1 There is no lack of publications on the origin, causes and conséquences of the European Recovery Program initiated by U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, but little attention has been paid to the significance of Czechoslovakia in the genesis of the Marshall Plan. It is perhaps not surprising that only very few studies of Czechoslovak historians deal with this topic1, since their access to sources and freedom of objective interprétation has for years been severely limited. However, also among published work in the West it has remained of marginal concern. Among the few exceptions are especially two publications. The first dealing in detail with the origins of the Cold War and the National Security State is the study by Daniel Yergin of The shattered peace which includes a critical assessment of the Czechoslovak case in relation to the political conditions of US économie aid and the US objectives of the Marshall Plan2. The second is the volume Der Marshall-Plan und die europäische Linke3 where the Czechoslovak question is taken into considération more thoroughly within the framework of the European Left. The most recent major books on the background to the history of the Marshall Plan either omit any reference at all4 or devote no more than one sentence to Czechoslovakia5 because it is – not without cause – widely held that the Soviet Union forced the Czechoslovak government to withdraw its acceptance of the invitation to the Paris Conférence in July 1947 and thus prevented any further participation of Czechoslovakia in US-inspired European reconstruction. Therefore, they conclude, there is not much more to be said about the affair.

2In this paper where the emphasis will be on économie aspects it will, on the contrary, be argued that among the policy decisions of the United States – in agreement with Britain and France – about the participation of European countries in the Marshall Plan Czechoslovakia became the touchstone for the dividing line between Western and Eastern Europe and that in Czechoslovakia’s internai affairs the offer of US-aid in the reconstruction of Europe announced by George C. Marshall at Harvard University on 5 June 19476 brought to a head the debate about the orientation of the country’s foreign policy, on the one hand, and sharpened the controversy about the future of its socio-political System and the direction of economie planning, on the other.

3Having in mind the scant information available about the historical background and wishing to substantiate my argument I feel I hâve to examine in fairly great detail the unique situation which developed in the society and the economy of Czechoslovakia in the short period bounded by the end of the war – for Prague this was one day after V-Day – on 9 May 1945 and the Communist takeover on 25 February 1948. This, I hope, may also contribute to encourage more research in this area.

I

4Czechoslovakia’s post-war survival as a pluralistic democracy depended upon the peaceful co-existence of the superpowers. In the period of deteriorating international relations between 1945 and 1948 leading to the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union observed closely and with rising appréhension and suspicion Czechoslovakia’s political and socio-economic development.

5Yet the new beginning was propitious. The reborn Czechoslovak Republic started life under relatively favourable external and internai conditions7. Following the total defeat of National Socialist Germany, the Czechoslovak state was recreated within its pre-Munich borders with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, its most backward Eastern area, which was ceded to the Soviet Union. On 5 April 1945, after the return of the President of the Republic, Dr Eduard Benes, to the liberated area, the programme of the new Government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks was promulgated in the East Slovak city of Kosice.

6While the political orientation of post-war governments in Eastern Europe was decisively influenced by the presence of the Soviet Army, this applies to a lesser degree to Czechoslovakia where by the end of 1945 the Soviet forces had left. More importantly, for spécifie historical reasons Czechoslovakia held a spécial position as the only pre-war democracy and the industrially most advanced State in Central and Southeast Europe. She was able to make an immédiate start on a constructive policy of recovery because, through intensive negotiations about major foreign and domestic issues, the Czechoslovak government in exile was able to prevent serious différences arising. Accordingly, as President of Czechoslovakia in Exile, Eduard Benes, succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the four allied powers (the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union) to his main policies : in particular, to the complété annulment of the Munich Agreement, to the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Alliance signed in 1943, and to the compulsory resettlement of the German population from the new Czechoslovak Republic.

