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The ugly phenomenon of terrorism has a long history, it hit the world like a thunderstorm in the 1970s, especially with the 1972 Black Septembist kidnapping of Jewish athletes during the Munich Olympic, and the plane hijacking that led to the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport in 1976 to free Jewish hostages, however, it was the September 11, 2001 attacks by suicide bombers against the United States that transformed terrorism into a new kind of warfare: they hijacked three separate civil aircraft and turned them into instruments of mass destruction by crashing them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the July 7, 2005 multiple bombing of London confirms to a great extent this new thinking of about terrorism.
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Osisioma Nwolise

AUTHOR’S NOTE
Note portant sur l’auteur

INTRODUCTION

1 Terrorism, which had not been a serious phenomenon in Africa (see Table 1), in 1998 became one of the criminal phenomena that threaten national and international security in the continent, the August 1998 bombings of the United States embassies in Dar es Salam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya), in which over 16 Americans and 200 Africans were killed, once more stormed the psyche of humanity with vibrations of the devastating capacities of terrorism, but it was the September 11, 2001 deliberate crashing of two planes into the towers of the World Trade Centre (New York) and of a third plane into the Pentagon, leading to the death or disappearance of over 6000 persons, that jolted and mobilized most of the world against terrorism, and exposed the phenomenon as a new kind of warfare, the London bombing of July 7 2005, confirms this new thinking.

2 It was Paul Wilkinson who, in highlighting the urgency and necessity of more and serious studies on the subject, expressed concern over the issue of terrorism and wrote:
“It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the contemporary relevance of the study of political terrorism, some indications of the scale of current concern to increase our knowledge of terrorism and how it might be contained is demonstrated by the intensive activity of governments, and national organizations in organizing study groups, conventions and inquiries into the subject”.

The fact that in the last three or four decades terrorism has not been an object of serious focus by most African governments unlike several of their European, Latin American and Asian counterparts, must be acknowledged here. I must add that part of the reason is the fact that many of these African governments sponsor use or apply terrorism, however, that terrorism has not received the attention due to it, in this part of the world, politically and intellectually, does not diminish the import of studying it, works by various scholars like Alan O Dav, terrorism s Laboratory: Northern Ireland; Alexander, the Irish Terrorism Experience; and also Middle East Terrorism: Current Trends and Prospects; Alison Jamieson, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in Europe in the 1990s; Wilkinson, terrorism: British Perspective; Martha Crenshaw, terrorism in Africa; and Edward Moxon-Browne, European Terrorism – all show that terrorism is a subject and phenomenon Nigeria and other African states must take more seriously, this assertion is reinforced by the devastating wave of terrorism which


Objective

The task of this paper is to x-ray the phenomenon of terrorism, highlighting, among others, conceptual discourses on the subject, the different types of terrorism, its nature, uses or goals, and consequences, this study also illuminates, through some case studies, the empirical dimensions of terrorism as experienced at various times in different countries. Measures which can be applied to counter and manage the terrorist phenomenon, as well as the relevance of the phenomenon to Nigeria and her armed forces, are also examined.

Rationale

Research, it is often said, “arises when there are problems to solve”, terrorism, which some may argue is at times desirable, is a very big problem facing mankind today, this calls for serious research, thinking, and study in order to find ways of eliminating it or at least minimizing its frequency and devastating impact.

This paper hopes to generate ideas and debate that will illuminate some path-ways for solving the problems posed by terrorism, as Arnold Kaufman rightly wrote:

“The Political Philosopher should provide those who make policy with principles which will aid them in the attempt to cope with specific socio-political problems.”

There is no doubt that the phenomenon of terrorism will increase with increasing contemporary struggles over issues of justice, democracy, public accountability, national resources distribution, and power sharing ethnic tolerance, religious tolerance and so on, extremists or dissidents, especially those with suicide tendencies, as well as patriots who can no longer bear the retrogression of their country in the midst of plenty, can always emerge to form terrorist groups that will terrorise citizens or
government officials, again, “demons” can always appear as rulers and use the instruments of coercion to terrorise and bamboozle their citizens into obedience and submission, as General Abacha did in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998.

