Table des matières
1. Theory
- 1.1. General setup
- Comparative statics of institutional change for government goods provision
- An increase in s
- An increase in w
- 1.2. The Winning Coalition’s reaction to a default
- 1.2.1. A member of W loyal to a defaulting government
- 1.2.2. A member of W that deposes a defaulting government
- 1.2.3. To depose or not to depose
- 1.2.4. Showing the possibility of continued support and deposition
- 1.2.5. Comparative statics of institutional change for the loyalty of the Winning Coalition post default
- An increase in s
- An increase in w
- 1.3. The government
- 1.3.1. To default or not to default
- 1.3.2. Comparative statics of institutional change for the threshold cost of repayment
- An increase in s
- An increase in w
- 1.4. Lenders and interest rates
- Threshold cost, default risk and interest rate
- 1.5. Conclusion
2. Empirics
- 2.1. Data
- 2.1.1. Political variables
- s and w for archetypical political regimes
- Measuring s and w
- s and w in the real world
- 2.1.2. Economic Variables
- Independent variables
- Dependent variables
- 2.2. Baseline specifications
- Debt crises
- Long terms interest rates and spreads
- Ratings
- 2.3. Baseline results
- Debt crises
- Long term interest rates and EMBI
- Sovereign ratings
- Conclusions from the baseline
- 2.4. Splitting the sample
- 2.4.1. Panel Threshold Regression
- Testing for a threshold
- 2.4.2. Monte Carlo trials
- 2.4.3. Applying PTR – debt thresholds
- 2.4.4. Applying PTR – share of external debt thresholds
Annexe
I. Algebra
- 2.2 The Winning Coalition’s reaction to a default
- (1) Utility of a member of W loyal to a defaulting government
- (2) Utility of a member of W deposing a defaulting government and once again member of W
- (3) Utility of a member of W deposing a defaulting government and shut out of the new W
- (4) Expected utility of a member of W deposing a defaulting government
- (6) The deposition condition
- (7) An increase in Selectorate size
- (8) An increase in the size of the Winning Coalition
- 2.3 The Government
- (9) Expected utility of a government honouring its debt
- (10) Utility of a defaulting government
- (13) Threshold cost of repayment
- Section 4 Lenders and interest rates
- (16) The competitive interest rate
- (17) An increase in the risk of default
- (18) Probability of default in terms of threshold cost of repayment
- (19) Interest rate in terms of threshold cost of repayment
- (20) The effect of higher threshold costs of repayment on interest rates