Chapter 1

Japan’s Modernisation as Seen from Hanoi

p. 7-18


Texte intégral

Exodus to the East

Peaceful Trade Expansion in the 16th and 17th Centuries

1Noël Péri has a rare double qualification — he was a distinguished expert on Japan, as well as a specialist on Indochina. In the 1920s, as a member of the École Française d’Extrême-Orient (French School for Far Eastern Studies), he carried out a study on Japan’s relations with the countries that constituted French Indo-China. Unfortunately, he died in 1922, without completing the thesis that he had started writing. Nonetheless, in 1924, the early chapters of his work appeared in the Bulletin de l’École Francaise d’Extrême-Orient.1 His research pertained to both Japan’s trade with the peninsula and its presence in the region. However, only the parts relating to maritime traffic and Japanese ships trading with the peninsula were published in their entirety in the bulletin. In the interest of Japanese establishments in Southeast Asia, though, there are many outstanding monographs written by Japanese researchers, revolving around nihonmachi — a term literally meaning “Japanese towns”, but which refers mostly to rather more modest settlements, trading posts and colonies. Scholars like Péri have left us Shogun archives which give a detailed view on trade between Japan and Southeast Asia during the 16th and 17th centuries. Japanese authorities established under the fiefdom of powerful Shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi were known for having a system of authorisation known as shuin-jô, or “red-seal licence”, which entailed the granting of a sort of license or passport for overseas navigation and trading. This control system imposed by the feudal regime gives us relatively precise information about the movements of ships authorised to navigate, their destinations, the ship-owners as well as their cargo. A first set of figures tells us that out of around ten ports that were given authorisation, seven belonged to Indo-China, four of which were situated in present-day Vietnam. Two-thirds of the permits mention Faifo, today’s Hoi An, as a destination. Trading with the kingdoms situated in modern-day Vietnam represented an essential percentage of the region’s trade, in terms of volume. In the order of importance, we find trade with Annam, Cochin-China (although the distinction between the two kingdoms was quite blurred at that time), followed by Tonkin. Trade with this part of the world mainly consisted of Japanese imports of silk, textiles, ceramics and tea. On the export side, the Japanese sold a variety of products, notably military equipment. The silk trade was so vital, that a “maritime silk route” was spoken of.2 For a long time, Japan depended on Chinese supplies of these products, but these were disrupted increasingly often by the incessant activities of Chinese and Japanese pirates, known as wakos, who preyed on ships along the Chinese coasts, thereby forcing the Japanese to find sources in a less dangerous region.

2This situation partially accounts for the fact that while trade was mostly with China in the 15th century, by the 16th and 17th centuries, Japan had expanded trade in Southern Asia. Consumption of tea, however, did not enjoy widespread popularity in the mid-16th century. However, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru (1532–54) liked it very much and contributed to making the fortune of the Nakajimas, a Samurai family that owned a famous teahouse or chaya, as they are known in Japanese. The name chaya replaced the Nakajima patronymic and it was under this name that the family came to be known in Vietnam. In his study, Péri records that several letters to the king of Annam are “sufficient to establish that the name of Chaya was favourably known in Cochin-China and enjoyed real prestige here”.3 A letter dated 1628 mentions that a war had just been declared between Cochin-China and Tonkin.

3The Lord of Hué, who was aware that Japanese ships supplying him arms also supplied his adversaries in the North, tried to make use of the Chaya family’s influence with the Shogun to forbid not only arms supplies to his enemies but also put an end to trade with Tonkin. Another letter dated 1635 reiterates this demand made by the king of Annam to Chaya Shirojiro of the Nakajima family: “Send merchant ships here every year regularly to maintain good relations (…); in future if any ship goes to Dong-Kinh (Tonkin), which is my enemy’s province, give authorisation to sell only other goods; I ask that the two officers of the ships impose a ban on carrying sulphur, copper vessels, bullets and guns…. If you sincerely follow my instructions, I shall be greatly obliged to you.”

4This flourishing trade with Southeast Asia soon enabled the Japanese to establish themselves in the region. At first, there were simple trading posts and in some places, more developed Japanese towns, nihonmachis, but they never became truly populated colonies. Hence, no just comparison can be made between the Japanese presence and the larger migratory movements of the Asian diaspora, predominantly consisting of the Chinese. The residents of these towns were sailors, merchants, ronins — samurais without a master, in other words, soldiers of fortune. Some of them served as personal bodyguards of Khmer and Siamese monarchs.4 Nihonmachis could be found in Dielaos and San Miguel in the Philippines, at Faifo (Hoi An), Tourane (today’s Danang) in Vietnam, at Ayutthaya in Siam, as well as in Cambodia.

