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France, Europe and Development Aid. From the Treaties of Rome to the Present Day

 | 
Gérard Bossuat
, 
Gordon D. Cummings

Enlargements and New Aid Paradigms (1975-1995)

The Role of France and the French in European Development Cooperation Policy1

Dieter Frisch

Texte intégral

Introduction

  • 1 Some passages are taken from Dieter Frisch: La politique de développement de l’Union européenne ECD (...)

1From the start, we must avoid a possible misunderstanding: we must not confuse France’s role with that of the French nationals who are European commissioners and officials. While it is normal for a Member State’s representatives – ministers, ambassadors, experts in a Council of Ministers’ task force or on the EDF committee – primarily to defend national interests (albeit without losing sight of the common interest), European commissioners and officials are required by the Treaty and by their status as European “civil servants”, to perform their duties purely with the interests of the European Union in mind. Of course, they can usefully apply their national experience and awareness, but they must use them solely in the service of Europe.

2In my presentation I shall therefore distinguish between the two types of role, starting with the role performed by France.

I. The Role of France

3The organisers of this symposium were right to distinguish between two quite separate aid periods, 1957-1975 and 1975-1995, because the role played by France changed radically from one period to the next.

4The first period, up to the first Lomé Convention (1975), was undeniably dominated by France. Its Euro-African geopolitical vision was already expressed in the act that initiated the European project, the declaration made on 9 May 1950 by the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Robert Schuman, in which the future Europe was encouraged to pursue the attainment of one of its essential tasks: the development of the African continent. True to this vision, it was France that instigated the entire “development cooperation” element of European policy, by insisting, in May 1956, that its partners in the Treaty of Rome negotiations must agree to association with the future European Economic Community (EEC) for France’s overseas territories. Together with the Netherlands, Germany – which had lost its colonial possessions at the end of World War I – was strongly opposed to the French demand, which amounted to making the EEC take on a colonial heritage. Chancellor Adenauer would even have offered a significant fixed sum to get rid of this problem. But all in vain: with Belgium’s support, France managed to get its point of view accepted.

5Association of the overseas countries and territories dependent on France and Belgium, plus those dependent on Italy and the Netherlands, thus became the subject of “Part 4” of the Treaty of Rome (which still persists as “Part 4” of the Lisbon Treaty, with dependent territories such as New Caledonia, French Polynesia, the British Virgin Islands… and, curiously, Greenland, the only country to become an overseas territory after having been an integral part of a Member State, namely Denmark).

6Association was the result of a political compromise: renunciation of the “colonial pact” in return for sharing the burden. The concession which the former colonial powers had to make to the other Member States involved abandoning their virtual monopoly over economic and commercial relations with their overseas territories: according to the principle of non-discrimination, they either had to give up the preferential commercial treatment which they enjoyed or extend it to the other Member States. In reality, owing to the local presence of their firms and an efficient colonial administration, this loss of monopoly had few practical implications, at least initially. In return for this concession, the six founder countries agreed to share the burden of financing the development of the overseas territories. This gave rise to the European Development Fund for the overseas countries and territories (FEDOM), the precursor of the European Development Fund (EDF).

7Grudgingly accepted – because it was imposed by France – this association carried from the start the seeds of discontent and frustration, particularly for the Germans and the Dutch. Use of the term “association” for the relationship with dependent territories – as opposed to association based on Article 238 (now Article 217 TFEU), which concerns relations with sovereign third countries – was a contributory factor in temporarily discrediting European development cooperation policy, when it later became established with independent countries. We shall see that English-speaking developing countries categorically rejected the term “association” whereas French-speaking developing countries were quite happy with it.

8Most of the “associated” countries gained independence in the early 1960s. Except for Guinea (which joined the club in 1975), the newly independent states – 18 African countries, all French-speaking except Somalia – expressed the desire to negotiate an association agreement with the EEC in order to consolidate their preferential position in relation to the Community. This led to the conclusion of the first Yaoundé Convention (1965-1970), officially called the “Convention of Association of the African States and Madagascar associated with the Community” (so they were doubly “associated”!). This association was designed as a global approach covering not only economic relations, notably trade rules – based on the principle of free trade in both directions, but with numerous exceptions on the part of the associated states – but also substantial financial and technical cooperation under the second EDF. The new feature consisted of the common institutions in which all the partners were represented on a basis of equality.

