Surging enrollments

15In terms of quantity, it was usually estimated that before the coup ethnic education providers across the country were catering to a total of about 300,000 children.318 Although this was just a fraction (a thirtieth) of the over 9 million students in government schools, EBEP systems were playing critical roles in terms of providing education to populations with often comparatively fewer education opportunities, including by implementing different solutions in terms of using a local language in the education process (an option unsurprisingly coming with both educational and political objectives).

16In terms of enrollments during the years following the coup, the increase in ethnic education systems seems as clear as the decrease in SAC-controlled schooling. More or less precise and reliable figures for some of the organizations are available (Table 4), but others seem to be missing and overall estimates are particularly difficult to produce, for reasons that include the extremely chaotic situation in many regions, the possible absence of formerly government/EAO mixed-schools that are experimenting different trajectories in the post-coup context, and the political significance of these numbers, which may largely be perceived as strong indicators of the revolution’s success vs the SAC regaining control. For 2022-2023, although compiling accurate and up-to-date figures is certainly challenging, some of the actors involved in this sector estimated that the total enrollment for ethnic education providers could be as high as 500,000,319 which would mean a dramatic 67% increase compared to pre-coup estimates. While different regions have been undergoing different and seemingly fluctuating dynamics in terms of enrollments under the SAC MoE (Chapter 2.2), as of early 2024, the SAC struggling on all fronts on the battlefield does not suggest an overall shift where families would be reverting to public schools and universities under the control of the military.

17Ethnic education providers that existed prior to 2021 and have aligned with the revolution, including but not limited to the KNU and KIO’s education departments, have indeed reported dramatic increases in their enrollments following the coup. In some schools under the KIO education system, such as Alen Bum, which is a flagship high school near the KIO’s capital of Laiza, the enrollments have surged from 700 students before the coup to 2,400 in 2023, as families directly involved in the revolution or wanting to stay away from SAC-controlled education have been moving into the locality from Kachin State and beyond.320 With increasing numbers of students avoiding the SAC’s matriculation exams, over 3,126 students took the KIO matriculation exam in the 2023-2024 academic year, compared to 2,735 in 2022-2023,321 a more than three-fold increase as compared to pre-coup years when about 1,000 were annually taking the exam (Fig. 52).322 As control over territory is evolving swiftly, the KIO announced a dramatic increase of its education system for 2024-2025, with the opening of 233 new schools, bringing the total to 448 schools.323

18Schools under the KNU education system seem to present similar quanti-tative dynamics,324 although different sources give different figures based on a rapidly evolving situation. Some reports describe a dramatic increase in the number of these schools at the expense of SAC-controlled schools between 2019-2020 and 2023-2024, through collaboration with CDM teachers, the disappear-rance of mixed-schools in KNU-controlled areas, and the relocation of students who formerly attended government schools.325 Although the diverse trajectories of formerly mixed schools may complexify the diachronic comparison of figures, according to the KNU’s Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD), overall enrollments have been increasing by about 30% following the coup,326 seemingly with a continuous increase year after year: in 2023-2024 the Karen education system reported a total of more than 1,460 schools, 9,500 teachers, and 123,000 students,327 a sharp increase compared to 2022-2023 (1,233 schools and 109,313 students), which was itself significantly higher than 2021-2022 (1,093 schools and 89,879 students).328

Figure 52: Students sitting for the KIO matriculation exam, April 2022.329

19Examples of dramatic increases in enrollments in ethnic education systems in the post-coup context are many and diverse (see following sections), with the NUG’s Federal Democracy Education Policy serving as a more or less tangible incentive. In some situations, new institutions providing ethnic education have been created, sometimes on the basis of pre-coup CSOs involved in education and other sectors, massively extending their reach thanks to the new workforce of CDM teachers and other individuals willing to contribute to these endeavors. Benefiting from the experience of pre-existing Ta’ang CSOs (such as the Ta’ang Women’s Organization, the Ta’ang Student and Youth Union, and the Ta’ang Education Institute), the Ta’ang National Education Committee (TNEC – renamed Ta’ang Land Education Council [TLEC] in March 2024), for instance, was created in February 2022, with the aim of providing education in regions largely populated by Ta’angs, following the major disruptions to education caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2021 coup, and subsequent conflicts in northern Shan State. Relying largely on CDM teachers, as of late 2023, TNEC was administering 380 schools, catering to more than 28,000 students (including 4,280 in middle schools and 1,100 in high schools), employing a total of 1,690 teachers,334 in addition to the development of higher education institutions and programs (see the following subsection on ethnic higher education). As of early 2024, and seemingly in relation to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) gaining ground in northern Shan State following Operation 1027 in 2023, TLEC was expanding its teacher training programs and expecting to run about 480 schools in 2024-2025.335

