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Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement économique de l’Europe

 | 
René Girault
, 
Lévy-Leboyer Maurice

A. Les effets du Plan Marshall en Italie et en Allemagne

Italy and European Integration from the Marshall Plan to the Pleven Plan

L’Italie et l’integration européenne du Plan Marshall au Plan Pleven*

Antonio Varsori

Résumé

Le present article, fondé sur des sources d’information de premiere main (en particulier, les archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangères et les Archives nationales) et des etudes et memoires recents, se propose d’analyser, à la lumiere de ces documents, la politique menée par l’Italie en matière d’intégration europeenne, du lancement du Plan Marshall au projet d’instauration d’une Communaute de defense europeenne et d’une Union politique européenne.

Les raisons qui, en juin 1947, ont conduit les autorites italiennes, non seulement à souscrire au Plan Marshall, mais également à promouvoir le developpement d’etroites formes de coopération économique dans le cadre du Plan pour la reconstruction économique de l’Europe (par exemple, le Plan d’union douaniere franco-italienne), sont analysées dans un premier temps. Les efforts deployes par le gouvernement De Gasperi pour faire de l’Organisation européenne de coopération économique l’instrument de la realisation de 1’union politique de I’Europe occidentale, et l’attitude de Rome vis-a-vis de la création du Conseil de l’Europe sont de même examinés.

Cette étude met aussi en évidence le grand intérêt porte par le gouvernement italien aux aspects politiques et économiques des projets – Plan Schuman, Plan Pleven – elabores par les autorités françaises. C’est en fonction, en particulier, des intérêts politiques et économiques italiens que De Gasperi s’est trouvé amené à concevoir un plan visant a instaurer une Union politique européenne.

Le declin de l’influence de De Gasperi et la remise en cause du projet de la CED ont sonné le glas du projet italien d’Union politique européenne. Le présent article analyse la faillite de ce projet, avant de s’efforcer de porter un jugement d’ensemble sur la politique europeenne de 1945 a 1954.

Texte intégral

  • * La traduction de ce résumé a été réalisée par le Service de traduction du ministère des Finances.

I

  • 1 At any rate see, in particular, V. Zamagni, Betting on the Future. The Reconstruction of Italian In (...)
  • 2 See in particular the contributions by P.P. D’Attore e R. Ranieri.
  • 3 I have already examined these topics in some previous studies ; see, in particular « II ruolo inter (...)

1This paper will not focus on the economic aspects of Italy’s Europeanist choice, even if those elements obviously played a relevant role in leading the Rome authorities towards a clear-cut adherence to the process of European integration and they will not be forgotten in my analysis1. Some colleagues of mine are going to examine the economic and financial problems and consequences of Italy’s decision to join the Marshall Plan2. As for the present study, I tried to sketch out briefly the political and diplomatic reasons which caused the Italian government to adhere at first to the Marshall Plan and, as some sort of following steps, to the Council of Europe, to the Schuman Plan, and to the Pleven Plan. In particular I tried to show how foreign policy aims and aspirations nurtured by the Italian decision-makers closely intermingled with their economic needs and hopes, and how Rome’s keen interest in economic integration was just a part of a broader political strategy, which was consistently pursued from the late 1940s onwards3.

II

2On June 5, 1947, the American Secretary of State George Marshall in a speech at Harvard University, launched his plan for the economic recovery of the European continent. As Alan Milward has pointed out :

  • 4 A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London, Methuen, 1984, p. 96. On the Mars (...)

3« ... When General Marshall chose to announce (...) the readiness of the United States to provide further aid to European economies he appeared to impose only one condition. This was that the aid should be used by the European countries in a coordinated way rather than be allocated individually to specific countries for specific purposes4 ». So the concept of integration was the cornerstone of the American plan. This project, on the other hand, was largely influenced, not only by the economic and social plight Europe was experiencing, but also by the quick development of the international situation, in particular the worsening in the relationship between East and West and by what was perceived in the Western world as an impending Soviet threat. As Pierre Melandri has explained convincingly :

  • 5 P. Melandri, Les États-Unis face a Tunification de TEurope 1945-1954, Paris, Pedone, 1980, p. 94.

4« Initiative de la dernière chance centre ce que Marshall et Clayton (the US Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) avaient nommément qualifié de forces de « désintégration », le Plan Marshall ne pouvait pas ne pas se vouloir une oeuvre d’« intégration5 ».

  • 6 See, as an example, the documents quoted in C. Sforza, L’Italia alle soglie dell’Europa, Milan, Riz (...)

5Italy did not wait a long time to give a positive response to the speech delivered by the US Secretary of State and Rome, not only declared itself ready to accept the American aid, but the Italian authorities quickly stated their support to the concepts on which the Marshall Plan was based, as well as their aspiration at being recognized a leading role in the development of the project6.

  • 7 On Italy’s internal situation see, among others, A. Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra dalla Liberazion (...)
  • 8 On this question see in particular the recent contribution by I. Poggiolini, Diplomazia della trans (...)
  • 9 C. Sforza, L’ltalia, cit.
  • 10 See, for example, C. Sforza, Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi. La politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1 (...)

6Italy almost desperately needed the American economic aid for the survival of her economy, but also other reasons led the Rome government to adhere in so an enthusiastic way to the American plan. A few weeks earlier, in May 1947, the Christian Democrat leader, Alcide De Gasperi, had been able to oust from the government the Communists and their Socialist allies. He was presiding over a weak one-party cabinet, which had to struggle fiercely against a serious economic crisis, a quickly worsening social situation and a growing opposition from the parties of the Left. So the Marshall Plan was offering De Gasperi and the moderate political forces, which supported his political experiment, a vital support in front of the Italian public opinion7. If economic problems and the difficulties related to the internal situation almost compelled De Gasperi, as well as other Western European political leaders to comply with the US project, in the case of Italy, definite foreign policy considerations concurred in shaping the characteristics of Rome’s positive attitude towards the Marshall Plan. In February 1947 Italy had signed the peace treaty which had put an end to the « status » of the peninsula as enemy-defeated country. The document, which had been drafted in Paris by the victorious powers, was, however, regarded by most of the Italians as punitive as well as a further symbol of Italy’s subservience to the will of the victorious nations. The ratification of the peace treaty by the Constituent Assembly was arousing bitter feelings and growing opposition among several sectors of the Italian public opinion, while De Gasperi and his Foreign Minister, Count Carlo Sforza, were determined to have the Paris treaty ratified, as, in their opinion, such a decision was the only way for Italy to recover some room for manoeuvre in the international context8. In such a difficult situation the involvement in the Marshall plan seemed destined to give Italy an early opportunity to play a significant role in international affairs. It is interesting to note that during the weeks which followed Marshall’s speech, a period which was characterized by the Anglo-French-Russian conference held in Paris, the Italian authorities feared the implementation of the plan could be the outcome of the decisions worked out by the major European powers. In the instructions he sent to some diplomatic representatives abroad, Sforza stressed that, in Rome’s opinion, every country, which was going to be a member in the American scheme, had to share the same duties, as well as the same rights9. It is not surprising that, when Britain and France invited Italy to take part in the Paris negotiations on the Marshall Plan, such an initiative was regarded by Italian diplomats and politicians as the recognition that Italy’s international « status » was not too far from the one enjoyed by other European nations. Furthermore the Italian government began to stress the concepts of co-operation and of integration, as they were useful tools, through which Italy could hope to overcome her weak international position10.

  • 11 See, as an example, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Segreteria De Gasperi, b. 21, fasc. 162, d (...)

