Concept

Definition

Indicators

Related Examples

“Salience: 1”

Manifested anticipation by i) official-level policy actors (i.e. the Council, the European Parliament, individual Member States, national legislatures); ii) private/advocacy actors (e.g. NGOs, unions, business groups) that the terms of an FTA (or chapters thereof) being negotiated will likely determine a utility loss. An analogous position can be voiced by individual members within the aforementioned institutions/organisations. To be coded under Salience:1, relevant textual entries need to pre-date the signing of an FTA, or to refer to the period preceding it.

Manifestation of concern that the way an FTA chapter will address a specific issue is insufficient, too weak, or entirely undesirable.

Open criticism or stigmatisation of the expected terms of an FTA chapter being negotiated.

Investment-protection: “Of big concern is also the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism that would allow foreign investors to directly sue the governments for loss of profit that may result from public policy decisions.” (European Students’ Union 2015)

Trade and labour: “There are also concerns that TTIP could lead to a reduction of workers’ rights in the EU, which are high in comparison to those in the USA[.]” (EAPN 2015)

Investment-protection: “Proofs of that are the creation of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) or ‘regulatory mechanisms’ which would seriously limit national governments’ sovereignty and the democratic scrutiny of economic policy.” (European Transport Workers’ Federation 2015)

TSD: “All participants in the debate expressed their wish to maintain the current broad scope of TSD chapters in EU FTAs […]. More effective means are needed to achieve this however.” (European Commission Services 2018: 2)

“Salience: 0”

Manifestation by i) official-level policy actors (i.e. the Council, the European Parliament, individual Member States, national legislatures); ii) private/advocacy actors (e.g. NGOs, unions, business groups) of either a favourable or neutral position as to the expected terms of an FTA (or chapters thereof). An analogous position can be voiced by individual members within the aforementioned institutions/organisations. To be coded under Salience:0, relevant textual entries need to pre-date the signing of an FTA, or refer to the period preceding it.

Open praise/optimism related to the likely terms of an FTA chapter being negotiated.

Explicit or implicit neutrality over the likely terms of an FTA being negotiated.

Acknowledgment that the way an FTA negotiation is being handled by official-level actors operating at the EU level is optimal or desirable.

TSD/Trade and Labour: “Ongoing trade negotiations - such as the ones with Mercosur, Mexico and Chile - are therefore also used as a vehicle for the protection of core values, from human rights to the environment.” (Council of the European Union 2020b)

Investment-protection: “Therefore, relating to the United States and TTIP, investment protection is not a key issue for German companies.” (Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce 2014: 1)

Geographical indications: “EFOW is very satisfied with the result of today’s vote in the INTA committee on the report of MEP Lange concerning the European Parliament recommendations to the Commission for the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement with the US. The call for an ambitious agreement which includes a greater protection and recognition of our GIs is a fundamental issue for the EU wine sector since the US is by far our leading destination country.” (EFOW 2015)

“PROs: 1”

Presence of political opposition/contestation potentially jeopardising the ratification of an EU FTA. PROs can be posed by i) official-level policy actors (i.e. the Council, the European Parliament, individual Member States, national legislatures); ii) private/advocacy actors (e.g. NGOs, unions, business groups). Private/advocacy organisations pose PROs by shaping the position of official-level policy actors with direct veto powers. To be coded under PROs:1, relevant textual entries need to time-wise follow the signing of an FTA, or to have been produced within the same year of signing in the case that they precede it. Alternatively, they need to make explicit reference to ratification in the case that they precede it ahead of the same year. Finally, relevant empirics time-wise anticipate the completion of an FTA ratification process.

The manifested intention to veto an FTA by an official-level policy actor; (the Council, the EP, and individual Member States).

An invitation to reject an FTA voiced by private/advocacy organisations, or members thereof (e.g. NGOs, unions, business groups) to official-level policy actors in charge of ratification.