20Particularly impacted by the coup, Kayah (Karenni) State has also seen a similar dynamic of pre-existing and newly created CSOs developing new or expanding pre-existing school systems in the context of the dramatically disrupted relation between the population and the military-controlled state education (as shown in Table 3 in the previous chapter, the number of candidates to the SAC matriculation exam has decreased to a resounding zero in Kayah State in 2023-2024, in contrast with over 7,000 during pre-coup years). These ethnic education providers largely rely on CDM teachers as well as individuals willing to support these initiatives by every means available, to varying degrees of collaboration or alignment with the NUG and its Federal Democracy Education Policy. Amidst rapidly evolving situations and shifting estimates, according to the Interim Executive Council of Karenni State as of late 2023 over 400 schools were providing education to about 40,000 students with more than 3,000 teachers.336 Later reports suggest similar numbers, with over 400 schools scheduled to open in 2024-2025, using different curricula but largely cooperating with a focus on providing education to displaced children, while SAC-controlled schools can only operate in Loikaw’s urban center.337 Organizations involved in providing education in the regions between Kayah (Karenni) State and southern Shan State include the Kayan National Education Committee, created in 2022 on the foundation of pre-existing CSOs and political parties, and which operates about 129 schools (104 primary; 17 middle and 8 high schools), with more than 850 teachers and catering to more than 11,000 students in 2024.338 IDP and Refugee camps close to or beyond the border with Thailand (including the two historical Karenni camps in Mae Hong Son province), have also seen an increasing number of migrants from regions within Kayah (Karenni) State, including youth seeking comparatively better education provision (Chapter 5.2).339

Identity, language, and politics

21The mobilization of different fashions of an ethnic identity is – almost by definition – among the priorities of ethnic education providers. In the post-coup context conversations dealing with federalism are high on the agenda. Multiple ethnic nation-building projects envisioned by EAOs and other organizations have received new impetus, which often translates into continued or renewed efforts to include components of their respective ethnic identities into schooling (including through language, history teaching, and paying respect to a particular ethnic flag during school assemblies). These renewed efforts should also be understood in a post-coup context in which several EAOs, most notably in Shan State, have recently announced or expanded forced recruitment policies following the SAC announcement of the activation of the 2010 People’s Military Service Law on February 10, 2024.340

22It should also be noted, however, that as of early 2024 not all ethnic armed organizations were in conflict with the junta.341 The military, taking inspiration from the colonial state before them, has largely been using ‘divide-and-rule’ strategies over the decades, and Myanmar has, so far, experienced a long history of rather unsuccessful attempts to forge pan-ethnic resistance fronts.342 A number of EAOs and militias have either chosen to join hands with the SAC, have tried to stay on the fence, or have simply followed their own agenda and priorities, multiple strategies which are not incompatible with efforts to promote their respective cultures and languages,343 including through education.

23In Southern Shan State, the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), for instance, has a history of being involved in preserving the Pa-O language and culture, but through summer classes and collaboration with the Ministry of Education rather than by setting up an alternative formal education system. Following the coup, the PNO has taken the side of the SAC and has been pressuring households in its territory to support the organization financially and send a young member of each family to its military training. These trainings, in which monks are often involved, reportedly include a strong emphasis on the safeguarding of the Pa-O ethnic identity, language, religion, and culture.344 Similarly, Lisu (and possibly emerging Lhaovo) militias allied with the SAC have been pressuring families, notably in Kachin State’s Waingmaw Township, to send at least one recruit per family, with reports of forced recruitments of high school students attending classes.345 The Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA) allied closely with the SAC and fighting against the KIO, has also been strongly supporting the teaching of Shanni language inside and outside of government schools in the territories under its influence in Sagaing Region and Kachin State, and its associated cultural organizations seem to be in the process of expanding a primary school curriculum.346 In Shan State, the RCSS, despite an evolving positioning, has by and large remained on speaking terms with the SAC following the coup and as of early 2024, and its education department has continued its activities, holding each year a graduation ceremony in Loi Tai Leng (Fig. 53).347

Figure 53: Chairman of the RCSS, General Yawd Serk, during a graduation ceremony in Loi Tai Leng High School, Southern Shan State, January 2024.348

24Between 2021 and 2023, the NMSP, with comparatively limited military capacities, was largely sitting on the sidelines of the armed resistance against the SAC, although this position seemed to be debated within its leadership as well as in the larger Mon civil society.349 The safeguarding of Mon identity has long been a priority for the NMSP and its education system, the MNEC, which has been catering to about 12,000 students in 136 schools (Fig. 54).350 In terms of language-in-education policy, the “Mon model” (South and Lall, 2016) has attracted a lot of attention over the past two decades, notably because it is well aligned with MTB-MLE principles (with a progressive transition from the local to the national language throughout grades). Following the coup, the NMSP and MNEC have been carrying on with their long-term projects, including the production of a new curriculum and the opening of a Mon National College as an alternative to state higher education (Box 3).351 But as of 2022, students finishing MNEC high school continued to sit the government matriculation exam.352 Bilateral negotiations between the NMSP and the SAC in early 2023 have also yielded prospects of teaching the Mon language in the government schools of Mon State where there are significant Mon populations, possibly beyond the primary school level in some regions, although implementation remained uncertain.353 As of late 2023 and early 2024, however, while the SAC was facing major military setbacks across the country, a splinter group of the NMSP announced that it was joining forces with NUG and armed resistance efforts, politically and militarily.354 Meanwhile, increasing numbers of students wishing to avoid SAC-controlled public schools have reportedly been enrolling in Mon National Schools,355 while only 5,767 students took the SAC MoE matriculation exam in Mon State in the 2023-2024 academic year, compared to 30,578 in 2019-2020 (Table 3).

