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State Cash Resources and State Building in Europe 13th-18th century

Katia Béguin
Anne L. Murphy

Tax or Borrow or Borrow and Tax?

Monetary, Fiscal and Financial Reform of the Castilian State (Thirteenth–Seventeenth Century)

José Damián González Arce

Note de l’auteur

This chapter was written as part of the HAR2011–26218 project, entitled ‘Fiscalidad y sociedad en la Corona de Castilla al sur del Tajo’ (Taxation and society in the kingdom of Castile south of the Tagus).

Texte intégral

1This chapter reviews the reforms undertaken by the Castilian crown to alleviate the successive economic crises of the pre-capitalist era. The solutions adopted at that time laid the foundations of the modern state through the introduction of new monetary, fiscal and financial systems that ultimately evolved into those in place today. In the interest of brevity, only the beginnings of these innovations, at the time of their implementation, will be addressed, as it is not possible here to analyse how they changed over time.

I. Monetary Policy and Deflationary Measures

2Castile was one of the first European regions to mint a gold coin. Alfonso VIII issued morabetinos starting in 1172, subsequently followed by Ferdinand II, king of Leon, and Sancho I, king of Portugal. In 1215, the maravedí became a money of account, but was not permanently replaced by the dobla as gold coin until the rein of Alfonso X. By 1200, the loss of value of the traditional billon (vellón) in relation to gold had become more acute, due to the issuance of quebrado (debased) billon coins in greater quantities to address the problems facing Castile. The crown pledged at that time not to debase the currency or mint new coins for a certain period in exchange for the establishment of a tax, the moneda forera.

3Alfonso X increased the amount of silver and billon coin in circulation more than he did the amount of gold coin, since gold was reserved for large transactions, and other coin was generally used for trading. The economic difficulties encountered during his reign led to the minting, from 1265, of new debased billon coins, which was also necessary because of the increase in money supply required to support growth in trade. Moreover, he linked the value of the maravedí as a money of account to that of billon coin, thereby separating it from gold coin, which was accordingly traded at a virtually fixed rate as a commodity currency, while the value of the maravedí fell in line with billon coin.

4During the subsequent reigns, billon coin was debased on at least one more occasion. Consequently, to avoid speculation and obtain a bigger gain when minting coins, Alfonso XI took control of the kingdom’s banks (tablas de cambio) for a year. At that time, gold, silver and billon coin could only be purchased at set prices in these institutions. Peter I began his reign with measures to overcome the effects of the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century; he struck the first silver coin with stable value over time, the real. Henry II had to deal with the debt caused by the civil war against his brother, Peter I, notably taking direct control of all public banks. During the regency of Henry III, billon coin continued to lose value, while the legal value of gold and silver increased. This king’s economic and fiscal policies led to the first significant bout of inflation in billon coin, but with money supply under control.

  • 1 M. A. Ladero Quesada, ‘Monedas y políticas monetarias en la corona de Castilla (siglos XIII a XV)’, (...)

5Under John II, in the fifteenth century, currency debasement adversely affected the nobility and the urban oligarchy, which received fixed income denominated in maravedís. It did not, however, affect the crown, which collected ad valorem taxes on trade (alcabalas), or merchants, artisans or farmers, whose interests were served by the existence of sufficiently liquid money supply, albeit at the cost of inflation. Leagues of the nobility forced Henry IV to devalue gold and silver coin in an attempt to strengthen billon coin. The monetary chaos in which his reign ended was settled by the new rulers, Ferdinand and Isabella, who, by allowing the appreciation of gold and silver coin, preserved confidence in such coin as reference currencies, for which they devalued billon coin as necessary, while keeping money supply under control so as not to exacerbate the inflation of prices expressed in maravedís. Finally, in 1497, a law (pragmática) provided for the melting of all existing coin and its transformation into a new currency in the space of 10 months. By 1499, the crown was willing to allow the currency to be regarded as a measure of value in relation to its legal value, regardless of the physical characteristics of the coin, and the Catholic monarchs ordered that all transactions be expressed in maravedís, and never in reals, ducats, florins or castilians.1

  • 2 J. D. González Arce, Gremios, producción artesanal y mercado. Murcia, siglos XIV y XV, Murcia, Univ (...)