7The implementation of the Marshall Plan, however, did not fail to stir up doubts in a few italian diplomatic and political circles. Some officials had developed strong hopes in the development of some sort of bi-lateral partnership with the United States, which had showed some goodwill towards Italy and it was believed that Rome’s relevance as an element in the anti-Communist front Washington was building-up in Europe could strengthen the Truman administration’s resolve to give Rome both economic aid and political backing. Such an asset would have faded if Italy’s needs were to be merged in a broader European context, where more powerful nations, such as Britain and France, could play a by far more significant role in the eyes of the American leaders11. But, in the opinion of De Gasperi and Sforza, Italy had to drop these fears and Rome, on the contrary, in its dealing with the Marshall Plan partners, had to play the integration issue both on political and economic grounds.

  • 12 At any rate see, besides Harper’s and Aga Rossi’s contributions, P.P. D’Attorre, « II Piano Marshal (...)
  • 13 Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Ambasciata di Parigi (APa), b. 378, fasc. 1, desp (...)
  • 14 On this issue see, in particular, J.B. Duroselle and E. Serra (a cura di), Italia e Francia 1946-19 (...)
  • 15 See the paper by B. Bagnato.
  • 16 P. Guillen, « Le projet d’union économique entre la France, I’ltalie et le Benelux », in R. Poidevi (...)
  • 17 ASMAE, APa, b. 405, fasc. 1, letter, P. Quaroni (Paris) to C. Sforza (MAE), 3.3.1948.
  • 18 For an analysis of the obstacles to the implementation of the French-Italian Customs Union see the (...)

8It is not an easy task to assess the part Italy was able to play during the Marshall Plan negotiations, which were held in Paris between the second half of 1947 and the early months of 1948 and which led to the setting up of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). As for the economic aspects, obviously Italy was going to profit from the American project, but it is very likely that Italy’s needs were regarded as minor aspects, when compared with the ones of the major Western European powers12. On some occasions Rome’s ambitions and hopes appeared to be frustrated both in the economic and political fields. In August 1947 the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Pietro Quaroni, explained to Sforza how Italy could not bargain with her Marshall Plan partners, but she had to limit herself to a mere compliance with the American schemes13. The Rome authorities however, did not share the pessimism of Quaroni’s evaluations and, if it was difficult for Italy to achieve all her economic goals, the negotiations on the Marshall Plan offered Rome the chance for developing some diplomatic initiative, which aimed at strengthening the ties with Washington, as well as at renewing the bonds with some major Western European power. It is very likely that France had been already singled out as the European victorious nation, which was going to develop the most friendly attitude towards the peninsula. Italy and France seemed to share some common problems and aspirations. Both countries had to face a serious internal threat from powerful Communist Parties. Paris could be interested in relying on a useful and friendly partner in the Mediterranean area. Rome could exploit the issue of the « traditional » tie which linked the two « Latin sister nations14 ». So the Italian authorities tried to involve the French government in a project which aimed at the creation of a French-Italian Customs Union15. As Pierre Guillen has pointed out, through such an agreement Italy, not only hoped to achieve some economic benefit (an outlet for the peninsula’s agricultural and industrial products, as well as for its manpower surplus), but also to obtain a further diplomatic success, the recognition of an international position which might be regarded as not too distant from the one enjoyed by France. On the other hand the scheme for a French-Italian Customs Union was destined to please the Truman administration and to show to the Washington authorities that Rome had fully understood the concepts on which the Marshall Plan laid its bases16. In March 1948 Sforza met Bidault in Turin and the two Foreign Ministers signed a protocol, which had to be considered as a first step towards the implementation of the Customs Union plan. But the French support to this initiative was lukewarm and the Paris government’s compliance with Italy’s schemes was mainly the consequence of France’s interest in strengthening the political position of De Gasperi and of his allies on the eve of the April general elections. In a letter to Sforza, Quaroni openly expressed his doubts about the feasibility of the Customs Union project, as well as of the French goodwill towards such a plan17. The evaluations of the Italian Ambassador in Paris were not too distant from reality and very soon powerful obstacles hindered the fulfillment of the French-Italian Customs Union18.

  • 19 On the US-Italian bi-lateral aspects in the Marshall Plan context see J.L. Harper, op. cit., p. 265 (...)
  • 20 ACS, Segreteria De Gasperi, b. 21, fasc. 162, letter, C. Sforza to A. De Gasperi, 14.5.1948 and let (...)
  • 21 See, for example, ACS, Segreteria De Gasperi b. 21, fasc. 162, letter, P. Campilli (OEEC) to A. De (...)

9On the other hand Rome’s early Europeanist choice appeared to be largely influenced by « prestige » ambitions and nationalist aims. During the early months of 1948 the De Gasperi government was deeply involved in the electoral campaign and, as for foreign affairs were concerned, the Italian moderate political leaders, as well as Rome’s diplomacy preferred to focus their attention and to devote their energies on the achievement of « nationalist » goals, such as the restoration of the Italian sovereignty over Trieste and the former African colonies, as it was believed these issues had a stronger impact on Italian voters. Obviously the Italian authorities did not disregard the important consequences of the impending implementation of the European Recovery Program, but, after the early enthusiams about the French-Italian Customs Union had faded, they seemed to be more interested in the bi-lateral aspects (i.e. US-Italian) of the Marshall Plan than in the development of forms of co-operation among European states19. On the other hand Italy’s decisions in this context were influenced by different and sometimes conflicting approaches. As an example, it is interesting to note how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – at that time located at Palazzo Chigi – was interested in exerting some form of control on the implementation of the Marshall Plan, as that was regarded as a paramount political issue, which could not be determined only on the basis of purely economic considerations20. There were further difficulties which Italy had to face in the ERP context, in particular her weak international position and the poor opinion the major Western European partners had of the peninsula’s economic system, as well as of its role21. Some remarks in Robert Marjolin’s memoirs appear as clear proof of Rome’s minor role in the early stage of the OEEC’s life. Marjolin, who in Spring 1948 had been appointed General Secretary of the new international body, has written :

  • 22 R. Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie. Memoires 1911-1986, Paris, Laffont, 1986, p. 192.

10« En principe, les seize pays etaient egaux, mais leurs poids respectifs etaient tres différents. Quand je mettais une proposition en avant, je devais etre assuré de l’accord des Anglais et des Français ; je devrais être certain aussi que les Américains n’y étaient pas opposés. Pour les petits pays la situation était différente. Le plus souvent, ils n’avaient pas de vue globale du problème dont il était question, mais, par contre, des interets particuliers auxquels ils tenaient d’autant plus que ceux-ci etaient plus limités et plus concrets22 ».

  • 23 Ibid, p. 196.

11Marjolin seemed to imply that Italy was a part in the group of the « petits pays » ; on the other hand he goes on pointing out that « La France et l’Angleterre menaient le jeu a 1’O.E.C.E.23 ». Last but not least, giving an overall evaluation about the European nations’ response to the co-operation aspects of the Marshall Plan, Marjolin has stated that :

  • 24 Ibid., p. 200.

12« Quant a l’Italie, alors comme aujourd’hui, il était difficile de définir quelle était sa politique economique24 ».

  • 25 On this topic see E. Guida. Ultalia e il problema dell’emigrazione nel secondo dopoguerra, unpublis (...)
  • 26 F. Romero, « L’integrazione dell’Italia in Europa negli anni Cinquanta : la questione dell’emigrazi (...)