Figure 54: Morning assembly in front of the Mon flag in a MNEC school in Kayinseikkyi Township, Karen State, June 2022.356

25In terms of curriculum and language-of-instruction, EBEPs in general alignment with the revolution, which are by far the majority, have found different solutions based on pre-existing (or emerging) education systems and curricula, local language situations, as well as guidelines and opportunities provided by the NUG and its Federal Democracy Education Policy. In this highly disrupted context, these choices have different implications in terms of identity and accommodation within education. The KIO’s pre-existing language-in-education model (with Kachin/Jinghpaw language and culture as an additional subject and a ‘classroom language’ alongside the national curriculum)357 seems, for instance, overall easier to access for populations who do not master Kachin language than the KNU’s primarily Karen-medium education system.358 Interestingly in that regard, the KECD has opened additional Karen language classes to accommodate new non-Karen speaking students, who have sought shelter and education in KNU territories after the coup, towards developing their Karen language competence to overcome language-in-education challenges.359

Figure 55: Morning assembly in front of the Ta’ang flag in a TNEC school in 2022,360

Figure 56: Graduation ceremony of the Ta’ang Education Academy, serving as a teacher training institution for TLEC, attended by PSLF/TNLA leaders, April 2024.361

26While dealing with different situations in terms of language diversity, ethnic educators have long prioritized the teaching of their respective languages and cultures, which has been bolstered by the NUG’s federal vision of education, albeit often more in terms of moral and ideological, rather than material support. The stated vision of the Ta’ang Land Education Council (formerly TNEC) is, for instance, “to establish a culturally rooted, inclusive education system in the Ta’ang Region that promotes lifelong learning, preserve our heritage, empowers individuals, foster leadership, and contribute to peace, prosperity, and self-determination.” TLEC schools follow a curriculum similar to the one prescribed by the NUG (i.e. the national curriculum produced before the coup minus subjects deemed incompatible with federal democracy, such as history, Chapter 2.3) and diligently include local ethnic languages as subjects within school hours. Although the mobilization of the Ta’ang nation is one of their stated central objectives (Fig. 55 and 56), the TLEC reports that languages other than Ta’ang, such as Lisu or Shan, are taught in its schools depending on local language situations as well as on the availability of teachers proficient in these languages. For Ta’ang populations, it is the recently devised ‘common/official’ (ဘုံစကား / ရုံးသုံးစာ) Ta’ang language, for which a first textbook was published in 2017,362 that is being taught and promoted.363 As new textbooks using this language are being introduced in 2023-2024 (Fig. 57 and 58), the TLEC envisions a shift towards MTB-MLE in the future.364

Figures 57 and 58: Textbooks produced by the Ta’ang Literature Program, 2023-2024.365

27Similar projects to promote a ‘common’ language associated with an ethnonym, including through education, are many and predate the coup366 but have found new impetus with the development of non-state education and the prospect of a federal education system. These include Kayan schools, which in 2022-2023 began to implement a formal MTB-MLE program in their 130 schools, through a curriculum produced by the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee (using Pekon region’s main dialect, often considered of high status and adopted as the Kayan standard since the early 2000s, Fig. 59 and 60).367 Other ongoing curricular development in regards to identity involves continued efforts towards the production of ethnic history books/textbooks, such as the Karenni National History published in 2022 (Fig. 61).368

Figure 59: Morning assembly in front of the Kayan flag, in a KNEC school in 2023.369

Figure 60: Textbook for the teaching of Kayan language (Pekon region’s main dialect) produced by the Kayan LCC under the NLD government but seemingly still part of the curricula in some Kayan schools in 2023.

Figure 61: A Karenni National History book (right) published in 2022-2023.370

Daunting challenges to the delivery of education

28In terms of quality, EBEPs have long been described as presenting some noteworthy advantages over state education, notably with an emphasis on ‘critical thinking’ and efforts to implement education in the ‘mother tongue,’ which aligns with the recommendations of a large body of research, texts such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), international agencies and foreign donors’ priorities, and more recently with the NUG’s Federal Democracy Education Policy (final version approved in May 2023, Chapter 2.3). Beyond the difficult (and arguably often ideologically-charged) assessment of these two complex issues within extremely diverse contexts, these education providers have been dealing with multiple and daunting challenges, which typically became much greater with the resurgence of conflict, as in the post-coup context. The sharp increase in enrollments due to the migration of revolution supporters towards the territories of the KNU and KIO and the desire of surrounding populations to avoid attending schools under the SAC, for instance, often lead to situations where the scarcity of resources becomes even more pronounced.371 Shortages of teachers, books, classrooms, and fewer teaching hours, within a context of multiple and daunting conflict-related hardships, inevitably have, at the very least, implications on the quality of the education provided.372

29While many ethnic education providers are facing an acute lack of resources, the greatest challenge for those organizations opposed to the SAC is security. Similar to what has been happening in the resistance-controlled areas of Sagaing and Magway since the coup (Chapter 2.3), the schools of the ethnic education providers opposed to the SAC are regularly targeted by military attacks, including increasingly frequent airstrikes (Fig. 62 and 63). According to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), between February 2021 and September 2023, 37 educational structures were completely destroyed in Southeastern Myanmar alone. These attacks are often particularly brutal and deadly: on September 7, 2023, for instance, a teacher and four students were killed in a school in Mutraw Township, where the KNU’s 5^th Brigade is based.373 KECD’s representative describes situations, in regions particularly impacted by conflicts, where they have to reduce schooling time by up to 80%, explicitly mentioning the obvious impact of these conditions on the delivery of “quality education.”374