7From a foreign policy point of view, there was widespread sympathy in Czechoslovakia for the Soviet Union and its putatively more équitable social System because the Soviets were not only regarded as liberators from the horrors of Nazi occupation but also as friends due to their rejection of the Munich Agreement in 1938 and, following the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Alliance in December 1943, as protector of the re-established State. The withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Czechoslovakia in November 1945 strengthened this trust. Furthermore, friendly contacts were to be maintained with the Slav nations and, in particular, with the Western Powers. This foreign policy was based on the assumption of a harmonious relationship between East and West.

8As far as domestic politics were concerned, already during the last phase of the war an agreement was reached between the government in exile in London under Eduard Benes and the émigré leaders of the Czechoslovak communists in Moscow under Klement Gottwald which enjoyed the support of the various résistance groups in their homeland. Hence, it was possible for them to préparé a joint policy. In the field of social and économie policy, the main results of this co-operation were the confiscation of property belonging to the enemy, war criminals, traitors and collaborators and the management of the confiscated property by officially nominated administrative bodies. Of great significance was the nationalisation of key industries, including banking and Insurance. Simultaneously, casier access to crédit facilities was promised for small and medium-sized enterprises and tradesmen. A prominent position was given to the land reform programme which aimed to satisfy the demands of landless and small peasants. These measures enjoyed the support of numerous segments of the population.

9In addition, following the dramatic expériences of the économie crisis of the 1930s and the fascist war economy, the belief was prévalent that socialist reforms would be necessary and that the negative aspects of the capitalist free market economy would hâve to be contained by State control. Although no consensus existed with regard to the methods of économie planning to be employed, there was a clear preference for the concept of an économie and fmancial democracy which would hâve given broad social groups rights of co-determination in the decision-making processes on the course of production and consumption.

10Consensus was also achieved about the nationalities policy which legally guaranteed equality between Czechs and Slovaks. At the same time, the policy of the expulsion and compulsory resettlement of Germans from Czechoslovakia was widely accepted.

11Within the National Front Government, despite a variety of ideas about implémentation, there was general agreement with respect to the main directions of the immédiate policy of political, social, économie and national reconstruction. At this time the National Front was without doubt a pluralistic, démocratie coalition of parties and diverse interest groups – such as trade unions, co-operatives, youth and resistance-fighter organisations excluding those who had been exposed as collaborators. The main parties were : the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Social Démocratie Party, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the People’s Party, the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Slovak Démocratie Party. Since 1941 the Communist Party had acquired great authority in the résistance movement and, with the end of the war, enjoyed the broad support of workers, peasants and intellectuals. While the party’s long-term objective remained the achievement of a socialist System, it followed a policy of « the spécifie Czechoslovak way to Socialism », which was to be pursued with the developing national and démocratie révolution. This approach to the solution of the backlog problems arising from the occupation and war was supported by a majority of the population.

12In the first post-war – and for the next fortyfour years the last – free démocratie élections, held on 26 May 1946, the Kosice Programme was confirmed by a singular degree of consensus. The communists emerged as the strongest party with 38 per cent of total votes and Klement Gottwald was appointed Prime Minister to head the new government of the National Front which held office until February 1948.8

13It was the task of this government to design and implement économie planning. A spécial government commission (Central Planning Commission) consisting of représentatives of ail parties in the National Front prepared the « Two-Year Plan for the Renewal and Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Economy » for 1947-1948. With its implémentation Czechoslovakia became the second country in history – after the Soviet Union – to take the path of a planned economy. Moreover, it was the first highly industrialised country ever to introduce into a democratie political society a System of central économie guidance which took into account market conditions. In this respect, too, Czechoslovakia held a spécial position among the économies of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, because the relative économie back-wardness of these States forced them to apply a strict System of centralised planning and control. In distinction to these countries, during the transition period to a System of economie guidance Czechoslovakia was able to draw on an advanced production apparatus, on a highly developed System of trade and commerce, relatively progressive industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as substantial reserves of technically, scientifically and generally well-educated workers, and, last but not least, the physical destruction by the war had been less severe than in neighbouring countries.