5Of all these Japanese settlements, Hoi An is the best known because it is the best preserved. Hoi An, a flourishing port city, reached the zenith of its prosperity during the 17th century and in the first half of the 18th century. It was at this time that it became a port of registry for many foreign merchants. Right from the 16th century, Japanese merchants were active traders, as were others such as the Portuguese and Chinese. The city of Hoi An, mentioned by Father de Faria in 1576, was described in detail in Christoforo Borri’s diary in 1618: “The city of Faifo is so vast that one would think it is two juxtaposed cities; a Chinese city and a Japanese city.” Japanese merchants made an appearance in Hoi An towards the end of the 16th century; particularly after the edict promulgated by Shogun Yeyasu Tokugawa in 1592, authorising trade with South Asian countries. Following the Chinese example, the Japanese settled down, bought lands and fields and married Vietnamese women. In the course of time, they established a Japanese quarter, which they administered and where they imposed their own customs. The location of the Japanese quarter is now known: it is in the Tran Phu Street neighbourhood.5

6With the subsequent arrival of Dutch, British and French merchants, the port continued to develop further in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, the establishment of the first Dutch trading post in 1636 marked the beginning of the decline of the Japanese presence. In fact, at this time, the Shogun forbade sea voyages and maintaining relations with foreign countries. This historic decision isolated Japan for two centuries; the sakoku (closure) period came to an end only upon the arrival of the American fleet under Commander Perry in the mid-19th century.

7The Meiji era, which took its appellation from the name taken by the new Emperor Mutsu Hito when he began his reign in 1868, was a period of rapid modernisation for the Japanese Empire. The emperor soon proved to be an excellent student of the West in all fields, solving the double-quandary confronting all non-Western people who faced foreign imperialism: First, finding an appropriate response to the threat the big powers posed to their independence and territorial sovereignty. The second, of an intellectual and cultural nature: becoming ‘modern’ without losing one’s cultural identity. In tackling these issues, Japan had undeniable success. King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) of Siam and the young Emperor of China, Guangxu, also tried to follow Japan’s example from the late 19th century, but without much success. However, Japan’s experience remains, if not a model, at least a source of inspiration even today, especially for countries undergoing economic and political upheaval, such as China and Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia and Laos.

Meiji Restoration

8At the end of the 19th century, exchange of information and acquisition of knowledge about Japan for the Vietnamese was essentially through China — through Chinese nationalists, reformers and revolutionaries, as well as through numerous Japanese writings translated into Chinese. Despite this, the Vietnamese as a whole showed little interest in Japanese matters, although these were of significant importance to their neighbour and mentor, China.

9The Vietnamese shared the Chinese opinion that there was nothing to learn outside the Sinicised world. So when a Siamese envoy to the court of Emperor Tu Duc suggested he send students to the West in quest of new knowledge, the Emperor replied: “Our culture is Chinese, so why waste our time by learning from barbarians?” However, the Emperor’s immediate entourage numbered several people who supported the Japanese approach of venturing out to the West in search of new knowledge worthy of emulation. Nguyen Truong To (1835–71) was one of the first among them to urge the Nguyen court to follow the Japanese example by sending students overseas to bring back modern learning. Despite his efforts, memos and petitions, the Emperor did not heed his arguments.

10However, following the newly constituted Japanese naval forces’ victories against the Russian army and the Czarist fleet in the Tsushima Strait (1904–1905), the Vietnamese élite were compelled to modify their view on Japan. These masterful victories left an impression on Vietnamese intellectuals. For example, in the “letters from prison” (Nguc Tring Thu) of Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940), an eminent Vietnamese patriot who played an important intellectual role in the anti-colonial resistance:

Japan’s victory in its war with Russia is also a great advance for us. Our minds may now contemplate a new, exquisite world. Prior to its domination by France, our country knew only the existence of China in this whole wide world. When the French came we then knew nothing but France. The world has changed, with amazing new developments of which our people have never dreamed…. It is impossible to deny that thanks to the Russo-Japanese war our consciousness has been raised.6