Figure 62: The New Generation School, in KNU-controlled Mutraw District, after a SAC attack in June 2023.375

30Other ethnic education providers aligned with the revolution face similar threats, with the SAC forces typically controlling only urban centers in resistance strongholds, losing ground as of early 2024, and seemingly deliberately targeting schools, churches, and other buildings in order to disrupt the development of alternative administrations.376 In that regard, Kayah (Karenni) State ranks high among the most disrupted regions as of early 2024, with widespread conflict, displacements of populations amounting to more than 80% of the State’s 420,000 inhabitants,377 and remarkable efforts of local organizations created after the coup to replace the SAC-controlled schools, in collaboration with existing EAOs.378

Figure 63: A school and surrounding houses destroyed by a SAC airstrike on an IDP camp in Mese Township (Kayah/Karenni State) in July 2023, documented by Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG).379

31According to March 2024 figures from the Karenni Civil Society Network, since the coup, more than 1,474 people have been killed, arrested, or injured, 2,600 have been dismissed in the education sector alone and 22 school buildings and 14 hospitals have been destroyed.380 About 225 schools set up by CDMers cater to IDP children, with about 10% of these schools offering classes up to Grade 9 or beyond.381 These makeshift schools operate under particularly difficult conditions, with extremely limited resources, and under the constant threat of an attack by the military,382 which sometimes materializes in the form of deadly airstrikes on schools.383 Many high-school or university-aged students have joined the armed resistance or have gone abroad to flee conflict, find work, or continue their education, primarily in Thailand (Chapter 5.2).

Ethnic higher education

32As a major facet of non-state post-secondary education (Chapter 1.6), the roots of ethnic higher education can be traced back to the Thai-Myanmar border with the establishment of tertiary programming under the governance of the Karen Refugee Committee Education Entity (KRCEE) and Karenni Education Department (KnED), in seven and two refugee camps respectively. Ethnic minority populations were finding it difficult to access mainstream higher education opportunities on both sides of the border: in Thailand, the Royal Thai Government, as a non-signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, did not recognize the basic education provided in the refugee camps, a policy that continues to this day (Chapter 5.2); and in Myanmar, most ethnic basic education systems did not lead to many of its students sitting (or passing) the State’s matriculation exam, a requisite for entry into the public university system.

33In the face of this dual challenge, by the 2010s the post-secondary education that had proven operational in the refugee camps was transported into Myanmar and adapted to fill gaps in the provision of EAO education departments. Branded with different names, with ‘Junior College’ and ‘Post-10’384 being the most popular, these higher education programs often shared with one another many characteristics and aspirations: residential learning typically lasting no more than three years with a focus on general academic skills, humanities, and social science training, and technical training (such as in teaching or community development) towards cultivating a skilled workforce largely for the host organization and its affiliates (that is, the CSOs within the networks of the EAOs, focusing on thematic areas such as education, women’s rights, youth mobilization, local development, and social welfare). With few exceptions, ethnic higher education uses English as a language of instruction, due to its value in accessing scholarships to foreign universities, although other languages may often be used as ‘classroom languages’ (i.e. complementary languages of explanation).

34The most well-known ethnic higher education programs – that is, legible to an international audience through established relationships with foreign development organizations and donors – were those under the administration of the MNEC and the KECD in Myanmar and the aforementioned KRCEE and KnED in the border refugee camps. The MNEC operates as the education department of the NMSP and manages a Mon National College (re-named and expanded from ‘Mon Post-10,’ Box 3)385 and the KECD operates as the education department of the KNU and manages a New Generation Post-Ten School, several Karen Teacher Training Colleges, and a newly established Junior College (Saw Than Min Htun and Mortensen, 2023). The KRCEE and KnED have professional affiliation with the KNU and KNPP respectively, albeit to varying degrees, with the KnED managing a Karenni National College, a Seh Theh College, and a Karenni Leadership College, and the KRCEE managing nine Junior Colleges, with much of their focus on teacher preparation for Karen-medium schools in the refugee camps and in KNU territory (Thako and Waters, 2023).

35Parallel to the development of higher education in EAO-controlled territories in eastern Myanmar, on the Myanmar side of its northern border with China, a sophisticated hub of higher education was started in KIO-controlled Mai Ja Yang, including a Federal Law Academy, an Institute of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and an Institute of Education (see also Box 4 on KSCU). It is not necessarily only the largest EAOs that have made significant investments in higher education; in September 2017 the Kaw Dai Organization established a Shan Community College outside Karli, in an area governed by a Shan People’s Militia (formerly Shan State Army Brigade No. 7), and which has managed to develop partnerships with several universities in Thailand (Chapter 5.2).

36Throughout the 2010s decade of reforms, more non-state higher education programs have been established outside the direct governance of EAOs and for additional ethnic groups, such that two broad typologies of ethnic higher education have emerged. The first, and as described in the preceding paragraphs, concerns a range of higher education programming directly administered by an EAO education department as the tertiary level of its education system, or run in close proximity to the department and unofficially a part of its system. The programs are located in territories under EAO governance, enroll students with a particular ethnic background linked to that of the EAO, and are largely occupied with developing a more skilled workforce to contribute to the economic and social development of the territory, chiefly through employment in EAO-affiliated civil society.