9The transition to a second 5-year period – Yaoundé II, 1970-1975 – encountered considerable problems. Germany and the Netherlands, in particular, were becoming ever less interested in association. In economic terms, it produced hardly any benefits for them, especially as most of the contracts financed by the EDF went to businesses from the old colonial powers, i.e. mainly France. Politically, Yaoundé gave rise to growing criticism, except among the associated States: “neo-colonialism”, “discrimination against those who are not members of the club”, “Yaoundé divides Africa and hampers pan-African efforts”. In the Commission, too, people gradually became convinced that this very limited regional policy on association did not in the long run correspond in any way to the Community’s potential role in development policy.

  • 2 The Lagos agreement never entered into force because of the Biafran war.

10France alone clung doggedly to its “French-speaking association”. However, to ease the pressure from those in favour of a policy of openness – led by Germany and the Netherlands – France had to agree to the conclusion of cooperation agreements, which were in fact preferential trade agreements: in 1966 with Nigeria (Lagos agreement), then in 1969 with the three East African States, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Arusha Agreement).2 But these modest overtures did not restore calm.

11With the impending expiry of Yaoundé and Arusha (1975), two political tendencies emerged, heralding major changes. The first, inspired by France, advocated maintaining and extending an association policy confined to the former colonies at regional level. The other, led by Germany and the Netherlands, wanted to get rid of the Yaoundé policy and replace it with a global development cooperation policy. The Commission intervened in this conflict between “regionalism” and “globalism” in July 1971 with the publication of its first “Memorandum on a Community policy for development cooperation”. In that memorandum, it expressed the opinion that the existing development policy measures no longer corresponded to the Community’s growing international importance, notably in view of the forthcoming first enlargement, and that, while maintaining and extending the association policy, it was also necessary to offer the developing countries practical cooperation options, particularly with regard to trade policy and commodities, but also in the financial and technical spheres.

12With its memorandum and the discussions which it triggered, the Commission opened the way to the decisive approach defined at the Paris summit conference in October 1972, attended by the heads of state and government of the six Member States plus those of the accession candidates. The Paris final communiqué resolved the conflicting views in a constructive way: it stressed the “essential importance” attached to the policy of association and to existing or future agreements with the countries of the Mediterranean basin. At the same time, the Community institutions and the Member States were invited “progressively to adopt an overall policy of development cooperation on a world-wide scale”. This laid the foundations for a structure which would preserve and extend what had been achieved while gradually taking measures in favour of previously neglected developing countries.

13While this was not the outcome that France would have wished, it had nevertheless avoided replacing the “regional” approach with a “world-wide” policy which, in view of the situation of the EEC at the time, would have entailed a great risk of scattering available resources thinly across a large number of countries, achieving no real impact. It was largely because of the insistence of France, supported in that regard by the Commission, that the regional element was saved, and not only consolidated but also enlarged, and that Africa has remained to this day the centre of gravity of European development cooperation policy.

14Whereas France had originally dictated to its partners the approach to adopt, and while it continued to play a decisive role in the period of the two Yaoundé conventions, its leadership was increasingly challenged by those in favour of openness from the 1970s onwards. The first enlargement, when Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the Community (1973), and the opening of the negotiations that led to the Lomé Convention (1975), were to herald the end of France’s leading role. Although, as we shall see, the role of certain Europeans who were French nationals was still decisive for the subsequent development of European policy, France’s role was now reduced to following a politically inevitable path which it took without any enthusiasm. That does not mean that France was resigned to doing nothing. Instead, it endeavoured to salvage what it could from the original French-speaking association.

15You will remember that Protocol No 22 to the United Kingdom’s Act of Accession to the EEC offered twenty independent Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific three options for arranging their relations with the future enlarged Community:

  1. Negotiate a new EEC association agreement jointly with the Yaoundé countries;

  2. Conclude an Arusha-type agreement; 3. Conclude trade agreements.

16The second and third solutions were not very attractive because they did not include financial aid. But even the first solution attracted strong criticism from many English-speaking countries. They interpreted the offer as an invitation to join the Yaoundé Convention “as it stands, which they would not consider under any circumstances. They demanded proper negotiations which they intended to exploit to secure some substantial modifications.

