Introduction: Defiance, Civil Resistance and Experiences of Violence under Military Rule in Myanmar
p. 11-29
Texte intégral
Contextualising the coup: A military misreading of the public opinion?
1On the morning of the 1 February 2021, after a few days of increasingly worrying rumours, the Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing, announced that the military forces had taken back the control of the country. Accusing the then governing party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy (NLD) of electoral fraud; “order and discipline” had to be restored in the country. This accusation had been flagged several times in preceding months by military forces, after the military backed-party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), once again faced a massive public rejection with the 8 November 2020 poll. With this ballot, while the USDP came second, it only secured a marginal 33 seats in the whole assembly, while the NLD won no less than 396 seats in both houses, securing a parliamentary majority (attained at 322 seats). The military immediately rejected these results and started to campaign to discredit the election.1
2This wasn’t the first time for the USDP and its associated supporters from the military forces to be dismissed by public opinion. In every free ballot organised since the 1990s, the NLD has systematically broken through, evidencing the massive public support for “Daw Suu” and the people’s thirst for democracy. Yet, the military continues to see itself as the architect of the nation. In the former period, generally qualified as a transition towards a more civilian administration and leadership, they imposed a Constitution in 2008, securing them key positions in the government (such as the ministries of: Defence, Home affairs, and Border affairs) as well as 25% of the parliament. This Constitution’s chief purpose was evidently to secure their own interests while maintaining a brake on any potential political development they judged as threatening their institution, conservative political positions, or economic interests. However, it did also provide a certain, albeit limited, space that lawmakers, politicians and civil society activists grabbed, progressively expanding the (tentative) democratic exercise. Indeed, between the by-elections held in 2012 (in which the NLD was permitted to compete and remarkably won 43 of the 44 seats they contested) and the general elections of 2020, the country experienced more political freedom, a noteworthy decrease in armed conflict and a rapid economic growth correlated with a substantial reduction of poverty levels. While the transition was not without challenges, numerous significant reforms took place, triggering no less meaningful progress in civic and political rights, a positive impact overall attributed to the NLD. Meanwhile, and importantly: “For many of its critics the Tatmadaw remains a power machine basically seeking only rent, control and profit, and this throughout the country” (Egreteau 2016: 88).
3It has been remarked upon that the military, and by extension the USDP, were oblivious as to how negatively they are perceived by the population. The military maintains that the 2020 General Election was fraudulent. Fraudulent elections being something they had previously proven experts at. Indeed, Myanmar has, since 1973, a record of unfree and unfair elections, in which the military have set up various rules to secure votes.2 After the 2020 results were announced, they used several tactics of intimidation such as harassing election observers and electoral officers to get confessions of fraud. Several hundred election officers were imprisoned, and at the time of writing, 21 are reportedly still in jail.3 But, as in 2015, these elections left no doubt about the political choice of the people of Myanmar and they were accepted by the international community as credible. The largest domestic elections observation organisation, the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections concluded that: “Generally, the elections were smooth and peaceful despite shortcomings in administrative procedures which did not impact the whole process and the overall election results” (PACE 2020).
4While the unequivocal public rejection of the USDP seemed a direct and logical consequence of the decades long oppressive military rule that resulted in a relative isolation (predominantly from Western countries) and appalling economic development, the military elite continued to suffer from a distorted vision of the reality. As documented by research on the military mindset, the military elite continues to see itself as both the architect and chaperone or, more specifically, the guardian of the nation.
A closer examination of Tatmadaw literature and propaganda, as well as public speeches made by successive high-ranking military Burmese leaders since the late 1950s, reveal a striking paradox. The Burmese officer corps never really presented themselves as the “ruling class” but rather as an elite tasked with “guarding” the country’s fragile independence institutions and protecting the nation’s integrity whenever needed—including against internal forces.
(Egreteau 2016: 22).
