Protests, the CDM, and the Spring Revolution

6Opposition to this new military takeover started to form immediately after the coup. On February 2, healthcare workers in Mandalay General Hospital sparked a movement that swiftly spread to civil servants and the larger society across the country, including the private sector: the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a nationwide strike, largely popularized through Facebook, whose name, guiding principles and course of action was inspired by peaceful protests in other countries, and maybe most emblematically by the one led by Mahatma Gandhi in India in the early 1930s.71 A campaign to boycott products and services linked to the military started the next day, while the CDM was rapidly gaining momentum. The education sector quickly and massively joined the movement: from Min Ko Naing (the iconic Generation 88 student leader, who was involved in the CDM from its inception) to Yangon and Mandalay Universities of Medicine staff, the Myanmar Teachers Federation, and faculty and students at Dagon University, Yangon University of Education, and many other universities and colleges.

7On February 4 and 5, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a parallel legislative body aiming to carry out the duties of the dissolved legislature, was formed and held its first meetings online, condemning the military coup as a criminal act in violation of the Penal Code. The following days and weeks saw the development of gigantic nationwide peaceful protests. Crowds filled the streets of most cities and towns, using a large repertoire of symbols and strategies, with creations or reinterpretations both in reference to previous cycles of protest in Myanmar and to movements in other countries (Egreteau, 2022), including those involved in the ‘Milk Tea Alliance’72: 88 uprising songs, ‘Spring’ revolution, the three-finger salute, pot banging, silent strikes, the red ribbon as a symbol of the CDM, organized traffic blockades to disrupt police and military forces, Htamein (women skirt) barricades to slow down superstitious soldiers, auspicious dates for protests (22.2.2021, more than 30 years after 8.8.88), creative and colorful thematic corteges, signs, slogans, and staged protests (Fig. 17 to 23).

Figure 17: “Civil servants teachers education family - Civil Disobedience Movement” (with the MoE’s logo and motto, “Spirit, Discipline, Knowledge”, marching in Bago Region’s Taungoo Township on February 23, 2021; Citizen Journalist).73

8All these actions and symbols were frenetically shared on social media and it quickly became evident that staying away from politics was hardly an option, with implicit or explicit social punishment for those perceived as close to the military or as trying to stay on the fence, not only inside the country but also abroad.74 After a decade of reform, the school or university-aged ‘Gen Z,’ taking explicit inspiration from the elder 88 Generation, had no intention to experiment with dictatorship and massively joined the protests.

9The SAC crackdown on acts of protest soon became ruthless: curfews and internet blackouts, the imposition of martial law, the shutting down of independent media, the targeted arrest of identified activists or personalities who publicly took the side of the revolution, the utilization of armed violent mobs to attack protesters, and the release of criminals to destabilize society and make room in jails for detained political prisoners. The use of force against protesters quickly escalated, with the cold killing of 19-year-old Grade 11 student Ma Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing during a protest in Nay Pyi Taw on February 9 marking the beginning of fatal bloodshed.

Figure 18: Screenshot from one of Min Ko Naing’s viral videos during the protests in February 2021

Figure 19: Dr. Tayzar San leading an anti-junta protest in Mandalay on April 10, 2021 (Citizen Journalist).75

10Arguably to an even greater extent than in previous uprisings, the education sector has been one of the central components of the opposition to the 2021 military coup. By March 2021, according to the Myanmar Teacher Federation, about 75% of the 450,000 total Ministry of Education staff had joined the CDM,76 with scores of teachers showing up to the protests in their white and green uniforms (Fig. 17, 20, 22, and 23). Many street protests and online messages were led and staged by students, who called for the public to stay away from the military’s “slave education system” (စစ်ကျွန်ပညာရေးစနစ်, Fig. 22 and 23),77 an expression directly borrowed from the 1920’s National Schools movement when Burmese nationalist movements were pitted against British colonization (Chapter 1.2).78

Figures 20 and 21: Two of the countless graphic creations shared on social media in 2021. “Do not go to the office, struggle free” was used as the main slogan of the CDM,79 and protesting ပစ်တိုင်းထောင်, a traditional tumbler toy for children in Myanmar, which became a symbol of the protester’s resilience.80

11Throughout that March and April, crackdowns became increasingly violent, with the death toll starting to dramatically increase after three notable massacres in North Okkalapa, Hlaing Thayar, and on Myanmar Armed Forces Day.81 Many CDMers and activists, including teachers, professors, student union members, doctors, and health workers, were charged under article 505a of the Penal Code, which was amended after the coup as part of a legal arsenal against opponents, and sentenced to harsh prison sentences. By March 18, more than 770 students had been arrested.82

12Facing this increasingly bloody crackdown, the agenda of anti-coup forces rapidly evolved, from a return to the 2020 election results towards a much deeper redesign of Myanmar’s political foundation, with the goal of finally and truly implementing the federal nature of the State created in 1947. This shift can be explained by several factors. First, the renewed impetus to abolish the 2008 Constitution, which grants an enormous amount of power to the military. Second, the revolutionary spirit of the protests, with an often progressive-leaning youth eager to address longstanding inequalities in Myanmar society, and with the direct experience of deadly violence by the army in the streets of the main cities prompting a shift of perceptions regarding the ethnic minorities’ relations with the State (most emblematically the Rohingya issue).83 And importantly, third, the political and military imperative for civilians to join forces with as many Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) as possible, as peaceful protests and slogans would likely not be enough to overthrow the heavily armed SAC.

13On March 8, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was founded as an alliance between anti-junta forces with the aim to “topple the military dictatorship and to build a Federal Democratic Union.” Membership included the CRPH, several EAOs, and local consultative councils. The Karen National Union (KNU), previously a ceasefire signatory, opposed the coup in a statement as soon as February 2, and had several skirmishes with the army throughout March followed by a major clash on March 27, on Armed Forces Day (which also saw the killing of a hundred anti-coup protesters). Two days earlier, on March 25, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) had launched an attack on a military base close to its headquarters. Clashes also started in Sagaing Region’s Kale town on March 28, one of the first occurrences of protestors not directly linked to an existing EAO military confronting the Myanmar armed forces.

14On March 31, the CRPH declared the 2008 Constitution void and released a Federal Democracy Charter as a basis for a future federal constitution. And on April 16, it formed the National Unity Government (NUG) as a parallel government, seen as the legitimate government of the country by those opposed to the SAC and composed of representatives from the NLD, ethnic organizations, and individuals from civil society.84 The NUG has since been declared a ‘terrorist’ organization by the SAC following the announcement of the creation of its armed wing on May 5: the People Defence Forces (PDFs), local resistance groups aligned with its Ministry of Defense. As the conflict escalated in several regions, by the end of May 2021 the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) confirmed 840 deaths and more than 4,400 arrests.

15Among other governmental functions, such as Health, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, or Labour, the NUG created a Ministry of Education, in order to coordinate and build a national framework for educational activities in regions under the control of the PDFs or allied EAOs, as well as online (Chapter 2.3). In September 2021 the NUG MoE released a (draft) Federal Democracy Education Policy, whose name and content demonstrate a willingness to work closely with the ‘ethnic’ education departments of the EAOs and other Ethnic Basic Education Providers (EBEPs, Chapter 3) with an inclusive approach aiming at a federal future.85 Ties between pro-revolution forces and allied EAOs were indeed strengthening in many ways on the ground: similar to what happened in 1988, many protesters from the center of the country had been fleeing towards border regions controlled by EAOs allied with the NUG, such as the KNU and the KIO, in order to avoid being arrested by the junta, sometimes to receive military training before joining the struggle, to enroll in local education systems as students or as teachers, or to try their luck across the borders.

Figures 22 and 23: Cartoons widely shared on social media in 2021 (the secons one is drawn by cartoonist JC), calling to boycott the “military’s slave education,” in reference to the 1920s student protests.86

Protracted conflict, blood, fire, and economic turmoil

16As of early 2024, more than three years after the coup, the impact of the civil war between the junta and the armed resistance groups on Myanmar society in general and education in particular is heavily felt, with the final outcome of the conflict still unclear despite a clear shift of momentum in favor of the resistance. Conflict-linked figures and mapping are often incomplete, inconsistent, and at times seemingly biased, but by March 2024 the AAPP had documented the cases of more than 4,650 people killed and 26,000 arrested by the junta. According to the NUG, by February 2024 close to 30,000 SAC soldiers had been killed and more than 15,000 soldiers and police officers had defected, including hundreds joining the resistance.87 While comprehensive and neutral figures are elusive, the overall number of deaths from all sides is indeed likely to be in the several tens of thousands, including at least 10,000 civilians (Gascon, 2024).

17Many of the historical and newly formed EAOs, as well as PDFs and other resistance forces, have indeed been leading fierce resistance against the SAC. They have relied on their knowledge of local terrain and have used weapons smuggled through national borders, as well as firearms traditionally used for hunting and homemade weapons, such as drones loaded with explosives, DIY rocket launchers, and other improvised explosive devices.88 Serious incidents have been occurring with high frequency across the country (Map 2), with evolving locations and nature, but the regions most impacted by conflict include Southern Sagaing/Northern Magway, Chin State, Kayah (Karenni) State, Kayin (Karen) State, Mon State, Tanintharyi, Rakhine State as well as Northern Shan State and some townships of Kachin State.

