Refugees

8According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), as of April 2024 there has been an estimated outflow of 125,500 refugees from Myanmar since the coup, with India (61,800), Thailand (51,900), and Malaysia (8,600) as the main destination countries.614 The Indian States of Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, all of which neighbor particularly hard-hit Chin State (Chapter 3) and Sagaing Region (Chapter 2.3), have received the most significant influx.615 Mizoram has been the main host for refugees from Chin State, who are distributed over 47 camps. These refugee populations have fled not only the conflict in Myanmar since the coup, but also the inter-ethnic violence that erupted in Manipur in May 2023, which led to various hardships for Myanmar nationals, including deportations.616 The situation for these refugees is often very precarious, notably because of the difficulty in generating income, although the government of Mizoram does allow refugee children (and in some cases, children who daily cross the border)617 to attend local schools. While India is not a signatory of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, it did enact the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act in 2009, which “provides to every child of the age of six to fourteen years the right to free and compulsory education in a neighborhood school till the completion of elementary education”, constituting an important legal framework on the matter of refugee education in India.618 According to Mizoram’s Minister of Education, as of 2023 close to 8,200 refugee children were enrolled in its government schools, including almost 6,400 from Myanmar.619 Most of these schools use Mizo as a medium of instruction, which is usually classified as belonging to the ‘central’ branch of Kuki-Chin languages (a subfamily that includes languages spoken in Chin State such as Hakha and Falam).620 English language instruction, largely perceived as a door to many opportunities, is mostly available in private schools in urban centers such as Mizoram’s capital Aizawl, and thus often inaccessible to these refugees.621

9Many children seem to have dropped out of formal education due to government schools being out of reach in some locations in Mizoram.622 In some refugee camps, US-based Chin NGOs have opened community schools that use the standard Mizo language curriculum and also include Myanmar, Chin, and English languages in the teaching-learning process.623 Depending on the students’ region of origin in Chin State and their mother tongue, Mizo as a language of instruction can constitute a challenge, and even those students who are able to understand content taught in Mizo and pass school exams face major uncertainties regarding access to higher education if they lack an Indian identity card. Moreover, there is typically a strong underlying desire within many of these populations to return to Myanmar and their region of origin.624 Some community schools operating in the Indian refugee camps prioritize the teaching of the Myanmar national curriculum, with the view that students must stay in touch with their country because they will return once democracy is restored.625 Some refugee students have passed the NUG’s matriculation exam (BECA, Chapter 2.3),626 and in 2022 the parallel government opened a Federal Education School (upgraded to the high school level in 2023) with Chin organizations and CDM teachers in the village of Chapi in Mizoram, which borders Thantlang and Matupi Townships in Chin State (Fig. 87 to 89).627 About 60 other schools managed by local organizations seem to be in general alignment with the NUG, although its Deputy Minister of Education, Ja Htoi Pan, made a statement in May 2023 to clarify that these schools were not necessarily directly affiliated with the parallel government.628

Figures 87 to 89: The NUG’s Federal Education High School, opened in Chapi Camp in 2022629 and Primary School, opened in Ngasi Camp, Lunglei District, 2024.630

10With over 8,600 new arrivals registered by the UNHCR since the coup,631 Malaysia is the third most significant country in terms of refugee influx, behind India and Thailand (Chapter 5.2). As of April 2024, 164,130 Myanmar nationals constituted the vast majority of the refugees living in Malaysia, with most being ethnic Rohingya (108,860, about half being school-aged) and Chin (25,930).632 Malaysia, however, is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and has detained and deported hundreds of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers from Myanmar, including children, since the coup.633

11Community schools catering to these Rohingya and Chin refugees, such as the Alliance of Chin Refugees (Fig. 90), run programs through informal learning centers created both before and after the coup, such as Life Education Centre, Agape Maluri School, Zomi Learning Centre, Teizang Education Centre, and Development Nursing School. But opportunities are limited and challenges are many for students given these education institutions have little funding and are only able to pay very modest salaries to the teachers they hire.634 In addition to a lack of official recognition for the education provided by these learning centers, new students are often several years behind their peers because of the disruptions to education caused by the successive Covid-19 and military coup crises, which compound the more general context of refugee populations often struggling to acquire legal documentation.635 With regard to tertiary education, Malaysian authorities made declarations in 2023 that seemingly approved the enrollment of Rohingya refugees in certain higher education institutions, including the International Islamic University of Malaysia,636 although in practice only a small number of private universities seem to be enrolling refugees.

