Chapter 7
Collectivism and Everyday Resistance in Anyar
p. 203-247
Texte intégral
1The Myanmar military coup of 2021 caused social and political structures to quickly fall apart at both the national and sub-national levels, drastically altering the lives of millions of people. As a result, a strong resistance movement emerged rapidly in the centre of the country (collectively referred to as the Anyar Region) which includes previously peaceful regions such as Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. The proliferation of anti-junta resistance was fostered by similar movements in other ethnic regions which have struggled against the Myanmar military for decades.
2Principally due to public support, the resistance forces in the central part of Myanmar have been setting up locally led armed groups, along with new public administration and institutions of governance, which attempt to provide regulations, social services and address disputes. New grassroots governance actors have also emerged, some of which, ideologically—if not functionally—are allies of Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs), People Defence Forces (PDFs,) or the National Unity Government (NUG). These different actors and the coordination between them, has led to the creation of governance apparatus that function alongside pre-existing state institutions.
3Following the rapid growth of the anti-junta movement and the emergence of parallel governance institutions in the region, Anyar communities have been targeted with unprecedented levels of violent oppression and atrocities by the State Administrative Council (SAC). Not only have basic supplies been restricted by the four-cut tactics of the SAC (see below), but also fundamental economic and social infrastructure has been destroyed by arson attacks, frequent military operations, looting, and the scorched-earth campaigns of the SAC. As the violent attacks of SAC forces on Anyar communities has intensified, popular resistance against the military junta has also increased with, for example, the growth of local resilience through collective efforts and solidarity against the SAC’s multifaceted suppression.
4This chapter employs the concept of “community” as inspired by Bujones et al (2013) in which a community is, in the context of this research, referring to individuals, households and groups of people who share similar characteristics and are exposed to certain shocks and stressors generated by the 2021 military coup. It is based on extensive research and provides insights on collective resistance efforts and emerging resilience mechanisms by analysing the evolution of social, economic, political, and environmental dynamics at grassroots levels. Its main analyses draw on concepts of collective identity, network and community resilience and explores emerging norms, social relations, subsistence practices and local wisdom.
5The initial analysis draws on the idea that collective action is an outcome of mobilisation, which is ongoing and is intertwined with the relationship between the actors involved (Shesterinina 2021). More specifically, the analysis is focused on revolution and dramatic societal changes. These changes have an informal structure, are self-organised, and are linked with social governance and reciprocity, which is outside formal political institutions (Scott 1979). Theories and case studies on social norms and reciprocity of peasant society in the colonial and post-independence periods of Myanmar also inform the study. This is especially the case concerning existing social norms, practices of obligations and reciprocity at the community level with regard to understanding the resilience of Anyar society in conflict situations amidst scarce resources (which relates to similar findings in comparable contexts, see Scott 1976). The study also gives special attention to pre-existing social and political dynamics, as well as post-coup collective identity and shared values (see the notions developed in the work of Weinstein 2007). Collective identity in a conflict situation may have two aspects: (1) a shared exposure and understanding of armed conflicts and the resistance; (2) actors’ roles as a part of social networks and the mobilisation process. The process may be ongoing and transforms itself throughout struggle and collective action (Shesterinina 2021). When communities are frequently exposed to violence and oppression, it can create a shared understanding of state violence and a shared identity that fosters expressions of solidarity and cohesion. This can help individuals coordinate and draw upon collective sources of support in times of need and enhance the collectivism (Drury 2012). Furthermore, Anyar resistance’s collectivism has been fortified by the resistance leaders’ efforts to establish extensive social services and governance in the areas they control. These relationships, known as “insurgent social orders” (Brenner 2019) strengthen ties between the grassroots communities and resistance leaders, as well as forging the symbolic or moral authority of rebel governance and its resistance to the junta (McCarthy and Farrelly 2020). This study aims to expand existing research by focusing on the everyday resistance of the Anyar community, alongside its collectivism and collective action in times of uncertainty and resilience. It examines three key sectors that have received little attention in existing research on post-coup Myanmar: (1) the local resilience and adaptive capacity of the Anyar communities, (2) insurgent social orders and the legitimacy of emerging resistance institutions of governance, and (3) collectivism and the collective identity of resistance struggles.
Methodology and conceptual framework
6Anyar is the historic term used to represent Upper Burma, heartland of the country’s culture and society for over a thousand years (Aung-Thwin, 2008). In general, the settlement areas of the Burmese people are divided into two parts: Anyar which means upstream of the Ayeyarwaddy River, and Akyay which encompasses regions downstream of Ayeyarwaddy River. The Anyar region includes the surrounding areas of the confluences of the Ayeyarwady and Chindwin Rivers, and includes the Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing Regions. The lower part of the Ayeyarwaddy River (Akyay) includes Bago, Yangon, and Ayeyarwady Regions.
Figure 1. The approximate location of the Anyar (အညာ) Region of Myanmar

7The Anyar region has witnessed significant resistance to the coup along with the emergence of numerous local armed forces and new administrative and governance systems. From January to March 2023, 99 interviews were conducted by the authors of this research in various townships of the Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing regions. The selection of these locations included townships with strong resistance areas, emerging local governance institutions and ones which are critical in providing logistical support to the resistance struggle. Different stakeholders were interviewed, including armed resistance; PAB (Public Administrative Bodies) members; civil society leaders; CDM members; REHASS (Resistance Emergency Humanitarian and Social Services) service providers and residents of Anyar from both urban settings and rural resistance strongholds.
8Field researchers were from the local communities. They used qualitative interview techniques (directed and semi-directed) focusing on the perceptions of the interviewees, to decipher the point of view of those living in these territories.
9Due to the sensitivity of the political issues discussed, as well as active armed conflicts, the researchers faced several challenges and obstacles. Most of the interviews were carried out via telephone due to the difficulties involved in conducting face-to-face interviews, potentially compromising the depth of conversation between interviewers and respondents that can occur during face-to-face interviews. The interview process was also delayed due to security risks and the unpredictability of the political climate and in some cases, interviews had to be cancelled. To protect the respondents’ identity and reduce the potential risks, the researchers avoided providing any detailed characteristics and descriptions of exact localities. In spite of these constraints, this rare field research is significant, particularly in Myanmar’s current extremely challenging environment because it provides a unique analysis of collectivism and everyday resistance in a context where data collection is extremely difficult.
Impact of the SAC’s Four-Cuts Strategy and scorched-earth campaign
10The initially peaceful anti-coup movement quickly evolved into nationwide armed resistance soon after the violent crackdown by the junta. To rapidly quell the growing armed resistance, the junta promptly employed suppressive measures known as the Four-Cuts Strategy to pre-empt the resources and logistical viability of the opposition. In addition, the SAC also launched scorched-earth campaigns to destroy resources and sites that could be used by the resistance. At the same time, the SAC imposed several restrictions preventing the flow of support (e.g. money, information, materials, and logistics) from urban to resistant strongholds in rural areas.
11In urban areas, civilians have been subjected to strict regulations enforced by heavily armed soldiers on every corner of the towns. These regulations stem from the SAC’s enactment of a series of repressive legal measures limiting freedom of expression and annulling safeguards against arbitrary arrest. They also criminalised criticism of the junta, support for the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), armed resistance and humanitarian support to communities in resistance areas. Furthermore, the SAC has imposed stricter regulations on private hospitals, clinics, and the charity groups (parahita / ပရဟိတအဖွဲ့), in urban areas. These regulations were implemented to limit access to healthcare services for individuals residing in areas of opposition. In late 2022, the SAC also closed numerous private hospitals and clinics that employed CDM doctors or provided medical services to people from areas where armed resistance was prevalent.1
12Moreover, the SAC amended the Electronic Transaction Law2 to restrict information flow, provide military access to personal information, and criminalise the spread of criticism of the junta. At the same time, the controversial Ward and Village Administration Law has been reinstated to monitor people’s movements, requiring guest registration with the authorities for overnight stays in non-resident wards or villages. The SAC also used the clearance of encroachers (kyu / ကျူး) to suppress the urban poor.3 Numerous cases of kyu clearances have been reported in Yangon, Mandalay, and other parts of the country, leading to the demolition of thousands of houses by junta authorities using heavy machines such as bulldozers. This strategic clearance of kyu is, in essence, aimed at suppressing the activities of urban underground groups that frequently disrupt the SAC security apparatus.