5Along with a self-appointed “guardian” mandate, the military also took on state building efforts soon after its genesis. As explained by Callahan in respect of the 1950s:
Gradually, military-building activities expanded into the realm of state-building. This transformation of warriors into state builders was neither smooth neither unchallenged, nor it was the outcome of any rationalised planning process or sneaky conspiracy. […] Army building and state-building processes were characterised by on-going struggles among civilian politicians, military field commanders, and staff officers over what that state should look like, who could claim legitimacy at its helm and who its enemies were.
(Callahan 2003: 172-173)
6These struggles still resonate in the current politically chaotic context of Myanmar—where even the NLD, as well as varied opposition movements, struggle to offer a comprehensive political vision that could rally legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of citizens, especially among some ethnic minorities. There appears to be a general agreement that the 2008 Constitution should be abolished and federal democracy be established. But beyond these broad lines, any sort of common agreement on the detailed contours of federal democracy is yet to be arrived at.
7The military apparatus hence did not fully comprehend why the voters refused to recognise the essential role it sees itself playing and showed such a lack of appreciation via the ballot box. Logically, this denial also equally shaped the perception that the USDP had of itself. This was made evident through the voices of some cadres of the party who were involved in the election preparations. For instance, the then Union Election Commission (UEC)’s Chairman U Tin Aye, a former Lieutenant General, expressed his views in a press interview six months before the poll:
Elections are crucially important. They need to turn out outstanding and virtuous people. It is important that outstanding and virtuous people get into the parliament and serve the country. […] I want the USDP to win, but to win fairly, not by cheating. As a chairman, I would say that you should never ever think I would help you to win. You ask me if I want it to win, it will win if it deserves it.4
8And on 15 November 2015, when he had to declare the unequivocal election results, he didn’t refrain from warning voters about the erroneous choice they had just made.5 He cautioned them about the lack of seriousness and performance of the NLD. He condemned the people’s ungratefulness towards the military, despite all the military efforts made to rule a country riddled by ethnic conflict. He even promised that the voters will have to call back the military back at the next election, begging them to restore the country. While he was speaking in his professional capacity, in what was a rather emotional speech, he probably expressed what many senior members of the armed forces elite felt. But this prophecy did not materialise and, instead, the voters extended their backing to Daw Suu and her party again in 2020. This erroneous reading of the political situation can probably offer one of the multiple and intricate factors that have led to the coup; which was also certainly initially driven by an irrational decision and based on pre-existing contingency plans that had not forecast the scale and magnitude of the public determination to resist in order to sustain their all too short democratic experience.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup: Defiance and violence
91 February 2021 should have marked an important day, as the newly elected assembly was to convene in its gigantic building in Nay Pyi Taw. One of the first task of elected members of the Parliament was, according to the constitution, to elect the president and vice-presidents.6 Underlying tensions with regard to the upcoming indirect elections was reportedly due to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi not being able to be a candidate due to a Constitutional clause designed to preclude her;7 while Min Aung Hlaing was supposed to retire from military service in July 2021 as he was to turn 65 (Thuzar, Thun and Montesano 2021). Hostility reached its climax after days of endless negotiations between the NLD leader and the Army chief. Instead of appointing a new president, and igniting a new legislature, that day will remain in history as the turning point in the life of millions of civilians who lost all they had to defend their political views. Many MPs, cadres of the NLD and other architects of the progressive demilitarisation of the country’s politics were immediately arrested–perceived as enemies of the nation and the army.
10Soon, citizens from all backgrounds took to the streets to express their disagreement and demand respect for their electoral choices. Demonstrations blossomed in small and big cities alike, organised by various professional associations, students, civil society groups and charismatic leaders of all ages—powerfully illustrated by Visual Rebellion in the first chapter of this book.