18Increasingly the SAC, in struggling to keep up with these multiple guerilla fronts, has relied on its air supremacy, with a growing number of airstrikes on resistance basecamps and villages.89 Exact figures tend to vary across sources, but the dramatic increase year after year since the coup is patent. According to the think-tank Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, there were 1,228 confirmed airstrike occurrences in 2023, against 339 in 2022 and 85 in 2021. These attacks are also increasingly deadly (with 63, 260, and 613 civilians respectively killed in 2021, 2022, and 2023) and they have repeatedly landed on civilian buildings, such as religious edifices, hospitals, and schools (with 137, 28, and 76 such occurrences respectively between February 2021 and December 2023).90 Schools in resistance strongholds have indeed repeatedly been hit, or even directly attacked, by the SAC and allied militias (Chapters 2.3 and 3). Other radical and widespread counter-insurgency tactics include arson attacks: as of December 31, 2023 more than 78,700 civilian houses have been torched by the SAC and its affiliated groups, with clear epicenters of this destruction in Sagaing and Magway Regions as well as Chin State91 (Maps 2 and 3).

19These conflicts also continue to yield a surge in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs), who often find themselves in extremely precarious situations in many regards, including when it comes to access to education. Having experienced multiple protracted conflicts since its independence, Myanmar was no stranger to displaced populations before the coup, with an estimated 328,000 IDPs in 2020, but the post-coup estimates are incomparably higher – more than 3 million by April 2024 – with the northwest of the country totaling about 1.4 million (more than 1.1 million for Sagaing Region alone), as of March 2024.92 As of May 2023, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were more than 1,120,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar, with close to a 90,000 post-coup increase,93 among sharply increasing international migratory flows (Chapter 5).

20The military crackdown on the resistance has also meant massive arrests of activists and individuals who refused to go back to work under the SAC: as of March 2024, according to the AAPP, more than 20,000 remained detained (out of more than 26,200 arrested). These include lengthy prison sentences levied against educators working with the resistance, or in some cases against their family members when security forces do not manage to catch the fugitives.94 More than 1,000 political prisoners have died in custody, where torture is widespread.95 More than 150 have been sentenced to death,96 including students,97 and four have already been executed in July 2022, including Ko Jimmy, a prominent 88 Generation student leader, and Phyo Zayar Thaw, a hip-hop singer, activist during the 2007 protests, and later NLD representative in the lower house of the Parliament; both were active against the 2021 coup and charged under the counterterrorism law.98

21Such a political situation takes a heavy toll on the economy and impacts in many ways all sectors of society, including education. In June 2023 the World Bank predicted that it would take at least until 2027 or 2028 for Myanmar to regain the 18 points contraction of its GDP lost to Covid and the coup, and that the political crisis may well leave the economy “permanently scarred.”99 Economists associated with the former NLD government still find this bleak prediction too rosy, although 2023 showed some fragile signs of economic stabilization compared to the previous years in terms of inflation (14% in 2022-2023 against 18% in 2021-2022) and GDP (an increase of about three points in 2022). According to a UNDP report, by the end of 2023, 49.7% of the population was living below the national poverty line, as compared to 24.8% in 2017 (a return to the situation before the decade of reforms preceding the coup), with a dramatically shrinking middle class.100

22Huge sections of society remain deeply impacted by the conflict itself and the multiple consequences of the overall political situation on the economy, including the departure of many foreign companies and the ‘brain drain’ of educated individuals seeking a better future outside the country (Chapter 5). About 40% of the total work-age population is out of work, mismatches between education and careers are sharply increasing,101 and 48% of farming households worry about not having enough food to eat.102 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, food insecurity has increased by 15% in 2023 as compared to 2022, concerning nearly 28% of the total population (15.2 million), which is an almost five times increase as compared to pre-coup estimates.103 The regions directly affected by conflict and the poorest populations are unsurprisingly those most severely impacted by economic hardship.

Map 2: Geographic locations of more than 30,600 violent events that occurred between February 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024 across 318 townships, adapted from IISS/ACLED.104

Overall impact on education

23Armed conflict and economic turmoil have impacted many sectors of society. The public health sector, for instance, is in profound disarray, with decreasing budget and availability of doctors, and increasing corruption.105 But arguably to an even greater extent than health (which did play a critical and early role in the opposition to the coup), education is much more than a collateral victim of the coup and subsequent conflict. As shown in the previous chapter and sections, Myanmar has a long history of highly politicized education, and the sector has always been at the forefront of political struggles, with both the State and alternative or rebellious movements using education to convey their divergent or antagonist conceptions of identity and political legitimacy.

24In the weeks preceding the coup, the army and its proxy party antagonized teachers, who made up most of the polling station workers, accusing them of helping the National League for Democracy commit fraud in the 2020 General Elections.106 In February 2021, education was one of the first sectors to massify participants to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and the post-coup situation has seen unprecedented politicization – and often criminalization – of education, with the association or non-association with one or another education system being liable to have multiple and dramatic consequences on teachers’ and students’ lives.

25The CDM and the desire to boycott military-controlled education (Chapter 2.2) have led to multiple phenomena, including enrolling in pro-revolution education (Chapter 2.3), alternative non-state education providers (Chapters 3 and 4), as well as migration (Chapter 5), with an extremely significant reduction in the share of (military-controlled) state education in total. However, this situation has also led to overall drop-outs and reduced access to education. According to a survey by the World Bank in 2023, the population aged 6-22 enrolled in education institutions across the country has decreased from 69.2 to 56.8% between 2017 and 2023, with only 22% of eligible students at the high school level enrolled in 2023, and 28% of the 6-17-year-olds being out of school (against 21% in 2017). According to this survey, the drop is very significant at all levels of schooling, but with increasing proportions from primary to high school (Graph 1). This survey also confirms multiple disparities in access between different groups, with widening gaps between the richest and the poorest, between urban and rural populations, between genders,107 and of course between regions experiencing intense conflicts and the rest of the country.108

26Education has been most directly impacted by the conflict in many ways. According to data from the Myanmar Teachers Federation, 125,900 basic education teachers and 19,500 higher education staff (31% and 69% of the total workforce of state institutions, respectively) were suspended in early May 2021 for joining the CDM.109 According to the AAPP, by March 2024 more than 500 staff from the Ministry of Education had been arrested, 570 children were killed and 713 were arrested,110 160 university students had died, and more than 1,000 had been arrested.111 Marginally, these deaths include teachers killed after receiving letters warning them to stop working for SAC-controlled institutions, especially in May-June 2021, to deter students and teachers from returning to school, as widely reported in media under the control of the military.112 But schools associated with the resistance have by far been the main targets of sustained violence in many forms (Chapters 2.3 and 3).113 Between February 2021 and March 2022 alone, the UN documented 260 attacks on schools and education personnel and 320 cases of schools being used by armed groups.114 According to NUG data, by early 2024 over 570 children had been killed by the military since the coup, with tragic and deadly attacks on schools continuing into the year.115

Graph 1: Estimated enrollment rates (in any form of education) by level of schooling in 2017 and 2023, according to a 2023 survey conducted by the World Bank.116

27The compounded effects of the economic crisis, job loss, poverty, political polarization, and a climate of hatred and violence surrounding education have taken a heavy toll on the realm of childhood and schooling: among multiple violations of children's rights,117 child labor, often with salaries amounting to a fraction of an adult’s, is on the rise,118 as is child trafficking and various health problems. The mental health of both teachers and children is a major concern, including but not limited to those with a direct experience of violence and conflict.119 This is hardly surprising in a situation where even the future is stained with resentment and anger, and reconciliation may seem like a distant prospect, as shown in some debates among the resistance. These debates have occurred around not only on how to compensate those who lost everything by joining the CDM, but also on if/how those who have continued to work with the SAC should be punished once the revolution prevails.120

A dramatic drop in enrollment

29In the wake of the major disruptions and school closures caused by the pandemic, the coup and the subsequent CDM movement have had a tremendous impact on the public education system in quantitative terms. As stated earlier, around 75% of the Ministry of Education staff had initially joined the CDM, and by May 2021, respectively about 30% of basic education teachers and 60% of higher education staff had been sacked for not returning to work.121

30Students and parents also massively boycotted the military’s ‘slave education system,’ primarily as a political statement of opposition to the coup. In addition to concerns about Covid-19 threat in 2021,122 other reasons for staying away from public schools include not wanting to be perceived as a supporter of the military by the rest of society, as well as avoiding the different forms of violence and risks surrounding these institutions following the coup, including junta forces being posted in schools or using them as barracks (a move widely condemned by UN agencies and NGOs as a “serious violation of children’s rights”)123 in addition to attacks against these symbolic targets by various anti-junta armed-groups particularly in 2021.124

31In 2020-2021, still in the midst of the pandemic and the immediate consequences of the coup, only 2.3 million students were enrolled in basic education institutions, as compared to 9.2 million in 2019-2020 (Fig. 24). These enrollments significantly increased the following year, as Covid restrictions were lifted and the SAC began to pressure teachers and parents to return to school. But despite the two-year interruption due to Covid and the coup, which would normally have caused a post-crisis spike in enrollments, only a little more than half of the basic education student population was re-enrolled in 2021-2022, with 5.3 million students.125 These school enrollment figures are of extreme political significance, largely perceived as a quantified measure of the CDM’s strength, and are thus susceptible, if not likely, to be manipulated or ‘rounded up’ in the directions supporting the belligerents’ political aims. Nonetheless, according to statistics provided by the SAC itself, the following years have seen only limited growth in enrollments: 5.6 million in 2022-2023 and 5.8 million in 2023-2024 (later sources for that year mention 6.7 million).126 Early SAC MoE data for 2024-2025, which may slightly increase later on and seem to be inclusive of monastic and private schools following the national curriculum, provide the figure of close to 6.4 million students.127

Figure 24: A sarcastic comment on Twitter, on June 1, 2021, as the SAC was trying to get students back to school.

