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State Cash Resources and State Building in Europe 13th-18th century

 | 
Katia Béguin
, 
Anne L. Murphy

Tax or Borrow or Borrow and Tax?

Tax Systems, Debts and Loans: the Case of the Habsburg Monarchy (Sixteenth–Eighteenth Centuries)

Peter Rauscher

Note de l’auteur

The notes are mostly limited to recent studies containing further information. I would like to thank Prof. Dr Margarete Grandner (Department of Development Studies at the University of Vienna) for her friendly support.

Texte intégral

  • 1 Friedrich Walter, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung II/3: Vom Sturz des Directoriums in Publici (...)
  • 2 Rudolf Goldscheid, ‘Staat, öffentlicher Haushalt und Gesellschaft. Wesen und Aufgabe der Finanzwiss (...)
  • 3 Joseph Schumpeter, ‘Die Krise des Steuerstaats’, in R. Goldscheid and J. Schumpeter, Die Finanzkris (...)

1The ‘disease of the state’, Count Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz argued, is decentralization: every province has its own government and constitution and because of the rivalries between the various lands and between the leaders of the authorities the provinces continue to segregate from each other.1 Kaunitz, head of Austrian foreign policy, was not talking about the European Union but about the early modern Habsburg monarchy after the unsuccessful Seven Years’ War. Even if I am sceptical about the benefits of diachronic comparisons, the similarities of the Habsburg monarchy and the European Union are obvious: strong member states with different constitutions and tax systems on the one hand and difficulties in creating a fiscal union on the other. Certainly, there are big differences between these two political systems: the European Union might be a result of the Second World War but its aim is not to wage war against other powers. In contrast, the common interest of the kingdoms and principalities constituting the Habsburg monarchy was warfare or military defence against the Ottoman Empire. The influence of warfare on the development of state finance and administration is well known. In 1926 Rudolf Goldscheid declared: ‘The sociology of finance coincides mostly with the sociology of war. Or in other words: It is impossible to practice finance ignoring that most of all principles and practices are products of wars, the preparation of wars and their consequences.’2 Some years earlier Joseph Schumpeter stated: ‘The most important causes [for the crisis of state finance around 1500] were the growing expenses for warfare’.3 Recent historians and social scientists have affirmed these statements.

  • 4 Cf. Thomas Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg (...)

2In this regard the monarchy of the ‘Austrian’ or ‘German’ Habsburgs was no exception. Maximilian I (1459–1519), who – comparatively successfully – tried to obtain the Burgundian heritage, waged long wars against France, Venice and others. The division of the inheritance of their Spanish and German grandparents between Charles V (1500–1558) and his younger brother Ferdinand I (1503–1564) led to the establishment of two (main) branches of the ‘house of Habsburg’ (‘casa de Austria’, ‘maison d’Autriche’). Whereas the conflicts with France and the battle for the Netherlands became part of the Spanish policy, the leaders of the German branch of the family – since 1526–1527 kings of Hungary and Bohemia, since 1558 Roman emperors – had to focus on the Ottoman Empire until the second decade of the seventeenth century.4 Due to the internal problems of the Ottomans this struggle became less important during the following half-century until the 1660s. In the meantime the emperor triumphed over the rebellious Austrian and Bohemian Estates during the Thirty Years’ War but failed to defeat his rivals within and outside the Holy Roman Empire: the Protestant German Estates, as well as Sweden, and especially the up-and-coming French monarchy. After a few decades of weakness following the war, the simultaneous struggles with France for the Spanish crown and hegemony in central Europe and with the Ottoman Empire for predominance in Hungary became characteristic of external politics at the court of Vienna until the middle of the eighteenth century.

  • 5 Cf. T. Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit…, op. cit.; Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars of emergence. W (...)
  • 6 Elisabeth Klecker, ‘Bella gerant alii: tu, felix Austria, nube! Eine Spurensuche’, Österreich in Ge (...)
  • 7 Ernst Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrh (...)

3If we include the period of the development of the very expensive border defence system against the Ottomans since the 1550s, the Habsburg monarchy regularly waged war against one or more enemies.5 No statement on the Austrian monarchy seems more unfounded than the famous hexameter which is not documented before 1654:6Bella gerant alii. Tu felix Austria nube!’ (‘Let others wage war. You, happy Austria, marry!’). In contrast, Ernst Hanisch, an Austrian historian, declared: ‘Modern Austria originates from a crusade-Empire – from the battle against the external enemy, the Ottomans, and against the internal enemy, Protestantism’.7

4At this point, it is useful to introduce some figures. During the second half of the sixteenth century between 17,000 and 27,000 soldiers garrisoned at the Turkish border had to be paid. In peacetime these troops cost approximately 1.4 million florins, paid by the contributions of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg lands which were granted by the imperial and provincial diets (‘Reichstag’ and ‘Landtage’).

Table 1. The number of imperial fortresses and troop strength at the ‘Turkish border’ in Hungary (second half of the sixteenth century)

Year

Fortresses

Number of soldiers

1556

I 80

16,982

1572

128

19,861

1576

123

27,013

1582

118

21,148

1593

171

27,493

Source: Géza Pálffy, ‘Der Preis für die Verteidigung der Habsburgermonarchie in Mitteleuropa: Die Kosten der Türkenabwehr in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts’, in Friedrich Edelmayer, Maximilian Lanzinner and Peter Rauscher (ed.), Finanzen und Herrschaft. Materielle Grundlagen fürstlicher Politik in den habsburgischen Ländern und im Heiligen Römischen Reich im 16. Jahrhundert, Vienna, Oldenbourg, 2003, pp. 20–44, here p. 24.

Table 2. Calculated salaries of the troops at the ‘Turkish border’ 1545–1601 (without auxiliary troops) in florins per year

Year

Annual expenses

1545

383,640

1546

358,776

1548

600,683

1549

496,939

1554

605,766

1556

789,476

1558

1,025,040

1572

1,220,762

1576

1,442,736

1577

1,461,900

1578

1,368,438

1582

1,418,293

1593

1,726,623

1601

2,307,698*

Note: * Real expenses of the four Hungarian – without the two Slavonian and Croatian – districts of the Turkish border (‘Türkengrenze’).