11Within a few days, a large number of activists were detained and on 19 February, the armed forces started their violent retaliation—killing the first “martyr of the revolution” Mya Thwe Thwe Khine, a 19-year-old unarmed protestor in Nay Pyi Taw.8 The following months saw the scale of a disproportionate and violent response to what was a peaceful civil disobedience movement (inspired by Gandhian values). Thousands of strikers refused to collaborate in anyway with the new authorities, and the country became paralysed.9
12Soon, the opposition to this military coup organised itself around three central institutions: 1) The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) formed on 5 February 2021 by Members of Parliament who had not been arrested and which drew on the electoral legitimacy of its members, 2) The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) as a platform for the CRPH, political parties, Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), representatives of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on 8 March, seeking to enable a collective leadership and serve as the most inclusive platform, and finally 3) the National Unity Government (NUG) on 16 April 2021 (Thuzar and Tun 2022). In the months after, on 7 September 2021, the “People’s Defensive War” was announced by the NUG, branding the resistance as a violent one (as analysed in the second chapter of the book).10
Challenges to resistance mobilisation: Old and new fault lines
13Three years after the coup, the military still clings on to power, many CDMers struggle to maintain their strikes while thousands had to go back to work due to the pressure of their superiors, fear of denunciations or economic survival needs. The armed conflict spread across a massive portion of Myanmar territory from Rakhine to Shan State and from Kachin State to Tanyintharyi Region, leaving only the few largest cities, most of the Irrawaddy Region and Mon State in a relative calm. The degree of deterioration of civilian security varies significantly at the local level. Various armed groups—called People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), more or less aligned to the NUG’s Ministry of Defence—have emerged, constituted of civilians who have nothing left to lose and opted for the armed struggle against the junta. In addition, Local Defence Forces (LDFs) have also mushroomed in most ethnic areas and in the northern dry zone, with their own local and ethnic agenda, and in various levels of collaboration with other armed actors of their area. In the geographic areas where they have managed to push back the Myanmar military troops, hence called ‘liberated’ areas—they now have taken on various organising roles depending on their leadership, political legitimacy and interaction with traditional leadership. Some of the complex intricacies between traditional and new leadership are explained in the chapter examining collectivism in the Anyar,11 where the testing of local leadership seeking autonomy from the army and central state is an entirely new experience.
14To generalise a complex situation, the border and remote areas have, in part at least, experienced the consolidation or emergence of ethnic based political authorities, that recognise the political value of collaborating with the NUG, and with other emerging local powers. The Myanmar military is desperately trying not to lose further ground in predominantly ethnic states, holding on the largest cities by relying on air strikes and extremely violent campaigns against the civilian populations in the hope of uprooting the armed resistance. However, various indicators show that the Myanmar military is stretched due to the multiple fronts and the intensification of armed conflict, as unquestioningly evidenced by the decision to invoke the conscription law on 10 February 2024.12 This desperate attempt might have serious long-term consequences on the conflict. In the short term, the immediate effect was to radicalise many youths who had formerly decided to refrain to engage in armed struggle. Thousands have already reached out to the PDFs to join their troops.13 Besides, while difficult to assess numbers, certainly thousands have already fled abroad. Again, this decision begets questioning the Myanmar military’s understanding of its own people.
15At the time of writing, at least 2.6 million people have been displaced inside Myanmar since the coup, including approximatively 800,000 people since October 2023.14 Sagaing is the most affected area with more than one million displaced people and a very high reported prevalence of conflict intensity.15 The UN estimates that 17.6 million people, which represent about one third of the population, are in need of humanitarian aid.16 Meanwhile the State Administrative Council (SAC) regime continues to actively hinder humanitarian access (see chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the book).
16The current multifaceted political crises are a mix of inherited conflict and new fault lines. In the same way as the massive public reactions in the direct aftermath of the coup allied “old and new repertoires of contention” (Egreteau 2022); the on-going political and armed struggle embody, and reify, old and new fault lines. Some of the conflict dynamics (described above) emerged after the coup; like the spread of violence in many areas of Sagaing area, some of which now distance themselves from its former perceived alignment to Burmese mainstream politics—often summarised as extensive support to Daw Suu and the NLD. The emergence and intensification of conflict in areas that were previously relatively stable can be seen to generate new perceptions of the self and the groups of belonging. New political identity categories, and developing historical narratives appear to justify the local political culture and struggle, as in the case of Anyar. To complicate things, these new expressions of conflict are also tied into older ethno-nationalist movements, decades long grievances in areas like Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Karen and Karenni populated areas.
