Time and space: a historical and geographical perspective

6As discussed in Chapter 1, in Myanmar, at least as much as in the rest of Southeast Asia (Tayeb et al., 2023) and the world, formal education has historically played critical roles in terms of politics and identity, with successive dynamics such as: (i) monastic schools projecting the Buddhist monarchy’s legitimacy during the dynastic period; (ii) efforts to inculcate loyalty to the British crown through colonial education; (iii) the creation of writing and schooling systems by the missionnaries for the populations inhabiting primarily the mountainous peripheries; (iv) the role of the education sector in the Burmese struggle for decolonization; (v) the progressive narrowing of education around a monolithic Burmese national identity conveyed by schools under successive (most notably military) regimes; (vi) student protests against these regimes; (vii) the expansion of alternative education systems mobilizing diverse ethnic identities following the end of the BSPP period; (viii) nascent decentralization reforms towards including ethnic minority languages and cultures in government schools and increasing contact between the MoE and the education systems of EAOs during the 2011-2020 decade.

7Following the 2021 coup, education certainly has held its place among the most politicized sectors of society, largely marching at the forefront of the opposition to the SAC, notably through the CDM. Despite the priority of the NUG to channel its limited funds to the armed resistance, education has nonetheless remained a key sector to maintain the revolution on a daily basis, through an ongoing boycott of SAC-controlled schools and universities and through efforts to build or strengthen education systems in alignment with the perspective of a federal democracy.

8As also noted by David Steinberg,767 the saying that ‘history doesn’t repeat itself but it often rhymes’ seems particularly true in the case of Myanmar, with striking similarities between successive coups and protests and direct references to previous uprisings and crackdowns. Past events such as the 1920s student strike against the colonial ‘slave education system,’ the Rangoon University Student Union building being blown up by Ne Win in 1962 in efforts to subdue unruly students, the crackdown on student protests surrounding U Thant’s funerals in 1974, or the leading role played by student activists in the 1988 uprising (some of them, including Min Ko Naing and Ko Jimmy, being still critically involved in 2021) have constituted explicit references and have combined with elements coming from protest in other countries to blend into the specific repertoire of Myanmar’s 2021 Spring Revolution.

9The military, too, has developed its own machinery to crack down on successive cycles of protest. The SAC’s 2021 playbook to try to bring the education sector to heel, notably through the use of direct violence and the rewarding of submissiveness, is inspired not only by the cardinal values of the military but also by the experiences of previous juntas in taking back control of the country following uprisings. Activists fleeing to EAO-controlled territories as well as those reaching the Thai border and being involved in pro-revolution activities from the peripheries, notably through education, is also certainly reminiscent of post-1988 dynamics.

10One of the critical differences this time around is the technological leap forward of telecommunications, which has decisively contributed to an unprecedented mobilization to reject the coup through social media, has allowed for a very precise and vivid documentation of the violence used by the military in their repression, and has fostered regular exchanges between activists and politicians based in different regions and abroad. Largely building on the technological experience gained during the Covid-19 pandemic, the leveraging of digital technologies has helped document and report on the ongoing revolution and maintain new political institutions created in reaction to the coup.

11In the realm of education and following the 1988 uprising, ‘distance’ was chiefly associated with the SLORC/SPDC efforts to keep students away from campuses where they might have been exposed to disruptive, revolutionary ideas. After spending 2020 striving to deal with online education tools in the context of the pandemic and its disruption to education, it appears now that ‘distance education’ has radically switched sides post-coup. The mastery of new technologies has allowed educators, including those who left the public education system as part of the CDM, to develop particularly ambitious and impressive online alternatives to SAC-controlled education, although these endeavors have predictably been more successful for higher education than for basic education.

12Keeping with our historical and geographical perspective, the 2011-2020 decade could be described as having witnessed nascent and limited decentralization processes in two ‘asymmetrical’ fashions (Tinzar Htun and Raynaud, 2018; Raynaud, 2021), both affecting the realm of education. First, the State and Region governments and parliaments progressively came to life and consequently played increasingly important roles in multiple domains, such as (most relevant to our perspectives and to conversations dealing with federalism) the introduction of ethnic minority languages and cultures in government schools. Second, an uneven and unstable ‘bottom-up’ (South, 2023) decentralization process was arguably taking place, with continuations and ruptures with the ceasefire agreements dynamic of the 1990s,768 through overall increasing contact between non-state actors and the ministries of their respective sectors. When it comes to education, this included dynamics such as an increasing number of ‘mixed schools’ and collaboration and bridging between some EAOs’ education systems and the State. This double and asymmetric decentralization process was arguably centripetal in the sense that it was bringing peripheral perspectives and actors closer to the regional and central governments, ultimately working towards reinforcing senses of belonging to the Union of Myanmar through a greater inclusion of diversity.

