Version classiqueVersion mobile

Solidarity Intervention

Monique Jo Beerli

2. A Roadmap to Transnational Solidarity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Texte intégral

1In September 1993, Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), famously shook hands on the White House lawn following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Yet, as peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians finally seemed within reach after nearly 25 years of ongoing military occupation and conflict, practices on the ground attested to another reality. Throughout the 1990s, Israel endorsed land expropriation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by permitting the construction of settlement infrastructure and settlement expansion thus complicating the feasibility of a sovereign Palestinian state. Meanwhile, although Arafat, representing the PLO, negotiated an agreement with the Israelis, many Palestinians were opposed to the Oslo Accords long before it was signed. As the proposal refused to recognize the right of return for the millions of Palestinian refugees and compromised the territorial integrity of historic Palestine, in 1974 the first Rejectionist Front was established in direct opposition to the negotiated settlement, some supporting a retaliative armed struggle.

2Since its initiation, members of the Rejectionist Front include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Al-Sa’iqa, Fatah-the Uprising, Fatah-the Revolutionary Council, the National Salvation Front, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others (Chasdi 2002: 309). In response to the killing of 29 Muslims in the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in the Ibrahimi mosque, Hamas launched their first suicide bombing campaign within Israel’s borders, mimicking the strategy until then only used by the Islamic Jihad, legitimizing Israel’s security concerns and calling into question the credibility of peace negotiations (Norman 2010: 30-31). Notable setbacks also included the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin at a pro-Oslo Accords rally in 1995 by an extremist right-wing Zionist, Benjamin Netanyahu’s destructive leadership from 1996-1999, and so forth (Said 2000: xi). Finally, the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000 and the continuation of the occupation incited outrage and disappointment among Palestinians, culminating in the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 and subsequent engagements in violent and nonviolent resistance.

3In an exploration of transnational solidarity activism in Israel/Palestine, I will undertake a meso-level analysis of the TSMOs engaged in solidarity work and political altruism in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. In doing so, I will first provide a detailed introduction of each organization, assigning them in groups in terms of their religiosity or secularity, in order to contextualize their involvement as a third party in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Next, I will put forward an examination of action repertoires, or the operations strategy of collective action (Tilly 1986: 541), for the sake of demonstrating what it means for the given organizations to endorse Palestinian rights. Lastly, I will analyze the organizational structures facilitating such action repertoires by focusing primarily on the types of volunteerism, the recruitment process, and the sources of financial resources. As such, the aim of this section is to situate transnational solidarity activism in Israel/Palestine by highlighting the specificities of the voluntary organizations while demonstrating how they operate.

2.1. Organizations of Transnational Solidarity

4Increasingly in the last two decades, social scientists have noticed a general rise in the number of TSMOs (Smith 1997; Sikkink and Smith 2002). Given that transnational social movement organizations are the principal structures through which international volunteers become engaged and hence transnational activism is mobilized in the West Bank, one cannot understand this phenomenon without an examination of the organizations themselves. Who are the principal actors responsible for the resurrection of such organizations? What arguments are proposed by each organization to support their projects? What cultural and philosophical resources do these organizations draw from and build upon? In order to address these questions, a contextual background highlighting the origins and values proposed by the organizations, which have been the subject of this study, will be explored. Though this list is not exhaustive, there are predominately six organizations, religious and non-religious alike, engaged in mobilizing international solidarity in the region.

2.1.1. Religious Organizations

  • 1  This term refers to the Church of the Brethren, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) and the (...)
  • 2  Alongside CPT, the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH) is another organi (...)

5Among the solidarity social movement organizations operating in the West Bank, a number of them are based on a religious identity and mission. First conceptualized by Ron Sider, a Canadian-born theologian and social activist, Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) offered members of the “peace churches”1 a new opportunity to bear witness to their faith. Headquartered in the United States with regional support groups in the UK, the Philippines, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia, CPT is a faith-based organization committed to “building partnerships to transform violence and oppression” while “reflect[ing] the presence of faith and spirituality” in order to promote a world vision which “embrace[s] the diversity of the human family and live[s] justly and peaceably with all creation” (Christian Peacemaker Teams 2010). Alongside operations in other conflict zones—such as Iraq, Columbia, Uganda, Congo, etc.—CPT currently maintains a peacemaker team in Hebron, also known as Al-Khalil in Arabic, located approximately 30 kilometers south of Jerusalem in the southern West Bank with a population of approximately 160,000.2

  • 3  When an extremist American-born Jewish settler, Baruch Goldenstein, opened fire on worshipers in t (...)

6Increasingly since the 1990s, Hebron’s old city and surrounding districts have been transformed into spaces of tension between remaining Palestinian inhabitants and the growing number of ultra-Orthodox settlers. In 1997, three years following the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in the Ibrahimi mosque3, Hebron was partitioned into two areas, H1 and H2 (refer to Figure 2 in Appendix 1), the latter of which came under Israeli military control. Although the population of approximately 30,000 Palestinians living in H2 is permitted to stay in their homes, the measures that have been taken by the Israeli authorities as well as the violent behavior of the setter population drastically restrict the movement and complicate the daily lives of the families who have decided to stay in their homes.

7In 1998, CPT set up a full-time peace corps, headquarted in the H2 zone of Hebron and active in the greater South Hebron Hills region. Staffed by a continual flow of veteran and newly-recruited volunteers, CPT provides support for “Palestinian-led, nonviolent, grassroots resistance to the Israeli occupation and the unjust structures that uphold it” in hope that “by collaborating with local Palestinian and Israeli peacemakers and educating people in [their] home communities, [they] help create a space for justice and peace” (Christian Peacemaker Teams 2010). As such, CPT draws on Christian teachings coupled with a priority of peace and justice in its support of Palestinian nonviolent resistance and steadfastness against the occupation.

8Having similar attributes to that of CPT, Operation Dove is one of many projects organized by the Pope John XXII community, which was founded in 1973 by a Catholic Italian activist-priest, Father Oreste Benzi. The Pope John XXII community is based in Rimini, Italy and maintains Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations since 2006. Of the wide range of programs “committed to remove the causes of injustice” present in 25 countries around the world, Operation Dove was first started in 1992 in response to the war in Yugoslavia as a way to support “the active building of peace in war zones, through a nonviolent presence in the opposing fronts of conflict areas in order to ‘build bridges and soothe wounds’.” In conjunction with operations in Albania, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Congo, Chiapas (Mexico), and Chechnya (Russia), Operation Dove sends a non-violence peace corps, made up of only Italian volunteers, to Palestine (Association Comunità Papa Giovanni XXII).