Figure 90: Facebook picture celebrating the 10^th anniversary of the Alliance of Chin Refugees (Kuala Lumpur) in 2023.

12Rohingya populations on both sides of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border have experienced additional hardship since the coup. In Myanmar, Rakhine State is still recovering from the devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 and has become more conflict-torn amidst escalations in fighting between the SAC, the Arakan Army (AA), and other armed groups.637 As of June 2024, amidst a particularly disconcerting and violent escalation of conflict and persecutions, including arson attacks, forced recruitment, and shelling of hospitals and schools, the total number of IDPs in Rakhine State could be as high as 500,000, including 200,000 in the Townships of Buthidaung and Maundaw, which border Bangladesh.638 In Bangladesh, which is also not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, arson attacks and other acts of violence have recurred in what has become the largest refugee camp in the world near Cox’s Bazar.639 As of 2023, about 300,000 children, out of the 416,000 school-aged population (3-18 years), were reportedly attending one of 3,400 learning centers in the refugee camps,640 studying mainly the Myanmar national curriculum (Fig. 91). This decision reflects the controversial aim of the Bangladeshi government and the SAC to repatriate children into the mainstream education system of Myanmar, once conditions are perceived to be conducive for a safe return (Shohel, 2023). While the SAC has refused to guarantee legal citizenship status for returnees, the NUG has announced a radical shift regarding Rohingya inclusion and citizenship, as also compared to the previous USDP and NLD governments.641

Figure 91: Refugee Rohingya children holding textbooks of the Myanmar national curriculum, picture posted in 2022 by the NGO BRAC,642 working with UNICEF, UNHCR, the government of Bangladesh, and other institutions on the “Myanmar Curriculum Scale-up.”

Migrant workers

13Before the pandemic, it was estimated that 4.25 million migrants from Myanmar were living abroad.643 Overall post-coup figures appear difficult to compile as the data from various host countries is not always available, and it may be that an important share of the migrant workforce very likely remains unregistered and thus difficult to account for. Those statistics that are available indeed suggest a very significant increase.644 In Thailand, for instance, the number of migrant workers included in the labor registration system surged from about 1.5 million to close to 2.4 million between December 2020 and December 2023 (Chapter 5.2). Other popular destinations for Myanmar migrant workers include Japan (47,498 workers from Myanmar in 2022 against 27,798 in 2019, with migrant children often enrolled in local schools),645 South Korea (with new regulations restricting the domestic mobility of migrant workers),646 China (with entry depending on an ever-evolving situation at its borders),647 Singapore,648 as well as Gulf countries (with employment mostly as domestic helpers or in the hospitality industry).649 Following the coup and as of 2023, learning foreign languages, and sometimes also vocational skills, in order to prepare for expatriation had become increasingly popular (Chapter 4.2),650 despite the often hefty costs associated with the required departure procedures. Consequently, the number of overseas employment agencies in Myanmar has more than doubled (over 540 as of early 2024 against 200 in 2021),651 and long queues have been regularly observed in front of passport offices and embassies,652 with thousands leaving every month and many pre-coup planned returns being canceled.653

14With the cumulative sum of Myanmar’s overseas workers accounting for as much as 10% of its total labor force,654 migrant workers constitute a key economic and political issue. In 2019, migrant workers were collectively sending 2.8 billion USD in formal remittances back to the country, more than 4% of Myanmar’s entire GDP.655 Since late 2022, and although comparable figures appear to be elusive, migrant remittances are seemingly increasing.656 The overall diaspora, including pre-and post-coup migrants, has also played a decisive role in supporting the CDM and armed resistance against the SAC, with support estimated to be in the tens of millions of USD.657 Finding work abroad is often paved with restrictions, expenses, dangers, corruption, scams, and abuses, most especially for those who have been involved in the CDM and revolutionary political affairs. Some of those expatriates known to be supporting the resistance have faced harsh retaliatory measures from the SAC, including the cancellation of their passports.658 The military-controlled State has also strived to tap into migrant cash flows, such as through new measures forcing migrants to remit at least 25% of their salaries every month through an official channel under the Myanmar Overseas Employment Agency, with an exchange rate significantly lower than that of the market, on top of implementing a 2% tax for migrants in the foreign currencies they earn.659