37The second typology concerns higher education programs run outside the influence and jurisdiction of EAOs but sometimes administered by ethnic civil society or faith-based organizations. These may offer entry to any ethnicity within a particular geography, and are largely dedicated to educational and technical upskilling towards local and regional development, inclusive of both state and non-state territories. Notable programs include Chinbridge Institute in Hakha, Kachinland College and the Ramprat Shanan Education and Leadership Program in Myitkyina (administered by the Kachin Baptist Convention – Youth Department), the Taunggyi Youth Center, and the Tea Land School in Lashio. As might be suggested by some of these school names, nation-building along ethnic identity lines can remain a component of this second typology, mobilizing along sometimes similar and sometimes competing visions and understandings of an ethnic identity vis-a-vis the EAOs.

38Since the coup, it does not appear that any non-state higher education programs in SAC-controlled territories have been forcibly shut down by the junta, although schools in areas of active conflict may have had to shutter or relocate to safer environs, primarily EAO-controlled territories in the borderlands. This is not to suggest that major disruptions have not occurred; issues stemming from ongoing conflict such as the closure of supply routes, the higher cost of goods, and interruptions to telecoms and electricity have undoubtedly affected the operations of many schools. But for reasons likely related to the pre-coup existence of these schools and entrenched presence in the local community, the ability of school leaders to sensitively navigate relations with local authorities, and the perception by the SAC that the schooling they provide does not truly undermine SAC MoE higher education, these programs have persevered. For schools in EAO-controlled territories, the calculations are indeed simpler; so long as schools are adequately resourced and not the frequent target of junta airstrikes, which sadly is no guarantee, they remain open.389

39Moving forward, in recognizing gaps in SAC MoE higher education due in large part to the effects of CDM (Chapter 2.2), it is not unreasonable to foresee a growing demand for ethnic higher education across Myanmar and its borderlands. As part of its 2023-2026 strategy, the KECD has as its first objective an expansion of post-secondary education opportunities for Karen communities, including through vocational training and scholarship opportunities for local and international studies.390 In some reported instances, demand for ethnic higher education has increased beyond the capacity of supply; in Karenni areas, for example, five Karenni higher education programs have had to turn away prospective students due to resource limitations.391 Several new higher education institutions, however, opened or were planned to open in the region in 2023 and 2024, including the Karenni Youth Academy College, the Phansaw University, and a Karenni Medical College.392 Other ethnic education providers in the process of extending their higher education activities include the Kayan National Education Committee (KNEC), who has scheduled the opening of a Kayan National College for the 2024-2025 academic year.393

40In addition to the establishment of a Kachin State Comprehensive University in KIO territory (Fig. 64 and 65, Box 4), the territorial and administrative expansion of EAOs in armed conflict against the SAC suggests a growing space for ethnic higher education. In 2023, while the TNLA’s territory and influence were growing in Northern Shan State, Ta’ang education institutions were in the process of expanding. In January 2022, the Ta’ang Law Academy was opened in rural Namhsan Township, with the purpose of training dozens of young adults to serve as lawyers and judges in the law offices and legal departments of the TNLA.394 The Ta’ang Land Education Council is also in the process of opening a Ta’ang Land University, located in TNLA territory, in collaboration with the NUG’s Myanmar Nway-Oo University,395 and opened to those who passed the NUG’s matriculation exam (BECA, Chapter 2.3) since 2023 (or the national matriculation exam before 2021),396 as well as the Ta’ang Education Academy, with one-year Diploma in Teacher Education programs.397

Figures 64 and 65: Second graduation ceremony of the Kachin State Comprehensive University, Laiza, March 2024, attended by General Gun Maw, Vice-Chairman of the KIO and Chancellor of the KSCU,403 and logo of the KSCU.

Brief case-study 1: Kachin State

42Already impacted by the resurgence of conflict since 2011, Kachin State has been profoundly disrupted by the 2021 coup and its consequences. While the vast majority of this State’s citizens have not accepted the coup,404 the KIO, one of the Myanmar military’s most long-standing and redoubtable opponents, has been largely aligned with the NUG’s federal perspectives – including in the field of education – and made significant territorial gains against the SAC around its headquarters in Kachin State, as of early 2024.405 As described earlier in this chapter, the KIO announced a dramatic increase of its education system for 2024-2025, with the opening of 233 new schools, bringing the total to 448 schools.406

43Schools under the control of the SAC have been boycotted to a large extent after the coup, following massive participation in the CDM of Kachin State’s civil servants.407 Situations, however, seemed to differ widely and evolve rapidly according to different geographies as of 2023, as some remote locations offered few, if any, alternatives to state schooling,408 while other villages have been abandoned following conflict and internal migrations.409 In regions such as Shwegu Township in Bhamo District, the SAC controlled the towns where it had reopened government schools, while the KIO and local PDFs did not allow such openings in villages under their influence, where they have opened 30 pro-NUG schools with a total of more than 7,000 students.410 Similar situations were reported in regions of Northern Shan State under KIO influence, such as Kutkai, in June 2023.411 Circumstances may have evolved following Operation 1027, which seems to mark a greater influence of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, and notably of the TNLA, in this region. Both the KIO and TLEC are reportedly integrating what used to be government schools in their respective systems.412