  • 4  While the construction of settlements is generally authorized by the Israeli state, outposts are u (...)

9With the help of CPT, Operation Dove set up permanent operations in the village of At-Tuwani following an invitation by the South Hebron Popular Committee and the Israeli peace group Ta’ayush in 2004. At-Tuwani is a small village located in Area C, with a population of 200-300 inhabitants, outside the city of Yatta (refer to Figure 5 in Appendix 1). Less than one kilometer away from the small village rests the Ma’On settlement, which was established in the early 1980s, and the Havat Ma’on outpost.4 Given the unusually close proximity between the villagers of At-Tuwani and the neighboring settlers, confrontation between the two parties has become a frequent event. Children on their way to school, shepherds grazing sheep, farmers cultivating the land, etc. became subjects of settler violence. Based on these conditions, with the help of CPT and Ta’ayush, the village was able to solicit international volunteers in order to ease the hardships of daily life. Though principally a religious-based organization, Operation Dove expands its horizons by instrumentalizing a dialogue on human rights and exercising itself in the international arena in order to legitimize its actions in conflict zones.

10The third major religious organization active in the region, born out of the “Ecumenical campaign to End the Illegal Occupation of Palestine: Support a Just Peace in the Middle East,” the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) was established in 2002 under an initiative proposed by the World Council of Churches (WCC), a fellowship of over 300 churches worldwide “seeking unity, a common witness and Christian service” (World Council of Churches 2012). Recognizing UN resolutions as the foundations of a just peace while using the Geneva Conventions as an indicator of the responsibilities of the state of Israel as an occupying power, EAPPI brings groups of international ecumenical accompaniment volunteers, referred to as Ecumenical Accompaniers (EAs), to the West Bank to “experience life under occupation.” During their term, volunteers “work with local churches, Palestinian and Israeli NGOs, as well as Palestinian communities in various capacities, to try to reduce the brutality of the occupation and improve the daily lives of both peoples” (World Council of Churches 2012).

11Under the direction of the World Council of Churches and through its coordinating body in Geneva, Switzerland, EAPPI embodies the efforts of approximately 30 church groups and ecumenical partners from the following twelve countries: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Furthermore, EAPPI maintains a broad range of operations in the West Bank with teams placed in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jayyous, Jerusalem, Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarem, and Yanoun (refer to Figure 1 in Annex 1). While in the field, EAs “provide protective presence to vulnerable communities, monitor and report human rights abuses and support Palestinians and Israelis working together for peace”; and once back in their home country, “EAs campaign for a just and peaceful resolution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict through an end to the occupation, respect for international law and implementation of UN resolutions” (World Council of Churches 2012). Bridging a Christian discourse of salvation with the endorsement of international humanitarian law and UN Security Council resolutions, EAPPI constructs a model for civil disobedience rooted in international norms and religious doctrine.

2.1.2. Non-religious Organizations

12While performing nearly identical missions, secular TSMOs in the West Bank develop their collective action framework upon principles of liberalism and socialism, disconnecting from a religious discourse. The most sensationalized TSMO present in the region, the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) materialized for the first time almost unwittingly in December 2000. Marching for the removal of an Israeli military base located on the outskirts of Beit Sahour, a small Palestinian town just outside of Bethlehem reputed for its nonviolent resistance against the occupation, Palestinian activists joined by Israeli and international activists successfully entered the military base and carried out a nonviolent action. While the Israeli army had been systematically suppressing Palestinian protest since the outbreak of the second Intifada, using violence if needed, on this particular occasion, the demonstration surprisingly took place without complications and a French activist even managed to place a Palestinian flag atop a military watchtower. From this moment, the power of aligning foreign and Israeli activists alongside Palestinian nonviolent activists as a protest strategy was realized and developed into a permanent project.

  • 5  Namely in Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherla (...)
  • 6  Whereas other organizations are very strict with regard to their interpretation of non-violence, I (...)

13Of the initial group of co-founders, mentionable names include: Ghassan Andoni, a Palestinian activist of Beit Sahour, a physics professor at Birzeit University, and the director of the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between Peoples; George Rishmawi, also a Palestinian activist from Beit Sahour; Neta Golan, an Israeli activist married to a Palestinian man, living in the West Bank; Huwaida Arraf, an American-Palestinian human rights activist and lawyer; and Adam Shapiro, and American Jewish activist and documentary filmmaker. Constructed by a conglomerate of transnational activists, ISM aspired “to support and strengthen the Palestinian popular resistance by providing the Palestinian people with two resources, international solidarity and an international voice with which to nonviolently resist an overwhelming military occupation force” (International Solidarity Movement). Made famous following the deaths of ISM volunteers Rachel Corrie and Tom Hurndall in 2003, today there are ISM support groups5 mobilizing volunteers across the globe. Upholding the pragmatic utility of non-violence6 and emphasizing the need for direct action to contest the “facts on the ground”, ISM solicits international mobilization as a means to compose and diffuse a new narrative and image of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while demonstrating support for the Palestinians and their nonviolent resistance throughout the West Bank and minimally in Gaza.

14Since 2002, the International Women’s Peace Service (IWPS) has brought “human rights volunteers” to the village of Deir Istiya, located in Area B bordering Area C, in the Salfit district of the northern West Bank approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Nablus and 7 kilometers east of Salfit, with a population of less than 4,000 (refer to Figure 4 in Appendix 1).  In addition to its close proximity to the Separation Barrier, Deir Istiya has been subject to similar conditions of life under occupation as described with regard to other areas in the West Bank. Given the direct impact of the occupation in addition to the willingness of Deir Istiya’s community to resist nonviolently, IWPS became involved in the region.

15Since its initiation, the IWPS consistently “provides an international presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories with the aim of supporting nonviolent resistance against the occupation and intervening against and documenting Human Rights violations” (International Women’s Peace Service 2010). Though based in the village of Deir Istiya, IWPS is active throughout the Salfit district and is the only organization active in the region. Unlike the other organizations, IWPS is only open to women volunteers, evoking a feminist approach to peacemaking. In summary, IWPS is based on the conviction of women’s increased capacity in peacebuilding roles, working to facilitate the inclusion of Palestinian women in both grassroots resistance and the peace process while underscoring the termination of the occupation in respect of human rights and international law as their overall objective.

  • 7  In 1974, the Institute was founded in honor of A.J. Muste, a former labor, civil rights and anti-w (...)