The Four-Cuts Strategy
13These Four-Cuts tactics of the SAC—taken from the Myanmar Army textbook (inherited from the colonial times), and not unique to Anyar—involve denying access to necessities, such as food, shelter, finance, information, and recruitment for resistance forces. The goal is to diminish the capacity to challenge the military by constantly disrupting opposition organisations, community supply chains and support systems. Historically, the military deployed the Four-Cuts Strategy in the 1960s against the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the Bago and Ayeyarwady regions (Moe 1999).
14As part of the Four-Cuts campaigns, the SAC has imposed strict regulations on travelling and transporting goods, including medicine and food, by setting up multiple security checkpoints where travellers are required to show their National Identity Cards. Inspections of mobile phones are also often used to accuse civilians of having links with resistance groups. Transportation of items of first necessity but also agricultural supplies, especially fertiliser, severely affect local production, market access, and the agricultural supply chain. Local transport services have virtually disappeared and local trade has been fundamentally disrupted, leading to economic collapse in the region.
15Furthermore, the SAC’s strategy includes destroying basic social services like education and healthcare. Schools and hospitals have been dysfunctional in most rural areas of the Sagaing and Magway Regions since the coup. One of the major reasons for this is the reallocation of medical staff and teachers to fill the workforce gaps in urban areas caused by the mass Civil Disobedience Movement of government employees. Transportation of medicine and school textbooks to rural areas has been prohibited and subjected to prosecution by junta forces at checkpoints. Even retailers in urban areas have been threatened when they are found selling books to villagers. Worse still, the SAC has often used many of these coercively vacated schools and village hospitals as military bases for their operations.
16The SAC has also imposed large-scale mobile and internet shutdowns in several towns across the country. According to Access Now’s report, Sagaing and Magway regions were among the most affected,4 mainly because these are the regions with not only one of the strongest resistance forces but also where most SAC atrocities took place, compelling the junta to cut communication between resistance communities. This also made it harder to report the violent conflict and the numerous human rights violations. Finally, the SAC dramatically reduced electricity supplies, which had systematically negative impacts on the general public.
Scorched-earth campaign
17In order to reinforce the Four-Cuts Strategy, SAC troops launched scorched-earth campaigns to destroy all forms of civilian properties. These usually featured attacks on civilians, massacres, looting, and the destruction of civilian properties (including the torching of homes), leading to the displacement of thousands who have been precariously seeking refuge in nearby villages and forests.
18According to a report by Data for Myanmar, nearly 54,000 houses in the Sagaing Region and 11,000 in the Magway Region were burned down by the military and its militias over the two-year period following the coup.5 Respondents from Magway Region noted that nearly all of the 50 villages in the northern part of the Gantgaw Township have been destroyed in SAC arson attacks, leaving the majority of residents in dire situations.
19Abductions of civilians and indiscriminate attacks on the villages suspected of supporting resistance efforts were also prevalent. During clearance operations, SAC troops and their Pyu Saw Htee6 militia members looted people’s properties and took valuable items, such as gold, motorcycles, and harvested crops. They also butchered villagers’ cattle and destroyed usable assets that they couldn’t take away. In addition, they have damaged irrigation systems to disable farming and contaminate drinking water by throwing objects into the wells. One housewife described the despicable situation:
They took everything, even kitchen utensils, pots, and rice cookers. They piled stolen items in front of the houses and carried them away by trucks. They destroyed everything and if they could not carry something, they spoiled it with engine oil, or burned it.
20In conjunction with the scorched-earth policy, the SAC increased its use of aerial strikes and artillery shelling throughout the country, particularly after the declaration of martial law in thirty-seven additional townships, including 11 in Sagaing, in early 2023.7 The junta’s strategy aims to weaken resistance and logistical support while forcing more people to flee and become internally displaced persons (IDPs), thereby burdening supporters of the resistance and dispersing financial and logistical support across multiple areas, including humanitarian aid for these IDPs. According to the local research group Nyan Lin Thit Analytica, the military conducted 454 airstrikes in the first four months of 2023, nearly one third of the total airstrikes (1,427) since the military seized power in 2021.8 Artillery shelling targeted areas suspected of hosting resistance groups, resulting in indiscriminate casualties among innocent civilians, including women and children. The military’s airstrikes frequently targeted local infrastructures such as monasteries, schools, and hospitals, and civilian targets. This was the case, for instance, in the Let Yet Kone9 and Pazigyi10 massacres.
Widespread crimes against civilians
21In conflict-affected areas, numerous cases of crimes against unarmed civilians by the SAC have been reported. People have been arrested and, in some cases, tortured to death on suspicion of having ties to resistance groups. There have been instances where family members were informed of the deaths of their loved ones without being allowed to see the bodies. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), between February 2021 and 31 July 2023, the overall death toll of detainees under the junta’s custody, which includes prisons, interrogation centres, and military barracks, reached 1,334 people.11 Moreover, SAC military forces are frequently accused of committing sexual violence and harassment during raids and detention, although victims of these sexual offences have often been reluctant to speak out, and there are suggestions that these crimes are widely underreported.
22Furthermore, junta forces frequently used civilians as porters to transport weaponry, military equipment, and food for their military operations. Civilian trucks and lorries were often forced to carry military supplies and food to the frontlines. As SAC forces faced significant losses on the battlefield in ground operations due to landmines and guerrilla attacks by resistance forces, they resorted to taking civilians as human hostages during their raids.
23The severe hardships imposed by the Four-Cuts Strategy, scorched-earth campaigns, and severe crimes against civilians, collectively give rise to an extraordinarily oppressive atmosphere. Equally, these factors collectively lead to a profound and enduring sense of injustice, popular resentment, anger, and deep-seated grievances among and beyond affected communities. These grievances can have long-lasting social and psychological impacts and create a fertile ground for the growth of, and support for, the resistance groups. Even those who had not yet personally encountered the SAC’s brutality became allies of the resistance groups, especially upon observing the extreme and widespread nature of the SAC troops’ cruelty taking place in their neighbourhoods. This led to a shared feeling of adversity, existential threats and grievance against the junta and fostered solidarity with resistance groups. New narratives of a collective will to challenge the oppressive regime and support resistance actors emerged out of the SAC’s widespread crimes against civilians.
Economic shocks and stressors
24As mentioned above, SAC’s Four-Cuts Strategy, has had dire consequences across all economic sectors. Agriculture is the primary livelihood in Anyar and faces shortages of essential inputs, trade barriers, and production interruption, while non-agricultural companies have been forced to downsize or halt operations. Consequently, local communities have seen incomes fall, increased unemployment and overarching economic crisis.
25Commercial activities have become prohibitively risky due largely to the SAC’s frequent military operations. Most pressingly, military operations have disrupted seasonal production activities. For example, SAC troops usually intensify their activity intentionally during peak farming seasons. According to one interviewee:
They [SAC troops] conduct military operations when it’s time for villagers to plant crops. They repeat it again in the harvest season.
26The security threats to farming were reported to be worse in areas close to SAC troop stations and villages under the control of Pyu Saw Htee militias. In those areas, SAC troops and the militias constitute constant military threats. Describing how farmers working in the vicinity of SAC stations have suffered, a respondent from Magway said:
During the harvest season, the SAC would abruptly fire guns and artillery to not merely scare off working farmers but also to steal the crop using rice harvesters [when the farmers had left the field].
27A 2023 study from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) indicates that, in the first quarter of 2023, about 12% of farmers from the Dry Zone they surveyed were unable to cultivate their land, while an additional 7% of crops and fields were either destroyed or not harvested due to the conflict (IFPRI 2023). In addition, the multiple checkpoints guarded by SAC aligned armed forces have become formidable barriers to trading and travelling between urban and rural areas (essential for commercial activities) has become overwhelmingly dangerous. The IFPRI noted that about 30% of farmers from the Dry Zone they surveyed faced serious security challenges to travel. The experience of a respondent from the Sagaing Region illustrates such situations:
Truck drivers are increasingly reluctant to provide transportation services as they don’t feel safe to drive on such roads.
28Access to essential inputs has also fallen sharply as the SAC authorities have been either disallowing or restricting the transport of agricultural materials, such as fertilisers and fuel. Fertilisers usually get confiscated at SAC checkpoints on the basis that the resistance groups could use them to make explosive weapons. Respondents from Sagaing noted that suppliers need to either bribe officers or bypass the checkpoints through longer roads to avoid confiscation. As a result, farmers are faced with a scarcity of basic agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides, and fuel to operate farming machines, explaining significant loss in crop yields.
29Inflation is exacerbating the economic difficulties with dramatic increases in commodity prices. For example, there has been a high rise in the price of fertilisers, pesticides, and fuel, making it no longer affordable for most farmers. According to an interviewee familiar with the resale business of agriculture materials, prices of fertilisers rose around six-fold; those that used to be 10,000 MMK before the coup rose to 70,000 MMK (equivalent to 25 US$) and even higher in peak season, reaching up to 100,000 MMK (30 US$). In addition to the original price increase, many factors have incurred significant extra costs due to changes in logistic conditions.