44The Myitkyina Federal School, an online school aligned with the NUG (Chapter 2.3) continues to provide education to about 700 students as of 2023-2024, but in the first half of 2023, converging accounts were suggesting an increase in enrollments in government schools, as compared to previous school years. Low cost and national recognition were apparently the main draws when compared to their alternatives, although statistical manipulations, such as including enrollments in private schools following the national curriculum (see paragraph below) seemed to contribute to this increase.413 This dynamic may have been reversing in the later part of 2023, with resistance forces gaining ground all around the country, and parents pulling their children out of government schools fearing forced enrollments of high school-aged students, notably by local Lisu and claiming-to-be-Lhaovo militias, which in some instances have reportedly happened during school hours.414

45Another noticeable development, in relation to inhabitants of Kachin State trying to find educational alternatives to SAC directly-controlled education, is the growth of private education, including private schools following the national curriculum (more or less closely and often with the addition of foreign textbooks for some subjects, such as English) and being regulated by the (SAC-controlled) MoE (Chapter 4.2). Many describe the ‘mushrooming’ of these private education institutions in Kachin State’s urban centers, as available to those who can afford to pay around 50,000 to 100,000 kyats per month and per child. According to official statistics, there were 60 private schools in Kachin State in 2022-2023, as compared to 22 in 2018-2019,415 an almost three-fold increase which, if accurate, does not take into account all forms of private education (such as tuition or boarding schools, for instance).

46A comparable dynamic can be observed with Chinese schools in Kachin State, which have often seen steep increases in their enrollments (some schools more than doubling their intakes as compared to the pre-coup situation, Chapter 4.3) and increasingly attracting ‘non-Chinese’ populations. This type of education, which seems to be present in most townships of Kachin State (with some schools changing their location depending on evolving conflict situations), can be a complement to state schooling (‘supplementary’ programs, typically taught in the early morning and late afternoon), or a proper alternative to government schools, a situation which seems increasingly frequent following the coup. Chinese language skills are believed to open opportunities for work or further studies either in Taiwan or Mainland China, but most Chinese schools in Kachin State seem to be using the Taiwanese curriculum.416

47Among the alternatives, schools in KIO-controlled areas have seen a dramatic increase of at least two-fold in their enrollments,417 to more than 30,000 students in 2022-2023 (close to 18,000 of whom are in schools administered by the KIO, the rest being in private, missionary, and IDP schools).418 In Alen Bum, one of the flagship KIO high schools in Laiza, enrollments went from an average of 200 students in the final year of high school before the coup to more than 1,100 in 2023-2024.419 This quantitative increase, however, also comes with material challenges to educational improvements, as resources remain limited, while choices of curriculum, including in terms of languages, are being discussed.420 The region also offers a number of higher education options for those who have completed KIO or NUG matriculation exams, such as the Federal Law Academy, Mai Ja Yang College, Mai Ja Yang Education Institute, and Institute of Liberal Arts and Sciences, with some educational pathways to study abroad for the graduates,421 as well as the newly opened Kachin State Comprehensive University (KSCU, Box 4). The KIO-controlled region has also been increasingly directly impacted by conflict with the SAC in late 2023, with the military bombarding Laiza following the seizure of two military outposts by the Kachin armed group.422

48Another noticeable development in Kachin State is the expansion of education programs in churches, with the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) as the most influential actor. Most of these programs are not new but have gained momentum in the post-coup context. Some of these church schools are operating mainly in the early morning and sometimes change location depending on the presence of conflict. They typically follow a curriculum similar to the one used in government schools, constituting either a complement or an alternative to state schooling. These schools tend to run with support of the religious institutions as well as the collection of school fees (which may at times constitute a barrier for some families), and some of these schools provide education to as many as several hundred students. Depending on local situations, the classroom language also appears to be primarily Burmese, for reasons that include the presence of populations who are themselves not always fluent in Kachin (Jinghpaw), both among students and teachers. However, there seems to be ongoing discussions regarding the curriculum and language of instruction, with Kachin and other local languages likely to be introduced, and some of these systems also include, to different extents, foreign English-language curricula. Questions related to the recognition of this education and available pathways to higher education (including theological universities and higher education institutions in the KIO area) are also being discussed.

