair; however they are only the prelude to an aid programme that is still very modest, which, though ostensibly generous, constitutes hardly 2 per cent of the volume of global Japanese aid.
Vietnamese Intervention in Cambodia and Japan’s Deception
12In 1978, Vietnam’s relations with Cambodia and China became strained. The United States and Japan adopted a more hostile attitude towards Vietnam, which was sidling up closer to Moscow with the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty signed in November. China, for its part, was successful in improving relations with both Washington and Tokyo. So, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty signed in August that year, had a special significance in Asia, as it was quite different from what had been envisaged by the Japanese as a simple diplomatic normalisation of relations. From then, Japan was to become one of the pillars of what Hanoi called the “Beijing-Washington-Tokyo axis”.
13Unfortunately, the improvement in the situation did not last long. In December 1978, when Hanoi decided to intervene in Cambodia by sending in troops to put an end to the Khmer Rouge regime and replace Pol Pot and his administration with a government led by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen — favourable to Vietnam’s interests — the break with Tokyo was complete.
14In fact, Japan’s reaction was not tardy in coming: In early 1979, the Japanese suspended all economic aid to Vietnam. They firmly placed themselves on the side of China, ASEAN and the United States and demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Their stand remained firm until October 1984 when Tokyo resumed negotiations with Hanoi to pressurise it to leave Cambodia in exchange for aid revival. Despite the impressive amount proposed by the Japanese — around $200 million per annum for the Indo-Chinese countries once the Vietnamese troops were withdrawn — their generous offer was not sufficient to sway the Vietnamese authorities, who even announced their intention of remaining in their neighbouring country for a five to ten year period. This obdurate attitude reinforced the idea of the Americans, along with their Japanese allies, to concentrate their aid on “weak” countries so as to fight Communism.
15With a Chinese “punitive invasion” following the Khmer-Vietnamese conflict between 17 February and 16 March, the Japanese were left aghast by the serious incidents in Indo-China. Thereupon, the Japanese government followed the policy proposed by the ASEAN, favouring the withdrawal of all troops occupying the region, placing, in a way, the Chinese and the Vietnamese on the same footing. While this decision suited the Chinese, it was not satisfactory to the Vietnamese, in whose opinion their presence in Cambodia was justified and not comparable to an aggression. On numerous occasions, in various diplomatic arenas, the Japanese had the opportunity to reaffirm their support to ASEAN’s policy on the situation in Indo-China by issuing sanctions against Vietnam. Nevertheless, Japan strove to maintain a neutral position with regard to the Sino-Vietnamese disagreement. Encouraged by the Ambassador of China to support Kampuchea’s independence struggle, the Foreign Affairs Minister Sonoda declared that though Japan was forced to suspend its economic aid to Vietnam for some time, it continued to be one of the few countries that could still communicate with Hanoi, and continued to give “wise” advice to the Vietnamese.9 Tokyo did not hesitate to caution Beijing to act with prudence vis-à-vis Vietnam.
16In Japan, public opinion regarding Vietnam also changed. Great confusion reigned amongst the Vietnamese sympathisers opposing the American war. Many no longer understood anything about these conflicts between socialist nations. Some still supported Vietnam and the Heng Samrin government, others China and the Khmer Rouges, but on the whole, Vietnam was disgraced. The Japanese public trained its eyes on China, whereas the Soviet Union, Vietnam’s ally, was still very unpopular. The conflict that had flared up in Afghanistan in Central Asia had shown the Soviet-Vietnamese bloc to be particularly aggressive in the eyes of all the Japanese.
17On the economic front, the Japanese emerged as great winners. During the Indo-Chinese conflict, their trade with Southeast Asia had skyrocketed, going up to more than 700 per cent from the early 1960s to 1975. During the rest of the 1970s, this trend continued, and Japan’s trade with this zone was twice that of the United States in 1979. During this decade, Japan established itself as the regional leader of commercial, industrial and technological development, ahead of its American competitors — who, in turn, had replaced the Europeans as the key player in development and the main partner after the Second World War. The Vietnamese, on account of their expansionist military policy and an internal policy made manifest by waves of refugees, the “boat people”, were excluded from this dynamism that swept across all the countries in this part of the world.
Arrival of the “boat people” in Japan
18According to Masaya Shiraishi, Professor at the Waseda University in Tokyo and a discerning scholar on Vietnam, one of the main reasons for the ASEAN countries’ criticism directed at Vietnam was the rapid increase in the number of Indo-Chinese refugees arriving in ever-increasing numbers, particularly by sea, which explained the name given to them: the “boat people”. For the ASEAN members, these displaced people posed security problems and were an unbearable financial burden on their economies.