World politics is fast coming under the yoke of terrorism today: terrorists tend or attempt to force governments to reverse their decisions, avoid taking any decisions over some crucial issues, or to make decisions they would not normally make, also, nobody is safe, and terrorists can strike at any time, targeting children, women, heads of state, travellers and installations, in 1993, for example, a Nigerian plane was hijacked to Niger Republic following the June 12 crisis, the Niger-Delta is fast becoming a zone of terror, and the symbols of the Talliban are showing them-selves in Borno State. Yet, there exists a pool of millions of hungry and angry unemployed youths in this country, from which terrorists can be recruited easily, these make it necessary and urgent for Nigerians to begin to think and plan seriously about terrorism, the people have been enlightened and mobilize; and the military, security and intelligence force trained and equipped adequately to meet the new challenges of terrorism.

Table 1: International terrorist operations by regions for the period 1993-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Eurasia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>185</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>110</td>
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<td>158</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>766</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>127.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>5th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSES

To enhance understanding and appreciation of this presentation, I deem it necessary to define and discuss relevant concepts like terror, terrorism, and violence, and I also examine some of the rationale behind the value-laden nature of some of the concepts.
Terror

11 In every day usage, “terror” simply means “great fear”, something or someone that causes great fear. Hugo Reading, in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, conceptualizes terror as:

“Tyranny characterized by failure of obedience to guarantee safety and the infliction of arbitrary punishment to create fear and paralyse resistance.”

12 Paul Wilkinson, on a more intellectual platform, asserts that in its most important and general sense, the term terror signifies a psychic state of great fear or dread. The term, he went on, also denotes the action or quality of causing dread, and great fear, terror, he informs us, comes from the Latin verb terrere, which means “to cause to tremble”, while deterrence comes from the Latin word deterrire meaning “to frighten from”.

13 There are some things that can generate terror in human beings, apart from the actions of man, these include:

a. Death, which frightens hell out of people.
b. Natural catastrophes like volcanic eruptions, tsunamis (tidal waves), fire, flood; diseases like HIV/AIDS: hunger and starvation; attacks by wild animals like snakes and lions, etc.
c. Spirits and ghosts.
d. Magical processes.
e. Accidents (road, air, sea).

14 There are three major types of terror:

a. Psychic terror: e.g., when a terrorist places a gun against a person’s forehead.
b. Criminal terror: carried out by individuals who want to utilize blackmail or intimidation to enrich themselves.
c. Political terror: Political terrorists can effect political murder in order to produce psychic terror.

15 Features of political terror include:

i. Indiscriminate action.
ii. Unpredictability of area or time of action, though on a few occasions some people get warned.
iii. Arbitrariness of operation – no observance of commands or laws of procedure generally
iv. Extreme and ruthless destructive methods – genocide, massacre, political murder, physical beating, harassment, and defamation campaign, rape, biochem agents utilization, etc.
v. Preparation against possible resistance.
vi. Indifference to existing moral and humanitarian codes and considerations etc.

16 One can also talk of defensive terror, repressive terror, enforcement terror, and agitational terror, defensive terror is the “systematic use of terrorization by groups in a population to defend the status quo or traditional rights.” Repressive terror is the “systematic use of terrorism by a government or by rebels to eliminate rivals, coerce popular support, or maintain conformity within the rebel organisation.” Enforcement terror relates to repressive terror as the former is the terror launched by those in power, while agitational terror stands for the terroristic acts launched by those aspiring to power.
On Terrorism

The *Pitman Dictionary* defines terrorism as “ruling by fear; intimidation”, hugo Reading’s *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* defines terrorism as “systematic violence aimed at undermining the authority structure through creating fear.”

Hardman, writing on “errorism” in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, defines terrorism as:

“... the method or the theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence.”

From these definitions of terrorism, it becomes clear that two major phenomena stand out, these are; fear and violence, for this study, I will adopt an earlier definition of mine, which views terrorism as:

“The threat or use of violence and terror for the achievement of a political, socio-economic or other expedient purpose against an individual or group of individuals, a thing or group of things, a state or group of states.”