15The majority of migrant workers may be young adults without children or workers who have left children with family back home during the period of their migration. However, the situation is different for mid-to-long-term migrants who may often bring along children or give birth to children abroad. These migrants may seek education for themselves (such as formally studying the host country’s language, in parallel with working) and are also likely to make various choices regarding the education of their children, depending on their own perspectives and future plans regarding Myanmar’s evolving political situation, as well as the options available to them in the host country. These limited choices have deep and long-term implications in terms of identity, especially with institutions whose language of instruction and curricula prepare for a long-term (re)settlement – and possibly a form of acculturation of the next generation – as opposed to migrant learning centers teaching a curriculum similar to the Myanmar national curriculum, with the more or less tangible objective of a future return back home.660

16Another important concern for migration and education (speaking primarily to its quality dimension) is the departure of an important share of the most educated workforce from different sectors in seeking better opportunities abroad. Together with students enrolling in universities abroad (see next subsection), and depending on unpredictable future political developments in Myanmar, this departure of elites and skilled workers could be part of an enduring ‘brain drain’ dynamic, likely taking a heavy toll on Myanmar’s human capital and potential for future economic, political, and social development.661

Migrant students

17Although comprehensive, precise, and up-to-date figures seem to be largely lacking, converging information points towards a dramatic increase in the number of students going abroad to pursue education following the coup.662 The main reasons underpinning this choice appear to be relatively obvious: going abroad for studies is one strategy to avoid military-controlled universities, act in support of the CDM and overall resistance movement, and pursue better education and career opportunities for an undefined period of time, away from Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, economic crisis, and uncertain prospects.663 Myanmar social media has indeed been rife with advertisements for overseas educational agencies and agents, who offer their services to help students navigate the academic, administrative, and financial aspects of their migratory ambitions (Fig. 92 and 93).664 According to estimates from the United States International Trade Administration, the outbound student mobility rate has increased prominently since 2021, with more than 17,000 students abroad in 2022. Thailand and Japan have been cited as the top host countries for Myanmar students in 2022, with 3,700 and 3,500 students respectively (and more than 7,000 for Thailand in 2023, Chapter 5.2). Other popular Asian destinations include Singapore, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia; the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Germany, and Australia are the main Western destinations.665

18In the context of migration towards the United States, which has since the 2000s largely hosted ethnic minorities including Chin, Karen, and Kachin, those regions where significant migrant communities reside (such as Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Memphis, and Fort Wayne) appear to be experiencing new waves of post-coup migration, with an estimated total of 322,000 as of August 2023, according to the Burmese American Community Institute (BACI).666 According to the Refugee Processing Center, 3,664 refugees from Myanmar have arrived in the US between October 1, 2023 and March 31, 2024 alone.667 Post-coup arrivals seem to include increasing numbers of students who are enrolling in community colleges located in these regions. Many such students are assisted by their relatives and communities, as well as by the services of private agencies in Myanmar, which recruit students on behalf of colleges and universities they are in formal partnership with. Close to 500 such students were enrolled in 2022, and these numbers could be increasing.668

Figures 92 and 93: Facebook advertisements from overseas education agencies in Yangon, offering services to facilitate enrollment in various countries.669

19Different countries, universities, and programs have different standards in terms of the credentials necessary for admission. Many often require completion of 12 years of basic education (Myanmar has historically had 11 or fewer years of basic education, until 2023 when Grade 12 was added), a university degree (chiefly for pursuit of an advanced degree), as well as language tests such as IELTS, TOEFL, HSK or JLPT and/or tests set by the host university. Given this backdrop, there has been an increase in private education centers and private schools in Myanmar offering preparation courses for passing exams such as the GED or IGCSE (Chapter 4.2). A number of scholarship programs that existed before the coup (such as the ones provided by the Asian Development Bank, Australian Awards, Chevening, Erasmus Mundus, Lincoln Scholarship, and DAAD German Academic Exchange Service) have continued to run.670 In addition, new programs, some of which are connected to the NUG and designed for CDMers, have been created to support Myanmar students, such as in Pusan National University in South Korea.671 There have also been new USAID programs in partnership with United States universities,672 new virtual mobility programs for Myanmar provided by the European Union, which accepts the certificates of interim university council,673 and new scholarships covering the cost of online courses at Arizona State University for displaced Myanmar students,674 an institution which has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NUG. Work-study programs and scholarships for vocational training abroad are also available.675