17The Commission and the other advocates of a broader revision of European cooperation policy were very open to the idea of large-scale negotiations, with a thorough review of the Yaoundé policy, negotiations in which the only prerequisite would be to preserve what the “old” associated countries had gained and to treat the “newcomers” on a basis of equality.

18Conversely, others clung to Yaoundé and wanted that association model to be preserved in full. In effect, they were offering a kind of “Yaoundé III” to those who were willing to join. It was the president of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was the leading spokesman of a group of conservative countries. Although he knew that the trade rules whereby most of the French-speaking countries granted preferences to France, and, by extension, to the Europe of Six, was the main stumbling block for the Commonwealth countries that did not have this type of “reverse” preferences, Senghor called them the glue that held the association together, and insisted that they stay.

19A rift was beginning to open up. Already, parallel negotiations were looming on the horizon, with a coalition in favour of Yaoundé and a coalition against; it would mean two separate agreements which would assuredly lead to deadlock.

20It is hard to say whether France played an active role in this dangerous manoeuvre which, instead of bridging the frontiers which were the legacy of colonisation, would have increased the divisions between French- and English-speakers in Africa. In any case, the French allowed Senghor to wage his campaign, whereas they could probably have prevented that.

21It is the Commission that deserves merit for having shown the way out of this crisis, led by the French Commissioner Jean-François Deniau. First, through his chef de cabinet, Jean Chapperon, he authorised me to announce at a decisive meeting in February 1973 in Accra, that Europe was not demanding “reverse” preferences from its future partners (the English-speaking countries were at first incredulous, then – after I had confirmed it – genuinely surprised). In April 1973, the Commission presented its proposals in the form of a document known as the “Deniau memorandum”, which opened the way to the large-scale negotiations which culminated in February 1975 with the signing of the “ACP-EEC Lomé Convention” (the term “association” had been dropped!) by 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific States and by the Community and its nine Member States.

22It is interesting that all the independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa (except South Africa, with its apartheid regime) were invited to join in these negotiations. That was a deliberate move aimed at demonstrating a willingness to open up beyond the old colonial links. Thus, the African states in “Lomé” included Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea.

23There is much less to be said about France’s role in the second period under review, from 1975 to 1995. Having overcome its initial reticence, France loyally played the Lomé game. It showed solidarity in contributing the same percentage as Germany to the financing of the 4th EDF, that of Lomé I, though the volume had more than tripled from 900 million to 3 000 million units of account since Yaoundé II. It was France that made sure that Lomé concerned itself in one way or another with the instability of the commodity markets. Since price stabilisation appeared technically and politically impossible, the Commission proposed and secured the creation of a system to stabilise export earnings, known as “Stabex”, a minor revolution at the time. It was also very largely thanks to France’s vigilance that Africa today is still a central concern of European development cooperation policy.

24If France’s influence over European policy did not reach its full potential, it was partly because French cooperation policy itself was not always conspicuous by its coherence and credibility: powers were fragmented between the Élysée, “rue Monsieur” (the Ministry of Cooperation), Quai d’Orsay, Rivoli/Bercy, AFD etc. Sometimes a minister was in charge (but never with full responsibility), sometimes a deputy minister, sometimes a secretary of state. In that regard, the British – with a well-organised, coherent national policy on development cooperation – were more successful in influencing European cooperation policy, and I am pleased to say that their influence was positive.

25That said, I feel that France acquired a taste for what gradually became “a global European policy on world-wide development cooperation”; especially once it began to feel cramped by its own policy limited to cooperation with its own “backyard” or “core aid recipient” countries. First, perhaps as a result of Lomé, France discovered that there were other countries of economic and political interest in sub-Saharan Africa, beyond the “core” countries. It was actively involved in Europe’s Mediterranean policy, and willingly played a part in the extension of European cooperation to include the developing countries of Asia and Latin America.