Just as there are different types of terror, there are different types of terrorism based on different variables, for example, in terms of the objectives of terrorism, one can talk of political terrorism and criminal terrorism, terrorism can also be organized or unorganized. Using the source of the terroristic action, there can be state terrorism, group terrorism, or individual terrorism, on the spatial (geographical) of special scope, there can be national or international terrorism, there are also repressive terrorism, revolutionary terrorism and sub-revolutionary terrorism, some of these types of terrorism need to be elaborated upon.

**Political Terrorism**

Political terrorism is explained by Wilkinson as:

“., a sustained policy involving the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement, or faction, or by a small group of individuals.”

Political terrorism is geared towards the achievement of political objectives and can be carried out by either a government (those in power), the opposition (those aspiring to be in power), a liberation movement or terrorist body.

**Criminal Terrorism**

Criminal terrorism is regarded as “the systematic use of acts of terror for objectives of private material gains”, this type of terrorism is often carried out by an individual or a few individuals, and is geared towards personal enrichment or satisfaction, with no gains for the masses of the people and no bearing with the struggle for reforms, social justice, and human rights in the society.

**Repressive Terrorism**

Wilkinson defines repressive terrorism as:
“... the systematic use of terroristic acts of violence for the purposes of suppressing, putting down, quelling, or restraining certain groups, individuals, or forms of behaviour deemed to be undesirable by the repressor.”

The repressor here may be the state, its rulers, agents or a part or faction; and the repression may be directed against the whole population or a selected group or part of it, for example, state terror, police terror, colonial terror military terror (where the state uses the army as a terror tool), prison terror, slave terror, ideological terror, and counter-insurgency terror, all these are forms of repressive terrorism.

Revolutionary Terrorism

Revolutionary terrorism is defined as the:

“...resort to systematic tactics of terroristic violence with the objective of bringing about political revolution.”

The features of revolutionary terrorism include;

Collective rather than individual action.
The existence of a guiding revolutionary ideology or programme.
The existence of leaders who mobilize people for terrorist activities.
The creation of alternative institutional structures to those of government.
The acquisition and use of weapons.
The acquisition of competence in terrorist methods and skills.
The secrecy of operational plans.
Some degree of popular support.

Organizations carrying out revolutionary terrorism may be those of pure terror such as national liberation movements, guerrilla groups, international terror groups, etc.

Sub-revolutionary Terrorism

Sub-revolutionary terrorism is the terrorism employed for political motives other than the pursuit of revolutions or governmental repression, examples are attempts to force a government to introduce a greatly desired policy, law or programme; revenge or punishment or warning against specific officials, waging terror in a feud with rival groups, or retaliation against invasion of land, or cultural interference.

State Terrorism

A state can terrorize its own citizens, typical examples are the terrorization of Africans in South Africa in the days of apartheid and the Nigeria experience under the Abacha regime (1995 to May 1998), which virtually became a terror machine, bombing military buses, churches, stadia and assassinating political opponents, a state can also terrorize other states, a good example is the American invasion of Panama during which the latter’s defence forces were humiliated and the Head of State, President Noriega was captured, tried in court and jailed in a foreign land (the US.) at the instance of a foreign government which claims to be the champion of democracy in the world.
Violence and Political Violence

While Hugo Reading defines violence as “the application of injurious physical force to persons or property”, Robert Wolff sees violence, in a value-judgement sense, as the illegitimate and unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of others. To Wolff, violence is wrong; but he asserts that all actions that serve rights and justice are non-violent, while all forceful actions that do not serve rights and justice should be regarded as illegitimate violence, thus, when a government is unauthorized, any armed insurrection against that government will be regarded as non-violent. Gerald Runkle agrees with Wolff and states that: “A physical assault on a human being would be violent only if it were illegitimate.”

This assertion is based on moral and legal grounds, but Edwin Maduna had warned that: “... since morality itself is a class concept, we see that there is no universal morality on which to judge violence.”

