Historical evolutions towards different forms of monastic education

4As discussed in Chapter 1.2, the colonial period saw an abrupt decline in terms of prestige for monastic education, from a practice underpinning monarchic legitimacy and comparatively high ‘literacy rates’ towards an education perceived as out-of-fashion and associated with poverty, following the failure of colonial authorities to base their education system on the monasteries. In 1954, after independence and a political crisis around the issue of including religion in schooling, the U Nu government, which was strongly influenced by the Sangha, largely acquiesced to the monks’ demands for an emphasis on Buddhism (as opposed to other religions) in public schools. The government also allowed the Sangha – concerned with keeping their influence in society – to open “Ba Ka” schools (ဘက for ဘုန်းတော်ကြီးသင်ပညာရေးကျောင်း), which are monastic schools following the government school’s curriculum (Smith, 1965; Dhammasami, 2004).

5For an important share of the population, Buddhism was tightly associated with patriotism and decolonization, and the discipline inculcated by the monks was described as a “national asset.”481 Furthermore, not unlike the colonial State’s (failed) endeavors, the independent State saw this involvement of the Sangha in formal education as an opportunity to extend its reach, in the context of very limited public resources. These Ba Ka schools received some support from the government, such as books or furniture, but primarily relied on village community donations. The role of these schools, however, was largely limited to the basic competencies of primary education, as the idea that education is a function that largely falls to the State became widely accepted by the population (Nash, 1965; Than Htut, 1980). In the early 1960s, there were more than 5,000 Ba Ka schools throughout the country teaching almost 300,000 students, compared with about 1.7 million students in government schools (Than Htut, 1980).

6The Ba Ka education system, however, was suppressed in 1964, in the wake of the 1962 military coup and alongside the nationalization of all private schools. The constitutional amendment making Buddhism the state religion was de facto suppressed by the suspension of the 1947 Constitution, and Ne Win overall tried to control the Sangha rather than use it for the legitimacy of his regime (Dhammasami, 2004; Wiant, 1981; Charney, 2009). Unlike U Nu, he relied mostly on the most rigorist branches of the Sangha, such as the shwekyin, for their strict doctrine of non-involvement in the country’s political affairs. Other forms of monastic education remained, but under strict state surveillance.

7The Ba Ka program was officially revived by the SLORC in 1992, in the wake of its promotion of a nationwide township-based Buddhist civic ethics training program (ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာယဉ်ကျေးမှုသင်တန်း). Some monasteries actually (re)opened schooling programs following the government school curriculum prior to this date, which contributed to replacing, in a way, the literacy campaigns conducted during the socialist era. These schools were placed under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), as it was known at the time, after the reopening of the program, and their number increased throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In 2011, there were about 1,400 Ba Ka schools catering to 215,000 students, around 90% of whom were in primary schools and with novices and young nuns adding up to less than 5% of the total.482 Although different monastic schools have presented different characteristics depending on the inclination of their abbots and networks, including in terms of quality (i.e. teaching methods, see next subsection), the objectives of the overall program strongly emphasize quantity (i.e. access to education for the more modest populations) and identity (i.e. the defense of Buddhism, Box 5; Fig. 69).

8Operating in parallel to those monastic schools following the national curriculum, another form of education that has subsisted through the centuries is the ‘traditional’ (also known as Pariyatti) monastic education in dedicated monasteries (စာသင်တိုက်), in which an important share of the country’s estimated 500,000 monks, novices, and nuns primarily focus on studying sacred texts483 in order to pass national monastic examinations or more local “association” exams (Fig. 70).484 In recent years, there were close to 30 Buddhist higher education institutions in the country,485 the majority of which are non-state institutions that must comply with the rules and regulations of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Culture (MoRAC) and Education (MoE). Monasteries are also engaged in various activities related to education, such as serving as orphanages or providing boarding to students so they can more easily attend government schools in the more remote regions. In some border areas, monastic schools linked to the MoRAC’s Department for the Promotion and Propagation of the Sasana, and the Ministry of Border Affairs (MoBA) have provided free education, a program explicitly described as a Buddhist missionary activity.486 Many monasteries also offer various types of training, which can be conducted in the evening, during weekends, or through summer schools. Depending on a monastery’s inclinations and availability of resources, as well as public interest, these trainings can cover a wide range of subjects, with more or less direct implications in terms of identity, such as English language and familiarization with Information Technology (IT) on the one hand or, on the other hand, Dhamma schools teaching lay children the foundations of Buddhist teachings and meditation as well as how to behave in a Buddhist society.

Figure 69: Students listening to the head monk at “The Waso-robe offering ceremony” in a Ba Ka school in Yangon, July 2022.488

Figure 70: Monastic examination in Yangon, November 2022.489

Quantity, Quality, Identity: monastic education before and after the coup

9Often described, among other functions, as a type of ‘social safety net,’ monasteries have provided education to the less privileged social classes, primarily among Buddhist populations, by bearing or alleviating many of the costs attached to attending school (such as for books and school supplies, uniforms, transportation, boarding, and tuition fees). According to 2019-2020 official statistics, there were close to 305,000 students enrolled in more than 1,500 Ba Ka schools throughout the country in the year preceding the coup. The vast majority of these schools were primary and post-primary schools (only 101 middle and two high schools), with novices and young nuns representing 16% of the total student enrollment.490

10Post-coup (2023-2024) statistics, if they are to be believed, seem to indicate a significant overall increase in enrollments (to 339,172 students), with a massive increase at the primary level but also a noticeable decrease in middle and high schools (Graph 3). This seems to be the double consequence of families relying increasingly on the ‘safety net’ of monastic education to educate their younger children in times of economic hardship, while dropouts also increase dramatically for higher levels of schooling as older students exit early to enter the workforce or for other pursuits. Anecdotal evidence and interviews confirm the dynamic of students enrolling mostly at the primary level, mainly due to the deterioration of the overall economic situation and also in local situations in which government schools have not reopened because of the CDM or conflict-related developments. In some instances, students or their families also boycott schools under the SAC-controlled MoE and instead seek out monastic education alternatives.491