16The most recently developed of the affiliations thus far mentioned, the Palestine Solidarity Project (PSP) is a “Palestinian project dedicated to opposing the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land through nonviolent direct action” which was launched in the summer of 2006 from the village of Beit Ommar, located 11 kilometers northwest of Hebron in the Southern West Bank with a population of nearly 17,000. With funding from the A.J. Muste Memorial Institute in New York7, PSP was co-founded by Rebekah Wolf and her husband, Mousa Abu Maria. Wolf is an American citizen of Jewish descent, who first came to the West Bank in 2003 as an ISM volunteer. Wolf’s activism eventually led her to the village of Beit Ommar where she met her current husband, Mousa Abu Maria, a former political prisoner, nonviolent activist, and member of the Beit Ommar Popular Committee. Inspired by ISM, Wolf and Abu Maria created the PSP in order to mobilize international participation in support of nonviolent resistance in Beit Ommar and neighboring villages.

17Located in area C, Beit Ommar is encircled by five neighboring Israeli settlements—Karmei Tsur, Kfar Etzion, Migdal Oz, Bat Ayin and Allon Shevut (refer to Figure 3 in Appendix 1). Though once a prosperous agricultural village, economic and social life in Beit Ommar has suffered, at least in part, as a result of the occupation. In response, some of Beit Ommar’s community is committed to resisting the occupation in the belief that “peace and security are rights not just for some, but for all the people of the world.” International participation is thus a valuable resource “dedicated to supporting Palestinian communities resisting the Israeli occupation” who are subject to “intimidation, violence, economic strangulation, and a history of displacement” (Palestine Solidarity Project). A pronounced exemplification of the intersection between the “local” and the “global” as well as diffusion processes, PSP has imitated the action repertoire of other TSMOs which bring international volunteers to support protest and steadfastness in order to better guarantee the survival, efficiency, and success of Beit Ommar’s grassroots civil disobedience movement.

18Following the outbreak of the second Intifada and the breakdown of political willingness to make peace, there was an emergence of transnational solidarity organizations which attempted to support alternative means of survival and contestation “in the meantime”. Furthermore, the high profile of the conflict and the long sought after peace has encouraged organizations to launch projects, as well as donors to provide financial resources, aimed at reconciling peace. Together, these six organizations represent the accrued efforts of “rooted cosmopolitans”, in other words, “people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts” (della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 237) in their struggle for the advancement of a given cause. Activist-priests, Diaspora descendants, transnational couples, professional activists, university professors, human rights and peace activists are among the individual profiles which have instituted organizations engaged in the protection of Palestinian rights and the advocacy of an end to the occupation. United only by their solidarity with Palestinian rights, the organizations and their founders otherwise represent groups versed in different epistemological discourses.

19Though the organizational identity is articulated in variant terms, each organization, religious and non-religious, adopts systems of moral universalism encouraging individuals, regardless of race, religion, or citizenship, to rise up against that which is normatively framed as “wrong”. First, there are Christian faith-based organizations, such as CPT, founded on religious culture and symbols drawn from the Bible, advocating Christians to serve the poor and the suffering in their pursuit of a life similar to that of Jesus Christ. Deviating from a purist approach, EAPPI and Operation Dove merge Christian teachings with international law, intermingling two different “doxa” (Bourdieu, 1977) not commonly grouped together. Moving away from a religious affiliation, ISM and PSP pursue the defense of human rights, justice, and peace whereas IWPS builds on these cultural foundations while incorporating a gender perspective. Thus, as opposed to witnessing the replacement of the traditional advocates of solidarity by the “new middle class”, as suggested by Passy (2001) in the case of national solidarity movements, instead there is evidence of a cross-fertilization, both in terms of interactions between different community bases and intermingling of social philosophies, between Christian, humanistic, and socialist traditions in the development of a collective identity based on the pursuance of Palestinian rights. Having reviewed one branch of civil society organizations striving for Palestinian rights, I will now attempt to explain what it means to defend Palestinian rights in terms of operations strategy and what organizational structure is appropriated in order to fulfill the organizations’ missions.

2.2. Operations Strategy and Organizational Structure

20With a bearing on the most active organizations engaged in facilitating transnational Palestinian rights solidarity activism in Israel/Palestine, alongside the social and cultural resources on which they draw from, the objective is now to provide a synthesis on the specific action repertoires of these organizations as well as the organizational structure which permit a given type of collective action. As such, this section will attempt to address the following questions: What does it mean for these six organizations—CPT, ISM, EAPPI, IWPS, Operation Dove, and PSP—to defend Palestinian rights? What are the limitations of their organizational support and solidarity? Furthermore, how are the organizations structured? How do they mobilize resources? How do they recruit and train volunteers?

2.2.1. Operational Capacity

21Together forming a network of advocates for Palestinian rights, the TSMOs that predominately facilitate solidarity activism in the West Bank collectively subscribe to particular operational elements, which distinguish them from other categories of organizations. Once in the field, Palestinian rights TSMOs are engaged in an array of activities in specific spatial locations which are designed to ease the pressure on the daily lives of the select communities. In varying degrees, each organization provides the following services: a) protective presence to threatened communities; b) monitoring and documenting of human rights abuses; c) support for Palestinians and Israelis working for peace and d) advocacy.

22With regard to protective presence, this type of engagement strategically employs internationals to accompany targeted Palestinian communities based on the assumption that the physical presence of international witnesses will reduce the likelihood and intensity of violent or harmful interactions between Israeli soldiers or settlers and Palestinians. Though other instances may occasionally arise, the most common accompaniment work involves escorting children on their way to school, consorting with shepherds while they are grazing their sheep, assisting farmers during the harvest season, staying with families who have received demolition orders on their homes, and attending nonviolent demonstrations. Some Israeli peace groups are involved in similar accompaniment work. However, practical considerations generally limit the already marginal group of Israeli activists to accompanying Palestinians on Saturdays. As even the most extreme Israeli activists are not prepared to move to the West Bank and establish a permanent presence there, the placement of international volunteers in remote, vulnerable communities where they are available on a 24-hour basis allows for the development of a more effective and efficient on-the-ground response team.

