Chapter 2
The Pacific War and the Imperial Army in Vietnam
p. 19-34
Texte intégral
Occupation

Vietnam: A Bridge between China and Southeast Asia
1While Japan gained a foothold in Vietnam, which was then under French control, the regional scene was rife with tension. Towards the end of the 1930s, Japanese imperialism became defined clearly and spread across Asia towards China and Southeast Asia. According to the Japanese military strategy, French Indo-China — cut off from the home country, and hence very vulnerable — had a major role to play in the Japanese troops’ inexorable advance across the Asian continent. Once again, Vietnam’s destiny was linked to those of the surrounding countries, especially China.
2Right from the beginning of the 20th century, Meiji-era Japan was modernised on the Western model, asserting itself as a powerful regional player in Asia; its 1905 victory over Russia lending credence to this assertion. Japan proved to the world in general, and to Asia in particular, that the “yellows” were capable of defeating the “whites”. Basking in the glow of this prestige, the Japanese archipelago placed itself in the forefront to become “Asia’s leading spirit”. More than this desire to guide and “civilise” the Asian people, an urgent reason behind its expansionism was the need to ensure the viability of a Japan cramped for space and also poor in raw materials. To solve its internal problems, especially that of overpopulation, the Empire of the Rising Sun arrived at the conclusion that only a policy of economic development, together with territorial expansion, would afford it access to a power worthy of its name. To begin with, Japan had to be economically independent, that is, protected from the vagaries of foreign markets. In this regard, the huge Chinese continent was a Heartland to be conquered as a first step.1 There, within reach, was a gigantic market that could fulfil Japan’s need for food and raw materials and at the same time be an outlet for Japan’s industrial exports.
3Japan’s expansionist policy, undertaken during the First World War and brought to a close by Western powers following the Treaty of Washington on 6 February 1922, once again became very vigorous during the inter-war period. Right from 1922, Tokyo showed a very keen interest in Manchuria and North China. Neither was it indifferent to Southeast Asian countries, at least as far as the press was concerned. It was not uncommon, for example, to read that Filipinos were “brothers of the same race”. As for French Indo-China, Japanese editorials had estimated back in 1918 itself that it had become a “useless burden” for France;2 Japan should relieve her of this burden.
4Such talk aroused suspicions that were confirmed by events that took place in early 1939. In fact, Tokyo made its expansionist desire manifest by occupying Hainan Island in February and in March, the Spratly Islands, that had still been an integral part of Indo-China from 1933. France’s diplomatic protests were futile. Japan advanced step by step. And such signs foreshadowed Japan’s final objective: clearly, a takeover of Southeast Asia’s human and natural resources. This wealth, earlier coveted by the West, now stirred Japan’s greed, and the Second World War provided it the opportunity to fully achieve its ambition of territorial expansion.
Japanese Occupation
5The first episode started in Asia in 1937 during the Sino-Japanese conflict. Already from 1931, the Japanese had been occupying Manchuria, re-named Manchukou, and North China. After that, Southern Asia remained to be conquered by them. But Chinese nationalism — thanks to Western help, which came from the southern side, from Tonkin — continued to resist the Japanese invasion. Twice in 1939, Japanese General Tsushihashi was sent post-haste to ask the French colonial authority to put an end to the arms transit to southern China; he was never successful.3 In these adverse conditions, French Indo-China was once again in the eye of the Japanese cyclone. It became apparent to the Imperial Military that the occupation of the northern part of the Indo-Chinese peninsula was essential, as it would result in cutting off the Tonkin border, thus depriving Kuomintang troops of Western logistical support. The geo-strategic position of French Indo-China placed it in a delicate situation wherein its destiny was closely connected to the Sino-Japanese conflict. With the United States warning Japan against its advance in Indo-China, on 18 August 1941, the Japanese government showed its conciliation by expressing the intention of withdrawing troops from Indo-China after settling its dispute with China.
6So all Japan had to do was wait for a good opportunity to gain a foothold in the French territory. And this opportunity did not take long to offer itself when France suffered military defeat at the hands of Germany in June 1940. Alone and abandoned by its home country in total disarray, and by the Anglo-Saxons fighting on the European front, Indo-China, under Governor General Catroux and later under Admiral Decoux, former Chief of French naval forces stationed in the Far East, found itself to be politically weakened. On the contrary, Japan, which had just then signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on 27 September 1940, was free to carry out its great “Co-prosperity Sphere” project.
