ANNEX 1: Attempts to define sustainable forest management: the ITTO Mission to Sarawak

1In a further attempt to dispel negative criticism, the ITTO and the Malaysian government agreed that a Mission would be sent to Sarawak in 1990 for the examination of forestry management practices and recommendations on improvements (Poore, 2012, p. 66). In the wake of the global attention which had been cast on Sarawak regarding indigenous peoples’ rights violations and hopes to finally enforce much needed reforms on unsustainable logging practices and land conflicts in the state, and in light of ENGOs’ discontent with the ITTO, the Mission was regarded as a crucial test case by many (Gale, 1996, p. 106). It appeared as the first opportunity for the Organization to practically define sustainable management. Controversies and disagreements crippled the Mission from start to finish, beginning with debates over Terms of Reference and whether the investigation ought to encapsulate indigenous peoples’ rights. Fervently advocated for by ENGOs, the ‘native question’ and any reference to forest dwellers or human rights, were eventually left out in favour of inquiry into the economic viability and capacity of forests and the forestry industry, as well as ecological concerns. The main focus of the Mission was on the ‘“sustainability” of the forest resource in Sarawak’, which it defined as the ‘attainment and maintenance of a forest estate yielding a continuing and non-declining flow of benefits and products at levels considered best by the people of Sarawak and at levels which can be supported or even increased in the future’ (ITTO, 1990). Having left out the Indigenous question and barely enunciated what SFM should be in practice, the Mission also sparked contentions over its Annual Allowable Cut1 calculations, deemed too high by ENGOs and too low by timber producers and the Sarawak government. ENGOs took issue with the final report, which was adopted in 1990 by the ITTO and welcomed by most of the main trading countries,2 but never applied3 due to its weak and unenforceable recommendations (Nagtzaam, 2009, 284).

ANNEX 2: SLAPP case brought by the Samling Group against SAVE Rivers

2In the lawsuit brought by the Samling Group against SAVE Rivers in July 2021, the plaintiffs claimed that seven articles published on the NGO’s website had affected their business and commercial relationships, demanding RM 5 million (about USD 1.12 million in August 2022) loss and damage compensation for these alleged defamatory statements. The articles notably addressed the aforementioned concerns over inadequate community consultation in the Gerenai FMU, as well as issues of transparency and ineffectiveness in the MCTS complaints system. Additionally to financial reparations, Samling Group demanded a retraction of the articles as well as prevention from publishing similar statements, and a public apology (Bourke, 2022). Initially scheduled for September 2022, the case was delayed for the fourth time in May 2023, and should take place in September 2023. To this day, it has cost the NGO at least RM 150,000 in legal fees, which were in part covered by legal assistance funds (Personal communication, May 2022). On the other hand, the dispute resolution process activated within the MTCC following the May 2021 GCRAC complaint, was stalled by the lawsuit as the committee in charge declared itself not wishing to interfere with the lawsuit. In October 2021, subsequently to the lawsuit, a formal complaint was filed to the PEFC (the umbrella organisation for the MTCS), which cited the unfinished dispute resolution process as a barrier to opening a new investigation (Bourke, 2022). Finally, a complaint to the FSC, the ‘sister’ body to the PEFC, was brought a year later by the NGOs coalition, which has been accepted and is being examined (FSC, 2022).

ANNEX 3: SCORE scheme and grassroots mobilisation

3Various local, indigenous-led NGOs emerged among different Dayak communities, notably in the wake of the “Sarawak Corridor for Renewable Energy” (SCORE) project launched by the government of Sarawak. This scheme, designed to reach the federal state’s ambitious energy targets necessary to fuelling its extractive and accumulation-oriented industries and intensifying its production, is inscribed in the global turn to sustainability. Supported by the sustainable discourse’s impetus to move away from fossil fuels and justified by developmentalist rhetoric to address persistent energy poverty in rural areas, the SCORE scheme was launched in 2008 by the government-owned company Sarawak Energy Berhad.

4While a first hydropower dam had been constructed in 1985 in Batang Ai, this scheme projected to meet and far exceed the region’s energy needs through the construction of at least a dozen large hydroelectric dams in the Borneo rainforest by 2030. This industrialisation programme has had disastrous ecological and social consequences, by requiring the clearing of forests, the displacement of thousands of people, and generating pollution through methane emission caused by vegetation decomposition in dam reservoirs. The Bakun Dam (2,400 MW) became functional in 2012, inundating 700 square kilometres of land and displacing an estimated 9,000 to 10,000 people. Murum Dam (944 MW) began operations in 2013, swallowing 250 square kilometres of land and forcing the resettlement of 1,400 indigenous people. Construction of the Baram Dam was originally planned for 2020. This latter project, with a capacity of 1,200 MW, would flood an estimated 412 sq. km and numerous villages, affecting and displacing approximately 20,000 people (Opperman et al., 2017) While not the focus of this research, this scheme further exemplifies the continued history of extraction and dispossession which indigenous peoples in Sarawak have been subjected to. It notably crystallised the creation of a grassroots activist network among various Dayak communities.

5In the wake of the first steps to construct the Baram Dam, sparse moments of protest took place increasingly often, which lacked coordination and collaboration, eventually sparking the initiative for various NGOs and protesters from communities of the Baram area to work together in resisting the project. This marked the emergence of the grassroots network SAVE Rivers in 2011, in an attempt to stop the construction of hydroelectric dams proposed by the government of Sarawak to power and attract energy-intensive industries and businesses. SAVE Rivers engaged in various advocacy activities such as trainings, workshops, and visits to soon-to-be-affected communities, as well as more direct actions through blockades on planned construction sites. Efforts extended throughout Malaysia and the network began working in conjunction with more Penan-focused NGOs such as the Penan-led Keruan and Bruno Manser Fonds.

ANNEX 4: List of interviews and villages per ethnic group

6Interview #1, Miri, August 21st, 2022 (SAVE Rivers office, majority Kenyah respondents and one Penan respondent)

7Interview #2, Long Moh, 23 August 2022 (Kenyah village)

8Interview #3, Long Moh, 24 August 2022 (Kenyah village)

9Interview #4, Long Moh, 24 August t 2022 (Kenyah village)

10Interview #5, Long Semiyang, 25 August 2022 (Kenyah village)

11Interview #6, Long Semiyang, 26 August t2022 (Kenyah village)

12Interview #7, Long Tungan, 27 August 2022 (Kenyah village)

13Interview #8, Long Tungan, 28 August 2022 (Kenyah village)

14Interview #9, Long Kerong, 29 August 2022 (Penan village)

15Interview #10, Long Kerong, 30 August 2022 (Penan village)

16Interview #11, Long Kerong, 31 August 2022 (Penan village)

17Interview #12, Long Ajeng, 1 September 2022 (Penan village)

18Interview #13, Long Ajeng, 2 September 2022 (Penan village)

19Interview #14, Miri, 6 September 2022 (Kenyah respondent)