49Other programs, often referred to as Myu Sha Jawng (the Kachin equivalent for အမျိုးသားကျောင်း – “national school”), which may or may not be conducted in churches, focus to a large extent, as their name suggests, on Kachin identity through Kachin (Jinghpaw) mother-tongue based education and with a transition towards English curricula, Burmese being typically only a subject.423 These schools’ fees tend to be slightly higher than most other options, but the education they provide has a good reputation. Altogether, and although estimates seem difficult to produce, these Kachin churches and community schools may be providing education to as many as 27,000 students in 2023 (Table 4), with church-based education apparently in the process of expanding.424 Recent developments in terms of transmitting Kachin language and culture to the youth also include the opening of an online school that offers certificates, diplomas, and bachelor's degrees in Kachin Studies.425

50At the higher education level, in addition to the institutions in the KIO-controlled area (including the KSCU, Box 4), the Kachin Baptist Convention offers diverse programming, including in the theological colleges of Myitkyina and Kutkai, and with an expanding offer in secular subjects. Other Kachin civil society organizations, such as the Kachinland College or the Naushawng College, offer a variety of diplomas in fields such as Education, Development, Business, and Politics, as well as Kachin Studies, with an emphasis on English and Kachin as media of instruction.426

Brief case-study 2: Chin State

51Chin State and its immediate surroundings have rapidly become one of the regions most affected by the coup and its aftermath, following staunch local resistance and the constitution as early as March-April 2021 of the Chin (or Chinland) Defense Forces (CDFs, ချင်းကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့), the Chin equivalent of the PDFs, in addition to the pre-existing Chin National Army, an EAO which is the armed wing of the Chin National Front (CNF, founded in 1988). Particularly hard-hit regions include Thantlang, Mindat, and bordering areas of Sagaing and Magway Regions.427 According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, as of early 2023 about a quarter of the State’s population (more than 100,000 out of about 480,000) had been displaced (including close to 50,000 IDPs inside Chin State as well as Magway region, and at least 50,000 in refugee camps and other locations in the neighboring Indian State of Mizoram, Chapter 5.1).428 In addition to more than 350 recorded civilian deaths as of late 2023,429 close to 1,500 people have been arrested and over 2,000 houses and religious buildings destroyed. Between January and September 2023 alone, more than 300 events of armed clashes, shelling, and landmine explosions have been recorded, as well as close to 290 airstrikes by the SAC,430 occasionally killing children after landing on schools.431 According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, 191 religious, healthcare and educational facilities have been destroyed by the SAC between February 2021 and May 2024, including 49 schools and learning centers.432

52After more than three years of closure due to the pandemic and the conflicts immediately following the coup, the SAC-controlled MoE announced in June 2023 that about 300 schools were opened in all townships of Chin State except Thantlang, catering to a total of about 35,000 students.433 Other sources put this figure slightly higher for that same month: 390 schools and 49,741 students,434 and declarations by the SAC in September 2023 mention more than 580 schools.435 Beyond these uncertain, evolving, and likely biased figures, one thing appears to be certain: the 2023 enrollments in SAC-controlled MoE schools in Chin State are a very far cry from the pre-coup situation, when close to 135,000 students were attending about 1,500 schools in 2019-2020.436 The dramatic drop in the number of students sitting for the matriculation between 2019-2020 (12,373 candidates) and 2023-2024 (401 candidates, Chapter 2.2) also gives a good idea of the extent to which the SAC-controlled education has been boycotted and disrupted in Chin State.

53Chin State has indeed seen some of the strongest participation in the CDM of the entire country, with reportedly more than 70% of its 20,000 civil servants joining the movement in 2021.437 As of late 2023, in most townships the majority of the territory appears to be controlled and administered by resistance groups, while the SAC typically controls="true" (a diminishing number of) urban centers.438 In towns under the control of the military, when pro-resistance education is not available, some parents have no choice but to send their children to SAC-controlled schools, especially when they cannot afford the cost of private education.439 Although situations in which children are administratively enrolled without attending schools regularly seem to be relatively common across the State, as of mid-2023, Southwesternmost Paletwa, and possibly Tonzang, were reportedly the townships with higher enrollments in schools under the SAC (Table 5);440 the situation may be very different in Paletwa as of early 2024, with the Arakan Army (AA) fully in control of the region.441 In higher education, accelerated promotions, such as lecturers becoming assistant professors, have been used by the SAC-controlled MoE to replace CDMers in attempts to run Chin State’s six public higher institutions.442 In some other situations, in contrast, the SAC has ordered the closure of public services, including schools and hospitals, apparently in retaliation for local CDF activities.443

54Similar to what has been developing in other regions of the country that are mostly controlled by resistance groups, CDF forces have organized township-based interim public services in order to replace the junta-controlled State, although groups primarily constituted along ethnic/tribal lines and local NGOs also exist and provide education.444 In such a complex and unstable context, accurate and comprehensive statistics seem impossible to compile. In 2023 there appeared to be a total of about 750 to 900 schools aligned with the resistance, catering to between 65,000 and 75,000 students in the different townships (Table 5). These schools operate mostly at the primary level but may go up to high school in some cases. The Mindat People’s Administration , for instance, managed to reopen schools as soon as October 2021, with close to 3,000 children being taught in their village’s former government schools (as well as churches, monasteries, clinics, or makeshift shelters when the school is damaged or unsafe)445 and it seems that by 2023 almost all the former government schools of that township, similarly to other townships like Thantlang or Matupi, have been replaced by resistance schools (Table 5).446 Depending on the accuracy of these figures, it appears that resistance schools cater to significantly more students than those of the SAC-controlled MoE as of 2023 (private schools apparently totaling only a few hundred students),447 which still leaves an overall gap of at least 15% out-of-school children compared to pre-coup enrollments,448 an estimate that seems rather optimistic in regard to the overall situation.