17The coup, and the following uprising, unleashed the wrath of new generations of activists—who had previously no intention, or space, to question NLD’s attitude and rather top-down, non-consultative leadership—creating new political groupings.17 In many ways, these young generations, among which many individuals radicalised and decided to opt for armed or confrontational political opposition, were faced with severe restrictions. After tasting democracy during the transition and the NLD rule, they refused to return to the hardship of a vicious military dictatorship. However, it does not mean that they had all felt well represented and served by the NLD. Even if they still held respect for the political icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, they will never return to a non-critical approach of her or others’ leadership perceived to be top down. Even if released and allowed back into the formal political life of the country, it seems extremely unlikely that she could recover the unification role she had sought to play until the coup. And, worryingly for the future of the nation, to date, no institution or person seems to be able to play a meaningful role to rally what are varied and heterogenous pro-democratic aspirations.
18Since the 1990s, the mainstream and dominant national (Bamar) political project revolved around the charisma of Aung San Suu Kyi, who crystallised the democratic agenda. Yet, the current opposition movements hardly share converging views on united leadership or political agenda—among themselves—let alone with the representatives of her party. Many of them are seen as blocking political dialogues mainly within CRPH, and NUCC presumably because they expect their leader to make any significant decisions. While there is a common agreement on the short-term objective of defeating the army and establishing a federal state (that no one seems able to define precisely), the middle to longer term political project remains a blur. This fragmentation of political views questions the essence of what could a new nation building project look like. The old-style nation building, driven by the Myanmar military, being one Tatmadaw (armed forces / တပ်မတော်), one language, one religion—had been pushed with much coercion but negligible results. But the invention of a new, realistic, and yet acceptable—to—all national narrative is, at the time of concluding this research, in deadlock, caught between various competing political units created by the emerging revolutionary forces. Pre-existing ethnic minority older political elites have been entangled in pervasive ethno-nationalism which continues to see push back by some of the younger, upcoming, generations. In this dynamic, there is at least a facing up to these stickier political issues, and, in this, the opportunity for democratic debates.
Defiance, civil resistance and experiences of violence
19While the mainstream revolution very much self-identifies with violent means—the vast majority of the people of Myanmar have opted for civilian resistance, more or less openly expressed. The notion of “defiance” seems particularly well adapted to the various forms of daily life opposition that the people are choosing in Myanmar.18 Defiance can be generally defined as an: “offensive behaviour caused by a defensive reaction to norm sanctioning” (Terman 2017).19
20Defiance is part of—but goes further—than what can be framed as merely revolutionary mainstream narratives, designed by the political elites. Caygill attempts to isolate defiance from the concept of resistance, on the basis of the thorough analysis of wide-ranging historical examples and philosophical concepts (Caygill 2013):
[…] in many ways these expressions of defiance, which would probably be the more generic concept for me, all had something pre-political about them. That defiance is not motivated politically; it doesn’t necessarily lead to political expression. Rather, defiance is something that can take place on many levels. While resistance can take place at the political level, as for example when resistance and defiance are tied with revolutionary or emancipatory political projects. However, it also has some other qualities that make it pre-political. What I mean is that defiance is closer to violence than to speech and politics.
21In the case of the contemporary political crises in Myanmar, the unearthing of various defiant modes, and depicting the impact of the coup on the everyday life of some groups of populations in Myanmar highlights the heterogeneity of the resistance, and the diversity of its expression in a very constrained context. This book gathers a selection of research that aims to reflect on the violent experiences of the Myanmar citizens since the coup. Importantly, it also analyses the limited space left to civic engagement for the people and the diverse shapes that the non-violent political opposition can take. It encompasses multidisciplinary approaches to illustrate the multidimensional nature of the coup’s impact on people all over the country and on its institutions. It also seeks to demonstrate the emergence of identities and political narratives within the heterogeneous resistance movement.
