Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement économique de l’Europe
| ,B. Les retombées du Plan Marshall sur les autres économies occidentales
The Netherlands, the Marshallplan and the European payments union, 1947-1950
Les Pays-Bas et la genèse de l’Union Européenne de Paiement, 1947-1950*
Résumé
L’une des principales préoccupations des Pays-Bas, après le discours de Marshall du 5 juin 1947, fut d’obtenir la plus grande part possible de l’aide globale annoncée. Mais ce n’était pas la seule. Les Néerlandais comptaient sur la coopération européenne au sein de l’OECE et sur le rôle dirigeant des États-Unis pour créer un cadre d’échange et de paiements en Europe permettant de soutenir l’effort de reconstruction et de croissance économique du pays.
À cette fin, et avant même la tenue de la Conférence sur la Coopération économique européenne organisée à Paris durant l’été 1947, les Pays-Bas ont plaidé en faveur d’un plan qui organise les échanges et les paiements européens sur une base multilatérale. De concert avec la Belgique, ils ont présenté à la Conférence sur la Coopération économique européenne un plan qui prévoyait d’utiliser une partie de l’aide Marshall pour financer un accord de paiements intra-européen. En dépit de leurs considérables divergences d’intérêts en matière économique, les Néerlandais et les Belges ont adopté le point de vue selon lequel il était indispensable de surmonter le bilatéralisme pour poursuivre la reconstruction économique de l’Europe.
Ce premier plan n’a pas été accepté ; toutefois des accords de paiement intra-européens ont été par la suite conclus en 1948 et 1949. Les principales caractéristiques de ces accords étaient de prévoir d’une part l’instauration d’un accord de compensation multilatéral, et d’autre part l’utilisation d’une partie de l’aide Marshall pour la création de lignes de crédits entre les pays de l’OECE. Il a fallu attendre l’été 1950 pour voir se créer une Union Européenne de Paiements (UEP) au sens plein du terme.
L’UÈP, rendue possible par la générosité des crédits américains, a instauré la convertibilité entre les monnaies européennes. Toutefois, l’importance de l’UEP n’était pas seulement économique. Pour Washington, c’était le plus grand succès obtenu en matière d’intégration européenne pendant la durée d’application du Plan Marshall.
Le présent article retrace la position des Pays-Bas sur les accords de paiement intra-européens signés par la suite, et sur l’UEP, depuis là première proposition de l’été 1947 jusqu’à la création de l’UEP en 1950. Les responsables de la politique néerlandaise avaient la conviction que le multilatéralisme et la convertibilité des monnaies au plan régional étaient à long terme de l’intérêt de leur pays. La composition des exportations et des importations néerlandaises désavantageait les Pays-Bas placés dans un système d’échanges presque exclusivement bilatéral. L’instauration d’échanges et de paiements multilatéraux sur une base régionale était considérée comme la condition indispensable d’une croissance fondée principalement sur les exportations.
D’autres intérêts importants à court terme étaient également en jeu. En premier lieu, le fort déficit de la balance commerciale des Pays-Bas avec la Belgique, tenant apparemment à des causes structurelles. De 1945 à 1949, ce déficit a été financé par les États-Unis et par la Belgique dans le cadre des accords de paiement intra-européens et de l’UEP.
Texte intégral
Introduction
- * La traduction de ce résumé a été réalisée par le Service de traduction du ministère des Finances.
1After Secretary of State Marshall’s offer of aid for European recovery on 5 June 1947, one of the primary Dutch concerns was to get as large a part as possible of the American aid package. This was not however their only goal. The Netherlands looked to regional economic cooperation in western Europe to create a framework for continuing économie recovery. On 12 July 16 European countries gathered in Paris to formulate a response to Marshall’s speech. Several days earlier, the Benelux countries had agreed to a joint position for the conférence, a position that was based on a common perception of the obstacles to European économie recovery.
- 1 « Ontwerp Mémorandum », annex to letter REA 547 H/EB from Hirschfeld to the REA, the Hague 10.7.47 (...)
2The main underlying principle of the Benelux position was that Europe should make full use of its existing productive capacity, a position that was directed especially against French economie ambitions. The Benelux countries explicitly rejected drafting a joint plan for économie recovery on the basis of large scale reconstruction and industrialization plans, such as the Monnet plan in France. From the Benelux point of view, recovery was hampered not by a lack of productive capacity but by constraints on existing capacity, constraints of both a political and économie nature. This concerned, first, the ceilings on German industrial production and the limited access of neighboring countries to the German market. One of the primary goals of the Benelux was the integration of German economie potential in western European recovery. Secondly, the Benelux countries wanted to develop intra-European trade and payments on a multilateral basis1.
I. The Paris conference and the benelux plan for a multilateral payments system
3Trade in post-war Europe was based on a network of bilateral trade and payments agreements. By 1947 these had become a serious obstacle to the continued growth of trade. Bilateralism meant that equilibrium had to be attained with each individual trading partner. The effects of this were somewhat softened by the inclusion of revolving crédits -the so-called swings- in the bilateral agreements. But the main objection to bilateralism remained : a déficit with one country could not be offset by a credit with another. In practice the level of trade was therefore determined by the weaker of the two trading partners. The Benelux hoped that at the Paris conférence the sixteen participating countries would be able to break the constraints of bilateral trade by placing intra-European trade and payments on a multilatéral basis.
- 2 Verslag Hirschfeld, Parijs 2.8.47, Annex X (MBZ, 610.302 Marshall-hulp, Verslagen van de Nederlands (...)
- 3 Ibid. ; Overzicht van de Besprekingen in Parijs in de week van 21 tôt 25 Juli 1947 (MBZ, 610.302 Ma (...)
4To achieve this, the Benelux countries proposed the création of a multilateral European payments System. Europe, they said, should « resort to multilatéral instead of bilateral payments agreements. This would mean that European currencies would once more become interchangeable. » The ultimate aim of any such System was not only to make the currencies of the participating countries « transférable from one European currency into the other » but « to make them convertible into dollars »2. The long term goal was in other words « the total removal of exchange restrictions » and the realization, in practice, of the Bretton Woods System3. Certainly the latter was not an immédiate objective, yet the idea of an early return to transferability of European currencies was radical enough in itself.
- 4 F.A.B. Keesing, « Het Plan Marshall en het inter-Europese betalingsverkeer », in : Economisch Stati (...)
5To back up these general objectives F.A.G. Keesing, an advisor to the Dutch Minister of Finance, and H. Ansiaux, a director of the Belgian central bank, drafted a proposai containing the broad outlines of an intra-European payments System. The plan envisaged a multilateral clearing System which would supersede the existing bilateral agreements. The credit and débit positions of a country would be pooled so that a country would no longer have to seek bilateral balance of payments equilibrium with every other country. A credit position with one country could then be used to offset a déficit with another. The resulting net position would be to the group as a whole rather than to any one country. The crédit margins in the bilateral treaties, the swings, would also be pooled so as to create multilatéral credits with the System as a whole. The United States would be asked to provide aid so that once a country had exhausted its credit, its déficit could be financed out of a dollar fund. A net créditer would extend credits to the System, beyond which it would be able earn dollars out of the fund4.
- 5 See for example A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (London 1984) 67, 77 & 2 (...)
- 6 Bespreking 30 juni 1947 op het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken betreffende het Plan-Marshall, #10 (...)
6It is an often made mistake to describe the plan as a purely Belgian initiative5. At first sight the proposai particularly suited the Belgian position. Such a scheme would allow Belgium to earn dollars on its European export surplus to cover its déficit with the Western Hemisphere. Using the aid program to liberalize intra-European trade was therefore very much a Belgian interest. However, from the first moment that policy makers in the Hague started formulating the Dutch response to the Marshall plan and before a coordinated Benelux position had been drafted, a multilatéral payments plan, backed by dollar aid, was seen as being in the interest of the Netherlands6.
- 7 For the perceived short term character of the European debtor position see : Handelingen van de Twe (...)
- 8 Economie Reconstruction in the Netherlands, (Min. of Économie Affairs, den Haag 1952) 74-5.
7In 1947, the Netherlands were in debt on most of their current account balances with other Western-European countries but the Hague consistently viewed the déficit in intra-European trade as a short term problem which could and would be overcome if a return to the autarchic policies of the thirties were avoided7. Belgium was the only European country with which the Dutch did not foresee a more balanced trade relationship in the near future. A more flexible trade and payments System in Europe would allow not only offsetting the déficit with Belgium by credit positions which the Netherlands hoped to attain elsewhere in Europe but, if financially backed by Washington, would also funnel part of Marshall aid into covering that deficit. Furthermore, the Netherlands hoped to profit from both increased flexibility and volume of trade. The Netherlands were heavily dépendent on imports of so-called essentials, such as Steel and capital goods, while the Dutch export package consisted of many non-essential products such as fruit and vegetables, dairy products and flower bulbs8. In a system of bilateral exchange and trade Controls the Netherlands were especially vulnerable as any attempt by other countries to reduce imports would always be directed first and foremost against non-essentials. Ideally the payments scheme would, in other words, help the Netherlands to finance its European déficit while at the same time creating a framework for increasing and more flexible trade which would help overcome that déficit.
