A Tradition of Political, Economic and Social Control

1In many Western countries emerging capitalism brought in its wake values such as individualism, liberalism, and by extension, democracy. From the outset, the capitalist system that developed in the West was opposed to absolutism. In Thailand, however, an aristocracy was able to co-exist harmoniously with capitalism.1 Thus over time, the Thai population had to use means other than those of liberal democracy to assert its social demands and struggle for greater freedom.

2When Ayutthaya was still the capital of the Kingdom in the 18^th century, exports were considered a royal privilege.2 International pressure from rice-importing countries finally broke this monopoly, and Siam’s external trade developed rapidly in the second half of the 19^th century.3 At the same time, the peasants of the central plain who were formerly confined to economic self-subsistence began to increase areas under cultivation and reap greater harvests. Eventually aristocrats were no longer the sole beneficiaries of overseas trade; merchants, mostly Chinese traders in collaboration with Western partners, also took advantage of increased opportunities. Though agriculturalists could produce much more than what was needed for their consumption, they failed to develop into a local bourgeoisie or a bourgeoisie with local capital holdings, as was the case in Europe. The Thai peasantry never really developed into a middle class.

3During the reign of King Chulalongkorn from 1868 to 1910, the monarchy succeeded in overcoming local powers and influential networks, and proceeded to centralise and professionalise the government machinery. A salaried bureaucratic class and professional army were established. These invariably led to a caste of high-level bureaucrats devoted to government service, whose existence was predicated on being educated overseas. The monarchy sent many promising young plebeians and aristocrats abroad to receive training. Freshly qualified from British and French universities, those bound for the Thai civil service returned home with great optimism, a fascination for European democracies, and — for some — a host of progressive ideas.

4From among these foreign-educated bureaucrats emerged a group that, from afar, began to view the land of their birth with new eyes. The movement was powerful enough to question royal domination and force King Prajadhipok (r. 1925–35) to transform the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy in 1932. And yet, the arrival of this young civil and military force did not have the impact on the society one might have expected. Until the end of the 1970s, Siam (which became Thailand in 1938) continued to be an essentially rural nation subject to distinctly hierarchical social organisation.

5It was a major student uprising in 1973 — in some ways a legacy of the 1932 movement, but one strengthened with radical demands in relation to its time — that finally brought reformist ideas to power. The real democratisation brought about by students who participated in this historical event was tragically cut short by the military coup d’état of 1976, which was accompanied by bloody repression.

6But the foundations of social reform had been laid, and above all, a real middle class of bureaucrats, merchants, and businessmen (often of Chinese origin) had emerged.4 Aspiring to greater liberty, the middle classes wanted to do away with the military control that had been imposed with the blessings of the aristocracy. Many of them were descended from a generation that had experienced war, and had become disillusioned with fascism. They sought to construct a more open society that could offer better economic prospects.

7Nevertheless, this orientation met with great resistance. Since the coup d’état of 1932 up until very recently, the generals in the country have dominated Thai national politics.5 The army traditionally enjoys the relative support of peasants, who regard it as a fortress against commercial exploitation.6 This support helps explain the Thai military’s continual proximity to political power.

8In the 1950s the army was given the responsibility of restoring order to a nation suffering from financial difficulties and an incipient Marxist insurrection. During the Cold War era, interests converged between the anti-communist United States and the Thai military government. As a result, Thailand benefited from a good deal of military support — as well as three billion dollars of financial assistance — between 1951 and 1975.7 Washington’s only terms of agreement were that the state’s military-industrial capitalism, based on a system of monopoly, was unacceptable and would need to be replaced. Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat came to power in Bangkok in 1958, and from the outset he cooperated with the injunctions of the Kennedy administration to open the door to foreign investments.