Graph 3: Number of students at different levels of “Ba Ka” schools, according to official statistics.492

11Sending children to monastic schools, ideally in cities far from their birthplace and as novices or nuns, is also a strategy that has long been used by some families, particularly among Buddhist minorities in Shan State (such as Ta’ang, Shan, and Pa-O) to try to avoid or at least postpone or mitigate forced conscription by different armed groups.493 Not only do the robe and the distance offer some kind of protection in this regard, but acquiring at least a basic level of formal education in a monastic school also significantly decreases the chances of ending up as a basic foot-soldier, likely to be sent to the frontlines, for those who are bound to be recruited. Unsurprisingly, this issue has become increasingly pressing in the midst of post-coup conflicts. By early 2024 the SAC had activated the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, and EAOs with forced conscription policies, directed at youth as young as 16-year-old (including the TNLA and other groups active in Shan State) had also been expanding this practice to new territories falling under their control.494

12As direct consequences of conflict and economic hardship, monastic schools face the double challenge of increasing requests from families in precarious situations, on the one hand, and decreasing volumes of donations, on the other hand. These schools and orphanages are sometimes forced to refuse new children, while requests for enrollment as boarding students are on the rise.495 A monastic school in Hopong Township, Shan State has for instance received about 300 IDP children (about half of them as novices or nuns, Fig. 71) fleeing conflict between the SAC and local PDFs in Pinlaung Township.496 With new students coming from diverse regions of the country, the Pearl Yadanar monastic education school in Arakan State’s Thandwe Township, and the Garuna Uyin in Mrauk Oo Township have dealt with similar enrollment and resource challenges following the coup.497 Other illustrations of these difficulties include a nunnery in Shwepyitha, a particularly modest suburb of Yangon, which reports struggling to feed and educate a new wave of orphans and abandoned children.498 Even exceptionally well-known and well-connected monastic schools, such as Phaung Daw Oo in Mandalay, are confronted with these challenges and are compelled to limit the number of enrollments, particularly in the boarding programs, for which requests largely surpass its hosting capacities.499

13If quality of education is defined as equipping children with critical and autonomous thinking skills, the bulk of monastic education appears to be quite ambivalent to this aim. Historically, the religious roots of education in the monasteries explain to a significant extent the emphasis on rote learning in Myanmar’s education culture, as reciting sacred texts down to the last comma was a central objective of education in itself, which remains part of the monastic examinations to this day.500 However, during the last decades some monastic schools led by reformist abbots, and most emblematically Phaung Daw Oo monastery in Mandalay, have played a pioneering role in the introduction of an alternative pedagogy, typically referred to as the Child-Centered Approach (CCA), through connections with multiple institutions and international donors, allowing for better-trained teachers, better access to IT, and superior English skills (Lall, 2020).

Figure 71: School assembly with lay students, nuns, and novices, in front of Naung Taung Monastic School, Hopong Township, Southern Shan State, December 2022.501

14The consequences of the coup on the quality of education in monastic schools can only be detrimental by almost any standard. Not only does the military always keep a watchful eye on the potentially rebellious elements in the Sangha but, as described in the previous chapters, the values promoted by the military regimes in the realm of education, beyond slogans and catchwords, align with the hierarchical conception of society largely underpinning monastic education, and are hardly conducive of ‘critical thinking.’ Many of the central concepts of monastic education are identical to those promoted by the military in the realm of education, with a clear emphasis on training obedient children who are conscious of their place and duty in a hierarchical society. Most explicitly, at least since the early 2010s, many Dhamma School programs (usually taught on Sundays or during summer holidays) are referred to as “ယဉ်ကျေးလိမ္မာ” (polite and obedient/well-bred), with an explicit aim at training “လူတော်လူကောင်းများ” good persons, Fig. 72 and 73).502 In addition to this alignment of values towards a disciplined and hierarchical society, the overall economic situation since the coup, with the aforementioned dual challenge of increasing enrollments and diminishing financial support for many monastic schools, is inevitably leading to an overall shift towards teacher-centered pedagogy through increasing student-teacher ratios, in addition to all the other physical health, mental health, and material problems faced most directly by these vulnerable populations.

Figure 72: Logo of the ယဉ်ကျေးလိမ္မာ (“polite and obedient/well-bred”) training in Magway.

Figure 73: Photo from a similar training in Nay Pyi Taw, 2022.503

15In a deeply intertwined fashion with the previously described conception of teaching and pedagogy, monastic education is ambivalent and multifaceted in its identity and political dimension. Some components of the Sangha have been at the forefront of direct confrontation with the military, most notably during the 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” and to a lesser extent in 2021. Other monastic networks perfectly align with the military’s conservative and nationalist values and agenda, of which Buddhism is a central component. In different regions of the country, monastic schools can also be linked to different ethnic identities (for Buddhist populations such as Mon, Shan, Rakhine, or Pa-O) with different degrees of mobilization of that ethnic identity (including in terms of using the attached ethnic language in the education process) and alignment with or opposition to the SAC’s agenda.