32This decrease is particularly significant at the high school level. It has been widely reported in the media that in March 2023, according to official statistics, only about 161,850 students took the matriculation exam, a number considerably lower than the previous year (281,751), and a staggering drop of about 80% compared to pre-Covid figures (850,890 in 2018-2019 and 910,273 in 2019-2020).128 While the transition to the new 12-year basic education system, involving the addition of a high-school grade, may contribute to explaining the low number of candidates for this particular 2022-2023 cohort,129 the following year’s figures tell a similar story, with even lower numbers (Graph 2 and Table 3).

Graph 2: Number of students sitting for the matriculation exam between 2019 and 2024.130

33According to the figures provided by the SAC, only 128,801 students were registered for the matriculation exam in 2023-2024,131 a spectacular 85.9% overall decrease as compared to 2019-2020. Armed conflict has had a major impact on the matriculation exam, with zero students sitting the exam in war-torn Karenni State.132 In Rakhine State, examination centers did not open in areas under the control of the Arakan Army (AA) and anecdotal evidence reveals a general reluctance to sit the exam in 2024 due to military tensions; a reluctance that was certainly not unfounded as on the first day of the matriculation exam, an artillery shell detonated near an examination center in Sittwe Township ended up injuring two exam-takers.133 Given the disruptions to the 2024 matriculation exam, the SAC-controlled MoE announced in late March a second round of testing to occur at 17 exam centers across the country in April,134 but in practice this option seems to have been chosen by extremely low numbers of students.135

34The drop is even sharper when it comes to higher education and enrollment in public universities. Of the 109,851 students who passed the matriculation exam in 2023, a mere 24,243 (22%) went on to enroll in university.136 This marks a dramatic drop (of 75.8%) from the 2022 new-student enrollment of about 100,000, which was itself a three-fold decrease from a figure of around 300,000 pre-coup.137 This low enrollment of new university students contributes to an overall striking diminution in the number of students attending higher education under the SAC-controlled MoE. Prior to the coup, the total student population in public universities was slightly above one million and had dropped by 70% to slightly above 300,000 in 2022-2023. Yet in 2023-2024, according to data provided by Min Aung Hlaing himself in a speech marking the three years of the SAC creation, a total of only about 113,000 students were enrolled in public universities, and of these less than 87,000 remained enrolled for the duration of the academic year.138 In other words, not only was enrollment barely a third of what it had been one year prior, but the overall public university student population had dropped by about twelve-fold as compared to pre-coup enrollments. The subsequent activation of the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, on February 10, 2024 is likely to have contributed to further emptying universities, with students increasingly considering migration abroad or joining the ranks of resistance armed-groups, in order to avoid forced conscription (Fig. 25).139

35Despite this dramatic decrease, which includes both sheer drop-outs and enrollments in alternatives to state education, it appears that as of 2023 the SAC-controlled MoE remained the main provider of (basic) education in the country. The World Bank estimated in a May 2023 report that state schooling still represented 92% of the total, against 95% in 2017,140 a figure which may underestimate the share of non-state education providers, amidst dramatically increasing numbers of IDPs, and which is likely to have diminished afterward, as the SAC was starting losing ground at a more rapid pace since late 2023.

36According to this same report and predictably, the poorest and the more rural populations – depending of course on various conflict situations across different geographies – tend to rely more on state education. The share of state education is higher at the lower education levels (primary school). In contrast, the share of non-state education has increased more markedly after the coup for urban populations, the richest quintiles of the population, and at the higher levels of education (high school and tertiary education).

37As time passed after the coup, some families with limited to non-existent access to alternative education, for reasons that include lack of financial resources and limited access to the internet, have faced hard choices when it comes to the education of their children, with the years of interruption due to Covid and the coup adding up (Chiu, 2024; Fig. 26). Often under pressure and threats from local SAC administration, many parents who were determined to boycott the military-controlled education system after the coup had no option but to re-enroll their children in state institutions in 2022 and 2023 (this trend may have changed later on, with the SAC overall losing ground on the battlefields, especially since October 2023).141

38Some of the active members of resistance education institutions, as much as they want to see the revolution prevail, have avoided blaming parents who had no other option,143 publicly or privately stating that education is first and foremost a human right and that criminalizing any form of education would be detrimental to the country’s future as a whole, as the political crisis continues. Various student unions seem to have different perspectives, policies, and practices on the matter, according to evolving circumstances, with both Telegram channels aimed at ‘naming-and-shaming’ those who return to military-controlled universities and institutions/individuals avoiding condemning those who chose to pursue a military-controlled education, understanding that options have been sometimes extremely limited for these students.144

Figure 25: Cartoonist Michi Emma, on different fates for university-age youth in Myanmar compared to other countries, in reaction to the activation of the People’s Military Service Law in February 2024.145

Figure 26: Cartoonist JMP describing (in May 2022) the painful choice for some of the poorest populations between (left) becoming a waiter, beggar, garbage collector, or selling small items at the crossroads, and (right) “military slave education.”146

Critical thinking… under the boot?

39At face value, some of the declarations by the SAC and its MoE seem to suggest much continuity with the reforms that were underway under the previous civilian government. Officially, education accounts for almost 9.48% of the total 2023-24 government budget, which is slightly above pre-coup figures. In reality, however, the obvious increase of military expenses since 2021, in addition to reports of SAC-controlled schools lacking both textbooks and teachers,147 suggests a copious dose of skepticism regarding this figure,148 let alone the impact of a galloping inflation on what can be implemented with this budget.

40Formally, the SAC has been carrying on with reforms started under the Thein Sein and NLD governments, including the release of the second (2021-2030) National Education Strategic Plan (with a noted emphasis on ICT in education) and the implementation of the final stages of transitioning to the new curriculum, which was drafted with the support of JICA, ADB and the World Bank under previous governments. During a Myanmar National Education Conference in May 2023, General Min Aung Hlaing (in company with three other senior generals), stated in an opening speech rich with English language concepts enunciated after their Burmese translation that “(...) education enhances personal skills, critical thinking, problem-solving, creativity, evaluation, analytical skills, collaboration, adaptability, social skills, emotional intelligence, justice, ethical behavior, and leadership for all.”149 In September 2023, during a seminar on literacy of rural and ethnic minority populations, the SAC Vice Chairman General Soe Win explicitly blamed “illiteracy” (စာမတတ်ခြင်း) for the unrest in some regions following the coup,150 and Minister of Education Dr. Nyunt Pe – who replaced Dr. Myo Thein Gyi following his arrest during the coup – similarly asked the faculty members to “eliminate rote memorization” (အလွတ်ကျက်မှတ်သည့်စနစ်ကို ပပျောက်စေရန်) when visiting the University of East Yangon.151

41This type of box-ticking, flashing, and manipulation of consensual ideas, expressions, and buzzwords (not uncommon, to say the least, in the realm of education), contrasts with the military’s playbook, relying on decades of know-how and aimed at bringing the rebellious education sector to heel. The reforms, dictated by the magnitude of the crisis and underpinned by the military’s cardinal values, are hardly compatible with any kind of ‘critical thinking.’ As noted by long-time observer of Myanmar’s military Mary Callahan, the handling of the education sector following the coup seems to have many similarities with what was implemented following the 1962 and 1988 coups, with control of society as an absolute priority and a negative impact on the quality of education by any standards.152

42The first priority for the SAC, after reopening schools and pressuring teachers and parents to return, has been to hire new teachers in order to replace the 125,900 basic education and 19,500 higher education teachers sacked for participating in the CDM beyond May 2021. In this regard, it must be noted that teachers were already lacking before the coup (although claims regarding student-teacher ratio were often disputed, most likely due to major geographical disparities).153 Before the coup, the 21 Education Colleges and two Education Universities trained about 10,000 teachers a year. While precise data is difficult to gather, it seems clear that the SAC’s answer to this large-scale human resource problem,154 beyond a small increase in the teachers’ salaries,155 has been as simple as unsurprising: promote those who did not participate in the CDM, significantly lower job requirements, and hire on the basis of loyalty to the military and its proxy political party.