- 9 Brief 4É 40/8 H/EB van Hirschfeld aan de Minister, Parijs 1.8.47, Annex 1 Bespreking met Undersecr. (...)
8Washington strongly advocated the creation of a multilateral clearing System in Europe but was reluctant to pick up the tab. At the Paris conférence the Americans argued that the aid program was meant to finance Western Europe’s debt with the Western Hemisphere, not trade between European countries. Furthermore, the Americans wanted to retain control over the actual spending of aid. In giving dollar aid to back a European payments scheme, Washington would lose control over the ultimate destination and therefore the spending of the dollars thus allocated. With a view to attaining public support for the Marshall plan in the United States, under-secretary of State William Clayton explained, it would be casier to give grain than gold9.
- 10 William Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe. A study in economie coopération 1947-1951 (N (...)
9The Benelux plan depended very much on American aid if it was to be acceptable to the potential creditors. In light of the American refusai the Benelux countries therefore drafted a new and less far reaching proposai. This plan left the bilateral agreements treaties intact but retained the transferability of bilateral débit and credit positions. The resulting net debt positions would not be financed multilaterally however but were to be divided between the net creditors in relation to their multilateral credit position. As such this plan proved unacceptable to potential creditors such as Great Britain. This rejection was motivated by the fact that while the bilateral payments agreements were to be left intact, the extent of the debt would no longer be determined on the basis of the bilateral trade relationship. Creditors would no longer be able to choose their debtors nor control the size of the debt. More importantly their chances of dollar earnings would be reduced. By spreading debts there was less chance of a large debtor exhausting its credit position on any one bilateral agreement. Conversely, the plan was inacceptable to some debtors as they would no longer be able to control gold and dollar payments by restricting imports bilaterally10.
- 11 Diebold, o.c., 21-27 ; Nota voor Min. Lieftinck van Prof. Keesing, den Haag 27 october 1947 (MBZ, 6 (...)
10What finally resulted was no more than a limited multilatéral compensation agreement between five countries. On 18 November 1947 France, Italy and the Benelux countries, joined shortly thereafter by the Bizone, agreed to limited compensations between their bilateral balances. Automatic, or first category, compensations would only be effected in cases where this would not lead to an increase in any balance. For example, if country A owed one dollar to country B, B owed one dollar to country C and C owed 1 dollar to A, the debts could be crossed off against one another. Compensations which would resuit in the increase of any balance could be executed only if ail the countries involved agreed. These second category compensations involved a limited form of currency transferability. If country A owed one dollar to both countries B and C, while C owed one dollar to B, a second category compensation would lead to the transfer of C’s debt to A’s balance with B, that is A owes B two dollars. Eight other ERP countries participated as occasional members which meant that their acquiescence would be necessary for any type of compensation in which they were to take part11.
11The agreement of November 1947 was a far cry from the original Benelux proposai. The proposal had floundered not only on the lack of American financial backing but also on the opposition of other European countries to even a limited form of convertibility of European currencies.
II. Dollar backing for intra-european trade
- 12 The Charge in Belgium to the Secretary of State. Brussels January 16, 1948 (FRUS 1948 vol. III) 367 (...)
- 13 Especially Ansiaux was very active in drafting different proposals. See for example : Mémorandum by (...)
12In early 1948, Belgian prime minister Paul-Henri Spaak told the Americans that the problem in Europe was « largely financial ». Financial constraints, he argued, produced a « kind of descending spiral » in intra-European trade and while it « was ail very well [to] say that countries must produce more » under the existing conditions of balanced bilateral trade they could not achieve this12. During 1948, the initiative in developing and proposing further plans came to lie more and more with the Belgians. Not surprisingly the different proposais put forward by Brussels reflected First and foremost the interests of Belgium, that is financing Belgium’s European créditer position out of Marshall-plan aid. More and more the objective became simply finding ways to create crédit facilities, with dollar backing, to finance intra-European trade in general and to convert Belgium’s European export surplus into dollars in particular13.
- 14 Diebold, o.c., 29-31 ; Hogan, o.c. 121-2.
- 15 Minutes REA 21.7.48 pt.3 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 571).
13After the participating countries had created the intergovernmental Organization for European Économie Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948, the United States did allow for some dollar financing of intra-European trade. In the allocation of aid for the third quarter of 1948, a limited amount of dollar aid was allocated to OEEC countries to finance imports from other sources than the United States itself. These so-called « off-shore purchases » helped to balance intra-European accounts while the Americans retained control of the flow of dollars14. The Dutch were accorded $20 million to help cover their déficit in Belgium under this procedure15.
- 16 Milward, o.c., 268.
- 17 Vergadering van de Council van de OEEC van 8 tot en met 16 Juli en van 20 en 24 Juli 1948, Verslag (...)
14By mid June 1948 it became known that the Americans might allow part of Marshall aid to be used in support of a western European payments scheme16. A month later the OEEC agreed to the general principles of such a plan. Its main feature was that a country expecting a trade surplus with another participating country would extend grants, or so called drawing rights, to cover a part of that surplus. The drawing right were to be extended from the spécial accounts, the counterpart funds, into which each country paid the local currency équivalent of the aid received under the Marshall plan. In return it would receive conditional dollar aid from the United States to an amount équivalent to the actual use that was made of the drawing rights. The scheme would help to finance bilateral déficits and would therefore help the expansion of intra-European trade. But it was not much more than that : the extension of aid to promote trade between European countries on a bilateral basis17. In practice it meant little more than the substitution of American aid to debtor countries under the offshore procedure by the conditional allocation of aid to the creditor countries.
- 18 Overzicht van de werkzaamheden van de OEEC van 9-30 augustus, den Haag 30.8.48 ; Overzicht van de w (...)
15Within the OEEC Belgium presented a further reaching and more flexible proposai in August. Brussels proposed the création of a multilatéral pooling System whereby conditional dollar aid would be divided among the creditors in proportion to their overall European trade surplus. This proposai proved unacceptable to especially the United Kingdom which feared a loss of dollar aid to Belgium18.
- 19 Meeting # 103, August 17, 1948 pt. 1 (NA, RG 56, Records of the National Advisory Council on Intern (...)
- 20 Minutes RFA 8.9.48 (ARA, 2.0205 MR, box 571) ; Diebold, o.c. 40 & 45.
16The idea of bilateral drawing rights was accepted in Washington mainly because it fit, the American objective of giving responsibility to the OEEC for the division of American aid. Washington realized that this could lead to additional aid being given to a country, Belgium, which in terms of the objectives of the ERP needed the money least19. Other countries, notably the Netherlands, nevertheless had a real interest in the plan. For the Dutch this interest lay mainly in the financing of the trade deficit with Belgium. For 1948-49 the Netherlands received a total of $83 million in drawing rights of which no less than $72,5 million were on Belgium – approximately one third of the total granted by that country20.
- 21 J.M.M.J. Clerx, Nederland en de liberalisatie van het handels- en betalingsverkeer (1945-1958), (Gr (...)
17The Intra-European Payments Agreement concluded in October 1948 included ail the OEEC member States except Switzerland and Portugal. The working of the agreement was rather complicated but the main features of the 1947 agreement were retained. The only important new feature was the inclusion of drawing rights. As in the 1947 agreement, first category compensations were to take place automatically. After such compensations had taken place, the remaining bilateral debts would, in part, be financed through the use of drawing rights. Second category compensations which implied an increase in a bilateral balance still required the permission of ail the countries concerned21.
- 22 Nota inzake de deviezenpositie, 11.5.50 (HTK 1949-50, Bijlagen II #1643) 8.
18The main redeeming feature of the 1948 agreement in the eyes of the Benelux countries was that it included substantial dollar backing. The drawing rights served to enlarge the scope for financing intra-European trade but did nothing to break the constraints of bilateralism. Furthermore, trade déficits proved difficult to predict and in practice drawing rights could only be partially used in some cases while in others they were insufficient to cover the déficits that occurred. The only multilateral aspect of the agreement was the automatic compensations. These amounted to just over $103 million between October 1948 and the end of June 1949, when the 1948 agreement expired. While this was a significant improvement over the $4.7 million achieved under the 1947 agreement, it represented only a small proportion of intra-European trade. In comparison, $677 million in intra-European trade (or about 10 % of the total) was financed through the use of drawing rights22.
III. The transferability of drawing rights
- 23 Circular telegram Harriman to the ECA missions in Europe, Paris 25.6.49 (FRUS 1949 vol IV) 404.
- 24 Wexler, o. c., 135. See also : Hogan, o.c., especially chapter 5.
19American policy towards European recovery changed dramatically during the latter half of 1948 and 1949. The emphasis shifted from increasing production to freeing trade and payments. Washington increasingly wanted to overcome, not finance, what it considered a consolidation of bilateralism and a tendency towards self-sufficiency : « Unless this trend is checked investment and production planning will to a considérable extent merely add to vested interests protected by bilateralism and trade discrimination23. » In the long run, multilateralism was to be achieved on a global basis. But early on the Économie Coopération Administration (ECA), the American organization created for the administration of the the European Recovery Program, realized « that régional trade and payments liberalization was a necessary préludé to the ERP nations’ achievement of general currency convertibility and free trade24 ».
- 25 For British rejection of transferability, see : Milward, o.c., 272-3.
