Chapter 6
Laws as Weapons of Oppression: Challenges and Resilience of Myanmar Civil Society in the Post-Coup
p. 159-200
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Context
1On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s nascent democracy suffered an abrupt demise when the military orchestrated a coup, toppling the elected civilian government led by President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The brief era of democratisation, framed by the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, lasted a mere ten years. The coup unfolded under the pretext of the government’s1 alleged failure to address military and allied political parties’ grievances related to claims of electoral fraud in 2020.2 This alleged failure to investigate claims of electoral fraud was used as justification for a state of emergency under Article 417 of the 2008 Constitution on the same day.3
2In the aftermath of the coup, Myanmar witnessed a groundswell of popular resistance, spearheaded largely by the youthful demographic cohort known as “Generation Z.” This diverse coalition comprised professionals from various sectors including healthcare, education, the arts and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Questioning (LGBTQ) activists, as well as students, trade unions, and numerous other social groups (Jordt, Tan and Sue 2021). The protests were broad-based with widespread participation and were accompanied by the emergence of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Initially the CDM was an online initiative led by healthcare workers but it rapidly evolved into a nationwide mobilisation against military rule.4
3As protests gained momentum, the State Administration Council (SAC), the ruling military council, imposed nationwide night-time curfews and prohibited public gatherings of more than five people on 9 February.5 Additionally, the SAC enacted numerous repressive laws to quash opposition, leading to the arrest of thousands, including civilians, students, artists, journalists, healthcare workers and teachers.
4CSOs, including the CDM, played a pivotal role in mobilising the resilience movements against the military coup. Many CSO leaders faced arrest or detention or were compelled to flee or hide due to their involvement in protests. The coup and its aftermath dealt a severe blow to CSOs, subjecting them to heightened surveillance, censorship, and harassment. Facing increased persecution, restrictive laws, and a crumbling financial system, many of these CSOs were forced to shut down or suspend operations.
5Over the past two and a half years, the civic space has significantly contracted, with certain segments of CSOs experiencing disproportionate scrutiny and hostility. Organisations dedicated to democracy, peace, federalism, human rights, minority and ethnic rights, LGBTQ rights, youth empowerment, labour rights, resource mobilisation, as well as those supporting protests and the CDM, encountered heightened pressure and threats. Any association, real or perceived, with opposition forces such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) and National Unity Government (NUG) resulted in their branding as adversaries and terrorists, and led to brutal suppression by the military regime. The repercussions of the coup have not only stifled the activities of CSOs but also jeopardised their very existence in the face of escalating challenges.6
6This research aims to examine the background of CSOs legal existence and space in Myanmar. It will then expand to the challenges they have encountered since the coup and look into the ways the SAC has systematically instrumentalised the legal apparatus to curtail their activities and respond to CSO political activism and the pro-democratic movement. Finally, it examines the coping and resilience strategies adopted by CSOs in diverse situations.
7This study is predominantly based on a qualitative empirical investigation encompassing a comprehensive literature review and primary data collection through key informants, thanks to interviews of leaders and CSO representatives.
Literature review
8The author has conducted a comprehensive literature review of both publicly available and confidential studies and reports addressing the contraction of civic space in post-coup Myanmar. To establish a contextual historical backdrop, the review incorporates documents published prior to the coup. A significant part of the review involves scrutinising announcements, briefings, press statements, and reports from prominent international rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), as well as local rights organisations such as the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). The review extends to relevant reporting by local and international media entities, including Radio Free Asia (Burmese Program), BBC Burmese, VOA Burmese, DVB News, The Irrawaddy, and Frontier Myanmar during the period from February 2021 to April 2023.
9Furthermore, the study critically examines law amendments, orders, and notifications promulgated by the SAC post-1 February 2021. The author referred to publications from state-owned media outlets such as the Myanmar Alinn Daily. The synthesised findings from this thorough review serve as a foundational resource for understanding the current context, and military backed perception of civil society actors.
Fieldwork / data collection
10The primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews, both online and in person, engaging with 30 leaders and representatives of CSOs between July and August 2023. The respondents were purposefully selected, ensuring a diverse representation. Geographically, these CSOs operate nationwide, reflecting a broad spectrum of organisational backgrounds, with trusted individuals, given the sensitivity of data collection in Myanmar. Some of these organisations are long-established entities boasting extensive experience covering up to two decades, while others emerged between 2016 and 2019.
11Among the respondents, only six organisations are currently registered under the 2014 Registration of Organisations Law, with their registrations set to expire by the end of this year or extend into the following year. In contrast, five organisations are registered as private companies under the Myanmar Companies Law, while an additional five are in the process of re-registering under the 2022 Organisations Registration Law. The question of the choice of legal status will be discussed in subsequent sections. Notably, there are also numerous organisations operating without formal registration, and most of them currently have no imminent plans for registration, because of the lack of incentives and the legal risks related to registration under the SAC. They hence decided to operate with very low visibility.
12Out of all the interviewed CSO representatives, 27 organisations are currently based in Myanmar, while three operate from either Thailand or Myanmar. Thematically, the activities of these CSOs are wide-ranging: healthcare and education services, advocacy for women’s rights, land rights, labour rights, access to justice, humanitarian aid provision in conflict-ridden areas. Additionally, several CSOs are involved in livelihood and economic issues, including microfinance and vocational skills development.
13Please see the summarising table below for further details, CSO names have been coded for safety reasons.
14The study encountered specific limitations arising from the prevalent atmosphere of fear and an overall diminished level of trust, due to widespread surveillance of activists since the coup. Consequently, the research scope was confined to interviews with previously known CSOs leaders and representatives associated with trusted networks, supplemented by reliance on publicly available information. Given the sensitive nature of the study, the interview approach was based on volunteers coming forward and respecting their responses to questions, despite potential limitations in their depth. Quotes have been anonymised for the same reason. Moreover, acknowledging the restricted number of organisations included in the study is crucial. The findings may not comprehensively capture the diverse experiences and situations of CSOs across the entire country but despite these limitations, the research provides valuable insights within the defined parameters.
Civil society: Conceptualisation and brief historical background in Myanmar
15The concept of civil society is intricate, with various emphases on content and features, and its boundaries are often blurred, resulting in a wide range of definitions. It is often seen as the space between the state, the family, and the market, representing a positive force for democracy (Diamond 1999). Another definition distinguishes civil society as a public realm exclusively comprising citizens who act collectively to promote or defend their interests towards the state (Boussard 2002). Regardless of the chosen perspective, civil society encompasses a diverse array of activities and organisations, including non-profit associations, community-based groups, professional associations, people-centred groups, and more.