1960–90: Helplessness of the Salaried Class, Radical Protests and the Emergence of a “Middle Class”

9The closing decades of the 20^th century were marked by profound socio-economic change in Thailand. Agriculture, which in 1960 still accounted for 40 per cent of GNP and 83 per cent of exports, was by 1990 reduced to only 14 per cent of total economic activity and 22 per cent of export revenue.8

10A remarkable increase in GNP was only one consequence of this shift. Industrialisation was also accompanied by rapid urbanisation and a massive rural exodus, leading to great disorientation and anomie in a population unaccustomed to such mobility.9 Intact families were split up, and individuals who had become separated often had to recombine with different family members to form new households, a process that disrupted norms of social control. The very rules that had long governed work and social distinctions were fundamentally transformed. Prompted by the changed conditions and a general sense of unease, people confronted new identities and came into association with others of the same identity in groups based on new norms and demands.

11The beginning of industrialisation in the 1930s saw the appearance of a Thai labouring class, a new social entity. However, it would be much later before worker-based class consciousness would appear. The first truly popular political movements started only after 1972 with the lifting of restrictions on trade union organizations. Workers’ demands at that time originated with the public sector employees’ unions, and slowly spread to private-sector labourers. All pressed for better salaries and improved working conditions. In 1972 some 8,000 labourers protested in 34 labour strikes; the following year there were 501 strikes involving 120,000 labourers.

12These strikes received strong support from a student movement that was inculcated with Maoist ideology. In 1973, a trade union was created with the objective of rallying workers, students, and peasants all under one banner. On 14 October 1973, the army proceeded to brutally suppress the demonstrators, which led to the fall of the military government. However, the strikes did not stop. Protests against the American presence, capitalist exploitation, and corruption continued, now subsumed under the trade union umbrella of the Labour Coordination Centre of Thailand (LCCT).

13In 1974, student activists reproached the civil government for continuing to sanction tacit military control. They also joined protests organized by private sector workers. A common march was organised under the LCCT banner on Sanam Luang, the Royal Esplanade of Bangkok near Thammasat University, an event that brought together 20,000 to 30,000 people over five days. To put an end to the strike the government decided to introduce a guaranteed minimum salary. The new provisions, however, excluded certain categories of workers, in particular tourism sector employees.

14The workers, most of whom were from a rural milieu, had scant experience in negotiating or in organising protests. They lacked a unifying base and needed resources and assistance to form one. It was the Thai students who helped the workers construct a framework to press for general welfare demands and create pressure groups to publicise their grievances.

15The year 1975 sounded the death knell of the golden age of the LCCT, which became a victim of dissension among the student unions that were involved. This provided an opportunity for some employers to withdraw employee benefits. By converting workers’ base pay to piece rate, many employers evaded new legislative measures regarding paid leave, sick leave, overtime, and severance pay. These were essential elements of the fragile new social contract. A bomb was set off in the midst of striking workers at a textile company at Thonburi, an act that symbolically marked the return to an earlier balance of power. Increasing numbers of industrial employees who dared to protest were fired. During the first nine months of 1975, 8,100 workers were retrenched across 1,931 companies. The right to strike was restricted and thereafter, a prior notice of eight days had to be given to warn the company of impending actions.

16On 4 July 1976, students and workers organised a major strike against companies representing the American-Taiwanese-Japanese presence in the country. Protesters shouted slogans condemning what they termed a “capitalist takeover” of the economy, one carried out under the pretext of an imaginary communist threat. The police used violent means to suppress the strikers, and the LCCT eventually collapsed. From then on, student demonstrations were broken up and their leaders arrested. In October of that year the law granting the right to strike was abolished, and between 2,000 to 3,000 students had to flee to countryside, forests, and neighbouring countries. Any progressive ideas that had inspired the protests were thenceforth considered tantamount to communism and hence illegal.

17This was the end of an epoch. When the students who had gone underground came out of hiding a few years later, their society had been transformed. The emerging middle classes no longer dreamt of liberty or social reform, but only of the economic growth and prosperity they might achieve.