16As a consequence, different monastic schools present vastly different positioning vis-à-vis the SAC and the revolution, depending on many factors, which include the inclinations of the abbot and his network as well as the location of the school. Explicitly supporting the revolution and the parallel government is hardly an option for the monastic schools in regions under the control of the SAC or its allied armed groups and militias. In the months following the coup, monks involved in the protests, just like lay people, were charged under Section 505a of the Penal Code, and their monasteries were raided by soldiers.504 Some went underground or stopped their teaching activities,505 while others chose to keep a low profile, sometimes coming around to a conception of the Sangha often promoted by the military and conservative monks in times of upheaval, according to which monks must stay away from political affairs.506

17As discussed in Chapter 2.3, in regions where pro-revolution groups are active and with a significant Buddhist population, including but not limited to Sagaing and Magwe Regions, monastic schools are more likely to take the side of the revolution and to have more or less direct contact with and support from the NUG. Some of these schools have paid a heavy price, such as the Let Yat Kone monastic school in Depayin Township, Sagaing Region, in which at least 11 children died in a helicopter attack.507 Among other instances, in 2023 a child was killed and two injured in the shelling of a Ba Ka school in Kale Township;508 a monk teaching at Phaung Daw Oo as well as students from this prominent monastic school were arrested for their contribution to the movie “Don’t Expect Anything,” which according to the SAC was an “insult to Buddhism;”509 a monastic school supporting the revolution was burned down in Welet Township, Sagaing Region;510 and eighteen children studying at a monastic school were injured by the military’s shelling in Sagaing.511

18Monastic schools associated with hardliner conservative monks are likely to be supportive of the SAC, particularly those that were close to the 969 movement and subsequent Ma Ba Tha, the notorious Association for Protection of the Race and Religion (အမျိုး ဘာသာ သာသနာ စောင့်ရှောက်ရေး အဖွဲ့) that was banned under the NLD government in 2017 (and evolved into the Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation). The military’s nationalist discourse has long relied on Buddhism and the SAC has certainly been continuing this heritage, with the coup leader being largely displayed in state-controlled media in various religious ceremonies, including the inauguration of an imposing Buddha statue, often in the company of prominent conservative abbots (Fig. 74).512 Most controversially, the monk Wirathu, arrested under the NLD after years of anti-Muslim hate speech, was released by the SAC in 2021 and granted a high-level award for “outstanding work for the good of the Union of Myanmar” (Fig. 75).513 These hardliner abbots have been directly supporting pro-SAC militias, with in some instances monks being trained at handling firearms while wearing their robes in Sagaing.514

Figure 74: The coup leader inaugurating a Buddha statue in Nay Pyi Taw (May 4, 2023).515

Figure 75: awarding the Thiri Pyanchi title to the monk Wirathu (January 2, 2023).516

19The SAC, in continuity with previous military governments and pro-military organizations, has also been promoting an expansion of Dhamma Schools programs.517 These programs, including the Dhamma School Foundation, often involve hardline conservative monastic networks such as former 969 and Ma Ba Tha members and the Young Men Buddhist Association (YMBA), an organization that played a major role in the early days of the decolonization struggle and subsequently largely abstained from politics until the late 2010s, with the appointment of General Min Aung Hlaing as its patron and the formation of close relationships with the USDP and former Ma Ba Tha members.518 Aimed at preserving Buddhism, some of these programs have been known to convey xenophobic ideas, particularly against Muslim populations.519 According to research conducted before the coup, the curricula used by these organizations in their Sunday or summer programs do not necessarily contain inappropriate or xenophobic material, but things may be different in the oral commentaries provided by the trainers.520 In addition, these programs arguably convey a sense of karmic fatalism and submission to the elders’ authority, thereby working against any form of political contestation in the long run.

The cases of two monastic schools

20In order to ‘zoom in’ and illustrate a heterogeneous reality, we wish to briefly present the cases of two monastic schools, anonymized for security purposes. We have selected these schools because they present two very different situations and positionings with regard to the 2021 coup and its aftermath, among extremely diverse situations throughout the country. The data that follows is based on information available through public media and social media, as well as semi-formal interviews conducted by one of the members of our team in mid-2023.

21School A is located in Mandalay Region. Established in the early 2010s, this Ba Ka school has educated over 2,000 students through the post-primary level. Following the coup, the school has taken the side of the revolution and is explicitly aligned with the NUG. The school’s self-appointed mission, evolving in the post-coup context, is to provide a safe environment for learning and personal growth.

22The school has experienced an influx of families seeking shelter from conflicts that have impacted the surrounding regions. School A thus found itself functioning as a refuge for individuals and families, including those most directly affected by civil war, who have been in search of educational opportunities and in need of healthcare and assistance in the process of emotional and physical recovery. At the time of the interview in mid-2023, the school catered to an increasing population of about 200 students and their families, who had been affected by armed conflict.

23The school adopts primarily an on-site mode of learning, with students attending classes on the school premises. This approach allows for face-to-face interaction and fosters a sense of community among the students. Unlike many educational institutions, it does not have a Facebook page or any significant online media presence. Several factors seem to explain this choice, including security concerns, limited resources, as well as a focus on in-person engagement, as the school has been dealing with financially challenged students and now with IDP children and their families. The school follows the curriculum prescribed by the NUG’ MoE (Chapter 2.3) with Burmese as the primary medium of instruction, reflecting the cultural and linguistic context of the region, despite the presence of students with diverse linguistic and ethnic backgrounds.

24School A relies on various sources of funding to sustain its operations. It received some (limited and punctual) financial support from the NUG, in addition to recognition and educational guidelines, as well as contributions from individual and organizational donors. Despite this diverse funding base, however, the school barely meets its financial needs and the ongoing security issues in the region constitute a central and enduring challenge. Ensuring the safety of students and staff is a top priority, and additional resources are necessary to address these concerns effectively (such as preparing hide-outs, medical support, and clothing). The increasing number of students requires continuous financial support in order to maintain an environment conducive to education. Many children come to the school with their own conflict-related traumas and addressing their psychological and emotional well-being requires access to medical facilities and trained professionals, which the school might need to invest in so it may continue playing its ‘safety net’ role for increasingly vulnerable populations seeking refuge and education.