20The first sign of the changing priorities became apparent in September 1948 when the ECA tentatively proposed that drawing rights be made transférable. This would introduce some flexibility in the payments agreement by allowing countries to choose where to exercise their drawing rights. For the exporting country, transferability would introduce compétition with other exporters for conditional dollar aid. It was this uncertainty that led the British to immediately reject the proposai and it was not included in the 1948 payments agreement25.
- 26 Tel. Hoffman to Harriman, Washington 21.4.49 ; See also Tel. Hoffman to Harriman, Washington 23.5.4 (...)
21In 1949 the ECA increased its efforts to achieve a more liberal trade and payments System within Europe and American pressure on the OEEC to overcome bilateralism mounted. In principle Washington wanted full convertibility of drawing rights into dollars. Realizing « that this alternative without modification would be too strong a medicine for Europe to take at the présent time », the ECA did not press this point except as a negotiating device to attain transferability among the participating countries themselves26.
- 27 Tel. Foster to Hoffman, Paris 29.4.49 (FRUS 1949 vol. IV) 385-7.
- 28 Note #1397/H/EB to the RFA, den Haag 7.6.49, (MBZ, DGEM 214) ; Circular Tel. Harriman to the ECA mi (...)
22At the end of April 1949 the Americans told the OEEC that a « radical improvement » over the existing agreement and real steps towards multilateralization were necessary. They immediately clashed with the British who emphasized « the importance of retaining (the) known advantages of (the) présent scheme27 ». Throughout the negotiations on the 1949 Intra-European Payments Agreement London opposed any plan which would not give the U.K. complété certainty of the amount of dollar aid it would receive. Its main worry was that any multilateral élément in the new payments agreement could lead to a loss of Marshall aid to Belgium. At issue was not only the transferability of drawing rights but also the financing of Belgium’s large European trade surplus. As such the conflict became very much one between the U.K. and Belgium, with the latter country not only supporting a transferability of drawing rights, but their convertibility into dollars28.
- 29 Note #1397/H/EB to the REA, den Haag 7.6.49 ; Note #1309/H/EB to the REA, den Haag 9.5.49 (MBZ, DGE (...)
23The Dutch Commissioner for the European Recovery Program, H.M. Hirschfeld, pointed out to the Dutch government that the Americans had, for the first time, accepted the possibility that a country might increase its dollar and gold reserves through Marshall aid. Transferability of drawing rights meant that the United States would no longer be able to control the amount of conditional aid going to a spécifie country. A country could therefore earn more dollars on its European trade surplus than it lost on its déficit with the western hemisphere. In practice Belgium was the only country that could realistically hope to achieve this. The Netherlands could nevertheless profit indirectly. The greater the potential dollar earnings for Belgium, the greater the chances that a satisfactory solution might be found to covering the already large and growing Dutch deficit with that country29.
- 30 Minutes REA 22.6.49 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 571) ; Nota # 1470/H/EB aan de REA, den Haag 21.6.49 (MBZ, (...)
24In the Hague Finance Minister Lieftinck openly favored the British position fearing that a multilateralization of intra-European trade and payments would leave the government less means by which to control the country’s foreign currency reserves. His position led to an officially expressed Dutch « understanding » of the British objections. A majority in the government nevertheless continued to support a multilateralization of intra-European payments, but in the context of the discussions in the OEEC this implied only very limited steps in that direction. The Netherlands moreover only supported the Belgian position, and thus the introduction of transferability, on the condition that a solution to the fmancing of the forecast deficit with its Benelux partner could be found30.
- 31 Nota # 1487/H/EB aan de REA, den Haag 4.7.49 (MBZ, DGEM 215). See also : Nota inzake de deviezenpos (...)
25A compromise between the Belgian and British positions was reached at the end of June 1949. Belgium dropped its demand for dollar convertibility of drawing rights and, together with the United States, agreed that 75 % of the drawing rights would be strictly bilateral while only 25 % would be transférable. Belgium furthermore agreed to a spécial arrangement to finance its large trade surplus in Europe. This surplus was forecast at $400 million against an expected déficit with the western hemisphere about half that size. Belgium was to be allocated $200 million in conditional dollar aid under the generally applicable conditions. For the other half of its forecast European surplus, Belgium would extend $112.5 in multilatéral drawing rights and $87.5 million in crédits of its own. To meet the British objections even further, Brussels accepted a ceiling of $40 million on the amount of multilatéral drawing rights that could be transferred from another country to Belgium. For the British the basic premise had been that they would not allow the payments plan to jeopardize the gold and dollar reserves of the sterling area. The low percentage of drawing rights that were transférable and the ceiling on the amount that Belgium could reçoive, limited the amount of conditional dollar aid that Britain could lose. For the Netherlands the plan was wholly acceptable. The country was to recoive not only $101 million in drawing rights on Belgium but another $38 million in crédits from that country. This came close to doubling the amount in the 1948 payments agreement31.
IV. Plans for a regional liberalization of trade and payments
- 32 National Advisory Council on International Monetary Affairs Meeting #132, Washington 30.6.49 (NA, R (...)
26For the Americans the 1949 payments agreement was less satisfying. It could hardly be seen as a meaningful step towards convertibility, even on a régional basis. The problem for the Americans was how to combine a liberalization of trade and payments on a régional basis within Western Europe with a long term movement towards general multilateralism and convertibility. By the summer of 1949 the main issue in Washington was which steps could be taken to circumvent the danger that Western Europe would become a soft-currency area discriminating against the dollar permanently. Even as the OEEC was negotiating the payments agreement, Washington laid down the outlines of its long-term policy. It would accept the OEEC compromise for 1949-50. Future trade and payments arrangements in Europe would however only be supported if they were « part of a program designed to restore multilateral trade on a world basis and global convertibility of currencies32 ».
- 33 ECA Administrator Hoffman to US Spécial Représentative in Europe Harriman, Washington 6.10.49 (FRUS (...)
- 34 Secretary of State to the US Ambassador in France, Washington 19.10.50 (FRUS 1949 IV) 469-72.
- 35 Summary record of the meeting on 21-22 October, (FRUS 1949 IV) 474-94, for citation see page 474-5 (...)
27By October a broad, if somewhat ambiguous, strategy emerged in Washington. The United States would push for a liberalization of intra-European trade and payments on a régional basis as a step towards the American global objectives. As a complement to this, a further reaching economie integration among a smaller number of countries would also be supported. The EGA expressed a « marked preference for real économie intégration of a smaller number of countries as against the continuation of presently purely cooperative arrangements among a larger number of countries33 ». The Secretary of State advocated not only a « much greater progress toward liberalization of trade and payments among ail OEEC countries » but he too wanted « a more intimate intégration (...) of as many countries as possible » which would hopefully involve « some merger of sovereignty ». What was needed for the latter was « decisive leadership » on the part of France in integrating West-Germany into Western Europe34. There were nevertheless grave doubts concerning the ability of France to exert such leadership. The American ambassadors in Western Europe moreover strongly advised the Secretary of State that Great Britain be included in any further plans for intégration35.
- 36 Minutes RFA 21.9.49 pt.4 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 571).
28Soon after the dévaluations of European currencies vis-a-vis the dollar in September 1949, the Dutch government discussed the possibility of proposing some form of régional currency convertibility in the OEEC. During the preceding summer the OEEC had adopted resolutions calling for a voluntary removal of quota restrictions on commodity trade and the Netherlands saw the dévaluations as a chance to expand the trade liberalization program to include régional convertibility. Although this idea received broad support in principle in the Dutch cabinet, it did not lead to any concrete plans until well into November36.
- 37 For a description of the policy setting in which Fritalux was launched, see especially Milward, o.c (...)
- 38 Tel. form Lieftinck to Drees, van den Brink, Koster and van den Beugel, Washington 13.9.49 (MBZ, DG (...)
- 39 Minutes MR 19.9.49 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR).
29In early September France had already proposed a further liberalization of trade and payments between the Benelux countries, France and Italy. The main objectives of the French proposai, usually referred to as Fritalux, were to achieve floating exchange rates and free capital movement between the five participants37. Initially, the plan was not taken very seriously in the Hague. Finance Minister Lieftinck in fact rejected it out of hand : he considered neither a floating exchange rate nor the free movement of capital to be acceptable38. A floating exchange rate was moreover unanimously rejected by the Dutch government in the framework of the discussions on the dévaluation of the guilder39. But, even more than the contents of the plan itself, the exclusion of West-Germany was totally unacceptable to the Netherlands.
- 40 Bespreking te Parijs 18, 19 en 20 october, from Spierenburg, annex to letter #1757 7H/EB to the REA (...)
30In October the deputy Dutch Commissioner for ERP, D. P. Spierenburg, reported from Paris that the French were canvassing American support for Fritalux. He warned that the EGA was in need of « proof » of European intégration to présent to Congress. Consequently, some of the ECA’s représentatives seemed well disposed towards the French proposai and the Dutch feared that it might receive American Financial support. Spierenburg told the British delegation in Paris that if the U.K. did not give up its neutral stance towards Fritalux, a very real danger existed that the Netherlands would be forced into « the French-Italian bloc40 ».
- 41 Bijeenkomst te Parijs van de Consultatieve Groep en de Council op ministerieel niveau van 28 octobe (...)