43Courses for the training of primary school teachers in Education Colleges have doubled their yearly intake, while their length has been halved.156 Multiple testimonies report that new hires are often appointed as daily-wage teachers, and are often USDP supporters with comparatively low education levels who have not undergone the normal training and examination to become a teacher.157 In addition to a military ideology that rewards obedience, the deep contradiction between the transition to a new curriculum which is much more advanced than the previous, on the one hand, and a steep drop in the average level of training of teachers,158 on the other, is predictably leading to a reversion towards the old practice of rote-learning.159

44The choice of such a large number of teachers to carry on with CDM and thus stay away from state education may explain why the SAC does not seem to have conducted a survey among civil servants, similar to the infamous “33 questions” following the 1988 uprising (Chapter 1.5), in order to identify potential troublemakers. However, those who chose to return to work in 2021 were under tight scrutiny, sometimes not receiving their salaries for several months.160 The SAC chairman repeatedly stated, in the media and when visiting education institutions, that according to article 26 of the 2008 Constitution, teachers, like other civil servants, must “stay away from party politics” (ပါတီနိုင်ငံရေးကင်းရှင်းရမည်),161 and that as civil servants they should carry-out the “country’s duty” rather than being involved in the “country’s politics” (နိုင်ငံရေးထက် နိုင်ငံ့အရေးကိုသာ ဆောင်ရွက်ကြရမည်).162

45Under the SAC, there seems to be a renewed emphasis on the civil servant’s oath (နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းသစ္စာအဓိဌာန်),163 which very much aligns with the military regime’s stated objectives and specifies that civil servants should abstain from party politics (Fig. 27). Newly recruited teachers have been often asked by their superiors to write a pledge of allegiance stating that they will not be involved in any political activities (Box 1). Similarly, the training at Phaung Gyi and Zee Pin Gyi’s Institutes of Civil Service, largely known for being training camps to instill military discipline and propaganda among civil servants after 1988,164 and which include basic military training, have reportedly been lengthened severalfold, with increasing pressure for civil servants to attend training for promotion and other career benefits.165 Some sources even suggest that civil servants, including health and education staff, could be used as auxiliary forces, in order to strengthen the armed forces which have been depleted by the armed conflict,166 a prospect that has become increasingly clear in late 2023; for example, the SAC losing ground to the various resistance forces has led to the forced enrollment of newly graduated medical students as military reservists.167 Early 2024, university teachers and students were increasingly sent to military training,168 and the reintroduction of the long-standing 2010 People’s Military Service Law led to a swift collection of conscription-related data on government staff, raising unease within the civil service.169

Figure 27: The civil servants oath, in the Civil Servant code of conduct (2022).170

Box 1: Transcript of a pledge of allegiance asked to a newly hired teacher in Magway Region in September 2022.171

46The rewarding of compliance also concerns high school and university students. As shown in Table 3, before the coup the typical national average success rate for matriculation exam was slightly above 30% (31.4% in 2018-19; 32% in 2019-20) with some substantial variations across States and Regions. In parallel to the drop in the number of candidates sitting the exam as described in the previous section, the exam success rate has dramatically increased to 46.88% in 2021-22 and to 67.87% in 2022-23. Although one needs to keep in mind that 2022-23 was an unusual year due to the transition between two systems, the political will to reward those enrolled in state education and to work towards compensating – quantitatively speaking – the absence of CDM students is patent. 2022-23 exams were reportedly unusually easy, with cases of questions being given in advance to the students, a common practice under previous military regimes.172 While not as high as during the transitional year, the following 2023‑24 exam overall success rate, at 57.9%, confirms the trend.173 This post-coup sacrifice of quality for quantity is also clear in university entrance requirements: a shift towards lowering the admission standards for the country’s five medical universities has resulted in a soaring number of candidates and in some instances crowded classrooms.174 In some cases, in 2022 the number of first-year medical students became comparable to pre-coup figures, yet the overall number of medical students has fallen significantly, from more than 10,000 in 2019-2020 to less than 7,000 in 2022-2023.175

47Other notable post-coup higher education reforms aim at suppressing the organizational, decisional, and academic autonomy that the universities progressively gained during the period of transition, with a return to the previous system where universities were under the direct control of different line ministries. The National Education Policy Commission (NEPC) has been abolished, and a National Curricula Committee (NCC) has been established with the main duty to supervise university curricula. Faculty who are still in university positions (because they did not participate, or did not remain, in the CDM) reported being under increased scrutiny and have thus been very careful, both in the content of their teaching and in informal conversations with colleagues and students (Proserpio and Fiori, 2022). This represents a clear shrinking in freedom of expression and any form of ‘critical thinking,’ and can hardly be perceived as a positive development in terms of the quality of the education system.

Figure 28: Pro-military pamphlets being handed out to students as they are taking the matriculation exam in Nay Pyi Taw in March 2023.176

Figure 29: “You’re late at school. Go sweep the trash and when you’re finished come to report the latest info.”

Reverting to a narrow conception of national identity?

48As described in Chapter 1, the 2011-2020 period witnessed limited but significant shifts towards a more inclusive state education system, notably with the beginning of a (re)introduction of ethnic minority languages and cultures in government schools. Despite some frustrations and challenges, this shift was liable to have multiple benefits, not only in terms of improving access to education for ethnic minorities, but also in terms of preserving the country’s cultural heritage and – perhaps even more importantly – in terms of contributing to ‘national reconciliation’ through some extent of curricular decentralization (Salem-Gervais and Raynaud, 2020).

49For historical reasons, the military’s conception of the nation has been primarily centered on the Bamar-Buddhist perspective, with a national historical narrative prioritizing the great warrior ‘unifier’ Burmese kings, the struggle against the British colonialists, and the military’s duty to keep the independent nation-state together in face of internal and external enemies. With the SAC, some of the core notions associated with this conception of the Myanmar nation have returned front and center in the political scene and state-controlled media: “Union spirit” (ပြည်ထောင်စုစိတ်ဓာတ်), “patriotism” (မျိုးချစ်စိတ် / နိုင်ငံချစ်စိတ်), “unity of the ethnic nationalities/national races” (တိုင်းရင်းသားစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ရေး), and even at times “protecting/ defending the race/religion” (အမျိုးစောင့်),178 a concept commonly used by Buddhist and nationalist hardliners.

50In the realm of education, the old military motto stating that the “national discipline starts with the school” (အမျိုးသားစည်းကမ်းအစ စာသင်ကျောင်းက) resurfaces,179 and a greater emphasis on these values, as well as on concepts such as “polite/well-bred” (ယဥ်ကျေးလိမ္မာ), “a good person / role-model” (လူတော်လူကောင်း), and “discipline” (စည်းကမ်း), are evident. This is for instance clear in the transcription in state-controlled media of a visit of Dr. Nyunt Pe, Minister of Education, to Myitkyina’s Education College in April 2022:

“(...) Then, the Union Minister met with the Principal, teachers, and staff of the Education Degree College in that school hall [and declared:] ‘as teachers of the Education Degree College, all the trainee-teachers are not only to be trained in order to be well-versed in their subjects, but also to be disciplined (စည်းကမ်းရှိ), to have a sense of nationalism (နိုင်ငံချစ်စိတ်ရှိ) and patriotism (မျိုးချစ်စိတ်ရှိ), to be polite and well-bred (ယဥ်ကျေးလိမ္မာ), to cherish Myanmar culture (မြန်မာ့ယဥ်ကျေးမှုကို မြတ်နိုးတန်ဖိုးထား), and to respect and value parents and teachers (မိဘ၊ဆရာများအပေါ် ရိုသေလေးစားတန်ဖိုးထား). Only then, the teachers graduated by the Education Degree Colleges will be able to nurture the students who are disciplined (စည်းကမ်းရှိ), polite (ယဥ်ကျေးလိမ္မာ), and full of nationalism and patriotism (နိုင်ငံချစ်စိတ် မျိုးချစ်စိတ် ပြည့်ဝသော) on whom the country can rely (...).’”180

51Despite a surface layer of ‘unity in diversity’ rhetoric, this emphasis on hierarchy, obedience, and national unity seems diametrically opposed to the federal perspectives to which the NUG has committed (Chapter 2.3), and constitutes a significant departure from the decentralization dynamic which was gradually taking life under previous governments.

52One revealing illustration of these post-coup developments in terms of identity in the realm of education is the October 2022 amendment of the 2014-2015 National Education Law (Fig. 30).181 In addition to the suppression of articles allowing the formation of teachers’ and students’ unions,182 this amendment nullifies article 49(f), which had granted State/Region governments the freedom to administer educational matters. Furthermore, in terms of language-in-education policy, the 2022 amendment explicitly suppresses the possibility of using ethnic minority languages as “classroom languages” through the amendment of article 43(b), from:

“If there is a need, an ethnic language can be used alongside Myanmar as a classroom language at the basic education level.”