Open criticism of an FTA, voiced in the aftermath of signing and before ratification is completed – either at the EU and/or Member-State level.

i/ii) “France says NO to Mercosur: A wise decision” (FNSEA 2019)1

iii) “EU’s Investment Court System in TTIP and CETA does not protect governments’ right to regulate.” (UNI Europa 2016)

“PROs: 0”

A condition of substantial absence of political challenges to the ratification of an FTA, which makes the latter unlikely to face a veto during ratification. To be coded under PROs:0, relevant textual entries need to time-wise follow the signing of an FTA, or to have been produced within the same year of signing in the case that they precede it. Alternatively, they need to make explicit reference to ratification in the case that they precede it ahead of the same year. Finally, relevant empirics time-wise anticipate the completion of an FTA ratification process.

Explicit support to the ratification of an FTA, voiced by i) official-level policy actors; ii) private/advocacy organisations, or members thereof.

Explicit or implicit neutrality over the ratification of an FTA.

Explicit or implicit praise of an FTA (or chapters within it), voiced in the aftermath of signing and before ratification is completed – either at the EU and/or Member-State level.

“European Business Calls for Swift Ratification of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.” (European Footwear Confederation 2018: 2)

TSD: “The EESC stands ready to assist the Commission in the development of an effective mechanism that improves the implementation and monitoring of TSD chapters in EU FTAs and enforces full compliance, drawing on the experiences of other countries as well as proposals developed by business, environment, labour and other civil society groups.” (European Economic and Social Committee 2018: 8)

Regulation and NTBs/TSD: “The entry into force of the agreement with Japan in February this year adds to the list, together with other agreements such as Korea and Canada, of ‘new generation agreements’ mainly negotiated after 2006. These types of agreements aim not only to liberalise trade, but to also include commitments on key issues for chemicals such as regulatory cooperation, as well as stronger rules-based and values-based provisions included in its Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters.” (Cefic 2019)

Organisation name

Organisation type

Position on CETA3

Average full-time lobbying personnel

Number of CETA DAG members

Offices in EU Member States

EU lobbying budget

ClientEarth

NGO

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

Agriculture: concerns with lowering of food standards.

6.5

1

Belgium

Germany Luxembourg Poland

Spain

UK

500,000 - 599,999 €

Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT)

Trade union

Labour: concerns on CETA’s impact on worker rights.

Need to protect EU regulatory sovereignty and rule of law.

5

1

France

200,000 -299,999 €

Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL)

Trade union

Labour: concerns on CETA’s impact on worker rights.

Agriculture: concerns with lowering of food standards.

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

12.2

1

Italy

400,000 - 499,999 €

Eurogroup for Animals

NGO

Agriculture: concerns with lowering of food standards (from an animal-welfare perspective).

4.5

1

Belgium

900,000 - 999,999 €

European Public Service Union (EPSU)

Trade union

Labour: concerns on CETA’s impact on worker rights.

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

4.5

2

Belgium

700,000 - 799,999 €

European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE)

Trade union

CETA’s impact on EU public services.

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

8

2

Belgium

700,000 - 799,999 €

European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)

Trade union

Labour: concerns on CETA’s impact on worker rights.

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

22.2

2

Belgium

1,000,000 -1,249,999 €

FH Danish Trade Union Confederation

Trade union

Supportive of CETA.

n/a

1

Denmark

n/a

Fondation Nicolas Hulot

NGO

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

TSD: concerns with CETA impact on climate change.

Agriculture: concerns with lowering of food standards.

n/a

1

France

n/a

German Trade Union Confederation (DGB)

Trade union

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

n/a

2

Germany

n/a

Humane Society International/Europe

NGO

n/a

2.2

1

Belgium

600,000 - 699,999 €

Swedish Trade Union Confederation

Trade union

Exemption of public services from CETA.

Need to protect EU regulatory sovereignty and rule of law.

5.5

1

Sweden

n/a

Trades Union Congress (TUC)

Trade union

Labour: concerns on CETA’s impact on worker rights.

Geographical indications (GIs): concerns with CETA impact on protection of EU GIs.

Investment protection: critic of ISDS/ICS.

1

1

Belgium

UK

100,000 – 199,000 €