23Closely related to accompaniment work, monitoring and documenting human rights abuses remains a significant prerogative for organizations defending Palestinian rights in the West Bank. Protective presence missions are simultaneously a monitoring task, resulting in documentation should an incident arrive or conditions be judged inhumane. Beyond the aforementioned accompaniment assignments, volunteers also monitor major checkpoints, such as the Qalandia checkpoint (Ramallah-Jerusalem) or the Huwwara checkpoint (Nablus); checkpoints within the organizations main area of operations; and occasionally “flying checkpoints”, which are temporary surprise checkpoints lacking permanent infrastructure. Equipped with handheld camcorders, international Palestinian rights defenders are prepared to film in order to produce hard evidence in support of any potential reports, covering incidents and events which would otherwise go unreported. The monitoring and reporting carried out by volunteers simultaneously acts as a pedagogic formation for the volunteers themselves, resulting in the acquisition of a particular knowledge production and establishing confidence in one’s “subjective” and “objective competencies” (Mayer 2011: 229). Additionally, organizations collect data on the number of people waiting on either side of the checkpoint, the time it takes to cross the checkpoint, the number of children searched, and so forth. Resulting reports are then distributed to international NGOs (INGOs) such as the International Red Cross Committee, the United Nations, and Amnesty International; foreign consulates and diplomats; local activist and NGO networks; and, lastly, on the respective organization’s online website and perhaps Facebook or other social network engines.

24Simply demonstrating solidarity and support is an important element of the organizations’ work. Indeed, for some volunteers this facet was appraised as the most important:

  • 8  Interview with Participant R., held February 9, 2012.

“I think the solidarity part is the most important thing even if you can’t maybe change anything at least you show the Palestinians that they have friends in the world. That not all people outside of Palestine are like the settlers or the Israeli soldiers but that that they also have friends. And most people appreciate that, are grateful for that and I think that’s the best part of our activities, whether we are in Sheikh Jarrah or go to demonstrations, just that we are present there.”8

  • 9  Interview with Participant O., held March 8, 2012.

“But on a personal level it is very satisfying to be connecting face to face with Palestinians in that struggle and standing side-by-side with them. You know, someone from the UK, which was very instrumental in creating that situation, I think it’s good that people from the UK can stand next to the Palestinians and say ‘I’m with you’.”9

25Yet, although solidarity organizations broadly support the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination, their cooperation is conditional. Cooperation and support is contingent on the communities’ willingness to resist the occupation nonviolently, either actively through symbolic demonstrations of contestation or even passively by maintaining a presence on their land, referred to as “steadfastness.” In addition, these organizations predominately network on a community-level, partnering with Palestinian communities directly impacted by the construction of the Separation Barrier; the encroachment of neighboring settlements; bureaucratic displays of violence such as the closure of roads, the refusal of building permits, the destruction of unauthorized domiciles; and physical violence and harassment by the military or settlers.

  • 10  Interview with Participant S., held March 14, 2012.

26As opposed to “bottom-up” peace initiatives funded by international donors during the Oslo years to create a dialogue and renewed trust between Palestinians and Israelis (Bocco and Taiana 2011: 73), organizations of the post-Intifada years privileged the Palestinian side in support of a “peace on the ground”. As a CPTer remarked, “[w]e have to always support the leadership of the Palestinian people, or wherever we are working, the local nonviolent leaders.”10In other words, as these organizations value pacifist resistance, an emphasis was placed on noncooperation and nonviolent strategies in order to avoid creating new and more extreme cleavages between the two parties, further jeopardizing a peaceful end to the occupation. Second, operations were organized at the grassroots level in order to provide resources for disfavored communities enduring physical and material costs, particularly those in Area C under Israeli administrative and security control. Based on these circumstances, as well as certain particularities of Gaza, TSMOs have predominately operationalized solidarity projects in the West Bank in a select number of Palestinian villages willing to cooperate with international partners. As such, on-site solidarity with Palestinians only arose in a few areas, just as the nonviolent struggle itself is isolated to a select number of communities as opposed to a mass phenomenon (Pallister-Wilkins 2009: 396).

27Furthermore, these solidarity movement organizations do not function within an isolated world, but instead establish contacts at a local level and collaborate closely with other collectives believed to share similar values and aspirations. Inter-organizational ties act as a means to express countenance for the work carried out by particular Israeli and Palestinian peace groups. While support may be understood as of primarily symbolic and social meaning rather than economic or material, these interactions lay the foundation for the development of complex transnational networks based on the “principled-issue” (Sikkink 1993) of Palestinian rights. Accounting for the various contacts within Israeli society, as provided by an EAPPI volunteer:

  • 11  Interview with Participant L., held February 8, 2012.

“We’ve met a lot of Israeli sort of NGOs and peace groups but they would be Israelis involved in campaigning against militarism, they’re a very particular group. We’ve met Breaking the Silence, we haven’t worked with Ta’ayush but other groups do. Um, ICAHD, B’tselem, PeaceNow, Women in Black, Ma’schom Watch, Grassroots Jerusalem, Physicians for Human Rights, and we did visit a settlement.”11

28Other examples of Israeli civil society peace groups include Rabbis for Human Rights, Yesh Din, Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Solidarity, Anarchists Against the Wall (AATW), etc.; and on the Palestinian side, Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between Peoples (PCR), Alternative Information Center (AIC), Holy Land Trust, Popular Committees, Popular Committee against the Wall and Settlements, and so forth. While alliances and the intensity of those alliances will vary from one organization to another, there is nonetheless an observable process of networking between the “local” and the “global” with recognizable overlaps and commonalities. TSMOs essentially provide one of many interlocutors for local organizations through which they may transmit their cause to the international arena, with a possibility of mobilizing additional resources.

29Lastly, inter-organizational ties also serve a pragmatic function as each of the mentioned organizations function with limited means, both in terms of financial and human resources. First, certain occasions may require the manpower of two or more organizations pulled together. For example, should there be an order for the demolition of two houses in a Palestinian village located in Area C, any attempt to block the Israeli military from doing so would require as many people present as possible. Second, as the Palestinian rights TSMOs are run by volunteers as opposed to professionals, there may instances in which experts would better manage certain information or tasks. For example, as opposed to merely posting an article on the organization’s website, important data collected at a checkpoint would have more impact should it be analyzed by a professional human rights organization, such as B’Tselem, with greater technical expertise and a wider range of contacts. Networks of support thus reinforce the development of a unique community or branch of civil society fighting for Palestinian rights who then become engaged in a continuous exchange of social capital both exclusively among themselves and through mediated contacts. Though the organizations have no concrete authority, their power rests in the diffusion of collected information and the consequential delegitimization of the Israeli occupation.