53to:

“Myanmar language shall be used as the classroom language at the basic education level.”183

54Similarly, the amendment of article 44 unambiguously restricts the teaching of ethnic minority languages as subjects to the primary level (Grades 1-5), from:

“In Divisions or States, teaching of ethnic languages and literature can be implemented by Division or State governments, starting at the primary level and gradually expanding (to higher grades).”

55to:

“Learning ethnic literature and languages in Regions and States shall be undertaken at the basic education primary level under the relevant Region or State government.”184

56The actual consequences and reach of these reforms are contingent upon the overall military and political trajectory of the country, as attendance in public schools has been markedly decreasing, and as many non-state ethnic education systems are far from being on any kind of speaking terms with the military-controlled MoE, and in general alignment with the NUG’s federal vision of education. But in theory, these legislative steps back towards a more centralized and monolingual conception of education administration and language-in-education policy potentially have two sets of consequences: limiting the use of ethnic minority languages and cultures in government schools themselves, and hindering the possibilities of recognition and bridging between the MoE and non-state ethnic education systems, which typically use their respective languages to a wider extent (Chapter 3).185

57Interestingly, despite these legal moves towards a more centralized and monolithic conception of education, the SAC has been communicating heartily regarding the training of new batches of teaching assistants in charge of ethnic minority languages in the different States and Regions in late 2022 and early 2023.186 This can be interpreted as an attempt to kill two birds with one stone. First, the ethnic language teaching assistants who did not participate in the CDM or who have been hired after the coup can be perceived as a reserve of a rather docile workforce, constituted of individuals in often precarious positions who would be grateful for a position or a substantial promotion in the process of ‘filling the gaps’ left by CDMers.187 Reports on their training in state-controlled media systematically mention the same key military concepts of “Union Spirit” (ပြည်ထောင်စုစိတ်ဓာတ်), “Unity of the ethnic nationalities” (တိုင်းရင်းသားစည်းလုံး ညီညွတ်ရေး), “patriotism” (မျိုးချစ်စိတ် / နိုင်ငံချစ်စိတ်), or the necessity for them to abide by the code of conduct of civil servants (နိုင်ငံဝန်ထမ်းကျင့်ဝတ်, see earlier).188 Second, not suppressing these classes altogether and being able to display these teaching assistants in state media, often in their ethnic costumes (Fig. 31), is more than likely to have political objectives. As the SAC repeatedly announced in 2022 and 2023 that it was planning to organize elections in the future – for which it would need a credible number of ethnic parties to register – displaying these ethnic language classes in government schools is likely to be considered of importance, politically and symbolically. While on the ground, reports from different regions have been suggesting that these teachings were at best very unsystematic,189 ethnic language classes seemed to also constitute a political card for the SAC, which appeared to be granting more leeway in that regard to ethnic groups and organizations not opposing the coup (Chapter 3).

58Other shifts in relation to identity in SAC-controlled state education include closer relations with China, Russia, Japan, and India to compensate for the sharp deterioration of relations with Western countries. This includes Russian language classes during the training for civil servants,190 cooperation between the Yangon University of Medicine 2 and Japan’s Niigata University,191 as well as various education programs, notably through the Naypyitaw State Academy, touted as a potential international hub of ‘academic excellence,’192 including an increasing number of ‘Phauk Phaw’ (ပေါက်ဖော်, “siblings”) scholarships for Myanmar students (800 for 2022-2023), as part of a Chinese program on poverty alleviation which started prior to the coup.193

Figure 30: Publication in state-controlled media of the October 2022 amendment to the National Education Law.

Figure 31: Teaching Assistants in their ethnic costumes during training in Ayeyarwady Region, featured on MRTV in November 2022.194

Towards a ‘Federal’ education system

60The NUG’s Ministry of Education was created on the day the parallel government was born, April 16, 2021. Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, an orthopedic surgeon and former Rector of Yangon’s University of Medicine who was involved in the early days of the CDM, was appointed the Union Minister for Education as well as for Health.195 The NUG’s Ministry of Education also appointed two deputy ministers: Ja Htoi Pan, formerly the Director of Institute of Liberal Arts and Sciences in Mai Ja Yang (KIO-controlled area) who holds an MA in Anthropology from Northern Illinois University, and Dr. Sai Khaing Myo Tun, a Japan-educated international relations and international development expert with experience as an academic as well as in the field of education reform and with the formation of labor and educator’s unions. The NUG has since been labeled a ‘terrorist’ organization by the SAC (a term which is also used the other way around), and consequently its members and close collaborators face charges under the Counter-Terrorism Law, which often yield life sentences.196 In March 2022 the SAC announced the termination of Dr. Zaw Wai Soe’s citizenship, together with 10 additional personalities, including other NUG ministers as well as Min Ko Naing, the 88 Generation student leader.197

61In line with the shift toward federalist aspirations during the protests, and the Federal Democracy Charter released on March 31, 2021 (Chapter 2.1), the NUG’s Ministry of Education released a (draft) Federal Democracy Education Policy in September 2021. The draft policy was prepared through coordination meetings attended by a range of stakeholders: ethnic education organizations, community-based education organizations, faith-based education organizations, township education boards, university/college/institute administration councils, student unions, teacher unions, civil society education organizations, strike committees, Parliament representative, NUCC and NUG members, state consultative council members, political parties, as well as national and international education experts (most notably Dr. Thein Lwin, a senior member of the National Network for Education Reform, NNER). A final version of that document was approved by the NUCC on May 8, 2023.198

62Largely inspired by the recommendations made by the NNER during the transition decade (which already contributed to giving structure to the students’ demands during the protests of 2014, Chapter 1.6), this progressive-leaning policy takes a diametrically opposed approach to the vision of education promoted by the SAC and previous generations of military junta before them. The document indeed contains a strong emphasis on values such as ‘equity,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘social justice,’ ‘academic freedom,’ ‘critical thinking,’ and ‘human rights.’ Although, as described earlier (Chapter 2.2), the SAC has seized upon some similar concepts (already used under previous governments) for its public relations, most striking is the ‘federal’ vision of education of the NUG, which contrasts with the monolithic vision of the nation and education promoted by successive military governments. This policy entails a great deal of decentralization and of collaboration with non-state (including ‘ethnic’) education systems (Chapter 3), with frequent references to the idea of “self-determination of ethnic regions”.199 Under this scheme, school education councils have much leeway to make decisions, including in terms of curriculum and language of instruction, in accordance with frameworks set by the Federal, State, and Township Education Councils (Fig. 32).

Figure 32: Federal administrative structure of Education according to the NUG and NUCC Federal Democracy Education Policy.200

63Most notably, in contrast with the legislative steps back by the SAC in terms of language-in-education policy described in the previous section, this policy prioritizes a Mother Tongue Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) framework (i.e. an education that starts in the ‘mother tongue’ and with a gradual introduction of the national language – Burmese – and an international language – English). MTB-MLE is in alignment with many Ethnic Basic Education Providers (EBEPs) policies and projects, and ultimately has implications for all schools located in areas populated by ethnic minorities. In contrast with its draft version, which mentions only the “mother tongues,” the final version of the Federal Democracy Education Policy contains several occurrences of both “mother tongue” (မိခင်ဘာသာစကား) and “local/regional language” (ဒေသသုံး ဘာသာစကား) which seems to be an acknowledgment of the numerous challenges involved in making sure every child will start education with his/her exact ‘mother tongue’ as a medium of instruction, particularly in the most ethno-linguistically diverse schools and regions.201

Educational activities and curriculum in time of crisis

64As stated within, this Federal Democracy Education Policy is intended for use when the Federal Democratic Union is in effect, but also gives directions for the current ‘interim’ period, which is marked by intense conflict and disputed political legitimacy. Within the ongoing struggle, the NUG has been channeling most of its limited resources to defense activities,202 a situation which is naturally entirely incomparable with the stated objective of the Federal Democratic Union government to allocate, in times of peace, at least 20% of its resources to education while overseeing an entire state administration on the ground.