13If Marjolin’s views about Italy’s ability to adapt her economic choices to the Marshall Plan’s goals are too harsh, it is likely that his opinions were influenced by the sharp contrast between Italy’s political ambitions and the reality of the peninsula economic and social weakness. As a further example, it is worthwhile remembering that in the Marshall Plan context De Gasped and Sforza singled out as a paramount aim the opening of the European frontiers to Italian emigration. In early 1948 the Rome authorities organized in the Italian capital an important conference on this issue and the Italian government put much pressure on its OEEC partners in order to convince them about the feasibility of the Italian plans aimed at promoting a strong flux of emigrants to some Marshall Plan countries25. But Rome’s hopes clashed with the interests of other Western European nations and, as Federico Romero has pointed out in a recent essay, Italy’s efforts, largely backed by political considerations, gave very scant results26.

14So, in mid-1948, if Italy’s adherence to the Marshall Plan and her compliance to the concepts of economic co-operation had brought some definite benefit to the peninsula’s economy, the Rome authorities had been able only to a limited extent to achieve the ambitious political and diplomatic aims, which had largely influenced their decision to join the American plan.

III

  • 27 As for the creation of a Western defence system, see, among others A. De Staercke (ed.), NATO’s Anx (...)
  • 28 On the Brussels Treaty see : J. Baylis, « Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment (...)
  • 29 A. Varsori, « II Congresso dell’Europa dell’Aja (7-10 maggio 1948) », in Storia contemporanea, XXI (...)
  • 30 On French foreign policy see the recent J.W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance 1 (...)
  • 31 M.T. Bitsch, Le rdle de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de l’Europe, in R. Poidevin (sous la (...)

15The Marshall Plan was only an aspect of a broader strategy, which aimed at strengthening Western Europe and at containing Stalin’s ambitions. If in 1947 the United States and the major Western European powers had singled out economic recovery and the stabilization of the social situation of the « old continent » as the main goals of their foreign policy, very soon they began to believe that the Western response to the Soviet threat had to develop forms of military and political co-operation, in particular among the nations of Western Europe27. As for the military aspects were concerned, in March 1948 five European states (Britain, France, and the Benelux countries) signed an alliance, the Brussels Treaty, which was destined to favour a definite American involvement in the defence of the Western half of the « old continent », so paving the way to the creation of the Atlantic Pact28. Such developments were mainly the results of American and British efforts. As for the political co-operation aspects, while the Brussels Pact appeared to be unable to overcome the boundaries of a traditional military alliance, the Europeanist movements, in this period largely influenced by Churchill’s « United Europe », organized a conference, which was held at the Hague in early May 1948 and whose programme singled out the setting up of a European Assembly as the best instrument in order to favour political integration and perhaps the creation of a supra-national European body29. Such a project received the strong backing of the French authorities, who hoped that European integration could be the positive response to the threat of a too quick German economic and political recovery30. As it is well-known the French supra-national schemes were opposed by the British Labour Cabinet, which had no intention to give up Britain’s sovereignty and preferred to rely on the « special relationship » and on the Commonwealth than on an entangling involvement in a federal Europe. The compromise solution worked out by the two major Western European powers was the Council of Europe, which was neither a supra-national organization, nor an effective intergovernmental body31.

  • 32 As for Italy’s adherence to the Atlantic Pact see, among others, M. Toscano, Appunti sui negoziati (...)

16Which was Italy’s attitude towards the developments that characterized the Western scene between 1948 and 1949 ? And, in particular, how did such developments influence Rome’s policy towards the Europeanist issue ? As for the Brussels Treaty, Italy’s position was a very cautious one. De Gasperi and Sforza regarded the pact, which had been signed in the Belgian capital, mainly as a military alliance and in the heated atmosphere of the electoral campaign it was not an easy task for the De Gasperi government to take into consideration the idea of an Italian involvement in such a treaty. The majority of the Italian public opinion showed scant interest in joining an organization, which would have meant for the peninsula definite military commitments and very few if any, economic and political advantages. Last but not least, after some signs of early goodwill, the five countries, which were going to form the Brussels Pact, regarded the idea of an Italian participation in the treaty more as a liability than as an asset, in particular from the strategic point of view32.

17As a consequence of the landslide Christian Democrat victory at the April general elections the Rome government felt its international position had been considerably strengthened and both De Gasperi and the Foreign Ministry believed it possible to have the peninsula admitted to the Brussels Pact, even if such a goal was largely influenced by the hope in getting some concessions by the Western European powers, in particular as for the former colonies issue and the exploitation of the German economic resources were concerned. But Rome’s aspirations were frustrated by the negative attitude of the British government.

18Only in Summer 1948 the Italian authorities began to realise that the major Western powers were developing definite projects, which aimed, not only at economic integration but also at closer forms of military-political co-operation. The already difficult internal situation, which was characterized by the presence of a powerful Communist Party, and the weakness of Italy’s international position, still largely influenced by the negative heritage of the peace treaty (i.e. the Trieste and the former colonies questions) led the De Gasperi government to pursue a « low profile » policy towards the projects for the creation of a Western defence system and Italy wavered between, on one hand, vague aspirations to a closer security ties with the United States and, on the other, the hopes in an « armed neutrality ». As a consequence of such an uneasy position the Rome Government felt it vital to develop some initiative, which could show Rome was playing a relevant part in shaping Western policy. In such a context De Gasperi and Sforza singled out the European issue as the best tool in order to recover some room for diplomatic manoeuvre.

  • 33 See A. Varsori, Il Congresso... cit. The Italian delegation at the Hague conference was mainly comp (...)
  • 34 C. Sforza, Cinque anni cit., pp. 483-496.
  • 35 Ibid, pp. 69-73.
  • 36 ASMAE, APa, b. 405, fasc. 1, despatch no. 1062/17185/3570 P. Quaroni (Paris) to C. Sforza (MAE), 4. (...)
  • 37 C. Sforza, Cinque anni cit., pp. 73-80.
  • 38 As for the British position see, for example, ASMAE, Ambasciata di Londra (AL), b. 1360, fasc. 1, t (...)

19The activities of the Europeanist movements and the Hague conference, however, had aroused scant interest in Italy’s political and diplomatic circles, as the political world had been deeply involved in the electoral campaign and in the developments following the general elections. Very few leading politicians had been members of the Italian delegation at the Congress of Europe33. So neither the Italian Europeanist movements nor the Italian goverment had played any role in the early plans for the creation of a European Assembly. When, in July 1948, the French authorities began to back the plan for the creation of a European assembly, Paris believed that such a project had to be examined at first by the members of the Brussels Pact. The French government’s attitude seemed destined to exclude Italy from the most promising developments in European political co-operation, at least from its early stages. The Rome government quickly reacted to this threat. On 18 July, in a speech delivered in Perugia, Count Sforza had already advocated closer forms of economic and political integration among the nations of Western Europe34. In August, very likely as a response to Bidault’s open support to the programme worked out by the Elague conference, the Italian Foreign Minister sent to the French government a memorandum, in which Italy singled out the OEEC as the instrument through which Western Europe could achieve political and economic unity35. The Paris authorities showed scant interest in the Italian plan and there was no official reply to Sforza’s proposals, perhaps also as a consequence of the series of government crises which France was experiencing in this period36. This diplomatic set-back did not deter the Italian authorities from trying to exploit further the Europeanist issue. On the contrary the rapid development in the international situation, in particular the likely creation of a Western defence system, from which the peninsula appeared to be excluded, led the De Gasperi government to resort to the Europeanist ideal as the only card which could save Italy from being relegated to a second-rank position in the Western world. In October 1948 the Palazzo Chigi sent to the members of OEEC another memorandum. In this document the Rome government renewed its proposals, following which the OEEC had to be transformed into a body aiming at the build up of the political and economic unification of Western Europe37. But the major Western European powers, in particular Britain and France albeit for different reasons, rejected Italy’s vague plans. In the opinion of the British authorities the OEEC was already performing its tasks and, on the other hand, they disliked any grandiose scheme, which aimed at European integration. As for France, the Paris authorities were already deeply involved in the uneasy task of convincing their British allies about the feasibility of the project for the creation of a European assembly38. Furthermore, even if in the French opinion European integration had to play some part in the future of the « old continent », the majority of the Western decision-makers had singled out the setting up of a military alliance, which would have involved the United States in the defence of Western Europe, as their paramount and most urgent aim. So Italy was compelled to give up her hopes in playing a leading role in shaping Western policy towards the « old continent » ; on the contrary the Rome authorities had to focus their energies and attention on the Atlantic Pact project, as only the membership in this military alliance could give the peninsula the guarantee of remaining a part of the Western world and, as a consequence, of any future scheme aimed at European co-operation.