Interviewed CSOs on the current legal status of their organisation, their key focus and geographic coverage
No | Year of establishment | Registration Status | Interested to register or renew registration | Thematic Areas | Project Locations |
1 | 2005 | Registration expired in 2021. Has applied for re-registration | Yes | Health, legal awareness and legal aid | Nationwide |
2 | 2016 | Registered. Registration valid until the end of 2023 | Not sure | Women’s rights, gender equality, peace and security | Shan State |
3 | 2003 | Registration expired in 2021. Has applied for re-registration | Yes | Gender equality, women empowerment, humanitarian support | Yangon, Mon, Tanintharyi and Southern Shan |
4 | 2019 | Registered as a private company | Yes | Legal aid, legal awareness raising | Magway |
5 | 2007 | Registered. Registration valid until 2024 | No | Livelihood, rural development, early childhood education and nutrition, environmental awareness, legal aid | Ayeyarwaddy, Southern Shan |
6 | 2016 | Not registered | No | Land rights, indigenous rights, environmental awareness | Shan State |
7 | 2016 | Not registered | Yes | Land rights | Shan State |
8 | 2004 | Not registered | No | Peace, democracy, good governance, humanitarian support, gender | Nationwide |
9 | 2017 | Not registered | No | Human Rights, Access to justice, gender equality | |
10 | 2008 | Registered as a private company | No | Legal aid, legal awareness raising | Shan State |
11 | 2010 | Registered as a private company | Yes | Legal aid, legal awareness raising | Nationwide |
12 | 2011 | Registration expired in 2022. Has applied for re-registration | Yes | HIV prevention, GBV, reproductive health, legal aid, paralegal services | Nationwide (apart from Chin and Kayah) |
13 | 2000 | Not registered (based in Thailand currently) | No | Human rights and advocacy | Nationwide |
14 | 2016 | Not registered. Registration expired in 2022 | No | Women’s rights, women empowerment, Human rights, federalism and humanitarian assistance | Kayin, Kayah and Sagaing |
15 | 2016 | Not registered | Yes | Legal aid, legal awareness raising | Ayeyarwaddy |
16 | 2008/2001 | Registration has expired. Has applied for re-registration | Yes | Capacity building, network strengthening and advocacy | Nationwide |
17 | 2018 | Not registered (based in Thailand currently) | No | Social harmony, interfaith and inclusion | Nationwide |
18 | 2011 | Registration has expired. Has applied for re-registration | Yes | Legal aid, legal awareness raising, women’s rights, child rights, labour rights, criminal defence, fair trial rights, safe migration, and civil documentation | Nationwide |
19 | 2012 | Registered. Registration valid until 2024 | Yes | Microfinance, informal education, humanitarian aid, social cohesion, returned migrants | Rakhine |
20 | 2012 | Registered as a private company | Yes | Environment, indigenous rights, land resources management | Nationwide |
21 | 2015 | Not registered | Not sure | Access to Justice | Nationwide |
22 | 2012 | Registered | Yes | Skills development, livelihood | Nationwide |
23 | 2004 | Registered | Yes | Education, local governance, livelihood | Rakhine |
24 | 2008 | Registered | Yes | Livelihood, governance, civil society strengthening | Nationwide |
25 | 2012 | Registered as a private company | Yes | Legal aid, legal awareness raising | Nationwide |
26 | 2018 | Not registered | Yes | Education, community development | Mon |
27 | 2019 | Not registered | No | Natural resources | Nationwide |
28 | 2012 | Not registered | No | Labour rights, farmer rights, land rights | Nationwide |
29 | 2012 | Not registered | No | Humanitarian | Sagaing, Kayah, and Kayin |
30 | 2020 | Not registered | Yes | Humanitarian | Rakhine |
16A robust link exists between a vibrant space of civil society and a genuine democracy. Civil society, in its vibrancy, plays a pivotal role in the democratisation process by fostering citizen engagement, promoting accountability, facilitating dialogue, and contributing to the overall health and resilience of democratic systems. It has been credited with crucial roles in historical events, such as the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern European countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the transition from military dictatorship to democracy in the Philippines in 1986 (Weigle and Butterfield 1992).
17In authoritarian states, regimes often perceive civil society as an adversary or threat rather than a partner, resulting in stringent control over its activities. Authoritarian leaders fear that civil society could potentially destabilize the regime, prompting measures to suppress and control it. O’Donnell and Schmitter highlight the challenges civil society faces under non-democratic regimes, where authoritarian regimes dismantle self-organised and autonomous associations, replacing them with state-founded organisations with predefined goals and closely monitored activities (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In 2018, CIVICUS, a global alliance of CSOs, also drew attention to the repression experienced by civil society in nations like Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela.7
18In this chapter, the primary focus of CSOs is on non-governmental and non‑profit organisations but does not include political parties, private businesses, and armed organisations. They may be self-help groups or ones with funding donors (local or international) and may be registered or non-registered with the government.
Historical background
19The evolution of CSOs in Myanmar is intricately woven into the socio-political fabric of the country, reflecting a dynamic interplay of historical, political, and legal forces. The origins of CSOs can be traced to informal village-level religious organisations, acting as hubs for social and religious activities, without official registration. These informal entities also played a significant role in political activism during the colonial era. The best example of this was the Young Men’s Buddhists Association (YMBA), which engaged in both religious and political pursuits on a national scale and contributed to the foundation of the independence movement.
20By the time Myanmar gained independence in 1948, various professional and voluntary organisations had flourished, predominantly in urban settings. In this historical panorama, it is crucial to highlight the role of social welfare organisations, locally known as Parahita Athin (ပရဟိတအသင်း) or Parahita Aphwae Ase (ပရဟိတအဖွဲ့အစည်း.). These groups have played a vital role in contributing to social welfare, working with the broader spectrum of CSOs and addressing diverse challenges and needs within Myanmar’s complex socio-political landscape.
21However, the vibrancy of civil society faced a decline following the 1962 military coup led by General Ne Win. The subsequent establishment of a single-party socialist state, characterised by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), marked a period described by David Steinberg as the demise or, more accurately, the murder of civil society (Steinberg 1997). From 1962 to 2011, successive military regimes used various laws, notably the colonial-era 1908 Unlawful Associations Law, to suppress civil society organisations, including trade unions, student unions, and advocacy groups.
22Concurrently, the military regimes (under BSPP rule) created Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs), exerting strict control over large farmers’ associations, workers, young people, and veterans. In 1993, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) introduced the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), later transformed into the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in 2010. Other GONGOs, such as the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association and the Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation, also emerged during this era (Steinberg 1997).
23Despite these challenges, the late 1990s witnessed the emergence of certain faith-based organisations and others focusing on community development, environmental protection, and health issues. These organisations maintained a low-profile and apolitical stance. Ceasefires with some ethnic armed organisations in the 1990s facilitated the establishment of CSOs affiliated with these groups, such as the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), leading to the formation of groups like the Metta Development Foundation and the Shalom Foundation (Nyein Foundation). Additionally, the late 1990s saw the rise of private sector CSOs, exemplified by organisations like The Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) and the Myanmar Women’s Entrepreneurs Association (MWEA). This complex historical backdrop highlights the diverse origins and intricate evolution of CSOs in Myanmar.8
A new era of CSOs between 2008 and 2020
24In 2008, Cyclone Nargis left an indelible mark on Myanmar’s civil society, paving the way for the emergence of grassroots organisations central to immediate relief and long-term recovery efforts. As one of the deadliest natural disasters in the country’s history, Cyclone Nargis wrought widespread destruction, claiming over 140,000 lives and impacting millions. The magnitude of the disaster underlined the weakness of the military government’s disaster management capabilities and drew global attention to the humanitarian crisis within the country.
25In response to the government’s sluggish reaction, local communities, youth groups, religious organisations, and international partners collectively filled the void. They mobilised resources, coordinated volunteers, and delivered essential assistance to the affected communities. The resilience and initiative displayed by these grassroots organisations showcased the potential of civil society in responding to crises and addressing the immediate needs of affected populations.
26In 2011, a reform process was initiated, characterised by an expansion of the civic and political spheres, which opened up fresh avenues for CSOs. They engaged actively and, in certain instances, assumed their crucial roles in steering or spearheading reform initiatives. This included helping people to assert their rights and tackling grievances through newly established institutions like the Parliaments (Hluttaw / လွှတ်တော်) at both national and sub-national levels. This newfound collaboration allowed CSOs to increasingly work with government agencies on various issues, including peace initiatives, concerns related to extractive industries and the promotion of gender equality. The aftermath of Cyclone Nargis thus not only exposed the limitations of the government in disaster management but also catalysed a shift in the dynamics between civil society and the state, fostering a more collaborative and participatory approach to addressing broader societal issues.9
27Between 2011 and 2020, the number of CSOs rose significantly, ranging from those promoting democratic reforms and human rights to others supporting social and economic development. They also actively engaged in capacity building and empowering local communities by conducting training, workshops, and awareness campaigns on various issues, including human rights, democracy, and environmental conservation. Many of them were also actively engaged in policy building as well as public protests regarding several sensitive issues such as rule-of-law, corruption, land rights and natural resources management. One significant accomplishment was the mobilisation against the USDP-led government’s decision to build the massive, Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam at the source of the Irrawaddy River in September 2011. This pressure on the government persisted and influenced the subsequent NLD government’s decision to maintain the suspension of the project.
28Throughout this period, the realms of political and civil society in Myanmar became deeply interconnected, marking an era that can be referred to as the “rise of Civil Society.” Numerous political and rights activists chose to establish or join CSOs, united by the common objective of “fostering democracy from the grassroots.”
29Acting as a rival political sphere, CSOs vigilantly monitored and scrutinised government policies, pushing for improved governance and accountability. They actively participated in efforts to hold the powerholders accountable for meeting its commitments to global humanitarian and environmental conventions. These CSOs directed considerable attention towards legislative changes, working to ensure fair enforcement of laws. Collaborating with legislators, criticising governments, and using media exposure, they sought to expose violations of the law. Governments were expected to adhere to the law and operate transparently, reflecting the inherently political nature of these CSOs as they sought to establish and expand the political space for non-state actors. However, under the current military rule in Myanmar, such actions and advocacy efforts by CSOs are severely constrained, as explained in the following section.