- 42 Ibid. ; for position Spierenburg, see : ’Bespreking te Parijs 18, 19 en 20 october, from Spierenbur (...)
31The well documented speech by EGA Administrator Paul Hoffman before the OEEC at the end of October seemed to warrant Spierenburg’s warning. Hoffman asked the OEEC to produce a program by early 1950 which would take Europe « well along the road towards European économie intégration ». The Dutch government Commissioner for ERP, H. M. Hirschfeld, reported that Hoffman had placed great stress on the necessity of creating a single European market but had paid almost equal attention to the issue of régional intégration among a smaller number of countries. Despite Dutch attempts to focus discussions on intra-European currency convertibility and trade liberalization, the ensuing discussions in the OEEC were dominated by the issue of regional integration. This happened to such an extent that Hirschfeld warned the Hague « that America has gone too far in supporting the régional idea, that England has made use of this in transferring the center of gravity of its policy to the British empire and that France thinks to have the initiative for a régional conférence led by France41 ». Both Spierenburg and Hirschfeld advised the Dutch government to préparé its own proposai to counter the French initiative42.
- 43 Minutes REA 16.11.49 pt.6 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 571) ; De multilateralisatie van het Europese hande (...)
32The government was quick to respond. The president of the Dutch central bank (DNB), Holtrop, presented a mémorandum to cabinet wherein the long standing Dutch position that trade expansion necessitated a transferability of European currencies was re-asserted. The most surprising recommendation in Holtrop’s mémorandum was that any European payments plan would hâve to exclude the U.K. to be successful. Between April and September 1949 Britain had run a large net déficit in its balance of payments with its major OEEC trading partners so that British participation would quickly exhaust any American assistance. There was some doubt in cabinet about the validity of Holtrop’s statistics which were taken from before the sterling dévaluation in September. The exclusion of the U.K. was nevertheless accepted, in part because nobody could really imagine that Great Britain itself would be willing to join43.
- 44 Minutes REA 23.11.49 pt.4 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 571) ; Mémorandum, annex to letter #1806/H/EB from (...)
33On the basis of Holtrop’s suggestions the government drafted a plan which formulated long standing Dutch objectives in a situation of renewed American pressure for European intégration. It was meant to preempt the French initiative before this could gain real American support. The Dutch proposai aimed at both an extension of the OEEC program of trade liberalization as a multilateralization of intra-European payments. As far as payments were concerned the Netherlands wanted to eliminate exchange Controls, although they maintained that some control over capital movements, especially spéculative capital movements, would hâve to be retained. The full transferability of drawing rights and an extension of the System of automatic compensations was foreseen but the plan stopped short of a complété pooling of bilateral credit and débit positions. The government was itself divided on the latter and decided to leave this issue open to negotiation. The proposal was contingent to American aid. It foresaw some kind of central institution, subject to control by a council of ministers, but only to supervise the process of trade liberalization and to manage the dollar fund. This institutional provision was added at the insistence of the Minister of Économie Affairs, J.R.M. van den Brink, who warned that lacking such supervision the smaller countries would become the victims of trade liberalization44.
- 45 This is well illustrated in a telegram from Harriman to the different ECA missions, listing no less (...)
34The Hague now stood for the task of selling its plan to the ECA. Internally the ECA had not yet decided on any definite strategy. Advocating European intégration and a single market was one thing, applying the principles expounded in the Hoffman speech quite another45.
- 46 Minutes of Regional Mission Chiefs Meeting held 19 November 1949 in the Hague (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. (...)
35On 19 November délégations from the ECA missions in London, Paris, the Hague and Brussels met with the deputy to the ECA spécial représentative in Europe, Milton Katz. Katz explained that the ECA hoped to achieve the single internai market -in ECA terminology synonymous with the widely used but ill defïned terni ’integration’– through the élimination of quantitative trade restrictions and convertibility between European currencies. He went on to say that every initiative to this end should be supported, at least initially. The French plan, he said, « outlines what may be a proposai. But there are other Unes of thinking in Europe. [Dutch foreign minister] Stikker suggested a European monetary fund. It is just as important to hâve his proposai expanded and explained. (...) We are not yet at a stage where we can select any one thing or plan or proposai. Ail must be developed46. »
- 47 Tel. from the Office of the Spécial Representative to the ECA mission in the Hague, Paris 2.11.49 ( (...)
36When Stikker and Holtrop discussed the Dutch ideas with Katz several days later he therefore « expressed great interest and indicated that the proposai reflected a basic thinking in line with that of [the ECA’s] Office of the Special Representative in Europe except for the omission of the UK. » When Stikker explained that this « omission » had been impelled by the « cold figures », Katz suggested that « it might be better to include the UK even if this should require increasing the size of the central pool by several hundred million dollars47 ».
- 48 ECATO 651, tel from ECA Washington to Hague mission, Washington 23.11.49 (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. missi (...)
- 49 REPTO 549, Tel. from OSR to Hague mission, Paris 25.11.49 (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. mission, Finance and (...)
37If the exclusion of the UK was not acceptable to the ECA, « [t]he Dutch proposai is encouraging at least as a basis for discussion », deputy administrator William Foster commented. The principles of the proposai were considered to be in line with the ECA’s views48. At the same time the ECA criticized the « limited scope » of the French plan. « In our view, the entire tone of the French document is excessively cautious and protectionist. » The substance of the plan was considered « ambiguous at several major points » and spécifie points received appraisals ranging from « obscure » to « extremely weak ». On the whole the ECA thought that the French proposai did « not justify a major allocation » of American aid49.
- 50 European Clearing Union cable, Washington 26.11.49, circulated as AAP Policy Series Paper PS/ AAP(N (...)
- 51 Comments on original Fritalux proposai, Washington 29.11.49, circulated as Policy Paper PS/AAP(NA49 (...)
38In late November the ECA drafted a tentative outline for a European payments union of its own. This plan was circulated among the ECA missions in Europe during the First week of December50. The ECA consequently rejected the Dutch, as well as the French, plan. It argued that these did not go far enough and attempted to « évadé the main issues which cannot be avoided in drafting any payments arrangements which makes significant progress over the présent Intra-European Payments Plan »51. The ECA hoped to achieve substantially more than that which was proposed by the French and were strongly disposed to British participation. American support for a régional group had by no means disappeared altogether but such a group would only be considered useful to American objectives if it could go substantially further on the road to intégration than that which the Americans now hoped to achieve with the OEEC as a whole.
V. The european payments union
39On 10 December 1949 the ECA presented its proposal for a European Payments Union (EPU) to the OEEC. The proposai, often referred to as the Bissell plan after its main proponent, assistant deputy Administrator of the EGA Richard M. Bissell, foresaw a fully multilatéral and automatic payments system in Western Europe. The plan was based on the transferability of European currencies for payments on current account. Each member’s payments position would be determined towards the group as a whole and crédits would be extended multilaterally. The OEEC was furthermore to remove quantitative restrictions on intra-European trade. The EGA would provide initial dollar backing for the union. But the Americans did not wish to provide support indefinitely. A payments system which could survive Marshall aid needed either « automatic incentives » or a strong central body to force countries to adapt national policies to achieve balance of payments equilibrium. The EGA proposed a combination of these two éléments. The automatic incentive in the Bissell plan consisted of rising payments or decreasing receipts of gold and dollars in relation to the size of a country’s déficit or credit position. Furthermore, a supervisory managing board which could take binding decisions by less than unanimity was foreseen.
- 52 Tel. #709 from Hague mission to ECA Washington, the Hague 20.12.49 (WNRC, RG 469, EGA European Prog (...)
40In the Hague it was very much doubted whether the U.K. would accept the plan. The Dutch also worried that the Americans wanted to sweep away bilateralism too quickly, preferring instead a more careful, graduai approach. The Bissell plan nevertheless corresponded to a large extent to the plan that the Benelux countries had proposed at the Paris conférence in 1947. The Dutch co-author of that proposai, Keesing, immediately welcomed the American plan. In late December 1949, he told the EGA that the Dutch government found the Bissell plan « technically competent and in agreement with Us own line of approach52 ».
- 53 Nota Keesing voor Lieftinck, den Haag 2.1.50 (MF, BBV 1260/198).
- 54 Letter vdB/Kl 8978 from Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 2.1.50 (MBZ, DGEM 216).
- 55 Minutes REA 4.1.50 pt. 2a (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 572).
- 56 Minutes REA 24.1.50 pt. I (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; see also : Enige beschouwingen over de voorge (...)
41At the beginning of January 1950, after the OEEC completed a report on the principles of a 1950-51 intra-European payments agreement, a report which was very much based on the American proposai, Dutch reactions became more enthusiastic. Keesing reported to cabinet that the « principles that the Dutch délégation to the OEEC has advocated for the last two and a half years, now seemed close to being realized53 ». Spierenburg, reported in much the same vein, advising the government that if agreement could be reached in the OEEC « a very important step would be taken in the direction which the Netherlands hâve always supported54 ». In cabinet, Lieftinck’s worries about possible balance of payment pitfalls were countered by van den Brink who applauded the « constructive approach » taken in the Bissell plan to solving the problem of intra-European payments. To this end, the Minister of Économie Affairs argued, « certain risks » should be taken55. Despite Lieftinck’s concern the government approved the main principles of the Bissell plan contained in the OEEC report. It thereby accepted, at least in principle, the potential loss of hard currency reserves in a multilatéral payments system. The amount of credits and dollar backing that would be given in relation to hard currency settlements was nevertheless still vague and the Hague reserved its position on the practical implémentation of the principle of gold and dollar payments, i.e. at what point and to what extent such settlements would take place56.