6Prices and wages were capped in an attempt to correct the inflation caused by this currency manipulation. But this measure did not remain in place very long, because it soon became uneconomical and impossible to maintain. The bias induced by this measure and its inefficiency stemmed from the fact that it was generally not applied to agricultural products so as not to cause adverse effects to landowners; in consequence, inflation of staple foods became incompatible, over time, with the maximum prices imposed on other goods. To enforce such measures, which were often inefficient for producers and traders, the authorities resorted to seizing products sold at prices above the set ceiling, monetary fines, corporal punishment (humiliating punishments such as the wearing of chains or pillorying) and imprisonment, while artisans who refused to produce at the imposed prices were threatened with the same sanctions, as well as a ban on working for life, banishment and even death.2

  • 3 I. García Ramila, ‘Ordenamientos de posturas y otros capítulos generales otorgados a la ciudad de B (...)

7The reign of Alfonso X began with widespread inflation, possibly a result of currency manipulation and growing demand. In an attempt to remedy this, the Cortes de Sevilla of 1252–1253 adopted new price ceilings, anti-monopoly measures, export restrictions and the first sumptuary laws. Price caps were placed on goods consumed by the privileged classes such as horses, military clothing, saddle ornaments and falconry birds. Prices of other products, including fabrics, leather, shoes, livestock and game, were also capped. The resale of fish, meat and wood was also prohibited. In addition to these measures, the export of rare or strategic products, such as cattle, horses and leather, was prohibited throughout the Middle Ages. Moreover, to encourage competition and limit oligopolies, agreements between merchants and artisans were prohibited, with a view to forcing them to sell their products at market prices, under penalty of imprisonment and seizure of goods sold at agreed prices. The sumptuary laws were designed to curb demand for expensive and discretionary luxury goods, which were usually imported, and to avoid social transgression by the lower classes, which imitated the ruling class by buying goods symbolizing wealth, resulting in price increases. As these initiatives proved ineffective to prevent inflation, similar measures were adopted at the Cortes of 1256, 1258, 1261 and 1268.3

  • 4 J. Torres Fontes, ‘El ordenamiento de precios y salarios de Pedro I al reino de Murcia’, Anuario de (...)

8The situation repeated itself a century later, around 1348, at the time of the notorious Black Death. Faced with the same problems, the same remedies were adopted, including caps on prices and wages in 1351.4 The Black Death decimated workers, inevitably pushing up wages due to the reduced supply of labour. The ruling class used these limits to maintain its purchasing power and disposable income. As its revenues were constant or diminishing – rents remained unchanged while the cost of labourers working the land rose – it sought to curb increases in the prices of the goods it consumed.

  • 5 J. D. González Arce, ‘Señorío regio…’, op. cit.; idem, ‘Los cambistas…’, op. cit.; idem, ‘Asociacio (...)
  • 6 J. D. González Arce, ‘Asociacionismo…’, op. cit.

9In the same vein, restrictions on guilds – regulations prohibiting the existence of fraudulent brotherhoods – were adopted. Some authors contend that these measures were intended to outlaw guilds and trade bodies, and to avoid collusion and oligopolies, which were reputed to push up prices. However, the law was directed against subversive groups of all kinds, including those of a political nature, and was therefore not aimed solely at guilds, which remained perfectly legal, even though some practices were indeed outlawed.5 Thus, in the Partidas, Alfonso X proscribed only guilds of artisans whose objective was to set prices, those that allowed only their affiliates to work and those that only admitted their own relatives as members. So the measure was in reality a ban on oligopolies, seen as anticompetitive and fostering higher prices, rather than guilds, which could continue to exist provided that they did not engage in these anticompetitive practices. In 1351, during the Cortes of Valladolid, Peter I reiterated this regulation almost word for word, reflecting the relative ineffectiveness of the Partidas. Another similarity was that the new laws appeared during a period of inflation, which the authorities sought to curb by stimulating supply.6

  • 7 J. D. González Arce, ‘Señorío regio…’, op. cit.; idem, ‘Señorío regio e implantación de la producci (...)