  • 39 ASMAE, AL, b. 1360, fasc. 1 tel. no. 673, MAE to London, 1.12. 1948 ; b. 1383, fasc. 1, teles, no. (...)

20The analysis of Italy’s adherence to the Atlantic Pact is outside the scope of the present paper, even if Rome’s involvement in the Western defence system was more the result of France’s and the United States’ decision to support Italy’s candidature than a purely Italian achievement. In spite of that, Rome’s Atlantic choice seemed to strengthen Italy’s position in the European context too. In early 1949 the Brussels Pact powers invited Italy to take part in the final stages of the negotiations leading to the creation of the Council of Europe. Italy’s attitude appeared to confirm that Rome’s Europeanist choice, so loudly advocated in the previous period, was the ill-concealed instrument of a nationalist policy. Instead of stressing the issue of integration, the Italian government tried to play the role of mediator between, on one hand, Britain’s cautious positions and, on the other, France’s views, perhaps in the hope of enhancing the peninsula’s international position in the eyes of its two major Western European partners39. Furthermore the Rome authorities did not forget to stress some purely Italian political and economic interests : from the recognition of Rome’s international stand to the need of opening the European frontiers to Italian emigration. Last but not least, the adherence to the Council of Europe was exploited in order to soften both the internal opposition and the international reaction to the peninsula’s Atlantic choice. On the occasion of the signature of the Council of Europe treaty, Count Sforza opened his final statement by declaring : « Few international treaties have been signed under happier auspices than this Act. For many months we have been, in Berlin, under the nightmare of a threat of war and just to-day we learn that this threat is disappearing. Let us give credit for this also to a reborn desire for peaceful understanding on the part of Moscow. But let us not forget that the signing of the Atlantic Pact and the conclusion of our work towards European Union have had, beyond doubt, a fundamental influence on what we desire with all our hearts : a constant will of peace. »

21And the Italian Foreign Minister added : « We firmly desire that the Union to which we have decided to give the rather plain name of « Council of Europe », will soon show the world that it serves peace and the organisation of our old Continent. We shall succeed, if we are able to create a Europe in which national boundaries are not written in ink, but in pencil. We shall succeed if we always remember that history is the graveyard of those nations who did not dare to look to the future. Indeed history should teach us to-day that our supreme duty is to organise Europe and to suppress its watertight compartments, so as to raise the general well-being to the same decent standard everywhere. The only way to be intelligently selfish is to be generous. It is for our sake that every one of us will, if need be, even accept sacrifices.

  • 40 ASMAE, AL, b. 1384, fasc. 1, memorandum « Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe ».

22We are free and solid nations. The more we will organise ourselves, the more we shall be prosperous ; the more we shall be prosperous, the more we will understand that our supreme necessity is one and only one : PEACE w40.

23Sforza’s words seem to show that the Europeanist choice, in Rome’s opinion, had to serve a twofold purpose : on one hand a softening in the cold war atmosphere on the other further economic aid and political backing to Italy on the part her Western European partners.

  • 41 On Italy’s policy towards the Atlantic alliance see A. Varsori, Italy and Western Defence 1948-1955 (...)
  • 42 On this question see G. Rossi, L’Africa italiana verso l’indipendenza (1941-1949), Milan, Giuffrè, (...)
  • 43 See, as an example, the evaluations in ASMAE, Affari Politici (AP), USA, 1949, b. 30, fasc. 2, lett (...)

24During 1949, however, Italy’s interest in the issue of European integration lessened sharply. The Rome authorities appeared to content themselves with what they mainly perceived as diplomatic and « prestige » achievements and the De Gasperi government focused once again its attention on the former colonies question, without forgetting to struggle in order to get further recognition of a relevant international stand in the context of the Atlantic alliance. Two goals, which stressed Rome’s persisting ambitions in pursuing a foreign policy largely influenced by nationalist bias. In both cases, however, Italy’s aspirations were frustrated. The peninsula’s role in the Atlantic organisation was regarded as a minor one by the major Western powers41 and with the failure of the so-called Bevin-Sforza agreement Italy was compelled to give up any hope at playing an important part in her former African empire, with the meagre exception of a ten-year trusteeship over Somaliland, granted by the United Nations in November 194942. Furthermore Italy’s record, as for the implementation of the European Recovery Program was concerned, began to be openly criticized by ECA officials43.

25In early 1950 Italy’s stand in the Western world appeared to be a very weak and minor one. Sforza’s foreign policy was criticized both at home and abroad. Once again European integration was going to become the only chance left to Italy in order to play some significant role in foreign affairs.

IV

  • 44 On the Schuman Plan, on Monnet’s and on Schuman’s roles see among others : J. Monnet, Memoires, Par (...)
  • 45 See in particular R. Ranieri, L’Italia e i negoziati del Piano Schuman, in E. Di Nolfo, R.H. Rainer (...)
  • 46 As for the relations with France see in particular the two essays by P. Guillen in J.B. Duroselle a (...)
  • 47 As for the relations between Italy and West Germany see : P. Guillen, « L’ltalie et le problème all (...)
  • 48 R. Ranieri, op. cit.