65As of 2023, the NUG’s MoE, with an extremely limited budget, was mostly trying to coordinate and maintain some coherence in a variety of pre- and post-coup online and in-person education programs aligned with the revolution, both in basic and higher education, while regularly exhorting the public not to “kneel and bow the head” (ဒူးထောက်ဦးညွတ်) before the “terrorist military dictator” (အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်) by attending government schools under the direct control of the junta (as well as to some extent monastic and private schools following the SAC’s regulations).203 In at least one instance the police forces under the NUG (in Kale township, Sagaing Region in this case) have arrested school teachers working in SAC-controlled schools and charged them with anti-terrorism offenses.204 This somewhat radical stance has drawn both support and criticism, the latter particularly from parents feeling they have no other credible available options.205

66Maybe surprisingly to an outsider’s perspective, the curriculum the NUG recommends following is in fact mostly the same as the one used in the schools controlled by the SAC, which has been developed with the support of JICA, the ADB, and the World Bank and gradually deployed in government schools throughout the last several years. Anecdotal testimonies report people have been harassed or arrested for copying or carrying these very same textbooks because the junta security forces suspected that they were going to be used in resistance schools.206

67Yet, there are at least two notable curricular differences in resistance schools, which are not surprising as they touch upon the two components of schooling which are the most directly charged with identity: (1) much more leeway in teaching and using local ethnic languages in the education process (in accordance with the pro- MTB-MLE stance described earlier) and (2) an exclusion of the components of the program deemed as “incompatible with the Federal Democracy” (ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပညာရေးစနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် သင်ရိုးများ), which most directly concerns social subjects and history textbooks, whose latest iteration largely continues to prioritize a Burman-centric national narrative.207

68In this regard, while a new history program is reportedly in the process of being drafted for the NUG MoE,208 different education providers in general alignment with the NUG seem to have chosen different alternatives, such as using their own history textbooks (usually with a particular ethnic perspective on history), other sources (which can include curricula from ‘democratic countries’ as recommended by the NUG),209 or potentially using this opportunity to deconstruct the official textbook’s narrative and sharpen their ‘critical thinking’ skills.210 While the risk of not extending this critical outlook to other (including one’s own) competing (national) narratives is likely to be particularly strong in times of conflict, in practice, a CDM teacher working with the NUG’s MoE explained during an interview that many schools do not formally teach history, or instead focus on the world history sections of the textbooks only. In late 2023, the NUG’s MoE also produced a teacher’s textbook on civic education for higher secondary, with chapters dealing with concepts such as ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’, ‘federalism’, ‘citizenship’, ‘media literacy’, and ‘social justice’.211 Some school systems also add religious content to the curriculum, more or less systematically and depending on local cultures.212

69While the SAC-controlled MoE has seen a dramatic drop in terms of students sitting its matriculation exam (Chapter 2.2), the NUG, following the stances of university interim councils and wider public expectations, has created an alternative exam, the Basic Education Completion Assessment (BECA), in order to provide academic credentials to students completing high school in those education systems aligned with its federal education perspectives. In 2023 the NUG’s MoE claimed that a total of 60,000 students had sat this exam, both online and in territories under the control/influence of armed groups in general alignment with its policy.213 In the form of multiple-choice questions and with much flexibility in terms of scheduling the exams, BECA, like many other exams increasingly held online worldwide since the pandemic, requires some adaptations and regulations to avoid the most obvious forms of cheating (Fig. 33 and 34). In terms of competencies tested, this exam is often presented as a significant step forward in terms of requiring a proper understanding of taught concepts and being able to apply them, rather than simply memorizing answers.214

Figures 33 and 34: Instructions disseminated through Facebook by the NUG’s MoE for the 2024 BECA candidates.215

70One of the challenges for the sustainability of this exam – itself critical for the coherence of education under NUG guidelines – is its limited recognition and opportunities available for students afterward. Needless to say, the BECA is not recognized by the SAC, and the NUG has also announced that it will not recognize the matriculation exam results obtained under the SAC rule.216 As described later and in the following chapters, a number of alternatives to SAC-controlled higher education have strengthened or appeared following the coup, but few non-state institutions offer degrees. Discussions are ongoing at the time of writing, with the NUG managing to sign MoUs with a few foreign academic institutions (Chapter 5), but it is not yet clear if and to which extent some universities abroad will accept the BECA as proof of high school completion.217 As such – and as different geographies present different and evolving situations – choosing to sit the BECA in 2023 has been described as a “leap of faith” in the revolution and in the support it could receive from outside.218

71A somewhat bitter assessment made by some, including educators who wholeheartedly support the revolution and make daily efforts to structure alternative education systems, is the extent to which education – a basic human right – is now even more politicized than it has been in the past, as vividly illustrated by these two antagonists’ matriculation exams.219 As of 2023, the respective downsides of these two options – in terms of compatibility with the students’ values and beliefs on the one hand, and in terms of recognition and educational pathways on the other – seemed to have led a significant proportion of students towards alternatives, such as the American GED or British IGCSE (when these options are geographically and financially available to them, Chapters 4.2 and 5), as well as increasing school dropout before completing secondary education.

72As of early 2024, in the context of the SAC facing many setbacks on the battlefield, the NUG had announced important progress in terms of higher education offerings for those who have completed the BECA or passed the public-system matriculation exam before the coup. At this time, about 8,000 students were reportedly in the process of enrolling in one of the 16 universities aligned with the NUG, including online institutions (discussed later in this chapter) as well as on-the-ground universities, such as the newly created Chindwin Comprehensive University (CCU, Fig. 35) in Sagaing and the Aung San Comprehensive University (ASCU) which is in the process of opening in Magway, in addition to the already existing Kachin State Comprehensive University (highlighted in Chapter 3).220

Figure 35: Logo, which includes the three-fingers salute, of the Chindwin Comprehensive University (CCU), opened in December 2023 in the “3K” region (ကသုံးလုံးဒေသ) of Kawlin, Kanbalu, and Kyunhla Townships, Sagaing Region, with a School of Arts and Sciences and a School of Education.221

Pro-revolution education, on-the-ground

73The landscape of education aligned with the revolution is diverse, complex, and thus particularly challenging to document, quantify, and categorize. Schematically and somewhat simplistically, these education programs can be divided as online (see next section) or on-the-ground, as well as primarily Bamar (in regions controlled by People’s Defense Forces, PDFs, or Local Defense Forces, LDFs)222 or primarily ‘ethnic’ (in regions controlled by historical as well as newly formed EAOs in alignment with the revolution). According to the NUG’s early 2024 figures, on-the-ground education totals close to 6,000 schools, more than 61,500 teachers, and about 730,000 students across 304 (out of 330) townships,223 figures which thus seem to include at least some of the ethnic education providers in general alignment with the resistance and its federal agenda.224 This section outlines on-the-ground pro-revolution education in resistance-controlled areas, primarily in Sagaing and Magway Regions, although education sharing similar characteristics is also notable in resistance-controlled territories in other States and Regions, such as in Tanintharyi.225

Map 3: Locations of arson attacks against civilian houses following the coup, as of December 31, 2023 (Data for Myanmar).226

74Southern Sagaing and Northern Magway Regions (along with neighboring Chin State), gradually emerged as hotbeds of resistance to the junta in the months following the coup, and military crackdowns became increasingly ruthless as local resistance groups grew in strength. According to available data, Sagaing Region seems to be at the top of several macabre rankings among all States and Regions, including the number of civilians killed (as of February 2024, out of the 4,611 documented civilians killed by the military since the coup, close to 2,000 were slain in Sagaing),227 the number of houses burned down (59,921 for Sagaing and 11,682 for Magway out of 78,737 nation-wide as of January 2024, Map 3),228 and the number of internally displaced people (1.17 million for Sagaing, and 235,000 for Magway out of a total above 3 million, as of April 2024).229

75In cities, towns, and regions controlled by the SAC and allied Pyusawhti militias,230 government schools tend to be open, although with reduced capacities and attendance due to the CDM movement and various consequences of surrounding conflicts which do not allow the SAC MoE to appoint properly qualified personnel.231 Many of the more rural areas of the region tend to be under the control of resistance forces more or less directly aligned with the NUG,232 although their coordination has sometimes constituted a challenge, with some allegations of criminal activities and instances of groups fighting each other.233 Some regions have also experienced extremely volatile military and political situations, such as Kawlin township, whose main town has successively been under the control of the resistance and the SAC in the course of early 2024.234

76In this highly disrupted situation, local communities have often managed to reopen former government schools (whose location often needs to be frequently changed for security purposes), providing ‘interim’ education following the NUG guidelines with CDM or young graduate teachers who try to make the best use of the available human and material resources.235 Pictures posted online often show the students paying respect to an empty flagpole, to the old Union of Burma flag, or at times to a PDF flag,236 during school assemblies, thus avoiding the tricolor white-starred flag prescribed by the 2008 Constitution. Revolutionary songs also seem to be often sung during ceremonies,237 and for those who reach the final year of high school, including young PDF fighters, this education leads to BECA, the NUG’s matriculation exam discussed earlier (Fig. 36 and 37).

Figures 36 and 37: PDFs soldiers passing the Basic Education Completion Assessment (BECA), in Magway and Tanintharyi Regions, March 2023.238

77Particularly active and well-documented townships include Myaing, in Magway Region (where 70 of the 256 schools were reopened in 2022 under the People’s Administration Team,239 catering to a total of more than 11,000 students with more than 350 CDM teachers and close to 900 volunteer teachers)240 as well as Kanbalu, Sagaing Region (where, as of mid-2023 160 schools were operating under the NUG, with 16,000 students and 1,200 education staff)241 and Myaung, in Sagaing Region (more than 30 schools, 500 teachers and 5,000 students in early 2023, Fig. 38).242 A significant proportion of villages seem to have neither SAC nor NUG schools operating for diverse reasons that include the proximity of a road, which increases the likelihood of an attack. In these cases, depending on available human and material resources, education can take place in private homes, or in the village monasteries for those who can’t afford tuition or have to flee their homes,243 and may lead towards BECA in regions under the influence of PDFs.