30Overall reduction in agricultural output was common in the research area and farmers have been excluded from access to formal financial services. Even before the 2021 coup, financial services for agriculture were minimal. The Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB) provides loans to farmers for certain types of crops—mainly rice, sesame, peanut, and beans—but these loans are under further restriction. For example, the loans for paddy are accessible only to farmers who cultivate 10 or more acres, and they must be fully repaid at harvest, or the lending service will be suspended for the whole township if any borrower defaults, leaving most farmers without official credit coverage (Turnell 2016). After the coup, the situation worsened as the banks’ closure and loan deferment became commonplace (IFPRI 2021).
31Restriction on financial transactions is also adding constraints to the local economy. For example, some interviewees reported that SAC authorities would either forbid carrying large sums of money through their checkpoints or, in some cases, confiscate them. Transactions through digital means have not been feasible for rural communities, mainly because the SAC suspended internet services in the Magway and Sagaing Regions13 and partly because rural communities are weak in digital literacy. This has made payments to purchase local produce particularly difficult and due to rapidly shrinking market access, distressed selling has become imperative for many rural communities. The widespread military operations, road blockades, and insecurity has narrowed the trading windows, obliging rural farmers to sell their surplus or stock to immediate buyers without price negotiation. In addition, the communities in Resistance Groups Controlled Areas (RGCA) have also been exposed to a constant risk of losing their properties and livelihood assets. As an interviewee who witnessed such an incident said:
The [SAC] troop came with trucks and fired their guns abruptly to scare off the villagers. They then picked anything they want from deserted houses. They took everything they wanted—even used cookers—and loaded them onto the trucks. They left nothing.
32In such a situation, community members who still had a leftover surplus and valuable assets had no choice but to sell them at any price. Casual workers and small business owners alike have also experienced a depletion of employment opportunities. Overwhelming vulnerability to arson attacks and scorched-earth campaigns have made many non-agricultural occupations impossible, as illustrated by a respondent from the Sagaing Region:
Now, there’s almost no job opportunities for people like carpenters, welders, and masons. Since the dogs [SAC soldiers] are burning down everything in whichever villages they come to, no one dares to rebuild any construction.
Resilience through adaptability and solidarity
Adaptation in agricultural production
33In order to cope with the new security context, local farmers are using non-standard farming techniques to mitigate livelihood problems. By using methods requiring less time than typical farming, farmers do as much as they can during narrow windows available between intervals of SAC military operations. In doing so, for example, some farmers are skipping non-essential land preparation and reducing the farming acres they cultivate while those who can afford it hire more labour and machines than usual so that the tasks can be done faster than usual. Farmers opt for direct seeding from transplanting seedlings, eliminating the nursery time required to grow seedlings. To further mitigate agricultural production risks, local farmers are choosing the type of crops that require less seasonal work and produce more yield despite being less marketable. A farmer from the Sagaing Region said that:
What we are doing for livelihood is mainly the growing of beans because once the crop is planted, it doesn’t require much nursery, and therefore, we can leave it during an active military operation.
34While farming which is rushed is less productive, it is the principle, viable means of maintaining local provisions of sustenance. Moreover, a shortage of chemical fertilisers is one of the main difficulties for agrarian communities in RGCA. Some farmers started to make organic fertilisers using locally available materials. Also, to minimise the risk of harvested crops being destroyed or looted by SAC troops and militias, they have taken other measures. One such measure is to sell surplus crops as soon as buyers are available, at any price. In addition, farmers have tried to mitigate the risk of losing all the harvested crops, by keeping separate stockpiles in hidden various locations so that, in the event of a SAC looting, they could still access some reserve crops for their sustenance stored elsewhere.
Migration, remittance and resistance struggles
35The deterioration in livelihoods and decline in agricultural production following the coup have prompted many young people from conflict-ridden regions to seek employment opportunities elsewhere. Consequently, central Myanmar has witnessed a trend of the working-age population migrating to other parts of the country or foreign countries. The scale of this outward migration has been so substantial that it could potentially have a considerable impact on the local demography, as an interviewee from Magway described:
Since the coup, young adults from our community, both male and female, who can still work, are leaving for foreign countries in search of job opportunities. There is some concern as to whether young people will remain in this community if this trend persists. Compared to the pre-coup demographic profile, only about one third of young people may be left in the community.
36This outbound migration trend could significantly affect the availability of the local labour force. On the other hand, communities have reportedly received substantial remittances from migrant workers. These funds were reported to be significant in supporting essential social services in areas under resistance control and sustaining the armed struggle against the SAC.
37Internal migration has also become increasingly common, especially among communities targeted by frequent military operations. Despite difficult working conditions in the areas they migrated to, they send money to support their family members and make donations to their communities. For instance, a farmer from the Sagaing Region explained:
Young individuals who are earning some income, such as those working in Hpakant (jade mining area in Kachin State), are making collective donations without publicising it.
38In the context of the resistance struggle, such practices illustrate how individuals actively participate in the solidarity economy by pooling their resources and providing support to one another. Although they are facing various challenges in the notorious jade mining industry, including unsafe workplaces, exploitation, and adverse living conditions, they are quietly and collectively demonstrating their dedication to collective wellbeing and their readiness to contribute to the resilience and survival of their community. This kind of support and collective action strengthens the bonds of solidarity, hence sustaining the resistance in the Anyar region.
39In response, the SAC is relentlessly attempting to cut off any financing to resistance communities. This includes restrictions on labour mobility, such as refusing to issue travel documents to people from the Magway and Sagaing regions, usually by means of extrajudicial measures. For example, interviewees reported that immigration officials were no longer issuing passports to applicants whose National Identification Card numbers contained the references 5/ and 8/ (i.e. citizens from the Magway and Sagaing Regions). As mentioned above, moving from rural to urban areas has also become more challenging due to the proliferation of SAC checkpoints. Consequently, these barriers to labour mobility inadvertently compel affected communities to strengthen community-based self-sufficient livelihoods and solidarity economies, as described in the following section.
Solidarity economy and community resilience
40Research has shed light on the significance of both material and moral reciprocity across households and communities in fostering rural resilience, in the midst of tumultuous revolutionary contexts. Throughout various historical eras, including the colonial period and the post-independence era, these reciprocal practices such as sharing food with neighbours, landowners’ support to tenant families, shared voluntary labour practices in cultivation and during the harvesting season. These monthly basic earnings (la sar lite / လစားလိုက်) have played a vital role in supporting communities amid the uncertainties of crisis. For instance, norms of mutual obligation between landowners or creditors and peasant farmers have historically acted as protective shields, safeguarding vulnerable people from losing their land and livelihoods during crop failure or economic upheaval (see Scott 1976). This collaborative ethos is closely linked with the principles of a solidarity economy in which the interconnection of economic stakeholders serves as a safeguard against vulnerability. Additionally, strong bonds of solidarity within villages, as well as between conflict-affected communities, have bolstered collective resilience. These bonds ensure a certain degree of sustenance, as those with surplus resources feel morally compelled to share with others in the community. This practice is rooted in the principle of reciprocity, where people expect that if they encounter hardships in the future, others will reciprocate the support they once received. This communal support system aligns with the values of a moral economy, emphasising collective well-being and shared resources as essential components of economic resilience (as noted in other contexts by Scott). In the context of revolution, these historical, material, and moral reciprocity practices emphasise the enduring relevance of solidarity-based economic principles. They highlight how communities can leverage resource sharing and mutual support to navigate the challenges of revolutionary efforts by upholding the values of cooperation and interdependence which are fundamental to a solidarity economy.
41In the current Anyar context, growing networks among resistance communities also enable some forms of local survival mechanisms. For example, communities that are vulnerable to SAC military operations have now set up intra and inter-emergency response coordination mechanisms. Such networks are stronger and more significant in areas where resistance groups have established new governance institutions. Through these networks, temporary shelters and sustenance food are made available through mutual and reciprocal support. For example, when civilians from certain villages experience displacement and destruction of their properties, nearby villages provide temporary shelters and share necessities.