20Challenges are often many for students wishing to pursue education abroad.676 These include the cost of renewing passports and obtaining visas (and potential dangers of doing so for those who have expressed support to the resistance or who wish to study topics that may be perceived by the SAC as subversive),677 as well as accumulating all the documents necessary to apply, such as degrees, transcripts, bank statements, and language tests (costing several hundred USD in the case of IELTS or TOEFL). The costs of enrollment and living expenses abroad often constitute a major challenge for those who do not obtain full scholarships, as the most sought-after universities abroad tend to have extremely high fees for an average Myanmar citizen. Although individual faculty members with strong personal links to Myanmar strive to facilitate academic partnerships and support the enrollment of Myanmar students, many risk-averse institutions prefer staying away from contentious politics and may be reluctant to enroll students who do not possess all the required paperwork processed by the administration under the SAC.678

21For those who successfully enroll in universities abroad, mental health and depression may become issues, including a sense of guilt towards friends and family back home, who may explicitly or implicitly remind them of their privileged situation and blame them if they share doubts and challenges regarding their student lives away from home.679 Depending on the outcome and duration of the political crisis in Myanmar, this flow of migrant students might end up contributing to the development of the country in the future,680 but for the time being it rather seems to be part of a ‘brain drain’ / ‘brain waste’ situation. It is certainly reminiscent of what happened following the 1962 and 1988 coups, when many of the most academically capable students were either not able to fulfill their potential inside the country or engaged in studying and working abroad for an extended length of time.681

Evolving and diverse migrant schooling

26The first migrant learning centers (MLC) began to appear in Thailand in the early 1990s, in the post-1988 uprising context, as migration flows were increasing and various difficulties in accessing formal education for migrants from Myanmar created the need for alternative learning programs specifically designed for them (Ball and Dim, 2016).694 As a direct result of multi-decade, progressive policy-level reforms, access to education for Myanmar migrants in Thailand has slowly but steadily improved, and some MLCs have been able to provide education up to the high school level and beyond. Although multiple financial, geographic and linguistic challenges in accessing education for migrants haven’t vanished, by 2018 more than 16,300 children were enrolled in MLCs, most of them in Tak Province (where the prominent border town of Mae Sot is located), which hosts about 70 (out of 110) MLCs catering to more than 12,000 students. Other provinces with a significant number of MLCs and students include Ranong, Chiang Rai, Pathum Thani, Phang-Nga, and Samut Sakhon (Table 7).695

27Although migrant schools have been operating without a clear legal framework, they were informally permitted by Thai authorities in 2005, following the 1999 Education for All Policy and the 2005 Cabinet Resolution on Education for Unregistered Persons, which allow migrant children to attend schools regardless of their nationality or legal status (Nawarat, 2014; Arphattananon, 2021). In Tak Province, MLCs were placed in 2012 under the supervision of the Migrant Educational Coordination Center (MECC), an institution created by the province’s MoE office.696 Larger school buildings have progressively been established as the number of students has grown. Most schools are of rather modest size, with only a few hundred students or fewer, but a handful have become larger institutions, with between 500 and more than 2,000 students enrolled. Larger MLCs include Thoo Mwe Kee, Children Development Center, Hsa Thoo Lei, New Blood, Sunshine, and Parami Learning Center.697

28MLCs have made different decisions in terms of syllabus and language of instruction, based in part on the particular characteristics and goals of the populations they are serving, including in terms of ethnicity and perspectives to either living in Thailand, returning to Myanmar, or trying to migrate to a third country. Most MLCs (55 out of 64 in Tak Province in 2024)698 use Burmese as the primary language of instruction, often following more or less closely the Myanmar national curriculum, with adaptations varying from one school to another, such as emphasis on English or Thai languages.699 Some MLCs were able to establish formal cooperation with the Myanmar MoE in 2013, sometimes with the Burmese Migrant Workers Education Committee (BMWEC) acting as an intermediary, thereby allowing for multiple pathways with more or less smooth transfers towards the Myanmar national education system for returnees (Ball and Dim, 2016).700 Other MLCs, such as Kwe Ka Baung, Hsa Thoo Lei, or Thoo Mweh Kee, have been established around, and consequently offer an explicit emphasis on, the ethnic Karen identity (Fig. 94), teaching primarily Karen language curriculum, such as the one produced by the KECD,701 but also paying respect to symbols of the Thai nation, like most if not all other MLCs (Fig. 95).702