26To conclude this section on France’s role: France, somewhat in spite of itself, was indeed the originator of the edifice of European development cooperation policy, which has never stopped growing. By forcing its partners to agree to the association of the overseas territories, France laid the foundations for the Yaoundé conventions. It was the malaise that gradually emerged in the face of the geographically narrow framework of Yaoundé that generated the creative tension which opened the way to Lomé. For its part, Lomé led to the first real discussion on a coherent Mediterranean policy, culminating in far-reaching cooperation agreements from the mid-1970s. This exclusive concentration on the African continent gave rise to questions, perhaps a feeling of discrimination, on the part of the other two developing continents, Asia and Latin America. In response, Europe began establishing cooperation links and concluding agreements with numerous Asian and Latin-American countries. The 1976 Community budget records an initial, very modest amount (20 million units of account) under this heading.

27Goodness knows what would have become of European cooperation policy without the “historical accident” of the association of overseas countries and territories. In retrospect, we must be grateful to France for having put this cuckoo’s egg into the nest of a nascent Europe!

II. The Role of the French

28Let us now turn to the people, the European commissioners and officials of French nationality, to examine their role in the construction of European policy on development cooperation.

29At first sight it is surprising. Here, too, it is worth noting the break between the two pre-Lomé and post-Lomé periods; the first was marked by a very strong role played by France’s overseas heirs, the second by a new generation of Frenchmen driven by a desire for openness and reform in cooperation policy, and with the means to achieve that.

30For a long time, in fact until 1984, the development portfolio was in the hands of a French commissioner. That is not surprising if we realise that, even though the president of the Commission has the right to allocate responsibilities among its members, the commissioners’ portfolios often reflect certain political or economic priorities of their country of origin. In the case of development, it was also true that the other nationalities were not, at first, very interested in this responsibility. The first two commissioners, Robert Lemaignen (1958-1962) and Henri Rochereau (1962-1970), the former connected with business circles with African interests, the latter a former Gaullist minister, managed their portfolio diligently without making any permanent impression. The third, Jean-François Deniau (1970-1973), wrapped up in his work as the commissioner in charge of the first enlargement, left his “development” portfolio very largely to his chef de cabinet, Jean Chapperon. He nevertheless became the commissioner for the transition to Lomé (“Deniau memorandum”), even though it was his successor, Claude Cheysson, who really got to grips with the matter.

31At administrative level, at DG VIII in those days, during the period from 1958 to 1975 we find that European officials of French nationality, most of them from the French overseas service, played a dominant role, though it did decline towards the end of this period.

32As former colonial administrators, they were practically the only ones with local knowledge, able to contribute practical experience, used to dealing with the Africans, confident that they knew what had to be done and how to approach it. Though their active presence was very valuable, it also brought the risk of perpetuating a paternalistic style, whereas it was necessary to adapt to the new context of independence.

33The only colleagues who could also contribute African experience were the Belgians and a few Luxembourgers who had served in the Congo. But compared to the French, they were a small minority.

34We, the “young men” of the day, of other nationalities, were entering unknown territory and bringing nothing with us but our education; we benefited from the experience of our French colleagues but were therefore very heavily dependent on it. As we gained our own experience, frustrations were to become apparent. We wanted to rationalise the process of deciding priorities and selecting projects, a process hitherto characterised by discretionary pragmatism or even simply the intuition of our French colleagues.

35That is the context surrounding the “Jacques Ferrandi case”, of which much has been spoken and written. A typical product of the French overseas service, a former Director General of Economic Services in French West Africa, chef de cabinet of the first French commissioners and then Director of the EDF at DG VIII, Ferrandi was a powerful man who cultivated his network of contacts with African political elites and knew how to secure the loyalty of his teams, taking all nationalities together.

36True, his taste for the symbols of power (red carpet, motor cycle escorts, decorations, photos with inscriptions by heads of state etc.) could be held against him.

37But what is rarely mentioned is the sense of honour and loyalty that were characteristics of the Corsican Jacques Ferrandi. I can testify that he never forgot the trust that the German Director General, Heinrich Hendus, placed in him, in appointing him “EDF director” by merging two pre-existing directorates, knowing that he was thus giving him considerable power. Ferrandi respected Hendus and never betrayed his trust. In the many years that I worked closely with them as assistant to the director general, I can remember only one serious incident between these two men (and it concerned the technical solution to the question of the water supply for the town of Dakar), but it was soon resolved. I therefore strongly contest this caricature of loyalty and fidelity which has presented Ferrandi as the omnipotent boss thirsting for power.