26The rehabilitation of West Germany, as well as the growing Anglo-American pressures for a German rearmament had led the French authorities to resort to the exploitation of the Europeanist ideal as the best way to control the process which might have transformed the Federal Republic into a powerful element in the Western European context. In May 1950, under the guidance of Jean Monnet and of his advisers, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, launched the plan for the creation of a European supra-national authority, which could control the coal and steel production44. Italy almost immediately gave a positive response to the French project. I have no intention to deal in detail with the economic aspects of this relevant episode in the history of the process of European integration. Some Italian scholars, in particular Ruggero Ranieri and Vera Zamagni, have already thouroughly examined this topic45. So I would limit myself to a few remarks about the political aspects of Rome’s decisions. As it has been noted, the Schuman Plan aroused some doubt and suspicion in Italian political and economic circles. The peninsula’s economic system was regarded as very weak when compared with the ones of other European countries and it was feared that competition with stronger economies could jeopardize Italy’s interests, in particular as for the steel industry was concerned. Nevertheless the De Gasperi government resolved to join the negotiations, which were going to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first European specialised authority with some definite supra-national characteritics. As Ranieri has cleverly explained, Italy’s positive attitude to the Schuman Plan was influenced by the hope in some economic advantages (i.e. : access to raw materials, a special position for the Italian steel industry, some concession in the field of emigration policies, etc.). Furthermore in some Italian circles it was believed that the peninsula had to face a challenge, which could favour a process of economic modernization. But it is impossible to disregard that Rome’s involvement in the French scheme was also the consequence of definite political considerations, a part of a broader political strategy. As for the internal balance, after the disappointments and frustrations caused by Rome’s inability to achieve outstanding diplomatic successes in both the Atlantic alliance and in the African/Mediterranean context, the participation in the Schuman Plan appeared as an undisputed recognition of Italy’s international « status » : a diplomatic achievement which could be offered to a too often disillusioned public opinion. Furthermore this decision stressed the peaceful goals of the anti-Communist leadership, which could boast its paramount interest in economic co-operation, an objective which could bring advantages to the Italian people. As for foreign affairs were concerned, the De Gasperi government hoped to strengthen its ties both with France and West Germany, the former one of the victorious powers in World War 1146, the latter a powerful element in the process of European economic recovery47. On the other hand, the Rome authorities could confirm, in particular in the eyes of the Truman administration, their allegiance to Europeanist ideals, so countering the critical views expressed by some US officials about Italy’s attitude towards ERP policies. Once again European integration revealed itself as a useful issue, through which the Italian leadership hoped to recover for the peninsula a relevant role in the international context. Furthermore, as for the Schuman Plan, the Italian government seemed to show more determination and consistency in pursuing its objectives and Ranieri’s studies seem to confirm that the Rome authorities were able to achieve some of their economic and political aims48.

  • 49 On this issue see the recent reassessment by W. Lafeber, « NATO and the Korean War : A Context », i (...)
  • 50 On the Pleven Plan and on EDC see E. Fursdon, The European Defence Community : A History, London, M (...)
  • 51 On Italy’s attitude towards the EDC scheme see A. VARSORI, « L’ltalia fra alleanza atlantica e CED (...)

27The rearmament of West Germany and Bonn’s involvement in the Western defence system were further relevant steps towards the complete rehabilitation of the former enemy country. The Korean War gave both Washington and London the opportunity to work out plans, which aimed at transforming West Germany into a member of the Atlantic alliance. In September 1950, on the occasion of a Tripartite meeting held in New York, such a scheme was put forward by the American to their British and French allies49. The French response was a negative one but as Paris knew too well, it was impossible to block the US initiative for a long time, in the French capital it was hoped that Europeanism could serve once again the twofold purpose of appeasing the Truman administration and of controlling the process of West Germany’s rehabilitation. In late October 1950 the French Prime Minister René Pleven launched the project for the setting up of a European Army along the lines of the Schuman Plan50. Italy had already expressed her preference for adoption of the American plan. From a military point of view Bonn’s adherence to NATO would have strengthened Italy’s strategic position. Furthermore Rome would have pleased the American administration and, last but not least, Germany’s contribution to the defence of Western Europe would have lightened Italy’s economic burden devoted to military expenditure. Despite all that, Italy did not reject the Pleven Plan and the Rome authorities resolved to take part in the Paris negotiations on the European Army, which opened in February 1951. It is very likely that the De Gasperi government disliked the idea of an open contrast with France, which in Rome was still regarded as a useful and friendly partner and with which Italy was still negotiating the implementation of the Schuman Plan. Furthermore the refusal of the new French project would have contradicted Italy’s Europeanist choice. On the other hand the Rome authorities had scant confidence in the feasibility of the Pleven Plan and the Italian delegation at the Paris talks maintained a cautious « wait and see » attitude. If the French plan would have failed. it would have been easy to come back to the American proposals and Italy would have confirmed both her friendly attitude towards Paris and her faithfulness to the European ideals51.

  • 52 ASMAE, Fondo Cassaforte (FC), b. 23, despatch no. 554, P. Quaroni (Paris) to A. De Gasperi (MAE), 2 (...)
  • 53 See, as an example, the critical remarks in ASMAE, FC, b. 23, despatch no. 2817, G. Malagodi (OEEC- (...)

28In Summer 1951, however, in particular owing to the dramatic change in the foreign policy of the US administration, the Pleven Plan seemed destined to become a reality with the creation of a European Defence Community. Almost immediately Italy realized that it was no longer possible to rely on a « low profile » policy and on a lukewarm support of the French plan52. In many Italian circles the EDC scheme was regarded as a serious threat to the Rome’s interests. In the military field the European Defence Community would have overlapped with NATO, so breaking off the bonds the Italians had built up with some sectors of the American military establishment and perhaps losing the benefits deriving from the US military aid. Furthermore, in a EDC context Italy would have been compelled to comply with a French or a French-German, political and strategic leadership53. Above all the Rome authorities feared the economic consequences of the setting up of an integrated defence community : a common budget on whose aims and characteristics Rome would have had a limited say, the loss of any form of control on vital aspects of the peninsula’s economic system, the very likely increase of military expenditures to the detriment of the country’s economic recovery. The Italian authorities had began to appreciate the economic aspects of the process of European integration, but they believed that the advantages deriving from the creation of EDC would have been largely overcome by heavy commitments. As the Italian Liberal politician, Giovanni Malagodi, at that time in charge of the Italian Delegation at the OEEC, pointed out in a letter to a Palazzo Chigi high official : « Per un paese economicamente debole, una alienazione importante, ma parziale delle sue facolta sovrane in materia economica è una prospettiva che, coinvolgendo tutta la vita del paese, merita profonda meditazione. Una messa in comune totale della nostra economia con quella di altri paesi (accompagnata naturalmente dalle necessarie misure di transizione) rappresenterebbe una possibilità di vita piu ampia e compenserebbe quindi largamente i rischi che pure comporterebbe. Una alienazione importante ma parziale significherebbe invece mettere in mani altrui la facolta di influenzare in modo decisive la nostra economia, senza ottenere nessuno di quei compensi che a noi sono indispensabili (libera circolazione dei capitali e degli uomini, libero mercato per i nostri prodotti caratteristici) ».

29And after stressing the close ties between the creation of the European Defence Community and the future of the Italian economy, Malagodi added :

  • 54 Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE), Archivio Ivan Matteo Lombardo (AIML) fasc. 3704, G. Malagodi ( (...)

30« Sappiamo per esperienza quanto grandi siano le difficoltà e la resistenza, per esempio della Francia a facilitare effettivamente, sul piano economico, la soddisfazione delle nostre esigenze di vita nel campo del lavoro e della produzione. Una volta che Francia e Germania, tanto piu forti di noi economicamente, avessero raggiunto i loro scopi politici e ci avessero tra 1’altro legati politicamente a loro attraverso la costituzione dell’esercito comune, la loro volontà effettiva di venirci incontro nel campo economico diminuirebbe ancora54 ».

  • 55 The text of Spinelli’s memorandum to De Gasperi in S. Pistone, L’ltalia e I’unita europea dalle pre (...)
  • 56 A. Varsori, L’ltalia, cit., pp. 142-147.

31Obviously Italy could not oppose the Pleven Plan, which by then was enjoying the American support. The only way out left to De Gasperi was the development of some strong political initiative. In Summer 1951 Altiero Spinelli, a leading member of the Europeanist movement, suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that the EDC project could be exploited as a way in order to favour the setting up of a European Political Community55. The Christian Democrat leader, who was also in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began to believe that a bold move towards political integration could be the right response to Italy’s fears and ambitions. Through advocating the transformation of the European Defence Community into an instrument aimed at achieving political unity, De Gasped hoped to recover for Italy a leading role in the European context, as well as the full confidence of the American administration. Furthermore ; in an integrated political community Italy would have enjoyed a « status » similar to the one of the major members of the « Six » (i.e. France and West Germany) and in such a position Rome would have been able to bargain the economic aspects of European integration from a position of strength. Last but not least, as for the internal political balance was concerned, it would have been easier to convince the Italian public opinion that the Europeanist choice was going to offer the Italian people definite benefits56.