7It was in the year 1940 that the Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister, Matsuoka Yosuke, had unveiled Japan’s ambitions by announcing clearly and officially its project to create a sort of Asian economic and political bloc headed by Japan. This was the “new order” as conceived by the Japanese Empire for Eastern Asia. On 30 July, Matsuoka, in a first draft of the project, referred to “Japan’s vital zone” which would include French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaysia, Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, India, Australia and New Zealand.4 For the first time, on 1 August 1940, the Chief of Japanese diplomacy mentioned the concept of a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (Dai toa kyoeiken). So the idea of a “new order of Greater East Asia”5 (Dai toa shinchitsujo) — which already comprised Japan, Manchukou and North China — had to be extended by including “zones such as the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China”.6
8Konoe Fumimaro used the geopolitical expression “Greater East Asia” for the first time on 3 November 1938. However, as early as April 1934, the idea that peace or order in East Asia should be built under the sole “responsibility” or authority of Japan, had been put forward by the “Amo declaration”. Moreover, the project of a great Asia under Japanese domination had known other variants such as “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (toa keizai-ken), a sort of “economic federation” which aimed at bringing together Indo-China, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the East Indies and the Philippines.7
9In the early 1940s, Indo-China’s economic situation was less than satisfactory. The French colony, whose trade depended largely on rice and rubber exports from Cochin-China, was asphyxiated by the blocks imposed by Great Britain, then fighting with Japan. As a result, the French colony thereafter became Indo-China’s sole possible outlet.
10It was at this time that French Indo-China was amputated from the northern provinces of Cambodia by the imposition of the Franco-Thai convention, signed in Tokyo on 9 May 1941. Thailand, Vietnam’s eternal competitor, obtained this important transfer thanks to its traditional good relations with Japan, sealed by the Mutual Aid Pact of 21 December 1941.8
11In such a vulnerable situation, which did not go unnoticed by the indigenous population, Indo-China resigned itself to satisfying Japan’s demands — which were becoming more and more insistent, even threatening. From June 1940 until the famous coup of 9 March 1945, when Japan ousted France once and for all from Indo-China, a series of Franco-Japanese accords were effectuated under pressure from Japan.
12The 20 June 1940 accord, concluded just as the Paris government fled before the advancing German tanks, allowed Tokyo to control the Tonkin border, thus depriving China of access to its source of food supplies from the south. On 30 August, Vichy was forced to accept the idea of an accord, no doubt acknowledging France’s sovereignty in Indo-China, in principle, but especially the Japanese Empire’s interests in the Far East. Military agreements on 4 and 22 September made use of North Tonkin in the Sino-Japanese conflict for Japanese troops to land; thereby paving the way for easier penetration into China through the Hai Phong port, railways, roads and aerodromes. It should be noted that Japan obtained this accord by applying pressure. On 22 September 1940, the Japanese launched a sudden attack on the French forts of Lang Son and Dong Dang. Japanese aircraft bombarded Haiphong. In an instance of historic irony, this show of force stemmed from the same principle as the “gunboat policy” practised by France in the 19th century, when it wanted to obtain major concessions from Vietnam to facilitate the colonisation process. In May 1941, important economic agreements were signed between the two States, such as the clause of the most-favoured-nation, facilitating rice and raw material exports to Japan. On 29 July, the Darlan-Kato agreement integrated Indo-China into Japan’s military system under the hypothetical name of “common defence”, whereas Japan had ensured USSR’s neutrality by signing a non-aggression pact a few months earlier in April 1941. Thereafter, Japanese troops were able to make use of airfields as well as the Cam Ranh and Saigon naval bases.
13In short, Japan had found a military and economic foothold in Indo-China. Cochin-China became an advanced base for access to the wealthy Southeast Asian countries, insular or peninsular, whose oil was necessary for Japanese ships, which were in turn indispensable for the operations carried out in that maritime region.9
14Thus Japan began its “Southward march”, its “Nam Tiên” (“Nanshin” in Japanese). And to advance towards the south, the Japanese military applied the Go strategy that Bui Xuan Quang summarises so well: “The principle of the game is to capture the enemy by attacking him from the periphery towards the centre, while positioning stones (territories already conquered or allies or friends) all around him to encircle him gradually and to render his situation untenable.”10 As we have said earlier, by occupying Hainan and Spratly islands in 1939, Japan had “encircled” French Indo-China so as to facilitate grabbing it later. Once under Japanese domination, it served, in its turn, as the “peripheral stone” from which Japan would reach the heart of Southeast Asia. In fact, Japan’s presence in Indo-China, especially in Tonkin and in Cochin-China, was a real threat for the Philippines, Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies — so many strategic and food supply points for Great Britain and the United States. Further, it was from this time, the summer of 1940, that Washington finally pressurised Japan to stop its advance towards the south. Until then, American leaders had not taken Japan’s encroachment into Indo-China seriously. They were of the opinion that Tokyo, having got stuck in the Chinese front, would not dare open a second front in Southeast Asia. Stalin committed the same error by thinking that Hitler would not risk opening a second front in the East when the German troops were already having a tough time on the Western front.