25School B is located in Sagaing Region, was established in 2008, and offers different forms of education: preparation of the monastic examinations, monastic higher education, and Ba Ka. Since its post-Covid/coup reopening in 2022, it has offered education following the national curriculum to students from regions affected by conflict, with a population of more than 6,000 students, up to high school (80% reportedly coming from conflict-torn regions like Sagaing itself, and also Kachin, Chin, and Kayah [Karenni] States, with diverse linguistic backgrounds).

26The school follows the curriculum of the SAC-controlled MoE. Its abbot, among several evolving and somewhat contradictory declarations, has become publicly vocal against the revolution, such as accusing PDFs of killing monks while largely refraining from criticism against the SAC’s numerous acts of violence. The school, which is maintaining a strong online presence in order to disseminate information, showcase its initiatives, and connect with supporters, has received regular online criticism for its collaboration with the SAC’s educational departments and the pro-military and high-profile Sitagu Sayadaw, as well as for posting videos of students staging plays criticizing the revolution.

27Amidst this collaboration with the SAC, the school has been overall successful in providing education to several thousands of children coming from conflict-affected regions. Its programs are designed with an explicit emphasis on ‘quality education,’ ‘peacebuilding,’ and extracurricular activities, such as music, painting, English, IT, and computer programming. Although most educational activities are in-person, the school also hosts talk shows in Burmese and in English, discussing topics such as the ‘right to education’ and the ‘modernization of monastic education’ or directly addressing the criticism it receives for its collaboration with the military. The abbot has, for instance, declared that the “revolution against dictatorship should be conducted with education, as it is impossible to succeed with weapons,” a statement that seems largely pre-negotiated with the military, seemingly as a way to deflect hatred against the SAC.

28School B has attracted significant attention, both locally and internationally, and receives support from individual and institutional donors. However, despite efficient communication in showcasing its work, the abbot’s bold comments and overall political stance have disappointed some of the school’s supporters. Moving forward, in addition to uncertainties in relation to the abbot’s political stance, the expansion of its activities amidst increasing student demand remains a challenge.

Historical background and debates

30As detailed in Chapter 1.2, schooling in colonial Burma was multi-tiered, differrentiated by provider and language of instruction. For the masses, vernacular schools administered by local authorities and monastic schools, which operated outside the architecture of the colonial State, provided education in Burmese or local languages. For elites, English or Anglo-vernacular schools were run by the colonial administration, and English-only not-for-profit private schools were managed by church-based networks. Naturally, this led to stratification by way of loyalty or opposition to the colonial State, by language of instruction, and by educational opportunities and outcomes.

31The U Nu government of the immediate post-independence period allowed private schools, in addition to Christian schools and monastic schools, to become part of the new education system, with autonomy granted under the Private Schools Act of 1951. For many private schools, this meant maintaining educational provision and stratification, as during the colonial era: teaching English from an earlier age, including Christian teachings within the curriculum, and focusing more on academic or religious education as opposed to more vocational education. Following the 1962 military coup led by General Ne Win, the direction and focus of education dramatically shifted towards a promotion of education for livelihood opportunities and a foundation in socialist moral values, and by 1965-1966 all private schools had been nationalized. With the exception of private tutoring, which was able to subsist under consecutive military governments (Chapter 1.4), private education remained dormant until the mid‑1990s.

32Following the national closure of public universities in 1996 in response to student protests, education alternatives were needed and the gap in public provision led to the re-emergence of a private education sector, only this time it was to be led by for-profit initiatives. As per MoE regulations, private education above kindergarten was technically illegal,521 but nonetheless private schooling at the basic education level was unofficially tolerated. To skirt potential state legibility, private providers largely shied away from public advertising and many branded themselves as ‘centers’ rather than ‘schools’ so as not to appear substitutional to government education. Given the intentionally lower profile of private providers, school credibility was hard to determine and households most often sent their children to schools/centers perceived to be the most popular (Lall, 2020). Those few private providers that delivered full-time schooling did so under the radar, whereas most providers operated as complementary options to those who could afford it, offering subjects based on popular demand taught to students outside of government school hours. This included training in foreign languages (largely but not exclusively English), computing, business, and accounting, as well as international examination preparation. Until 2011, the only legally operating basic education private schools were prestigious international schools, such as the International School of Yangon, which had been granted special status. All other offerings were at risk of intermittent crackdowns by the State, typically pertaining to what subjects could be taught and what school fees could be charged (Lall, 2009).

33By the 2010s, for-profit education could be described with five broad categories: (1) international schools teaching a foreign curriculum, typically American or British although with some exceptions, for students to sit international examinations; (2) national curriculum schools using the Myanmar government curriculum – and with some possibilities for supplemental curricula – for students to sit the state matriculation examination; (3) training centers offering complementary courses most typically in foreign languages (English, Japanese, and Korean being the most popular) or in IT skills; (4) private tuition classes providing supplementary tutoring for the government curriculum and its matriculation examinations; (5) private universities offering various qualifications (certificates, diplomas, degrees) often in partnership with foreign institutions and typically in professional disciplines.

34In 2011, the Private School Registration Law introduced modest attempts by the Thein Sein administration to regulate an ever-expanding private education sector.522 Rather than initiate a formal process for accreditation, the law instead focused on regulations pertaining to initial and ongoing registration, chiefly with regards to building specifications and teacher qualifications, and solely for those schools teaching the government curriculum. Instead of being overseen by the MoE, schools teaching an international curriculum were exempt from the law and instead remained registered as companies under the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration, free to operate without regulation or oversight. By 2015 the MoE was working on a Private Education Law towards establishing a regulatory framework for all private schools, both national and international, but the law was never finalized under the NLD administration.