30Whether through the dissemination of organizational documents, lobbying politicians, or merely recounting eyewitness testimonies, advocacy also represents an important component of transnational solidarity activism. Either during the volunteers’ service period or once they return to their home country, “spreading the word” bridges the realities of today with the hopes for tomorrow. According to a number of volunteers, in contrast to the overwhelming strength of the Israeli narrative, both a consequence of the Holocaust memory and a product of the Zionist lobby, the Palestinian narrative has historically been incapacitated and overlooked:

  • 12  Interview with Participant D., held March 15, 2012.

“Well, it’s more extreme here. Of course, media is not neutral at all, at least the mainstream media. But especially for these places, it’s quite extreme [media bias] and you see in Europe, most of all, especially if you look at the older people, there is still some guilt over the Second World War, so it’s still quite pro-Israel, mainly because of that, I think.”12

  • 13  Interview with Participant L., held February 8, 2012.

“Unfortunately, they [the Palestinians] feel like their voice isn’t being heard outside, so I think they’re happy that the internationals are around. As the Palestinian voice isn’t being heard, I mean, it is not as strong as the whole media machine of the Israelis and the Palestinian voice doesn’t have same weight as an international voice.”13

  • 14  Ibid.

“In say the 50s and 60s, people would have been very pleased for the Jewish people that they had somewhere after the horror of the holocaust…And my parents would have been sort of human, people, humanistic humanitarian people, they’d have been, if they had been sufficiently in touch with the fact that the Palestinian people had been pushed out of their own land I think they’d have talked more about that. So I think it only gradually came into people consciousness that, yes, that was great that that state was set up but look at the Nakba side of it.”14

31Furthermore, insufficiently equipped with financial resources and the network base to launch a reactionary campaign, the Palestinian community does not have the capability, nor perhaps the will, to change international public opinion regarding the conflict on its own. While coverage on episodic events—such as the Shabra and Shatila massacre of 1982, popular resistance during the first Intifada (1987-1993) and the second Intifada (2000-2005), the Gaza War (Dec. 2008-Jan. 2009)—raise questions and debates both on the individual and institutional level, advocacy efforts must be organized in a more systematic and ongoing fashion.

  • 15  Interview with Participant S., held March 14, 2012.
  • 16  The consortium of public-law broadcasting institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany.

32In order to augment the reach and magnitude of the Palestinian rights campaign, solidarity movement organizations encourage their volunteers to advocate for Palestinian rights. While on their mission, volunteer-activists may write articles for media sources back in their home country, post information and photos on their Facebook or other social networking pages, lobby their Consulate Generals in Israel, or perhaps organize a delegation to come join the organization in the field. Also, each organization has its own media contacts to which information may be transmitted.  As a CPT volunteer recounts: “Our media list, there are so many on our media list that we have to send out separate emails. And that’s really important to get the word out to them.”15Each organization headquarters will have a list of media contacts for volunteers to refer to and use. Mentionable media contacts include Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, Agence France Presse (AFP), BBC, ARD TV16, and Reuters. Otherwise, advocacy work mostly begins once the volunteers have returned to their home country.

  • 17  Though it varies according to the sending country, EAPPI volunteers must carry out a minimum numbe (...)

33While most of the Palestinian rights TSMOs do not oblige their volunteers to engage in advocacy efforts, with the exception of EAPPI17, and therefore fail to maximize the potential of their participants, volunteers nonetheless seem to engage in a minimal level of advocacy. Yet, for the most part, their advocacy remains at a very informal level, consisting mostly of discussions with family and friends. As a returning activist explained:

  • 18  Interview with Participant M., held March 5, 2012.

“When I returned back to Italy after the 3 months in the summer, I organized at a high school some lessons, because its important that children also have the possibility to know about this nonviolent resistance. And then I organized a press conference with some journalists from my town and they wrote an article about the situation here. And also I speak with friends. For me, the objective, maybe you can’t reach the government, so you have to reach slowly where you live.”18

34Among other advocacy opportunities, volunteers mentioned organizing screenings of informative movies or documentaries, trying to recruit youth as volunteers, giving lectures, talking with local politicians, etc. Despite its seemingly small scale, this advocacy strategy is claimed to have more impact as the narratives will be personalized, giving more weight to the issue than if it were reported in the news:

  • 19  Interview with Participant K., held February 9, 2012.

“I think it’s the personal stories that touch and everyone understands these stories because if you give the slogans people say ‘I can’t understand because I don’t know the situation’. But if they see specific examples of injustice then they realize, hopefully.”19

“I think we have an important role in this thing. It is different when you hear about the conflict from the newspaper or television. I live in a little town so it could be easier to involve people in this if you speak directly with them. They can say ‘oh there is a young guy from our town that went to Palestine. What he went there to do. And what happened in Palestine?’ So I think if you speak directly with the people that maybe know you it’s a good way to spread, to let the people know what happens here. It’s very different from the newspaper from the media.”

35However, some individuals also expressed the limitations of such a grassroots approach, especially with regard to close family and friends:

“I sort of write regular emails about the situation here, not that many people read them. I think people back home were really interested when I first came here and they wanted to talk to me when I got back. But now it’s kind of this routine, ‘ya, ok [he]’s been away for 3 months in Palestine’. It’s kind of back to normal. It sort of drains the interest because I’ve come so often.”

36Also, some international volunteers may write articles, though, these articles generally do not appear in mainstream media sources, but in marginal print or online sources, and often contribute to a reproduction of information that is already “out there”:

  • 20  Interview with Participant R., held February 9, 2012.

“When I came here, I didn’t think of the Palestinians as my main audience. I wanted to write articles for the Swedish population. I was thinking about writing a lot of articles and informing people about the situation here and after a while, I wrote some articles for the ISM web and some newspapers back home. Not the big ones, printed daily or weekly newspapers. But after awhile, I felt like the situation just repeated itself and I couldn’t think of more articles to write”20

  • 21  Interview with Participant O., held March 8, 2012.

“…. And to me that [doing on the ground work with Ta’ayush] was much more satisfying maybe  than sitting in an office, traveling around talking to people, writing things. Because so many people do that. There’s so much information about here. And what more can people write about to be quite honest.”21

37Nonetheless, there is a grassroots diffusion of information, challenging the state’s monopoly (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 200), that might otherwise not make it to an international audience. Moreover, it should be noted that advocacy efforts of these TSMOs are directed toward the international arena, based on information extracted from the local level, while mostly bypassing the national level consisting of both Israeli and Palestinian audiences.