42One of the factors that seems to have impelled resilience was the limited reliance on foreign aid or humanitarian assistance from external sources since the launch of the Four-Cuts Strategies by the military junta. As the junta suspected humanitarian mechanisms, civil society groups, and local charity organisations alike to be supporting resistance forces, it has been tactically blocking humanitarian operations through suppressive legal and financial measures. The resulting formidable operational challenges forced most pre-existing humanitarian agencies and civil society groups to either downsize, suspend their activities, or relocate abroad. As a result, the humanitarian crisis peaked, leading to an unprecedented humanitarian vacuum. On the one hand, the lack of access to typical humanitarian assistance caused a period of desperate struggle, especially in the regions where scorched earth campaigns were concentrated. On the other hand, the inaccessibility to external humanitarian support, urged affected communities to strive for survival by mobilising locally available resources. Reflecting on such humanitarian efforts, a farmer living in the Sagaing Region said:
I haven’t heard of any significant support from the external organisations until now. We are subsisting mainly on local people’s support. Those who have anything left over from SAC arson attack share what they have with those impoverished by scorched earth campaigns.
43The emerging norms and practices of mutual support and community efficacy are critical in mitigating economic shocks. Institutionally, the fact that there has been minimal external aid since the beginning of the crisis has encouraged more self-reliant efforts. While this has placed communities in a situation of great fatigue, their efforts have engendered stronger resilience from locally driven sources than those delivered by external sources. This has particularly been the case in areas where access to conventional humanitarian organisations are virtually absent.
44Consequently, in these areas, the sources of livelihood remain centred on self-reliance and community-based support mechanisms. A respondent from the Sagaing Region explained self-reliance practices as follows:
Support is provided mainly from people to people, sharing what’s left with those who have nothing left due to the scorched earth campaign; even if we have only one piece of food, we’d share half of it.
45This quote highlights the values of empathy, generosity, and solidarity and underlines the idea that people are often the most immediate and effective sources of help for one another. Even when resources are scarce or limited, moral values and social reciprocity practices encourage the act of sharing, symbolised by “Even if we have only one piece of food, we’d share half of it,” which suggests that people are willing to share even when they themselves have very little left, highlighting the importance of collective well-being over individual accumulation. This observation seems to indicate that constant and widespread vulnerability to armed attacks ignited a unique strength of solidarity among communities. It tended to strengthen the existing social reciprocity practices along with anti-coup motivation and, thus, generate a form of solidarity economy that aligned with revolutionary struggle. In essence, civilians felt obliged to look after each other to maintain resistance integrity not only because those who had lost all their possessions felt uncertain about their future, but also those who had not yet lost everything, felt it could happen to them, as expressed by an interviewee from the Sagaing Region:
The constant vulnerability to the scorched earth campaign means even though we may still have 10 utensils for the time being, we can no longer assume they belong to us. Therefore, if my family has 10 plates left, we share five with those who have none. We feel obliged to help them not merely out of sympathy for their suffering but also because we ourselves can lose them at any time. So, when there is a scorched earth campaign in a village, nearby communities would promptly respond with no hesitation to share the food and clothes they have with those affected.
46This quote indicates a sense of transience and uncertainty as material possessions cannot be guaranteed in time due to the ever-present threats. This act of sharing reflects both empathy for the suffering of others and a practical acknowledgment that their circumstances could change at any moment. It’s a testament to the power of collective action, solidarity, and shared resilience in the face of adversity.
47Moreover, the prevalence of SAC military operations created a situation in which civilians were highly vulnerable to indiscriminate attacks and victimisation. A respondent from the Magway Region explained this as follows:
When the scorched earth campaigns started, civilians felt they were in the same boat as those who experienced forced displacement and victimisation.
48This shared sense of adversity can lead to stronger solidarity among those affected, as they recognise that they are facing similar challenges and injustices. It reflects the idea that in times of crisis or conflict, people often come together and empathise with one another, forming a collective bond based on shared suffering and collective psychosocial resilience (Penić, Drury, and Bady 2021). Collective psychosocial resilience means that shared experiences and identity allow the affected communities to express and expect solidarity and cohesion, thereby coordinating and drawing upon collective sources of support.
49The SAC’s repeated attacks on civilian residences were so ruthless that civilians were even forced to watch their houses being burned down, which in turn inspired a wholehearted revolutionary spirit. At both personal and community levels, such a spirit appears to provide formidable moral premises for revolutionary narratives and encourages collective action. These shared grievances foster a perceived common objective and common resistance motivation to strive for revolution. The belief that the SAC should no longer remain unpunished has grown so strong that affected communities are determined to stand together and support one another, prepared to endure significant hardships and continue their struggle for justice and change, regardless of their challenges.
50The present culture of generosity supplements the spirit of resistance against the regime, allowing collective mechanisms to alleviate inevitable livelihood and survival challenges. In many instances, residents of the area have reported that if they receive a warning of military troops advancing towards their village, they would evacuate to other nearby villages. The host community, to the best of their abilities and available resources, would provide support in terms of food, shelter, and other basic necessities to those who have fled. Today, temporary displacement has become so common that even those living in SAC-controlled urban areas discreetly contribute to support rural displaced communities, as part of their resistance struggle:
Many of the people [living in urban areas] are strongly opposed to the SAC. They just don’t want to express it to avoid being arrested. But they are all willing to secretly support the more suffering communities while continuing to go about their daily business on the other hand.
51The SAC strategies have severely disrupted commercial infrastructure and economic opportunities. But the side effect to this asymmetrical conflict is that it has significantly fostered grievances while also heralding the cultural norms and values of generosity within an evolving “humanitarian resistance.” Urban dwellers also hold strong moral objections to the SAC, however, they must skilfully navigate the delicate balance between upholding their principles and the need to avoid persecution. However, while they may not openly voice their dissent, they are actively engaged in clandestine acts of support for distressed communities. This illustrates a form of everyday resistance and solidarity in the face of authoritarian rule, where individuals express their opposition through covert assistance to those suffering.
Local governance institutions amidst armed resistance
Armed resistance groups
52Newly formed local armed groups play a significant role in post-coup security dynamics. When the NUG announced the formation of public administration bodies, local communities started to form security groups, along with the administrative bodies, to inform and assist villagers when SAC forces were approaching. Although the term People’s Defence Forces is generally used for localised armed resistance groups formed by, or affiliated with, the NUG, there are numerous local armed forces who call themselves PDFs and represent their constituent communities but maintain autonomous status or do not affiliate with the NUG. Generally, three main security groups function in resistance areas.
53The first type of security group is the village-level Local Security Group (LSG) or pyithu-karkwoiye-aphwet / ပြည်သူကာကွယ်ရေးးအဖွဲ့ which acronym is PaKaPha / ပကဖ, and based solely in their respective village (or village cluster) to deal with security matters. The PaKaPha is mainly composed of local youths and activists who improvise village-level armed protection, mostly with handmade or light weapons, and implement community security measures. They can be referred to as local resistance militia forces, or—more commonly—as LSGs.
54The second type of security group is the PDFs which are formally affiliated with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the NUG and serve as battalions of district-level command units.
55The third type is the autonomous local resistance group, here referred to as “Local PDFs” (LDFs), which occasionally collaborate among other autonomous LPDFs and the MoD-affiliated PDFs. In addition, there are some armed groups with a name of a particular town or region which are active in the resistance stronghold areas rather than within the representing townships. To complicate things, NUG’s PDF battalions are sometimes based in other townships; for example, NUG’s Minbu and Magway PDF battalions are mainly based in the Gangaw District. Also, tribe or ethnic minorities-based groups (e.g. Asho Chin Defence Force-ACDF) carry out military missions in collaboration with other armed groups in the Magway Region.
56Despite the differences between resistance groups with regard to integrating the Chain of Command (CoC) of the MoD, security cooperation is reportedly gradually improving. While NUG mobilises to centralise CoC, many autonomous LPDFs propose a CoC based upon regional stakeholders, in which MoD would take part as one of the stakeholders rather than as the ultimate supervisory body. Amid differences in their political ambitions, there has been some form of coordination and cooperation between different armed groups including information sharing, logistics support, and joined transportation of food and weaponry. However, and despite the common goal of resistance, there have been several instances of clashes between LPDFs, LSGs, and NUG’s PDFs, raising the question of the unity and solidarity of the armed resistance movement.
Local governance institutions
57The emergence of functional governance institutions also enables resistance communities in RGCA to mitigate economic shocks and stressors resulting from the aforementioned SAC strategies. Alternative governance institutions have emerged, such as the PABs, local police forces (LPFs or PaLaPha / ပလဖ), along with LSGs and the PDFs. The PAB, for example, serves as the main governing body whose role, to date, has been essentially to mitigate the economic shocks the community is exposed to by initiating security measures and setting up survival mechanisms.