  • 57 As for these aspects see D. Preda, Storm di una speranza. La battaglia per la CED e la Federazione (...)
  • 58 Some interesting material about the activities of the « ad hoc » assembly is to be found at the Arc (...)

32It is impossible to examine in the present paper the process which led the Italians to single out the creation of a European Political Community (EPC) as the main objective of their foreign policy, in particular in the context of the negotiations for the setting up of a European Army57. Nevertheless I may stress how De Gasperi’s efforts appeared to be successful. Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, signed in late May 1952, foresaw the transformation of the European Defence Community into the first step towards a European Political Community. Furthermore Italian pressures largely concurred in the creation of the so-called « ad hoc assembly », which, between 1952 and 1953, worked out a definite plan about the EPC58.

  • 59 See, as examples, MFE, AIML, fasc. 3704, teles, no. 21/0306, MAE to Italian Delegation EDC (Paris), (...)
  • 60 On the opposition to the EDC treaty, besides the contributions by Fursdon and Clesse, see, among ot (...)
  • 61 ASMAE, AP, 1953, Italy, b. 255, memorandum « Appunto sulla riunione dei ministri della Comunita Eur (...)

33In spite of these diplomatic and political initiatives, Italy’s hopes were doomed to failure. Georges Bidault, who, in early 1953, took the place of Schuman as French Foreign Minister seemed to pour cold water on Italy’s enthusiasms about a supra-national political authority59. On the other hand the whole EDC project to which the implementation of the EPC was closely tied, began to crumble as a consequence of the development in the international situation, as well as of the growing uneasiness and opposition the European Army project was causing in France60. On the other hand De Gasperi showed that, if Italy was very much interested in economic integration, the setting up of a political community was regarded as a fundamental priority, for, in Italian opinion, only the achievement of political integration could offer the Rome authorities the position of strength through which it would have been possible to bargain with Paris and Bonn on economic matters. So, it is not surprising that the De Gasperi government had a non-committal attitude towards the so-called Beyen Plan, which aimed at setting up a sort of Customs Union among the « Six ». In fact such a project did not seem to offer the Italians the political guarantees they needed61.

  • 62 On De Gasperi’s Europeanist choice see the interesting remarks in P. Pastorelli, La politica estera (...)
  • 63 On these developments see : E. Fursdon, op. cit. ; A. Clesse ; op. cit. ; on the French position se (...)
  • 64 E. Serra, « L’Italia e la conferenza di Messina », in Idem (a cura di), II rilancio delTEuropa e i (...)

34 In spite of all that, between the second half of 1951 and the first half of 1953 the Italian government, De Gasperi in particular, played a leading and unprecedented role in the process of European integration62. The crisis of the EDC scheme, the failure of De Gasperi’s attempt at securing a solid parliamentary majority on the occasion of the 1953 general elections, his resignation from office, the emphasis on nationalist aims in the program of De Gasperi’s successor Giuseppe Pella, marked a radical change in Italy’s attitude towards the issue of European integration and the Rome authorities appeared to lose any interest in the schemes aiming at the unity of the « old continent ». On the other hand from mid-1953 onwards the whole Europeanist project seemed destined to face a complete set-back. The final rejection of the EDC treaty on the part of the French « Assemblée Nationale » in August 1954 had, as an almost obvious consequence, the « death » of the EPC plan. Britain’s initiative led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) and to West Germany’s adherence to NAT063. In Autumn 1954 the Western world appeared to be characterized by the presence of military alliances and by a few « special relationships » : the « traditional » tie between London and Washington, a strengthened bond between Washington and Bonn, a renewed friendship between Paris and London. Italy seemed to be relegated in a second-rank role and, on the other hand, she had played no significant part in the international developments of the period 1953/1954. In spite of all that, in particular owing to the efforts of the advocates of European integration, the Messina conference, held in early June 1955, paved the way to the so-called relaunching of Europe, which led to the signature of the Treaties of Rome and to creation of the Common Market and of the EURATOM. For Italy such a development meant a new chance which the Rome authorities perhaps with less ambitions and with a more realistic approach, resolved not to lose64.

Notes

1 At any rate see, in particular, V. Zamagni, Betting on the Future. The Reconstruction of Italian Industry, 1946-1952, in J. Becker and F. Knipping (eds.), Power in Europe ? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World 1945-1950-, Berlin/New York, W. de Gruyter, 1986, pp. 283-302 ; J.L. Harper, L’America e la ricostruzione delTItalia 1945-1948, Bologna, il Mulino, 1986 ; as well as the contributions by V. Zamagni, P.P. D’Attorre e R. Ranieri in E. Di Nolfo, R.H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (a cura di), LTtalia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1945-50), Milano, Marzorati, 1988.

2 See in particular the contributions by P.P. D’Attore e R. Ranieri.

3 I have already examined these topics in some previous studies ; see, in particular « II ruolo internazionale delFItalia negli anni del centrismo (1947-1958) », in AA. W., 1947/1958 L’ltalia negli anni del centrismo, Rome, Acropoli, 1990, pp. 195-221 and « La scelta europeista », in AA. W., Storia della societa italiana, vol. XXIV, Il « miracolo economico » e il centro-sinistra, Milan, TETI, 1992.

4 A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London, Methuen, 1984, p. 96. On the Marshall Plan see also : J. Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford (Cal.), Stanford University Press, 1976 ; E. Aga Rossi (a cura di), Il Piano Marshall e l’Europa, Rome, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983 ; M. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

5 P. Melandri, Les États-Unis face a Tunification de TEurope 1945-1954, Paris, Pedone, 1980, p. 94.

6 See, as an example, the documents quoted in C. Sforza, L’Italia alle soglie dell’Europa, Milan, Rizzoli, 1947, pp. 17-26. See also C. Sforza, « Italy, the Marshall Plan and the « Third Force », in Foreign Affairs, XXVI (1947), no. 3.

7 On Italy’s internal situation see, among others, A. Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra dalla Liberazione al potere DC, Rome/Bari, Laterza, 1975 ; L. Valiani, LTtalia di De Gasperi (1945-1954), Florence, Le Monnier, 1982 ; E. Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze degli italiani (1943-1953), Milan, Mondadori, 1986.

8 On this question see in particular the recent contribution by I. Poggiolini, Diplomazia della transizione. Gli alleati e il problema del trattato di pace italiano (1945-1947), Florence, Ponte alle Grazie, 1990.

9 C. Sforza, L’ltalia, cit.

10 See, for example, C. Sforza, Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi. La politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951, Rome, Atlante, 1952, pp. 41-67.

11 See, as an example, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Segreteria De Gasperi, b. 21, fasc. 162, doc. « Misure direttive per l’E.R.P. ».

12 At any rate see, besides Harper’s and Aga Rossi’s contributions, P.P. D’Attorre, « II Piano Marshall : politica, economia, relazioni internazionali nella ricostruzione italiana », in E. Di Nolfo, R.H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (a cura di), op. cit., pp. 497-546 ; R. Quartararo, « L’ltalia e il Piano Marshall » (1947-1952), in Storia contemporanea, XV (1984), no. 4, pp. 647-722 ; A. Giovagnoli, « L’ltalia nell’OECE e le prospettive della politica estera degasperiana », in AA. W., De Gasperi e l’età del centrismo (1947-1953), Rome, Cinque Lune, 1984 pp. 371-398.