Sources: G. Pálffy, ‘Der Preis…’, op. cit., p. 27; Peter Rauscher, ‘Nach den Türkenreichstagen: Die Steuerbewilligungen des Heiligen Römischen Reichs im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert’, in Peter Rauscher (ed.), Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen. Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740, Münster, Aschendorff, 2010, pp. 433–485, here p. 434.

5Figure 1. The military expenses of the Habsburg monarchy 1655–1735 in florins (zero = no data)

6Sources: Thomas Winkelbauer, ‘Nervus rerum Austriacarum. Zur Finanzgeschichte der Habsburgrmonarchie um 1700’, in Petr Maťa and Thomas Winkelbauer (ed.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 bis 1740. Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2006, pp. 179–215, here p. 182; Peter Rauscher, ‘Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen. Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740’, in P. Rauscher (ed.), Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen…, op. cit., pp. 5–38, here p. 24.

Table 3. The military expenses of the Habsburg monarchy 1742–1796 in florins (selected years)

Year

Military expenditure

1742 W

21,690,000

1744 W

26,020,000

1748 W

22,310,000

1749 P

14,120,000

1757 W

36,000,000

1761 W

41,466,000

1762 W

32,000,000

1763 P

16,885,553

1778 P

19,692,467

1779 W

64,989,411

1789 W

70,044,409

1792 W

44,331,918

1796 W

109,057,223

Note: W = wartime; P = peacetime.

Source: M. Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars…, op. cit., p. 286.

Table 4. The military expenses of the Habsburg monarchy and state revenues 1793–1798 in 1,000,000 florins

Military expenses

Total state expenditure

State revenues

Deficit

Total

Annual average

Total

Annual average

Total

Annual average

Military expenses –state revenues

Total state expenditure –

state revenues

534

89

808

135

451

75

83

357

Source: Adolf Beer, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs im XIX. Jahrhundert, Prague, Verlag von F. Tempsky, 1877, p. 7.

  • 8 Thomas Fellner and Heinrich Kretschmayr, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung I/1: Geschichtliche (...)
  • 9 T. Fellner and H. Kretschmayr, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung…, op. cit., pp. 234–269; Oskar (...)

7The financing of war had two consequences, firstly the necessity to raise taxes, and secondly extensive borrowing, which led to the growth of the debts of the monarch. Since the Estates had the right not only to decide on taxes but also to administer them until the middle of the eighteenth century, they played a key role within the Habsburg financial system. To understand this system we have to briefly consider the development of the central administration at the Imperial Court and of the different countries: the central authority of Habsburg finance was the Court Chamber (‘Hofkammer’).8 It was responsible for the administration of the seigniories of the emperor and financial rights (‘regalia’) such as coinage, mining, tolls, some taxes on alcoholic beverages and the taxes on Jews. These affairs were also taken care of by the subordinated, but largely autonomous, chambers of the different kingdoms or groups of countries such as the Hungarian, Bohemian, Silesian, Upper or Lower Austrian Chambers, which were responsible for communication with and the control of the various bailiffs. The Court Chamber and the Aulic War Council (‘Hofkriegsrat’), which was responsible for the organization of warfare,9 were the only central authorities for the entire composite monarchy of the Habsburgs. All other central authorities, such as the influential Court Chancelleries, were only responsible for parts of the monarchy.

  • 10 Gerhard Putschögl, Die landständische Behördenorganisation in Österreich ob der Enns vom Anfang des (...)

8We have to consider that it was not only the central financial authority, the Court Chamber, that raised loans, but also the provincial chambers and the Estates.10 This is the reason why we cannot calculate the total ‘public debt’ but only the debts of various funds.

  • 11 Franz Freiherr von Mensi, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs von 1701 bis 1740, Vienna, Manz, 1890, pp. 179– (...)
  • 12 Adolf Beer, ‘Die Staatsschulden und die Ordnung des Staatshaushaltes unter Maria Theresia I’, Archi (...)

9During the eighteenth century central administration of Imperial finance became even more complicated. To solve the credit problems of the monarch in 1706 the Vienna City Bank and in 1714 the so-called ‘Bancalität’ were established.11 While the City Bank, based on some Imperial funds and on the credit of the City of Vienna, should have served the debts, the ‘Bancalität’, also funded with some Imperial revenues, was responsible for raising new loans. Many things changed during the first two decades of the reign of Maria Theresa. While the Vienna City Bank persisted, the ‘Bancalität’ was dissolved. From 1761 a short-lived ‘Estates Credit Deputation’ created ‘a “national credit” which all Europe would regard as secure’.12 By 1760 a commission to serve all debts had been established.

  • 13 Hans Sturmberger, ‘Dualistischer Ständestaat und werdender Absolutismus’, in Hans Sturmberger, Land (...)
  • 14 P. Rauscher, Zwischen Ständen und Gläubigern…, op. cit., p. 288.
  • 15 T. Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht…, op. cit., pp. 191–196.
  • 16 M. Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars…, op. cit., pp. 34–38; Jean Bérenger, Finance et absolutisme autric (...)

10Most of the taxes, especially the taxes for warfare (‘Kontributionen’, ‘contributions’), were never part of the responsibility of the Chambers but of the authorities of the Estates of the various lands such as Hungary, Bohemia, Silesia, Moravia, Upper or Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the Tyrol and others. For tax purposes they had to communicate with the different Chancelleries at the Imperial Court, such as the Austrian Court Chancellery. Due to the fact that the Estates of the various lands granted taxes at the provincial diets (‘Landtage’) the fiscal systems of the different countries differed from each other. Even if there were few meetings of representatives of the Estates of all countries in order to debate financial questions, the Estates of the Habsburg monarchy never formed a corporate body or a kind of ‘Austrian États généraux’.13 Plans developed in the early eighteenth century to form a central parliament of the provincial Estates (‘Ständisches Zentralparlament’), which was to draw up a reformed tax system, were far from being realized. Due to the fiscal autonomy of the various lands, it is almost impossible to write the history of the evolution of taxation under the Habsburg monarchy. However, one thing is quite certain: if we look at the Bohemian and Austrian countries which formed the Habsburg ‘core state’, from the early seventeenth century there are some distinct turning points at the level of the general government (‘Gesamtstaat’). During the sixteenth century the Estates of the various lands granted taxes in the case of open warfare against the Ottoman Empire and to finance the border defence system in Hungary. In return for religious rights some Estates, such as those of Upper and Lower Austria but not the crown of Bohemia, assumed the debts of the monarch, who in return granted the Estates the rights to tax their subjects.14 In this period the monarch depended to a high degree on cooperation with the Estates. After the victory over the Protestant Estates at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War, the oppositional nobility was replaced with loyal Catholic aristocracy.15 At the end of a chaotic period of war the emperor maintained a professional standing army. The conclusion of the Imperial diet in 1654 obliged the provincial Estates to finance these armies. The former occasional contributions for war finance became permanent.16