10The ban on the export of goods that were either strategic or in shortage was also reintroduced in 1351. A bullionist and mercantilist policy conducted since the rein of Alfonso X was aimed at preventing outflows of precious metal. Alfonso X had created for this purpose new customs duties that increased import prices; he had also outlawed the outflow of gold and silver, meaning that importers could only offer goods in exchange for what they brought into the kingdom; further, he prohibited at various times the export of grain, cattle, horses, leather, wine, etc. to promote their abundance and contain prices. To prevent the decline in imports from triggering shortages, he strengthened domestic production, in the textile industry for instance, where some of the local wool was preserved.7

  • 8 J. Torres Fontes, ‘La vida en la ciudad de Murcia en 1442–1444. Precios y salaries’, Anuario de his (...)

11In the fifteenth century, wide-ranging price limits re-emerged, such as those laid down by John II in 1442 after a series of currency debasements. These represented the first mixed limits: the prices of certain goods were set for all, while individual towns determined those of other goods, depending on their individual circumstances. It was an attempt to adapt limits to local economic reality and thus make them as efficient and sustainable as possible. However, the civil war undermined their effectiveness, and the king abolished them soon after their introduction, partly because of pressure exerted by the privileged classes, which controlled certain means of production such as land and livestock.8

  • 9 J. D. González Arce, ‘Inflación y crisis …’, op. cit.

12In 1462, during the Cortes of Toledo, Henry IV again sought to manipulate the currency, which was once again followed by the imposition of limits on prices, particularly for livestock, wool and cloth. This followed not only the devaluation, but also a decade of uninterrupted wage increases, culminating around 1460. It sparked the civil war and political troubles that clouded the latter part of the reign. The crown justified limits on prices by arguing that the debasement of the currency had prompted prices to rise, in real terms, to the same amount of noble metal as before the currency manipulation, and ordering that they be set at their pre-debasement level.9

II. Fiscal Policy

  • 10 J. D. González Arce, ‘La política fiscal de Alfonso X en el reino de Murcia: portazgo y diezmos’, S (...)

13As mentioned above, a mercantilist policy was adopted in Castile from the thirteenth century. Its aim was to restrict flows of precious metal outside the borders of the kingdom through the implementation of new customs duties, replacing tolls (portazgos) such as the diezmo (or tithe, 10% of the value of imports) in the north and the almojarifazgo (5% to 10%) in the south, which had become obsolete.10 The imposition of these duties not only helped improve the trade balance, which was at that time in deficit, but also served to provide the Treasury with money in times of deficit and could be an instrument of consolidation of its accounts in times of economic crisis. It was part of a new tax policy that sought to increase revenues derived from new productive activities and the economic boom experienced after the partial conquest of Andalusia and of the kingdom of Murcia.

  • 11 J. D. González Arce, La fiscalidad del señorío…, op. cit.; J. D. González Arce, ‘Los precedentes de (...)