Figures 94 and 95: Kwe Ka Baung MLC’s logo with Karen symbols, and paying respect to the Thai national flag during a morning assembly at New Blood MLC, Mae Sot.704

29Quantitatively speaking, the main avenue of education in Thailand for migrant children from Myanmar is through Thai public schools, in which enrollments have been gradually increasing following the 1999 Education for All Policy and the 2005 Cabinet Resolution on Education for Unregistered Persons (Arphattananon, 2021). In 2018-2019, 60,908 migrant children were enrolled in Thai public schools (close to 3.75 times more than enrollment in MLC for the same year; Table 7 and Graph 6).705 Although children of undocumented migrant families can legally attend public schools, this option is primarily accessible for those who have started their education in the Thai public school system since kindergarten or the early primary grades (other options include attending a grade lower than normal for the child’s age, as well as through the Thai non-formal education system KoSoNo). While Thai public schools unsurprisingly emphasize the national Thai identity and its symbols (Lertvorapreecha and Swindell, 2024), schooling in the Thai language often entails a significant language barrier for those who did not grow up in a Thai-speaking environment. Only a small number of public schools along the border, where migrant children are particularly numerous, have made specific language adaptations, such as hiring bilingual teaching assistants in collaboration with a local NGO.706 There are also a small number of schools where the teaching of Myanmar (schools in Samut Sakhon)707 or Mon (schools in Sangkhlaburi)708 languages as subjects have been implemented. Being the largest provider of education for Myanmar migrant children, Thai public schools unsurprisingly tend to be the preferred choice for students born in Thailand, those who migrated at a very young age, and families with long-term expatriation plans. Enrollment in Thai public schools is also likely to contribute to obtaining longer-term legal status and opening avenues towards tertiary education opportunities and better-paid, or at least less ‘dirty, dangerous, or difficult,’ jobs.709 Overall statistics (Graph 6) as well as converging anecdotal testimonies suggest that the Thai public education pathway is increasingly popular in the post-coup situation, with no situation conducive to return to Myanmar clearly in sight.710

Graph 6: Increasing enrollments of children from Myanmar in Thai public schools, especially following the coup.

Graph 7: Distribution of Myanmar children in Thai public schools by the level of schooling in 2023-2024.711

30Parallel to MLC and Thai public school educational options, an estimated 200,000 migrant children were out of school prior to the pandemic and the coup, for reasons that include entering the workforce at a very young age, needing to take care of siblings, and having parents who are unable to cover school and transportation fees.712 Graph 7 shows that the vast majority of children from Myanmar enrolled in Thai public schools are either in preschool (22.1%) or primary (61.1%) levels, which has several possible explanations: migrant children may overwhelmingly be young or, more realistically, there is some combination of post-primary dropout from Thai public school (education being compulsory until Grade 9) and older migrant children simply never seek access to formal education when in Thailand. Interestingly, figures from MECC in Tak Province show that across MLCs, of the 13,508 students in kindergarten through high school, nearly one-third were in high school, revealing MLCs to have in general a relatively more even distribution of students across levels of education, albeit one that still quite strongly favors the early years of education (Fig. 96).

A disrupted post-coup migrant schooling landscape

31Recent history has seen particularly challenging developments for already vulnerable migrant populations in Thailand, including children and students, who were disproportionately impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Hardships stemmed from strict measures by the authorities to contain the virus, which included particularly severe and long-lasting closure mandates for MLCs vis-a-vis Thai public schools, the large-scale return of migrant workers to Myanmar, and the loss of employment opportunities in Thailand.713 The 2021 military coup and subsequent conflict and political crisis in Myanmar, however, appear to be having much deeper and longer-term consequences with regard to migration, including in the realm of education.