35The rise in private education over the last decade, with a nearly twofold increase between 2016 and 2020 (Table 6; Graph 4), has largely occurred in urban areas, catered to the middle classes and the wealthy, been a profit-making endeavor, and gone unregulated by the State. The enlargement of the sector can be seen as a response to the enduring shortcomings of the public system. As observed by Mael Raynaud as early as 2016,523 the economic growth during the reform era of the 2010s did not in fact alleviate poverty for many in Myanmar, and education had not itself played much of a role in addressing wealth inequality. With public education seen to consequently be failing, or at least insufficient, in terms of providing social mobility opportunities, for those households with the means to, turning to private alternatives was a rational choice. The enlargement was likely also a product of a more liberalized economy in which entrepreneurs could more freely enter, compete in, and benefit from a market for educational services. By their very nature, private institutions must compete for customers and are consequently driven to offer what customers (students and households) believe will lead to a meaningful return on investment. But, importantly, critics have warned that an overreliance on private education at the expense of investments in public education will further stratify society and heighten inequalities.524

Post-coup developments within private basic education

36As with public education, all forms of private education were in relative disarray in the year following the 2021 coup, but by May 2022, around 90% of private schools were reported to have reopened and with strong demand for enrollment.525 As an example, in Mandalay Region, over 55,000 students were enrolled across 230 private schools in 2023-2024,526 in comparison to just over 70,000 students across 213 private schools during the 2019-2020 academic year,527 which signals a substantial rebound of student numbers following two years of disruption. More broadly, official figures present an increase in the number of private schools since 2020, suggesting confidence toward investments in the supply-side quantity of private schooling (Table 6). In 2023, private education fairs, bringing together private institutions across all levels of education, were not irregular occurrences in Yangon and Mandalay (Fig. 76).528 Competition for private schooling also appears to be affecting the education that occurs within the sector as some private schools have more recently incorporated a wider range of subjects to attract more students, including music, computer courses, and foreign languages.529

Figure 76: Advertisement showing over 40 private international institutions attending a 2023 promotional fair in Yangon.530

37Official figures for 2022-2023 from the Central Statistical Organization (Table 6; Graph 4) show attendance at the primary level has grown considerably from 2019-2020 numbers, from 72,330 students to 121,083 (a 67% increase), whereas attendance at the high school level has fallen by two-thirds, from 150,153 students to 45,224. Interestingly, the post-coup trend of dramatic differences between growing primary enrollment and declining secondary enrollment appear similar to the trend observed in monastic education (Chapter 4.1). Although these figures and their interpretation require a great deal of caution, this might suggest that older students may be turning to more politicized providers of education, recognizing also that attendance has dropped across the SAC-controlled basic education system (Chapter 2.2), with the most likely choice being pro-revolution interim education systems. Another, possibly more decisive, element explaining this situation could be that after years of disrupted studies, many older students have stopped their formal schooling altogether.

38In general, households now appear to be allocating a greater share of their educational expenses to private education, in its various forms. A study by the World Bank (2023), drawing upon household survey data alleging a nationally representative sample, suggested that changes in patterns of household educational expenditures since the pre-coup 2017 period indicate a small but significant shift towards non-state, fee-charging schooling.532 Without being able to draw definitive conclusions, the authors of the study find that fee-charging schooling outside the SAC-controlled system is, unsurprisingly, most accessible by the wealthiest 40% of the population, in urban areas, at the high school level, and with no change in share from 2017 to 2023 for the poorest quintiles of the population. In line with pre-coup debates and concerns, observers note that a two-tier education system consequently remains. Given the increase in quantity of private provision at the primary and middle school levels, this two-tier system has likely been strengthened by the coup. Wealthier households are able to afford private schooling (despite increasing fees) and thereby avoid the SAC-controlled system as much as possible, while it has become more difficult for lower-income families to continue boycotting SAC-controlled schools due to the absence of affordable alternatives (Chapter 2.2).533 Commentators additionally suggest the increasing role of English language education as a social class divider, an issue that has a long history in Myanmar, with roots in the three-tiered colonial education system.534

39Private tuition appears to continue unabated. The same 2023 World Bank study reports that the share of household monthly educational expenditures towards private tuition has increased from 2017 to 2023 for both rural and urban households and for all wealth quintiles, indicating that private tuition remains a (potentially more expensive) part of daily life for many. In late 2023, reports surfaced that teachers in SAC-controlled schools had been frequently holding private tuition classes, under the classic pretext of ‘extra teaching time,’ in basic education schools, charging up to 50,000 MMK (close to 13 USD at market rate) monthly per subject.535 Following this, the SAC warned teachers to not offer private tuition on school grounds, although there was no mention of punitive measures for non-compliance.536 Private tuition fees asked by teachers within SAC-controlled schools, which had been suppressed by the NLD administration, have re-introduced the in-class privilege of students who can pay, while more broadly a rise in private tuition fees across the country is increasingly pricing out households.537 However, as it has for decades, private tuition remains an intractable complement to schooling, and since the coup, it has also become for some an alternative to returning to schooling under the regime. In some instances, students may be attending online education from the NUG (and other pro-revolution institutions) while concurrently attending private tuition in preparation for the mainstream matriculation exam, or they may be attending only private tuition without enrollment in either the SAC or NUG education systems.538

Graph 4: Representation of the number of students enrolled in private education according to official statistics (2016-2023).539

Private higher education and training centers: youth looking abroad

40Amidst plummeting enrollment in SAC-controlled higher education (Chapter 2.2), youth have found alternative study options in the form of short-to-medium-term courses and diploma programs, many of which are offered by private providers. Private universities, many of which have partnerships with overseas institutions (Chapter 1.6), are reportedly overwhelmed by student demand, and there is some concern that Myanmar’s political turmoil may dissuade overseas institutions from forming new partnerships.540 This reluctance might be limited to only for-profit collaborations, however, as foreign development assistance has brought new international universities into the ecosystem with non-profit initiatives, such as in the cases of the European Union Mobility Program for Myanmar (EMPM) or the USAID-funded Diversity and Inclusion Scholarship Program’s selection of the University of Arizona as its main subcontractor for higher education training opportunities.541 The introduction of non-profit international actors stands to have wide benefits in terms of access and choice, given tuition fees for for-profit private universities in Myanmar are relatively high, although scholarships can be available, and coursework is typically limited to professional degrees in business management and ICT. Moreover, this type of virtual mobility programming provides a needed complement to existing scholarship programs for overseas study (Chapter 5) by providing opportunities for scholars at risk, such as those participating in the CDM or activist leaders, to pursue affordable and accessible international study without needing to leave Myanmar.