22Contributions, from authors of varied experiences and areas of expertise, have been selected to shed light on various realities of this defiance, ranging the “everyday forms of resistance” (Scott 1985) to the recent controversy about the concept of “humanitarian resistance” (Slim 2022). The former concept of “every day resistance is the most common form of opposition to oppression. It consists of foot dragging, non-compliance, pilfering, desertion, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, flight, etc.” can be used to provide a framework to the analysis of the situation in rural areas of Sagaing.20
23Throughout their varied contributions, authors also shed light on the actual space for public defiance in a seriously constrained context, where the price to pay to express ones’ political opinion is very high. It also suggests the emergence of local regional dynamics. It wonders why the youth politics seem so disjointed even if the revolution is also very much seen as led by a younger generation of activists. In order to depict these complex realities, different photographic and cartoon contributions have been encouraged, as they provide a parti pris reading of events through the individual eyes of engaged artists.
24The chapters of this book seek to reflect various political, social and humanitarian aspects of the impact of the coup and how individuals, and organisations, have reacted to it. One of the common threads is the experience of physical or symbolic violence by civilians, across the country and all socio-economic strata and demographics. The disproportionate and traumatic collective experiences of violence could partially explain the radicalisation of many, especially among the youth.
25Before introducing the different parts and chapters of this book, it is important to note that conducting field work in Myanmar, and at the Thai-Myanmar border, has become incredibly challenging. Travelling in many regions is a dangerous under-taking for researchers, asking questions in public, online or even on the phone can create grave risks for them, as well as for the interviewees. The authors of the following chapters, have hence worked in these very difficult conditions, to collect rare and precious anthropological data. Some of them need to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the research of their topics.
26The book is articulated in three parts that chronicle the experiences of violence, the popular defiance and the impact it has on people’s daily realities. The first part provides contextual elements of the post-coup political situation, with the countrywide public uprising, that was soon faced with widespread state violence.
27The first contribution on the “Streets of Protest” proposed by the photojournalists of Visual Rebellion reveals pictures taken in the three months following the coup. They evidence how the demonstrations started with humour and creativity and a general sense of hope that the coup could be countered by the people—before they were subject to violent retaliation. This selection of photos depicts Burmese people from different backgrounds and ages, defying the military with resolve in various locations in the country.
28The second contribution from Buscemi and Maguire, looks at the “branding” of the revolution that progressively—and inexorably—turned towards a violent movement. It investigates the socio-political processes that have led to legitimise armed resistance and that underpin consent for it in the aftermath of the coup. It looks at the logic that reproduces violence and looks at the ways in which such logic also shapes non-violent resistance practices. This includes an exploration of the on-going role of ethnonationalism in political discourse and how a deliberate strategy of de-humanising opponents continues and in doing so, enables and entrenches violent responses.
29The third chapter, by Nyi Nyi Kyaw, relates to the marginalisation of the youth in politics, particularly in the pre-coup period. It proposes a rare analysis of the historical factors that participate to explain the relative lack of institutional representation and absence of united legitimate views of younger political actors. While the revolution has certainly shown that a significant part of the youth is now looking beyond Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and does not anymore rely solely on the NLD to project their political aspirations, this critical research sheds light on possible partial explanation of deficiency of cohesive, vocal, and effective young leaders in the political arena within the fragmented pro-democratic movements. The author suggests three reasons to explain their marginalisation: the unattractiveness of political professions; the lack of vehicle to echo their more progressive and leftist political values and the use of the civil society organisations arena—instead of formal political parties—for younger leaders to emerge, that did not grant them the legitimacy to move onto the more formal political sphere later on.