15We are familiar with what followed. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese drew the United States into the war. However, they reacted too late to prevent Japanese troops from sweeping across the whole of Southeast Asia. In the West, Japan had reached Burma. In the South, it had gained a foothold in part of New Guinea. Thus the Japanese empire found itself in a position to threaten India and Australia respectively. To a certain extent, it can be said that the Pacific war took shape exactly at the time when Japan landed its troops in Indo-China, thus posing a double threat to the vital interests of England and the United States. It is to be noted that the operation base set up at Saigon by the Japanese facilitated the take-overs of Malaysia, Singapore, the Dutch Indies and Burma.11 Nevertheless, according to some historians like Bernard Fall, Indo-China had played a very secondary role in the Second World War.
16At that time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt held the view that Indo-China “served as the springboard for the Japanese attack on the Philippines, Malaysia and the Dutch Indies”, as was revealed in 1943 by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.
17As far as Japan was concerned, the passage provided by Eastern Indo-China — in the north towards China and then towards Southeast Asia — became all the more obvious as it was not an occupation in the real sense of the term but rather a “stationing” of Japanese troops. Their numbers never exceeded 35,000 men between 1941 and 1945, and they were stationed mostly around the communication highways. Beyond these strategic points, it was the French administration that had control over the Colony’s daily life. France’s order and authority continued to prevail.
18In fact, this French-Japanese “co-existence” dictated by Japan’s desire to handle France’s Vichy government carefully, and to ensure that it was able to obtain new economic outlets peacefully, served the Japanese well; all the more because the Decoux administration fulfilled its economic needs, such as rail transport and maintenance of Japanese troops, all the while ensuring that there were no internal problems. Thus Japan was present in Indo-China without having to bother about management problems. So, freed from the restrictions normally caused by any political occupation, the Japanese troops had time to concentrate on the conquest of other Southeast Asian regions whose wealth in raw materials they considered indispensable for the ensuing military operations.
19In the strategy of Imperial military conquest, Indo-China had become a strategic passage through which supply convoys for the troops of Chinese resistance made their way. Later, it was this very passage that the Japanese army invaded to reach Southeast Asian countries. It was from the regional perspective that Indo-China’s, that is to say Vietnam’s, role of transit passage and crossroads acquired meaning. By being at once continental and maritime, Indo-China enabled Japan, a maritime power, to penetrate into the continental space of China and the maritime space of Southeast Asian peninsular and insular countries.
Japanese Presence and Indo-China’s Emancipation
20Japan’s policy regarding French Indo-China may be differentiated as “before” and “after” the Japanese coup of 9 March 1945.12 At first, Indo-China’s independence, just as the Dutch East Indies’, was envisaged as a possible objective. But in the early 1940s, it was necessary to ensure Japan’s political and economic supremacy in these two Western possessions, considered major strategic and economic points in its expansionist plans for the Southern seas. In these circumstances, Japan faced the option of invading Indo-China and overthrowing French control. The Japanese military preferred to spare its forces, continuing with the colonial administrative structure that happened to depend on the Vichy government established in June 1940. Except for the Japanese officers posted in Indo-China and the Vietnamese nationalists, the Franco-Japanese pact signed in 1940 and 1941 that allowed France to maintain nominal control over its empire was a serious “anomaly” in view of the slogan introduced by Japanese propaganda: “Asia for Asians”. Aware of this contradiction, the authorities in Tokyo pointed out that the situation was of a temporary nature. In their mind, there was no doubt that in the end, the entities constituting French Indo-China should become independent, even though that independence would be singularly limited by Japan’s “protective” attitude. Japan had, in fact, decided that it was necessary to “train” the Vietnamese on a long-term basis because their political capabilities and their aptitude to manage a fully autonomous state were still very limited.13 This paternalistic approach of Nippo-Vietnamese cooperation could only lead to the frustration of the local nationalist movements that distrusted Japan, which was, after all, an imperialist power.
21During the early 1940s, Japan’s presence on colonial soil spelled con-stant pressure for the French authority that applied, not without success, a screening policy between the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Vietnamese. Faced with Japanese propaganda — led by Kempeitai, the military police, amongst others — Admiral Decoux, then Governor General, took a series of measures that were likely to win over the indigenous people of Indo-China.14 In this way, the Japanese forces, by their presence and the destabilising nature of their activities, indirectly contributed to the emancipation of the people of Indo-China.