Writing on political violence, Madunagu asserted that violence “is termed political when it is used in defence of a political order or is directed against it.” He goes on to observe that political violence is:

“... either revolutionary or reactionary depending on whether it is used in furtherance of the drive for progressive social change or is used in defence of or the restoration of a decadent social order.”

On the basis of this argument, the violence aimed at sacking colonial rulers in USA, and many African and third world states, or aimed at restoring the sanctity of the June 12 elections in Nigeria, or at dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa, will be seen as revolutionary political violence, while the violence leashed out in defence of the status quo will be seen as reactionary.

Terrorism and Liberation Activities: The Politics Of Nomenclature

Politics has been variously defined as “the struggle for power”, “the authoritative allocation of values” (David Easton) and the process of determining who gets what, when and how much (Harold Laswell), we shall also bear in mind that politics, as I see it, is the struggle for the minds and resources of men and nations in the vast theatre of power acquisition and utilization in pursuit of certain goals, those who allow themselves to be deceived or defeated in the struggle lose their resources and grow lean, while those who deceived or defeated them gain resources and grow fat.

In the heat of the cold war, western nations under the leadership of the US did all they could to make the world believe that the liberation activities in Africa, especially in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were acts of terrorism, the African National Congress (ANC) in the then apartheid South Africa was labelled a terrorist organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is struggling for a homeland for the Palestinians, was also labeled a terrorist organization, nelson Mandela and (late) Yasser Arafat, who were then the organizations’ respective leaders, were labelled terrorists, the purpose was for the West to defend and promote their investments in the countries or regions concerned.

At that time, of course, African countries. China and the defunct USSR refused to be deceived, and they recognized these anti-colonial and Anti-imperialist bodies as liberation movements, because under natural law and justice, the UN Charter, the OAU
charter, international Law etc, the liberation fighters in Africa were pursuing a just cause – the right of self-determination, equal rights, and an end to minority and racist rule.

It will be recalled that the UN at the time had decided that the liberation movements had no alternative method of pursuing their just and popular cause other than the use of forceful action, during the Sixth Legal Committee of the UN debate on terrorism in November 1972, the main index used in distinguishing liberation struggles from terrorism was whether the individual or organization using forceful actions and terror for political, economic or other purpose was isolated from the masses (terrorism) or was acting in the best interest of the masses (liberation struggle), over two-thirds of the countries represented at the debate agreed with the view of the Chinese government representative, pi Chi-Lung, who said:

“The Chinese Government is opposed to assassination and hijacking of individuals as a means for waging political struggles, and is also opposed to adventurist acts of terrorism by individuals or a handful of people divorced from the masses because they are detrimental to the interests of the cause of national liberation and people’s revolution., in our opinion, despite the recent occurrence of some incidents of assassination and hijacking by a few people, we should never allow imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, racism, and Zionism to use such incidents to vilify and suppress the national liberation movement and people’s revolutionary struggles.”

It will be recalled that even the conservative Vatican on April 5, 1986 acknowledged that armed struggle could be used as a last resort to combat obvious and protracted tyranny, this change of heart of the Pope contrasted with his earlier disagreement with the concept of liberation theology, this of course meant that the Vatican had accepted the logic that violence can be used to end injustice and to promote the common good.

It was in this vein that Nnoli focusing on South Africa in his article, “Revolutionary Violence, development, Equality, and Justice in South Africa” asserted:

Revolutionary violence is associated with a political programme for the fundamental transformation of a social order, it is defensive in nature because it does not aim at attaining privileges or protecting vested interests by one group at the expense of others, instead, it usually occurs in the form of resistance against obvious social evils such as exploitation, domination, repression, and discrimination, its goals are greater equality, justice, and freedom for an increased number of the population, therefore, it seeks the safety and freedom of the individual and group from violence to life, existence and property; and their protection from the threat of such violence, fear, anxiety, uncertainty, doubt, loss, want, or care, and in general all forms of danger.