- 57 Report #9730 by Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 6.2.50 (MBZ, DGEM 216).
42The EGA wanted quick results on the payments plan so that it could présent Congress with proof of substantial progress in European intégration. The U.K. was not however prepared to accept any proposai which might lead to a loss of gold and dollars. Although the Bissell plan was accepted in the OEEC in very general terms, this support was nullified by the qualification that the new payments scheme would hâve to be reconciled with the bilateral payments agreements and the sterling area. British opposition thereby effectively stalemated progress on the payments plan and killed any hope of an early implémentation57.
- 58 European Payments Scheme, per letter ^ 10827 Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 18.3.50 (MF, BBV 1260 (...)
43Washington was adamant on British participation in the union. The sterling area accounted for a large proportion of global trade and represented the largest reserve currency in the world after the dollar. London drafted a proposai of its own which was circulated in Paris in March. This proposai aimed mainly at protecting the U.K. gold and dollar reserves by restricting the use of sterling in the union. Britain would not receive credits from the union but was to retain the crédit facilities in its bilateral treaties. Some of these agreements, as in the case of the Netherlands, did not foresee in gold settlements. Furthermore, the U.K. would be allowed to continue applying bilateral quantitative trade restrictions and the use of sterling outside Great Britain itself would, as in the past, be strictly controlled by London58.
- 59 Keesing to Lieftinck, den Haag 20.3.50 and Posthuma (de Nederlandsche Bank) to Lieftinck, den Haag (...)
44The Dutch reaction to the British plan was surprisingly conciliatory. Different government advisors, including Keesing, seemed prepared to accept the spécial position the U.K. was asking for, albeit under certain conditions. The main problem was the rétention of bilateral trade discrimination. If this were accepted, Britain’s trade partners could find themselves in a diffîcult position if they themselves were bound to trade liberalization in the OEEC in the framework of an EPU agreement. From the Dutch position it seemed logical that the possibility of applying bilateral trade restrictions should be reciprocal59.
- 60 Keesing to Spierenburg, den Haag 13.4.50 (MF, BBV 1260/20) ; Note Keesing, annex to letter #11915 f (...)
45Informai discussions in the OEEC during April showed less sympathy for the British position and led Ansiaux to draft a counter-proposal. His plan, dubbed « the creditor’s dream » in Paris, limited the amount of crédit to be extended by the surplus countries in favor of a relatively high proportion of gold and dollar settlements. To meet the predictable objections of the potential debtors, Ansiaux wanted a high level of dollar aid. The crux of the proposai was that it foresaw a payments union using up large amounts of dollar aid to finance trade rather than, as the Americans wanted, a union which would be capable of surviving ERP and eventually supervising steps towards dollar convertibility. The Belgian proposai received only half-hearted and non-committal support from the Hague, its attractiveness depending largely on the credit facilities in general and the amount of dollar aid from the Americans in particular. The Dutch now also wanted to keep open the possibility of British participation and were hoping that Dutch foreign minister Stikker, who had been elected chairman of the OEEC at the beginning of April, might play a mediating rôle. Belgian attempts to draft a joint plan with France, Italy and the Netherlands on the basis of the Ansiaux proposai failed60.
- 61 Note from Boomstra to Spierenburg, den Haag 17.5.50 (MBZ, DGEM 1451).
46The American strategy concentrated first at settling the issue of sterling participation bilaterally with Britain. Stikker was kept well informed of the Anglo-American discussions but was given only a token role to play. The issue was dealt with at a high political level when Acheson visited London in the second week of May. He posed a sériés of American demands on Britain which in effect would mean full sterling participation in the Payments Union. To reassure the U.K., Acheson promised spécial aid from the union if the run on the reserves due to the conversion of existing sterling balances would be too large61.
- 62 Participating countries were to receive quotas in the EPU based on their total current account turn (...)
- 63 Letter from Liefrinck to Lieftinck, Paris 22.5.50 (MF, BBV 1260/21) ; Note from the dir. gen. BEB, (...)
- 64 Comments on the UK commercial policy clauses in connection with EPU, Paris 19.5.50 (WNRC, RG 469, O (...)
47The latter assurance, as well as a dramatic improvement in the position of sterling over the first several months of 1950, led the British to accept full membership of an EPU. Opposing positions on the characteristics of the union developed immediately between the U.K. on one side and Belgium, with some support from France and Italy, on the other. These différences focussed on the size of the crédit facilities and the rate of gold and dollar settlements to and from the union. The British wanted very generous crédit facilities in conjunction with a low ratio of hard currency settlements62. The U.K. furthermore wanted the right to retain bilateral as well as multilateral trade restrictions. Belgium wanted to push the gold mechanism as far as possible and was strongly opposed to trade discrimination as the means to correct extreme credit and deficit positions63. On the latter point Belgium could count on American support. In the Office of the Special Representative in Paris it was argued that trade discrimination, would undermine the very essence of EGA policy. Trade discrimination would « set up a « soft » export trade for net debtors, (...) impède the development of trade in its most economic direction » and would preserve a high cost area by offering « no incentive for cost réduction ». This would retard the achievement of « both intra-European and dollar viability64 ».
- 65 Minutes REA 25.4.50 pt.3 & 5 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; Note from Holtrop to Lieftinck, Amsterdam (...)
48Faced with a deteriorating balance of payments situation during the first months of 1950, Dutch central bank president Holtrop and Finance Minister Lieftinck were somewhat reluctant to go forward too fast. Holtrop was mainly concerned about the Central Bank’s hard currency reserves. Although a keen supporter of a reintroduction of the gold mechanism in one way or another, he had severe doubts whether the politicians in the government would institute the domestic austerity that this would require. Lieftinck combined concern for the potential drain on the reserves with strong support for social démocratie policies. He favored retaining bilateral Controls in order to protect both such polices and the reserves. To his mind the gold mechanism was an anachronism in the post-war world. Giving up trade and exchange Controls, he warned his colleagues, would put the full weight of balance of payments adaptation on monetary and budgetary policies. This could hâve far reaching consequences for the government’s domestic policies, such as maintaining full employment. Lieftinck found himself more or less isolated in the Dutch cabinet. Strong support for a multilatéral payments System and trade liberalization on a non-discriminatory basis could ; be found especially with Foreign Minister Stikker, a liberal, and the Catholic Party ’Minister of Economie Affairs van den Brink. Their position was actively supported by the acting government Commissioner for ERP, Spierenburg. They represented the main stream of Dutch policy and commanded majority support within the government65.
- 66 Minutes REA 25.4.50 pt.5 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572).
49Given hid isolated position, Lieftinck did not oppose a multilatéral payments System as such but pressed for the exhaustion of the dollar pool during the course of the first agreement which was to be signed for two years. He pointed out that the $600 million set aside by the Americans for the European Payments Union came out of Marshall aid appropriations and was therefore to be deducted from the amount of direct aid allocated to the ERP countries. As this was clearly unacceptable to the Americans, the Dutch government initially simply circumvented the main issue by not taking any position on the character of the dollar pool66.
- 67 Letter Hunter to Foster, the Hague 26.4.50 (WNRC, RG 469 OSR Program Div., Country subject files, b (...)
50Commenting on the Dutch position, the EGA mission chief in the Hague, Clarence Hunter, wrote to Washington that the Dutch government supported EPU but would probably « not see its way clear to adhéré to a final agreement which did not make provision for sufficient aid67 ».
- 68 Minutes REA 17.5.50 pt.3a (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; letter 4+12401 from Spierenburg to the REA, d (...)
51By mid May the Dutch position was brought more into line with that of the EGA. A permanent dollar pool was now accepted in principle although this was linked to a sufficient allocation of initial aid. The latter was a form of additional aid that would replace the drawing rights and that was to be granted to so-called structural debtors during the first year of the EPU’s operation. This linkage would be difficult to apply in practice however. The EPU itself was subject to multilatéral negotiations in the framework of the OEEC while the allocation of initial aid was part of the division of aid process and thus subject to bilateral discussions with the Americans68.
- 69 Samenvatting van het besprokene tijdens de vergadering van de Raad op ministerieel niveau op 2 juni (...)
52The outlines of the EPU crystallized during the first weeks of June. A managing board would be responsible for day to day operations but would not be the strong central institution, the embryo of European intégration, envisaged in the Bissell plan. It would take majority decisions but decisions of any importance were subject to the approval of the OEEC Council of Ministers where they couldbe vetoed by any of the participating countries. The union would include rising gold and dollar payments in relation to debt, or decreasing hard currency settlements in relation to a country’s credit position. The extension of crédits relative to gold payments in the EPU was to be generous. A country’s quota would be fixed at 15 % of its turnover on 1949 intra-European trade while the first 20 % of the quota would be extended as pure crédit, a resuit that came close to the British position. Over the entire quota only 40 % was to be settled in gold and dollars69.
EPU settlments

Source : J.M.M.J. Clerx, Nederland en de liberalisatie van het handels- en betalingsverkeer (1945-1958), 40.