11There are other commentaries in the same vein, such as those of Prince Cuong De, who greatly hoped Japan would liberate and modernise his country: “The news about Japan’s victories, one after another, warmed many Vietnamese hearts, especially members of our group…. We believed if we asked Japan for help, it would be readily given for the Japanese and Vietnamese share the same culture and are of the Asian race.”7

The dong du8 (Exodus to the East) or the Missed Opportunity

12The interest kindled by Japan amongst the Vietnamese in the early 1900s can be gauged through a key person of the Vietnamese resistance against colonial France: Phan Boi Chau. He left his imprint in the Vietnamese national movement during the first 20 years of the 20th century. His aims and means can be summarised in one sentence: to get rid of colonial authority through illegal actions, in other words, by insurrection, for Phan Boi Chau was right in his opinion that France would never agree to leave Indo-China of its own accord.

13Such an undertaking was, however, not possible by the Vietnamese alone. External help was necessary. Much inspired by the Japanese imperial system, in 1905, Phan Boi Chau went to Tokyo in search of arms for the forthcoming insurrection, amongst other things. He never got them. But beyond the immediate practical aspect, the Vietnamese nationalist’s choosing to turn to Japan arose from the vision of Asia in general, and Japan in particular, that was shared by a good number of Vietnamese intellectuals of the time, Chau most of all. Three points draw our attention here.

14To begin with, Phan Boi Chau and his followers had a dichotomist vision of the Asian continent: countries belonging to the Sinicised civilisation, and the others. According to him, his country, Japan and China were countries of the “same culture, same race, same continent” (dông van, dông chung, dông châu),9 whereas Siam and Cambodia, for example, shared neither the same language nor the same alphabet with Vietnam. Now it was clear that Japan, under the Meiji era (1868–1912), after emerging victorious over Russia in the naval battle of Tsushima, appeared to be “the new upcoming country of the yellow race” and a civilised nation par excellence.10 By demonstrating that a “yellow” nation could win over a “white” power, Japan showed the rest of Asia the way.

15Further, Phan Boi Chau, who held a Darwinian vision of the world, opined that an underdeveloped country should come out of its condition by its own efforts; it was only a question of will-power. However, if Vietnam failed to take up this responsibility on time, it could suffer the same destiny as the ancient kingdom of Champa (which was absorbed by Vietnam itself) and the Ryukyu Islands (annexed by Japan at that time). Japan, by its voluntaristic policy of modernisation, was a role model. This was how progressive, educated people tried to develop activities hitherto neglected by Vietnam: companies were to multiply in the areas of agriculture, commerce, industry, and in the field of political and scientific teaching.11 Further, Phan Boi Chau felt that Meiji-era Japan was a perfect example of the positive outcome of a reform programme, in other words, that a reformed monarchy could very well con-tribute to the modernisation of a country. Lastly, the Vietnamese élite saw Japan as a highly civilised nation. Young Vietnamese selected by Phan Boi Chau and his followers were thereupon sent to Japan to undergo general and military training; they, in turn, would have the responsibility of training their countrymen when Vietnam revolted against French rule. Once they arrived in Japan, the Vietnamese students were entrusted with the unofficial responsibility of the “Association of the countries of the same culture as Eastern Asia” (Tôa dôbunka).

16This journey to Japan was known as the “exodus to the East”, the dong du. Established as a model, the Empire of the Rising Sun thus replaced the Celestial Empire. This change from Chinese orientation to the Japanese example is a symbolic and ambiguous one. In the “geocultural” aspect, Vietnam, for the first time in its history admittedly followed a Confucian power as reference, though not China. Vietnamese reformers also had to improve the image of the military, which was until then looked down upon by the Confucian culture of the Mandarin type, and get used to techniques needed to modernise the Army and the Navy. Such a step clearly illustrates a significant change in the model to be followed: Vietnam, without breaking its ties with China, a mainland country, turned to Japan, which was a rising Asian maritime power in the early 20th century.