14Other taxes, however, were created to bolster the royal finances. Each year the Cortes adjusted the tax burden based on estimates of the crown’s expenditure, setting the amounts to be obtained from taxpayers in the form of special taxes, both direct (servicios) and indirect (alcabalas), in addition to ordinary, customary or foreros (i.e. applied under regional law, or fuero) income taxes.11

15The servicios, which appeared in the middle of the thirteenth century, were levies designed to meet short-term needs. The Cortes fixed the total amount to be collected, and the crown the amounts to be raised as monedas or pedido no foreros, in more or less equal parts, and the date by which they had to be paid. The servicios had their origin in the pedido forero, which had by then disappeared, and the moneda forera, which, although still collected, had lost much of its importance. Members of the Cortes (procuradores) determined the amount that each locality should pay, as a pedido or moneda desaforados, and towns spread this amount among their taxable inhabitants, depending on their wealth, thereby establishing the principle of collection per head. The servicios were never provided by fuero and each time had to be granted by the Cortes. Their amount was variable and could be claimed in the form of various pedidos or monedas no foreros simultaneously during a single year, or in several consecutive years. The power exercised by the crown over the Cortes allowed it to obtain what it wanted without difficulty.

16The large amount of servicios granted made it a significant and almost annual source of revenue, especially in times of crisis, when it was very common. However, its importance waned during the fifteenth century, when its total amount was more or less unchanged, while the money of account experienced a sharp decline in value in relation to gold and silver, as we noted earlier.

17The great fortunes were also subject to the servicios, including commoner knights (caballería villana), which by contrast were exempted from payment of moneda forera. In Castile, most exemptions related to moneda desaforada, as opposed to the pedido, so that the amount owed as pedido was often greater than that owed as moneda. Unlike the pedido, the moneda desaforada due from taxpayers was not assessed on the basis of their wealth, and all people paid the same amount above the cáñamas or tax thresholds, putting poor and rich in the same boat, and even allowing the rich to avoid paying, given the proliferation of groups exempted. However, poor taxpayers were required to pay the pedidos desaforados, as well as the moneda, and the minimum level of wealth required for a person to be taxable was higher than that applicable in the case of the moneda. In addition, richer taxpayers paid more: taxpayers were divided into three groups based on their wealth. In 1432, the top bracket was set at 1,200 maravedíes, and the middle and bottom brackets were established accordingly.

18At the Cortes of Valladolid of 1385, after the defeat at the Battle of Aljubarrota against Portugal, a new tax formula was tested, but did not have the desired effect. It allowed John I to introduce a tax under which any taxpayer whose assets amounted to 15,000 maravedís was required to pay 420 maravedís, or 2.8% of his assets, and the amounts to be paid by the less wealthy were assessed on this basis. However, in response to complaints from taxpayers about the tax and the formulas used to calculate their wealth, the crown replaced this tax with a loan of 10 million maravedís, the word ‘loan’ being a euphemism covering special but periodic contributions demanded by the crown from towns, which undertook to raise the funds as they deemed fit, usually in the form of indirect taxes on staple foods (sisas) or surcharges on the price of certain consumer goods, generally staples. The Cortes of Briviesca of 1387 attempted to revive direct taxation levied in proportion to the taxpayer’s wealth. As John I owed a debt to the king of France (540,000 francs), he decreed that ‘all’, whether or not they were exempt, had to pay a contribution based on their wealth: people with 20,000 maravedís had to pay 20 doblas, and so on down to people with 1,000 maravedís, who were required to pay 1 dobla. Moreover, as this income tax was expected to raise enough for the Treasury, the king decided to abandon the six monedas planned for that year; the tax rate was also lowered, leaving with people with 20,000 maravedís required to pay only pay 8 doblas and so on. In June, the king sent a letter to towns, reminding them of these provisions and the fact that he had set the price of the gold dobla, in the wake of protests against the devaluation of the currency, at 50 maravedís per dobla, bringing the tax burden down to 2% for those who had to pay 5 doblas or less. However, instead of falling, the value of this gold coin, in which the tax was to be paid, reached 100 to 120 maravedís per dobla, increasing the number of people exempt and causing tax reform once again to end in failure.