41In the decade preceding the coup, learning Japanese and Korean had become increasingly popular for finding overseas work, while Mandarin was primarily beneficial towards working for Chinese firms in Myanmar.542 In the years following the coup, there has been an observed increase in demand for Korean, Japanese, and Mandarin classes delivered by training centers, with these languages growing as a conduit for securing overseas study or employment.543 Overall enrollment figures in private language centers are unavailable, though reports suggest Japanese classes in Yangon have seen as much as a threefold increase in enrollment.544 Emigration to Japan has indeed become an increasingly attractive option for young adults boycotting SAC-controlled higher education545 and in 2022 Myanmar had the most registrants of any country for the Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT), which led to pandemonium around the sale of JLPT application forms by the Myanmar Association of Japan Alumni.546 In 2023, over 37,000 candidates sat the Employment Permit System - Test of Proficiency in Korean (EPS-Topik) exam, reportedly the highest number in the history of the exam, a figure that doubled the following year, with 74,000 candidates in 2024,547 with many youths hoping to join the fastly growing tens of thousands Myanmar workers in South Korea (Chapter 5.1).548 However, the activation of the 2010 People Military Service Law in 2024 has, according to some reports, appeared to lead to decreased enrollment in some private language centers, as youth look to avoid conscription by fleeing urban areas.549

42Quite frequently, centers provide job-readiness training in addition to language preparation, so that upon testing at a particular language proficiency level, students are able to emigrate for work in predetermined industries, such as farming, nursing, food-processing, and automotive maintenance in Japan (Fig. 77 and 78), where there were nearly 48,000 workers from Myanmar in 2022 compared to about 28,000 in 2019.550 But securing a passport for emigration is not as straightforward as it once was, with skyrocketing application fees and delays in passport issuance (Chapter 5.1).551 Moreover, labor rights organizations have accused some language centers of spreading fake job offers through their employment programs.

Figure 77: 2023 Facebook ads for an education center offering training in Japanese.552

Figure 78: Visa and jobs in food and beverage factories in Japan.553

43Another increasingly popular option for youth boycotting SAC-controlled education is preparing to sit the General Educational Development (GED) test, which offers high school equivalency certification from the United States (Fig. 79 and 80). For youth boycotting high school, this offers an avenue for formal recognition of basic education completion while for those boycotting higher education, the GED qualification can significantly increase one’s chances of acceptance into universities abroad (Chapter 5.1). The rise in GED preparation programs extends to migrant communities in Thailand as well (Chapter 5.2) and overall includes both nonprofit and for-profit options, with some listed fees reaching as high as two million kyat (approximately 588 USD as of 2023) for five months of preparation.554 GED preparation offers an internationally recognized and academically rigorous, albeit decidedly Western, qualification for those able to access it, but for youth looking to gain entrance into overseas universities, it is merely one step in a process that may often also include university acceptance and the securing of scholarships or financial aid. The credentialing offered by private institutions – be it as a vocational training diploma, a language proficiency score, or high school equivalency – is widely perceived by young people as a token of quality education that is absent in the public sector and which offers a justifiable return on investment with regard to private benefits.

Figure 79: Promotional material for GED preparation program offered by S4PPD (Suṭā Ñāṇa) in Mawlamyine, Mon State.555

Figure 80: The University of Taxila, Yangon.556

Heightened SAC involvement in private schooling

44The perceived political neutrality of private institutions has not been without ramifications, especially for some private universities. In the week following the coup, Parami University released a statement that stopped short of condemning the coup, which was met with criticism from current and former students, some of whom noted that the institution had previously received financial support from the military-linked KBZ Bank and Daw Thet Thet Khine, a philanthropist who would become the SAC’s Minister of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement (and subsequently Minister for Hotels and Tourism).557 When accepting these donations Parami University would have certainly not expected an eventual coup to call into question its philanthropic relationships, but as noted by Rosalie Metro (2023), “by linking its reputation to powerful individuals, Parami seems to have constrained its ability to respond to the coup in a way that students and alumni found appropriate.” At least one private university, the Myanmar Metropolitan College, which was founded in 2013, has evidently dissolved since the coup, for reasons that have not been publicly shared. As has been noted, its corporate partners may have influenced its post-coup silence (Metro, 2023) as well as its apparent closing.