14Thanks to its advanced industrial structure and export-orientated economy the recovery of the Czechoslovak economy – especially its industrial production – progressed faster than after the First World War and even faster than some comparable West European countries such as France and Belgium. By the end of 1946 production had reached approximately 80 per cent of the pre-war level despite the simultaneous expulsion of the German part of the population. Also exports picked up. With the elimination of Germany as a competitor Czechoslovakia played an important rôle as an exporter of goods for the extremely deprived East European market, which absorbed 6.5 per cent in 1946 and 14 per cent in 1947 – the respective figures for the Soviet Union were 13.5 per cent and 5 per cent. Even more important for the Czechoslovak economy were commodity exports to the world market, mainly Western Europe, which absorbed 81.5 and 81 per cent of total exports in 1946 and 1947 respectively9. At that time Czechoslovak foreign trade with the Soviet Union was falling while exports to Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Britain and Belgium were rising.

15As in the interwar period Czechoslovakia’s strengths lay in the production of industrial goods its weaknesses were to be found in raw material resources. Thus, while retaining the spécifie features of the Czechoslovak economy, it was objectively possible to employ previously untried methods of planned économie growth differing from those of the Soviet model. Constructed on the basis of the prevailing économie situation, the Two-Year Plan was based in many respects on the market mechanism which was to be directed in accordance with the statutory framework created by the government in 1946. President Benes defined the Czechoslovak System as a « socialising democracy10 » consisting of a pluralistic parliamentary régime with éléments of an économie democracy. With regards to Czechoslovakia’s geographical position in the heart of Europe the President and his Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, genuinely believed in the « bridge-building » rôle of his country between East and West.

16In the light of the evidence from US documents (unfortunately no such sources are available from the USSR) it is highly doubtful whether this situation was sufficiently appreciated and understood by the policy makers of the superpowers. Above ail, in the United States misapprehensions were current and distrust of Czechoslovakia’s position increased after the élection success of the Communists.

17A pointer to the change of mood in British and US-attitudes is, for instance, that two months before the May élection in Czechoslovakia Winston Churchill said in his famous Fulton speech (5 March 1946) that with the exception of Czechoslovakia there does not exist real democracy in the East European States. It is highly doubtful whether he would hâve said so after the Czechoslovak élection results. Although US diplomats recognised that the pro-communist vote was expressed in a free démocratie élection process, by late summer of 1946 the State Department refused outright to extend further financial aid to Czechoslovakia11. Nevertheless, as Europe entered the centre stage of United States interests the part Czechoslovakia was to play concentrated the minds of American policy makers.

II

18According to contemporary opinion, Czechoslovakia was in the immédiate postwar years « an island of economie stability », but serious problems began to be encountered in agricultural production and, above all, in the process of financial reconstruction. They increased in almost direct proportion to growing international tensions between East and West.

19The war had left Czechoslovakia with a devalued currency and a System of finances in complété disarray. On 1 November 1945 the government pushed through a far-reaching currency reform and, finally, set the exchange rate at Kcs50 to US$ 1.

20This made it possible for Czechoslovakia to join the International Monetary Fund and provided a basis for its exports. With the passage of time, however, it was only possible to stick to this exchange rate with difficulty and problems were experienced with the budget and the balance of payments in the early stages of the Two-Year Plan which commenced on 1 January 1947.

21In the first phase of financial reconstruction, important assistance was rendered to the State finances by UNRRA. During 1946 when the UNRRA aid was at its peak, deliveries of goods amounted to 5 per cent of the Czechoslovak gross national product and 36 per cent of total imports. Because these goods were free of charge but nevertheless could be sold on the domestic market, they contributed to budgetary equilibrium and a more favourable balance of trade. These supplies covered nearly one third of the government’s expenditures on public health, social services, as well as repatriation and reconstruction costs12. UNRRA assistance to Czechoslovakia practically ran out by the end of 1946. However, in distinction to other recipient countries it was not replaced by loans for reconstruction. Moreover, from the autumn of 1946 Czechoslovakia was prevented from drawing any further on trade crédits and other loans which, in addition to UNRRA, had been taken up by her in the USA since 1945. They consisted of $20 million for the purchase of cotton, of $5 million for the purchase of tobacco, and $50 million for the purchase of surplus stores of the US army in Europe. Similarly, access to the 5 million sterling loan was stopped by Britain. There also had been a promise during crédit negotiations in Washington in June 1946 that the International Bank would release a loan of $50 million for machinery and raw material. But when in mid-September the United States held back deliveries to Czechoslovakia from previously agreed crédits (only $10 million were drawn from the $50 million loan) negotiations about the International Bank loan were also interrupted13.