Figure 38: Morning assembly in a school administered by the Myaung Education Network, a community-based interim education provider in Sagaing Region, July 2022.244

78In such a context, multiple and daunting challenges to any education process are omnipresent, starting with security (Fig. 39 and 40). Disrupting the capacity of the parallel government to provide social services is indeed critical for the SAC in order to undermine the NUG’s credibility. Schools typically need to be guarded by resistance fighters so as to be protected from SAC or Pyusawhti militia attacks.245 Between November 2022 and May 2023 alone, 20 schools have been bombed, struck by artillery, or destroyed by ground forces, including six in Sagaing Region, and one each in neighboring Magway, Mandalay, and Chin.246 These attacks have not stopped during the following months of 2023.247 Notable, documented, and particularly macabre cases of violence against education since the coup include the killing of 11 children in an airstrike that targeted a school in September 2022,248 the decapitation of a school teacher and the impalement of his head on the school’s spiked gate in Magway Region in October 2022,249 and the assassination of three teenage Student Union leaders in July 2023.250 Another particularly deadly massacre in April 2023 saw the death of more than 160 people in Kanbalu of Sagaing Region after a junta jet fighter dropped two bombs on a ceremony for the opening of an office for the township’s People Administration Team.251 In early May 2024, the Myaing Township Education Board decided to temporarily close its schools because of the likelihood of airstrikes by the SAC.252

Figure 39: Chaung Ma village school in Sagaing’s Kani Township after an attack by fighter jets and helicopters on May 17, 2023 (Citizen Journalist).253

79In such a heated and violent context, the resistance institutions are often intransigent regarding the background of people involved in their education system: they have at times accepted neither CDM teachers who tried to go back to work under the SAC254 nor students who have been enrolled in schools under the SAC (and sometimes in any school which is not directly under the NUG). Echoing wider debates and the dilemma of the resistance regarding punishment or pardon of non-CDMers, the Myaing Township Education Board, for instance, has repeatedly warned that non-CDM students will be blacklisted, with no more access to NUG education, not only during the interim period but also beyond (i.e. once the revolution has prevailed).255 In April 2024, amidst new influxes of people reaching or returning to resistance-controlled areas, the Ye-U Township Education Board in Sagaing Region, which operates under the NUG MoE, announced that students who had not participated in the CDM and had previously been enrolled at schools under the control of the SAC would be required to pay between 300,000 and 500,000 kyat in fines (approximately 78 to 130 USD) to enroll in its interim education services, possibly without recognition of the grades completed under the SAC MoE. Beyond these local decisions and at the time of writing, the NUG MoE was still working on a systematic policy regarding these former ‘non-CDM’ students.256

Figure 40: A High School in Kale, Sagaing Region, after an attack by the SAC forces on June 5, 2023 (Citizen Journalist).257

80These debates regarding how to deal with non-CDMers during and beyond the revolution are ongoing nationwide,258 especially in resistance strongholds, which of course include regions under the influence of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs, Chapter 3). In the first such instance, in November 2023 following an offensive from the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), over 200 staff and their family members from Loikaw University were taken into custody by the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC).259 Following this, 193 were exiled (နယ်နှင်ဒဏ်) from Loikaw after being made to apologize for not partaking in the CDM and pledge to no longer work for the SAC.260 Five staff, including the rector and deputy rector who were found to be supporters of the junta, remained in the custody of the Karenni State IEC and were to be charged under the investigation of the Karenni judicial court, before finally being amnestied in May 2024.261 By Karenni State IEC judicial decision, these staff were ordered to pay a fine of 900,000 kyat (around 230 USD) and were sentenced to two years in prison for unlawful association with the SAC military.262 In a similar and more recent incident, following clashes between SAC armed forces and allied PDFs near Kale University in February 2024,263 over 130 teachers, students, and staff were detained by the resistance groups. Over the course of March 2024, 100 detainees were released, but at least 30 remained in PDF custody, including the rector of the university and professors, awaiting unspecified punishment for not participating in the CDM.264

81In addition to this climate of violence and extreme politicization of education, funding constitutes a major issue for the schools, as most of the NUG’s budget goes to support the PDFs and People’s Administrations, and with very limited funds to support education beyond general guidelines and some teacher training.265 It has been reported that NUG policy prescribes 30% of tax revenue to fund its education and health operations.266 Communities thus mostly rely on themselves, often collecting relatively small fees from the parents who can afford it, in order to pay an honorarium for the teacher’s living expenses, reducing teaching hours so the teachers can have side work, or organizing local fundraisers, which can take the form of lotteries.267 Despite extremely limited resources, small groups of women and youth are also striving to provide training on topics such as federalism, democracy, and the protection of civilians to the local resistance groups of Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay Regions.268

Pro-revolution basic education, online

82In Myanmar, the idea of ‘distance education’ has long been associated with military rule because of the SLORC/SPDC efforts to promote higher education through mail communication following the 1988 uprising, mostly in order to prevent students from gathering on campuses (Chapter 1.5). However, this time around, distance seems to have largely switched sides on Myanmar education’s battlefield. Building on the leap forward in digital technologies adoption spurred by the Covid pandemic, a myriad of online programs have been created in the wake of the coup, allowing pro-revolution education, both for basic and higher levels, to reach hundreds of thousands of students including in the main cities and territories under the direct control of the military.

83Pro-revolution online schools at the basic education level started to appear around May 2021 in order to provide an alternative to SAC-controlled schooling for CDM teachers and students. As of February 2024, the NUG has claimed that online basic education totalise about 75 schools, with 4,000 teachers, and 96,000 students.269 Using a variety of resources, such as soft copies of textbooks and videos developed by the NUG as well as synchronous online teaching, these schools multiplied in the months following the coup and according to the NUG’s guidelines largely shared on the online schools’ Facebook pages, lead towards passing the BECA.

84Despite being online, and thus not technically limited in terms of geographical reach, many of these schools have been founded in reference to a geographical entity (township, district, town or Region), in general alignment with the objective of setting up a parallel administration, and because of CDM teachers knowing each other locally. In May 2022, the NUG released an 11-point list that these schools must comply with in order to be accredited, such as being a non-profit school, being part of the People’s Administration, being aligned with the Federal Democracy Education Policy, promoting freedom and peace, and being free from discrimination. These schools are also free to use local curricula and MTB-MLE when relevant.270

85Although offering opportunities one could not even dream of in the wake of previous military coups, distance schooling programs in their multiple forms nonetheless face challenges, including in terms of access, sustainability, recognition, and security. Firstly, as experienced worldwide during the pandemic, providing online schooling for primary and middle school children is extremely difficult due to the demands of the child’s attention and diligence towards largely self-regulated study. Secondly, this type of education is contingent upon possessing functioning digital equipment, such as laptops, tablets, or smartphones, and also necessitates a decent internet connection, episodically at the minimum, which poses a number of problems in terms of access: rural regions with poor or no signal, the monthly cost of an intense usage of internet which is not always affordable for families, and the possibility for the military to shut down the internet at any time in some regions.271 Satellite-based internet access, chiefly through SpaceX’s Starlink system, has become more present in some communities under the control of anti-SAC forces (Sagaing and Magway Regions and Kachin and Karenni States), and the NUG’s ambition to expand satellite-based internet access, as well as other tools to continue teaching without constant connexion (Box 2, Fig. 41 and 42), could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of online schooling opportunities.272

Figure 41: The EduLamp – a small, portable single-board computer that leverages a local area network for accessing educational materials.273

Figure 42: Examples of educational content advertised by EduLamp.274

86Diverse other issues have been reported, such as an impossibility of enrolling in those schools providing the best services because of their saturation or cases of misuse of school enrollment fees by school directors.275 However, although a few individuals have tried to take financial advantage of the situation, most CDM teachers involved in these programs are doing it out of political convictions, under precarious conditions, and receiving little to no financial compensation for this activity, which entails great risks particularly for those who operate from inside the country.276

87Security is indeed a central concern for these online schools. Because of their explicit affiliation with the NUG, the educators working for these schools, and to a lesser extent the parents choosing to enroll their kids in these institutions, are considered ‘terrorists’ by the SAC. One of the first cases of crackdown came after a data leakage in a popular online school named “Kaung For You,” which claimed to have 30,000 students enrolled. In June 2022 some of the parents of children enrolled in this school started to receive threatening phone calls looking to extort money from them. A few weeks later, the principal of the school and 30 of its teachers were arrested.280 Similar cases have repeatedly happened since,281 notably through a pro-military Telegram channel on which details about these schools, or SIM cards used to connect to them, are posted.

Figure 43: Two CDM teachers (left and right) involved in NUG online education, and the father of two children (center) enrolled in the school, displayed on pro-military media “Myanmar Hard Talk”,282 (faces and names hidden by the authors).