18In 1978, General Kriangsak Chomanand became Prime Minister. He himself was credited for the military patronage of the Federation of Labour Unions of Thailand, a body that brought together workers and other salaried employees in large public enterprises associated with transport, utilities, and tobacco. When he took over as prime minister, Kriangksak Chomanand decided to annul all other existing trade union organisations.10

19A group of young officers nicknamed the “Young Turks” gained increasing influence in Thailand between 1973 and 1976. The appellation was borrowed from a movement of the same name that had introduced democratic values into the Ottoman Empire at the start of the 20^th century. The Young Turks of Thailand fought in the Vietnam War alongside the Americans, who had trained them in anti-guerrilla warfare. They arrived on the political scene at a time when the discredited army had lost ground to civilian politicians.

20The young officers tried to repair the image of the army by feigning an interest in the country’s social problems — a message that met with general approval, as their civilian rivals showed a troubling propensity to mix public interest with personal goals. This tendency had grown to such an extent that the ordinary Thai citizen was likely to perceive a soldier to be less corrupt than an elected politician. Although the Young Turks were able to get help from the remaining trade unions and student associations which they managed to control, they were never able to accede to power directly. The Thai King continued to oppose them, and the next fifteen years were marked by the mutual opposition of the two political forces.

21Meanwhile, individuals in the reigning civilian-military caste that had been in power almost continuously since 1932 remained allied to the aristocracy. But increasingly, they were confronted by the Thai middle classes, who between 1973 and 1976 had started to wield power as they gained in strength from continued economic growth.

22In 1981, the right to strike was restored. Fifty-four strikes involving 22,000 workers subsequently took place. Trade unions reappeared, and by 1983 there were 413 such organisations.11 But the power to retrench continued to be a discretionary weapon in the hands of employers, and activists, naturally, were its main victims. Employers continued to suppress those who dared challenge the status quo, until all threats or protests were virtually done away with. Conditions for workers in Thailand thus began an era of long-term decline. During the 1980s, politicians and businessmen extended privatisation measures to businesses across several of the country’s economic sectors.

23Meanwhile, the fight against communism continued. The communist “threat” at the borders was always deemed to be present, all the more since counterinsurgency assistance from the American army had declined considerably after the Vietnam War. The government decided to recruit and train young people to form paramilitary units to counter a possible armed insurrection. Organisations such as the Volunteers for National Defence, Forest Guards, Red Guards, and Village Scouts were just some of the paramilitary units in which young Thais who today, in 2000, are between 30 and 35 years of age, received training in combat fighting at the time. By 1985, membership in these units numbered some three million young people.12

24On the social front, a 1988 study of 110 companies in Bangkok showed that 232 union leaders were among the 1,531 employees who were retrenched during that year. Employers would not hesitate to close down a factory and dismiss all employees when its workers threatened to go on strike. Subsequently, the employer would start recruiting new workers for the same jobs with different contracts, often with reduced benefits. Unions survived, but most often in clandestine fashion.

25Employers generally continued to increase the number of fixed period, or temporary, contracts. The proportion of jobs characterised by precarious employment rose to 90 per cent in some sectors such as the textile industry. In 1990, another study estimated that 44 per cent of Thai workers were paid less than the legal minimum wage. Only white-collar workers were spared during this employment restructuring. The shortage of qualified white-collar labour during the country’s growth period from the early 1980s until 1995 served to strengthen the position of the middle classes.

26Coups that have taken place in Thailand one after another since the 1970s have all been justified by the need to safeguard the country’s three pillars — nation, religion, and the monarchy — against the “communist threat”. The reason for the 1991 coup d’état was somewhat different. The “threat” from communism having virtually disappeared, those mounting the coup claimed to be doing so to counter the “threat” of generalised corruption, which they alleged to be a necessary counterpart of parliamentarism. From the perspective of those who support putsches, such actions are necessary to slow the pace of the democratisation, as well as fight “revolutionary” militants (i.e. the Young Turks). The military acted as if it held power unreservedly, pretending to have “everything under control except the moon and the stars”, but their efforts failed to counter even street-level resistance and the coup attempt failed.