13The 2021 coup, on the contrary, has triggered a centrifugal dynamic in many regards. Although these questions may end up being settled in a federal future that would tie the country’s redefined components together, at the time of writing, major and increasing portions of the territory are under the control of a multitude of historical and newly created armed groups. These groups’ political agendas may prioritize to different and shifting extents two aims that may be only partially aligned: the construction of a federal state on the one hand and the building of their own nations and attached territorial claims on the other. In the context of a Myanmar military rapidly losing ground as of early 2024,769 these armed groups are gathering not only control or influence over territories but also new or renewed political and symbolic legitimacies acquired on the battlefields by victories and bloodshed against the military-dominated central State. They may well prove to be the most influential actors in terms of reshaping the political map of what is currently known as Myanmar (Fig. 100, Maps 4 to 7).

14Exploiting this failing state dynamic, a different type of actor, namely criminal organizations largely involved in online scamming with transnational complicities, has also sprung up since the coup, particularly in border towns and special economic zones, as part of an overall dramatically rising criminality.770 In a January 2024 study dealing with the 50 countries most affected by conflicts, ACLED ranked Myanmar as the “most violent overall and retaining its position as the most ‘fragmented’ due to its hundreds of small militias formed to contest the government since the coup in 2021.”771 Myanmar has a long history of defying political analysts’ forecasts – and it would be particularly unwise to make any prediction in such a radically disrupted context – but a fractured future, with multiple authorities exerting diverse and shifting levels of control over swathes of territory, is certainly among the realm of possibilities.772

Figure 100: Cartoonist JMP describing (as of April 2024) a possibly unfolding scenario (for 2025) in which armed groups, legitimized by their sacrifices on the battlefields, end up splitting between themselves the territory of a Myanmar tortured by the military.773

15These multifaceted migrations primarily affect youth and young adults, and include refugees and migrant workers, but also diverse elites, including skilled workers, middle and higher social classes trying to invest their capital away from Myanmar, and students enrolling in universities abroad. Foreign language training centers have been mushrooming, largely filled by students preparing for diverse forms of expatriation away from Myanmar’s ongoing crisis and lack of economic opportunities. The remittances of these migrants constitute an increasingly important share of the economy, partly directed towards supporting the resistance, and the SAC has been striving to tax migrant workers more systematically.

Maps 4 and 5: Attempts at mapping ‘military control’ over territory, as of February 2022 (first) and June 2024 (second) by Thomas van Linge, clearly showing a territorial expansion of several of the main armed groups at the expense of the Myanmar military.777

Maps 6 and 7: Attempts at mapping military control over territory as of April 2024, by Thomas van Linge (first) and adapted from The New York Times (based on more detailed mapping by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, SAC-M, second).

16Depending on future political developments in Myanmar, a return of these populations with new skills and capital (a phenomenon that had begun over the 2011-2020 reform period) might become a significant asset for the country. But in case of stagnation, similar to the decades following the 1962 and 1988 coups, this phenomenon may become protracted, draining the country and its economy of many of its sharpest minds and strongest arms, and thereby taking a heavy toll on Myanmar’s future development with regards to ‘human capital.’

Quantity, quality, identity: education under the SAC and beyond

17Following our lens, analysis reveals that the coup and its aftermath have triggered a sharp and unsurprising drop in overall access to education across the country. In terms of overall quantity, a 2023 World Bank report estimates that the proportion of the population aged 6-22 years enrolled in formal educational institutions has sharply decreased from an already low 69.2% in 2017 to a worrisome 56.8% in 2023. According to this report (which may underestimate pro-revolution education), the higher the level of schooling, the sharper the enrolment drop: from 90% to 73% in primary; from 67% to 43% in middle; and from 43% to 22% in high schools (Chapter 2.1).

18Critically, and in addition to many other disruptions in relation to conflict and economic hardship, SAC-controlled public education has been tremendously impacted by the CDM, involving both teachers and students. Around 75% of the Ministry of Education staff had indeed joined the CDM initially, and by May 2021, about 30% of basic education teachers and 60% of higher education staff had been fired for not returning to work. Conveying great political significance, figures and estimates regarding student enrollment in government schools have been fluctuating, according to shifting dynamics in different regions more or less impacted by conflicts and in relation to the availability of alternatives to SAC-controlled education. According to the SAC’s own Central Statistical Organization, 5.3 million students were enrolled in 2021-2022, the year following the coup, and 6.7 million were actually attending schools in 2023-2024, as compared to 9.2 million pre-coup (2019-2020). If these sets of statistics are to be believed, the drop in basic education is most significant at the high school level, with a record low number of students passing the matriculation exam: 128,800 in 2023-2024, as compared to 910,273 in 2019-2020 (a staggering 85.9% decrease).