38On the whole, advocacy is mostly carried out on a horizontal scale, relying on the will of the volunteers to reach out to their communities both to spread awareness and mobilize action. Horizontal advocacy, however, is difficult to envision without the facilitation of new technologies and the Internet. The very use of digital cameras and video cameras in the field and the possibility to immediately upload visual or textual data onto online platforms, allowing them to be diffused instantly and indiscriminately, is a factor that cannot be taken for granted. While it is difficult to measure the impact of such a diffuse and decentralized tactic, it can be assumed that grassroots efforts may at the very least encourage greater comprehension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over time:

  • 22  Interview with Participant K., held February 9, 2012.

“And I think EAPPI contributes to that [awareness] because it has started 10 years ago and they send every year 12 people who go back to Switzerland to record. And if every one of those 12 people has talks to 200 people and then they talk to more people, or the blogs that are distributed all over. It’s like a snowball.”22

  • 23  Interview with Participant O., held March 8, 2012.

“Well, plainly that [grassroots advocacy] has had a huge effect over the last few years, its been changing. It is now much easier, I think certainly since Operation Cast Lead, I mean, the big problem for the Palestinians in media image and coverage was the suicide bombings campaign, that just turned everyone away. But, now, and I think it’s partly social media but certainly the Internet has had a huge impact on what people know, at least those who want to know.”23

39Yet, the end effect and the potential impact of that understanding is uncertain. Regardless of this, my aim here is not to assess the performance of these voluntary organizations and whether or not they have the power to bring down the occupation, but rather to understand the level and extension of their operations and equally their organizing structure.

2.2.2. Organizational structure

40Having explored the range of activities which Palestinian rights TSMOs perform, our attention will now turn towards an understanding of how these organizations structure themselves and, conjointly, how they mobilize resources, both financial and human.

41To begin with, none of the Palestinian rights solidarity organizations mentioned in this study are registered with the state of Israel or with the Palestinian Authority; instead they are registered abroad. In contrast to, for example, the UNRWA international protection officers mandated within UN-registered Palestinian refugee camps during the first Intifada or the TIPH project currently operating in the West Bank, local authorities do not sanction grassroots solidarity organizations. As such, these organizations are unable to obtain work permits for potential international employees. While it is unclear whether the solidarity organizations were refused registration or whether they bypassed it in order to avoid bureaucratic delays and overhead costs, as a result of their unrecognized status, volunteers may only enter the country on tourist visas, thus limiting them to a maximum stay of three months per trip in the country. In some cases, visas may be renewed by traveling to a neighboring country, such as Egypt or Jordan, and reentering Israel/Palestine via a land border.

42Also, volunteers are not necessarily sure of being permitted entrance into Israel. As demonstrated by the refusal of entry to activists planning to attend the “Welcome to Palestine” campaign in Bethlehem in the spring of 2012, the Israeli border control have become increasingly suspicious of possible pro-Palestinian activists. Should volunteers want to avoid being rejected entry at the airport especially, or at a land border, they are recommended by their affiliated organization not to carry anything that may reveal their intention to work in the Occupied Territories. If asked, volunteers usually deny having plans to go to the Occupied Territories, with the exception of perhaps religious sites, such as Bethlehem. When asked the purpose of their trip, most will reply tourism, religious pilgrimage, or studies, depending on their situation. The same goes for the volunteers’ departure from Israel. As security checks when leaving Israel can often be more difficult and thorough than upon arrival, the discovery of a volunteer’s activities during their visit could result in a 10-year ban from entering Israel based on security precautions.

  • 24  Interview with Participant D., held March 15, 2012.

43As a result of the visa issue and the increasing difficulty for Palestinian rights activists to enter Israel, each solidarity organization experiences a high volunteer turnover, due to a near constant change of volunteers in the field. This turnover then strictly limits the possibility of developing a hierarchical structure. ISM and its volunteers like to think of themselves as the least hierarchical: “We don’t have this hierarchy that you usually see in the other organizations or foundations or whatever. We don’t have that. We are just a group of people who change all the time, and we reach consensus about what we are going to do.”24 But all of the organizations involved in this study demonstrated a fairly flat, horizontal organizational structure.

44Of the six organizations, EAPPI seemed the most layered as it is the only organization with on-site paid staff. According to an EA, EAPPI’s Jerusalem office employed Palestinians to take on the following paid positions: a) a field officer charged with making contacts with the local community and then directing the volunteers where to go; b) an advocacy officer responsible for training the volunteers about how to advocate for Palestinian rights once back home; c) a project manager to take care of administrative and coordination issues for the Jerusalem office; and d) the overall program manager overseeing all the EAPPI placements in the West Bank. Palestinians with permits to live and/or work in Israel primarily fill these positions. When in the field, however, EAPPI volunteers operate independently in teams, numbering usually from two to six volunteers, relying on their training and recommendations from their field officer to conduct operations throughout the day.

45Like EAPPI, the remaining five organizations organize themselves in horizontal teams of as few as two volunteers to as many as perhaps 15 volunteers, wherein each volunteer theoretically has as much authority as the other. Not only do the volunteers work in teams, but they also live together in communal living quarters, often including the organization’s office or headquarters. Decision-making, particularly the division of tasks, is generally made by consensus as the whole group is either directly or indirectly involved. However, intra-group social dynamics may lead to the development of power relations or informal group leaders. Volunteers are generally provided with cell phones, except for self-financed volunteers, to ensure 24/7 accessibility:

  • 25  Interview with Participant T., held March 5, 2012.

“You don’t have a time in which you close your office. Our telephone is 24-hours open, so if there are problems during the night, the Palestinians call us, it has happened in the past, it can happen in any moment, maybe now, so really, the Palestinians know they can contact us when they need.”25

46 In some cases, the organizations may also have “local advisors” who are not paid staff, but rather local community members who try to influence or direct the activities of the given organization. Since these organizations are designed to support and show solidarity with local nonviolent resistance, it would thus seem necessary to consult with local nonviolent activists. A CPTer described it as follows:

  • 26  Interview with Participant S., held March 14, 2012.

“So we don’t charge in and do things, we come in and we support. When we see what it is that can be useful, we ask our advisors, ‘is it useful?’ If they say ‘yes’, then we do it. We meet with our advisors probably once a month. We have 6 or 7 advisors here in Hebron. These are people who know us and understand who we are and also who are very in touch with the system, with what’s going on. And so, we constantly ask them, if we have a good idea that we could do, we ask them if it’s a good idea or not. And sometimes they’ll say ‘ya that’s great’ or sometimes they’ll say ‘Oh, don’t do that’. Ya, so, that’s very important to us, to recognize the leadership of the local people on the ground. And you walk with them, not in front of them, not behind them, side by side.”26

47Similarly, other organizations also have periodic meetings with local contacts and organizational affiliates in order to evaluate current projects, brainstorm possible improvements, and plan upcoming events.