22 There were signs of growing US irritation with Czechoslovakia where, in comparison with other countries in Eastern Europe, direct Soviet influence was not apparent. However, on several occasions Czechoslovakia had independently supportée ! Soviet positions, especially with regards to the German question. Herein lie some of the reasons why Czechoslovakia was the first country against which the new principles of US aid policy were applied almost half a year before the official proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 194714. If Czechoslovakia was to be a test case the crucial question for the US administration was, to what extent loans and aid might benefit the Soviet Union and/or the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Indeed, credit-financed sales and loans to the Czechoslovak Government were suspended by the US Government in September 194615.

23At the 26th extraordinary Cabinet Meeting of the Czechoslovak Government on 7 October 1946 Jan Masaryk reported on his earlier conversation with the US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who had resolutely refused financial aid of any sort to Czechoslovakia. At the same meeting this American attitude was confirmed by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Vlado Clementis, who reported the comment of the US Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, to him that, while the State Department had nothing against Czechoslovakia, no crédit would be provided which might increase her industrial potential16.

24The question of freezing or unfreezing crédits to Czechoslovakia was of constant concern to the US Ambassador to Prague, Laurence A. Steinhardt, from the beginning of 1947. It was not so much that the Czechoslovak economy was in urgent need of aid and, therefore, effective pressure could be applied, but that Czechoslovakia could be a politically crucial element in US policy. On the one hand, one of the objectives of United States policy towards Czechoslovakia was to bring her Western-orientated economy more closely into contacts with Western States17. On the other hand, the country had a pro-communist électorale, had chosen économie planning which was seen to be largely communist and socialist inspired, and it had a government wishing to be friends with East and West.

25This dilemma can be exemplified by a number of US – Czechoslovak économic problems which became increasingly political in the run up to the Marshall Plan. As other contributions to this Conférence will undoubtedly deal with questions – such as US assessments of European recovery, anxietiejs about a looming crisis of catastrophic dimensions and, above ail, the containment of fcommunism – which were meticulously studied and debated in préparation of George Marshall’s public statement, the following passages will confine themselves to gaugeing the effect of these considérations on US policy towards Czechoslovakia.

26One of the smouldering problems during the First half of 1947 was the manner of payment for Czechoslovak freight traffic across the American and British zones of occupation in Germany since the end of the war and the insistence of the American occupation authorities that Czechoslovakia make such payments in dollars. Because of their depleted foreign exchange reserves, especially lack of dollars, the Czechoslovaks appealed for a lenient seulement and thus the issue was turned into a diplomatic and political one. In line with the State Department stance of the autumn of 1946 a seulement of the transit question in faveur of Czechoslovakia could « be used to provide an indirect subsidy (to the) Czech economy18 ». This would assist the financing of nationalised industries and thus contradict the US objective that nothing should be done which could directly or indirectly support the Czechoslovak Two-Year Plan. If, however, no settlement was to be reached and Czechoslovak transit trade would to a greater extent than was already the case be diverted through Poland the United States would, in fact, « acknowledge that Czecho is to be completely dépendent on Eastern Europe for its foreign trade facilities ». In order to avoid this the Acting Secretary of State, Dean G. Acheson, hoped that « ensuing negotiations will take into account necessities imposed on Czecho by reason of its géographie location as well as preferential position it occupied in transportation and port System of the Weimar Republic », and he stated that the « maintenance of principles underlying historic des between Czecho and the West is important in furthering our current diplomatie policy19 ». Vaccilating between these alternatives negotiations dragged on, while the Soviet Union applied pressure on the Czechoslovak government to sign a treaty of alliance with Poland similar to those already concluded with the Soviet Union (12 December 1943) and with Yugoslavia (9 May 1946). Spécial advantages in shipping through Polish ports for Czechoslovak foreign trade were included in the treaty which was signed in Warsaw on 10 March 194720.