22The French and the Japanese fought on ideological and cultural grounds; the former to ensure the loyalty of the Vietnamese, the latter to increase their influence over them. According to David Marr “Although Tokyo did not wish to undermine French capacities to maintain internal order, it remained committed to ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ and allowed civilian and military personnel to organize projects designed to convince Indochinese of Japanese superiority and the longer-term merits of participation in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”15
23A comprehensive cultural policy was developed, with Japanese language courses being held in big cities, Vietnamese films being projected, and magazines like Dong A (East Asia) published. Many Japanese works on culture, sports, martial arts in particular, were translated into Vietnamese and made available to the public. Radio programmes were also broadcast in Vietnamese. Intellectuals, artists and Japanese Buddhist monks were invited as public speakers. Some Japanese civilians took active part in this conquest of the mind, including Matsushita Mitsuhiro, a businessman who had lived in Indo-China for a long time and who endeavoured to build a network among pro-Japanese Vietnamese allies of Prince Cuong De. The writer Komatsu Kiyoshi influenced Vietnamese intellectuals with his anti-colonial and anti-fascist opinions. Komaki Oomi, another indefatigable proselyte of the Japanese cause, also played an important role as the Director of the Japanese Cultural Institute at Hanoi (Nihon Bunka Kaikan). He is also credited with setting up an association of Vietnamese writers called “Today Society”16 (Konnichi-sha).
24Before the Japanese coup against the French administration, the prevalent feeling amongst the Vietnamese was that though upheavals were to be anticipated, there was no actual support for the Japanese against the French. Early contact between the native population and the Japanese showed signs of a certain fascination for the Japanese martial style, the irreproachable order of the troops and the bearing of its sword-bearing officers. The Japanese troops, in addition, were encouraged to fraternise with the people, and it was rumoured that Japanese soldiers had gone to the defence of the Vietnamese against French settlers in the streets. The French noted that the Vietnamese were gratified by the announcement of every new Japanese victory over the Europeans. However, the Vietnamese had increasing difficulty in understanding why the invincible Japanese were not using their might to oust the French colonialists just as they had ousted the English, Dutch and Americans.17 With the spread of the Japanese presence, there were rumours in circulation regarding Japanese brutality, particularly that of the Kempeitai, a combined armed and political police force. People began to realise that the Japanese could turn out to be more cruel oppressors than the French.
25Finally, the sole concrete Japanese action in Indo-China was the coup of 9 March 1945, which was a crucial turning point in Vietnam’s history, proving to a decisive factor shaping the country’s future. In a few months, a sequence of events plunged the Indo-Chinese peninsula into the decolonisation era, and later, into the Cold War era.
26On the night of 9 March 1945, the Japanese troops put an end to the French presence in Indo-China. Internal and external pressures caused this sudden change of attitude. On the one hand, Tokyo came to know about the existence of French Indo-Chinese networks that informed and assisted the Allies.18 On the other hand, the external scenario was no longer favourable to Japan, for, since 1943, Anglo-Saxon forces had regained ground in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. Besides, in another theatre of the World War, France’s liberation in 1944 ended the Vichy regime in favour of General De Gaulle’s government. Lastly, the loss of the Philippines in December 1944 had swept away residual Japanese reluctance to oust France from Indo-China. Thus, after the events in the Philippines, Indo-China, “the springboard” to Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia, had every chance of becoming, in its turn, the theatre for future confrontation. From rear base, the Indo-Chinese peninsula became the war front.
27The consequences of the Japanese putsch were immediate and considerable: from March, Japan freed thousands of Indo-Chinese political prisoners who had been rotting in French jails; some of them were immediately given important administrative posts, contributing to the prevailing anarchy by suppressing those who had cooperated with France. With the looming threat of defeat, the Japanese chose to support the Vietnamese resistance, notably by placing arms at their disposal.
28Moreover, Tokyo granted symbolic independence to the entities constituting French Indo-China. In March 1945, Japan asked Emperor Bao Daï to repeal the Protectionist Treaty of 1884, in favour of a reunified Vietnam; thus he put an end to the existence of three “Kys”; Bac Ky, Trung Ky, Nam Ky, otherwise known as Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China, symbols of more than 80 years of French domination.19 Cochin-China’s fate, fought over by the Vietnamese and Cambodians, nevertheless remained in suspense. This French colony, placed under Japanese control immediately after the coup, was given back to the Vietnamese only on 14 August 1945, that is, one day before the capitulation of the Japanese empire.
29Above all, the ousting of colonial rule gave rise to a political void, further intensified by the Japanese capitulation on 15 August. This was a void into which Vietnamese nationalist movements, the most vigorous in Indo-China, plunged unhesitatingly.