  • 17 Friedrich Walter, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung II/1: Die Geschichte der österreichischen Z (...)

11The next turning point was the state reform of Count Haugwitz under the reign of Maria Theresa in the middle of the eighteenth century. Since 1748 Haugwitz had successfully negotiated with the various provincial Estates for a ten-year increase in contributions to finance a powerful army and to service and repay debts. With the invention of new authorities of the crown to control the manorial lords and to collect taxes, the Estates lost their right to administer taxation.17

12Following this very short introduction to the development of the Habsburg monarchy, and especially to the key problem of war finance, I will focus on four points. Firstly, who were the taxpayers and which type of wealth was taxed? Secondly, who were the creditors of the Habsburg monarchy – did the Habsburgs depend on foreign creditors or credit markets and what role was played by the Court Jews? Thirdly, I will discuss the limits of Austrian state-building or the decentralized constitution of the Habsburg monarchy, and last, we will look at the groups or authorities involved in the decision-making processes and their political concepts or moral values.

I. The Invention and Development of Tax Systems under the Habsburg Monarchy

  • 18 P. Rauscher, Zwischen Ständen und Gläubigern…, op. cit., pp. 206–220.
  • 19 The main sources of income, by the way, were the taxes on mining and salt. H. Körbl, Die Hofkammer(...)
  • 20 Benjamin Bowman, Das Mautwesen des 18. Jahrhunderts im heutigen Niederösterreich, dissertation, Vie (...)
  • 21 Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Der staatliche Exporthandel Österreichs von Leopold I. bis Maria Theresi (...)
  • 22 Andrea B. Serles, ‘Analyse der Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Vizedomamts in Österreich unter der Enns (...)

13As mentioned before, it is not possible to give a general overview of all the taxes within the various Habsburg provinces for the whole early modern period. For that reason I can only highlight some important sources of income. Particularly during the heyday of southern German commerce from the late fifteenth century until the Thirty Years’ War, tolls were extremely important for financing the monarchy: in the 1560s about 40% of income came from tolls (‘Mauten’ and ‘Aufschläge’ [taxation of the transport of wine and some other goods]), in large part from the Tyrol as the main transit route from Italy to Germany and from the Danube trade.18 Even if tolls became less important during the following centuries, it is quite certain that they remained one of the fundamentals of the ordinary finances of the emperor.19 It seems to be clear who paid these tolls: the merchants, normally burghers, and, ultimately, the consumers, whereas many members of the higher Estates held exemption privileges from tolls or specific passports. Those could be for members of the Imperial Court, members of the Imperial family, certain privileged companies, foreign envoys or ecclesiastical institutions. The tolls were administered by Imperial authorities or mostly by noble tenants.20 Besides the emperor, the nobility or at least parts of it benefited from the tolls. With the reign of Charles VI (1711–1740) Austrian toll policy changed. To support domestic industry, import tariffs were increased. In 1775, at the end of the reign of Maria Theresa, the government removed internal tariffs. From then on, the Austrian and Bohemian countries formed a single customs territory. The losers from this policy were the formerly extremely important foreign trading companies and the merchants of the Imperial cities.21 The income from taxes on wine was shared between the emperor and the Estates (in Bohemia taxation of beer). The emperor’s portion, the so-called ‘Ungeld’, was generally leased – in most cases to the provincial cities.22 The payers of the tax were the consumers.

  • 23 Peter Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems in the Habsburg monarchy, c. 1526–1740: t (...)
  • 24 Cf. the ‘Fleischkreuzer-Patent’ of Ferdinand III for Austria below the Enns, Vienna, 31 March 1643, (...)
  • 25 Herbert Knittler, ‘Eine österreichische “Luxussteuer” des 16. Jahrhunderts’, in Alfred Hoffmann and (...)

14Even the sixteenth century witnessed several fiscal experiments – for example, the implementation of a number of excise and transfer duties which were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries referred to as ‘Akzise’ (excise) and were considered a goldmine for princely finances.23 In Austria below the Enns in 1556, luxuries, food, livestock (the so-called ‘Fleischkreuzer24 – ‘meat money’) and horses, paper, playing cards, foreign wine and other goods became objects of taxation.25

  • 26 P. Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems…’, op. cit., p. 318. On indirect taxation in (...)

15During the Great Turkish War at the end of the seventeenth century (1683–1699), the establishment of a ‘general excise’ (‘Universal-Akzise’) was considered for all Habsburg lands including the Tyrol and Hungary, assuming that the old contribution were to be abolished. As the population had been estimated at 9 million people, the yield of the excise was evaluated at the large amount of 22.3 million florins. Grain, domestic and foreign wine, beer, meat, oil, tallow, vinegar, rossoli (liqueur), spirits, copper, canvas, yarn, tobacco, playing cards, paper, leather, wigs, women’s bonnets, carriages, luxury horses, letters, building timber and firewood, bricks, vats for spirits, and the transfer of wealth in the shape of sales contracts or wedding contracts were to be taxed. While this plan was met with reservations from the Estates of the other lands, the indirect taxation was put into action, step by step, in Silesia. However, the main goal, to replace the contribution on the basis of a land tax with a general excise (‘Generalakzise’), was not achieved here either.26

  • 27 T. Winkelbauer, ‘Nervus rerum Austriacarum…’, op. cit., pp. 206–207; P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and (...)
  • 28 Cf. the literature cited by P. Rauscher in ‘Krieg, Steuern, Religion, Recht. Staatsgewalt und bäuer (...)
  • 29 Liselotte Seeger, Die Geschichte der ständischen Steuern im Erzherzogtum Österreich unter der Enns (...)