27The matter of credit-financing imports to Czechoslovakia – and thus the whole question of the « freeze »– was reopened early in 1947 when the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Washington, Slavík, inquired at the US Export-Import Bank about a renewal of the cotton crédit21. While no approaches were made by the Czechoslovaks for the reactivating of the suspended $50 million loan they applied for a $350 million long-term reconstruction loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on 27 February 194722. In the opinion of Steinhardt instead of refusing credits the promise of review of the possibility of obtaining credits in US as soon as the pending settlements such as American claims for nationalised properties hâve been reached would strengthen the non-communist éléments and improve relations between Czechoslovakia and the US, particularly since Czechoslovak trade had been shifting more to the West23. Thus the freeze remained in force, the US stalled on the settlement of outstanding problems which, in the process, pushed Czechoslovakia further into the Soviet orbit.

28A recurring theme in US despatches from January to June 1947 was disenchantment with Czechoslovakia’s desire to remain on good terms with both East and West. Especially the role played by Jan Masaryk evoked distrust : he, obviously, took up a neutral position in domestic policies thus losing support among non-communist parties, and was seen to become an instrument of Soviet policy in international affairs as he was put forward by the Soviet Représentative to the United Nations, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, as Candidate for Chairman of the Economic Commission for Europe at the First Spécial Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York during 28 April to 15 May 194724. But referring to the presence of Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia Steinhardt reported to the Secretary of State after conversations with Masaryk and Beneš, that « there has been no direct intervention by the Soviet Government in Czech affairs other than the Soviet request for the recent Czech-Polish treaty »25.

29 In early May 1947 President Benes reiterated Czechoslovakia’s East-West policy when referring to Czech susceptibilities on the German question : « Faced with the danger from Germany and a threat to our security we march with the Soviet Union and we shall continue to do so in the future. Culturally we are Europeans. We will not range ourselves solely with the East nor solely with the West, but with East and West simultaneously. In social and économie matters we will not abandon the position we hâve taken up26 ».

30This was the situation when George S. Marshall delivered his speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947. In its wake European countries were compelled to take sides and Czechoslovakia found itself between two grindstones.

III

31Before making the intention public to initiale a European Recovery Programme the United States government generated feverish policy planning activities which from the beginning of May 1947 were conducted on an organised basis through the Policy Planning Staff directed by George F. Kennan. Taking into account the deepening économie crisis that was gripping Europe and the tenets of the Truman Doctrine27 US aid was to be extended « under a System of priorities, where it will do the most good from the standpoint of promoting U.S. security and national interest28 ». Highest priority was to be given to Western Europe and in its framework to the restoration of West Germany’s productive capacity. The short-term immédiate assistance to alleviate the desperate need for coal, food, housing and transport constituted only part of a much larger balance-of-power concept growing out of the décliné of Britain’s strength, on the one side, and the rise of Soviet power, on the other. The study of US policy deliberations on the European crisis and the requirements of économie aid in préparation of George Marshall’s announcement29 provide convincing evidence for Michael Hogan’s statement that « since the inception of the Marshall Plan, the goal was to refashion Western Europe in the image of the United States30 ».

32In the priority listing of countries considered for US assistance Czechoslovakia was entered together with Britain, Belgium and Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Poland under States who were in no immédiate need of aid but substantial requirements were expected to develop later31. Czechoslovakia was singled out as a spécial case. The road to the American aid programme and to Western Europe was left open for it under well-defined conditions and guarantees which, above ail, depended on the strength of communism in the country’s political and économie decision making32. As in France and Italy where, as a resuit of domestic politics, the departure of the communists from government removed obstacles to full participation in the Marshall Plan, the US – in concord with Britain and France – saw a chance of weakening communist influence in that country if it was to join the American-led European Recovery Project.