19From the sixteenth century, the servicios of the Cortes of Castile continued in the form of a special tax granted by this representative assembly through a politico-fiscal pact between the kingdom and the crown, the control of which was highly centralized within the institutions of the Royal Treasury. These subsidies were a direct grant or benefit, and not a tax, the result of the powers of parliaments of the Ancien Régime to raise taxes, meaning that they were graces or gifts from the kingdom to the crown in situations of exceptional fiscal uncertainty that in principle were unlikely to reoccur, such as those caused by economic crises. As such, even though they were used repeatedly over time, were granted with great frequency and were collected as ordinary revenue, they were never considered part of ordinary revenue, as during the Middle Ages, and were therefore not considered to result from a kingly prerogative (imperium regio) in the same way as the ordinary tax system.

20Unlike the medieval servicios, they were a personal and direct tax paid by taxpayers based on their wealth. The ability of each person to pay was assessed by towns, and was expressed in tax brackets, or cáñamas, of 10,000 maravedís each. The Treasury determined how many maravedís should be paid in each bracket. Until 1530, this contribution retained its direct nature; thereafter, however, rising debt and liquidity needs led to towns being allowed to collect servicios by whatever means necessary, so that instead of spreading them out among the people subject to tax as was previously the case, some tended to collect them indirectly, through the application of sisas on consumer goods.

  • 12 J. M. Carretero Zamora, ‘Los servicios de las Cortès de Castilla en el siglo XVI’, Cuadernos de his (...)

21During the early part of the reign of Charles I, the servicio grew steadily to fund the endless wars, but also royal weddings, including that of the emperor himself. It increased significantly due to growing requirements and economic crises, and the trend continued with the accession of Philip II. From 1570 until the end of Philip’s reign, the servicio was set at roughly 450–456 million maravedís per three-year period, an amount that had become customary by the seventeenth century.12

  • 13 J. D. González Arce, La fiscalidad del señorío…, op. cit.

22The alcabala was a tax of between 5% and 10% levied on sales or exchanges of property, collected as required by the Treasury, allowing the tax burden to vary in times of crisis. Like the servicios, it was introduced as a temporary measure in response to cyclical factors, although it became widespread from 1342, when its granting was approved by the Cortes of Burgos and Leon. As it never lost its special nature, it was necessary for subsequent meetings of the Cortes to give their consent for its collection, for a given period. The publication of new collections of decisions (cuadernos), which set conditions for its collection, was also necessary. This opportunity was seized to usher in significant changes, including the tax rate. Under Peter I, it rose from 5% to 10%, before being cut back to 5% under Henry II. In 1402, the last cuaderno mentioning this tax was issued; subsequently, as evidenced by the cuaderno of 1405, the allocation of alcabalas no longer required a decision from the Cortes, but followed custom. From 1403, the tax rate was set at 10%, and from 1413 it was borne in full by the vendor.13

  • 14 L. Carpintero Aguado, ‘La contribución del clero castellano a los servicios de millones’, Revista d (...)

23The millones, like the alcabalas, compounded the tax burden from direct taxes (servicios) by indirect taxes. In 1601, the Cortes approved the establishment of a servicio of 18 millones and assumed all powers previously exercised by the towns, the method of collection chosen being the sisa, i.e. the taxation of wine and oil. When it was realized that the yield was insufficient to achieve the stated objectives, the number of eligible taxpayers and products (such as vinegar and cheap wine) was increased. Meat was then subjected to a tax of 1 maravedí per pound or 1 real per head of sheep or goat sold in meat markets. Until the end of the century, several other servicios were successively introduced until this tax was ultimately collected by means of a subscription (encabezamiento) because of the many complaints it prompted in the trading sector.14

24The profound crisis of the seventeenth century began to fade in the reign of Charles II, partly due to his policy of lowering taxes, which had the effect of increasing demand and stimulating productive activity, thereby improving tax collection; the tax burden from millones, alcabalas, cientos and other taxes on the consumption of staples was reduced. These tax cuts helped boost potential demand from population groups – the middle strata of urban society – with the highest marginal propensity to consume industrial goods. They also made it possible to reduce the costs of small urban workshops, the main production units, whose lack of competitiveness, generally attributed to wages, was also caused by the need to support the artisan’s family. Moreover, to offset the reduction of taxes on staple foods, taxes on tobacco, sugar and even cocoa were increased, shifting the tax burden to the upper middle class and luxury goods.