55Given that resources are extremely limited and defense is prioritized by the NUG,449 the township education boards receive only very modest financial support from its Ministry of Education (a few thousand kyat per student and per year),450 and so education largely relies on local fundraising activities and the support of the Chin community abroad (hence their frequent qualification as ‘self-help schools’/‘ကိုယ်ထူကိုယ်ထကျောင်း’).451 The curriculum taught in these schools tends to follow the NUG’s guidelines, leading towards its parallel matriculation exam (BECA, Chapter 2.3), but the NUG gives the township education boards total freedom regarding the content of education,452 and there are thus local adaptations according to specific situations and the availability of resources,453 with schools largely relying on photocopied textbooks, from the national curriculum and other sources.454 Chin State is extremely diverse from an ethnolinguistic standpoint,455 resulting in Burmese and English being typically the main written media of instruction, while local languages tend to be used orally, as well as taught as subjects, depending on local situations and availability of teachers.456

Figure 66: A ‘self-help’ school in Tonzang Township, Chin State, in 2023.457

56In the midst of conflicts, multiple daunting challenges, and extremely limited resources, children often learn in more or less severely inadequate conditions (Fig. 66 to 68).458 Internet and phone restrictions by the SAC also constitute a challenge: the Zomi Education Working Group, for instance, was only able to reach students located outside of Chin State following a shutdown of telecommunications by the SAC in September 2021. As is true elsewhere in resistance strongholds, security remains an ever-present concern for these schools, with the SAC increasingly relying on its air supremacy since 2022 in its efforts to defeat the resistance. According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, as of September 2023, 35 people had been killed and 79 injured in 289 airstrikes in Chin State during the year (against 20 in 2022), all of whom were civilians.459 In at least 30 instances, these airstrikes have landed on schools and school compounds.460 In November 2023, eight children were killed after a bomb was dropped on a school in Matupi Township.461 In particularly sensitive townships, like Thantlang, the interim education board is sometimes compelled to avoid opening schools due to the likelihood of airstrikes.462 Reports have been showing classes and examinations held in places thought to be safe from these attacks, such as in the jungle (Fig. 68).463

57Unsurprisingly in such a context, and similarly to other regions where conflict is the most intense, being involved in either the NUG or SAC education system carries extreme significance. While individuals involved in the NUG’s interim education risk being arrested, sentenced to life imprisonment,466 or killed by the military, ‘non-CDM’ teachers and administrators are often blacklisted by the CDFs of their respective townships, which may prevent them from crossing resistance-operated checkpoints, and may result in potentially harsher measures extending to the ‘post-revolution’ era,467 in accordance with the Interim Chin National Consultative Council policy.468 In the more severe cases, warrants have been issued against non-CDM educators,469 with teachers from SAC-controlled schools having been arrested in neighboring Kale Township.470 In Mindat, parents wishing to enroll their children in the interim education system after attending a SAC school are expected to take an oath and sign a formal document, swearing that they will not enroll again in education under the SAC.471 These strong measures not only aim at upholding the spirit of the revolution and commitment of its supporters, but are also part of protection against potential informers, who might spend time amongst the resistance and thus be able to provide intelligence to the SAC.

58This overall extremely disrupted situation in Chin State has triggered multiple refugee and migration flows towards other regions of Myanmar, the neighboring Indian State of Mizoram, as well as other destinations abroad, in order to find jobs or to pursue higher education (Chapter 5.1). Although passports are increasingly difficult to obtain,472 villages and town demographics have been profoundly impacted by the ongoing conflict, with youth increasingly likely to be fighting for the resistance or seeking opportunities abroad. Massive migration flows seem to be seen as a growing challenge for the CDFs and their administrations, and some townships have announced in 2023 that official authorization will be necessary in order to cross checkpoints.473

Figure 67: A classroom of the Paletwa Township Education Board in October 2022.474

59More generally, the exceptional ethnolinguistic diversity of Chin State, which was already raising difficult questions before the coup (notably in the process of including local languages in the government schools of Chin State),475 may be translating into political challenges with much deeper implications in the context of the resistance against the SAC and establishment of inclusive Chin political institutions. Very significant developments in that regard, involving pre-coup MPs as well as CNF and CDFs representatives, include the establishment of a Chinland Council, the formation of a Chinland government, and the drafting of a Chinland Constitution, an interim document which includes the principle of being part of a Federal Democracy Union, with little details on the distribution of power, but in general alignment with the NUG’s vision. Regarding education, the Chinland government is also working towards opening a Chin National University (CNU) in order to support the training of human resources and the building of the Chin nation.476

Figure 68: A school examination in a forest to reduce the risk of military attacks or airstrikes, Kanpetlet Township, Chin State, in March 2024.477

60Consensus with all Chin resistance forces and institutions, however, remains hard to reach. This includes actors prioritizing a township-based administration of the region, while others prefer to organize themselves primarily according to ethnic (“tribal” is more often used in the intra-Chin context) logic, with organizations bearing names such as Zotung Federal Council, Lautu region administration or Mara Land Council (among others).478 Shifting alliances according to competing visions of identity and political legitimacy, including with the involvement of Chin and neighboring EAOs, has so far resulted in significant difficulties in establishing political visions and institutions inclusive of all stakeholders (notably with the constitution of a ‘Chin Brotherhood Alliance,’ which as of early 2024 does not cooperate with the Chinland Council)479 and in a few instances in open conflicts between groups opposed to the SAC.480