88In order to try to answer these major concerns undermining the viability of a parallel pro-revolution education, the NUG issued an Information and Technology Security Guidelines document in December 2022.283 However, these increased precautions have had limited effectiveness for schools operating in SAC-controlled areas: in July 2023, 15 teachers of a Mandalay-based online school arrested earlier in the year were severely sentenced, with the head of the school being condemned to 20 years of prison.284 In another Mandalay occurrence, in August 2023 two teachers as well as two students and their father were arrested (Fig. 43).285 At the time of writing, different online schools may be in very different situations in terms of activity, enrollments, and security, but many seem to still be active, and the logos of 77 schools meeting the NUG’s criteria are displayed on its MoE website (Fig. 44).286

Figure 44: The logos of some of the basic education-certified online schools displayed on the NUG’s MoE website.287

Pro-revolution higher education, online

89In addition to already existing or newly created education institutions and programs set up by ethnic education providers (Chapter 3), numerous and diverse institutions were created to provide post-secondary education to students not willing to attend universities controlled by the SAC. Many of these new institutions, which operate mostly online and offer short-term and diploma courses, were created in the wake of the suspension in April-May 2021 of 19,500 (out of 28,850) teachers and administrators from the Department of Higher Education for joining the CDM (of whom close to 16,000 were involved in pro-revolution education in late 2023, according to the NUG).288 While partnerships between different types of institutions are common, these pro-revolution higher education providers can roughly be classified into different categories, such as Interim University Councils and Students Unions, public universities directly under the NUG’s ministries, and independent online education platforms.

90Interim University Councils (IUCs) and Student Unions are CDM councils created out of pre-existing individual institutions and meant to offer a parallel structure to the universities under the control of the SAC. According to a Spring University Myanmar (SUM) 2023 report,289 there are 11 stand-alone IUCs and 119 alliance IUCs collaborating with the NUG’s MoE and other institutions. They gather respectively 281 and 533 teachers, and have been providing education to a total of close to 11,500 students. Among other activities, medicine IUCs have, for instance, established in 2022 a program to issue temporary certificates to final-year medical students.290 Other examples include the Dagon University Interim Council, which provides training in languages such as Thai and Japanese, as well as courses related to social sciences, such as ‘Research and Sampling Methodology,’ ‘Global Politics,’ or ‘Civic Education for Human Rights,’ often in partnership with other pro-revolution education institutions and/or NUG ministries.291 Typically teaming up with other online institutions, the Yangon University Interim Council also offers multiple courses such as ‘Introduction to Anthropology,’ ‘Introduction to Academic Reading and Writing,’ or ‘Certificate Course on Legal Rights for Rule of Law.’292 Among many other institutions, Myitkyina University’s IUC and student union have claimed that their programs had reached 1,800 students for the sole year of 2022 (Fig. 45).293

Figure 45: Example of a weekly course organized by Myitkyina University’s IUC and Student Union.294

91Different NUG ministries have also been engaged in providing training and classes to students, staff, and defense forces, including PDFs and EAOs. This includes the MoE, notably through the Myanmar Nway-Oo University (MNOU), which opened in October 2022 and works with IUCs in offering diverse educational programs: short-term courses, including with foreign scholars, college preparatory courses, modular courses for master degree programs, as well as BA programs in Liberal Arts, Sciences and Education, since 2023.295 In February 2024, the MoE announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Arizona State University towards academic cooperation with activities to include knowledge exchange, scholarships, teaching, lesson co-creation, and workshops.296 The Ministry of Women Youth and Child Affairs has also been offering training, both online and in ‘liberated areas,’ dealing with civic education, federalism, mental health as well as merchandise production. The Ministry of Health has been producing health-related educational videos, as well as programs and short courses, including nursery and midwifery. Other Ministries, such as Human Rights, Justice, Federal Union Affairs, and Defense, have been creating training in their respective fields for students, staff, and PDFs.297

92Additionally, at least 15 online independent education institutions have appeared after the coup,298 the two most well-known being probably Spring University Myanmar (SUM) and Virtual Federal University (VFU). Spring University Myanmar is defined by its creators as “A virtual platform to provide education to Myanmar youth, while supporting at-risk scholars” (basically meaning CDMers). It is composed of 12 faculties (such as Law School, School of Federalism and Peace Studies, School of Health, and School of Languages) providing short courses, on-demand courses, but also nine-month diplomas, mostly online, with about 15,000 students above the age of 16 (Fig. 46 and 47).299 The Virtual Federal University, led by members of the Yangon University Student Union, is free-of-charge and, among other programs, offers courses through MP3 and transcripts taught by Myanmar and foreign scholars (Fig. 48).

Figures 46 and 47: a Diploma of International Relations and Global Affairs, provided through Zoom by Spring University Myanmar (SUM) in 2023-2024.

Figure 48: Some of the courses available on the Virtual Federal University (VFU)’s website, in MP3 as well as English, Burmese, and a few ethnic minority languages transcript formats.

93Through collaborations with IUCs and Student Unions, these institutions have been offering a wide range of short courses and diplomas, not only in topics directly aligned with the situation of Myanmar and priorities of the revolution (human rights, federalism, peace education,300 resilience, mental health, gender, discussion of national historical narrative, citizenship and statelessness, labor issues…) but also broader foundation courses in multiple subjects, such as foreign languages, anthropology, law, health, economics, or the arts. SUM also organizes regular Zoom classes for batches of up to 25 students, in some of the main ethnic minority languages and cultures (such as Mon, Jinghpaw, Rakhine, Sgaw/Pwo Karen, and Tedim Chin, Fig. 49, 50 and 51), publishes reports, and organizes webinars, including English and Burmese speaking events which gather educators from Myanmar and international experts, practitioners, and activists for discussions on the state of education in post-coup Myanmar, and other topics in relation to federalism and human rights.

Figures 49, 50 and 51: Facebook ads for West Pwo Karen and Shan (Tai Long) language and Kachin culture classes provided through Zoom by Spring University Myanmar (SUM) in 2023-2024.

94Other institutions providing online training include the National University of the Union of Myanmar (NUUM) which was established in July 2021 under the auspices of the Burmese American Community Institute (BACI) and has been offering certificates and short courses to about 1,000 students since the coup, as well as webinars dealing with a wide range of subjects, such as humanitarian aid, constitutional developments, democratic institution building, education, or health.301 The Irrawaddy Law School was founded in May 2021 by CDM students and teachers and has so far educated over 200 students in 12 available online courses on subjects such as international human rights law, international humanitarian law, constitutional law, corporate law, and legal research.302 The Thabyay Education Network Foundation established a School of Governance and Public Administration (SGPA) in 2021 to prepare public administrators for a future federal democratic Myanmar through capacity building in leadership, governance, and public administration. SGPA’s diploma in public administration covers subject-matter in governance, federalism, public administration, and public policy, which students complete online and without fees.303

95Institutions such as SUM, VFU, NUUM, the Irrawaddy Law School, and SGPA exemplify the growth of alternative, pro-revolutionary forces in higher education and reflect what Wong and Kareng (2023) describe as potential for a creative revisioning of higher education, through actors taking on new roles and through the formation of new networks and alliances. Moreover, although these programs are themselves not directly under the NUG MoE, they represent concerted efforts of institutions in general alignment with the prospect of a federal and democratic future to prepare skillful and active citizens, such as lawyers, peace and human rights practitioners, and public administrators.

96Online higher education appears to be overall much more practical than online basic education, and certainly presents opportunities for students to access knowledge on a wide range of subjects and topics. The youth of most individuals running these institutions is often an asset, in terms of mastering modern technologies and understanding the student’s desires. However, the development of this type of education also faces notable difficulties.304 According to a survey conducted by SUM in 2023, material conditions, namely electricity, poor internet connection, and phone bills were by far the three main challenges faced by students attending interim education programs (totaling more than 50% of the answers). In addition, the SAC can easily block access to these educational websites from inside the country. Although technically it is relatively easy to go around this problem, notably through the usage of a VPN, this not only slows down already poor internet connections but also entails security problems: in January 2022, a draft law was meant to criminalize having such type of software on a mobile phone or laptop, with as much as three years of prison sentences, and cases of harassment or extortion by the security forces have been reported.305 In order to get around these problems, SUM, among others, has developed offline programs, such as independent devices that can be connected to a laptop and a projector for group classes, or lectures broadcasted on radio stations. SUM has students in every State and Region of Myanmar, but Yangon and Mandalay are by far the regions with the most enrollments, with respectively more than 8,000 and close to 2,000 students in 2023, due to the presence of urban populations and comparatively better internet connections.306

97According to the same 2023 survey conducted by SUM, students overwhelmingly want longer-term classes with degrees formally accredited by international institutions, which are seen to contribute significantly to greater academic and professional opportunities. Pro-revolution higher education has indeed been facing challenges in that regard, including a deficit of financial support for both institutions and students as well as concerns around accreditation, with regard to a shortage of degree-granting programs and a lack of credential recognition.307 Some institutions have nonetheless achieved notable successes in terms of linking partnerships with foreign professors and universities abroad, (not all of which are free-of-charge for Myanmar students),308 including SUM and VFU, with partnership with institutions in several countries, including Arizona State University and Princeton University (Chapter 5.1).309