16Therefore, the contribution remained the most important tax for financing the army. Since the late seventeenth century the quotas of the Austrian and Bohemian provinces were more or less fixed.27 Crucial for this levy was the role of the nobility and the clergy which constituted the class of the lords of the manor. In most of the Austrian provinces the distribution of the tax duties among the various manorial lords was based on their income from ground rents (‘fermage’, ‘Gülten’) fixed in so-called ‘Gült-Bücher’ (‘books of the ground rents’).28 The land cultivated by the lords of the manor themselves – that is, by their bailiffs, day labourers and compulsory labour – was excluded from tax liability. Only a few parts of the seigniorial land, such as vineyards, were taxed. In addition to the ‘Gült-Tax’, taxes on farmhouses were imposed regularly from the late sixteenth century.29 As a consequence the peasants had to bear most of the tax burden. In the cities, the tax basis of the burghers was real estate. The house-owning nobility in the cities, members of the Viennese Court and the houses and storehouses of abbeys or bishoprics did not belong to the citizenry and were therefore excluded from paying taxes.

  • 30 P. Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems…’, op. cit., pp. 309–311.

17Taxes imposed on houses, farmland and vineyards only affected the wealthier peasants and burghers. From the sixteenth century it became necessary to ensure higher revenues by enlarging the number of those taxed. Income taxes for employees, trade taxes – for example, for the running of mills – capital income taxes and various poll taxes had to be paid by the middle and lower classes in towns and in the countryside.30

  • 31 Cf Franz Pichler, ‘Gülteinlage, Gültensteuern und Steuerpraktiken der Grundherrschaft. Eine exempla (...)

18To conclude this section, even if the nobility and the church had to contribute taxes, for example, in case of warfare, there can be no doubt that the tax system privileged the higher Estates. The nobility and the church participated in the provincial Estates and could therefore determine the tax system. They were also the most important lords of the manor which collected the taxes within their seigniories. In this function they had the opportunity to overtax their subjects.31 Poll taxes affected the lower classes. Tolls and taxes on several goods burdened commerce. Even if taxes were the most important part of state finance, they often resulted from the necessity to service and repay debts. We must therefore take a closer look at the creditors of the Habsburg monarchy.

II. The Creditors of the Habsburg Monarchy

  • 32 Lukas Winder, ‘Die Kreditgeber der österreichischen Habsburger 1521–1612. Versuch einer Gesamtanaly (...)

19It is well known that the most important creditors of the Habsburg monarchy during the sixteenth century were big trading enterprises from southern Germany, especially from the Imperial city of Augsburg, such as the Fugger, Welser, Manlich, Paler and others. Thanks to a preserved register of encashed debt obligations we can roughly estimate the structure of the creditors of the Habsburg kings and emperors from the early sixteenth to the early seventeenth century. In this period more than 50% of the credits came from Augsburg without taking into account the Fugger and the Welser Company. Augsburg was undoubtedly the financial capital of the sixteenth century in central Europe. Creditors from other Imperial cities such as Nuremberg, some Estates and cities of the Holy Roman Empire and the collector of the Imperial taxes (‘Reichspfennigmeister’) played a minor role. The second important group of creditors belonged to the nobility and/or were office bearers of the Habsburg provinces. Merchants from Vienna only became important from the end of the sixteenth century. Due to the structure of the Italian enterprises which had branches in Vienna or in Imperial cities the proportion of Italians is difficult to measure. Even if we can identify some important individual creditors, the Italian merchants only played a limited role.32

  • 33 J. Bérenger, Finances et absolutisme…, op. cit., p. 437.
  • 34 Ibid.
  • 35 Cf. Max Grunwald, ‘Geschichte der Juden in Wien vom Jahre 1625 bis zum Jahre 1740’, in Geschichte d (...)
  • 36 J. Bérenger, Finances et absolutisme…, op. cit., p. 451.

20We do not have good data for the first decades of the seventeenth century. For the reign of Emperor Leopold I, Jean Bérenger analysed the structure of the Imperial creditors. He also came to the conclusion that credits neither from the Netherlands nor from Genoa were very extensive: ‘En définitive l’aide extérieure était quantitativement peu importante’.33 From the 1680s the period of the Viennese Court Jews began. The most famous of those was Samuel Oppenheimer, who started as a military supplier granted almost 50% of the annual credits for the year 1695.34 After the bankruptcy of his enterprise in 1703 the financial administration of the Habsburg Empire had to be reformed by establishing the Vienna City Bank in order to maintain the creditworthiness of the emperor. Oppenheimer and other Court Jews such as Samson Wertheimer granted loans with a volume of almost 80 million florins between 1698 and 1739.35 Like the sixteenth-century Vienna-based Italian and some German bankers, members of the financial authorities or of the domestic nobility and ecclesiastical institutions served as creditors. The total of their loans was quite high. As Bérenger concludes: ‘au moins 60% du crédit était fourni par des capitalistes habitant les pays héréditaires’.36

  • 37 Gustav Otruba, ‘Die Bedeutung englischer Subsidien und Antizipationen für die Finanzen Österreichs (...)
  • 38 Cf. F. Mensi, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs…, op. cit., pp. 340–400.

21The first four decades of the eighteenth century were not fundamentally different from the past. Loans from the Jews, state officials and the nobility were quite common. Although it seems that foreign loans became more important. During the War of the Spanish Succession England and the Netherlands were allies of the emperor. In this situation the Habsburgs tried to obtain loans in the main financial markets of Europe: Amsterdam and London.37 In Amsterdam these loans were secured by the revenues of the important mercury mine of Idria (Idrija) in today’s Slovenia, by the copper mines and by the contributions of Silesia and Bohemia. In London successful credit negotiations only took place during the first and fourth decades of the century. These British loans were like subsidies. In the 1730s the emperor also borrowed money in Genoa.38

  • 39 Cf. P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and government…, op. cit., pp. 272–299.
  • 40 Ibid., table 9.6.