19The refugee issue became the matter of animated internal debate in Japan, between its humanitarian duty to give asylum, supported by a section of opinion, and the wish of a majority of political leaders to maintain the homogeneity of the population, and to fortify itself against future intra-Asian exoduses. However, when compared to other Southeast Asian countries that were in the forefront and forced to accommodate several hundreds of thousands of Indo-Chinese refugees in camps, Japan only had to contend with a tiny number of people fleeing the region. From 1975 to 1981, the number of refugees forced to flee Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was estimated at more than 2 million. The big waves of refugees left in 1978 and 1979, particularly the exodus of the Hoas (Vietnamese of Chinese origin) in 1979, of whom 250,000 chose to flee by the South China Sea at their own risk. Only 8,000 — a very small fraction of these (1 out of 250) reached Japan from 1975 to 1985!
20From the time of the first wave of refugees, Japan’s attitude was considered deplorable; the target of international criticism blaming the world’s second most powerful economy for its lack of open-handedness and compassion. According to Thomas Havens, the way in which the Japanese managed the Indo-Chinese refugees issue in their country was undoubtedly a very small episode in Japan’s dramatic 20th-century history. Nevertheless, it showed the international community that the sentiment of racial and cultural exclusion was fairly widespread amongst the Japanese during the 1970s.10
21This lack of compassion for the exiles aroused criticism even in Japan: the Japanese journalist Makoto Maekawa denounced the coldness of his fellow countrymen by calling them tsumetai nihonjin (literally meaning “cold” or “glacial”, “heartless”). For the authorities, the refugee question centred around the type of status that should be given to them, and the maximum number of refugees allowed to reside in the country. Generally, the exiles in Japan were dissuaded by the attitude of the Japanese administration that was only willing to give them a temporary stay, in transit to another destination; North America, as it happened. Moreover, very few (4 per cent) of those who came disembarked at the Archipelago’s ports, braving the obstacles and distance, managed to arrive on Japanese boats. The government had to ask the Japanese merchant navy not to further tarnish the country’s image and to stop if their boats came across smaller craft carrying boat people in distress. Private organisations such as the Japanese Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Buddhist monasteries such as Risshô Kôseikai, Tenrikyô, and especially, the Catholic organisation, Caritas Japan, were the first to help the refugees in distress landing in Japan.
22Later, many private associations were also involved in helping the refugees. In 1980, a committee for assistance to Indo-Chinese refugees (Indoshina Nammin Kyûen Renrakukai ) was established. At the same time, the Japan Volunteer Centre was initiated to coordinate collection of funds and material, and to send health workers and other specialists to the camps in Southeast Asia. Several thousands of Japanese volunteers participated in these operations.
23On the other hand, the government took time to get involved and coordinate the work of different administrations, NGOs, religious organisations and the Office of the High Commission for Refugees to manage the influx of Indo-Chinese refugees. The Japanese government did not want to set a precedent by granting asylum and resident status to the Indo-Chinese too generously, for there was no dearth of candidates for immigration at that time in the region, starting with Filipinos, Taiwanese and Koreans.
24In 1978, President Carter had to take up the issue with Fukuda for his country to give humanitarian aid to these refugees and accept a certain number of them as long-term or even permanent immigrants. Following American pressure, the government relaxed its stand and agreed in principle to allow a certain number of refugees to settle down. A study conducted by the daily Asahi Shimbun in June 1979, showed that a majority of the Japanese (50 per cent) was in favour of the Indo-Chinese refugees’ settling down in Japan. But almost all those who were interviewed felt that most of the refugees would not want to live in Japan because of the inhospitable nature of the Japanese.
25For the government, the way out of this situation was through generous financial contributions to refugee aid. It was accused of buying public favour. So, when the exodus reached a peak in 1978, the Foreign Affairs Minister Sonoda Suneo surprised his ASEAN colleagues by announcing that Japan would bear half of HCR’s expenses for the resettlement of the Indo-Chinese refugees, amounting to $30 million in 1979, and twice that sum the following year. Japan also financed other international organisations such as the UNICEF and the World Poverty Program, as well as the International Red Cross and refugee camps in Thailand, for a total of $92 million in 1979.
26No opposition party objected to the government’s restrictive immigration policy. The principal idea was that the Japanese were one single race and that it was important to maintain this for the harmony of society. Other popularly-held ideas, such as “Japanese is a difficult language for foreigners” were often put forth. The Japanese were also inclined to treat any one leaving his native country as suspect. So the widely shared opinion was to let the doors of the country remain closed. This selfish attitude irritated the ASEAN countries that were of the opinion that Japan, being an Asian country, should give more importance to Asia. Lastly, many in Asia thought that since Japan had reaped extensive benefits from the Indo-Chinese conflict, it had the moral obligation to take in its share of refugees.