30One of the major consequences of the Japanese coup was to cause the OSS (Office of Strategic Services, American Secret Service), that no longer had French networks, to turn to Vietminh, the best organised Vietnamese resistance group, with which it would be closely linked. The fact is to be emphasised because President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s America, known for its anti-colonial sentiments, had followed the Japanese policy of preventing France from returning to its colonies. Washington, through the OSS, saw to it that the power vacuum (political, administrative and legal) was prolonged, because of which its ally Vietminh asserted itself in the Vietnamese political scenario. Some historians consider that the United States’ support played a decisive role in the success of what the Vietnamese later called the “August revolution”.
31In fact, in this anarchic interregnum, the Communist Party of Indo-China (CPI) came through very well. In a circular dated 6 August 1944, the CPI had already prophesied clearly that the next upheaval would take place “in very favourable and unique conditions in the history of the country’s struggle. The opportunity being favourable and factors conducive, it would be unpardonable not to take advantage. It would be a crime against the history (of the) country.”20 The Japanese coup of 9 March provided the “favourable opportunity” (thoi co) which the Vietnamese communists awaited.
32The CPI movement, with limited participants, was the only political organisation with well-defined strategy and tactics. In September 1941, the CPI had set up the Vietminh under its command; a united front bringing together all the rebel forces, the armed wing of which was to be the National Salvation Army. In the same year, its chief, Nguyen Ai Quoc, adopted the symbolic name of Ho Chi Minh.
33Apart from their organisation, the communists had two other major strong points compared to the other nationalist movements. Firstly, as opposed to the Dai Viêt party and certain other groups, including the Caodaist and Hoa Hao sects that claimed to have nearly a million followers each, the Vietminh did not play the Japanese card. From 1943, Japan had encouraged various supposedly pro-Japanese nationalist factions to unite. In September, the different groups in the South, notably the religious Caodaist and Hoa Hao sects, had also come together to form an alliance.
34In the North, the different nationalist movements united between late 1943 and early 1944 to form the National League of Great Viet (Dai Viêt quôc gia liên minh Hôi), known by the contraction “Dai Viêt”, (a reference to the Viet country, which, after ten centuries of Chinese domination, had acquired independence in 968 and took the name of Dai Co Viêt, the “Great Viêt”, as opposed to “Great China”). To do this, they profited from the goodwill of the new occupation authorities, whose interests the CPI did not compromise. Secondly, the communists had a safe zone that the French attempted to “pacify” without success in 1943–44: the Viêt Bac, a base situated in the high Tonkin region on the Chinese border that connected them, ipso facto, to their Chinese comrades, and even to the Communist International.
35Well-organised, recognised for its actions against the French and Japanese, and strongly established in the Vietnamese territory, especially in the countryside, the Vietminh enjoyed strong external support from groups such as the Chinese Communist Party and the American OSS, as well as a solid and homogeneous but limited internal socio-logical base.
36Also, from the time the Japanese capitulation was made known, the CPI was able to form a temporary National salvation government and continue its “August revolution” by dispatching troops to Hanoi. On 9 August 1945, the Supreme War Council met at Tokyo and, under pressure from Emperor Hirohito, accepted the “unacceptable”: Japan’s capitulation. The surrender was officially signed on 2 September on board the American ship Missouri, the very day on which Ho Chi Minh announced the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Emperor Bao Dai, made head of the government immediately after the Japanese coup, was forced to abdicate on 25 August. On 2 September, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam, which was named the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).
37The coup of 9 March 1945 was thus indirectly the factor that set off a series of events, which, before concluding six months afterward, would give birth to the DRV. Japan’s presence in Indo-China for scarcely five years was thus a major “episode” in the history of the Indo-Chinese peninsula in general and Vietnam in particular. But while the Vietminh was trying to take Japan’s place at the helm, elsewhere, Vietnam’s destiny was being decided. For the third time since the colonisation of their country, the Vietnamese, in this case, the Communist resistance movement, were in fact “ditched” by their ally of the moment, the United States.21 When Harry Truman replaced Franklin Roosevelt (who died on 12 April 1945) as President of the United States, Washington changed its Indo-China policy significantly. There was no longer question of placing the peninsula under international tutelage, as the preceding president had wished. Circumstances had changed in the world because the “Soviet danger” loomed large on the horizon.