27Born out of popular student protests in the 1970s and strengthened by the economic growth of the 1980s, the urban middle class was eventually in a position to form what is generally called “public opinion”. Unionists, politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats, teachers, religious authorities, writers, and artists soon took over the reins of the Fourth Estate. These groups were able to do so simply because they were responsible for what was said in the media, what was written in books, or what was taught in school. They were thus able to create the myths, knowledge, and other common opinions of the time.

28Along with economic growth, educational trends also contributed to the expanding influence of the middle class. Access to tertiary education became a universal right in Thailand. However, many students of the 1973–6 generation did not follow the usual paths to a bureaucratic career. Rather than heading for administration after graduation from the universities, one can find them today in 2000, aged 45 years or so, holding down jobs as secretaries, accountants, or commercial agents. Many have distanced themselves from values propagated by the civilian-military elite that had caused Thai society to stagnate rather than evolve. By their very actions and life choices, members of the 1973–6 generation succeeded in introducing the ideals of civilian society and democratic debate into Thai society.

29A large number of associations for human rights, economic development, environmental protection, and freedom of expression were formed. By defending life and environment in the villages, urbanites were able to associate themselves with villagers. Thus united, urban and rural alike formed the essence of the new political force of the 1980s. Artists relayed the messages of this grassroots “NGO movement” in their creations. Musical groups such as Carabao defended the environment and railed against injustice, while Asanee Chotikun denounced corruption, prostitution, and urban exploitation.

The Decline of Politicisation and Growth of Cynicism

30Two decades of repression in Thai society acted to limit the extent of politicisation among members of the earlier “coming-of-age” generation in Thai politics. Many were sufficiently disillusioned by events in the 1970s to leave politics altogether, and chose instead to make use of opportunities to start business in the economic climate of increased foreign investment.

31The trend away from politics is even more marked for the following generation. Educated in the 1980s, many of this group opted to study engineering and management and, as of the year 2000, are holding key posts in industries, services, tourism, and public transport and works. Far from the idealism that fired their more senior counterparts during their student days, members of the 1980s generation today are more likely to have individual aspirations. They have become adults at a time when a fascinating culture of consumerism has emerged in Thailand, one promoted more by television than by educational theories. These young people are less interested in social reconstruction than they are in the construction of new condominiums, malls, and other fast track schemes. Cynical about politics, their only genuine interest appears to be ascending the ladder of social mobility. When the 1980s generation took to the streets in May 1992, they were not protesting against the arrogance of the military and loss of democratic practices, but rather against the limits to their personal success they feared would be imposed on them by a monopolistic elite.

32Students of the late 1990s generation, whose preference for yaa baa is so marked, are therefore inheritors of an eventful history. The Thai military’s partial or total consolidation of power over seven decades served to bring about the end of communism in the country, but also effectively killed off all other alternative ideals. Members of the current cohort in 2000 stand completely apart from their parents, the latter belonging to the student generation of 1973–6 that experienced the agonies of a society created in protest and suppressed by violence. Members of the current generation of young people are also unlike the generation of their immediate seniors, who became caught up in the dynamism of economic growth of the 1980s and succumbed to the excitement it generated.

33The spell of economic success was broken by the shock of 1997, precisely the moment when the student generation of the 1990s was either anticipating or actually preparing to enter the job market. In July of that year, the baht lost nearly 40 per cent of its value against the dollar, revealing over-confidence and bad management.13 Foreign investors embarked on a massive capital withdrawal. The construction sector was especially hard-hit, leaving millions of workers unemployed.14 The government was forced to take drastic economic measures, and the King personally insisted that all Thais should accept the sacrifices imposed by the situation.