Doi moi and the Withdrawal from Cambodia
27To what extent did the freezing of Japanese aid make the Vietnamese more amenable to arguments for withdrawing their troops from Cambodia? This is difficult to ascertain, just as it is difficult to evaluate all the consequences this had on Vietnam’s economy. At least three factors can be considered to have been responsible for the unanimously approved Vietnamese change-of-heart.
28First of all, the strategic priority changed from territorial expansion to economic reconstruction. From the early 1980s, much thought was given to failure, following reunification and the establishment of a radical socialist system throughout the country. This reflection gave rise to a programme of economic reforms based on a “new economic policy”. From 1986 on, economic reform policy or doi moi (literally “change to do new things”, renewal or renovation) introduced a market economy and participation in the international market as priorities.
29Subsequently, the freezing of aid from developed western countries and Japan, the cessation of foreign investment and all flow of technological exchange had a strong impact on the economy, due to the resulting crippling shortage of capital.
30Lastly, the Comecom countries’ announcement in 1986, of a gradual reduction in their assistance to Vietnam, forced its authorities to end its international seclusion. The USSR, Vietnam’s main supplier of aid, was then planning to reduce 20 per cent of its aid and one-third of its military aid by the end of 1995 in order to better support its own economic reform. In these conditions, the lowering of aid would be more drastic; amounting to 65 per cent in 1990.
31With the end of the Cambodian deadlock in 1990, Japan did not tarry in proceeding with a re-examination of its Vietnam aid policy. Japanese decision-makers were faced with the questions of when, and for what reason Japan ought to resume its Official Development Aid (ODA) in Vietnam.
32In a meeting with the ASEAN on 27 July 1990, Nakayama Taro, Japan’s Foreign Affairs Minister, reaffirmed the objectives of Japan’s diplomacy in Asia; the first of which was the desire to work for peace and stability in the entire region. Regarding Vietnam, he said Japan had a lot of hope in economic reforms that, in his opinion, should be accompanied by the democratisation of the political sphere. Thus, Japan’s approach to aid policy was seen to be in the process of changing from one aimed at exerting pressure on Vietnam to force it to modify its attitude to the outside world, to an indirect control of regional conditions to encourage economic development. So the Japanese relied on Vietnam’s development to encourage peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. To achieve this, the aid that they proposed to give Vietnam should enable its opening to the world. From an economic point of view, Vietnam’s integration into the world market benefited not only Vietnam but also the region as a whole, given that its internal demand would transform it into a new frontier for its neighbours’ trade expansion. From a political point of view, on account of this integration into East Asia as an active member of regional development and in fact intensifying its interdependence in the multiple regional networks, Vietnam had to reduce its belief in the power of arms, conceived as the only means for defending its national interests. From then on, the Japanese thought their aid should primarily support the country’s economic development. In keeping with progress, they changed the scale and scope of their ODA, introducing market economy and opening up the country. A policy of sanction, objectively, gave in to a policy of incentives.
33While Vietnam took great efforts to promote the country’s economic liberalisation, it vigorously rejected any thoughts of political pluralism and maintained the principle of the Communist party’s leading role. Whether democratisation should be made a condition for reviving aid to Vietnam was a question debated by the Americans and the Japanese. The Gaimushô in its 1990 White Paper conjectured that Japan, as a nation supporting freedom and the democracy like its fundamental values, was to choose a dialogue within an international framework to help to promote the democracy and to assist by the means of the assistance the countries which make efforts to be democratised.11
34This declaration was clearly an official recognition of the relation between the ODA and Japan’s foreign policy. Yet this stand did not imply that the Japanese position held the same perspective as the Americans’. In practice, the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry declared that Japan would not impose any kind of system or political values in countries receiving its aid. At that time (because things started to change from then), Japan’s stand was therefore not to link revival of aid to political or humanitarian conditions. Japan’s belief in this field was that development and economic growth would inevitably lead to democracy; a widely held opinion that could, today, appear less obvious because the passage to democracy seems to be less automatic, as could be observed in the case of China. The Japanese were very pragmatic in this respect: they thought that if economic development did not necessarily lead to democracy, stimulating economic development through market mechanisms was a more realistic approach than slowing down a country’s economic development by refusing it aid.