53For the Dutch this meant that a déficit with the EPU would be covered as follows :
- 70 Verslag van de bespreking bij de Minister, den Haag 11.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
Crédit facilities to the Netherlands in EPU (quota $ 330 mln70.)

- 71 Ibid.
54The size of the quota and the ratio of crédits to gold and dollar settlements as such was acceptable to the Dutch. Lieftinck nevertheless made his acceptance conditional to the amount of initial aid that the Netherlands were to receive and the way in which existing bilateral crédits were to be amortized in the union71. The domestic discussion focussed on these issues.
VI. Initial aid and the credit on Germany
- 72 Liberalisatie en betalingsbalans, annex to letter #11816 from Spierenburg to the RFA, den Haag 19.4 (...)
55The Dutch balance of payments position in Europe had taken a turn for the worse over the first quarter of 195072. A net deficit of no less than $123 million was predicted for 1950-51. This déficit was entirely attributable to the aniticipated déficit with West-Germany and Belgium.
- 73 Note #404 for the RFA, den Haag 24.5.50 (MBZ, DGEM 231) ; Minutes RFA 17.5.50 & 7.6.50 (ARA, 2.02.0 (...)
56With regard to West-Germany, the Netherlands found themselves in a unique, if difficult, situation. A very advantageous trade agreement concluded in September 1949, had abolished quota restrictions on Dutch exports but had allowed the Netherlands to retain most of its own restrictions on imports from West-Germany. This had led to increasing surpluses and despite attempts to achieve a more balanced trade during the first months of 1950, the Dutch credit position had increased to $86 million guilders by May 1950. Failing a bilateral agreement between the two countries, the EPU agreement foresaw that the bilateral crédit would be liquidated in monthly installments over two years73.
57In 1948 and 1949, drawing rights had allowed the Netherlands to finance large déficits with their Benelux partners. The monthly deficit, which had stabilized at about 20 million guilders, had risen significantly after November 1949, due in part to the large degree of trade liberalization already achieved within the Benelux.
Monthly déficit whit the bleu (mlns of gldrs.)
November 1949 | 12 |
December | 30 |
January 1950 | 42.5 |
February... | 66 |
March...................... | 78 |
April | 84 |
Source : Nota inzake de deviezenpositie, Handelingen der Staten generaal 1949-50, Bijlagen II 1643.
- 74 Aantekening betreffende liberalisatie en betalingsbalans and annex UEBL, Duitsland en sterling area (...)
58Although the monthly déficits were expected to decrease, a deficit of 350 million guilders was forecast for 1950-51. The Netherlands hoped for considérable American aid to finance this déficit74.
- 75 Letter #13327 from van den Brink to the REA, den Haag 21.6.50 (MBZ, DGEM 217).
- 76 Note dir. BBV to Lieftinck, den Haag 17.6.50 ; Note from the dir. BBV to Lieftinck, den Haag 25.6.5 (...)
- 77 ECA Mémorandum on initial positions with EPU, 10.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/22).
- 78 Tel. 341 from Hague mission to Washington, the Hague 21.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, ECA Washington, Europea (...)
59The ECA indicated that the Netherlands might expect to receive initial aid of between $40 and $70 million. The Netherlands requested no less than $90 million, an amount that would allow the country to finance its predicted European déficit using only half of the first tranche credit in the EPU75. The request was very much a starting position for bilateral negotiations with the ECA and internally Dutch Finance ministry officiais admitted the inflated character of the figures76. It nevertheless became a sensitive domestic political issue. Lieftinck aimed at covering ail or most of the OEEC déficit with aid, hoping to avoid not only gold payments but also drawing too heavily on the EPU credit. This was antithetical to American intentions as it sought to avoid exactly that which the ECA hoped to achieve with the EPU : the adaptation of domestic policies to achieve balance of payments equilibrium, or in ECA terminology « viability ». The ECA explicitly warned that initial aid must be « justified by spécial factors in the économie position of the country » and was not meant to finance déficits as such77. Not surprisingly therefore, one of the points of criticism made by the ECA mission in the Hague was that $90 million would allow the Dutch to avoid gold payments in 1950-51. But the mission also recognized the delicacy of the domestic political situation. One of the most pro-American Dutch politicians, Stikker, who was to negotiate the amount of initial aid with the ECA, was being put under strong political pressure by Lieftinck. The mission consequently advised the ECA that too low a figure « would embarrass Stikker personally78 ».
- 79 Katz to division directors OSR, Paris 26.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, OSR Tasca files box 2).
60The main Dutch argument to back the large request concerned the realization of the Benelux économie union and the large degree of trade liberalization that had already been achieved in that framework. The ECA was growing somewhat weary of this argument however. As Belgium and the Netherlands did not propose treating the two économies as a single unit in the EPU, the ECA preferred to see the intra-Benelux déficit as simply another bilateral problem which would not be treated differently from other bilateral problems79.
- 80 Mémorandum 1161263-4880 GS from Stikkker to the MR, Paris 16-18.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
61The Benelux argument came close to becoming altogether redundant in the middle of June when Belgium threatened to stay out of the EPU. Both the size of the quota and its crédit component had been settled to the détriment of the Belgian position. The high turnover on Belgian trade in 1949 would lead to a quota of $433 million of which $260 million was to be extended in credit. Furthermore, earlier aid to Belgium had been extended as conditional aid with the corresponding extension of drawing rights. In the same way, Belgium was expected to pass on its 1950-51 aid allocation to the EPU as an initial déficit position. Belgian foreign minister Paul van Zeeland protested strongly against both these points. He wanted to extend no more than $120 million in crédit to the EPU and wanted direct, rather than conditional, Marshall aid. The latter point was seen as a direct attack on the proposed Benelux économie union by Stikker. How, after ail, was the intra-Benelux déficit to be financed if not by the extension of a large initial credit position to the Netherlands, offset by an initial Belgian deficit in the EPU ? Van Zeeland was told that the initial aid issue in itself, let alone Belgium staying out of the EPU altogether, would mean the end of Benelux. The EGA spécial representative in Europe, A. Harriman, reacted just as strongly, declaring that the Belgian government « had gone crazy » and at one point describing its position as a « déclaration of économie war on the U.S. A80.
- 81 Ibid, ; letter Keesing to Stikker, Paris 16.6.50 and Note #78 Boomstra for Stikker, den Haag 26.6.5 (...)
62A compromise was reached after three days of intensive negotiations. The Belgian quota was reduced to $360 million which brought the crédit component to $216 million. Half of the Marshall aid allocation was to be direct aid while Belgium would accept an initial déficit position against the other half. Against the advice of Ansiaux, Van Zeeland furthermore accepted that Belgium would extend further crédits against gold settlements at a ratio of one to one after the exhaustion of its quota. If it chose to leave the EPU it would have to accept trade discrimination against its exports. Stikker considered the chance that Belgium would leave the EPU as very real and advised the Hague to include an escape clause in the Benelux économie union treaty to deal with this possibility. Of more direct concern was that, despite attempts by Stikker to hâve the EGA pick up the tab, the réduction of the Belgian initial position seriously undermined the Dutch request for initial aid81.
- 82 Minutes RFA 27.6.50, pt. 3 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 572) ; see also : Meeting between Stikker, Lieftin (...)
- 83 REPTO # 3647, Paris 30.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, EGA Washington, European Program Div., Office of the Dir (...)
- 84 REPTO 3647, Paris 30.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, EGA Washington, European Program Div., Office of the direc (...)
63Cabinet discussions show that a $65 million initial position would be considered a reasonable success but the EGA offered no more than $30 to $40 million82. On top of this the Americans asked the Netherlands to extend $25 million of their 1949-50 aid allocation to West Germany in the form of bilateral drawing rights. Stikker reacted « profoundly disturbed » explaining that the American position would mean the end of Benelux and the Dutch program of trade liberalization83. He made a personal plea to the Americans claiming a major rôle in solving the difficulties with England and Belgium earlier in the EPU negotiations. He himself, Stikker explained, had taken the lead in bringing the Netherlands into almost every existing western organization, including NATO, Benelux and now the EPU. « Certain that the decisions which he had helped to bring about were still resented in certain quarters » in the Hague he explained, an insufficient allocation of initial aid would make his position « rather impossible ». Perhaps there was no outcome, he said, « except for him to resign » from the Dutch cabinet84.
- 85 For a full account of the negotiations from the Dutch and American sides, see : Note 4^66332-5255 f (...)
- 86 Note #426 from the dir. gen. BEB to the REA, den Haag 4.8.50 (MBZ, DGEM 233).
64The ECA did not press the issue of drawing rights leaving this to the bilateral negotiations between the Netherlands and West Germany85. The ECA finally offered $40 million in initial aid, a figure which was reduced to $30 million in the OEEC at the beginning of July. In the ensuing discussions with West Germany the Netherlands consequently took a very uncompromising attitude. The negotiations ended in a bilateral agreement which, despite several small concessions by the Netherlands, foresaw total repayment of the credit on West-Germany within two years86.