32Triggering poorly documented but massive waves of migration away from Myanmar,714 the coup is undeniably impacting institutions providing education to migrants along the border. Although these figures are impossible to confirm, some estimates suggest that the number of migrant children in Thailand has doubled, from about 300,000 to 600,000, between the pre-Covid period and 2023.715 According to the data provided by the MECC, the number of students enrolled in MLCs in Tak Province alone surged from about 9,000 in June 2021 to 14,368 in March 2024 (Fig. 96), and enrolments seem to be dramatically increasing in MLCs located in other provinces.716 This quantitative increase has constituted a great challenge, with many MLCs doubling their intake and further compelled to refuse enrollments so that they may better maintain their education standards in qualitative terms. Thoo Mweh Khee MLC in Tak’s Phop Phra District, for instance, accepted in 2023 a record 2,000 students up to the high school level, in contrast to a pre-coup enrollment of about 1,000 pupils.717 New Blood MLC in Mae Sot has experienced a similar dynamic, with over 1,000 students in its different programs in 2023, in contrast to 400 in 2020.718 Many other popular MLCs, including Hsa Thoo Lei and Child Development Learning Center, report similar challenges and have been compelled to refuse enrollments as their funding is limited and their classrooms are already densely crowded. Cases of MLCs with up to 150 students of all ages and levels in a single large room have been reported.719 Students who do not manage to enroll can, at best, try their luck in education centers and programs that are less renowned, not under the MECC’s supervision, or far away from their homes.720 Anecdotal testimonies, on the other hand, suggest that some MLCs have seen a significant share of their high school students crossing the border in the other direction, pausing or stopping their education to fight alongside EAOs and PDFs against the SAC.721

Figure 96: Statistics and infographic produced by the Migrant Educational Coordination Center (MECC) of the MLCs in Tak Province, March 2024.722

33In contrast to the 2010s convergence between MLCs and the Myanmar public education system, during which the Department of Alternative Education under Myanmar’s MoE facilitated transfer through several pathways into the mainstream system for returnees,723 the coup has triggered a centrifugal dynamic; while departures from Myanmar are increasing, most aspirations for return have been forgotten and migrant prospects of staying in Thailand have typically shifted towards the long-term. Institutional contacts with the SAC-controlled MoE and its regional offices have thus drastically decreased (Pyone Myat Thu and Vungsiriphisal, 2024) but they have not totally disappeared, as some migrant institutions and educators maintain communication, prioritizing a long-term vision and seeking to avoid a situation in which education – a basic human right – would be overly politicized.724

34As an alternative to the largely collapsing educational bridges towards Myanmar and in recognizing the enduring lack of accreditation of MLC education (Miyajima, 2018; Mowry, 2023), programs leading to GED certificates, a United States high school equivalency credential that is liable to open avenues for higher education programs in Thai universities and beyond, have become increasingly popular.725 According to the MECC 2024 statistics (Fig. 96), 1,098 students are enrolled in such programs in Tak Province, in contrast to 276 in 2021. MLCs such as New Blood are now offering GED programs that have become popular with longstanding migrants as well as those who arrived after the coup. In 2023, New Blood MLC was able to accommodate 200 students, which doubled to more than 400 in 2024, with some of their new GED program graduates taking on teacher roles and others obtaining scholarships to enroll in Thai universities.726 Pre-existing and newly created private schools for Myanmar students also offer such curriculum, including in Bangkok, and are typically attended by middle and upper-class students, many of whom come from families who are increasingly investing in Thailand’s real estate.727

35Enrollment in Thai public schools, nevertheless, still constitutes the lion’s share of schooling for Myanmar migrant children, and enrollment has significantly increased following the coup (Graph 6): over 79,300 in 2023-2024 compared with around 60,000 in 2020-2021, with most of the new students arriving in the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 academic years. Anecdotal testimonies from multiple Thai public schools confirm this trend, including from schools in which most students are from Myanmar. It is uncertain how many students at present lack proper documentation and legal status, in which case deportation back to Myanmar can be a very tangible threat.728 According to late-2021 research conducted by the NGO TeacherFOCUS, 41% of students in MLCs and 46% in Thai public schools lacked proper documentation.729 In 2023, several cases of forced repatriation to Myanmar, including of children enrolled in Thai public schools, have been documented, despite the Thai legal framework granting all children access to education regardless of their legal status.730