34Three decades have thus now passed since the first glimmerings of democratic awareness in the country. In the period following, Thai society was wracked by confrontation. It has now been over a decade since the 1992 establishment of an authentic parliamentary democracy. Today, however, social demands are no longer on the agenda. Apart from the NGO movements, Thai civil society evidences a distressing lack of social infrastructure.15

35Deprived of the prospects brought about by the economic growth of the 1980s, young Thais today have few other ambitions except to be entertained and seek enjoyment. “Fun” is the watchword of a generation lacking in prospects, a generation which prefers to disdain — rather than take to heart — any social criticism directed at it. The craze of Thai youth for ATS allows individuals to “look at life through rose-tinted glasses”, a social syndrome highly evocative of this particular historical moment in Thai society. Taking a long-term view of the making of modern Thailand, then, we can surmise that the political, social, economic, and cultural conditions of the country in the late 1990s have been extremely conducive to the methamphetamine boom.

36The current period, though one of disillusionment, is also one of peace and relative social permissiveness. Despite current drug laws, in actual practice youngsters are generally free to use yaa baa as they wish. The product suits them because it embellishes their vision of the world. Perhaps naïvely, they use it in excess without worrying about possible consequences. Short-term interests dictate their choices. One young man named Nat confirms that “adolescents consume drugs only because they want to have fun” and to enjoy “the energy given by drugs”.16 Such is the game. Yaa baa is taken for the fun of it, consumed alongside other useless and superfluous products because to do so is amusing (sanuk). In truth, the prime motivating factor among drug-taking young Thais is not so much a desire to break the law as it is the desire to have a good time together.

37“Any prohibition is glamorised by the transgression it targets.”17 Patrick Pelège observes that in order to be different, adolescents in the West frequently try to break away from their families. They provoke, contradict, question their parents, and test the limits of what is permitted and prohibited in the real world.18

38However, while adolescents in the West take to addiction because of their rebellious attitude, this is not the case for young Thai addicts. Jacques Vincent, a journalist present at the student revolts of May 1968 in France who also witnessed the emerging methamphetamine boom among Thai youth, emphasizes the differences between the two. Young Thais, he observes, are not revolting against the consumer society, but are instead longing for access to it.19 Bernard Antoine’s analysis confirms that “youngsters are not consuming yaa baa to transgress what is forbidden”.20 Not having experienced military repression, members of the current younger generation feel relatively unconstrained with respect to the law.

39Young Thais’ drug-taking practices are not done in solitude. Yaa baa users must follow the group in Thailand, which guarantees a feeling of security. Thai youth has given itself over to sanuk, a traditional value which means “to act only by virtue of what gives pleasure and what is pleasant”. Their indulgence in risk-taking by using drugs to excess or becoming intoxicated underscores a game-like approach to the world. This game culminates in yielding relative — though not complete — control over oneself vis-à-vis the outer world: relative enough to experience a sense of freedom without incurring the social stigmatisation that results from becoming an advanced user.

40David Le Breton explains this as “losing your bearings”, in other words, creating a temporary disorder of the coordinates that control day-to-day existence in a social and cultural environment governed by precise rules. The player gives himself up, at least partially, to the intoxication of the senses. He wishes to “have a ball”.21

41Mr. Suchaat continues, “Yaa baa is modern because it is a chemical pill. It is in vogue. Yaa baa is very fashionable. It is taken because it is more cool than natural substances.”22 A report of the National Commission for Primary Education reveals that many school-age young people are up all night enjoying “the Western lifestyle” that has become so popular among middle class youngsters.23 Thai youth try to imitate what they imagine is the behaviour of their Western counterparts.

42Such actions never fail to alarm older Thais, who, like adults everywhere, disparage the values and identity crises of the younger generation. “Society is sick. We have to reconstruct the system of values and teach youngsters how to … find their self-esteem.”24 According to Mrs. Pim, “they drift and have false values. They are not sure of their identity, of what they are and the path that they take”.25

43In reality, the youngsters are not without values, but rather adhere to values consonant with a consumer society. Mrs. Nucharat Kanchanaroj observes that young Thais need their pagers, mobile telephones, video games, television, and music systems.26 Access to these symbolic consumer items is “necessary for existence” when one belongs to the wealthy or middle-income classes. It also holds true for those of more modest standing, provided they have the spending power. Children — including those of illegal workers — have a penchant for methamphetamine because it offers them entry into what they perceive as the modern world. In the lyrics of one of Carabao’s hit songs, “Thais are scared of being left behind”.27 A major concern among the young is not being “fashionable”, and since an authentic and modern Thai fashion sense has yet to emerge, what comes from abroad is thought of as “fashionable”. (The song lyrics reveal a paradox, however. Numerous “fashionable” consumer items are manufactured in Thailand, but if they are sought after it is only because they have been sent abroad to be labelled “Paris” or “New York”.)