22During the reign of Maria Theresa external borrowing became more frequent. The most important foreign financial centres were Amsterdam and Genoa.39 Politically closely linked with the Habsburg monarchy were the Austrian Netherlands, from which most of the loans came, and the Imperial city of Frankfurt.40

  • 41 Ibid., pp. 300–339.

23The main features of lending during the age of Maria Theresa are described by Peter Dickson. He observed that short-term credits were given by Jewish and non-Jewish bankers of Vienna, who also invested in copper and quicksilver. The creditors of medium- or long-term loans were ecclesiastical or charitable institutions such as brotherhoods, cathedrals, orders, hospitals or poorhouses, the provincial Estates or members of the nobility of the Habsburg monarchy. Many investors in obligations of the Vienna City Bank came from the Austrian Netherlands and Genoa.41

  • 42 Other relations are mentioned in J. Schasching, Staatsbildung..., op. cit., p. 25.

24To sum up: it is quite difficult to distinguish foreign from domestic creditors. Subjects of the Habsburgs, especially office bearers, noblemen, cities and ecclesiastical institutions, were always important lenders to the emperors. They often could not refuse credit applications from the Crown. On the other side the emperor could serve their loans with tax relief, awarding titles or seigniories. The merchant bankers of Augsburg and later of Vienna were interested in Austrian or Hungarian mines, monopolies or access to the growing market of Vienna like the Court Jews. These bankers, bill-brokers and military suppliers were the links between the Imperial Court and the financial markets. Even if the emperor himself took some loans in Amsterdam or London, the majority of his creditors and the biggest part of the credit amounts came from the Habsburg provinces or the closely related Holy Roman Empire, the Spanish or later Austrian Netherlands and northern Italy, especially Genoa.42

III. The Problem of Institutions, or the Limits of Austrian State-Building

  • 43 Peter Rauscher, ‘Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Kaiserliche Finanzkrise und Friedenspolitik im Vorfeld (...)
  • 44 P. Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems…’, op. cit., pp. 300–302; T. Winkelbauer, ‘N (...)
  • 45 Cf. Alfred Fischel, ‘Christian Julius von Schierendorff, ein Vorläufer des liberalen Zentralismus i (...)
  • 46 Helmut Rumpler, Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Hab (...)
  • 47 Kaiserliches Manifest vom 4. März 1849’, Allgemeines Reichs-Gesetz- und Regierungsblatt für das Ka (...)

25Turning to state-building, there was a fundamental problem with the decentralized structure of the Habsburg monarchy. Again and again attempts were made to create a more centralized state and a kind of a fiscal union. In 1614, when Emperor Matthias was faced with bankruptcy, he invited deputies of all provincial Estates to Linz to debate the possibility of financing a new war against the Ottoman Empire. The members of the Imperial government knew that these kinds of General Estates (‘États généraux’) could be dangerous for the power of the monarch.43 After the defeat of the Estates in Austria and Bohemia and after the victory over the Hungarian rebels at the end of the seventeenth century, the Imperial government saw opportunities fundamentally to re-organize the allocation of the tax burden among the Habsburg lands. In spite of Hungarian resistance, the Imperial Court (unsuccessfully) tried to integrate the kingdom of Hungary into a ‘total system’ (‘Gesamtsystem’) of the Habsburg monarchy concerning the financing of the military.44 A few years later (in 1712) the secretary of the Court Chamber, Julius Schierl von Schierendorff, issued a plan to create a so-called ‘Haupt-Einrichtungs-Deputation’. Deputies from all Habsburg provinces were to harmonize the tax systems. Schierl also intended to convene a general parliament (‘États généraux’) – even including deputies of the ‘common man’ (‘der Gemeine Mann’).45 In fact, these plans were never realized. The last attempt to centralize the monarchy by establishing a general parliament (‘Reichstag’) was the constitution of 1849. After the short period of so-called ‘Neo-absolutism’ (1849–1860) the Hungarian resistance led to the ‘compromise’ (‘Ausgleich’) and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (‘Doppelmonarchie’) in 1867.46 Thereby, the creation of what aspired to be a ‘General Monarchy’ (‘Gesammtmonarchie’) of an ‘indivisible Empire of Austria’ (‘das einzige und untheilbare Kaiserthum Oesterreich’)47 failed.

IV. The Groups and Authorities Involved in Decision-Making Processes

  • 48 Cf. Gehard Ammerer, William D. Godsey Jr., Martin Scheutz, Peter Urbanitsch and Alfred Stefan Weiß (...)
  • 49 T. Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht…, op. cit., pp. 191–196.
  • 50 Roman Rozdolski, Die große Steuer- und Agrarreform Josefs II. Ein Kapitel zur österreichischen Wirt (...)

26Looking at a period of c. 300 years it seems impossible to identify in brief the groups and authorities involved in decision-making. I have already mentioned some of the various authorities of the central government and the provincial Estates involved in the tax system of the Habsburg monarchy. Thus I will now turn to a discussion of the role of the various social groups in the decision-making process. In the Estates-based society of the Habsburg provinces the cities and burghers only played a marginal role within the provincial Estates.48 The dominant classes were the members of the higher clergy and especially the nobility. In some provinces, the majority of the aristocracy stood in opposition to the monarch until the early seventeenth century. But after their defeat and the establishment of a loyal nobility, the emperors did not touch the privileges of this class. A small group of extremely rich and influential nobles occupied the highest ranks of the Imperial Court and of the central authorities and were the leaders of the provincial Estates linking them with the central government.49 They defended the interests of their class against efforts to abolish noble tax privileges and to weaken manorial rights towards subjects. They also defended the interests of their provinces against increasing taxes. When Emperor Joseph II tried to harmonize the real estate tax in 1789, the nobility successfully regained their tax privileges only one year later.50

  • 51 P. Rauscher, ‘Zwischen Krieg und Frieden…’, op. cit., p. 252.