38As Director of the EDF, he preferred to follow his intuition rather than discuss priorities on the basis of economic research, or even rates of return. “In Africa, everything is a priority”, he liked to answer to anyone who tried to understand why a particular road had to be financed but not a particular hospital; or why it was necessary to help finance a particular economically dubious railway with the argument “if this project goes ahead, there is no question of it being done without the EDF”. Although Ferrandi probably often saw things correctly in making his decisions, his mistrust of the technical and economic research done by “development experts” and his empiricism were likely to irritate young officials seeking a more “rational” approach to the development issue. There were rumbles of protest…

39In July 1974, they took the form of a document submitted to Ferrandi by a small, informal think tank comprising officials of various nationalities on the EDF staff, including some Frenchmen. This document set out a frankly critical analysis of the “projects” department and questioned the management of the EDF. It went on to develop proposals for making that management more coherent, transparent and predictable, and advocated cautious devolution of decision-making power. Jacques Ferrandi responded by inviting the protestors to lunch to explain his vision of Africa and cooperation with the associated states. Despite a good meal, the guests left dissatisfied as the talk was all about a conservative approach. All the same, the think tank had the satisfaction of seeing some of its ideas appear in “Lomé I” in 1975, particularly in relation to the planning of the EDF’s financial and technical cooperation.

40During this first period, French interests and the dominant role of European officials who were French nationals coincided so closely that the observer could easily confuse them (as many writers did). Yet the strong position of Jacques Ferrandi and his colleagues from the French overseas service certainly did not mean that they were following instructions from Paris. In reality, the feeling of power and responsibility within DG VIII was accompanied by a desire for autonomy in relation to Paris. Our French colleagues certainly felt that they were acting in the common interest of Europe, to the point where Ferrandi was convinced that the only genuinely European policies from the initial years of creation of the Community were agricultural policy and development cooperation policy. It matters little if he considerably over-estimated the role of the latter. But his decidedly subjective appraisal is credible and testifies to his commitment to Europe.

41Following the Paris summit (1972), major changes set in. The first enlargement (1973), with the arrival of the British in particular, ushered in a very broad geographical openness to development cooperation, an open approach desired and prepared by the Commission and the “globalist” Member States. At European level, the main player in this movement was a French commissioner, Claude Cheysson (1973-1981). Not well-known before he arrived in Brussels, a graduate of the École Polytechnique and the École Nationale d’Administration, a technocrat and diplomat who became a politician on the European scene, Cheysson was the man for major changes. Open, dynamic, a man of action (some would say hyperactive), anglophile (with fluent English), an impulsive decision-maker (people feared his sudden decisions), a tireless traveller, Cheysson aimed to reform and open up not just the geographical framework and the set of European cooperation policy instruments, but above all to reform the way of doing things, the style: he was determined to end the paternalism of the “Ferrandi period”, however benevolent and honest it was, and replace it with a transfer of accountability to our development partners. As regards the management of the EDF, the idea that “We know what is good for you” gave way to the famous: “It’s your money! You will use it best according to your own priorities. We are here to give you technical advice if needed.” For Ferrandi, that was intolerable.

42So it was a French commissioner who ended the reign of a senior French official. We shall never know whose side the French Government was on. Apparently, it just let things happen. All the better for the independence of the French players on the European scene!

43Jacques Ferrandi left, taking early retirement in 1976, disappointed, wounded, bruised. In my view, it is the bitterness of this proud Corsican, when diminished by age, that explains some of the statements that appeared in later interviews, statements that Ferrandi would never have made in calmer moments, I am sure.

44Cheysson was the French commissioner who inaugurated the new era, the age of “Lomé” and the conventions that came after it, while France, in its bilateral policy, tended to keep within its traditional preserve, opening it up very cautiously and as little as possible to newcomers.

45If we are looking for points of reference, we could say that 1975 really marks the start of a more coherent, more rational and more ambitious policy on cooperation between Europe and the developing world. And Lomé acted as the catalyst and the pioneer.