Refugee education

36In addition to transnational migrations and internal displacements triggered by the coup and its aftermath, the population of the nine refugee camps hosting populations of Myanmar origin along the Thai border has been increasing. This includes young refugees seeking education in the camps as they shelter from conflict and, in some cases, newer arrivals seeking access to schooling given that education options inside Myanmar might be limited or non-existent due to armed conflict or the CDM. In 2022-2023, the Karen Refugee Committee Education Entity (KRCEE) reported a roughly 71% increase in the number of students passing the Grade 12 exam under the KECD, with a total of 857 students for the seven primarily Karen camps, in contrast to around 500 the previous year. For that same academic year, the total number of students enrolled in the 49 schools within these seven camps, ranging from elementary to high school, was about 16,000.731 This student population dramatically increased the following year, with 21,267 students enrolled in 2023-2024.732 KRCEE works in an operational environment in which resources are extremely limited (including in the context of a diminution of funding which started in 2018): for example, only 465 out of their 834 teachers receive monthly assistance of 1,000 baht.733 In such a context, the ongoing quantitative surge in enrollments is unavoidably creating challenges to the provision of (quality) education, with a shortage of textbooks as well as buildings to accommodate the students. Notably, KRCEE is able to ensure some pathways to tertiary education. As of 2023-2024, 1,087 high school graduates were enrolled in nine camp-based post-secondary schools, which offer studies in subjects such as English, Social Studies, Public Health, and Community Development.734

37Due to massive displacements caused by conflicts in Kayah/Karenni State (Chapters 2.1 and 3), the population has been increasing in protracted and in newly created Karenni IDP camps inside Myanmar and along the Thai border.735 The two primarily Karenni camps located on the Thai side of the border tend to offer comparatively more education opportunities than the IDP camps inside Karenni State, where access to high school and higher education is more scarce,736 although new initiatives and institutions are being launched (Chapter 3.2). Dawnoeku IDP camp, which has seen its population increase by the thousands in 2022 and 2023,737 offers education from kindergarten to upper secondary and saw school enrollments double from 2022 to 2023. This influx of students likely stresses a school environment that lacks access to electricity and the Internet as well as many basic facilities and equipment (including buildings, toilets, desks, books, and other school materials).738 Schools in the Karenni camps have historically followed the KnED curriculum in Karenni (Kayah) language, with an emphasis on Karenni identity (Niwitkulnipa, 2019).739 In Karenni Refugee Camp 1, which hosts more than 10,000 refugees, it is reported that 200 students annually pass the exams administered by the Karenni Education Department (KnED).740 The options for higher education include the Karenni National College (Chapter 3.2), which is located in Ban Nai Soi, outside Karenni Refugee Camp 1. Education opportunities outside the camps remain limited for these populations, who often lack ID cards and have uncertain financial means, and the education provided inside the camp is not recognized by the Myanmar or Thai governments,741 although Thai educators have been advocating for recognition of the credentials and multilingual skills of the youth educated in the camps.742

CDM teachers

38CDMers, including teachers who left their jobs in Myanmar’s schools and universities following the coup, are among the waves of newly arrived refugees and migrants in Thailand. According to estimates from the Joint Action Committee for Burmese Affairs (JACBA), migrants fleeing potential arrest by the military could number as many as 50,000 in Mae Sot and 10,000 in other cities and towns, including Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Chiang Rai.743 Often ill-prepared for this unplanned migration and with the NUG being only able to provide very limited support, some CDM teachers have been hired for the same position in MLCs. Some of these MLCs were indeed founded by post-1988 activists and have been keen on creating initiatives to support CDMers and their families, sometimes in collaboration with the NUG.744 Other CDM teachers are involved in various online education programs associated with the revolution (Chapter 2.3), with students following these classes from both inside and outside Myanmar, through institutions that include the Minority Affairs Institute and the Burma Academy.745 But many of these teachers are either volunteers or receive only a small honorarium for their work, and many cannot be hired at all because resources and vacancies are often limited.746 Despite their background and qualifications, these teachers may have no choice but to find another source of income, as waiters, food sellers, construction workers, or farm workers.747 Prior to the coup, the hiring of teachers without proper work permits was already problematic, contributing to the closure of some MLCs by the Thai authorities, notably in Ranong Province in the late 2010s.748 In the post-coup context, these teachers, like other undocumented migrants, are particularly vulnerable to extortion and harassment, and under the constant threat of being forcibly repatriated to Myanmar.749