17As for Japan itself, it held the ambiguous position of being, at the same time “too insular not to be “maritime” (and) too Sinicised not to be partially “mainland”,12 as François Joyaux observed. Isolationist Japan, which was then a “mainland” archipelago, progressively became a “maritime” empire, open to ideas and trade circuits of the external world towards the late 18th century; particularly from the beginning of the Meiji reform (1868). Despite that, the kaikoku policy (opening up of the country) thus decided upon was not without ambivalence inasmuch as it was accompanied by the concept of kokutai (national essence). In fact, the opening, which was to a great extent oriented towards the West, meant a reinforcement of nationalism in the face of foreign influence. Between 1880–1905, the term “modernisation” replaced the notion of “westernisation”. Japan was able to combine tradition and modernity: the cliché is classic. It was precisely this nationalist Japan’s modernisation that kindled great interest amongst the Vietnamese; but we also find amongst them a similar ambivalence in being both “mainland” and “maritime”. For if the process of Japan’s reformation enjoyed unanimous approval, admittedly there is a difference in interpretation amongst the various components of Vietnamese nationalism, for geopolitical reasons. For the North Vietnamese nationalists, historically more influenced by China’s “mainland” mentality, it was a question of following the Japanese example and modernising the country in order to better resist Western influence by looking inwards and relying on its own capabilities.

18South Vietnamese nationalism, which was less rigid and historically more attracted to an Indianised Southeast Asian model, preached modernisation by opening the country to external influence in order to better compete with the West, without, however, putting up a radical resistance against it. But the dong du movement was a missed opportunity for Japan and the Vietnamese. Phan Boi Chau and his friends were, in fact, “betrayed” by the Japanese powers, as was the case with the educated traditionalists before them, when the Chinese ally entered into an agreement with France (Treaty of Tien Tsin of 1885).

19The Japanese empire refused military aid to the Vietnamese resistance for two main reasons. The first was that the Japanese did not wish to contest the status quo in Asia and thus risk turning against the powers of that time, including France, by supporting the Vietnamese and the Asian nationalists in general. The second rationale is also based on the same logic. After the Russian war, Japan was in great need of capital. This is how France, while making arrests and suppressing protests within its colony, came to sign a treaty on the outside with Japan in July 1907, by which Japan officially recognised all French possessions in Asia; in exchange, the Japanese government would receive a loan of 300 million francs.13 From the following year onwards, Tokyo would send back young Vietnamese students staying in Japanese universities. Some took refuge in China, where they later joined the Kuomintang ranks, while others found refuge in Siam. For his part, Phan Boi Chau also took refuge in southern China. Under the influence of the nationalist party of Sun Yat Sen — whose revolutionary movement contributed to the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and took him to the head of the first Chinese Republican government, Chau changed his ideology and formed a new political organisation: “Vietnamese Restoration Society” (Viêt Nam quang phuc Hôi). His objective was to abandon the project of restoration of a renewed monarchy in favour of the Republican option. Tactically, he deepened his radicalism by opting for anarchic action.

20The Middle Empire was an eternal “Chinese shadow” in Vietnam’s history because even during the dong du period, China’s influence in Vietnam cannot be considered negligible. The Chinese empire continued to play a predominant role in more ways than one, primarily as an intermediary between the Annamese dissidents and the Empire of the Rising Sun, more specifically, as a “geographic” intermediary, because southern China was always a refuge for members of the Vietnamese Resistance, who enjoyed the support of their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, the port of Hong Kong was a compulsory stopping point en route to Japan. Phan Boi Chau, was a “political” intermediary because once he arrived on Japanese territory, he met with Chinese nationalists such as Liang Qichao, who introduced him to Japanese political circles and established contact with Chinese reformers who were very prominent in Japan at that time.14 At the same time, Sun Yat Sen was also in Japan, where in 1905, he became the President of a Republican league that had considerable influence in China: the “Tongmenghui” (United League), the first step to Guomindang. The Republican Sun, however, opposed Chau, who supported monarchy at that time.

21Resolving this disagreement between the two men, which was more than a divergence of political agendas, was the need of the hour. To begin with, the Chinese leader counted on leading his action from Tonkin with Vietnamese support, and later, once victorious, giving them all the necessary help to let them fight their own battle successfully. On the other hand, his Annamese interlocutor proposed the opposite solution: first of all, Vietnam should be freed from the French yoke so that later “the Chinese revolution (could) make use of Viêt Bac as a springboard, from where it would first save Guangxi and Guangdong”.15 Sun Yat Sen’s tactics became a reality about 40 years later, when Vietnamese communists were able to combat French forces more efficiently from the huge “springboard” that was the PRC; thus liberating North Vietnam as a first step.