He went on to add that such (revolutionary) violence is generated by the peacelessness often associated with conditions of structural violence which result from the imposition of domination by the ruling class over the underprivileged classes, initially by force but later sustained by propaganda, intimidation, blackmail, bribery and corruption, structural violence is usually visited by a dominant minority on the powerless majority, and is based on a combination of exploitation, repression, and fragmentation of the majority that places them below a minimum level of existence and always at a disadvantage.

Emphasising the objectives of revolutionary violence, nnoli observed further:

“The objective of revolutionary violence is to pull the majority of the population above the minimum level of existence, and eliminate their disadvantage, when
successful, it tends to move the socio-economic and cultural system toward an ever larger measure of power to the people for conscious participation in building their own future, higher production for societal needs, non-exploitative relations of production and equitable principles of distribution: needs and aspirations of the masses; and the maximum possible enjoyment of culture, as well as an aesthetically and ecologically sound environment by the masses.”

On this issue, he informs us that the aggressor must be clearly distinguished from the victim, the predator from the prey, and the exploiter from the exploited, in his words:

“Violence that is used to hold man down in poverty, ignorance, disease, prejudice, hate, and exploitation must be distinguished from violence used to free man from these obstacles to human progress.”

I have gone this far in discussing the issues of terrorism and violence, on the one hand, and revolutionary terrorism and revolutionary violence, on the other hand, to enable us to distinguish progressive struggles from criminal and self-centred struggles, with this ability, we can then refuse to be deceived by exploiters and oppressors who often misuse the coercive force of the society to hold the masses or groups down in misery and penury in the name of fighting subversive and terrorist elements.

The key message here for the armed forces and security agencies all over the world is that care and caution are needed when governments issue operational orders for the application of military strategies in dealing with people regarded by such governments as terrorists, this is because the operators of revolutionary violence (call them terrorists or liberation fighters) often have sympathizers among the people and even within the defence and security apparatus of the state, such sympathizers may take a position against the use or misuse of societal violence (military strategy) against citizens struggling for the common good, also, it must be borne in mind that just as the condemned (revolutionary) terrorists of yesterday have become the democratic leaders of today in South Africa, for example, the “terrorists” of today can become the leaders and commanders of the Armed Forces tomorrow in any country.

The message also implies that defence and security forces need to take a professional stand, when necessary, over matters of justice and societal morality in order to maintain their credibility and loyalty to the state, it must be borne in mind that two major aspects of the military man’s contract are commitment to military professionalism and unalloyed loyalty to the state not just to a government which is one element of the state and a mere agent for the execution of the will of the state, i must state here that I have no sympathy for criminal terrorists, whoever breaks the laws of the land must be ready to pay the price, that is the duty of government, but to unleash a state’s military might, for example, against students demonstrating in China, against Ogoniland, the Ijaw or against Igbo Youths demanding justice and a future for their people, is state terrorism, pure and simple, nigeria under General Abacha experienced a lot of this state terrorism between 1993 and 1998.

**Spectrum of Political Conflict**

Terrorism is one of the dynamics in the spectrum of political conflict, though not all terrorist acts are political, the spectrum of political conflict covers the following:

- Organization of agitation groups.
- Demonstrations and riots leading to street disorder.
- Terrorism for change of policy by government.
- Plots and coups for change of government.
THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

Anatomy of Terrorism

If terrorism was to be a living organism with flesh and blood, and it is dissected, what
would be seen? Among the things to be seen are: Anger, frustration, violence, death,
destruction, great fear and agonizing pain. A terrorist by extension is an angry,
frustrated and violent person, ready to use, destruction, great fear, and agonizing pain
to pursue his goals, some terrorists in these days of suicide bombing are ready to kill
themselves or be killed for what they believe in and the goal they are pursuing, as
obtains in the Middle-East.

Manifestations of Terrorism

Terrorism is manifested in the following activities, strategies and tactics of terrorists-
criminal, political, national or international:

1. Bombing and laying of mines and explosives at strategic places.
2. Arrests, Kidnapping, and Detentions.
4. Murder and assassination.
5. Arson.

a. Sabotage of installations.