27Until the middle of the eighteenth century the nobles and other seigniors were the key tax-collecting authorities. Ordinary people never came in contact with the administration of the monarch or of the provincial Estates. The seigniors used their position to overtax rural society. Due to this situation and to the fact that feudal dues were higher than taxes, we find very few examples of tax revolts in Austrian history. When peasants in Lower Austria rebelled against their lords in 1596 they complained about overtaxation and the fact that they were not allowed to control tax assessment.51 As far as we know, people did not criticize the legitimacy of the taxes, but rather unfair taxation.

Conclusion

28To conclude: the Habsburg monarchy arose from a dynastical and military union of various kingdoms and principalities. Their common interest was defence against the Ottoman Empire, but not to create a political or fiscal union. The tax systems of the provinces developed differently due to the decisions of the particular provincial diets. Generally the most important taxes for the financing of warfare were real estate taxes which had to be paid by the owners of houses and agricultural land. Additional tolls, poll taxes and consumption taxes burdened larger parts of society. The nobility and the clergy were personally excluded from most of these taxes, even if they had to contribute in the case of warfare. These higher Estates controlled taxation: they were members of the provincial diets which granted taxes; the authorities of the Estates administered the taxes; and as lords of the manor, the members of the Estates collected the taxes and had the power to overtax their subjects. Their most prominent members occupied the highest ranks of the Imperial authorities and of the Imperial Court. Finally, the nobles were important creditors of the emperor. Even if there were some attempts to reform the tax system during the age of Charles VI (1711–1740), fundamental changes did not occur before the middle of the eighteenth century when it became obvious that the fiscal basis of the Austrian monarchy had been too small.

29The creditors of the Habsburg monarchy were more or less directly linked with the state. The nobles granted loans secured by Imperial seigniories or by provincial taxes that they themselves had agreed to. The merchants were especially interested in the silver, copper and quicksilver mines, or privileged positions in military supply or dealings in coins. As burghers of the Imperial city of Augsburg, Court Jews or Viennese cambists, they all were linked with the monarchy. By the eighteenth century loans from England, the Dutch republic, the Spanish or Austrian Netherlands and Genoa became more important. Only the capital markets of London and Amsterdam were beyond the sphere of influence of the Habsburg monarchy.

30A fundamental problem for the Habsburg system was the lack of strong central institutions such as General Estates or Imperial authorities with responsibility for the entire monarchy. Since the early seventeenth century the Austrian and Bohemian lands formed the core provinces of the Habsburg Empire, but the integration of Hungary failed and some important German princes, like the sovereigns from Bavaria and especially from Prussia, increasingly became rivals of the Habsburgs. More generally speaking, the fiscal diversity of the Habsburg monarchy corresponded to the lack of political integration of the various provinces and their powerful elites.

Notes

1 Friedrich Walter, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung II/3: Vom Sturz des Directoriums in Publicis et Cameralibus (1760–1761) bis zum Ausgang der Regierung Maria Theresias. Aktenstücke, Vienna, Holzhausen, 1934, p. 101; Johann Schasching, Staatsbildung und Finanzentwicklung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des österreichischen Staatskredites in der 2. Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts, Innsbruck, Rausch, 1954, p. 7.

2 Rudolf Goldscheid, ‘Staat, öffentlicher Haushalt und Gesellschaft. Wesen und Aufgabe der Finanzwissenschaft vom Standpunkte der Soziologie’, in Rudolf Goldscheid and Joseph Schumpeter, Die Finanzkrise des Steuerstaats. Beiträge zur politischen Ökonomie der Staatsfinanzen, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, 1976, pp. 253–316, here p. 258.

3 Joseph Schumpeter, ‘Die Krise des Steuerstaats’, in R. Goldscheid and J. Schumpeter, Die Finanzkrise…, op. cit., pp. 329–379, here p. 337.

4 Cf. Thomas Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im konfessionellen Zeitalter, Vienna, Ueberreuter, 2003, vol. 1.

5 Cf. T. Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit…, op. cit.; Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars of emergence. War, state and society in the Habsburg monarchy 1683–1797, London, Longman, 2003.

6 Elisabeth Klecker, ‘Bella gerant alii: tu, felix Austria, nube! Eine Spurensuche’, Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur mit Geographie, 41, 1997, pp. 30–44.

7 Ernst Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna, Ueberreuter, 1994, p. 25.

8 Thomas Fellner and Heinrich Kretschmayr, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung I/1: Geschichtliche Übersicht, Vienna, Holzhausen, 1907, pp. 68–138; Peter Rauscher, Zwischen Ständen und Gläubigern. Die kaiserlichen Finanzen unter Ferdinand I. und Maximilian II. (1556–1576), Vienna, Oldenbourg, 2004; Peter Rauscher, ‘Personalunion und Autonomie. Die Ausbildung der zentralen Verwaltung unter Ferdinand I.’, in Martina Fuchs, Teréz Oborni and Gábor Ujváry (ed.), Kaiser Ferdinand I. Ein mitteleuropäischer Herrscher, Münster, Aschendorff, 2005, pp. 13–39; Hansdieter Körbl, Die Hofkammer und ihr ungetreuer Präsident. Eine Finanzbehörde zur Zeit Leopolds I., Vienna, Oldenbourg-Böhlau, 2009.

9 T. Fellner and H. Kretschmayr, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung…, op. cit., pp. 234–269; Oskar Regele, Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat 1556–1848, Vienna, Verlag der Osterreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1949.

10 Gerhard Putschögl, Die landständische Behördenorganisation in Österreich ob der Enns vom Anfang des 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Rechtsgeschichte, Linz, OÖ Landesarchiv, 1978, pp. 339–342; Ingomar Bog, ‘Türkenkrieg und Agrarwirtschaft. Einführung in die Probleme der Heeresversorgung und Kriegsfinanzierung vor allem in Österreich unter der Enns und seinem Grenzlandschaften im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert’, in Ingomar Bog (ed.), Oberdeutschland. Das Heilige Römische Reich des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts in Funktion, Idstein, Schulz-Kirchner, 1986, pp. 43–55, here p. 50.