Post-coup impact on CSOs
30The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has had profound consequences for CSOs, with many actively engaging in mobilisation and participation in nationwide protests immediately following the coup. The study’s respondents highlighted three key factors explaining the active involvement of CSOs in the resistance movement:
- Strong connections with political and civil societies: The strong connections between political and civil societies, coupled with the presence of politicians and CSO leaders with shared interests in political, economic, and social affairs, played a crucial role. Many CSO leaders and members, having grown up under successive military regimes, harboured strong oppositional attitudes shaped by first hand experiences of military rule. Their past experiences fuelled a resolute determination to avoid a return to military rule.
- Shared knowledge and experiences of democratisation: Over the past decade, CSO leaders and members had learnt a lot about and gained experiences of democracy, human rights, and citizenship. By engaging in the defence of human rights, documenting rights violations, and advocating for policy reforms, these CSOs had actively contributed to democratisation efforts. Many CSO leaders, educated abroad, came home with increased motivation and a deeper commitment to advancing democratisation, freedom, and justice in Myanmar.
- Leaders’ perceived sense of responsibility towards the grassroots communities they aim to represent: Having worked closely with grassroots communities, CSO leaders were attuned to public sentiment regarding the coup. They felt a strong responsibility to oppose military rule based on their understanding of how people perceived the situation. Their commitment stemmed from a desire to fight for their own future and that of the next generations, reflecting a deep sense of responsibility towards the well-being of the country and its people.
31One interviewed CSO leader claimed:
This is about the future of our country. We love our country, and we must do something to fight and uproot the military rule in Myanmar. It is our responsibility for future generations.
32Another said:
CSOs understand local communities and what they want. They want democracy and human rights. So, we have to fight for them.
33The active engagement of CSOs in the opposition movement after the coup can be attributed to their deeply interconnected roles in both political and social activism. Their empowerment, nurtured through prior experiences with democracy, has played a vital role, coupled with a profound sense of responsibility towards their communities. Additionally, a prevailing optimism existed, anticipating a swift reversal or halt to the military coup.
34The involvement of CSOs in anti-coup activities had an immediate and profound impact as they were compelled to defer, suspend, or cancel numerous activities due to security concerns. While the exact impact is hard to quantify, an unpublished national survey of 68 CSOs conducted in May 2021 indicated that 69% of them experienced adverse operational effects: 32% witnessed a reduction in capacity, 21% had to close entirely, and 16% had to temporarily suspend their activities.10 The same source mentions an International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO)—collaborating with approximatively 100 CSOs in Myanmar—which assessed that 30% of their local partner organisations no longer existed due to threats, intimidation, and raids orchestrated by the military regime.
35A report published by the International Centre for Not-For-Profit Law in November 2022 provided additional insight, indicating that 33% of CSO respondents had to postpone project activities, 18% were forced to close their offices, 16% had to shut down project activities entirely, and 14% had to relocate project areas following the military coup.11 This collective data paints a comprehensive picture of the significant challenges faced by CSOs in Myanmar, underlining the tumultuous aftermath of the military coup on the civil society landscape.
36The role of youth and youth organisations in the anti-coup protests and armed resistance has been crucial and should be noted. Youth organisations, such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU), have been at the forefront of organising protests and coordinating demonstrations across the country. They have made use of social media, like Facebook and Twitter, to spread awareness and rally people to join the movement. The young people’s digital savvy has been instrumental in disseminating information, sharing videos and images of human rights abuses, and connecting with international support. They also used innovative tactics to express their opposition to the coup such as art, music, poetry, and performance to convey their messages of defiance, resilience, and hope.12 With regard to armed struggle, many young people have also taken on an active role in creating People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) to protect their communities and resist the military junta’s oppressive rule. The involvement and leadership of youth in these defence forces has been instrumental in shaping the resistance movement.13
37Subsequently, numerous young people have been arrested, tortured, and murdered by the military regime. Those arrested were charged under various repressive laws such as the Counter Terrorism Law, the Arms Act, and Section 505 (a) of Myanmar’s Penal Code. Many were tortured in custody14 and the junta has sentenced 151 individuals to death as of April 2023—of whom 58.8% were aged between 19 and 29.15 Women’s rights activists and their organisations were also targeted as they played pivotal roles in mobilising against the junta, raising awareness about gender-based violence, and documenting instances of harassment and assault by security forces.16
38The current situation of CSOs in Myanmar remains grim and risky for different reasons:
- the lack of the rule of law
- the absence of an independent judiciary
- the instrumentalization of laws as weapons
- the curtailment of freedom of association and expression
- the relentless crackdowns on activists
39This cumulative assault on civil liberties has resulted in a substantial contraction of civic space, severely hampering the autonomy of CSOs.
Legal implications for CSOs
Absence of rule of law and independent judiciary system
40The rule of law and an independent judiciary are the foundations of a dynamic civil society. Under the rule of law, people expect to be bound by the same set of laws and regulations, administered fairly and impartially. An independent judiciary exists to interpret and enforce these laws without prejudice, safeguarding rights and freedoms. This environment is vital for CSOs, allowing them to function freely and to advocate change within the framework of a just legal system that ensures protection and accountability.
41Contrary to this ideal, Myanmar currently grapples with a starkly different reality. Following the coup, the military—invoking Article 420 of the 2008 Constitution that allows the Commander in Chief to restrict rights—CSO leaders, members, and activists have been subjected to arbitrary detentions, arrests, and prolonged imprisonments on politically motivated charges. As per the AAPP, no less than 26,237 individuals have been arrested since February 2021 (as of 14 March 202417) and detainees are denied legal representation, undermining their fundamental right to defence. Moreover, trials are conducted in closed-door special courts, devoid of public and media access, depriving the accused of fair trial rights.
42The collaboration among police forces, attorney general offices and courts is evident in the swift and severe penalties imposed on opposition to the regime, disregarding legal merit and evidence. Judges routinely dismiss bail applications immediately and conduct trials without due consideration of individual circumstances. Widespread corruption within the justice system forces lawyers to pay bribes for basic necessities like client visits and access to case files. Influenced by military officers, judges undermine any chance of a fair hearing.
43Political prisoners endure deplorable conditions in prisons, including physical and psychological torture, malnutrition, inadequate medical care, and limited family visits. Even after release, former political prisoners still face constant surveillance. This glaring absence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary presents a significant challenge for citizens as well as CSOs in Myanmar.
Deploying laws as weapons of oppression
44The regime’s use of laws as weapons of oppression has also caused a great deal of trouble for many CSOs in Myanmar. Immediately after the coup, the SAC enacted dozens of law amendments and new laws to forcefully crack down on opposition movements and stifle critical voices or dissent. This legislation has severely affected CSOs by creating an extremely challenging operating environment. These law amendments by the SAC represent a violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens. For example, in April 2021, the SAC threatened a severe action against the AAPP, accusing it of using fake and fraudulent data to frighten civil servants and the public, thereby inciting more riots and instability around the country. The SAC also asserted that AAPP was an “unregistered organisation” operating illegally and used the Associations Registration Law to attack it.18 These examples indicate that the SAC has strategically deployed laws to maintain political control and suppress opposition, while appearing to observe the principle of “the rule of law” and due process.
45Among the law amendments which have had most impact are:
46Amendment to the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of the Citizens (13 February 2021)19: This amendment grants authorities the power to enter private property without a warrant and allows them to search, arrest, and detain individuals for over 24 hours without court permission. It also allows officials to intercept private communications, accessing personal telephone and electronic data from telecommunication operators. In particular, searches and seizures can occur without the presence of witnesses. These expanded powers raise concerns about privacy violations and the unchecked authority of law enforcement agencies.
47Fourth Amendment of the Ward and Village Tract Administration Law (13 February 2021)20: This Fourth Amendment represents a worrying expansion of authority, granting officials the excessive power to conduct late-night raids and search private homes without the need to obtain a warrant. This legal modification not only infringes upon fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of movement, but also signals the resurgence of midnight raids, posing a direct threat to the safety and security of individuals. In particular, this places anti-coup protestors and participants in the CDM at heightened risk, emphasising the adverse impact of the amendment on basic democratic values and personal security.