44In the current computer age, young people easily learn about how the wealthy live and desire a foretaste of it, says a journalist.28 Individuals who are far from being well-off will sell methamphetamine, not to generate income to pay for the basic necessities of life, but to enjoy luxury products and expensive goods.29

45Of course, this phenomenon is not entirely new. Jacques Vincent remarks that young Thais have long gravitated toward the “disco-techno-pop-star” culture.30 But the tendency has grown considerably. Discos are more frequented than ever before. And as for student prostitution, it is common knowledge that “some girls are capable of going into prostitution just to get a mobile telephone or the latest L’Oréal product”.31

46Given the above, what used to be inaccessible has now become as indispensable as what is vital. Herein is an essential element of the new hedonistic culture: the youth of Thailand know that they no longer want the rigid morals of the old, but are unsure of what an alternative would be. Under these conditions, money becomes the standard that allows one to measure oneself against others. Depending on the individual, one aspires for the latest-model Mercedes or a gadget from a chic boutique. Even the less fortunate who cannot afford to buy things from shopping malls satisfy themselves by entering to look around in wonder and enjoy the air-conditioned atmosphere.32

47According to Patrick Pelège, when one is a part of a society where image is of primary importance and appearances are highly valued, it is a great risk to be fat when the norm is to be thin. And a society whose dominant value is appearance tends to instil childish mentalities in its members. The learning processes of education, autonomy and responsibility depend on the ability of a society to lead (ex-ducere) its members beyond primary dependences. At root it is education, in the sense of “being conducted outside of”, and not seduction (se-ducere), that enables this maturation process to take place.33

48But increasingly, the Thai social model is based on collective self-seduction. A player is defined in near totality once he has expressed his status or function. And for the youth who has neither the former nor the latter, it is only his articles of consumption that serve as a visiting card. The image conveyed by a person confirms that he “holds” his status. To ensure that his “right” worth is properly assessed, an individual must make regular display of his credited worth. The very rich in Thailand will organise a sumptuous reception or finance a charity that also accords them religious merit. For a man, the quest for recognition can be expressed through bold acts of virility meant to impressive his peers. Such behaviour is all the more impressive if it is carried out in a flagrant and ostentatious manner.34

49Surprisingly, the limitless desire to belong to a society of consumption in Thai society among young people does not generally give rise to acts of delinquency.35 Young Thais do not adopt a confrontational, nihilistic, or anarchist stance which refutes social values, even if doing so might give one the upper hand. For instance, theft is considered unacceptable and is never tolerated.36 Students from a very young age are taught this principle in civics classes in government schools. It is also covered in Buddhist teachings. Negative social sanctions against theft are rooted in social norms of respecting others and their possessions.37 But above all, the fact that a consumer society can emerge without a corresponding increase in behaviour that transgresses the law is proof that the rules of the social “game” are thoroughly respected. Young people in Thailand have not lost all their values, as some would claim. They have simply adopted new values and superimposed them on the older ones.

50For older generations, the current yaa baa phenomenon is difficult to understand. Why do young people take the drug in such large quantities when their lives are free of the physically demanding tasks that produce insurmountable or unavoidable fatigue? By adults’ reckoning, the concept of a recreational drug, one taken “just for pleasure”, is abnormal. According to Margaret Mead, in a world of perpetual change, man becomes an “immigrant in time”.38 This is indeed the case in Thailand, where educating children about drugs is becoming a problem. The cultural gap that divides generations in Thailand today is of such magnitude that many parents are at a loss about how to even begin to tackle it.