13 Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Ambasciata di Parigi (APa), b. 378, fasc. 1, despatch no. 692/ 9181/1425, P. Quaroni (Paris) to C. Sforza (MAE), 10.8.1947.

14 On this issue see, in particular, J.B. Duroselle and E. Serra (a cura di), Italia e Francia 1946-1954, Milan, ISPI/F. Angeli, 1988.

15 See the paper by B. Bagnato.

16 P. Guillen, « Le projet d’union économique entre la France, I’ltalie et le Benelux », in R. Poidevin (sous la direction de), Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948-mai 1950), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1986, p ; 144.

17 ASMAE, APa, b. 405, fasc. 1, letter, P. Quaroni (Paris) to C. Sforza (MAE), 3.3.1948.

18 For an analysis of the obstacles to the implementation of the French-Italian Customs Union see the documents in ACS, « Carte Sforza », b. 6, fasc. III. In spite of these difficulties, also during the following years, some Italian officials still hoped it was possible to work out some form of economic compromise with Paris, see « Appunto per S.E. il Ministro », 24.2.1950.

19 On the US-Italian bi-lateral aspects in the Marshall Plan context see J.L. Harper, op. cit., p. 265 ff. ; J.E. Miller, The United States and Italy 1940-1950. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization, Chapel Hill/London, The University of North Carolina Press, 1986, p. 250 ff. ; R. Quartararo, Italia e Stati Uniti gli anni difficili (1945-1952), Naples, ESI, 1986, pp. 145-234. Some interesting documents in ACS, Segreteria De Gasperi, b. 21, fasc. 162 and « Carte Sforza », b. 6, fasc. III.

20 ACS, Segreteria De Gasperi, b. 21, fasc. 162, letter, C. Sforza to A. De Gasperi, 14.5.1948 and letter, C. Sforza to A. De Gasperi, ; 10.6.1948. On this issue see also the other documents in the same file.

21 See, for example, ACS, Segreteria De Gasperi b. 21, fasc. 162, letter, P. Campilli (OEEC) to A. De Gasperi, 9.7.1948.

22 R. Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie. Memoires 1911-1986, Paris, Laffont, 1986, p. 192.

23 Ibid, p. 196.

24 Ibid., p. 200.

25 On this topic see E. Guida. Ultalia e il problema dell’emigrazione nel secondo dopoguerra, unpublished thesis dissertation, discussed at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Florence, Summer 1990.

26 F. Romero, « L’integrazione dell’Italia in Europa negli anni Cinquanta : la questione dell’emigrazione », in Passato e Presente 1989, no. 20/21, pp. 75-105. See also F. Romero, Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973, Rome, Edizioni Lavoro, 1991.

27 As for the creation of a Western defence system, see, among others A. De Staercke (ed.), NATO’s Anxious Birth : The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s, London, Hurst & Co., 1985 ; N. Henderson, The Birth of NATO, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1982 ; T.P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Westport (Conn.) Greenwood Press, 1981 ; E. Reid, Time for Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, Toronto, McLelland & Stewart 1977 ; O. Riste (ed.), Western Security. The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence 1947-1953, Oslo, The Norwegian University Press, 1985.

28 On the Brussels Treaty see : J. Baylis, « Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment », International Affairs, 1984, pp. 615-629 ; M. Vaisse, « L’echec d’une Europe franco-britannique ou comment le Pacte de Bruxelles fut créé et délaissé », in R. Poidevin (sous la direction de), op. cit., pp. 369-390 ; A. Varsori, Il Patto di Bruxelles (1948) : tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Rome, Bonacci ; 1988.

29 A. Varsori, « II Congresso dell’Europa dell’Aja (7-10 maggio 1948) », in Storia contemporanea, XXI (1990), no. 3, pp. 463-493.

30 On French foreign policy see the recent J.W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance 1944-1949, Leicester/London, Leicester University Press, 1990, and P. Gerbet, Le relèvement, 1944-1949, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1991.

31 M.T. Bitsch, Le rdle de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de l’Europe, in R. Poidevin (sous la direction de) op. cit., pp. 165-198.

32 As for Italy’s adherence to the Atlantic Pact see, among others, M. Toscano, Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione dell’Italia al Patto Atlantico, in Idem, Pagine di storia diplomatica contemporanea, Milan, Giuffrè, 1963, pp. 455-519 ; H.T. Smith, « The Fear of Subversion : The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the Northern Atlantic Treaty », in Diplomatic History, VII (1983) no. 2, pp. 139-155 ; A. Varsori, « La scelta occidentale dell’Italia (1948-1949) », in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, I (1985) nos. 1 and 2, pp. 95-159, 303-368 ; B. Vigezzi, « La politica estera italiana e le premesse della scelta atlantica », in Idem (a cura di) La dimensione atlantica e le relazioni internazionali nel dopoguerra (1947-1949) Milan, Jaca Book, 1987, pp. 1-190 ; O. Barie, « Gli Stati Uniti, 1’Unione Occidentale e I’inserimento dell’Italia nell’alleanza atlantica » in Idem (a cura di), L’alleanza occidentale, Bologna, il Mulino, 1988, pp. 115-208. See also the most recent E.T. Smith, The United States, Italy and NATO, 1947-1952, London, Macmillan, 1991.

33 See A. Varsori, Il Congresso... cit. The Italian delegation at the Hague conference was mainly composed by intellectuals, journalists and university professors. Among the few politicians it is possible to remember the names of : N. Carandini, L. Cattani and E. Giacchero.

34 C. Sforza, Cinque anni cit., pp. 483-496.

35 Ibid, pp. 69-73.

36 ASMAE, APa, b. 405, fasc. 1, despatch no. 1062/17185/3570 P. Quaroni (Paris) to C. Sforza (MAE), 4.10.1948. Quaroni stressed the lack of interest shown by Schuman and Chauvel towards the Italian plan.

37 C. Sforza, Cinque anni cit., pp. 73-80.

38 As for the British position see, for example, ASMAE, Ambasciata di Londra (AL), b. 1360, fasc. 1, teles, no. 1567/20675/4, P. Quaroni (Paris) to MAE, , 22.11.1948. See also the lukewarm attitude of the Belgian leader, Spaak, in memo « Conversazione fra il Presidente De Gasperi ed il Primo Ministro Spaak », 20.11.1948. in the same file.

39 ASMAE, AL, b. 1360, fasc. 1 tel. no. 673, MAE to London, 1.12. 1948 ; b. 1383, fasc. 1, teles, no. 31/96/Int., MAE to London, 18.3. 1949 ; tel. no. 170/125 ; T. Gallarati Scotti (London) to MAE, 1.4.1949.

40 ASMAE, AL, b. 1384, fasc. 1, memorandum « Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe ».

41 On Italy’s policy towards the Atlantic alliance see A. Varsori, Italy and Western Defence 1948-1955 : The Elusive Ally, in R. O’Neill and B. Heuser (eds.), Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-1962 : Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era, London, Macmillan, 1992.

42 On this question see G. Rossi, L’Africa italiana verso l’indipendenza (1941-1949), Milan, Giuffrè, 1980.

43 See, as an example, the evaluations in ASMAE, Affari Politici (AP), USA, 1949, b. 30, fasc. 2, letter no. 10397/4899, A. Tarchiani (Washington) to V. Zoppi (MAE), 7.12.1949, confidential.