38This was how the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945) created the worst of scenarios for the Vietminh. It was decided that the disarmament of the Japanese troops should be supervised by nationalist China, the traditional enemy, and by Great Britain, a colonial and maritime power, on either side of the 16th parallel. The Chinese brought along Vietnamese nationalists, survivors of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD), “decapitated” by France immediately after Yen Bay in 1930, who had not collaborated with the Japanese and therefore enjoyed some legitimacy even though they were under Kuomintang’s influence. As for the British, in all probability, they were going to help the French restore their sovereignty in Indo-China. In fact, just a month after the birth of DRV, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained in a telegram America’s new policy concerning the return of France to the Indo-China peninsula:
The United States has no intention of opposing France in restoring its control over Indo-China and no official stand taken by the American government, even indirectly, challenged France’s sovereignty in Indo-China. However, it is not the government’s policy to help the French in re-establishing their control over Indo-China by force and America’s desire to see the French control restored assumes that the French claim of having the support of the people of Indo-China will be confirmed by the events that follow.22
39On 12 April 1946, the new Secretary of State, James Burnes, officially made known Washington’s consent to reinstating French authority in Indo-China, thus tacitly recognising that the maintenance of European colonial empires had become necessary to confront the possible rise of Communism in the region.23
40At first, colonial France’s geopolitical venture considered Vietnamese territory an initial transit passage to reach the Chinese market, later becoming the platform for Japan’s continental and maritime expansionism into southern China and Southeast Asian countries. Thus Vietnam, which had barely come out of the world conflict, found itself “placed” geo-politically by external powers at the intersection of two new eras, between that of colonisation and the Cold War. Besides, the Franco-Chinese Treaty of 1885, the Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1907 and finally the Potsdam conference in 1945 taught the Vietnamese resistance a double lesson. Firstly, following the process of colonisation, their country’s fate was totally beyond their control. Secondly, Vietnamese nationalism could depend only on its own resources, and not on those of external allies, whose palinodes had showed the limits of their support.
Responsibility for an Apocalypse or the Origins of the 1945 Famine
41One of the most tragic consequences of the double occupation of Vietnam was the terrible famine of 1945 that caused veritable carnage in the country. More than 10 per cent of the population died of hunger or the consequences of famine. This disaster was the result of a combination of factors, namely natural (floods, severe winter), industrial and military, which entailed the bombing of roads, bridges and ports, and the added torpedoing of boats by Allied submarines. However, the Japanese occupation was one of the most decisive factors in this human catastrophe. The country’s economy had in fact undergone total restructuring in favour of the Empire and its army. All the indicators, especially those of Indo-China’s Statistical Directory, confirmed a very rapid increase in exports to Japan, particularly rice and maize. At the same time, the peasants were forced to grow cash crops such as cotton, jute, sesame, castor and other oil seeds, to the detriment of traditional food crops.
42Within three years, from 1942 to 1944, the area used for cultivation of industrial products had doubled in Indo-China, but, as Nguyen Thê Anh pointed out, the transformation in Tonkin was even more considerable than was suggested by the change in production, because the area for cash crops had tripled.24 These conditions lead to an acute shortage in essentials, making the people’s daily life increasingly difficult; “the spectre of famine thus loomed ominously over the North”.25 It is said that sorrow never comes alone, for, from 1936 to 1939, Vietnam and particularly Tonkin suffered from major floods caused by the breaching of dikes, which lead to considerable losses in rice harvests. Around 150,000 farmers were reduced to begging. Rampant speculation led to an increase in all domestic prices, which, for some people, reached prohibitive levels. The cost of a quintal of rice, which was 30 piastres in 1940, went up to 600 piastres in early 1945. The intensifying problem of war, coupled with a very severe winter in the region, led to tragedy.
43According to Nguyen Thê Anh, “The great famine of the year At-dâu was an atrocious calamity that left, an indelible mark on the people’s memory.”26 This gave rise to two questions; the first, concerning the magnitude of the disaster. Depending on the source, the figures vary from 700,000 victims according to the French authorities of that time, to two million as per official estimates of the post-war Vietnamese authorities.27 The second question was regarding to whom responsibility for the catastrophe could be imputed, setting aside the aggravating factors of inclement weather and the Pacific war.
44The French and the Japanese, naturally, blamed one another. In a telegram in September 1945, General Leclerc, Commander of French troops in the Far East, presented an account of the catastrophe by citing natural causes, disruption of supplies and insecurity as the prime causes. He mentioned that a rumour was being spread that the French were responsible. He replied to this attack with the “French defence”, based on four major points:
- The Japanese, large consumers of rice, had confiscated a sizeable portion of the available stock, thereby causing speculation.
- The Japanese had brought down the area of food crop cultivation to serve their needs.
- Harvests towards the end of 1944 had been bad.
- As the French had been chased away and replaced by incompetent Japanese or Annamites, the relief programmes could not be organised.