University students

39Enrollment of students from Myanmar in Thailand’s higher education institutions, both self-funded and with scholarships, has also been dramatically increasing in the wake of the coup. Migration towards Thailand (or cancellation of return plans) indeed constitutes one of the options to avoid military-controlled universities in Myanmar and offers paths towards better education, careers, and other opportunities, away from Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, economic crisis, and uncertain future.750 According to the Thai authorities and statistics from the United States International Trade Administration, there were between 3,700 and 4,050 students from Myanmar in Thailand’s universities in 2022, up from about 2,450 in 2019. Of the over 17,000 Myanmar students studying abroad globally, Thailand was the top destination for students in higher education, and Myanmar produced the second most international university students in Thailand, behind China.751 Late 2023 data from the Thai Ministry of Higher Education suggests a sharp increase, with 7,037 students from Myanmar enrolled (Graph 8).752 Thailand indeed offers a number of comparative advantages over other regional and global destinations for students from Myanmar, including cultural and geographical (albeit not linguistic) proximity, and thus comparatively easier travel to the border or inside the country, which makes it easier to stay in touch with relatives or continue to have direct contacts with refugees, migrants, and resistance networks. Other comparative advantages include the lower cost of daily life, a wide offering of higher education programs in English (Tables 8 and 9), and the existence of well-developed Myanmar networks helping students prepare for their expatriation and navigate academic institutions and programs.

Graph 8: Number of students from Myanmar enrolled in universities in Thailand between 2018 and 2023 (data for the first semesters).753

40Universities hosting important and increasing numbers of students from Myanmar in their international programs include private institutions such as Assumption University, Rangsit University,754 and Bangkok University, which typically charge several thousand USD in yearly tuition fees. Generally more affordable, public institutions with large enrollments of Myanmar students include Mae Fah Luang University, Rajabhat University, Chiang Mai University, Chulalongkorn University, and Mahidol University (Graphs 9 and 10; Tables 8 and 9).755 The most popular subjects for students appear to principally revolve around business, engineering, tourism, IT, science, medicine, and pharmacy. Social science students, a large proportion of whom seem to be conducting research on the situation of Myanmar itself, appear to be less numerous. They are typically enrolled in faculties with historical links with Myanmar and its political and social issues, such as Mahidol’s Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) and Chiang Mai University’s Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD), which have been involved in programs aimed at supporting academics who left the country following the coup. Other universities with notable involvement regarding research on Myanmar or the number of students enrolled include Chulalongkorn University as well as Chiang Rai’s Rajabhat University’s Department of Anthropology and Sociology. New or recently strengthened partnerships between ‘ethnic’ higher education institutions based in Myanmar (Chapter 3.2) and universities in Thailand are also noteworthy: the Shan Community College has official agreements to send students to Payap, Maejo, and Chiang Mai Rajabhat Universities,756 while the Mon National College (Box 3) has signed a MoU with Payap University.757

Graph 9: Repartition of students from Myanmar in different levels of education programs.

Graph 10: Types of universities in Thailand, in 2023.758

Education for migrant workers

41Finally, other forms of education for Myanmar migrants in Thailand include classes for workers (Fig. 97 to 99) organized by NGOs such as the Dear Burma Academy (created in 2002), Labour Rights Promotion Network Foundation (founded in 2004) or the smaller-scale and more recent Stay in Sampeng Yaowarat (launched in 2023). These programs typically focus on practical skills useful in navigating Thai society and obtaining better-paid jobs: Thai language and digital literacy first and foremost.761 Some of these centers, such as the Dear Burma Academy, also offer English as well as Burmese language classes (for workers from linguistic minority groups and/or with limited literacy in Burmese). Although many of these institutions largely predate the coup, the number of centers and especially the number of students are growing in regions where Myanmar migrant workers are numerous, such as Samut Sakhon, Samut Prakan, Bangkok, Pathum Thani, and Phetchaburi.762 The Bangkok-based Dear Burma Academy, under the supervision of a headmaster who fled the military crackdown of the 1988 uprising, is currently training 1,600 of these students per semester, with more than 30 teachers, and with intakes having roughly doubled compared to the pre-coup situation.763 Institutions interviewed in the suburbs of Bangkok and Samut Sakhon, which includes a Mon monastery, report similar dynamics, with increasing numbers of migrant workers participating in Thai, English, and Mon language trainings outside of work hours.

Figures 97 to 99: Advertisement for the Dear Burma Academy (Bangkok), the logo of the ECMT Education Training Center, and advertisement for ECG Samut Sakhon, which offers free English language classes to migrant workers taught by missionaries, during evenings and on Sundays.764