11 Franz Freiherr von Mensi, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs von 1701 bis 1740, Vienna, Manz, 1890, pp. 179–299; T. Fellner and H. Kretschmayr, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung…, op. cit., pp. 93–123; Brigitte Holl, Hofkammerpräsident Gundaker Thomas Graf Starhemberg und die österreichische Finanzpolitik der Barockzeit (1703–1715), Vienna, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976, pp. 103–132 and pp. 392–435; T. Winkelbauer, ‘Nervus rerum Austriacarum. Zur Finanzgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie um 1700’, in Peter Mat’a and Thomas Winkelbauer (ed.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620 bis 1740. Leistungen und Grenzen des Absolutismusparadigmas, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006, pp. 198–203.

12 Adolf Beer, ‘Die Staatsschulden und die Ordnung des Staatshaushaltes unter Maria Theresia I’, Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, 82, 1895, pp. 1–136, here pp. 10–13; Hans Gross, Die Ständische Kredit-Deputation und der Plan eines erbländischen Nationalkredites. (Ein Beitrag zur Finanzpolitik unter Maria Theresia), dissertation, Vienna, 1935; P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and government under Maria Theresia 1740–1780, vol. 2: Finance and credit, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 133–138; see Gaston Graf von Pettenegg (ed.), Ludwig und Karl, Grafen und Herren von Zinzendorf, Minister unter Maria Theresia, Josef II, Leopold II und Franz I. Ihre Selbstbiographien nebst einer kurzen Geschichte des Hauses Zinzendorf, Vienna, Braumiller, 1879, pp. 76–77.

13 Hans Sturmberger, ‘Dualistischer Ständestaat und werdender Absolutismus’, in Hans Sturmberger, Land ob der Enns und Österreich. Aufsätze und Vorträge, Linz, OÖ, Landesarchiv, 1979, pp. 246–272, here pp. 257–258.

14 P. Rauscher, Zwischen Ständen und Gläubigern…, op. cit., p. 288.

15 T. Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht…, op. cit., pp. 191–196.

16 M. Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars…, op. cit., pp. 34–38; Jean Bérenger, Finance et absolutisme autrichien dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle, Paris, Impr. nationale, 1975, pp. 320–334.

17 Friedrich Walter, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung II/1: Die Geschichte der österreichischen Zentralverwaltung in der Zeit Maria Theresias (1740–1780), Vienna, Holzhausen, 1938, pp. 157–161; Gernot Peter Obersteiner, Theresianische Verwaltungsreformen im Herzogtum Steiermark. Die Repräsentation und Kammer (1749–1763) als neue Landesbehörde des aufgeklärten Absolutismus, Graz, Historischen Landeskommission für Steiermark, 1993, pp. 49–51.

18 P. Rauscher, Zwischen Ständen und Gläubigern…, op. cit., pp. 206–220.

19 The main sources of income, by the way, were the taxes on mining and salt. H. Körbl, Die Hofkammer…, op. cit., pp. 415–418. See J. Bérenger, Finances et absolutisme…, op. cit., pp. 314–320; Otto Stolz, Quellen zur Geschichte des Zollwesens und Handelsverkehrs in Tirol und Vorarlberg vom 13. bis 18. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1955, pp. 211–219.

20 Benjamin Bowman, Das Mautwesen des 18. Jahrhunderts im heutigen Niederösterreich, dissertation, Vienna, 1950.

21 Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Der staatliche Exporthandel Österreichs von Leopold I. bis Maria Theresia. Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Österreichs im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus, Vienna, Braumüller, 1907, pp. 296–297; Adolf Beer, ‘Die Zollpolitik und die Schaffung eines einheitlichen Zollgebietes unter Maria Theresia’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 14, 1893, pp. 237–326.

22 Andrea B. Serles, ‘Analyse der Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Vizedomamts in Österreich unter der Enns am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts’, Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur mit Geographie, 51, 2007, pp. 1–38.

23 Peter Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems in the Habsburg monarchy, c. 1526–1740: the Austrian and the Bohemian lands’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi (ed.), Fiscal systems in the European economy from the 13th to the 18th century, Florence, Florence University Press, 2008, pp. 291–320, here p. 318.

24 Cf. the ‘Fleischkreuzer-Patent’ of Ferdinand III for Austria below the Enns, Vienna, 31 March 1643, in Christian Ritter d’Elvert, Beiträge zur Geschichte der böhmischen Länder, insbesondere Mährens, im siebzehnten Jahrhunderte, Brno, Histor. stat. Sektion, in Commission der Buchhandlung von C. Winiker, 1878, vol. 4, pp. 376–378.

25 Herbert Knittler, ‘Eine österreichische “Luxussteuer” des 16. Jahrhunderts’, in Alfred Hoffmann and Herbert Knittler (ed.), Wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Beiträge. Festschrift für Alfred Hoffmann zum 75. Geburtstag, Vienna, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1979, pp. 127–137; P. Rauscher, Zwischen Ständen und Gläubigern…, op. cit., p. 287.

26 P. Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems…’, op. cit., p. 318. On indirect taxation in Styria cf. Franz Freiherr von Mensi, Geschichte der direkten Steuern in Steiermark bis zum Regierungsantritte Maria Theresias, Graz, Styria, 1910–1912, vol. 1–2.

27 T. Winkelbauer, ‘Nervus rerum Austriacarum…’, op. cit., pp. 206–207; P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and government…, op. cit., pp. 186–200.

28 Cf. the literature cited by P. Rauscher in ‘Krieg, Steuern, Religion, Recht. Staatsgewalt und bäuerlicher Protest in Österreich ob und unter der Enns (16.–18. Jahrhundert)’, in Peter Rauscher and Martin Scheutz (ed.), Die Stimme der ewigen Verlierer? Aufstände, Revolten und Revolutionen in den österreichischen Ländern (c. 1450–1815), Munich, Oldenbourg-Böhlau, 2013, pp. 237–272, here p. 247.

29 Liselotte Seeger, Die Geschichte der ständischen Steuern im Erzherzogtum Österreich unter der Enns 1500–1584, dissertation, Vienna, 1995, pp. 224–231.