45As more and more students shift from SAC-controlled schooling to private institutions, private schools have faced increasing pressure and security concerns from the SAC.558 Following the 2022 shuttering of 16 private schools in Nay Pyi Taw for political reasons,559 political neutrality has become of great importance for private education actors, yet there is frightening precedent for the SAC to arrest and detain private school staff, with two major incidents stemming from suspicions originating on pro-regime Telegram channels. In July 2023, the Golden Gate Private High School in Mandalay was raided on suspicion of links to the civil disobedience movement (CDM), chiefly the employment of teachers on strike from the public system, which had been outlawed by the regime.560 In September 2023, the principal of Yinthwa Yadanar Private High School in Sagaing was arrested on suspected ties to the Sagaing Federal School, which is part of the NUG’s parallel system and consequently seen by the regime as a ‘terrorist’ actor (Chapter 2.3).561

46On May 12, 2023 the SAC-controlled MoE passed a new Private Education Law,562 replacing the 2011 Private School Registration Law and establishing new registration and supervisory oversight for private schools offering international curricula and those following the national curriculum. Some might argue that regulation of the private education sector was long overdue, and elements of the 2023 law reflect proposals from the NLD administration, which had aspired to clamp down on predatory education practices from unregulated private schools. Nonetheless, the new law grants extensive control over private schooling (but not training centers or private tuition) to the SAC-controlled MoE, including standards for all private schools, the registration of teachers, the issuance of teaching certificates, various other administrative matters, and, notably, the teaching and discussing of topics (article 30) and certain cultural and religious content (articles 30, 67, and 68) seen to be contrary to state policies. Meeting with educational officials following the passing of the law, SAC Minister of Education Dr. Nyunt Pe emphasized the necessity to teach the full national curriculum, including Myanmar language, Myanmar history and Myanmar geography, in order to strengthen ‘Union Spirit’ (ပြည်ထောင်စုစိတ်ဓာတ်ရှင်သန်စေရန်), to make the students ‘cherish, respect and value Myanmar culture’ (မြန်မာ့ယဉ်ကျေးမှု ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းများကို မြတ်နိုးလေးစား တန်ဖိုးထား တတ်စေရန်), to ‘strengthen national pride and patriotism’ (နိုင်ငံချစ်စိတ်၊ မျိုးချစ်စိတ် ရှင်သန် ထက်မြက်စေရန်) and foster ‘good habits and moral values’ (အလေ့အကျင့်ကောင်းများ၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်ကောင်းများ) so that ‘Myanmar culture does not disappear’ (မြန်မာ့ယဉ်ကျေးမှု မပျောက်ပျက်စေရန်).563

47Starting from September 2023, the SAC has directed national curriculum and international schools nationwide to pay respect to the Myanmar flag and observe the national anthem (Fig. 81 and 82).564 Additionally, the regime has repeatedly emphasized the importance of instilling a patriotic spirit and preserving Myanmar culture, mandating the teaching of Myanmar language, history, and geography in accordance with the new law.565 Critics have pointed out that the law limits discussions and teachings that go against the stances of the SAC, which undermines the autonomy of private schools, viewing the law as a way to control educational content and restrict freedom of expression. This is seen as part of an overall move to suppress democratic values and political discussions in education, producing a generation unaware of democracy or politics and thereby solidifying military rule.566 Identity as defined by the SAC (Chapter 2.2) can therefore at most be inculcated, and at least not directly challenged, through the education provided by national curriculum schools and international schools.

Figures 81 and 82: Paying respect to the national flag during school assemblies (similarly to government schools) in two private schools in 2022-2023.567

48Since the Private Education Law’s announcement, the SAC-controlled MoE has progressed with its enactment, with new directives issued and the occurrence of township-level school inspections.568 The new law has burdened some private school owners, who have expressed confusion and concern over changing regulations and increasing demands for student lists to the relevant authorities.569 Moreover, compliance issues have been reported in Yangon, which has forced some of the less well-resourced national curriculum schools to upgrade their facilities and put over 270 schools at risk of closure.570

Different forms of Chinese education

50Similar to their counterparts in other Southeast Asian countries and beyond, Chinese communities in Myanmar tend to deeply value education, through Confucian values, and with aims that include upward social mobility and the maintenance of their identity in the host society (Formoso, 2000). Like elsewhere in the region, Chinese communities have set up large numbers of schools throughout the modern history of Burma/Myanmar. Largely independent from the Department of Public Instruction during the colonial era, the 250 Chinese schools operating in the 1950s were involved in an intense political struggle, with some being aligned with Beijing, while others were loyal to Taipei (Tong, 2010).572 Following their nationalization by the BSPP in 1966 and the anti-Chinese riots the following year in response to the Cultural Revolution, Chinese communities were often compelled to maintain education programs in a low-profile fashion by teaching in small groups in temples or private houses (Aung Myoe, 2011). Chinese education returned in different fashions during the years following the 1988 uprising and SLORC takeover,573 in part encouraged by Myanmar’s gradual orientation towards a market economy, the greater leeway granted to some non-state education providers, and the overall warming relations between the Myanmar military and the government of Beijing, which often describe their nations as “pauk-phaw” (ပေါက်ဖော်, “siblings”).574 This trend continued during the 2011-2020 decade, in the context of China’s continuing emergence as a superpower and through its support to not only Chinese schools but also to the Myanmar education sector as a whole.575 Some border areas, including Kokang, Mai La, Wa Region, as well as Pang Wa, Laiza, and Mai Ja Yang in Kachin State, have also been particularly influenced by China, including in terms of language and education.576

51Different forms of predominantly Chinese education exist in Myanmar. Chinese community schools (တရုတ်ဘုံကျောင်း) are typically not-for-profit institutions with the primary aim of keeping the community together through religious and educational activities. Being identified as a school teaching Confucianism or Buddhist scriptures has indeed historically helped these institutions become accepted and not be perceived as a political threat by the authorities of Myanmar.577 These multi-purpose institutions can also serve as a place to discuss community affairs, including local business strategies, and organize various cultural ceremonies and weddings. Largely affordable, they rely on donations from the community, but often also receive support from networks in either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Taiwan, which has implications for the curriculum they teach. Historically, these Chinese schools have taught different Chinese languages, including Hokkien, although this situation has evolved with the increasingly dominant position of Mandarin, which is taught either in traditional (Taiwan) or simplified (PRC) characters. Classes are typically held early in the morning and late in the afternoon in order not to be in direct competition with government schools and to allow students to attend both institutions, hence the frequent categorization of these institutions as ‘supplementary schools.’ In practice, however, situations vary according to different regions and schools. Notably, a common occurrence in the border regions between China and Shan and Kachin States has been students dropping out of Myanmar government school after the primary level but continuing to attend Chinese schools as their main education provider.578