48Though the organizations featured in this study present similar organizational structures, the recruitment process, and hence the level of selectivity, vary from one to another. As demonstrated by McAdam, the recruitment or application process induces its own “natural selection” (McAdam 1986: 73), in part explaining why only a limited number of the total of individuals whose attitudes correspond with the collective action in question, referred to as the “latitude of acceptance” (Petty and Cacioppo 1981), actually engage in the act. Thus, a SMO’s recruitment process has a large impact on an individual’s eventual engagement in activism. At one extreme, ISM is the least selective organization, which does not even require any prior-registration. Thus, anyone interested and willing to come to Palestine with the means to do so may participate in ISM. This was summarized by an ISM volunteer as follows:

  • 27  Interview with Participant P., held March 2, 2012.

“When I was asking my friends about things and they described it, I was like ‘that is a really weird organizational structure’. And I actually had a friend show up, who I didn’t know was coming to Palestine, and he came and joined ISM, and he said the exact same thing. At the same time, it makes total sense because it has to be fast. If most people are going to be here no more than 3 months and many of them, maybe the majority, no more than 3 weeks, it has to be fast. And it has to treat people like adults because you are putting people in sketchy positions. And it has to give principles of consensus is a core principle of ISM is critical but at the same time it’s also weird because you have people, like some of the long term organizers, people who are core members and founders, who have to play this weird thing, because everyone has an equal voice, and it’s completely open membership activist groups.”27

49As membership is open and unselective, ISM volunteers have less accountability to the organization, and therefore less responsibility to follow ISM’s basic rules. The infraction of these rules, especially with regard to appropriate behavior, may in turn cause tensions between foreign activists and the local populations they interact with.

50In contrast to ISM, all the other organizations require potential volunteers, at a minimum, to complete an application form or a questionnaire (refer to Table 1, p. 34). Additional requirements may include references and interviews. One EA described the recruitment process as follows:

  • 28  Interview with Participant L., held February 8, 2012.

“You apply, you fill in a form. I think again for the UK and Ireland it’s run by the Quakers. They usually get about 100 applications and they take 20 people. And I think they probably interview between 30-40. So obviously they weed out a lot at the application stage. So then I got an interview and at any stage I didn’t expect to be appointed and then I was.”28

  • 29  Interview with Participant R., held February 9, 2012.

51For many prospective volunteers, as described by an ISM volunteer who had considered volunteering for EAPPI, the application process may have a deterrent effect, “And it was a very complicated application form, you have to ask 3 or 5 people to write a recommendation and I could not even think of one person I could ask that question.”29 CPT, perhaps the most selective organization, even requires potential volunteers to attend a 10-day delegation in the West Bank, accompanied by current CPT volunteers, to gain an insight into what it is the organization does.

Table 1: Organizational Structure

Table 1: Organizational Structure

52Aside from the recruitment process, the types of service periods (refer to Table 1) each organization offers will have an impact on the both the quantity of prospective volunteers and, to some extent, the type and quality of volunteers recruited by each organization. Organizations like ISM or PSP, which do not have a fixed service term, allow individuals the freedom to situate their volunteer experience according to their own schedule, exhibiting the most individualist model of volunteerism (Wuthnow 1991). This flexibility, however, as it is appropriated to the needs of the volunteers and not the organization or the community’s they serve, may result in an inconsistency in the number of volunteers available throughout the year. While vacation periods, especially over the summer, usher in a higher frequency of volunteers, the “off-season”, namely the non-vacation periods, see very few, if any at all, volunteers recruited. In contrast, the remaining organizations—CPT, EAPPI, IWPS, and Operation Dove—have stricter service periods, ranging from short-term to long-term commitments (refer to Table 1).

53Although these organizations may offer their volunteers the opportunity to specify a preferred volunteer period, the objective is to assign volunteers according to need in order to have a minimum number of volunteers in the field at all times, permitting for the permanence of operations. Typically, short-term engagements attract a much larger volunteer pool. In addition, the type of service periods offered by each organization act as an extension of their strategy. Organizations with flexible or short-term service periods aim to bring in the highest volume of volunteers the organization can support in order to facilitate broader and more expansive advocacy networks; organizations with long-term or reservists positions aim to recruit more committed and/or available individuals to produce a more experienced and skilled group of volunteers on the ground. Thus, as demonstrated by McAdam’s model of high-risk/cost activism, the level of costs and risks assumed by the volunteers will have an impact on volunteer mobilization.

  • 30  This is especially the case among unaffiliated university students on exchange—in universities suc (...)
  • 31  An umbrella Zionist organization which gives young Jewish adults from around the world aged 18-26 (...)
  • 32  Interview with Participant P., held March 2, 2012.

54Furthermore, an organization’s capacity to provide financial resources for its volunteers (refer to Table 1) will also have an impact on its action repertoire. ISM, IWPS, and PSP maintain the will to protect Palestinian rights, however, these nonpartisan organizations do not have the means to recruit volunteers. Receiving only private donations, these organizations require their volunteers to finance their way, though some organizations may provide accommodation. Self-financed volunteers then generally come to the West Bank for shorter periods of time. As the cost of living is generally lower in the West Bank than in the volunteers’ country of origin, a volunteer can manage on a relatively small budget. To finance their trip, self-financed volunteers rely on a variety of means depending on their situation: savings, social security, help from parents, grants and scholarships30, etc. A number of American Jews interviewed also reported participation in Taglit-Birthright31 in order to cover airfare costs: “As being a Jewish American I was able to take advantage of a Birthright trip. This is my first time to Palestine. So that made it economically feasible.”32

55Despite the contradicting perspective and ideology narrated by the Taglit-Birthright program, the economic opportunity proved irresistible. For those organizations church and/or state-sponsored and thus with greater economic means, stipends are provided for volunteers. Some programs, such as for certain EAPPI sender countries and the CPT reservists, require volunteers to do individual fundraising to finance their trip. As a CPT reservist explained:

  • 33  Interview with Participant J., held March 14, 2012.

“To come here, we have to do fundraising. My church puts a good amount, almost pays my way for one trip here a year. And I have many friends in intentional communities and I’m old enough that I’ve built deep friendships, who contribute to CPT and it’s more or less a bank account in your name where they send money and you kind of withdrawal on whatever you fundraised to make the trips.”33

56However, organizations that provide funding for their volunteers are inherently more selective as they do not have the means to accept all of their applicants. Regardless, as emphasized by Tarrow, the actualization of transnational collective action draws on financial resources either directly from the volunteers themselves or institutions within their home countries, underlining the importance of local networks and opportunities (Tarrow 2005: 2).