58The structure of local administration includes departments for administration, health, education, and local defence at the township level. Below, at the village-level PABs, LPFs, and LSGs have also formed in resistance areas. In some cases in Magway, PAB meetings take place in clusters of 10 to 13 villages. The exact hierarchy and relationship between the Township PAB and other committees, such as health and education, under the NUG’s ministries remains, at the time of writing, unclear and unharmonised from one location to another.
59Besides, it is important to note that the information system at the township level does not reach the same levels across the various parts of Anyar. It remains relatively weak in the Mandalay region compared to the Sagaing and Magway regions. Some townships in the Magway Region have a more robust and effective communication mechanism in place. This could be due to the level of coordination and collaboration among the PABs and PDFs, including PDF battalions under NUG command.
60The effectiveness of local administration appears to be most prominent at the village or village cluster level,14 with decisions being shared with the township PAB. An example is initiating a rice trading control initiative by village and cluster-level PABs to ensure local self-sufficiency. The process involves mobilising communities, explaining benefits and consequences, and sharing decisions with the township PAB. Additionally, village and cluster village-level PABs may collaborate with Township PABs to seek assistance for IDPs and house rebuilding. Given the collapse of existing public services and humanitarian assistance in Anyar’s resistance-controlled areas, PABs also played a vital role in coordinating REHASS. Along with the humanitarian crisis caused by the armed conflict, providing emergency assistance such as sustenance food, temporary shelter, and basic medical care has been critical for affected communities. Despite REHASS mechanisms being limited by financial capacity and inadequate human resources, these mechanisms play an integral role in logistical management, transportation, and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities. Notably, the local community’s collective contribution has played a significant role in providing school and health clinics with the necessary financial resources (more details will be discussed under the below section 4.2 entitled “Legitimacy and REHASS Mechanism”).
Local security mechanisms and sustaining the rural resistance
61Communities in RGCA have set up a formal LSG at the village level. The LSG plays a pivotal role in gathering security information and sharing these with communities in order to mitigate security threats and support emergency relocation. Local security initiatives such as setting up surveillance, information sharing, and reporting systems are essential. They are intrinsically linked with the emergence of local governance bodies. For instance, information on SAC military troops movements is delivered to the township administrative board, which conveys the message to respective villages for emergency awareness. The local administrative body, or PAB, prepares for the relocation of civilians and arranges transportation as well as provision of emergency food and shelter. When the LSGs monitor movements of SAC troops around the area, they also inform village administrations for necessary preparedness. With regard to their limited equipment, they can only rely on light arms and handmade weapons and encounter huge handicaps in confronting the SAC military forces. However they have the advantage to know well the local terrain. As a consequence, they have to use guerrilla strategies to delay SAC troops movements, rather than engage in conventional warfare. Thus, the villages rely on their LSGs for early warnings and preparation measures to ensure the safety of their villagers. They hence play a vital safeguarding role to promote the affected community’s resilience and adaptability in the midst of challenging and uncertain circumstances. With such a mechanism becoming more and more commonplace, it has become a norm. A respondent from Sagaing reported:
When there is a SAC military operation approaching our village, we are informed of it by the village LSG and are asked to leave the village and take temporary refuge in the forest, for which we have some preparation in the form of rationing and emergency kits.
62Meanwhile—and this is scarcely reported—PABs also play a vital role in community livelihood adaptation strategy for local security mechanisms either by coordinating resistance groups or facilitating emergency provision. Moreover, they help spread adaptation techniques and knowledge among different villages, for instance, the exchange of weather resistant seeds which allow farmers still able to work in the fields to produce survival food locally.
63It is worthy of note that women’s roles in the local security mechanisms have become increasingly acknowledged. Alongside, and despite, the amplified mobility difficulties for men and young people, housewives and women traders have taken on crucial roles as logistical support providers. They are instrumental in transporting essential resources like food and money and managing interactions with SAC soldiers at security checkpoints. Exactly like for their men counterparts, the involvement of women goes far beyond a desire to survive; it serves as a testament to their strength, resourcefulness, and adaptability in the face of evolving circumstances. Their contributions are more and more recognised as an integral part of the survival, and successes, of the resistance’s efforts. This transformation also signifies a broader societal recognition of the indispensable role played by women in challenging and complex environments.
Territorial control, taxation and legitimacy
64Alongside increasing territorial control, the local resistance groups and PDFs established numerous checkpoints along the highway and inter-town roads in the Anyar Region. On the main roads, resistance forces set up checkpoints to control commercial trade for taxation as well as cutting military logistics support for the SAC. These checkpoints are widespread and significantly instrumental in obtaining additional revenue sources in the Sagaing Region, which otherwise relies on agricultural produce, timber, and minerals. However, the Magway and Mandalay regions have not yet seen as much taxation by resistance groups as Sagaing. An important difference is that the former does not have many taxable natural resources, apart from some local oilfields, which remains largely out of the resistance’s control.
65With the progressive clarification and systematisation of the role of local administrative bodies, significant progress in township-based taxation mechanisms was observed in some townships of the Sagaing and Magway Regions. PAB started to coordinate high-value taxation within their respective townships. However, various resistance groups have enforced taxation with varying rates depending on the local armed groups in question and their territorial control, creating a heavy burden on the population and many consider these practices as extortionate.
66The lack of transparency and repeated claims of the “right to tax” by different armed resistance groups, even within the same township, has led to criticism on social media, framing it as a form of extortion. The checkpoints, which are set up in areas under resistance control, are primarily targeted to control the passage of fuel, cement, and high-value goods like timber logs. In some cases, resistance checkpoints tax local agriculture products trading on a business scale, such as those carried by 6-wheeled trucks. However, people often express their frustration with this practice because it affects the income of families who rely on farming and could potentially threaten their subsistence margins. So, such practices may also undermine the legitimacy of resistance movements. Although efforts of some resistance governance institutions to reserve food in RGCA were reported, it is unclear whether the taxation of local products aims at local food sufficiency in food unsecured areas or mere attempts to increase taxation to generate more revenue.
67A respondent from the Sagaing Region also mentioned that the resistance groups charged tax on fuel tankers and vehicles carrying gas or petroleum in his region. They established a fixed tax rate for such tanks and trucks and return transporters and taxpayers a payment receipt, which is applicable for exemption of additional payment at any checkpoints within the same township.
68In general, the overall management of taxation schemes is carried out by the PAB that allocates budgets to different sectors and gives support to the local resistance groups operating within the township. Taxation is reportedly mostly done in accordance with regulations issued by NUG. The revenues obtained are then intended to be managed by township authorities to finance social services, such as education, healthcare services, security, and defence programs. A respondent in the Sagaing Region, involved in local governance explained the revenue management of their township: 30% of the taxes and revenues are reserved for the NUG while the remaining 70% is designated for investments in local service and infrastructure such as health, education, humanitarian aid, and resistance forces. A local security personnel from Sagaing Region, explained such practices:
When fuel trucks pass through our town, we levy a fee. Previously, individual defence groups levied fees to fuel trucks passing through their checkpoints, mainly in the form of war funds. After the NUG issued tax guidance, the township administration body organised the collection of the revenue accordingly.
69In the earlier period during the emergence of resistance groups, the collection of fees from commercial activities was mainly for local armed defence efforts. But later, the budget allocation became more inclusive, and revenue obtained was also used for civilian purposes such as to finance essential social services and humanitarian assistance initiated by communities. Again, the situation varies according to the locations. Local governance stakeholders in areas where NUG taxation has not yet been effective, for example, have frequently urged local businesses to make voluntary financial contributions for humanitarian assistance to victims of military arson attacks and to social services initiatives. In some cases, the businesses that had been licensed prior to the coup but are no longer paying taxes to the junta were urged to pay to the local resistance governance authorities. A respondent from Sagaing Region explained their taxation practice:
There are a few liquor shops in our village, which obtained business licenses from the previous government but are no longer paying taxes to the SAC. So, they have had a tax break. Even though NUG has not yet implemented its tax policies in our village, with the consent of community members, we are urging liquor shops to make monthly financial contributions as much as they can afford, particularly when there is a need for funds to compensate volunteers at local healthcare and education services.
Legitimacy and collectivism
Legitimacy of local governance institutions
70The public has overwhelmingly joined various activities led by resistance groups, offering mutual support aimed at delegitimising the junta regime. This collective effort involves participating in boycotts, backing resistance forces, and consistently disavowing the military regime, even on the condition of deteriorating livelihoods. Simultaneously, the public widely endorse and support the resistance activities that are pivotal in defeating the military junta. They lend strong legitimacy to the revolution and collaborate in establishing governance and public administration within their communities. Legitimacy is a virtue of resistance institutions when its people in their constituencies have strong beliefs and faith in the institutions and authorities (Weber 1964). Local participation and robust support for armed resistance are key factors contributing to significant territorial gains in the Anyar region.