19The drop is even more spectacular for higher education: Min Aung Hlaing himself stated during a speech marking the third year of the SAC’s formation that as of February 2024 the number of students remaining enrolled in public universities was 87,000, an abyssal twelve-fold drop compared to pre-coup enrollments, which were slightly above a million. Just a few days after this speech, the activation of the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, on February 10, has likely made this dynamic even worse, with youth compelled to consider migration or joining resistance armed groups in order to avoid risking forced conscription under the SAC (Chapter 2.2).779

20In this context, those who have not dropped out of formal education altogether have been joining different alternatives or complements to public education. According to the NUG’s early 2024 figures, about 60,000 have taken its parallel matriculation exam (BECA)780 and on-the-ground pro-revolution education totals close to 6,000 schools, more than 61,500 teachers, and about 730,000 students across 304 (out of 330) Townships (Chapter 2.3).781 These estimates include a few of the ‘ethnic’ education providers, typically located beyond the military-controlled State’s diminishing reach, which have experienced a dramatic quantitative increase in their enrollments, including with the emergence of new actors, most notably in Chin and Kayah (Karenni) States. Although producing accurate overall figures is certainly challenging, it was estimated as of 2022-2023 that ethnic education providers catered to a total of about 500,000 students, in contrast with 300,000 pre-coup. This dynamic seems to be developing further as the SAC loses ground: the KIO, for instance, announced a dramatic increase of its education system for 2024-2025, with the opening of 233 new schools, bringing the total to 448.782 The Ta’ang Land Education Committee (TLEC) made similar announcements: about 500 schools in 2024-2025, against 381 in 2023-2024.783 This type of increase, however, sometimes leads to significant resource and logistical challenges (Chapter 3). Other alternatives to public education that are largely present in state-controlled territories and typically cater to different social classes, faiths, ethnicities, and geographies, such as monastic, private, and Chinese education, have also experienced an important increase in their respective overall enrollments. Available figures suggest that these increases are largely driven by primary-level schooling, with often an actual quantitative decrease in middle and high schools (Chapter 4).

21In the context of an estimated 40,000 people leaving the country monthly, according to the IOM, increasing numbers of migrant children, youth, and adults have been enrolling in different types of education institutions abroad, including schools in refugee camps, migrant learning centers, public and private schools, and universities. Neighboring Thailand, by far the primary destination country, is of critical importance in many regards, with booming enrollments of children and youth from Myanmar in Thai public schools (approximately 80,000 students in 2023-2024 as compared to 50,000 in 2019-2020) and with a similar dynamic in migrant learning centers as well as private and public higher education institutions (more than 7,000 university students in 2023-2024 as compared to less than 2,500 in 2019-2020, Chapter 5).

22Quality of education, as discussed in the Introduction, is difficult to define, subjective to some extent, and can be evaluated according to different criteria. In that regard, two issues often discussed in the Myanmar context are the rote-learning versus ‘critical thinking’ dialectic and the recognition of credentials delivered by education institutions in terms of pursuing further education or finding opportunities in the job market, both domestically and abroad. Overall, although some positive developments in alternatives to SAC-controlled education certainly need to be noted (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), the major disruptions that followed the coup, including conflict, massive population displacement, the economic crisis, the politicization of attending or boycotting government schools, and overcrowded classrooms in some of the non-state education providers are, needless to say, not conducive to quality education.

23In SAC-controlled public education, any kind of ‘critical thinking’ (despite the concept being at times used formally for public communication) hardly aligns with the SAC’s fundamental values and political agenda to bring the rebellious education sector to heel (Chapter 2.2). Tangible tradeoffs of quality for quantity include the replacement of CDM teachers and administrators by less trained and experienced but more obedient staff, as well as the apparent lowering of academic standards for students who have remained in the public education system, which translated into unusually high success rates for the matriculation exam: almost 69% in 2023 and 58% in 2024, as compared to 32% in 2020 (Chapter 2.2). Officially, 9.5% of the 2023-2024 national budget was allocated to education, which was slightly above pre-coup figures. However, a copious dose of skepticism regarding this number is likely warranted, given parallel increases in military expenses since 2021, reports of SAC-controlled government schools lacking basic materials, and the impact of galloping inflation on what could be implemented with this budget.