33 This emerged from the secret discussions which were held on the highest level between US and British politicians immediately after the Harvard speech33, because Britain’s role in the launching of the European Recovery Programme was conceived by the Policy Planning Staff as that of a partner rather than a récipient of aid with respect to the general approach to problems34. Especially Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, took an active lead in close consultation with Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, while preparing the ground for the Conférence which was to initiale the Marshall Plan (to commence on 12 July) in Paris. Bevin felt that while « Russian participation would tend greatly to complicate things and that it might be best if Russians refused (the) invitation » it was désirable to invite Czechoslovakia to participate. During the last days of June 1947 in intense discussions with William L. Clayton, Under Secretary of State for Economie Affairs, outlining plans for Paris, Clayton agreed with Bevin’s suggestion that France, Czechoslovakia and Italy should form a small représentative body consisting of five countries which would work out proposais of the needs of participating European countries for American assistance35. However, Bevin began to question whether Czechoslovakia and Poland who clearly want to participate would be allowed to do so. He voiced these doubts after the sharp disagreements of Bevin and Bidault with Vyacheslav M. Molotov at the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers from 28 June to 3 July 1947, which are amply documented and discussed lin literature. The Conférence ended with the Anglo-French détermination to go ahead with a joint invitation to European governments « to collaborate in appropriate degrees in préparation of a reply to Mr. Marshall’s suggestion36 ».

34When the British and French Ambassadors called on Masaryk in Prague on 4 July to tender the invitation to the Paris Conférence he accepted immediately. Steinhardt felt that the eqgerness of Czechoslovakia to participate in the Marshall Plan vindicated US policy of stalling in the matter of loans, since it was unnecessary « to be rushed into a reconsideration thereof (crédits) to accomplish a purpose which has already been accomplished ». The departure of a government delegation to Moscow scheduled for the next day increased his mistaken optimism for he expected that « they will presumably receive instructions as to the extent to which they may participate in any agreement which may be reached in Paris37 ». Still at noon on 10 July the US Ambassador in France reported to Marshall that « Czechoslovakia will be represented at the conférence by the Czech Ambassador in Paris but Czechs hâve informed the French they will reserve final decision on participation until they know more about scope of plan38 ». But by 6 p.m. on the same day Steinhardt was already in possession of a copy of Gottwald’s telegram to the Czechoslovak government sent after two audiences with Joseph Stalin which concluded : « ... according to Stalin, we should withdraw our acceptance to participate and he thinks we could justify this action by pointing to the fact that the non-participation of the other Slav nations and the other eastern European States has created a new situation under which our participation could easily be aimed against friendship with the Soviet Union and our other Allies... We regard it as impérative that you agréé to the withdrawal of our acceptance to joint conference at Paris and communicate it in such a way that it will reach here officially Thursday afternoon...39 »

35 It was the instant Czechoslovak reversai on the Paris Conférence under Soviet pressure which immediately and openly drew the line sharply between East and West in Europe. No room was left to take up a middle position.

IV

36Very little time was left to European countries, and thus also tô Czechoslovakia, to examine Marshall’s initiative at the beginning of June and to respond positively or negatively by early July 1947 to the Anglo-French invitation to join those who wish to accept the US économie aid offer40. The Czechoslovak press was divided into those papers right of centre which unconditionally demanded Czechoslovakia’s participation in the Marshall Plan, those in the centre who feared déstabilisation of the country’s East-West relations, and the communist press which called for caution as to strings which might be attached to US aid, reminding its readers of the close ties of friendship with the Soviet Union and the Slav countries. However, ail parties felt threatened by a programme of US assistance which included rebuilding Germany’s economie strength.