45American historian David Marr passed a harsh judgment on the actions of each of the two protagonists, considering that, at that time, both the French and Japanese authorities were entirely aware of the food situation and had the means to reverse the trend, had they so desired.
46Despite this, neither the French nor the Japanese sent rice on a priority basis to feed the starving Vietnamese civilians. He added that, above all, the two powers were only preoccupied with their own military logistics.28
47The historian thus corroborates the judgment passed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The responsibility becomes incumbent on the “French colonialists and Japanese Fascists”. However, the blame is not so equitably shared amongst the Vietnamese themselves, at least in retrospective view of this episode in their history. In their opinion, the colonial administration was the main culprit. According to them, it would have deliberately created the famine situation to weaken the opposition and to ensure the continued French presence in Indo-China. In the final analysis, the Vietnamese thus let off the Japanese more lightly. The people had not forgotten that the French administration remained in place until March 1945 and Japanese officials had given much publicity to the food grain they donated to help the famine victims. In any case, few Japanese felt the least guilt for the Imperial Army’s actions in Indo-China. Unfortunately, this attitude is a reflection of post-war Japanese ignorance about the most tragic episodes that had marked the Pacific war. The same goes for the great Vietnamese famine that is considered in Japan to be simply an unfortunate calamity in that war-torn period.
Japanese Renegades in the Vietminh
48If Westerners as well as the Japanese remain largely ignorant of the great Vietnamese famine of 1944‑45, the presence of Japanese at the side of the Vietminh in the first Indo-China war “could seem somewhat strange to those who are traditionally accustomed to seeing only two main players in a conflict, that is France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam”.29 In fact, as the Historian Christopher Goscha points out, the end of hostilities did not mean the total disappearance of Japanese forces from Indo-China. It was estimated that out of 97,000 Japanese military and civilians stationed or residing in Indo-China, several thousand soldiers of the Imperial Army had refused to be repatriated or to surrender to the Allies. Also, many soldiers lost in the Guam jungles have been found, until as late as the 1970s. The number of Japanese deserters in Vietnam in 1945 is often put at 5,000; their role was minimised by Vietnamese propaganda because “the subject is still explosive if not taboo”.30
49The French did not hesitate to denounce the presence of Japanese deserters amidst the Vietminh ranks to discredit the Vietnamese resistance. They were present in officers’ schools, in elite units, etc. Some high-ranking generals like Giap and Nguyen Binh recruited their “instructors from amongst Japanese officers who had remained in Indo-China to serve Indo-China in the capacity of military advisors and even as bodyguards”.31 But military cooperation was not the only available field of activity for “these belated Allies”.
50The Finance Ministry relied on the advice of about ten Japanese financial experts and economists. In his “Journal of a Minister”,32 Le Van Hien, Finance Minister from 1947 to 1954, confirmed that a good ten Japanese were working under him and had played a fairly important role in the working of the Ministry. Also, in the area of health, there were Japanese doctors, pharmacists, nurses and even veterinary surgeons. Oka Masamichi, journalist and writer, narrates the journey of one of these deserters in “Love in the Annam jungle”.33 While in Oka’s narration, the “hero” is forced to cooperate with the Vietminh and ends up marrying a Vietnamese girl, some of his fellow-countrymen were driven by other economic, ideological and even legal motivations, for some war criminals; not forgetting the die-hards who fought against the West to the bitter end.
51With Vietnam aligning itself with the Communist camp, the increase in China’s aid rapidly replaced other sources of aid and isolated these Japanese “renegades” in the early 1950s. In fact, Goscha explains that “according to a recent military study published in Hanoi, in 1951, the Vietnam military itself decided to dismiss officially Japanese (and European) advisors working in its offices. It sent them back via international channels of Communist China.”34 For their part, the Japanese authorities, with the consent of the Allies and the French, had organised several missions to find and repatriate their countrymen. The fate of these Japanese — missing soldiers or idealists — is both symbolic of irony in history, and also of the constant ambiguity in the relations between the two peoples.
Notes de bas de page
1Sir Halford John Mackinder, British geographer suggests in an article published in 1904 “The Geographical Pivot of History” that the control of East Europe was vital to control the rest of the world. His theory is based on the following assumption: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the world”. Mackinder’s “Heartland” is also known as “pivotal area” or area in the heart of Eurasia. See Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 241–42, 255, 257–58, 262–64.
2Pierre Renouvin, La Question d’Extrême-Orient, 1840–1940 (Paris: Hachette, 1946), p. 365.
3Philippe Richer, L’asie du Sud-Est, p. 88.
4William H. Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement, p. 16; William Gerard Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 227.