  • 15 B. Yun Casalilla, ‘Del centro a la periferia: la economía española bajo Carlos II’, Studia historic (...)

25This economic policy was neither coherent nor calculated to bring the country out of its decline. However, many rulers of the time had a clear desire for change, and so adopted a series of measures to reduce expenditure by the Treasury, requiring an increase in the efficiency of the tax administration, a reduction in waivers given to individuals and an improvement in collection systems through institutions, such as the superintendents of finance, who increased central control over local authorities. The Council for Trade and Money (Junta de Comercio y Moneda) was created. It was responsible for boosting trade and industry by various means (helping attract foreign artisans, assuming the function of arbitrator in disputes concerning the two sectors and approving ordinances to encourage industrial production), often through a mercantilist policy of import substitution. The immigration of foreign technicians and artisans, mainly from Catholic areas in the Netherlands, was favoured because the most important factor in industry at that time was not fixed capital but labour input, and above all the worker’s technical expertise. The aim was to substitute local production for imports from the regions of origin of these foreign artisans, and not to reduce demand for imported luxury goods via sumptuary laws such as those mentioned above.15

III. Public Debt

26In Castile, the juro was a debt security issued by the crown for the benefit of a person or institution that was granted the right to receive an annuity, in cash or in kind, on some of the Treasury’s revenues or taxes. The nominal value of the annuity was mentioned on the lien, as was the tax on which it was assigned and the town in which it was to be received. The sum of all interest due on juros was known as the situado. The issuance of juros responded to two key needs, on the basis of which it is possible to distinguish different types of securities: grants and loans. In the first case, the crown issued the juros to honour service to the king. The type of security used was generally a juro perpetuo (perpetual), a juro por vida (for life) or a juro de heredad (hereditary). The juros por vida had a fixed maturity, depending on the number of lives for which the lien was valid. Usually, the number was two, at the discretion of the holder, but juros por vida covering one or three lives also existed. The majority of juros were assigned on alcabalas and tercias, the safest annuity with the best reputation.

  • 16 J. D. González Arce, ‘Los cambistas compostelanos…’, op. cit.; C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda (...)

27As a debt instrument, the juro, comparable to what is now known as a debt security, went by the name of juro al quitar, which was created to request a loan. One of its key features was the nominal interest rate, which, applied to the principal borrowed, determined the amount due each year to the holder. The return was dependent on the type of juro, demand for it on the market and the urgency with which the crown needed to place its debt among investors, always ensuring that the interest rate was the lowest possible. This juro was either redeemable in full at maturity or amortisable over the term of the loan. The king could repay the principal or stop paying interest at his pleasure. As there was no single Treasury, payment of interest depended solely and exclusively on the tax revenue of the city or the tax on which the lien was assigned. For investors, it was important to choose the place of origin of the juro: if not enough of the tax in question was collected in a given year to pay the interest, there was no guarantee that the holder would be paid by another Treasury. On exceptional occasions, the crown allowed a change in the tax on which the juro was assigned or the payment of arrears, but only if it expressly received a request of this nature, if it considered the said request to be reasonable and if its financial situation allowed.16

28Issues of juros during the reign of the Catholic monarchs were very modest compared with those made under Philip II, when public debt peaked. No other European crown of the time was able to place on the financial markets a volume of securities similar to that issued by the Spanish crown between 1530 and 1640. Juros began to decline as fiscal problems grew, from around 1620. The economic crisis that gripped Castile at that time and the crown’s inability to increase its resources forced it to make a choice between continuing to pay interest and using money earmarked for interest to finance its expenditure. The crown opted for the second solution, and each year seized a large part of the interest owned on the juros, which was prejudicial to their reputation and prevented it from continuing to issue them as it had until then.