30The fourth contribution is a timeline of monthly political events, selected by young political cartoonists, Michi Emma and T.H.A, and explored through the creative dimensions of activism. It is important to notice that art and creativity have been present throughout the popular non-violent struggle, especially among youth, who have used social media intensively to spread their (often visual) messages to share their understandable frustrations. These artists purposely selected incidents that stoked their minds during the first two years after the coup. This selection echoes the top social media stories of these times and turns artists’ anger into (often black) humour. Expectedly, violence is a leitmotiv, the dark silhouette of death is also a recurring character. In this Manichean battle, the Army, or evil powers, depicted in black is systematically oversized and violently persecutes unarmed civilians. Significantly, the cartoonists often feature the expectations and failures of the international community, and the UN in particular. They also depict how defiance can come in many creative guises and approaches—including unexpected ones such as the boycott of Myanmar Beer.
31The second part of the book looks at the constraints faced by Civil Society Organisations and the way aid professionals and other activists adopted strategies to act in response to the coup. It looks at the concrete issues they faced but also at ways they managed to organise humanitarian aid, or the resumption of rudimentary service delivery to the civilian populations.
32The fifth chapter looks at the space for humanitarian actors in Myanmar and how they can accommodate international standards and perception of these local solutions. It explains how local aid organisations have led but also reshaped humanitarian responses, through new networks and coalitions. Meanwhile, the dual political and humanitarian “crisis” in Myanmar has sharpened civil society criticisms of international donors and aid agencies, especially the much-debated notions of risk and neutrality in international humanitarianism. Highlighting the contested nature of humanitarianism itself, civil society leaders are advancing values of responsibility and solidarity, as well as equitable risk sharing and integrated approaches. To Décobert and Wells, Myanmar’s current “crisis” is a double-edged sword: it brings civil society together in a shared struggle to end military oppression and to redefine humanitarian values and practices; but it also risks driving increased fragmentation amongst civil society—unless broader and respectful dialogue around broad values of responsibility and solidarity can be maintained.
33The sixth chapter draws the tally of the legal restrictions set to punish the opposition. This chapter provides to provide an overview of the CSOs’ curtailed legal space in post-coup Myanmar. The author describes how the SAC instrumentalised the apparatus of the law to restrict their operational capacity since the coup. It also examines the various coping strategies CSOs have elaborated to remain operational in response. While highlighting the current daunting obstacles faced by Myanmar’s civil society, it also narrates how these organisations’ resilience—constantly adapting to manage risks, in order to continue to implement their mandate, and sustain values such as solidarity.
34The third and last part proposes a closer look at the impact of the coup on civilians who are not part of the traditional political elites, and whose situation is infrequently documented.
35The seventh chapter, based on rare information collected in a very perilous terrain, sheds light about the civilians’ living conditions in the so-called liberated areas of the upper Dry Zone, or Anyar. Prior to the coup, this region has made its name for being a place of recruitment for the Tatmadaw, but also for being a stronghold of the NLD. This chapter delves into the grassroots dynamics of resource pooling and solidarity, theorising their role in sustaining the resistance against the dictatorship. It emphasises the role of collective identity in mobilising resistance efforts in this region of Myanmar. It argues that the brutal tactics employed by the junta have fostered a shared sense of grievance and solidarity among the communities, leading to collective action against oppression—that is not without internal tensions—but driven by a common resolve to defy the oppressive regime.
36The eighth and last chapter penetrates the close environment of the garment factories in Yangon’s industrial suburbs, that have been frequently reported in the pre-coup period for the predominantly horrifying terrible conditions faced by the—mainly female—workers. Through various interviews and cases, it illustrates the negative impact of the coup on the already dire workers’ rights and incomes. The authors share an important testimony of the degradation of the daily working conditions experienced by thousands of poor workers in factories, far from media attention and public knowledge. There too, and despite a very restrictive environment, workers have shown noticeable signs of defiance and efforts to organise collectively to rest, not always labelled as political.