48Amendments to the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code (14 February 2021)21: This amendment introduces a new provision (Sub-Section 505-A) to the Penal Code, criminalising citizens who provoke fear, spread false news, or indirectly incite criminal acts against any officials. Those suspected of this charge can be arrested without a warrant and face punishments, including three years in prison, fines, or both. The SAC has implemented this provision widely, charging over a thousand individuals, including celebrities, social influencers, medical professionals, university educators, journalists, members of Students’ Unions and political parties. This highlights the broad implications of the amendment in limiting dissent and freedom of expression.22
49Amendment to the Electronic Transaction Law (15 February 2021)23: This amendment significantly escalates the risk to freedom of expression and privacy by introducing wide-ranging exceptions to the safeguarding of personal information. More specifically, these exceptions apply in cases concerning the “perpetuation of sovereignty, stability, tranquillity, and national security of the state.” Under this amendment, military and police forces can arrest and detain individuals for online postings of content deemed undesirable by the SAC. Furthermore, it enables them to access personal data regardless of its location and to demand information from telecommunications service providers. This broadened scope of powers poses a substantial threat to individual liberties, facilitating abuses and impinging on both freedom of expression and the right to privacy.
50Martial Laws (14 and 15 March 2021)24: The SAC imposed martial law in Hlaing Thar Yar and Shwe Pyi Thar Townships in Yangon on 14 March. The next day it extended the martial law to four other townships in Yangon: North Dagon, South Dagon, Dagon Seikkan, and North Okkalapa Townships. On 2 February 2023, the SAC imposed martial law in 37 more townships in eight of the country’s 14 regions and states (Kayah, Kayin, Chin and Mon States and Bago, Magwe, Sagaing and Tanintharyi Regions). These martial law orders effectively put the townships under the complete control of the military by transferring all executive and judicial powers to the regional commander concerned. The martial law also allows the military to hold trials for 23 offences committed in the areas including murder and rape cases. All military tribunal decisions are final and there is no right to appeal a conviction, sentence, or the process of a trial. Only death penalty sentences can be appealed, and the final decision lies with the Commander-in-Chief, who can commute or reverse a death sentence.
51Amendment of the Legal Aid Law (29 April 2021)25: This amendment denies legal aid to people under arrest and detainees who are accused of committing a crime as well as victims and witnesses to crimes. The amendment allows legal aid provision only at court during the trial period which has subjected thousands of political detainees all over the country to serious abuses and denials of human rights while they are in pre-trial custody. The amendment also abolishes the role of paralegals, resulting in greater risks and uncertainties for those paralegals working in communities. Furthermore, it makes it much more difficult for many people across Myanmar to have access to justice.
52Amendment of the Counter Terrorism Law (1 August 2021)26: This amendment adds harsher penalties to persons convicted under Section 3(b)(15) of this law for committing the “acts of exhortation, persuasion, propaganda, recruitment of any person to participate in any terrorist group or activities of terrorism.” The amendment increases penalties for the offence from one to three years to a minimum of three years and maximum of seven years, subject also to additional fines. Since 1 February 2021, the SAC has charged numerous individuals engaged in anti-military activities under this law. Given that the SAC has already attempted to delegitimise the NUG and associated groups such as PDFs with the designation of “terrorist groups,”27 this law has been broadly deployed to suppress groups or activities that have connections with the NUG and PDFs in particular.
Lack of freedom of association
53The newly enacted Organisation Registration Law28 (October 2022), represents a stark assault on freedom of association which is a fundamental human right, critical to the development and functioning of civil society. This right is the foundation upon which CSOs are built, enabling people with shared values to come together, form associations, and collectively address various issues. It is an indispensable part of a diverse and vibrant civil society that encompasses a wide array of perspectives and concerns.
54However, the Organization Registration Law undermines freedom of association by imposing mandatory registration, enforcing criminal penalties, and severely restricting legitimate civil society activities. It intensifies operational constraints and subjects local and international CSOs and rights groups operating in Myanmar to heightened scrutiny. In contrast to the 2014 Associations Registration Law, which allowed voluntary registration, this new law mandates registration for all organisations, introducing more stringent requirements and penalties for non-compliance. Failure to comply with the law may result in severe consequences, including imprisonment ranging from two to five years or fines ranging from 500,000 MMK (240 US$) to 5,000,000 MMK (2,400 US$), or both.
55The troubling aspect of these penalties lies in the broad and arbitrary interpretation that can be applied to key provisions governing the behaviour of individuals and organisations. For instance, the law prohibits actions such as any form of criticism directed at the military junta or its perspectives on national unity, sovereignty, or security. However, the law lacks clear definitions of what constitutes an action that could commit this offense, allowing authorities to interpret provisions as they see fit, potentially leading to the suppression of independent associations. Clearly, with this law, the SAC is looking to curtail freedom of association by making it more difficult for CSOs to organise events, workshops, protests, and other activities, thereby hindering their ability to mobilise members and engage with the broader public.
56The lack of freedom of association and expression has had profound repercussions on civil society. Without the ability to freely assemble and express opinions, CSOs face severe constraints in advocating for human rights and addressing social issues. They risk persecution for mobilising or speaking out against the government or expressing dissenting views. This suppression fosters a climate of fear and undermines the development of a vibrant and inclusive civil society. Without these fundamental freedoms, Myanmar’s civil society struggles to function effectively, hindering progress towards democracy and social justice.
Crackdown on private media and freedom of expression
57The SAC has also cracked down on freedom of expression and media freedom, another essential element for a vibrant civil society. Independent local media and journalists have been on the frontline of the struggle to report on the widespread public resistance against the coup and of exposing the human rights violations committed by the security forces across the country. Inevitably, they become a target for repression.
58First, the SAC issued orders banning the use of certain terms such as “coup” and “regime” and sent directives to the Myanmar Press Council on how to cover the unfolding events. Almost all members of the council resigned in objection to these orders.29 When the media refused to comply with its terms, the regime revoked the licenses for several local media outlets. As of June 2023, licenses for at least 14 media outlets including Democratic Voice of Burma, Mizzima, Myanmar Now, Khit Thit Media, 7 Day, the Kachin-based 74 Media and the Shan-based Tachilek News Agency were revoked after the coup under the pretext of reporting false news.30
59The SAC also banned satellite televisions and warned the public that they could face one-year imprisonment and a fine up to 500,000 kyats (240 US$) under the 1996 Television and Video Act.31 This law provides for compulsory licensing of television sets, video cassette recorders and satellite television receivers with the Ministry of Communications.32 The law provides severe punishment for those who do not comply with its provisions. For example, anyone who obtains, copies or distributes videotapes containing anti-regime messages could be punished with up to a five-year imprisonment under this law.
60The SAC also tried, as part of its effort to control access to information, to confiscate radios from the market after the NUG announced that it would broadcast its radio programme (Radio NUG) twice a day.33 It warned that anybody who carries out or contributes to this radio programme would face legal action in accordance with the existing laws.34 Although the warning did not mention any law explicitly, the SAC could just use any of the various oppressive criminal laws (e.g. Section 124A and 505A of the Penal Code, the Unlawful Association Act and the 2014 Counter Terrorism Law) to punish those who associated with the radio programme and were therefore seen by the SAC to be disrupting the flow of information and violating people’s right to information in Myanmar.
61Since the coup the SAC has arrested 156 journalists and about 50 of them remained under detention at the end of 2023.35 Many of them were imprisoned under Section 505‑A of the Penal Code for allegedly spreading false news and causing incitement.36 The SAC has also charged journalists under other oppressive laws such as the Unlawful Association Act and the Counter Terrorism Law. This illustrates a systematic destruction of freedom of expression and media freedom. Many journalists had to go into hiding or to flee into exile as the SAC issued arrest warrants for them.37 Myanmar ranks 173 out of 180 countries on the RSF Press Freedom Index for the year 2023.38 According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Myanmar ranked second (only to China) and third (after Iran and China) among the world’s worst countries for jailing journalists for the years 2021 and 2022 respectively.39
Adapting to new realities
The struggles of CSOs: Security risks and operational challenges
62The absence of the rule of law, the weaponizing of laws (manifested by arbitrary arrests, lengthy imprisonments, legal constraints, etc.), and the lack of freedom of association and media freedom have had far-reaching consequences for the safety and security of CSO leaders and members in Myanmar. For example, one month after the coup, on 2 March 2021, the SAC declared 16 labour organisations illegal on the basis that they were not registered under the existing law and said that legal action would be taken against them if they continued activities against the government, effectively creating a blacklist and threatening a crackdown.40
63Many CSO leaders got arrested and detained. Others had to flee the country, move to areas under EAOs or EROs (Ethnic Armed Organisations or Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations) control or keep hiding in safe houses inside the country. Over 100 CSO leaders and members were arrested in a few months after the coup.41 Also among the CSOs interviewed for this study, five of them had reportedly experienced the arrests of their members or staff (ranging from a couple of weeks of detention to two years imprisonment), and six other organisations had arrest warrants issued for their staff.