71Local regulations and conflict resolution mechanisms are based on traditional practices, social norms, and new regulations set by resistance governance institutions. For instance, the local administration system in villages near the mountainous regions close to Chin State is largely based on traditional practices. In this system, tribal leaders play prominent roles in the decision-making process at the local level, particularly when it comes to resolving land disputes and social affairs. In certain cases, a tribal leader may appoint a respected person from the village as a mediator to engage and negotiate with conflicting parties in order to resolve disputes. However, in the central plain of Anyar, the regulations and conflict resolution mechanisms combine traditional practices and regulations established by local PABs, LSGs, and the NUG. In Magway Region, our observations show that the administration follows a collective leadership style, where village elders and armed groups elect PAB leaders and the major decisions are made through a committee-like structure that involves PAB leaders, village elders, health and education group leaders, and armed groups. This relates to existing local customs where village elders and community members discuss development affairs, school renovations, and religious and social matters in the pre-coup context. Therefore, local customs influence local regulations and administration, and people can suggest changes on given issues. The PAB committee discusses and adjusts regulations and punishments according to local contexts.
72However, it is worth noting that respondents across three regions of Anyar reported instances of significant LSG involvement in local administration and decision-making, with the Sagaing Region reportedly experiencing more power abuse and influence by armed actors. These instances include: the killing of people accused of being informants (dalan / ဒလန်); severe punishments for men involved in domestic violence and the coercive imposition of taxes and local contributions. Nevertheless, community expectations regarding the involvement of armed resistance actors in village-level administration and security mechanisms can vary based on the local security context, the relationship between armed groups and local communities, and their operational practices. In some cases, particularly in the Sagaing Region, where the army attacks have been particularly frequent and devastating, people generally welcome a more significant role for the LSG because they believe that it can enhance community security. A respondent from the northern Sagaing Region highlighted the critical importance of bolstering the role of the LSG in ensuring the security of local communities during times of conflict or war. In their community, people generally assumed that strengthening the LSG could improve the village community's security and emphasised the need for measures to empower and reinforce this local security force for the enhanced protection of the villagers.
We need a stronger presence of the PaKaPha [LSG] during this wartime period, as a more robust PaKaPha can provide enhanced security for the village community.
73Besides, the presence of PABs at the township level as well as a functioning justice system, is seen as crucial for legitimising resistance institutions. However, our interviews show that the role of township PAB in running a functional administration, conflict resolution, and handling of power abuses at the local level is still limited across the three regions. Generally, their roles are either as supporting local service delivery, coordinating for tax and revenue, or overarching regulations at the township level. Exceptional cases in natural resource-rich townships like Myaing and Yesagyo have a stronger influence over village-level administration and PDFs. This is because the township PAB can allocate financial resources for essential services within the township, as well as provide weaponry support to LPDFs through tax revenue generated from the local oil drilling and extraction sector.
74In general, key stakeholders in local administration include administrators, monks, respectable elders involved in administration, and—often—armed groups. Members of Parliament are also occasionally involved at the township level, with some working on the ground and others acting as patrons in Township PAB through online meetings. Challenges exist in township PAB formation, with disagreements and LPDFs’ dissatisfaction with some of NUG’s direct appointments of PAB members. According to the interviews conducted, people believe that key stakeholders should be elected instead. Observations indicate structural and administrative crises among stakeholders, such as NUG-appointed administrators, leaders actively involved in community affairs, and armed groups, leading to confusion. The NUG also imposes some regulations and works towards establishing township-wide administration, which are not always received positively.
75The observations show that the level of involvement of village elders and previous administrators is also critical in balancing civil-military relations. Additionally, the local administration situation is improved where traditional values and norms are considered, such as respecting village elders, consulting them in village affairs, and following local mediation processes in resolving disputes. Respecting local systems, religious and ethnic values and regulations is essential. A respondent from the Magway Region stresses the participation of religious leaders and village elders in the administration:
Although there are a lot of challenges in organising local administration and balancing the power of armed actors, we try to solve the problems collectively and not to break the tradition and social norms (luhmu-dalae / လူမှု့ဓလေ့) of the community.
76Practices of ethical considerations, and solidarity—in turn—can participate in building the legitimacy of some revolutionary actors.
77The above quote and case examples demonstrate how the actions of the local community in providing aid and support can be seen as a form of legitimacy granted to the LPDFs in the context of the ongoing conflict. Furthermore, it highlights the interconnectedness of local perceptions, local support and the perceived legitimacy of armed actors involved in resistance.
78There are also reports of some positive practices that participate to build or strengthen their legitimacy, particularly in the coordination mechanisms employed by LPDFs with existing village administrators close to their control areas. In certain cases, LPDFs in the Magway Region proactively established coordination mechanisms with pre-existing village administrators and tribal leaders in the upland areas adjacent to their operational zones. For example, LPDFs intentionally avoid conducting military operations during some seasons to minimise disruptions to the local communities’ livelihoods. This collaborative and considerate approach takes into account not only military objectives but also the welfare of the community. It demonstrates some LPDFs’ efforts to build rapport and effectively mobilise support from the local community and leaders in their resistance activities. A respondent from the Magway Region shared their experiences engaging with LPDF:
When LPDFs plan their operations, they actively seek and consider the suggestions of tribal leaders, taking into account factors such as planting and harvesting seasons.
79Despite growing recognition of resistance governance and its legitimacy in RGCA, voluntary contributions have been distorted in some areas. Individuals have sometimes been reportedly coerced into making regular payments in the form of sat kyay / ဆပ်ကြေး which is the equivalent of extortion money. Furthermore, weaknesses of the CoC or Joint Command system have led to the proliferation of multiple armed groups scattered across the regions, and abuses on civilians. Consequently, some armed groups have exhibited corruption and abusive behaviours towards civilians, and conflicts have arisen between various resistance forces.
80Another challenge for the non-armed resistance is that people expressed dissatisfaction with LSG actions, citing coercive problem-solving approaches such as imposing restrictions on villagers. Additionally, rules and regulations within local administration sometimes prove inappropriate in local contexts, adopting a top-down approach instead of consulting with the public. For example, a respondent from Sagaing criticised some rules as irrelevant, citing as an example the obligation for villagers to return to their residence by 7:00 PM.
They seem to exert power over local communities through their arms. For instance, returning to the village by 7:00 PM is difficult for villagers, as working in other villages or cities sometimes makes it impossible to return by 7:00 PM. Consulting with villagers would be better, as these villagers are their supporters, and they should also consider the livelihoods of the public.
81Another concerning aspect is the conduct of armed actors during operations targeting SAC informers. While the assassination of SAC, dalan is often viewed as strategic by most resistance groups, numerous complaints have emerged regarding the abuse and misconduct of armed groups. Civilians have frequently been wrongfully accused of being SAC informers, without any due process to defend themselves. Besides, accusing a person of being an informant can be used for personal retaliation purpose. A respondent from the Magway Region expressed his dissatisfaction with LSG’s approach to these accusations:
We have limited opportunities to suggest regulations and decision-making by LSGs, fearing potential labelling as dalan if we criticise or speak out against the LSG.
82The fear of challenging the LSG and the potential consequences of doing so can both reflect and influence the legitimacy of the LSG and PAB, which, in turn, can have significant implications for the effectiveness of local governance structures. This quote implies the importance of building and maintaining legitimacy for governing bodies to effectively serve its constituents and foster a sense of trust and cooperation within the community. In Anyar, like elsewhere, legitimacy is a critical component of successful local governance and community acceptance.
Legitimacy and REHASS mechanism
83The REHASS activities initiated by affected community members emerged as an ad hoc response to offer emergency relief and rescue to the local populations affected by SAC military operations. Later, in collaboration with the CDM and philanthropic groups, resistance community leaders forged links with local resources and networks by delivering vital services like healthcare, education, and conflict resolution to people affected by the conflict. These links are often termed “insurgent social orders”—which include the creation of these social order and essential services—and represent a deliberate strategy employed by resistance leaders to establish legitimacy. By addressing the practical needs and grievances of the local population, resistance groups bolster their moral authority and challenge the legitimacy of repressive actors from the SAC. This intricate interplay between governance, services, and legitimacy is pivotal in shaping the dynamics of conflict and resistance.