37At the time of concluding the field research for this book, some military related developments created a new sense of hope among the key leaders of the political opposition, with the symbolic reclaiming of various locations in northern Shan State since the beginning of the Operation 1027, and the subsequent push of anti-coup armed forces in Karenni state in late 2023. However, as in other parts of the country, it is obvious that civilian populations pay the hard price for the Myanmar military’s defeats—as air strikes continue across the country. The recent statement of the enforcement of the conscription law is seen as a confirmation of the precariousness of the military regime, its full effect is yet to be seen but it is already understood to be pushing many youths into desperate decisions such as enrolling in armed resistance or facing an uncertain exile.
38On a political level, it will be worrying if any fragmentation of the resistance into a collection of individuals and organisations with their own agendas becomes more pronounced. The deficiency of a visibly unified—or at least converging—leadership threatens the effectiveness and legitimacy of the CRPH, NUCC, NUG and other political actors that have been vocal since the coup. Instead, and in spite of the high expectations many citizens projected on these actors, to date they seem to excel at vetoing each other’s propositions, failing—as yet—to build compromise. Because of the current political deadlock, the question is being posed as to whether this heterogenous movement can possibly rule a complex democratic federal union one day? Could this simply be democracy in the (slow, not straight forward and painful) making?
39The pre-existing fault lines along ethnic grievances, diverging political views and competing version of identity are now entwined with newer conflict dynamics (including, but not limited to: supporters of the non-violence approach versus direct and active supporters of war; the youth versus former generations of political leaders; ever present ethno-nationalist divisions within minority groups and the emergence of new armed actors that will challenge locally attempts by the central state to assert itself.
40Nation building is always going to be a complicated exercise in this context. An autocratic military elite has failed to accomplish it over the last six decades and it is difficult to believe that the lasting peaceful solution(s) can still be found by people carrying weapons, even if some of them display the best political intentions. The future of Myanmar, as one country and even more so as a nation, will be challenging. Competing identities and narratives continue to emerge and demand exclusive recognition. The widening experience of violence, a common appetite for defiance and a growing everyday resistance culture are likely to create numerous long-term challenges for the potential of (re)emerging governance institutions—but they are all challenges that the civilian population have decided rest with them, not any military group.
***
41The military coup brought misery for millions of Myanmar people. The unacceptability of military rule also inspired a variety of resourceful and creative responses of defiance from people across the country, across ethnic groups, with many leading roles assumed by a youth demographic.
42This book was funded by Norwegian People’s Aid to support researchers and artists from (or working on) Myanmar in an effort to increase knowledge and understanding of the different dimensions of civil defiance that were—and remain—evident in the face of the military coup and subsequent violent repression. It features pieces proposed by senior and junior contributors, who reflect their perceptions, experiences and analysis of their own terrain.
43This research agenda is likely still at an early stage, but the stakes involved in trying to understand organised actions seeking to deny military rule and oppression make it a critical one. It is also one that invokes particular considerations for researchers when engaging with what is, by definition, hard to research and sensitive terrain. It is our hope that this collection of pictorial and narrative essays will make a useful contribution to the body of literature looking to better understand the determined efforts in play in defiance of the coup and in the cause of freedom in Myanmar. It is dedicated to the people of Myanmar in their efforts to bring about a just and fair federal democracy.
Bibliographie
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Notes de bas de page
1“The Tatmadaw finds the process of the 2020 election unacceptable, with over 10.5 million cases of potential fraud, such as non-existent voters”, quoted in “Tatmadaw reprimands diplomatic community on ‘unwarranted assumptions’”, Myanmar Times, 31 January 2021.
2Bertil Lintner, “Myanmar military’s long history of electoral fraud”, The Irrawaddy, 19 July 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-militarys-long-history-of-electoral-fraud.html, retrieved on 1 March 2024.
3“Joint Statement by Election Experts and Organizations on Myanmar”, 31 January 2023, www.idea.int/news/joint-statement-international-election-experts-and-organizations-myanmar, retrieved on 1 March 2024.