The Return of the Japanese
35In the field of socio-economic changes, Vietnam at first showed few signs of promise. It remained highly critical of the East European countries that had given up socialism. During the 7th Plenary session of the Central Committee in 1989, the Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Van Linh, denounced the East Europeans’ attitude and reaffirmed that democracy in Vietnam should be “guided” by the Party. Shortly afterwards, however, President Vo Chi Cong accepted that the death of Communism in East Europe was the inevitable result of the Party’s errors. In the following Plenary session in 1990, the principle of reform led by Party leaders was again reasserted, and any contestation of the Party’s leading role in the country’s politics was rejected. Many people in Japan then shared the conviction that in the near future, Vietnam would be facing a head-on collision resulting from tension between political dictatorship and economic liberalisation. This collision did not take place.
36During the 1990s, Japan had to face two obstacles in its project of reviving aid to Vietnam. The first one was external and resulted from the United States’ and the ASEAN’s opposition to aid revival. The second stemmed from the inability of the Vietnamese economy to absorb a massive foreign economic aid. The United States exerted strong pressure to dissuade the Japanese government and companies from providing any financial aid to this country. The Americans particularly feared that the effectiveness of their policy of “isolating and pressurising” for the MIAs (soldiers Missing In Action) would be altered. Though the Bush (Senior) administration had initiated negotiations in 1990, all trade remained prohibited according to the Trading with Enemies Act. In 1991, Washington issued a declaration in which the State Department indicated the four-step process for withdrawing sanctions against Vietnam (including the trade embargo).
37First of all, it called for a cease-fire in Cambodia and the setting up of a United Nations temporary administration at Phnom Penh. Following this, the schedule for lifting the trade embargo would depend upon the progress made in the MIA issue.
38As long as the United States continued the embargo, the Japanese were supposed to act only on a humanitarian level, or at the most, on the level of human resources and social infrastructure development.
39For their part, the ASEAN countries toned down their opposition to the revival of Japanese aid because they had seen the evident potential of the Indo-Chinese markets. In the early 1990s, public capital and private investors began to flood this new promising market, despite a certain preliminary inertia on the part of the bureaucracy and the military, which had tried, without much success, to slow down initial efforts.
The Vietnamese in Japan (1999)
| Resident Status | Number |
| Authorised professional activities | 2,170 |
| Interns | 1,619 |
| Students | 599 |
| Pupils | 92 |
| Vietnamese staying in Japan | 4,480 |
| Long-term residents | 5,401 |
| Permanent residents | 3,903 |
| Others | 1,114 |
| Vietnamese living in Japan | 10,418 |
| Total | 14,898 |
Sources: Nyûkan Kyôkai (Japan Immigration Association), Heisai 12 nenppan zairyûgaikokujin Tôkei (Statistics on foreigners in 2000), Nyûkan Kyôkai (Tokyo, July 2000): 155.
Vietnam’s Official Development Aid (1976–85) (in millions of dollars)
| Japan | OECD and multilateral aid * | USSR | |
| 1976–80 | 111.8 | 1,354.9 | 1,400 |
| 1981–85 | 8.3 | 680.6 | 6,200 |
Note: *Countries of the Development Assistance Committee of OECD and Organisations of multilateral aid.
Sources: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Development Countries, Paris, years referred to: 1980, 1984, 1987 and 1990.
Notes de bas de page
1Masaya Shiraishi, Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951–1987 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 43
2The second took place in 1973 with the announcement of the end of dollar convertibility into gold.
3Yoshiharu Tsuboi, “La Diplomatie japonaise et le Vietnam 1972–1998”, Revue d’Études internationales 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 85–86.
4Ibid., p. 86.
5Keizai Hatten Kyokai (Association for economic progress), Betenamu SengoFukkô Kaihatsu to Nihon no yakuwri (Japan’s Role in the development and reconstruction of postwar Vietnam) (Tokyo, 1973), p. 50.
6Tsuboi, “La Diplomatie japonaise”, p. 87.
7Takeo Fukuda, (1905), former Civil Servant of Finance, several times minister, for Agriculture (1959‑60), Foreign Affairs (1971‑72) and Finance (1965–66, 1968–70, 1973–76), would be Prime Minister from 1976‑78. His greatest achievement was the Peace and Friendship Treaty with China.
8See Far Eastern Economic Review (13 January 1978): 16.
9See Asahi Shimbun (17 January 1979)
10Havens, Fire Across the Sea, p. 250.
11Akihiko Tanaka and Yasuhiro Takeda, “Japan’s Economic Policy toward China and Vietnam”, in The U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Kaoru Okuizumi, Kent Calder and Gerrit Gong (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), p. 219.
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