24Other issues pertaining to the quality of SAC-controlled schooling include attacks on their facilities (mostly in 2021), a sense of guilt not uncommonly felt among children and youth sent to public schools and universities by their families, and likely an ongoing drop in the overall valuation of state education by the society and the job market, a situation that calls to mind the blatant mismatches between studies, careers, and salaries under previous juntas.

25Many education providers aligned with the revolution face daunting daily challenges, with extremely limited resources and utterly precarious ‘classrooms’ (in some cases limited to tarpaulin over dirt soil). They strive to deliver education under the threat and stress of military attacks, including the egregious SAC airstrikes that have repeatedly and increasingly landed on schools aligned with the resistance over the course of 2023 and early 2024.784 While teaching conditions vary across providers and geographies, this type of major disruption in the early years of schooling has long-term implications, both for individuals and for the country, as it is extremely difficult for children to compensate for the loss afterward, including damage to brain development caused by stress and trauma.

26Although often operating in these daunting conditions, many historical and newly created education providers have demonstrated great resilience and an infallible commitment to their educational mission. In general alignment with the revolution, many providers have benefitted from their past experiences of dealing with precarious situations as well as from an inflow of human resources from the CDM. While a quality assessment of these endeavors is certainly beyond the scope of this book, many of these providers have undoubtedly made impressive accomplishments in that regard, both at the basic and higher education levels, and especially given the circumstances they must deal with. Educators managing to lead their students to the NUG matriculation exam (BECA) in particularly hard-hit regions such as Sagaing, Magway, Chin, and Kayah/Karenni States are impressive testimonies of resilience and commitment to education, as are the higher education providers (including Spring University Myanmar and the Kachin State Comprehensive University, among many others) that offer training on a continuously growing number of disciplines and topics and manage to seal partnerships with foreign academic institutions (Chapter 2).

27One possible underlying challenge in relation to quality and identity within some of these education systems, including those linked to EAOs, could be a tendency to exert ‘critical thinking’ skills primarily or exclusively for the rejection of the narrative promoted by the military and their monolithic vision of the nation-state. If ‘critical thinking’ is a hallmark of education’s quality, there must be no actors, institutions, or narratives placed above criticism. Leaving blindspots to critical analysis when it comes to other nation-building agendas and associated narratives, including the ones typically associated with the different ethnic education providers, may not only be detrimental to quality education, it is also likely to hamper pragmatic and constructive reflections on politics beyond the SAC, most notably when envisioning federalism prospects (Chapter 3).

28Monastic schools have been ambivalent in terms of pedagogy over the last decades, with both pioneers in terms of the ‘child-centered approach’ (CCA) and more conservative schools, largely in line with the historical roots of monastic education, tending to prioritize obedience and rote-learning. Post-coup monastic education seems to remain multifaceted in this regard, fulfilling its ‘social safety net’ function for an increasing number of primary-level students in times of hardship and constituting one of the alternatives to education under the immediate control of the military. Meanwhile, the expansion of for-profit private education as another alternative to SAC-controlled schools and universities may foster some positive developments in terms of alignment between education and the expectations of society and of the job market. Yet, it also contributes to entrenching divisions in terms of social classes, including by reinforcing the status of English language education as a marker in that regard, a situation reminiscent of the multilayered colonial education system (Chapter 4).785

29Finally, in terms of identity, the SAC, in line with successive juntas that have ruled the country since its independence, has largely reverted to a monolithic Buddhist and Burman-centered conception of the nation, including with the retranscription in state-controlled media of religious ceremonies attended by Min Aung Hlaing and his subordinates and an abundant use of the go-to patriotic vocabulary of prior military regimes in its public communication. Most notable when it comes to education are the legislative steps back in terms of including ethnic minority languages in government schools through its October 2022 amendment of the National Education Law, in contrast to developments progressively materializing during the 2011-2020 reform decade (Chapter 2.2).

30Alternatives to public education in regions that are still (as of early 2024) under the control or within the reach of the military-controlled State seem rather heterogeneous in regard to identity. Different monastic schools seem to prioritize to different extents the Buddhist faith in their teachings, and may have different and potentially shifting relations to the SAC and its conception of national identity. Largely perceived as an alternative to education under the direct control of the military, private schools offer different programs and curricula. Private schools following the national curriculum (often with additional subjects, such as more emphasis on English) have been instructed through the 2023 Private Education Law to pay respect to the national flag, sing the national anthem during morning assemblies, instill ‘patriotic spirit,’ and preserve Myanmar culture, thereby limiting possibilities to challenge or even diverge from the military’s conception of the nation in these institutions. Other forms of private education arguably contribute to the centrifugal dynamic described in the previous pages, with youth being educated in or learning foreign languages and largely looking abroad for further studies and job opportunities. Equally diverse in terms of relation to the Myanmar State as well as in connection to the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, Chinese education could also be perceived as by and large participating in this centrifugal dynamic, especially as it seems to be increasingly chosen as an alternative to SAC-controlled schools rather than a mere educational supplement, notably in the borderlands of Shan and Kachin States.