84Amidst the various violent military actions of the SAC and with limited available resources due to the Four-Cuts Strategy, the availability of healthcare services serves as a particularly vivid illustration of resistance legitimacy. In RGCA, PABs and health committees have played pivotal roles in maintaining healthcare services and emergency care within the conflict-affected areas. For instance, the shortage of medical personnel has been addressed through the strategic rotation of doctors and healthcare staff. In addition, the rural health network created a zoning approach in conflict-prone areas to ensure that emergency health care is accessible to the people even in the vicinity of armed clashes. This approach also adds to the legitimacy of resistance actors. A respondent from Sagaing region explained:
The nearest zone to the conflict and the SAC troops is regarded as the hot zone, while the outer zone is the warm zone. In these zones, injured people are given first aid and emergency care and then transported to the safer zone where the clinic and doctors are situated. The cool zone is the safest area, where more extensive treatment or major operations are performed for affected patients.
85Furthermore, a voluntary medical network comprising of CDM medical workers, nurses, and trained volunteers has actively worked in Anyar areas, enhancing healthcare services and further legitimising the role of resistance actors. A respondent from this network in Sagaing Region shared his experience:
We do not have sufficient medical supplies but collaborate within our network to share essential medical equipment and supplies. Sometimes, we request medical supplies to be sent to our location. Occasionally, we arrange meetings halfway to exchange medicines, and sometimes we send someone from our team to collect the necessary supplies.
Figure 2. Illustration of zoning strategy for emergency medical care

86Education services have also been a focal building block for resistance efforts to enhance legitimacy. PABs and local resistance actors have organised educational services, working alongside CDM teachers and volunteers. The local community’s substantial involvement has extended to providing school infrastructure and the necessary financial resources. The willingness of parents to support the affiliation of schools with NUG’s education departments indicates their desire for formal recognition of their children’s education, further legitimising the role of PAB, and NUG as a whole. The NUG’s announcement of exams further motivated teachers and students to prepare and take the exams despite various limitations in high school education, including a shortage of human resources. Local communities have organised temporary school locations, even within monasteries and local homes.
87To sum up, PABs, in collaboration with various other resistance entities, have substantially contributed to essential services like healthcare and education within the resistance zones. This collaborative endeavour serves a dual purpose: firstly, it offers crucial assistance to the local communities, meeting their basic needs for health and education even amidst the challenges of conflict. Secondly, and equally importantly, it bolsters the legitimacy of these resistance actors as the primary providers of critical services under challenging circumstances. This alignment of insurgent social order with the provision of essential services ensures the wellbeing of the population. It also solidifies the perceived legitimacy of these actors as credible and responsible governance entities in the eyes of the communities they serve.
88These initiatives have reportedly become an effective survival mechanism for vulnerable populations. The REHASS mechanism in Anyar stresses the importance of “humanitarian resistance” against the unjust regime (Slim 2022). This also suggests that the importance of REHASS actions in saving thousands of people’s lives must be recognised and supported, while conventional humanitarian organisations are inefficient and stuck in their neutral and apolitical stance.
Collectivism in the Anyar resistance
89A farmer from the Sagaing Region explained:
We are resisting because we want justice (tayar-hmya-ta-hmu / တရားမျှတမှု့), [to that end] we are contending with surviving by living and eating according to the circumstances at hand. Although it’s not that convenient, the people’s concerns for economic wellbeing (Tat-oo chin-akyo-si-pwar and tharyar-wa-pyaw-hmu / တစ်ဦးချင်းအကျိုးစီးပွါးနှင့်သာယာဝပြောမှု့) have been superseded by the urge to seek justice.
90Communities took up arms against the SAC for a series of compelling reasons. The principal reason was the violent response of the military junta to peaceful protests during the anti-coup demonstrations. Thousands of protesters lost their lives during the brutal crackdown by junta security forces, which served as a catalyst for the conflict. The brutal actions of the SAC have instilled severe grievance among communities across the country, compelling them to pursue justice and thereby enhancing their collective strength and actions. As expressed in the above quote, the notion of a just cause motivated individuals and communities to prioritise their principles and values over their immediate material comforts. It also speaks to the resilience and determination of those engaged in the resistance, who are willing to make personal sacrifices to pursue a more equitable and just society, such as adjusting their living habits to pursue this collective goal. In the context of collectivism, it reflects a shared commitment to a higher cause, where individuals are willing to endure inconvenience and hardship to achieve justice together. The emphasis is on collective action and sacrifice for a common purpose, which resonated strongly in this interview with a respondent in Magway:
We have no choice; either we die, or we live under the military regime, so we strongly support the revolutionary forces such as the PDFs who sacrifice their lives for people and freedom. We have suffered for generations under military rule, and we cannot leave our sons and daughters under this regime, so we will fight till we die rather than remain under this military regime.
91As implied in the quote, a strong and unwavering collective commitment to the resistance forces reflects the deep determination in favour of revolution among Anyar people despite the risks and sacrifices involved. The reference to suffering for many generations under military rule underlines the long history of oppression and the determination to prevent future generations, including their sons and daughters, from enduring the same fate. Ultimately, this conveys a resolute collective determination of the Anyar population to fight for freedom and a better life, even at the cost of their own.
Figure 3. Villagers in a protest holding their burnt remains of their houses and a banner which reads “Only the village can be burnt down, not our spirit or our land”15

Photo Credit: Myanmar Now / Pale People’s Strike Committee in Yinmabin District of Sagaing
92Similarly, various factors also drived urban support for the resistance. Urban residents witnessed the SAC’s brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations and the atrocities committed in rural resistance strongholds. The junta’s imposition of a state of emergency resulted in a climate of fear and oppression, marked by arbitrary arrests, interrogation, and the criminalisation of criticism and support for the anti-coup movement. Furthermore, the junta’s clearance of informal or kyu settlements (kyu kyaw / ကျူးကျော် that could be translated by “encroachers”), involving the mass demolition of houses aimed at controlling underground urban groups, left the poor urban populations helpless during the economic crisis. As a consequence, a significant portion of the urban population increasingly aligned itself with the resistance, motivated by mounting repression and violations of their rights under the SAC regime. A respondent from the Mandalay region shared the community’s perception of the situation while indicating how their collective identity was forged in the resistance:
There are only two social classes: those who support the revolution and stand in solidarity with oppressed communities and those who support the SAC. We do not accept any group that remains neutral.
93This reflects a strong collective identity within this group and implies that it is a cohesive collective with shared values and goals. It also signifies a profound sense of unity and belonging among those who support the revolution and stand in solidarity with oppressed communities. They view themselves as part of a larger community that is committed to fighting against the SAC’s oppression. However, the quote also emphasises the polarisation within Myanmar society and the rejection of neutrality; there is little tolerance for individuals or groups who choose not to take sides and to remain neutral in the conflict. It is important to understand that shared grievances and collective identity within a resistance movement can also lead to an “us versus them” narrative.
The collective identity of being “the oppressed”
94The SAC’s atrocities generated collective narratives and an emerging sense of identity within the resistance community against the junta. In Anyar, this collective identity was forged around three main attributes: (1) a shared exposure to SAC’s atrocities and violence; (2) the accumulation of grievances that create a sense of moral connection and solidarity; and (3) societal class dynamics in the shared experience of oppression and exploitation.
95Firstly, there has been a common intolerance of SAC violence and suppression. The violence against civilians repeatedly committed in the visible forms of arson attacks, arbitrary arrests, ruthless killings, and torture has led to intolerance towards the SAC. Suffering from the intentional destruction of essential livelihoods also generated feelings of alienation. Being targeted or openly victimised by means of the Four-Cuts, scorched earth campaign, and arson-attacks is creating outright hostility to civilians. The physical violence and cruelty used by the SAC to instil fear clearly position it as the common enemy.
96A respondent from Mandalay Region stressed his engagement with the resistance:
Relatives, innocent civilians regardless of their association, were killed. Our villages, houses, and properties were burned. We cannot tolerate such a situation. Nor do we have an alternative way to live our lives but to resist. So, the more they kill, the stronger resistance will be.
97This quote highlights the indiscriminate violence inflicted upon innocent civilians. The mention of villages, houses, and properties set ablaze serves as a stark reminder of the large-scale devastation. In response to this relentless brutality, the community expresses an unwavering determination and a deep sense of despair. The shared exposure to the SAC’s brutality and violence is experienced both individually (“me” in relation to violence) and collectively (“us” in relation to violence). Furthermore, the shared experience of the atrocities and violence has fostered a new, shared identity within the communities which, in turn, has engendered a behaviour of solidarity (towards “us”) in the form of support, coordinated action, and shared commitments to the revolution. The community’s shared experiences make it unequivocally clear that the current situation has become unbearable, leaving them with no choice but to resist. This implies that as the oppressors escalate their brutality, the communities under siege become even more resolute in their pursuit of justice, their quest for rights, and their fight for collective survival.