52Other forms of Chinese education in Myanmar include three Confucius Classrooms, which are typically former community schools now directly supported by the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Ministry of Education and often described as an important tool of China’s soft power.579 Not unlike homologous American, British, French, or German institutions found in Myanmar, Confucius Classrooms are partly staffed by teachers from the PRC, offer classes on Chinese language and culture, host cultural events, organize Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) Chinese proficiency tests, and provide scholarships to help the best students to continue their education in China.580

53Finally, there are different types of private education institutions that focus on the Chinese language and culture, with a primarily commercial approach. This includes international schools with a more-or-less intense focus on the Chinese language,581 either as a medium of instruction or as a subject, as well as private language classes for students willing to learn Chinese,582 often mindful of studies or career prospects in Myanmar, in China, or in Taiwan (higher education programs in English and other Chinese languages being overall more prevalent in Singapore and Hong Kong).583

Post-coup developments

54Although comprehensive figures and analysis seem particularly difficult to collect, converging anecdotal evidence suggests increasing enrollments in diverse types of Chinese education institutions following the coup, seemingly by a greater proportion of ‘non-Chinese’ students. This choice can be partly underpinned by a desire to stay away from SAC-controlled schools, but the main draw seems to be the multiple opportunities attached to mastering the Chinese language, including employment in Chinese companies operating in Myanmar and mid-to-long-term migration towards the PRC or Taiwan to pursue higher education or seek work opportunities. These perspectives are not new, but the current political situation in Myanmar has rendered them comparatively more attractive.584

55In Kachin State, Chinese influence in education is not a new phenomenon: there are Chinese community schools in approximately every township, a few private Chinese schools, and widespread private Chinese language classes.585 The coup, however, has seemingly triggered a steep increase in the number of institutions as well as in the number of students enrolled. Comprehensive figures do not seem to be available, but a Chinese school teacher interviewed by one member of our team in June 2023 reports a more than two-fold jump following the coup, from about 1,800 to 4,000 students. The presence of children whose families do not possess Chinese roots, as well as situations where children attend Chinese school but not the government school, also seem to be increasingly common following the coup.

56A similar trend seems to be at play in other regions of the country, notably where Chinese influences were already strong before the coup. In Mogok (Mandalay Region), some estimate that as many as 80% of students attend a Chinese school.586 A Chinese school administrator interviewed by a member of our team in July 2023 described a 30 to 40% increase in enrollments as compared to pre-coup figures, with the majority of students having at least partial Chinese origins. In this school too, instances of students attending the Chinese school in the early morning and in the evening, but not the government school during regular schooling hours (8 am. to 4 pm, approximately) have become increasingly common.

57Converging reports and evidence suggest that the number of students enrolled in private classes in order to learn Chinese (as well as other foreign languages, Chapters 4.2 and 5) is also sharply increasing. This trend is attributed to the compounded effects of the coup and the development of online classes since the Covid-19 pandemic.587 Following the Facebook pages of several private Chinese language schools (Fig. 83 to 85) frequently reveals a significant increase in the number of branches and classes in 2023 compared to 2020.588

58Assessing the quality of Chinese education in Myanmar is beyond the scope of this work and the current capacities of our team. The criteria involved in doing so would be debatable and the results would likely vary significantly among different institutions and possibly different regions. However, similarly to other alternatives to state schooling, the post-coup increase in enrollments seems to contribute to challenges in terms of providing quality education. Student/teacher ratios are often sharply increasing and private language centers tend to prioritize profits, while Myanmar seems rather under-resourced in terms of institutions able to establish standards in teacher accreditation and support students’ plans to study in China.589

Figures 83 to 85: Facebook fliers for an international school opened in 2022 in Yangon, following Cambridge and Taiwanese curricula,590 and for private Chinese language classes in Yangon and Mandalay.591

59Some of the Chinese schools, depending on their location and other factors that would need further investigation, display clear signs of belonging to the Myanmar nation, with green and white signboards exhibiting the MoE’s classic school slogans (such as “The national discipline starts from the school” or “Morale, Discipline, Knowledge”),592 and school assemblies paying respect to the Myanmar national flag (Fig. 86). This type of display has become increasingly mandatory under the SAC, as private schools are now requested to organize daily school assemblies featuring the national flag and anthem (Chapter 4.2).593 Although Chinese schools tend to stay as far as possible from politics, those affiliated with Taiwan might be somewhat more sympathetic to the revolution, in line with Taipei’s stance on the Myanmar crisis.594 The PRC’s economic power, influence, and geographic proximity to Myanmar certainly contribute to its attractiveness, and despite its growing frustrations with the military, Beijing has overall been willing to work with the SAC after the coup, including in the education sector.595 Taiwan, on the other hand, offers significant prospects in terms of higher education with increasing numbers of foreign students, including from Myanmar, enrolled in its higher education institutions.596 In one notable instance, a Chinese school interviewed by a member of our team in 2023 recently transitioned from a Taiwanese to a PRC curriculum. Subsequently, some students intending to pursue higher education in Taiwan opted to transfer to a different school in Mandalay, which maintains the use of traditional characters and extends its classes beyond Grade 9, incorporating senior high school (高中). Chinese schools located in border areas, including Kachin and Shan States, seem to be typically more ‘Chinese’ in appearance, hardly displaying MoE symbols of belonging to Myanmar.

Figure 86: Crowded school assembly featuring the Myanmar flag, and slogans of the MoE at the Mandalay Confucius Education School New City Campus, March 2024.597