  • 17 A. Castillo Pintado, ‘Los juros en Castilla. Apogeo y fin de un instrumento de crédito’, Hispania, (...)

29Except in very specific cases, until 1625, in contrast to the ‘parties’ (asientos), i.e. larger loans from bankers, juros were not subject to seizure and were not affected by defaults ordered by the crown. As a result, they enjoyed an excellent reputation, which largely explains the strong demand for these securities, inside and outside Castile, for an uninterrupted period of more than 120 years. In 1560, the principal of debt in the form of juros was estimated at roughly 21 million ducats. By 1574, it had already reached more than 48 million ducats, and in 1598, on the death of Philip II, it stood at nearly 85 million ducats. In other words, between 1560 and 1598, the crown each year raised 1.65 million ducats by selling government debt in Castile. Given that the value of the loans granted to the crown by bankers between 1566 and 1596 amounted to 2.3 million ducats per annum, 40% of the crown’s annual borrowings came from the sale of juros.17


1 M. A. Ladero Quesada, ‘Monedas y políticas monetarias en la corona de Castilla (siglos XIII a XV)’, Moneda y monedas en la Europa medieval (siglos XIIXV): XXVI Semana de estudios medievales, Estella, Pamplona, 2000; J. D. González Arce, ‘Los cambistas compostelanos, un gremio de banqueros pionero en la Castilla medieval (siglos XII–XV)’, Medievalismo, 17, 2007.

2 J. D. González Arce, Gremios, producción artesanal y mercado. Murcia, siglos XIV y XV, Murcia, Universidad de Murcia, 2000.

3 I. García Ramila, ‘Ordenamientos de posturas y otros capítulos generales otorgados a la ciudad de Burgos por el rey Alfonso X’, Hispania, 5, 1945; M. González Jiménez, ‘Cortes de Sevilla de 1261’, Historia, instituciones, documentos, 25, 1998; J. D. González Arce, ‘Señorío regio e implantación de la producción textil en la Murcia del siglo XIII (1)’, Miscelánea medieval murciana, 14, 1987; J. D. González Arce, Apariencia y poder. La legislación suntuaria castellana, (en los siglos XIIIXV), Jaén, Universidad de Jaén, 1998.

4 J. Torres Fontes, ‘El ordenamiento de precios y salarios de Pedro I al reino de Murcia’, Anuario de historia del derecho español, 31, 1961.

5 J. D. González Arce, ‘Señorío regio…’, op. cit.; idem, ‘Los cambistas…’, op. cit.; idem, ‘Asociacionismo, gremios y restricciones corporativas en la España medieval (siglos XIII–XV)’, Investigaciones de historia económica, 10, 2008.

6 J. D. González Arce, ‘Asociacionismo…’, op. cit.

7 J. D. González Arce, ‘Señorío regio…’, op. cit.; idem, ‘Señorío regio e implantación de la producción textil en la Murcia del siglo XIII (2)’, Miscelánea medieval murciana, 15, 1989; idem, ‘La organización de la producción textil y las corporaciones gremiales en las ordenanzas generales de paños castellanas 1494–1511’, Anuario de estudios medievales, 38 (2), 2008; idem, ‘El consulado genovés de Sevilla (siglos XIII–XV). Aspectos jurisdiccionales, comerciales y fiscales’, Studia historica. Historia medieval, 28, 2010; idem, ‘Los gremios contra la construcción del libre mercado. La industria textil de Segovia a finales del siglo XV y comienzos del XVI’, Revista de historia industrial, 42, 2010.