65The OEEC created the EPU on 7 July 1950, although the agreement was not signed by the participating countries till 19 September, that is after Congress had passed the Marshall aid appropriation out of which the dollar fund for the union was to corne. Operations were started on 1 July. The agreement was signed for two years. It included escape clauses for withdrawal in cases where the EPU was incapable of making a gold payment to a créditor or if a member State exhausted its quota, whether as a debtor or as a créditer. These escape clauses facilitated Belgian participation.
Conclusion
66In 1947 the Benelux countries hoped to convince Washington to support, financially and politically, a road to recovery that best suited their interests. In both Belgium and the Netherlands a continuation of économie recovery and growth was thought to lie in breaking the constraints of bilateral trade and payments and directing dollar aid towards an expansion of intra-European trade. But the underlying interests of the two countries were very different. For Belgium the problem lay in the financial constraints that limited Belgium’s hard currency earnings on its European export surplus. The Belgians were increasingly interested in régional payments agreements leading to some form of dollar convertibility. The Dutch interest was to create a régional clearing union, backed by dollar aid, in which full convertibility was at best a long term objective.
67The need to create a multilatéral payments System became less pressing as American aid served to increase intra-European trade on a purely bilateral basis. A large proportion of the Dutch déficit with its Benelux partner was financed by American aid in the 1948-49 and 1949-1950 payments agreements. butch priorities changed as a resuit. In the discussions on the 1949 payments agreemerit, Dutch support for the transferability of drawing rights, a goal wholeheartedly supported by Brussels, was made conditional to sufficient aid to finance the bilateral déficit with Belgium. A Dutch proposai drafted in late 1949 re-asserted the objectives which had first been formulated in the 1947 Benelux plan. This proposai is however best explained by the necessity to preempt a French initiative, which was considered totally unacceptable, against the background of American pressure to produce plans for European « integration ». It nevertheless shows that, if no longer a priority for its own sake, régional trade and payments liberalization still commanded majority support in the government. This is confirmed by the positive reaction in the Hague to the Bissell plan. Certainly Dutch support was somewhat less enthusiastic than might be expected on the basis of the similarities between the EPU and the Benelux proposai for a multilatéral payments System in 1947. But there was never any real doubt that the Netherlands would join the EPU despite the warnings by the Finance minister that this would eventually lead to the need to adapt domestic policies to the exigencies of the balance of payments. The domestic political discussion therefore focussed on the amount of initial aid that the country was to receive in the Union.
Notes
1 « Ontwerp Mémorandum », annex to letter REA 547 H/EB from Hirschfeld to the REA, the Hague 10.7.47 (MBZ, 610.302 Marshallplan, Conferentie te Parijs/Oprichting CEEC 1947). For a full account of Dutch participation at the CEEC conférence, see : J. Schram, « Nederland en het Marshallplan. De Nederlandse belangen op de conferentie van Parijs, 1947 », in : P. Luykx & A. Manning (red.) Nederland in de Wereld 1870-1950. Opstellen over buitenlandse en koloniale politiek, aangeboden aan dr. N. Bootsma (Nijmegen 1988).
2 Verslag Hirschfeld, Parijs 2.8.47, Annex X (MBZ, 610.302 Marshall-hulp, Verslagen van de Nederlandse delegatie bij de Conferentie te Parijs).
3 Ibid. ; Overzicht van de Besprekingen in Parijs in de week van 21 tôt 25 Juli 1947 (MBZ, 610.302 Marshall-hulp, Verslagen van de Nederlandse delegatie bij de Conferentie te Parijs).
4 F.A.B. Keesing, « Het Plan Marshall en het inter-Europese betalingsverkeer », in : Economisch Statistische Berichten (ESB) 27.8.47, 677-8.
5 See for example A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (London 1984) 67, 77 & 258 ; Imanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited (Westport Conn. 1983) 124 ; Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan, (N.Y. 1987) 63-4.
6 Bespreking 30 juni 1947 op het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken betreffende het Plan-Marshall, #105- 61695 (MBZ, 610.33 Nederland/Marshallplan, Standpunt).
7 For the perceived short term character of the European debtor position see : Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (HTK) 1946-47, Bijlagen II #458, 7.
8 Economie Reconstruction in the Netherlands, (Min. of Économie Affairs, den Haag 1952) 74-5.
9 Brief 4É 40/8 H/EB van Hirschfeld aan de Minister, Parijs 1.8.47, Annex 1 Bespreking met Undersecr. Clayton op 31 Juli, 1947 (MBZ 610.302 Marshallplan, Verslagen van de Nederlandse Delegatie) ; FRUS 1948 vol. III, 380 fn ; Hogan, o.c., 121.
10 William Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe. A study in economie coopération 1947-1951 (N.Y. 1952), 22-24. Keesing, o.c., ESB 678.
11 Diebold, o.c., 21-27 ; Nota voor Min. Lieftinck van Prof. Keesing, den Haag 27 october 1947 (MBZ, 610.301 Alg. Marshallplan, dossier Monetair Accoord, november 1947).
12 The Charge in Belgium to the Secretary of State. Brussels January 16, 1948 (FRUS 1948 vol. III) 367-8.
13 Especially Ansiaux was very active in drafting different proposals. See for example : Mémorandum by Mr. Hebbard of the ECA mission to the U.K. to the American Ambassador in the U.K., London 10.5.48 (FRUS 1948 vol. III) 439-42. Meeting #94 5 May, 1948, Meeting #95 27 May, Meeting #96 3 June, 1948, (NA, RG 56, Records of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Affairs 1946-1953) ; See also : Wexler, o.c., 130-2 & Hogan, o.c., 165-6.
14 Diebold, o.c., 29-31 ; Hogan, o.c. 121-2.
15 Minutes REA 21.7.48 pt.3 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 571).
16 Milward, o.c., 268.
17 Vergadering van de Council van de OEEC van 8 tot en met 16 Juli en van 20 en 24 Juli 1948, Verslag # 998/35/ H/EB 28.7.48, (MBZ, DGEM 213) ; Diebold, o.c. 33-37.
18 Overzicht van de werkzaamheden van de OEEC van 9-30 augustus, den Haag 30.8.48 ; Overzicht van de werkzaamheden van de OEEC op 10 en 11 september, den Haag 12.9.48 (MBZ, DGEM 1289).
19 Meeting # 103, August 17, 1948 pt. 1 (NA, RG 56, Records of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies 1946-1953).
20 Minutes RFA 8.9.48 (ARA, 2.0205 MR, box 571) ; Diebold, o.c. 40 & 45.
21 J.M.M.J. Clerx, Nederland en de liberalisatie van het handels- en betalingsverkeer (1945-1958), (Groningen 1986) 31-2.
22 Nota inzake de deviezenpositie, 11.5.50 (HTK 1949-50, Bijlagen II #1643) 8.
23 Circular telegram Harriman to the ECA missions in Europe, Paris 25.6.49 (FRUS 1949 vol IV) 404.
24 Wexler, o. c., 135. See also : Hogan, o.c., especially chapter 5.
25 For British rejection of transferability, see : Milward, o.c., 272-3.
26 Tel. Hoffman to Harriman, Washington 21.4.49 ; See also Tel. Hoffman to Harriman, Washington 23.5.49, FRUS 1949v. ol. IV, 383-5 & 395.
27 Tel. Foster to Hoffman, Paris 29.4.49 (FRUS 1949 vol. IV) 385-7.
28 Note #1397/H/EB to the RFA, den Haag 7.6.49, (MBZ, DGEM 214) ; Circular Tel. Harriman to the ECA missions in Europe, Paris 25.6.49 (FRUS 1949 vol. IV) ; Present Positions on the Principles of the Payments Scheme for the 1949/ 1950 Financial Year, Paris 27.6.49, Annex to note 4^1487/H/EB to the REA, den Haag 4.7.49, (MBZ, DGEM 215).
29 Note #1397/H/EB to the REA, den Haag 7.6.49 ; Note #1309/H/EB to the REA, den Haag 9.5.49 (MBZ, DGEM 214).
30 Minutes REA 22.6.49 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 571) ; Nota # 1470/H/EB aan de REA, den Haag 21.6.49 (MBZ, DGEM 215).
31 Nota # 1487/H/EB aan de REA, den Haag 4.7.49 (MBZ, DGEM 215). See also : Nota inzake de deviezenpositie, 11.5.50 (HTK 1949-50, Bijlagen II #1643) 6.
32 National Advisory Council on International Monetary Affairs Meeting #132, Washington 30.6.49 (NA, RG 59, Records of the N AC 1946-1953) 4.
33 ECA Administrator Hoffman to US Spécial Représentative in Europe Harriman, Washington 6.10.49 (FRUS 1949 IV) 428.
34 Secretary of State to the US Ambassador in France, Washington 19.10.50 (FRUS 1949 IV) 469-72.
35 Summary record of the meeting on 21-22 October, (FRUS 1949 IV) 474-94, for citation see page 474-5 ; see also : Ambassador in France to Secretary of State, Paris 2.10.49 (FRUS 1949 IV) 342-4.
36 Minutes RFA 21.9.49 pt.4 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 571).
37 For a description of the policy setting in which Fritalux was launched, see especially Milward, o.c., 306-15. For a detailed description of the French plan itself see : R.T. Griffiths and F. Lynch, « L’echec de la petite Europe », in : Revue Historique, 274 (1985).