64Due to the increased pressure from repressive laws, scaled-up surveillance, tightening security and arbitrary arrests by the military regime, CSOs have been unable to function without fear of harassment and arrest, including raids on their homes and offices, seizure of equipment, revoking of passports, threatening phone calls, interrogations, and surveillance.
65An interviewed CSO leader reported:
Our office was raided twice, once in March and another in August of 2021. They saw us as a threat since we were working for democracy and social harmony, and [they] have also issued arrest warrants for some of our colleagues and partners.
66As a result, many CSOs have found it extremely challenging to organise activities as before. Many CSO leaders claimed that it has become very difficult to find safe venues for training sessions and other events, and also to mobilise participants to join them. Potential participants are worried about their safety as they could face interrogation, and could even be arrested for joining events. In some locations, people even need to report to local authorities about their movements.
67And many CSOs leaders, especially those engaging in political issues such as democracy, federalism, human rights, and social harmony, also had to relocate or go into hiding while they tried to continue their activities with their staff members who remained inside Myanmar.
68A CSO member working on advocacy told the author:
About 80% of our former partners before the coup were in Thailand […] the head moves out, but the body is left in the country.
69Several CSO representatives also reported receiving frequent warnings from local officials not to participate in political activism against the military takeover. Many CSO staff and members felt insecure travelling to project areas while local authorities have imposed travel restrictions and installed checkpoints on the roads. Fear has been a daily reality, and this has had cumulative effects on the CSO members—physically and psychologically. As a result, some CSOs have even lost their valuable project staff and volunteers.
70A representative from a women’s rights organisation operating in Shan State told the author:
Some of our staff members resigned soon after the coup as they were worried about their security. They just left suddenly after they encountered some questionings by local authorities.
71Heightened concerns for safety and security have also severely affected the wider “ecosystem” of CSOs by destroying pre-existing systems of networking, mutual trust, social capital, communications, and learning. All CSO leaders and representatives involved in this study said that lack of trust or “trust deficit” has been a key challenge currently facing Myanmar CSOs.
72A CSO leader, said about a recent meeting among CSOs:
The attendees were just looking at each other without saying much. We didn’t know who we could and couldn’t trust. So, it was difficult to discuss and exchange opinions and experiences freely. We had to be careful about what we say.
73This obviously reflects a lack of trust among the CSOs and its resulting impacts on their relationship. Trust and social capital are essential for the effectiveness and sustainability of CSO efforts in various fields, such as advocacy, community empowerment and social change. Without trust, the ability of CSOs to fulfil their missions and create positive social impacts is severely compromised.
(Re)-emerging divides among CSOs: Political and reputational risks linked to the registration law
74The political and legal context following the coup has also caused a divide between the CSOs, between those who opted to engage with the SAC and those refusing to engage, resulting in polarisation. The report published by the International Centre for Not-For-Profit Law in November 2022 found that 32% of the respondent CSOs had suspended their engagement with the SAC, while 26% had implemented their activities with permission from the SAC. The study further reported that 55% of the CSO respondents were able to implement their project activities without requiring any permission from the authorities. However, 19% needed permission from the SAC, and for those who operated outside SAC controlled areas, 26% needed permission from EAOs-EROs, PDFs, and Border Guard Forces (BGFs).42
75The new Organization Registration Law was enacted in October 2022 and makes it a crime to establish or operate an organisation without registration. Among other challenges and constraints, in order to register, CSOs must submit a range of information, including their intended activities, a listing of cash and assets, and a recommendation from the relevant ministries. CSOs must also submit activity reports every three months to the township General Administration Department along with an annual financial report which must be reviewed by a certified accountant.43
76Since the new law, there have been at least two different approaches among CSOs regarding registration. Also, among the CSOs interviewed for this study, 13 out of 30 organisations expressed interest in the registration under the new law. Five of them have already submitted their applications for registration and they are now waiting for updates from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). Four additional organisations, three of which work in legal aid, while another focuses on environmental and indigenous people’s rights, also indicated their intention to renew their registration as private companies. They highlighted two key reasons for registration, as follows.
77The first reason concerns safety and security risks such as surveillance, intimidation, arrests and detentions and they view registration as a risk prevention, or at least a mitigation strategy. Though they are not sure to what extent it could be effective in practice, they seem to believe that it will give them at least some protection for their operations as well as for all stakeholders concerned including staff members and beneficiaries.
78A leader of a CSO that has applied for registration claimed that:
Without registration there is a great deal of risk for our people on the ground. We have to take care of their safety and security. So, we decided to register.
79The second justification for registration pertains to the stipulations imposed by certain donor agencies and mandatory audits. As per the accounts of various CSO representatives, UN agencies stipulate that CSOs must be registered to be eligible for funding. Although some donors do not explicitly demand organisational registration from their CSO partners, they overall do require regular audits. These audits, in turn, necessitate registration since they rely on official channels—which amounts to imposing SAC-recognised procedures for CSOs to access most international donor funding.
80A leader of a CSO working for gender equality and women’s rights interviewed by the author said that:
We have to register mainly because of audit requirement. Audits need registration. If donors didn’t require audits, it would be fine. We wouldn’t need to register then.
81On the other hand, many CSOs exhibit a steadfast resolve against registering under the SAC. The interview of an official working for a donor agency revealed that among its 40 CSO partners, 39 CSOs strongly opposed registration with the SAC, with only one organisation expressing neutrality, deferring the decision to the donor. Likewise, 13 out of the 30 CSOs interviewed for this study did not wish to register, citing various reasons for their stance. Foremost among these reasons was the question of legitimacy. They were concerned that registration might inadvertently confer legitimacy upon the regime, a scenario they were determined to avoid, as some even saw registration as an act of betrayal.
82One CSO leader from Shan State working for farmers and land rights remarked:
If we register, we will be betraying our country, our resistance movement, and other farmers all over the country. Those that register do not have any strong principle and values.
83Certain CSOs were worried about their public image and reputation. They harboured concerns that any form of engagement with authorities, including registration, might be perceived as endorsing the SAC, prompting them to adopt a cautious “wait-and-see” approach while maintaining a low profile. In addition, one CSO raised financial concerns in connection with registration. This particular organisation is currently registered, with its registration valid until mid-2024. Being a registered entity allows it to use the formal banking system—which uses the official exchange rate of 2,100 MMK per US$, which is very low compared to the black market—as this is a requirement for some international institutional donors. The leadership of this organisation sees this as exploitative and unsustainable, prompting them to make the decision not to renew their registration when it expires next year. Instead, they have devised plans to relocate to an area beyond the jurisdiction of the SAC.
84A leader of this CSO said:
We will not register anymore. We don’t want to give the money of our international donors to the military. The money is not for killing people. It is for helping the poor and children.
85On the other hand, some CSOs cited the stringent reporting obligations of the Organisational Registration Law as the central reason for their reluctance to register. They are averse to disclosing all their activities, primarily due to their sensitive nature, and they fear severe repercussions if the authorities were to uncover unreported activities.
86A CSO leader working under the radar for a human rights organisation stated:
If we register, we will have to provide all our information to the authorities. We will have to give all the information they want. This is very difficult for us. If we don’t, we will be punished.
87However, there are CSOs that appear undeterred by the reporting requirements outlined in the law. They view it as a manageable issue, emphasising their ability to selectively report their activities. They believe that they can safeguard sensitive matters by keeping them confidential and unreported, asserting that this was a common practice among CSOs during the previous military rule until 2011, which they can revert to now. Furthermore, they hold the view that the regime lacks the capacity to scrutinise or monitor each and every activity conducted by CSOs.