46The progressive Claude Cheysson, champion of laissez-faire (“It’s your money”) was followed in 1981 by Edgard Pisani (1981-1984), the last French national to be appointed as development commissioner. It is hard to imagine two more different temperaments: a former minister under General de Gaulle turned socialist, Pisani got to the bottom of development issues, without rushing, taking time to reflect. He was the development thinker, the imaginative visionary (though always realistic) who was determined to tackle the “real issues”: rural development, food security, control of desertification; he dreamt of a “well in every village”. Above all, he wanted action to be the outcome of an in-depth dialogue with partner countries. The era of laissez-faire was followed by the period of “policy dialogue” and mutual commitments. This more demanding approach (sometimes wrongly likened to the imposition of conditions) was met with reticence among our partners in the Lomé III negotiations in 1983-1984. Claude Cheysson, who had become the Minister for External Relations (France was president of the Council during the critical phase of the negotiations), took the side of the ACP countries. One witness remembers an acrimonious argument, in the presence of the ACP ministers, between the Council president, Claude Cheysson, and the development commissioner, Edgard Pisani, on this concept of “policy dialogue”. But in the main, Pisani’s tenacity won the day: Lomé III changed the quality of our relationship with developing partners; while the “paternalism of yesteryear” had given way to the almost total transfer of responsibility to our partners, we were now sharing that responsibility with them via a dialogue which enabled both parties to put their ideas on the table and arrive at mutually acceptable agreements, in the form of cooperation programmes founded on mutual commitments. In fact, a genuinely “adult” partnership, free from any complexes.

47The differences of stance and approach between such figures as Cheysson and Pisani, of the same nationality and members of the same party, clearly show the important personal role of the European players in positions of control, and especially their independence in relation to the governments of their countries of origin.

48At the end of 1984, Edgard Pisani left, and that meant the departure of the last French development commissioner following the successful negotiation of Lomé III, a convention which comprised some real innovations. From 1985 (the first “Delors commission”) the “development” portfolio passed to other nationalities in the following order: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Danish, Belgian, and currently Latvian.

49It is true that Claude Cheysson returned, to everyone’s surprise, in 1985 for a final four-year term. As the two external portfolios had already been allocated to the Belgian Willy de Clercq (external relations and trade policy) and the Italian Lorenzo Natali (development), President Delors gave way to Cheysson’s insistence and created a third external portfolio, which meant taking some of the powers from the “development” portfolio (and DG Development). Ever since, the Commission has had difficulty in ensuring a rational, coherent approach in a sphere of policy divided for purely circumstantial reasons. Cheysson, who built up a global development policy on a European scale, was therefore also the one who started to dismantle that policy, just to satisfy his own professional interests. I think that he sincerely regretted that decision subsequently.

50Was it purely by chance that there were no longer any French nationals among the commissioners responsible for development, or was that due to France’s loss of interest in European cooperation policy? I do not know the answer.

51It remains to be seen what role French European officials played after Jacques Ferrandi left. Most of the colleagues from the old French overseas service reached retirement age or left early, overtaken by too many major changes. I can remember only one who successfully “converted” to the new context, learning English and speaking it correctly, accepting the changes of method (out of loyalty rather than conviction): André Auclert, who left in 1989 as Deputy Director General of DG Development.

52But for a long time, development cooperation continued to benefit from the assistance of excellent French colleagues, true professionals; among the senior officials I would mention Philippe Soubestre and Bernard Petit. As director general (1982-1993), I was privileged to work in full agreement with French deputy directors general, who were loyal at all times.

53Unfortunately, there is now a lack of Frenchmen among the higher echelons here too. We must hope that there are some young ones who will make their way up.

Notes

1 Some passages are taken from Dieter Frisch: La politique de développement de l’Union européenne ECDPM, Maastricht, March 2008.

2 The Lagos agreement never entered into force because of the Biafran war.

Auteur

With degrees in economics from Bonn University and in modern languages from Heidelberg University, Dieter Frisch served at the European Commission from 1958 to 1993, during which time he spent 24 years in various jobs relating to development cooperation policy. Director General of development from 1982 to 1993, he negotiated the Lomé III and IV Conventions. He is the author of numerous articles and in particular of a pamphlet on La politique de développement de l’Union européenne : un regard personnel sur 50 ans de coopération internationale, ECDPM, 2008. He is on the board of governors of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM, Maastricht) and chairs the planning committee. Dieter Frisch is also a co-founder of Transparency International and is a member of its advisory board and special adviser on European affairs.

© Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, 2013

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