57Returning briefly to the issue of donors, the willingness of state actors to finance these programs challenges theories that suggest the involvement of non-state actors in the sphere of world politics diminishes or negates the power of states. On the contrary, rather than representing a “zero-sum conception of power” whereby the increase in the power of non-state actors equates to a loss of power on the part of state actors, state-funding of civil society initiatives suggests “a changing logic or rationality of government” wherein “different types of nonstate actors are often funded, actively encouraged and supported by states both to mobilize political constituencies, to confer legitimacy to policy-processes, to implement policies, and to monitor and evaluate them” (Sending and Neumann 2006: 651-652). This confusion, however, is somewhat understandable given the difficulty in locating state-funding to begin with.

Table 2: Diffusion of State Funds

Table 2: Diffusion of State Funds

58As opposed to Operation Dove to which the European Union is a direct donor, state contributions to CPT and EAPPI are less clearly identifiable as they are masked through a diffuse funding process. Taking the example of EAPPI (refer to Table 2), this program is directly funded by the WCC whose contributions come from church-based or church-related specialized ministries. These church-based entities, however, donate money the origin of which can be traced back to states, as well as regional and international organizations. Only two examples of donors to the WCC, Christian Aid and DanChurchAid, are provided out of a long list of contributors. While this work has not developed a detailed investigation of the source of funds, this issue proves to be a promising subject for research in the future. Nonetheless, while at first glance one might have the impression that these initiatives are competing with states, instead it is civil society that can be understood as another channel through which a state may express its international interests. In this case, there is strong evidence which points to the effort of predominately European states supporting a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict while avoiding direct, public defamation of the Israeli state. Therefore, the involvement of these non-state actors within the sphere of world politics does not necessarily diminish or negate the role of states, and hence their power, within these processes.

59Lastly, the quality of the organizations’ volunteers is also a function of their training, that is the investment the organization is willing to make in their volunteers (refer to Table 1). The training provided is generally a function of the strategic aims of the organization, its financial resources, and the volunteer turnover rate. For example, CPT, which prefers a more professionalized volunteer peace corps mostly comprised of devout Christians with strong fundraising capacities, obliges and finances its volunteers to take part in a four-week training program. Those organizations that experience a more frequent volunteer turnover and have less financial resources, like ISM and PSP, invariably have the shortest training programs; IWPS and EAPPI fall in the middle of these two extremes.

60Overall, the structure of each organization has embedded consequences on the action repertoire of social movement organizations. Using an illustration from the recruitment process, the type of service periods, funding opportunities and training programs, this section has tried to demonstrate the opportunities, as well as the limitations, for collective action as experienced by grassroots Palestinian rights TSMOs active in the West Bank. Offering an alternative to existing political and social institutions, transnational social movement organizations provide Palestinian activists with additional resources and possibilities which might otherwise not be available to them. However, the presence of such organizations is largely dependent on the structural elements which provide the conditions and opportunities for the emergence of transnational networks.


1  This term refers to the Church of the Brethren, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) and the Mennonites. These three Christian churches and their communities are recognized for their Christian pacifism and Biblical non-resistance.

2  Alongside CPT, the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH) is another organization providing “an international civilian observer mission.” Formalized in 1997 following an agreement between both Israeli and Palestinian authorities, TIPH was mandated to provide protection services for Palestinian civilians, responding to the UN Security Council Resolution 904 following the massacre in the Ibrahimi mosque. Member countries include Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey (Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron).

3  When an extremist American-born Jewish settler, Baruch Goldenstein, opened fire on worshipers in the Ibrahimi Mosque killing 29 Palestinian Muslims.

4  While the construction of settlements is generally authorized by the Israeli state, outposts are unauthorized constructions, thus making them illegal according to Israeli law and subject to demolition given a court order.

5  Namely in Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

6  Whereas other organizations are very strict with regard to their interpretation of non-violence, ISM does not take such a firm stance. In other words, while other organizations refuse to participate in demonstrations or direct actions where, for example, Palestinian youth are known to throw stones and Molotov cocktails, ISM will nonetheless give continued support, therefore calling into question to appropriateness of categorizing the resistance as nonviolent.

7  In 1974, the Institute was founded in honor of A.J. Muste, a former labor, civil rights and anti-war activist. The organization provides grants in support of grassroots projects, which are anti-war, anti-nuclear, anti-death penalty, anti-discrimination, and/or endorse the use of nonviolent action.

8  Interview with Participant R., held February 9, 2012.

9  Interview with Participant O., held March 8, 2012.

10  Interview with Participant S., held March 14, 2012.

11  Interview with Participant L., held February 8, 2012.

12  Interview with Participant D., held March 15, 2012.

13  Interview with Participant L., held February 8, 2012.

14  Ibid.

15  Interview with Participant S., held March 14, 2012.

16  The consortium of public-law broadcasting institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany.

17  Though it varies according to the sending country, EAPPI volunteers must carry out a minimum number of presentations or talks with any given audience and are also encouraged to lobby politicians and continue to write articles.

18  Interview with Participant M., held March 5, 2012.

19  Interview with Participant K., held February 9, 2012.

20  Interview with Participant R., held February 9, 2012.

21  Interview with Participant O., held March 8, 2012.

22  Interview with Participant K., held February 9, 2012.

23  Interview with Participant O., held March 8, 2012.

24  Interview with Participant D., held March 15, 2012.

25  Interview with Participant T., held March 5, 2012.

26  Interview with Participant S., held March 14, 2012.

27  Interview with Participant P., held March 2, 2012.

28  Interview with Participant L., held February 8, 2012.

29  Interview with Participant R., held February 9, 2012.

30  This is especially the case among unaffiliated university students on exchange—in universities such as Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Al-Quds University, Birzeit University, etc---who partake in direct actions in the West Bank.

31  An umbrella Zionist organization which gives young Jewish adults from around the world aged 18-26 the opportunity to visit Israel on a 10-day peer-group educational trip. Airfare to and from Israel is included.

32  Interview with Participant P., held March 2, 2012.

33  Interview with Participant J., held March 14, 2012.

Table des illustrations

Titre Table 1: Organizational Structure
Fichier image/jpeg, 224k
Titre Table 2: Diffusion of State Funds
Fichier image/jpeg, 38k


Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.


Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search