22In the final analysis, it can be pointed out that Phan Boi Chau, the “prodigal son” who was once under Japanese influence, finally came back to China, which was then undergoing total socio-political change, and where he formed the “League for China’s prosperity and Asia’s recovery”. This was an international organisation that aimed at reinforcing solidarity between the Chinese and the colonised people.16 For Phan Boi Chau, former neo-monarchist now converted to Republican values, this meant recognition of the geopolitical influence of neighbouring China, which had, in the meantime, become a Republic.

23From the early 20th century, Japan — anxious to regain place amidst the pantheon of great powers and striving not to provoke the ire of the “white gods”— concealed the role of Prometheus assigned to it by Asian revolutionaries in general and the Vietnamese in particular. In fact, in Japan, in 1908, Phan Boi Chau founded the Eastern Asia League with the help of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Indian and Philippine revolutionaries, anarchists and socialists. Its aim was to become a solid alliance bringing together all Asian countries to fight Western imperialism and create “Greater Asia”; and it had nothing to do with Japan’s official pan-Asianism stand. But this was the vision that became a reality nearly forty years later.

Vietnamese Nationalism and the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”

24Between the two World Wars, the Japanese empire openly showed expansionist ambitions towards Eastern Asia. It conceived the great plan of establishing a common area under its aegis, the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (Dai toa kyoeiken). This ambitious project aimed at establishing Japan’s political, economic and cultural hegemony in this sphere, at the same time, making Japan replace Western powers. The project was outlined by the Total War Research Institute (founded in 1940). The concept of “total war” demonstrated Tokyo’s intention of waging war in all fields: in the cultural field, the Japanese applied the same strategy as missionaries did in Indo-China: once its zone of influence was established, the Japanese Empire took the educational system of Asian countries in hand in order to spread a “new spirit”: the Japanese spirit, thanks to new text books, new teaching methods and intensive learning of the Japanese language, which was intended to be Asia’s vernacular language.

25But the desire of the Empire of Rising Sun for supremacy clashed somewhat badly with the Asian nationalist movements’ quest for independence. As a result, it would prove difficult to sidestep this contradiction. In Japanese official circles, the prevalent feeling was “that the independence of the various peoples of East Asia should be based on constructing East Asia as independent countries existing within the New Order of East Asia ” and that this conception differs from independence based on the idea of liberalism and national self determination.17 In 1942, Hashimoto Kingoro, President of the Japan Youth Party (Dai Nippon Seinentô), authored an article in which he explicitly said that weak nations could only exist with a strong power’s protection, just “as a child grows up freely and safely under the protection of his father”.18

26For the Japanese, a great majority of “future Asian states” were in the early stages of nationalism; their social and economic bases were still too weak to form a solid national movement. In other words, these players did not have the maturity needed to take up the sole responsibility of their political future. Such a paternalistic vision justified the Asian nations’ delegating their military, economic and foreign policies to Tokyo. On the whole, as was later accepted by General Tojo before the International Military Court, the Japanese, in the long run, had to replicate the Manchukuo-type model, the puppet government that they had established in Manchuria (China), Burma, the Philippines, Siam, Java, French Indo-China and even in India and Afghanistan. The Manchukuo model was the archetypal Japanese approach, also serving as experimental ground for its economic development policies.

27In early 1932, the Japanese army stationed in Manchuria, facing the resistance of Chinese forces, set off a Manchurian independence movement. Although the Chinese — who constituted a large majority of the Manchurian population — rejected this movement, an “executive committee of Northeastern provinces” published a declaration of Independence for Manchuria on 18 February. The regency of the new state, named Manchukuo, was conferred upon Prince Pou Yi, the last Chinese emperor dethroned in February 1912 by the Republican revolution. Soon after, on 24 August, the Japanese government gave official recognition to Manchukuo. Thanks to the Nippo-Manchu agreement signed the following month, Tokyo was entrusted with the task of ensuring the internal and external security of the new state. For this, Japan obtained the right to station its military there. Independent on paper, Manchukuo actually became a protectorate in the hands of Japanese “advisors”.