4“I Want the USDP to Win, but to Win Fairly”, The Irrawaddy, 29 June 2015, www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/i-want-the-usdp-to-win-but-to-win-fairly.html, retrieved on 1 March 2024.
5Author’s personal notes, U Tin Aye’s speech, Union Election Commission, 12 November 2015. The press conference statement used to be on the ministry of information website but cannot be retrieved as of January 2024.
6The President is elected by the Presidential Electoral College, that is formed by: (1) Elected MPs from Amyotha Hluttaw, (2) Elected MPs from Pyithu Hluttaw and, (3) defence Services personnel Hluttaw representatives who are nominated by the Commander-in-Chief. Each of the three groups elects a Vice-President. The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw elects the President out of three Vice-Presidents using the First Past the Post System.
7According to chapter 3, article 59(f) of the 2008 Constitution, the president must be someone who “he himself, one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate children or their spouses not owe allegiance to a foreign power. […] [They shall] not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country … [or] be persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign country.”
8 Radio Free Asia, “First Myanmar protester death galvanizes Anti-Coup protestors”, 19 February 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/protester-death-02192021182555.html.
9Beeach Hannah, “Myanmar’s protests are growing, defying threats and snippers”, The New York Times, 14 March 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/world/asia/myanmar-general-strike.html.
10Sebastian Strangio, “Myanmar Shadow Government Declares ‘National Uprising’ Against Military Rule”, The Diplomat, 7 September 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/myanmar-shadow-government-declares-national-uprising-against-military-rule/, retrieved on 23 March 2024.
11See chapter 7 “Collectivism and everyday resistance in Anyar” in this book.
12Ye Myo Hein, “Myanmar’s Fateful Conscription Law”, United States Institute for Peace, 26 January 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/myanmars-fateful-conscription-law, retrieved on 23 March 2024.
13Phone interview with an individual close to the command of a PDF operating in Yangon area, on 20 February 2024.
14 Relief web, “Myanmar Emergency Update (as of 1 January 2024)”, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-emergency-update-1-january-2024, retrieved on 15 January 2024.
15ISP, “Almost half of the total townships marked high intensity of security risk index (as of 15 February 2024)” https://ispmyanmar.com/isp-data-matters/#images-8 , retrieved on 15 January 2024.
16Relief web, “Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan 2023”, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-year-end-dashboard-jan-dec-2023, retrieved on 15 January 2024.
17See chapter 3 “The Marginalisation of Student and Youth Politics in Myanmar” in this book.
18Defiance is generally defined as a “behaviour in which you refuse to obey someone or something”, as in the Cambridge Dictionary.
19She introduces her research as follows: “This paper identifies an important mechanism driving norm resistance, which I call defiance. Inspired by insights in social psychology, sociology, and criminology, defiance refers to the net increase in the commitment to or incidence of norm offending behaviour caused by a defensive reaction to norm sanctioning. […]. In the long term, defiance attaches oppositional norms to collective identity, potentially transforming domestic and international normative orders.”
20See chapter 7 “Collectivism and Everyday Resistance in Anyar” in this book.
Auteur
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Carine Jaquet
Carine Jaquet has been engaged in humanitarian aid, peace and democratisation efforts, research and activism in and on Myanmar/Burma for two decades. Her research examines peace and conflict, civil society and humanitarian space, ethnic identity and narratives. Since 2007, she has been working in Asian and Southeast Asian countries for the UN Political Missions, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and NGOs aiming at supporting local organisations. She also served as well as a technical advisor for Myanmar government institutions during the “transition” period, including the Union Election Commission. She is a former associate researcher affiliated with the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC). She holds master’s degrees in Asian Studies, and in Intercultural Communication from the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO), and in Political Science from Paris 1-La Sorbonne. She graduated in Myanmar Language and Civilisation from Yangon University of Foreign Languages (YUFL).
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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