98Secondly, the damage caused by the SAC has given a moral dimension to the resistance. The SAC’s intentional destructions are being viewed as a clear demonstration of its immoral nature.
99Therefore, the morally despicable characteristics of the SAC seem to have aroused a moral obligation to mobilise against it. Anger and moral indignation have led to the growth of grievances, that, in turn, has forged solidarity within the communities. A respondent from the Sagaing Region shared their experience of enduring the SAC’s atrocities and explained how the increasing community anger fed into stronger support for the resistance forces:
The soldiers from the SAC are ruthless. They seize everything within their reach and ransack what they can’t carry away. Their behaviour is utterly immoral. They even demand that women remove the earrings from their earlobes.16 As a result, the people offer whatever they possess to support the resistance fighters. The more we endure, the more resolute we become in our support for the resistance.
100Thirdly, social class dynamics play a crucial role in fostering social bonds within the resistance communities and gradually shaping a collective identity. To a large extent, the collective identity of Anyar society is also related to socio-economic inequality, political exposure, and participation in the pre-revolution social movement. Many of these resilient resistance hubs consist of rural villages where inhabitants struggle for their livelihoods as small farmers, landless families, and those reliant on remittances from migrant family members. These communities have first-hand experience—or have witnessed successive governments’ neglectful policies—of land seizures, exploitation, and social exclusion stemming from migration, poverty and their Anyar heritage. With expectations of enhanced security during the transition to democracy and a quest for social justice, numerous rural communities actively participated in peaceful demonstrations against the military coup. Unfortunately, the Anyar communities endured harsh and brutal treatment. In the post-coup resistance, they perceive themselves as sharing the same identity as small farmers, landless individuals, migrant families, and a subjugated social class. Their collective experience of oppression and exploitation has become the bedrock of solidarity and a shared collective identity. As one respondent from the Magway Region eloquently put it:
Our solidarity and identity are built on the shared experience of being part of the subjugated social class and of enduring the atrocities and oppression perpetrated by the SAC.
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101The Anyar region has demonstrated unique strength in resisting the rule of the diehard Myanmar military junta. The SAC’s notorious Four-Cuts Strategy, scorched-earth campaigns and atrocious acts created an extraordinarily oppressive atmosphere. However, they also seemed to be counterproductive, in that, they triggered grievances, widespread intolerance, a sense of injustice and an existential fear that fuelled rather than suppressed, popular collective resistance against the junta.
102The economic and security threats of the SAC were mitigated through various local mechanisms. Economically, the availability of fertile land and local ability to adopt new farming practices ensured means of sustenance amidst overwhelming security threats and multifaceted disruptions. Socially, the threats of—and vulnerability to—the SAC’s atrocious acts strengthened solidarity within and between Anyar communities. Local people have demonstrated more charitable, mutually supportive and contributions, not only resistance efforts but also to critical humanitarian initiatives. This led to the development of localised emergency response mechanisms amid inaccessibility to conventional humanitarian agencies.
103Governance institutions in the Anyar region play a significant role in enabling and sustaining a resilient resistance movement. The establishment of PAB and other resistance institutions has brought about essential alternatives to the junta’s system of governance. They provide a framework for local administration, conflict resolution, and decision-making while enabling local communities to participate in the governance process and express their voices, needs and resilience. They also initiate critical services, organise local resource mobilisation and facilitate the delivery of NUG’s support at the local level, particularly in healthcare, education, and humanitarian aid. By developing highly localised, emerging administration and services, these governance institutions create self-reliant communities and, in doing so, legitimise their role as alternative authorities.
104However, disagreement and conflict among localised resistance forces are creating divisions and hindering efforts toward a strategised revolution. Along with the rapid growth in armed resistance forces, came their influence on civilian administration which in some cases made civilians vulnerable to power abuses in the forms of coercion and the imposition of authoritative regulations. There were also cases of unscrupulous LSG operations in which civilians were wrongfully accused of being SAC informers.
105Overall, the undeniable Anyar communities’ contribution to Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, created political solidarity with pre-existing non-Burmese ethnic political struggles against hitherto military rule in the country. By collaborating and coordinating with multiple stakeholders and resistance communities beyond the Anyar region, by means of exchanging technical and material support from sources such as Ethnic Revolution Organisations, NUG ministerial task forces, diaspora communities and CSOs, the Anyar resistance movement can also be viewed as an achievement of interethnic collective action—which had been a rarity—particularly between Burmese and non-Burmese political movements.
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106Acknowledgement: We extend our sincere thanks to Civic Power Collective (CPC), Myanmar, for coordination and financial support throughout the research process. Additionally, we express our gratitude to Anyar partner teams, particularly, three local CSOs from the Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway regions for their significant contribution, dedication, and hard work during challenging circumstances. Finally, we extend our heartfelt appreciation to all reviewers and editors for their valuable suggestions and constructive feedback to finalise this publication.
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Notes de bas de page
1Myanmar Chronicle, 2023, “Tracking Community Perception Trends-2022”.
2State Administration Council, Law No. 07/2021, “Law amending the Electronic Transaction Law,” Myanmar Law Library.
3The clearance of kyu is aimed at eradicating urban slums or unpermitted settlements on government-owned land.
4Access Now, “Weapons of Controls, Shields of Impunity: Internet Shutdowns in 2022”, 2023, https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-internet-shutdowns-2022-myanmar-en/.
5Data for Myanmar, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/data4myanmar, retrieved on 27 June 2023.
6Pyu Saw Htee ပျူစောထီး (drinking blood) is a network of pro-military and pro-junta villagers that supports the military with counterinsurgency operations. The network leadership consists of local groups of Buddhist nationalists, members of the military's proxy party—the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and army veterans.
7Out of these, 19 townships were located in Anyar out of 50 townships under martial law then.
8Nyan Lin Thit Analytica, “International Complicity in Mass Murder by Military’s Aerial Attacks”, 2023, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/International-Complicity-in-Mass-Murder-by-Militarys-Aerial-Attacks.pdf.
9In September 2022, army helicopters opened fire on a Buddhist monastic school in Let Yet Kone village in Depayin township of Sagaing Region, resulting in the deaths of at least six primary school students and 17 injuries.
10In April 2023, a horrific incident occurred in Sagaing Region, in which the SAC’s aerial bombings and gunship at the opening ceremony of a local public administration office killed more than 170 people.
11Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, (AAPP). “Monthly Data Dashboard Since the Coup, 1 August 2023”, Retrieved 23 September 2023, from https://aappb.org.
12This is the story shared during the interview, and this story explains how the SAC’s ruthless actions targeted innocent civilians living in armed conflict areas.
13Access Now, “Internet Shutdowns in Myanmar: Facilitating Brutal Human Rights Violations in 2022”, www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-internet-shutdowns-2022-myanmar-en/, accessed 22 May 2023.
14Village clusters are based on geographic locations and territorial control, which differs from the existing village tract arrangements that prevailed under the Union level General Administration Department.
15Pale People’s Strike Committee, “Villagers protest against Myanmar’s military regime in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township”, Myanmar Now, 11 March 2022, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/women-vow-to-rise-from-ashes-to-defeat-myanmar-regime/.
16In the context of Anyar, earrings hold a special significance as they represent both a precious family resource and a cherished tradition. Parents often make concerted efforts to save money to purchase earrings for their daughters. Remarkably, even in cases of robbery, criminal gangs tend to refrain from taking earrings from women, recognising the sentimental and cultural value attached to them.
Auteurs
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Kyle Nyana
Kyle Nyana is a Myanmar-based researcher with over 15 years of professional experience in governance and political economy analysis. Since 2021, he has been working on research focusing on rebel governance, community resilience, and collectivism in rural areas of Myanmar that are currently under the administration of anti-dictatorship resistance.
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Alex Aung
Alex Aung is an independent researcher on environmental conservation, climate justice, and community resilience. Since 2021, he has conducted research, including natural resource status assessment, social service delivery, emergent humanitarianism, local governance, and collective resilience in conflict-affected contexts.
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Joseph Phan
Joseph Phan is an independent researcher based in Myanmar. His research has focused on federalism, governance, emergent humanitarianism, and community resilience in fragile, conflict, and violence-affected settings.
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Thel Mon
Thel Mon is an independent researcher with over ten years professional experience working in grassroot communities and ethnic areas. She took different roles and positions in several civil society organisations for peacebuilding, governance, human rights, and democratisation in Myanmar and Southeast Asia.
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