5See particularly Michel Vié, “Points de vue sur la politique extérieure du Japon entre les guerres mondiales”, Relations internationales, no. 22 (Summer, 1980): 141–52.
6William Gerard Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945, p. 227.
7Ibid., p. 227.
8Stéphane Dovert, “La Thaïlande prête pour le monde, ou de l’usage intensif des étrangers dans un processus de construction nationale”, in Thaïlande contemporaine, ed. Stéphane Dovert (Bangkok-Paris: IRASEC-L’Harmattan, 2001), pp. 177–273.
9See Bui Xuan Quang, “Le Samouraï et La Perle de l’empire français”, in Saigon 1925–1945, ed. Philippe Franchini. Memoirs series, no. 17, September 1992, Paris, pp. 216–32.
10Bui Xuan Quang, “Jeu de go Japonais”, in Saigon 1925–1945, ed. Philippe Franchini (September 1992), p. 233.
11Pierre Renouvin, 1946, p. 421.
12Masaya Shiraishi, “La Présence japonaise en Indochine (1940–1945)”, in L’Indochine française, 1940–1945, ed. Paul Isoart. Works and research of the Institute of Law for Peace and Development (Paris: University of Nice, 1982), pp. 215–41.
13W.H. Elsbree, 1953, p. 24.
14The colonial administration gave more importance to elite Indo-Chinese (especially monarchs, mandarins, notables), promoted indigenous officials, encouraged big installation projects, favoured craft industry, developed teaching, the “theeing” and “thouing” of the natives was officially banned by the Governor General in 1941, etc.
15David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945, The Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 81.
16Ibid., p. 85.
17Ibid., p. 91.
18Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 205–13.
19The Tonkin delta was called Bac Ky or Bac Bo, the Cochin-China delta was called Nam Ky and Nam Bo, and the Centre was called Trung Ky or Trung Bo.
20Marcel Benichou, “Il y a cinquante ans: le coup de force japonais du 9 mars 1945”, Le Médecin du Vietnam, no. 23: 18. This historian’s article presents the events of this important period in the history of Vietnam in a much synthesised manner.
21The first time by China (French-Chinese Treaty of Tien Tsin of 1885), and the second time by Japan (French-Japan Treaty of 1907).
22Telegram on 5 October 1945 for Walter Robertson, chargé de mission in China, extract mentioned by William J. Duiker, “Les États-Unis et l’Indochine française, 1940–1945”, in Isoart (ed.), 1982, p. 211.
23Quoted by Pierre Mélandri, “L’Apprentissage du leadership occidental. Les États-Unis et le monde 1941–1949”, Relations internationales, no. 22 (Summer 1980): 187.
24For this passage on the great famine, our text is largely based on Nguyen Thê Anh’s article “Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indo-China”, in Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1998), pp. 208–17; and also on Bui Minh Dung’s “Japan’s Role in the Vietnamese Starvation of 1944–45”, Modern Asian Studies 29, no. 3 (1995): 573–618.
25Nguyen Thê Anh, “Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indo-China”, in Kratoska (ed.), 1998, p. 214.
26Ibid., p. 217.
27According to the Indo-China Centre for Overseas Archives, 338/21, quoted by Nguyen Thê Anh, “Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indo-China”, in Kratoska (ed.), 1998, p. 222.
28Marr, Vietnam 1945, p. 100.
29This passage is largely based on Christopher Goscha’s lecture in the Institute of Eastern Asia on 7 February 2003, and his works on this question. See Christopher Goscha, “Belated Allies, technical support of Japanese deserters to Vietminh during the first years of the French-Vietnamese war”, in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 202–203 (2002): 81–109; and Christopher Goscha and Kyoichi Tachikawa, “Betomin to tomoni Tatakata Nihonjin (Japanese who fought beside the Vietminh)”, Gunjin Shigaku 36, no. 3–4 (March 2001): 218–32.
30Christopher Goscha, “Belated Allies, technical support of Japanese deserters to Vietminh during the first years of the French-Vietnamese war”, in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 202–203 (2002): 83.
31Ibid., p. 85.
32Le Van Hien and Nhat Ky, Cua mot bo truong (Journal of a Minister), Nha tuat Ban Da Nang, Danang, 1995, 2 volumes, p. 11.
33Masamichi Oka, “Love in the Annam Jungle”, in Jay Gluck, Ukiyo, Stories of the “Floating World” of Post-war Japan (Japan: Personally Oriented Ltd, 1993), pp. 107–21.
34Christopher Goscha, “Belated Allies, technical support of Japanese deserters to Vietminh during the first years of the French-Vietnamese war”, in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 202–203 (2002): 108.
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