8 J. Torres Fontes, ‘La vida en la ciudad de Murcia en 1442–1444. Precios y salaries’, Anuario de historia económica y social, 1, 1968; T. Puñal Fernández, ‘El ordenamiento de precios y salarios de Juan II en 1442. Estudio histórico-diplomático’, Espacio, tiempo y forma, III, Historia medieval, 14, 2001; J. D. González Arce, ‘Inflación y crisis: tasas concejiles y tasas reales: Murcia (1450–1470)’, Miscelánea medieval murciana, 16, 1990,

9 J. D. González Arce, ‘Inflación y crisis …’, op. cit.

10 J. D. González Arce, ‘La política fiscal de Alfonso X en el reino de Murcia: portazgo y diezmos’, Studia historica. Historia medieval, 10, 1992; idem, ‘Almojarifazgo y economía urbana en el reino de Murcia, siglo XIII’, Hispania, 53, 1993; idem, La fiscalidad del señorío de Villena en la Baja Edad Media, Albacete, 2002.

11 J. D. González Arce, La fiscalidad del señorío…, op. cit.; J. D. González Arce, ‘Los precedentes de la fiscalidad extraordinaria de la monarquía hispana: los pedidos reales en la Castilla del sur del Tajo (siglos XIV y XV)’, in A. Collantes de Terán Sánchez and J. A. Bonachía Hernando (coord.), Fuentes para el estudio del negocio fiscal y financiero en los reinos hispánicos (siglos XIVXVI), Madrid, Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto de estudios fiscales, 2010; M. A. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252–1369), Madrid, Editorial Complutense, 1993; idem, La Hacienda Real de Castilla 1369–1504, Madrid, Real Academia de la Historia, 2009.

12 J. M. Carretero Zamora, ‘Los servicios de las Cortès de Castilla en el siglo XVI’, Cuadernos de historia moderna, 21, 1999; idem, ‘El servicio de las Cortès de Castilla: una fuente para el estudio de la fiscalidad extraordinaria y del crédito en la corona de Castilla (siglo XVI)’, in A. Collantes de Terán Sánchez and J. A. Bonachía Hernando (coord.), Fuentes para el estudio…, op. cit.; J. I. Andrés Uncedo and R. Lanza García, ‘Estructura y evolución de los ingresos de la Real Hacienda de Castilla en el siglo XVII’, Studia historica. Historia moderna, 30, 2008.

13 J. D. González Arce, La fiscalidad del señorío…, op. cit.

14 L. Carpintero Aguado, ‘La contribución del clero castellano a los servicios de millones’, Revista de historia moderna, 15, 1996; J. I. Andrés Uncedo, ‘El servicio de millones durante el siglo XVII’, Hacienda pública española, 134, 1995; idem, La fiscalidad en Castilla en el siglo XVII: los servicios de millones 1601–1700, Bilbao, Universidad del País vasco, 1999.

15 B. Yun Casalilla, ‘Del centro a la periferia: la economía española bajo Carlos II’, Studia historica. Historia moderna, 20, 1999.

16 J. D. González Arce, ‘Los cambistas compostelanos…’, op. cit.; C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas 1540–1740’, Estudios de historia económica, 55, 2009.

17 A. Castillo Pintado, ‘Los juros en Castilla. Apogeo y fin de un instrumento de crédito’, Hispania, 89, 1963; A. Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda pública, fiscalidad y arbitrios en la corona de Castilla en los siglos XVI y XVII’, Banca, crédito y capital. La monarquía hispana y los antiguos Países Bajos 1505–1700, Madrid, Fundacíon Carlos de Amberes, 2006; C. Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda…’, op. cit.


José Damián González Arce is Professor of Economic History at the University of Murcia. His notable publications include: ‘Los cambistas compostelanos, un gremio de banqueros pionero en la Castilla medieval (siglos XII–XV)’, Medievalismo, 17, 2007, pp. 85–120; La fiscalidad del señorío de Villena en la baja Edad Media, Albacete, Instituto de Estudios Albacetenses, 2002; ’La política fiscal de Alfonso X en el reino de Murcia: portazgo y diezmos’, Studia Historica, Historia Medieval, 10, 1992, pp. 73–100.

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