31Most critical to the conversations regarding the political future of Myanmar are historical and newly created ethnic education providers, encouraged by the prospect of a ‘genuinely’ federal Myanmar that has become relatively consensual as a general aspiration among resistance forces post-coup, notwithstanding the challenges in actually designing this federal system. Ethnic education providers, including those who are still on speaking terms with the SAC, have by and large carried on with their priorities, which include shaping and transmitting their respective identities through education. Different groups and geographies present different situations, including in terms of ethnolinguistic diversity, and their level of ‘curricular readiness’ and priorities also differ, with some education providers largely teaching in the language(s) associated with their ethnic identities, while others continue to primarily rely on a Burmese (and sometimes English) language program. Overall, there is little doubt that an increasing number of students are starting their weekdays by paying respect to a particular ethnic flag during morning assemblies in an increasing number of schools administered by these education providers.

32Along with the debates regarding the pardoning or punishing of non-CDMers (including in the realm of education, and both during and after the interim period),786 questions dealing with the role of ethnic identities in education and beyond might be the greatest challenge that Myanmar will have to overcome if and once the ‘common enemy’ that is the SAC is overthrown or becomes less relevant. While the inclusion of ethnic languages and cultures in education certainly offers considerable leverage toward educational and political benefits, designing the components of a federal state that associates ethnic identities with territories and political prerogatives is no simple task in such a diverse country. As opposed to the essentialist belief – largely inherited from colonization – that a ‘true’ racial/ethnic classification intrinsically exists, contemporary research has long shown the limitations of these categories, which certainly carry significance but are also largely unbounded in nature and un-classifiable as discrete entities, as senses of belonging of individuals are by and large multi-layered and fluid through space, time, and circumstance.787

33As languages and especially their written forms – which are primarily transmitted through schooling and other education programs – are often regarded as one of the very critical attributes (if not the ultimate sanctuary) of ethnic identities, the famous quip according to which “a language is a dialect with an army and navy” seems to become more relevant than ever in post-coup Myanmar.788 While many share genuine aspirations for a federal democratic future, these aspirations will have to channel ethnonationalist projects, which often share at least some ideological similarities with the Burman nationalism championed by the military they are mobilized against.789

34Education can certainly be part of the solution to Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis. Indeed, some historical and newly created non-state education providers and local CSOs supporting these education systems are very well aware of challenges and have set ‘peace-building’ and the teaching of democratic values as explicit priorities in their endeavors towards building a federal education system.790 But a vacuum is being left by what increasingly looks like a failing State. Within this vacuum, and amidst forced conscription campaigns targeting youth by a growing number of armed actors,791 men in uniforms featuring diverse flags and acronyms are de facto in direct control of growing portions of territories, with their political relevance and symbolic legitimacy undoubtedly strengthened by confrontation with the SAC and bloodshed on the battlefield (Fig. 100). In such a context, there is a risk of education being used primarily as a political tool to support competing nation-building projects, along ethnic or other identity lines, and that the raising of particular flags in front of schools becomes one of the primary means to claim and project the idea of control over territories.792 Sheer military strength and balance of power between different armed groups may well become the primary forces reshaping the political map of what was known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, likely at the expense of the less numerous and less ‘military-relevant’ groups,793 a situation in which education could also be part of the country’s political conundrum, fueling further conflict and oppression.

35The people of Myanmar, who have certainly demonstrated a great deal of bravery and resilience in the face of yet another political catastrophe, will thus have to continue navigating an increasingly disrupted and shattered political and social landscape, through creative approaches in education and beyond. It is hoped that such approaches will first and foremost ensure that the right to quality education is realized and that education will be positioned as a catalyst for the reconciliation of historical grievances between groups. Ensuring that education is indeed used for the social good of all, in contrast to the potentially harmful systematic prioritization of nation-building objectives, will undoubtedly require acute senses of compromise, flexibility, realism, and inclusivity if durable and peaceful solutions are to be reached.

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Figure 101: “Education for all,” a selected drawing from a children’s art competition organized in 2019 by UNICEF and the European Union Delegation in Myanmar as part of a campaign entitled The Real Challenge, which aimed to spread awareness about children’s rights.794