28In the first place, Japanese propaganda aimed at controlling the intellectual élite of every Asian country that would later serve as intermediary between the Japanese authorities and the Asian masses. In this perspective, the Japanese government organised something similar to dong du at the Asian level. Some Asian intellectuals were, in fact, sent to Japan to undergo “training” at the International Students Institute19 (Kokusai Gakuyukai) that would make them efficient agents of the Japanese Empire. The aim of this institute for international students — founded in 1935 by Gaimushô, the Foreign Affairs Ministry — was to encourage foreign students to come to Japan. It received generous funds from the government and donations. In 1942, the Institute functioned directly under the Greater East Asia Ministry, which was responsible for many of the Foreign Affairs Ministry functions related to the countries of the Co-prosperity Sphere. Very clearly, the dong du logic was reversed: whereas in 1905, young Vietnamese went to the Japanese Archipelago to obtain military and intellectual resources to combat France, Japan of the 1930s intended to train Asia’s future nationalist leaders to serve its own interests.

29In fact, in Southeast Asia, some nationalists willingly responded to the call. Thus, following Emperor Bao Daï’s abortive renovation attempt in the early thirties, a few Vietnamese Resistants — Caodaist and Hoa Hao sect members and even Catholics such as Ngo Dinh Diem — once again looked to the East for inspiration, especially to the “League for the restoration of Vietnam” of Prince Cong De, who had taken refuge in Japan. U Saw, who later became Burma’s Prime Minister, went to Japan in 1935, and in the same year, founded an association to improve Nippo-Burmese relations. Benigno Ramos, a leader from the Philippine resistance, took refuge here. Malaysian Ibrahim Yacoob came into contact with the Japanese around 1938. Lastly, right from 1939, Phibun Songkhram, Prime Minister of Siam — the only member country of the League of Nations (LN) which had not condemned the Japanese “aggression” in Manchuria in 1933 — started sending hundreds of students for military instruction to Japan, just as Phan Boi Chau had done 30 years earlier.

30As mentioned previously, Siam signed a pact of mutual assistance with the Japanese powers two years later. All these men were zealous sycophants of the Japanese model.20 As for Vietnam, the local press, especially Left-wing newspapers such as the daily La Lutte, continuously denounced the rise of Japanese imperialism. In 1931, when Japanese troops penetrated Manchuria, public opinion and the Vietnamese press largely supported China, condemning Japan’s aggression. So most Vietnamese viewed the encroachment of the Japanese army into their territory with great distrust.

Notes de bas de page

1Noël Péri, “Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l’Indochine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles”, Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient 23: 1–104 (Hanoi, 1924).

2Ibid., p. 3.

3Ibid., p. 70

4Others were just exiles including Japanese Christian converts who were fleeing religious persecution.

5Saigon Eco: 6–8 (June 1998).

6Tran My-Van, “Japan through Vietnamese eyes (1905–1945)”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30 (March): 128–29.

7Ibid., p. 129.

8“Dong du” is pronounced as“dong zu”.

9Masaya Shiraishi, “Phan Boi Chau in Japan”, in Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement, ed. Vinh Sinh (Boston: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, The William Joiner Center UMass/Boston), The Lac-Viet Series, No. 8, 1988, p. 55.

10Shiraishi, “Phan Boi Chau in Japan”, p. 55.

11One of the practical reasons for forming trading companies was that they would facilitate rapid financing of the revolutionary movement.

12François Joyaux, Géopolitique de l’Extrême-Orient, 1981, tome 1, p. 214. (This paragraph owes much to chapter 10 of the book: “Le Japon, un État ‘continental’ devenu ‘maritime’”, pp. 195–215.)

13Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 153.

14Nguyên The Anh, “Phan Boi Chau and the beginnings of the Dong-Du movement”, in Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement, ed. Vinh Sinh, p. 5. At that time, Liang Qichao and Phan Boi Chau shared the same political view: to obtain their respective country’s independence while preserving the institution of monarchy.

15Georges Boudarel, “Phan Boi Chau and the Vietnamese society of his time”, France-Asie 23, no. 199/4 (1969): 426.

16Georges Boudarel, “L’Extrême gauche asiatique et le mouvement national vietnamien”, in Histoire de l’Asie du Sud-Est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions, ed. Pierre Brocheux (Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1981), p. 171.

17William H. Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement, 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 27.

18Ibid., p. 27.

19Ibid., p. 38.

20Philippe Richer, L’Asie du Sud-Est. Indépendances et communismes (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, coll. Notre siècle, 1981), p. 86. See Daniel Hémery, “Révolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial”, in Indochina, Communistes, trotskystes, nationalistes à Saigon de 1932 à 1937 (Paris: Maspero, coll. Bibliothèque socialiste, 1975), pp. 130–31.


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