88A CSO leader told to the author that:
Even during the time of stronger and more effective military intelligence in late 1990s and early 2000s, the military regime couldn’t track everything CSOs were doing. Now, it is even less possible to do so.
89It appears that the CSOs focusing on less politically sensitive issues like health, livelihood, environment, and gender equality are often more inclined towards registration. This inclination seems to stem from the perceived benefits of registration such as increased protection and recognition from the authorities, eligibility for funding and resources and collaboration opportunities with international organisations including UN agencies. Conversely, the CSOs dealing with politically sensitive matters such as democracy, human rights, legal aid, conflict, and peace tend to oppose registration under the military regime. These organisations prioritise maintaining independence and flexibility, fearing that registration could imply legitimising the SAC while, at the same time, subjecting themselves to increased scrutiny and restrictions.
90The politics surrounding organisational registration undeniably poses a threat to the unity among the CSOs and has the potential to lead to a situation of increased misunderstanding and mutual distrust. This could significantly erode their social capital, providing an opportunity for exploitation by the military regime, a strategy akin to the “divide and rule” policy that the Myanmar military has adeptly employed over the past seven decades.
91Notably, CSOs that choose to register with the SAC face the risk of being stigmatised as pro-military organisations, supporters of the military rule, or even as informants collaborating with the military, known as dalan (ဒလန်) in Burmese.
92This concern is exemplified in a statement made by a CSO leader working along the Thai-Myanmar border:
It is impossible for us to collaborate with the CSOs that register with the military council. As registered organisations they will have to provide all their information, including information about the CSOs that work together with them to authorities. This is so risky for us.
93Some CSOs have exhibited empathy and tolerance towards their counterparts who choose to register with the SAC. They recognise that those CSOs probably have their own reasons for opting to register and acknowledge that each organisation has the right to take actions deemed essential for their safety and survival during these challenging times.
94Another CSO leader told the author that:
We don’t blame those CSOs that register for their survival or sustainability. We understand them. Just look at what happened to the Pact Myanmar. Only staff members, their families and targeted beneficiaries of the program had to pay the price in the end.
95The registration process has proven to be quite challenging, even for those CSOs with a genuine desire to register. The 2022 Organisational Registration Law mandates that organisations obtain recommendations from relevant authorities, a requirement that many CSOs have encountered difficulties with. In several instances, even after securing recommendations, the MOHA has failed to issue temporary certificates, as stipulated by the law. Instead, they repeatedly request applicants to revise or modify their applications without offering clear and specific guidance. It appears that officials from the MOHA have intentionally caused delays, possibly due to concerns about potential consequences after issuing registration certificates, or potentially as a covert form of passive protection for CSOs. Therefore, at the time of writing this report, all registration applications remain pending, with no applicants having yet received a registration certificate, or a temporary certificate.
96However, a handful of CSOs remain optimistic regarding imminent progress. They mentioned a meeting organised by the MOHA in late July 2023, where over 80 NGOs and INGOs were said to have participated. During this gathering, participants discussed their present circumstances, highlighting the challenges and concerns associated with the registration process. In response, SAC officials pledged their backing for the registration efforts and encouraged attendees to resubmit their applications with the required modifications.
97It is uncertain to what extent this hope can actually materialise given the recent reshuffle of Union ministers. On 1 August 2023, Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the former Union Government Office Minister and chairman of the regime’s peace committee, was appointed as the Union Minister for MOHA. He is viewed by many as a less rigid military official with significant experience of CSO engagement because of his former involvement with the peace process. However, in the first cabinet meeting after the reshuffle, the SAC leader criticised NGOs as the agents of foreign countries and instructed the relevant ministries to systematically supervise them in line with rules and regulations.44 This has clearly further increased the level of uncertainty facing the CSOs in Myanmar, and the upcoming policies and practices of the SAC will largely shape the future environment.
98Some CSO leaders have cautioned that the SAC might attempt to co-opt the NGOs and INGOs that have been involved with it by providing them with limited concessions and opportunities, while simultaneously subjecting them to regulatory compliance. In such a scenario, these organisations could play a significant role in legitimising the SAC:
- Firstly, by engaging with NGOs and INGOs in this manner, the SAC may seek to project an image of cooperation and legitimacy to both domestic and international audiences.
- Secondly, by subjecting these organisations to regulatory compliance, the SAC could exert control over their activities and limit their ability to argue against the regime’s actions or policies.
99Hence, from the perspective of some CSO leaders, participating in such arrangements could inadvertently lend credibility to the SAC’s authority, potentially undermining the broader goals of advocating democracy, human rights, and social justice.
100A CSO leader based on Thai-Myanmar border told the author:
In the face of the SAC’s attempts to manipulate and control, it is crucial for CSOs to remain vigilant and maintain their independence. It is essential to remember the larger goal of federal democracy and human rights. Any engagement with the SAC must be approached cautiously to avoid inadvertently legitimising it and compromising our principles.
101Recent academic research has highlighted the presence of civil society within authoritarian regimes, although it often functions without full independence due to state-imposed constraints, manipulation, and co-optation of civil society organisations. For instance, Lorch and Bunk explored the role of civil society in legitimising authoritarian regimes and identified five key patterns: civil society as a facade of democracy; the regime making civil society play by the rules; civil society as a mechanism of limited participation and a feedback mechanism; using civil society as a strategy to increase legitimation of the regime; and civil society reproducing historical discourse legitimating the regime (Lorch and Bunk 2017).
Coping strategies and responses
102In the face of repression and stringent restrictions, Myanmar CSOs have exhibited remarkable resilience and adaptability to sustain their endeavours. Despite having a lot less room to manoeuvre, CSOs have not been eradicated; they endure in a constricted and weakened state. The historical practice of working low-profile and evading government scrutiny has resurfaced as a crucial survival skill. This cat-and-mouse game, ingrained in the collective memory, has allowed many CSOs to remain active within Myanmar, operating discreetly to ensure their survival in the current political climate.
103These organisations have adopted a range of creative strategies, such as decentralised structures and innovative communication methods, to navigate the challenges they face. They continue to function—albeit low-profile and apolitical—safeguarding their survival by distancing themselves from political involvement. They have shifted their focus away from politically sensitive activity towards less contentious initiatives, such as emergency and humanitarian relief services, capacity-building for Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs), livelihood programs, and vocational training, targeting the public as their primary audience. Adaptations to project activities have been crucial, especially in instances where direct engagement with the SAC would pose risks.
104Re-engaging with other power-holders: Many CSOs have suspended activities involving the SAC, redirecting efforts towards engagement with opposition forces, such as EAO-EROs, the NUG, and the NUCC, to advocate meaningful participation in humanitarian and development activities as well as in policy making. CSOs redirected their advocacy efforts towards these organisations as they represent democratic aspirations and resistance against the military regime. By doing so, CSOs sought to bolster their voices within movements that actively oppose military rule and campaign for the restoration of democracy. This shift in advocacy targets by CSOs reflects their strategic response to the political upheaval caused by the coup, as well as their commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, and social justice.
105Strategic relationship-building with local authorities, such as Ward and Village Tract Administrators, has allowed some CSOs to continue with their activities without interference, demonstrating their ability to navigate the challenging environment.
106As a leader of a CSO working for the health care of sex workers and persons living with HIV told the author:
We’ve built up a relationship with the local administration office of the ward where our Yangon office is located. At one point, when we gave rice to our members, we also gave some to the ward administration office. They were pleased with it and we could also carry on with our activities without any problem.
107Certain organisations have chosen to maintain collaborations with village-level administrators who are not directly appointed by the SAC. Additionally, there have been reports of a rise in corruption, forcing some organisations to engage in bribery with local officials affiliated with the SAC and EAOs-EROs, to secure travel permissions, access target areas, and conduct activities.
108Downscale to draw less attention: Some CSOs have demonstrated ingenuity in the way they function. For example, instead of organising large-scale training events that might attract unwanted attention, they have chosen smaller, more covert gatherings typically comprising five individuals. This approach, based on mutual trust, not only minimizes scrutiny but also proves highly effective in facilitating sessions on delicate subjects such as human rights and federalism. For instance, one CSO’s training coordinator pointed to how they could seamlessly introduce discussions on women’s rights and land rights into sessions primarily centred on less contentious topics like HIV prevention and agricultural practices, illustrating their adeptness in navigating challenging circumstances.