44 On the Schuman Plan, on Monnet’s and on Schuman’s roles see among others : J. Monnet, Memoires, Paris, Fayard, 1976, pp. 353-474 ; R. Poidevin, Robert Schuman homme d’etat 1886-1963, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1986, pp. 244-298 ; K. Schwabe (Herausgegeben von), Die Anfange des Schuman-Plans 1950/51, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1988.

45 See in particular R. Ranieri, L’Italia e i negoziati del Piano Schuman, in E. Di Nolfo, R.H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (a cura di) op. cit., pp. 547-572. See also Ranieri’s paper.

46 As for the relations with France see in particular the two essays by P. Guillen in J.B. Duroselle and E. Serra (a cura di), op. cit. pp. 13-48.

47 As for the relations between Italy and West Germany see : P. Guillen, « L’ltalie et le problème allemand 1945- 1955 », in Relations Internationales, 1987, no. 51, pp. 269-287 ; L. Berti, « L’ltalia e la Germania : Tatteggiamento della diplomazia italiana dal 1950 al 1952 », in Storm delle relazioni internazionali, VI (1990) n. 1, pp. 117-136.

48 R. Ranieri, op. cit.

49 On this issue see the recent reassessment by W. Lafeber, « NATO and the Korean War : A Context », in Diplomatic History, vol. 13 (1989) no. 4f pp. 461-477.

50 On the Pleven Plan and on EDC see E. Fursdon, The European Defence Community : A History, London, Macmillan, 1980 ; A. Clesse, Le projet de C.E.D. du Plan Pleven au « crime » du 30 aout, Baden/Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1989.

51 On Italy’s attitude towards the EDC scheme see A. VARSORI, « L’ltalia fra alleanza atlantica e CED (1949-1954) » in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, IV (1988) no. 1, pp. 125-166.

52 ASMAE, Fondo Cassaforte (FC), b. 23, despatch no. 554, P. Quaroni (Paris) to A. De Gasperi (MAE), 2.8.1951, secret.

53 See, as an example, the critical remarks in ASMAE, FC, b. 23, despatch no. 2817, G. Malagodi (OEEC-Paris) to A. De Gasperi e G. Pella, 28.7.1951 secret.

54 Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE), Archivio Ivan Matteo Lombardo (AIML) fasc. 3704, G. Malagodi (Paris) to V. Zoppi (MAE) 2.6.1951 confidential.

55 The text of Spinelli’s memorandum to De Gasperi in S. Pistone, L’ltalia e I’unita europea dalle premesse storiche all’elezione del parlamento europeo, Turin, Loescher 1982, pp. 191-206.

56 A. Varsori, L’ltalia, cit., pp. 142-147.

57 As for these aspects see D. Preda, Storm di una speranza. La battaglia per la CED e la Federazione europea, Milan, Jaca Book 1990.

58 Some interesting material about the activities of the « ad hoc » assembly is to be found at the Archives of the EC in Florence.

59 See, as examples, MFE, AIML, fasc. 3704, teles, no. 21/0306, MAE to Italian Delegation EDC (Paris), 22.1.1953 ; despatch no. Ris. 220, P. Quaroni (Paris) to A. De Gasperi, 13.2.1953.

60 On the opposition to the EDC treaty, besides the contributions by Fursdon and Clesse, see, among others, G. Elgey, Histoire de la IVe Republique, vol. II, La République des contradictions 1951-1954, Paris, Fayard, 1968, pp. 195-340 ; J.P. Rioux, La France de la Quatrieme République, vol. II, L’expansion et Vimpuissance 1952-1958, Paris, Seuil, 1983, pp. 18-29.

61 ASMAE, AP, 1953, Italy, b. 255, memorandum « Appunto sulla riunione dei ministri della Comunita Europea (Parigi, Quai d’Orsay, 12, 13 maggio 1953 », drafted by M. Magistrati, 14.5.1953, strictly confidential. On the Beyen Plan see R. Griffiths and A. Milward, « The Beyen Plan and the European Political Community », in AA. W., Noi si mura. Selected Working Papers of the European University Institute, ed. by W. Maihofer, Florence, E.U.I., 1986, pp. 596-622.

62 On De Gasperi’s Europeanist choice see the interesting remarks in P. Pastorelli, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, Bologna, il Mulino, 1987, pp. 145-208, 233-257.

63 On these developments see : E. Fursdon, op. cit. ; A. Clesse ; op. cit. ; on the French position see the essays by A. Grosser, R. Girault, M. Vaisse, P. Melandri in F. Bedarida and J.P. Rioux (sous la direction de), Pierre Mendès France et le mendésisme, Paris, Fayard, 1985 ; P. Mendès France, CEuvres Completes, vol. Ill « Gouverner c’est choisir », Paris, Gallimard, 1986 ; G.H. Soutou, « La France, l’Allemagne et les accords de Paris » in Relations Internationales, 1987 no. 52, pp. 451-470 ; Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1954, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1987. On Britain’s policy see : J.W. Young, « German Rearmament and the European Defence Community », in Idem (ed.). The Foreign Policy of the Churchill’s Peacetime Administration 1951-1955 », Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1988, pp. 81-107 ; S. Dockrill, « Britain and the Settlement of the West German Rearmament Question in 1954 », in M. Dockrill and J.W. Young (eds.), British Foreign Policy 1945-1956, London, Macmillan, 1989, pp. 149-172. On Italy’s position see : A. Varsori, « L’azione diplomatica italiana dal fallimento della CED all’istituzione della UEO (1954-1955) », in AA. W., La France et l’Italie dans les annees cinquante, Grenoble, CHRIPA, 1988, pp. 6394 ; A. Canavero « La politica estera di un ministro degli Interni : Scelbas, Piccioni. Martino e la politica estera italiana 1954-1955 », in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, VI (1990) no. 1, pp. 63-98.

64 E. Serra, « L’Italia e la conferenza di Messina », in Idem (a cura di), II rilancio delTEuropa e i trattati di Roma, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1989, pp. 93-124.

Notes de fin

* La traduction de ce résumé a été réalisée par le Service de traduction du ministère des Finances.

Auteur

Docteur en sciences politiques, professore associato di storia delle relazioni internazionali. Faculté des sciences politiques, université de Florence, Dipartimento di Studi Sullo Stato, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, via Laura 48, 50121 Firenze, Italie. A déjà publié : « L’Italia : la politica estera », in AA. VV., Storia dell’età presente. Iproblemi del mondo dalla seconda guerra mondiale ad oggi, vol. II, Milano, Marzorati, 1985, p. 735-821. « La scelta occidentale dell’Italia (1948-1949) » (I parte), Storia delle relazioni internazionali, a. I, 1985, n. 1, p. 95-159. (II parte), n. 2, p. 303-368. « De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their rôle in post-war italian foreign policy », in J. Becker and F. Knipping (eds), Power in Europe ? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a post-war world 1945-1950, Berlin/New York, W. de Gruyter, 1986, p. 89-116 ; « Italian Diplomacy and contrasting perceptions of american policy after world war II (1947-1950) », Storia Nordamericana, vol. 3, n° 2, 1986, p. 73-92. Il Patto di Bruxelles (1948) : tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Roma, Bonacci Editore, 1988, p. 361 ; « Great Britain and Italy 1945-1956 : The Partnership Between a Great Power and a Minor Power ? », in Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 3, July 1992, n° 2, p. 188-228 ; « Le Gouvernement Eden et l’Union Soviétique (1955-1956) : de l’espoir à la désillusion », in Relations internationales, n° 71, automne 1992, p. 273-298.

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