37In any case, the Czechoslovak government, including the communist ministers, hastily prepared the ground for participating in the programme if asked to do so. At its meeting on 24 June it established an Intergovernmental Commission to gather backup documentation for fïnancial aid, especially for crédits, required by the country. At this meeting it was stated that it would suffice for the economy staying on course if Czechoslovakia were not discriminated against in normal international credit relationships. In the short time available information was gathered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than by the Intergovernmental Commission, in order to be ready for an eventually expected présentation on an international forum.

38By that time, that is in mid-summer 1947, the Two-Year Plan was delicately poised because the catastrophic drought of that summer was beginning to threaten the planned targets in agriculture and it was becoming obvious that agricultural products will hâve to be imported into the country which had had a real chance of being practically self-sufficient. (In the event the harvest was 40 per cent lower than the annual average of 1934 to 1938.) While the expected budget déficit for 1946 had been substantially lower than expected and a favourable balance of trade had been achieved in 1946, by May 1947 a trade déficit had accumulated which was especially large in trade with Britain and the USA – Kcs 482.2 million and Kcs 975,7 million respectively for the first five months of the year41, underlining the effect of the cessation of UNRRA deliveries at the same time as the suspension of credits from Britain and the US was kept in place. The Marshall Plan seemed to point towards a possible resolution of these problems.

39During the first days of July, before an official invitation was received, the Czechoslovak government received strong signais that no objection would be encountered from its allies if it was to accept conditional participation. For instance J. Cyrankiewicz, the Prime Minister of Poland, during his visit in Prague on 2 July not only confirmed that his country would accept the Anglo-French invitation but that certain common steps should be agreed with Czechoslovakia, above ail, that in the aid programme to reconstruct Europe countries which had been victims of German aggression should hâve priority. Even more confusing, as it later turned out, was the signal from the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Prague, Bodrov, who on 6 July presented Masaryk with a note explaining why Molotov had departed from Paris in disagreement, but in conversation with Masaryk added that he had no instructions about participation in the proposed Conférence in Paris and that attendance at the Conférence could even be necessary as long as there was no intervention into the participating countries’ internai affairs42. On the express wish of President Benes the Czechoslovak government had decided to accept the invitation to Paris on 4 July and the composition of the délégation and its instructions were to be agreed upon at the Cabinet meeting on 7 July. This actually happened.

40However, Gottwald’s telegram from Moscow arrived on 10 July urging the government to meet immediately and rescind its decision. The meeting took place on the same day and after a long discussion it was agreed that Czechoslovakia would withdraw its acceptance of the invitation to the Paris Conférence because « the économie aspects of the Marshall Plan had been subordinated to political objectives ». Up to that time much of Soviet policy had been voluntarily supported by the Czechoslovak coalition government. Although in this case the Soviet demand was accepted under great duress not only the communists, who argued the Soviet point of view, but also the noncommunist ministers stated that they were not prepared to endanger the alliance with the Soviet Union. They felt that their political freedom of movement had been severely restricted. Whether they realised it at that point or then later in February 1948 their desired concept of remaining a bridge between East and West had become entirely unrealistic.

41Pro-Western politicians were unable to change the political standpoint of the US that neither food would be delivered nor loans granted without major political révisions in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Communist Party was able to use the fact to its advantage that the Soviet Union promised aid and actually delivered 600.000 tons of grain to alleviate the shortages which had become very serious by the end of 1947. The Czech Socialist Minister of Trade, Hubert Ripka, was reported saying : « The fact that not America but Russia had saved us from starvation will hâve a tremendous effect inside Czechoslovakia even among the people whose sympathies are with the West rather than with Moscow43. »

42At the turn of 1947-48 it was not possible any more to be « for or against » the Marshall Plan. The choice it forced upon European countries left no room for voluntary decisions not only for Czechoslovakia. But in its case it came to a culmination point between the USA and USSR : the boundaries geographically, politically and economically were drawn.

43In view of the political implications of the Marshall Plan also the Soviet Union was no longer satisfied with voluntary subordination to her policy but insisted on guarantees. As a conséquence Czechoslovakia had to abandon its pluralism and its « spécifie way to socialism » which was swept away after the communist takeover of 25 February 1948.