109A CSO leader working for land rights, who is also a member of a local Red Cross team, proudly claimed:
Whenever I conduct public education campaigns about health issues, I talk about human rights, child rights and women rights. That is how I have been educating people about their rights during these training sessions.
110Focusing visibly on less sensitive issues: A prominent local NGO that used to focus on gender equality has recently changed its name & focus by transitioning from women’s rights to agriculture and rural development. It maintains a strong commitment to women’s rights and gender equality but now approaches them more discreetly within the broader (and less contentious) context of economic development, emphasising the links between gender equality and economic empowerment. This strategic shift allows this NGO to navigate potential sensitivities while sustaining its commitment to social issues.
111Similarly, another NGO dedicated to land and environmental justice has embarked on a simple campaign for trash collection, seemingly diverging from its core mission. However, this apparent shift is based on a strategic decision to raise public awareness about more sensitive topics, such as land rights and environmental justice, under the guise of a less controversial activity. Engaging community members in trash collection provides a less conspicuous avenue to mobilise support and disseminate messages without attracting undue attention from authorities.
112Working from home: The impact of the 2021 military coup has also induced CSOs to adapt their working practices. Many organisations work from home to evade potential crackdowns by the SAC, thereby leveraging the remote working capabilities developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. While this approach offers a degree of protection, the study published by International Centre for Not-For-Profit Law indicated that 35% of respondents adopted remote working after the coup. However, it also revealed a downside, with 27% citing difficulties in human resource management, leading to diminished staff productivity and performance.45 This underlines the complex dynamics and challenges faced by CSOs in balancing visibility and safety in an evolving political landscape.
113A wide variety of activities have been able to continue online where access to the internet is still available. Many CSOs continue to conduct public awareness raising activities through the use of various online communication platforms and social media—Zoom, Signal, Google Meet, Facebook Messenger, Viber, etc. CSOs have also been using these online tools for managing data collection and data security.
114A CSO leader told the author:
We’ve been using google forms to collect data when it is not possible for us to travel and do it in person. And we delete those files after we have entered the data. This method has been quite useful.
115However, using online or digital tools has proven more difficult in rural areas where internet access is limited, and community members have limited digital literacy.
116The head of a CSO working for farmers’ and land rights in Shan State said during the interview:
It is now very difficult to gather people for trainings. And it is also not ok for us to give training via Zoom or other online tools as farmers don’t know how to use them.
117Moreover, activities involving building solidarity, networks and empowerment among workers are less impactful when conducted through the medium of virtual meetings, i.e. without the relationship-building opportunities of meeting face to face.
118Increased security measures: Many CSOs have returned to their former modus operandi, from previous military regimes. This includes maintaining a low-profile or operating discreetly when responding to the needs of the targeted population at community-level. They avoid high-profile or confrontational activities that could draw unwanted attention from the authorities. For organisations and staff who needed to work at the office, it became imperative to implement security measures and securely store data and project information. CSOs have also stopped inviting or receiving people in their offices.
119A leader of a CSO helping the survivors of gender and sexual-based violence asserted:
We’ve tried our best not to receive visitors in our office. We can’t accept strangers. We also have to be careful when we meet with survivors for counselling as they come from diverse backgrounds and we don’t really know who is who. We have to be careful about what information we give to them.
120Similarly, many community paralegals have stopped providing legal aid services in person due to security concerns. Instead, they help people by giving advice via phone or online platforms.
121CSOs have also focused more on developing the skills and capacities of their members and staff to effectively manage challenges, whether through training in safety and security and/or strategic planning and communication. Many CSOs have organised security awareness raising training sessions for all levels of organisational staff, and some have developed safety and security guidelines and protocols.
122The head of a CSO working for women rights and gender equality told the author:
We need to be sensitive about local security conditions when we organize activities in the community. We avoid travelling in large groups and visiting here and there unless necessary. We just maintain a low-profile.
123CSOs have also invested in digital security measures to protect their online communications and activities. They have also used alternative communication channels that are less likely to be monitored or censored. This involves using encrypted messaging apps, secure email services, and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). A few CSOs have also developed plans for responding to arrests of key members or sudden changes in the political and legal landscapes. Some organisations also have security committees or security advisors.
124CSOs have also attempted to minimize paperwork (hard copies) while encouraging staff, partners, and funding agencies to do as many things as possible online (soft copies). They have avoided visibility around funding sources and organisation names and logos in conducting training and public awareness campaigns. They have also practiced self-censorship in the dissemination of information both in project communications and in their individual social lives.
125A CSO leader also mentioned:
We don’t post anything about our activities, including pictures, on Facebook. We don’t need to be famous and we don’t shout on Facebook. We just focus on delivering our activities.
126In some cases, CSO members brought their wives and children or family members to their project locations since the security forces tend to pay less attention to family visits. They also have to ensure that they have nothing sensitive on their phones and that they remove anything (e.g. signing out email accounts, messages and photos, etc.) that could possibly be viewed with suspicion by the authorities. Some people use different sim cards and keypad phones when they travel but, inevitably, these practices lead to reduced effectiveness and inefficient use of resources.
127Building stronger relationships with local communities and networks: many CSOs also highlighted the importance of building stronger relationships and networks with their contacts in target communities. Communications and collaborations with grassroots contacts and networks have provided mutual support, information sharing and resources to navigate challenges more effectively. CSOs that have the trust and support of the community they serve could withstand challenges and continue their work effectively. Using the information obtained from these networks, CSOs could adapt their focus, approaches, and strategies in order to avoid detection or circumvent restrictions.
128A CSO leader who has been working for humanitarian relief told the author:
We have strong connections with local communities and we rely on them greatly to make our move. We always get information from them and also seek their advice before we make any decision on our trips and activities.
129A leader of a human rights NGO that relocated to Thailand after the coup said:
We work with activists and networks of human rights educators inside Myanmar. We’ve provided a series of training materials to them over the past two years on monitoring and collecting evidence related to human rights violations. We have thousands of alumni inside Myanmar.
130Seemingly, personal relationships and reputation have also played an important role in coping with risks and insecurity. Though trust deficit has been a key challenge for Myanmar civil society in general, some CSO leaders have successfully safeguarded their reputation and credibility by maintaining their personal relationships with all stakeholders including local authorities and resistance forces.
131The leader of a legal aid organisation, who is also a former law officer, told us:
I’ve quite a bit of power in my town as I have a good relationship with law enforcement authorities including judges and law officers. Because I used to work for the law office, I have known many of them personally for a long time now. So, I don’t have many problems organising training sessions on rule of law and access to justice. Indeed, some judges and law officers have even offered to give some training sessions themselves.
132Alternative strategies to maintain legal status: a number of organisations have registered themselves as private companies under laws such as the Myanmar Companies Law and Small and Medium Enterprises Development Law. Five of the CSOs interviewed for this study have also registered as private companies and two others are also considering the same approach. A couple of CSOs even changed their names when they registered as private companies.
133By adopting this strategy, these organisations could maintain their legal status while avoiding registration under the repressive Organisational Registration Law imposed by the military regime. As long as they maintain their “active” status by filing annual returns and paying income tax, they could remain legal. And the procedures related to these organisations are rather straightforward compared to the reporting needs and procedures under the Organisational Registration Law. Furthermore, registering as a private company is not as controversial and politically sensitive as registering under the Organisational Registration Law. This is probably because the Myanmar Companies Law and Small and Medium Enterprises Development Law are not laws enacted by the SAC.
134Given these reasons, registering as a private company could become quite common among the CSOs in the future.
135Relocation: Some CSOs had closed their offices and relocated to safe locations. Many CSO leaders or well-known activists for rights-based issues have also had to flee to safer locations such as EAO-ERO controlled areas along the borders and neighbouring countries such as Thailand.
136Generally, it has been observed that the older, larger, and more well-established organisations have been relatively more resilient and better able to seek the additional support they require from donors. They also have strong links with the EAOs-EROs. Conversely, the more recent, smaller, and less well-known organisations are less able to mobilise resources and bridge their funding gaps. Larger organisations also seem to have stronger links with the local networks that remain inside Myanmar.