30 P. Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems…’, op. cit., pp. 309–311.

31 Cf Franz Pichler, ‘Gülteinlage, Gültensteuern und Steuerpraktiken der Grundherrschaft. Eine exemplarische Untersuchung an Stift- und Steuerregistern der Herrschaften Kaisersberg, Lankowitz, Kirchberg am Walde und Frondsberg mit Lehenshofen’, in Herwig Ebner, Walter Höflechner, Helmut J. Mezler-Andelberg, Paul W. Roth and Hermann Wiesflecker (ed.), FS Othmar Pickl zum 60. Geburtstag, Graz, Leykam Verlag, 1987, pp. 483–493; Thomas Winkelbauer, Robot und Steuer. Die Untertanen der Waldviertler Grundherrschaften Gföhl und Altpölla zwischen feudaler Herrschaft und absolutistischem Staat (vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zum Vormärz), Vienna, Verein für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich, 1986, pp. 199–200; P. Rauscher, ‘Krieg, Steuern, Religion, Recht…’, op. cit., pp. 254–255.

32 Lukas Winder, ‘Die Kreditgeber der österreichischen Habsburger 1521–1612. Versuch einer Gesamtanalyse’, in Peter Rauscher, Andrea Serles and Thomas Winkelbauer (ed.), Das ‘Blut des Staatskörpers’, Forschungen zur Finanzgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2012, pp. 435–458, here p. 441 (44% creditors from Augsburg, excluding the Fugger, c. 19% nobles and office holders).

33 J. Bérenger, Finances et absolutisme…, op. cit., p. 437.

34 Ibid.

35 Cf. Max Grunwald, ‘Geschichte der Juden in Wien vom Jahre 1625 bis zum Jahre 1740’, in Geschichte der Stadt Wien, vol. 5: Vom Ausgange des Mittelalters bis zum Regierungsantritt der Kaiserin Maria Theresia, 1740, Vienna, Alterthumsverein zu Wien, 1914, part II, pp. 65–99, here p. 92.

36 J. Bérenger, Finances et absolutisme…, op. cit., p. 451.

37 Gustav Otruba, ‘Die Bedeutung englischer Subsidien und Antizipationen für die Finanzen Österreichs 1701 bis 1748’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 51, 1964, pp. 192–234.

38 Cf. F. Mensi, Die Finanzen Oesterreichs…, op. cit., pp. 340–400.

39 Cf. P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and government…, op. cit., pp. 272–299.

40 Ibid., table 9.6.

41 Ibid., pp. 300–339.

42 Other relations are mentioned in J. Schasching, Staatsbildung..., op. cit., p. 25.

43 Peter Rauscher, ‘Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Kaiserliche Finanzkrise und Friedenspolitik im Vorfeld des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs (1612–1615)’, in Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer (ed.), Frieden und Friedenssicherung in der Frühen Neuzeit. Das Heilige Römische Reich und Europa, Münster, Aschendorff, 2013, pp. 349–386.

44 P. Rauscher, ‘Comparative evolution of the tax systems…’, op. cit., pp. 300–302; T. Winkelbauer, ‘Nervus rerum Austriacarum…’, op. cit., pp. 206–207.

45 Cf. Alfred Fischel, ‘Christian Julius von Schierendorff, ein Vorläufer des liberalen Zentralismus im Zeitalter Josefs I. und Karls VI.’, in Alfred Fischel, Studien zur Österreichischen Reichsgeschichte, Vienna, Hölder, 1906, pp. 137–305; T. Winkelbauer, ‘Nervus rerum Austriacarum…’, op. cit., p. 207.

46 Helmut Rumpler, Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie, Vienna, Ueberreuter, 1997, pp. 380–382 and pp. 405–410.

47 Kaiserliches Manifest vom 4. März 1849’, Allgemeines Reichs-Gesetz- und Regierungsblatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich 1849, Vienna, 1850, no. 149, pp. 148–150, here p. 150; cf. ‘Kaiserliches Patent vom 4. März 1849, die Reichsverfassung für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich enthaltend’, ibid., no. 150, pp. 151–165.

48 Cf. Gehard Ammerer, William D. Godsey Jr., Martin Scheutz, Peter Urbanitsch and Alfred Stefan Weiß (ed.), Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten der Landesfürsten. Die Stände in der Habsburgermonarchie, Vienna, Oldenbourg, 2007.

49 T. Winkelbauer, Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht…, op. cit., pp. 191–196.

50 Roman Rozdolski, Die große Steuer- und Agrarreform Josefs II. Ein Kapitel zur österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Warsaw, Państwowe Wydawnictwo NauKowe, 1961; Renate Pieper, ‘Financing an empire: the Austrian composite monarchy, 1650–1848’, in Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O’Brien and Francisco Comín Comín (ed.), The rise of fiscal states: a global history 1500–1914, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 164–190, here p. 171; Eckart Schremmer, Steuern und Staatsverfassung. Zur Reform der Habsburger Landessteuern im frühen 19. Jahrhundert, vorzüglich in Galizien und der Bukowina. Zeitgenössische Gutachten und Berichte von Regierungsstellen, 1808–1824, St Katharinen, Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 2004.

51 P. Rauscher, ‘Zwischen Krieg und Frieden…’, op. cit., p. 252.

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Auteur

Peter Rauscher is Private Lecturer (Privatdozent) at the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung in Vienna. He is head of the research project ‘The toll registers of Aschach (1718–1737): database and analysis’ at the Austrian Institute of Historical Research (Vienna). His fields of work are financial and economic history, the Habsburg monarchy and the Holy Roman Empire, Jewish History. He has recently published: (with Martin Scheutz, eds.) Die Stimme der ewigen Verlierer? Aufstände, Revolten und Revolutionen in den österreichischen Ländern (c. 1450–1815), Vienna-Munich, Oldenbourg-Böhlau, 2013; (with Andrea Serles, Thomas Winkelbauer, eds.) Das ‘Blut des Staatskörpers’. Forschungen zur Finanzgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2012; (with Barbara Staudinger, eds.) Austria Judaica. Quellen zur Geschichte der Juden in Niederösterreich und Wien 1496–1671, Vienna-Munich, Oldenbourg-Böhlau, 2011.

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