38 Tel. form Lieftinck to Drees, van den Brink, Koster and van den Beugel, Washington 13.9.49 (MBZ, DGEM 1423).
39 Minutes MR 19.9.49 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR).
40 Bespreking te Parijs 18, 19 en 20 october, from Spierenburg, annex to letter #1757 7H/EB to the REA, den Haag 25.10.49 (MBZ, DGEM 1424).
41 Bijeenkomst te Parijs van de Consultatieve Groep en de Council op ministerieel niveau van 28 october tot 2 november’, note #1760 H/EB to the REA, (MBZ, DGEM 215) 9.
42 Ibid. ; for position Spierenburg, see : ’Bespreking te Parijs 18, 19 en 20 october, from Spierenburg, annex to letter #1757H/EB to the REA, den Haag 25.10.49 (MBZ, DGEM 1424).
43 Minutes REA 16.11.49 pt.6 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 571) ; De multilateralisatie van het Europese handelsverkeer, from Holtrop to the REA, Amsterdam 10.11.49 (MBZ, DGEM 1424).
44 Minutes REA 23.11.49 pt.4 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 571) ; Mémorandum, annex to letter #1806/H/EB from Hirschfeld to the REA, den Haag 28.11.49 (MBZ, DGEM 215).
45 This is well illustrated in a telegram from Harriman to the different ECA missions, listing no less than 10, rather vague, objectives which « should be primary goal of mission activities ». See : Circular tel. from the US Special Representative to the ECA missions in Europe, Paris 10.11.49 (FRUS 1949 IV) 445-7.
46 Minutes of Regional Mission Chiefs Meeting held 19 November 1949 in the Hague (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. mission, Office of the director, box 2).
47 Tel. from the Office of the Spécial Representative to the ECA mission in the Hague, Paris 2.11.49 (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. mission. Finance and program div., Classified subject files box 7).
48 ECATO 651, tel from ECA Washington to Hague mission, Washington 23.11.49 (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. mission, Finance and Program div., Classified subject files box 7).
49 REPTO 549, Tel. from OSR to Hague mission, Paris 25.11.49 (WNRC, RG 469, Neth. mission, Finance and Program div., Classified subject files box 7).
50 European Clearing Union cable, Washington 26.11.49, circulated as AAP Policy Series Paper PS/ AAP(NA49) 8 (WNRC, RG 469, Tasca files box 1).
51 Comments on original Fritalux proposai, Washington 29.11.49, circulated as Policy Paper PS/AAP(NA49) 9, Paris 2.12.49 (WNRC, RG 469, OSR, Tasca files box 1).
52 Tel. #709 from Hague mission to ECA Washington, the Hague 20.12.49 (WNRC, RG 469, EGA European Program. Div., Country subj. files box 16).
53 Nota Keesing voor Lieftinck, den Haag 2.1.50 (MF, BBV 1260/198).
54 Letter vdB/Kl 8978 from Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 2.1.50 (MBZ, DGEM 216).
55 Minutes REA 4.1.50 pt. 2a (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 572).
56 Minutes REA 24.1.50 pt. I (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; see also : Enige beschouwingen over de voorgestelde EPU, report by the president Holtrop of de Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam 23.1.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
57 Report #9730 by Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 6.2.50 (MBZ, DGEM 216).
58 European Payments Scheme, per letter ^ 10827 Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 18.3.50 (MF, BBV 1260/20). See also : The UK payments proposai, mémorandum from R. Triffin to HJ. Tasca, Paris 28.3.50 (WNRC, OSR Tasca files box 2) and Note for Lieftinck from the Thesaurier Generaal, den Haag 6.4.50 (MF, BBV 1260/21).
59 Keesing to Lieftinck, den Haag 20.3.50 and Posthuma (de Nederlandsche Bank) to Lieftinck, den Haag 20.3.50 (MF, BBV 1260/20) ; Boomstra to Stikker, den Haag 21.3.50 (MBZ, DGEm 1451).
60 Keesing to Spierenburg, den Haag 13.4.50 (MF, BBV 1260/20) ; Note Keesing, annex to letter #11915 from Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag (MF, BBV 1260/21) ; Tel. C2l, C23, C25 & Cl from Stijkel to Spierenburg, den Haag 17.4.50, 21.4.50, 28.4.50 & 2.5.50 (MBZ, DGEM 1451).
61 Note from Boomstra to Spierenburg, den Haag 17.5.50 (MBZ, DGEM 1451).
62 Participating countries were to receive quotas in the EPU based on their total current account turnover in 1949 trade. Belgium proposed a quota of 5 % of which the first 10 % would be free of gold settlements. Britain proposed a 15 % quota of which the first 30 % could be used free of gold payments – that is a gold free crédit facility 9 times larger than in the Belgian proposal. On the remainder, London wanted an average of 25 % gold settlements to 50 % in the Belgian proposai.
63 Letter from Liefrinck to Lieftinck, Paris 22.5.50 (MF, BBV 1260/21) ; Note from the dir. gen. BEB, den Haag 30.5.50 (MF, BBV 1260/21).
64 Comments on the UK commercial policy clauses in connection with EPU, Paris 19.5.50 (WNRC, RG 469, OSR Tasca files box 7).
65 Minutes REA 25.4.50 pt.3 & 5 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; Note from Holtrop to Lieftinck, Amsterdam 24.4.50 (MF, BBV 1260/21). For gold mechanism as outdated see : Verder punten fer sprake gebracht door de minister, den Haag 31.5.50 (MF, BBV 1260/21) ;
66 Minutes REA 25.4.50 pt.5 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572).
67 Letter Hunter to Foster, the Hague 26.4.50 (WNRC, RG 469 OSR Program Div., Country subject files, box 15).
68 Minutes REA 17.5.50 pt.3a (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; letter 4+12401 from Spierenburg to the REA, den Haag 13.5.50 (MBZ, DGEM 217) ; Note from Spierenburg to Stikker, den Haag 25.4.50 (MBZ, DGEM 1451).
69 Samenvatting van het besprokene tijdens de vergadering van de Raad op ministerieel niveau op 2 juni, Paris 6.6.50 (MBZ, DGEM 1218) ; Letter from Keesing to Lieftinck, den haag 6.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
70 Verslag van de bespreking bij de Minister, den Haag 11.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
71 Ibid.
72 Liberalisatie en betalingsbalans, annex to letter #11816 from Spierenburg to the RFA, den Haag 19.4.50 (MBZ, DGEM 217).
73 Note #404 for the RFA, den Haag 24.5.50 (MBZ, DGEM 231) ; Minutes RFA 17.5.50 & 7.6.50 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR box 572) ; Report by Posthuma on conversation with the FC A, Amsterdam/Paris 6.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
74 Aantekening betreffende liberalisatie en betalingsbalans and annex UEBL, Duitsland en sterling area, per letter 217).
75 Letter #13327 from van den Brink to the REA, den Haag 21.6.50 (MBZ, DGEM 217).
76 Note dir. BBV to Lieftinck, den Haag 17.6.50 ; Note from the dir. BBV to Lieftinck, den Haag 25.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/22).
77 ECA Mémorandum on initial positions with EPU, 10.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/22).
78 Tel. 341 from Hague mission to Washington, the Hague 21.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, ECA Washington, European Policy Div., Office of the Director, Country subject files, box 16).
79 Katz to division directors OSR, Paris 26.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, OSR Tasca files box 2).
80 Mémorandum 1161263-4880 GS from Stikkker to the MR, Paris 16-18.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33).
81 Ibid, ; letter Keesing to Stikker, Paris 16.6.50 and Note #78 Boomstra for Stikker, den Haag 26.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/22) ;
82 Minutes RFA 27.6.50, pt. 3 (ARA, 2.02.05 MR, box 572) ; see also : Meeting between Stikker, Lieftinck, Holtrop, Keesing, Posthuma and thee Thesaurier Generaal on 28 June, den Haag 29.6.50 (MF, BBV 1260/22).
83 REPTO # 3647, Paris 30.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, EGA Washington, European Program Div., Office of the Director, Country Subject files box 16).
84 REPTO 3647, Paris 30.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, EGA Washington, European Program Div., Office of the director, Country subject files box 16).
85 For a full account of the negotiations from the Dutch and American sides, see : Note 4^66332-5255 from Stikker, sent to the REA per letter #24805, den Haag 3.7.50 (MF, BBV 1260/33) ; REPTO 3625, Paris 29.6.50 ; REPTO 3647, Paris 30.6.50 ; REPTO 3657, Paris 30.6.50 (WNRC, RG 469, ECA Washington, European Program Division, Office of the director, country subject files box 16).
86 Note #426 from the dir. gen. BEB to the REA, den Haag 4.8.50 (MBZ, DGEM 233).
Notes de fin
* La traduction de ce résumé a été réalisée par le Service de traduction du ministère des Finances.
Table des illustrations
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Titre | EPU settlments |
Crédits | Source : J.M.M.J. Clerx, Nederland en de liberalisatie van het handels- en betalingsverkeer (1945-1958), 40. |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/igpde/docannexe/image/14867/img-1.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 23k |
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Titre | Crédit facilities to the Netherlands in EPU (quota $ 330 mln70.) |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/igpde/docannexe/image/14867/img-2.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 21k |
Le texte et les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont sous Licence OpenEdition Books, sauf mention contraire.