137Nevertheless, the process of relocating presents new obstacles, such as the possibility of unexpected raids and the need to adhere to local protocols. Furthermore, the financial implications of moving premises pose another significant challenge. Organisations deciding to move to new locations may find themselves constrained by existing leases which will require additional funds to cover the expenses associated with a new office space.46
***
138Myanmar’s civil society—deeply rooted in the country since the late colonial period— continues to play a crucial role in resisting the military junta, set up after the coup on 1 February 2021. Beyond its historical significance, civil society has been instrumental in steering the nation towards democracy. Despite challenges since the coup, the resilience of civil society is evident in both its unwavering commitment to side with the people and to sustain its active involvement in post-coup Myanmar. Analytically speaking, its wide-ranging activities include facilitating access to information domestically and internationally, proactively working towards violence prevention, and contributing to humanitarian efforts. These enduring commitments underline the resilience and adaptability of civil society in the face of complex political dynamics.
139The contemporary challenges of CSOs in Myanmar are highly complex, covering safety and security risks arising from the absence of the rule of law and restricted freedom of assembly and expression, alongside legal and political perils linked to organisational registration and funding shortages. The suppression of CSOs not only jeopardizes the potential for democratisation but also impedes their ability to address critical issues such as poverty, access to services and resources and justice.
140Despite the formidable obstacles, many CSOs have displayed remarkable resilience and capacity to adapt. They continually devise innovative strategies to function, adapt, and innovate, often at significant personal risk. While challenges loom large, the potential for positive change remains substantial. It is clear that CSOs play a pivotal role in defending human rights, calling for social justice and local governance, as well as laying the foundations for accountability, transparency, and civic engagement—the pillars of a robust democracy.
141However, CSOs are faced with a significant dilemma in their relationship with the regime. One option involves negotiating with the regime and operating in full compliance with its terms to sustain their activities. The alternative path is marginalisation, exposing them as targets for repression by the regime. This dilemma risks creating increased conflict and polarisation within Myanmar’s civil society. The regime may seek to co-opt or manipulate CSOs by offering incentives, support, or privileges to those accepting its agendas, potentially sowing divisions and undermining unity and effectiveness within the CSO community.
142The core issue lies not in a lack of understanding what is the ideal relationship between the state and civil society but rather, in the limited power of people and civil society to shape or to reshape this relationship. The prospect of a more robust and vibrant civil society in Myanmar hinges on achieving democratisation in the wake of military rule. It is probable that the independent space of civil society will remain constrained in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, their current initiatives and space merit acknowledgment and support. The international community also needs to stand in solidarity with the CSOs and support their efforts.
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Footnotes
1The government was made up of the Union Election Commission (UEC) and the National League for Democracy (NLD).
2“The Office of the President, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Order 1/2021”, Myanmar Alinn Daily, 1 February 2021, retrieved from https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/mal_2.2.21.pdf.
3Article 417 of the 2008 Constitution states that in order to prevent the “disintegration” of the Union or “national solidarity” or the “loss of sovereignty, due to acts or attempts to take over the sovereignty of the Union by insurgency, violence and wrongful forcible means,” a state of emergency may be declared.
4 “Timeline: The month since ‘Myanmar’s February 1 coup”, Aljazeera, 23 February 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/23/timeline-of-events-in-myanmar-since-february-1-coup.
5“90 townships in 30 cities across Myanmar under curfew order”, Myanmar Times, 9 February 2021, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/90-townships-30-cities-across-myanmar-under-curfew-order.html.
6International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Myanmar Civic Space Assessment: A Summary Overview and Preliminary Key Findings”, November 2022, https://www.icnl.org/post/assessment-and-monitoring/myanmar-civic-space-assessment.
7CIVICUS, 2018, “State of Civil Society Report 2018”, www.civicus.org/index.php/state-of-civil-society-report-2018.
8 Asian Development Bank, “Civil Society Briefs: Myanmar”, 2014, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154554/csb-myanmar.pdf.
9Myanmar Center for Responsible Business, “Civil Society Organizations and Extractive Industries in Myanmar—A Brief Overview”, 2014, https://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/2014-10-11-Briefing-Paper-CSOs-and-Extractives-Industries-Myanmar.pdf.
10John Liu, “CSOs after the coup: Operations squeezed, funding crunched”, The Frontier Myanmar, 28 September 2021, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/csos-after-the-coup-operations-squeezed-funding-crunched/.
11International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Civic Space in Myanmar: In the Post-Coup and Covid-19 Pandemic Era”, November 2022, https://www.icnl.org/post/report/civic-space-in-myanmar.
12Pen America, “Stolen Freedom: Creative Expression, Historic Resistance and the Myanmar Coup”, November 2021, https://pen.org/report/stolen-freedoms-creative-expression-historic-resistance-and-the-myanmar-coup/.
13 “Youth in Black: Myanmar protestors train to fight junta”, Reuters, 27 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/youths-black-myanmar-protesters-train-fight-junta-2021-04-27/.
14“Myanmar’s Military Junta Kills, Detains Youths in Crackdown on Protest Movement”, Radio Free Asia, 7 May 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/youths-05072021164621.html.
15Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, “Sentenced to death by the junta”, 11 April 2023, https://aappb.org/?p=24682.
16Lara Owen and Ko Ko Aung, “Myanmar Coup: The women abused and tortured in detention”, BBC News, 9 December 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59462503.
18“Myanmar Regime Threatens Severe Action Against AAPP”, The Irrawaddy, 27 April 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar‑regime‑threatens‑severe‑action‑aapp.html?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_ox7Sf2B5I1mwnj_Oj8a3901v1j5scYJG7qdJv_8w3Lo-1634373161-0-gqNtZGzNAjujcnBszQfR.
19“State Administration Council Law No.3/2021”, Myanmar Alinn Daily, 13 February 2021, Retrieved from https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/mal_14.2.21.pdf.
20Idem.
21“State Administration Council Law No.5 & 6/2021”, Myanmar Alinn Daily, 14 February 2021, retrieved from https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/mal_15.2.21.pdf.
22The Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar, In What Matter (60), 16 November 2021, https://www.ispmyanmar.com/burmese/2021/11/17/wm-60/.
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24Martial Law Order 1, 2 & 3/ 2021; Martial Law Orders 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7/2023.
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30International Federation of Journalists, “Myanmar: Junta revokes Ayeyarwaddy license”, 22 June 2023, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/myanmar-junta-revokes-ayeyarwaddy-license.
31 “Announcement of the Ministry of Information”, Myanmar Alinn Daily, 5 May 2021, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/mal_5.5.21.pdf.
32The State Law and Order Restoration Council. (1996, July 29), “The Television and Video Law”, Law No. 8/96, retrieved from https://www.mlis.gov.mm/mLsView.do;jsessionid=6933FA3A861D7B1D2FFC5DD2F3ADD803?lawordSn=261.
33“Myanmar Junta Confiscates Radios to Silence Shadow Government Broadcasts”, The Irrawaddy, 21 August 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-confiscates-radios-to-silence-shadow-government-broadcasts.html.
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37 Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Cease persecution of journalists”, 27 May 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/05/myanmar-cease-persecution-journalists/.
38Reporters Without Border, “The 2023 World Press Freedom Index”, 3 May 2023, https://rsf.org/en/index.
39Committee To Protect Journalists, “Number of jailed journalists spikes to new global record”, 14 December 2022, https://cpj.org/reports/2022/12/number-of-jailed-journalists-spikes-to-new-global-record/.
40 “Announcement of Illegal Associations”, Myanmar Alinn Daily, 2 March 2021, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/mal_2.3.21.pdf.
42International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, 2022.
43 See a legal analysis of the registration law: https://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Myanmar.NGO-Law-Analysis.final_.Aug23.pdf.
44“SAC Chairman instructs authorities to supervise INGOs and NGOs in line with rules and regulations”, Eleven Media Group, 31 August 2023, https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/sac-chairman-instructs-authorities-to-supervise-ingos-and-ngos-in-line-with-rules-and.
45Eleven Media Group, 31 August 2023.
46Protect, “Rebuilding an Architecture of Oppression: The impact of the military coup on freedom of expression and civic space in Myanmar”, December 2021, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Rebuilding-an-Architecture-of-Oppression.pdf.
Author
Kyaw Kyaw is a political economist in Southeast Asia, focusing on civil society, governance, natural resources, and justice for over 15 years. He has published extensively and has influenced policies, laws, and practices in the region. Kyaw’s commitment to bridging theory with practical application including coproduction of knowledge has been instrumental in driving positive change and amplifying the local voice across the region.
Only the text can be used under the OpenEdition Books License license. Other elements (illustrations, attached files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.
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