1. Mysterious phone calls.
2. Intimidation.

a. Bank raids and other forms of armed robbery.

b. Biochem warfare (See Table 2)

c. Suicide bombing

Some Cases of Terrorism

The Entebbe Affair

On June 27, 1976, a group of Palestinian and German terrorists hijacked to Uganda a
French Air Bus – Flight 139 which took off from Athens heading for Paris, at Entebbe, in
Uganda where the plane landed, the 4 terrorists held the 245 passengers and 12 crew
hostages demanding the release of 53 terrorist held in five countries, failing which they
blow up the plane and kill the hostages, then President Idi Amin aided the hijackers
thereby inviting an Israeli invasion of Uganda to free the hostages, he was also
condemned for his role.
Among the condemnations of the hijacking and praises of the Israeli invasion was the release from the Egyptian Gazetter of July 6th 1976, which read in part:

“No responsible person can condole the hijacking of civil airlines and the holding to ransom of innocent passengers, Egypt for her part has always been against terrorist operations and the hijacking of aircrafts which endanger the lives of innocent people”.

The Kenyan Daily Nation also condemned President Amin’s role in the hi-jack incident and praised Israeli action. 

The Beirut and Rome Operations

In December 1973, while the world yearned for peace to return to the Middle East, and a Geneva peace conference was being organized for Arabs and Israelis, an Arab leader (Col. Gaddafi as alleged) dispatched five terrorists to Beirut (Lebanon) to shoot down the plane of Dr. henry Kissinger (then US Secretary of state coordinating the Arab-Israeli Peace conference) in order to foil the peace-meeting, when this plan failed, the Arab leader ordered the men to head for Rome Airport and take hostages so that the hostages can be used as bait to stop the peace Conference.

On landing in Rome, the terrorists met tough security network, and out of frustration killed over 32 innocent people from indiscriminate shooting, they later hijacked a plane with passengers but got arrested in Kuwait on landing, and confessed to Gadaffi’s involvement.

Political Terrorism in Cotonou

In January 1977, a band of international criminals landed by air in Cotonou. Republic of Benin, their mission was to cease political power by force for President Zinson, first, they tried to seize the presidential Palace under heavy gunfire but failed, they then started shooting, killing and destroying in different pans of the town, and later left in a hurry leaving some members of their gang behind.

Action against Geneva Peace Conference

In November 1974, a group of terrorists made up of three Palestinians and one French man was arrested in Lebanon, they confessed that they were, paid $900000 by an Arab Country to blow up the United States embassy in Lebanon, the move was to stop the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from taking part in the coming Geneva peace conference.

Terrorism against OAU Heads

In July 1975, the Organization of African Unity in (now African Union) held a conference in Kampala, Uganda, on 30 July, terrorists ordered all heads of state and government attending the summit to leave the country within 24 hours or face liquidation through bomb attacks.
Hijacking of a British Airliner

In November 1974, a group of Palestinian dissident, acting on behalf of an Organization that was isolated from the Arab and Palestinian masses, hijacked a British airliner to Tunis, held the 43 passengers hostage and demanded the release of 13 commandos held by Egypt, failure to do which would make them kill the passengers.44

The Black Septembist Munich Terrorism

During the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, some Arab terrorists, who called themselves Black Septembists, secretly found their way into the Olympic village in Munich, west Germany, captured some Jewish sportsmen and women, held them hostage and made political demands on Israel, the West German government tried to negotiate with the terrorists but the negotiations broke down, as a result the government decided to use force against the terrorists, this led to the death of the Israeli athletes and some of the terrorists.

Terrorism by drug barons in Bogota

In December 1986, a half-ton bomb was exploded outside a government office building in Bogota. Colombia, killing 52 persons, this was part of the drug war between the cocaine princes, or drug barons of Colombia and the government of President Barco, as TIME magazine put the actions of the President then:

“In his offensive against the coke princes, president Barco has dented the drug pipeline, but hardly destroyed it, the barons lashed back by terrorizing the innocent.”

An insight into the damage terrorism can cause can be seen from the fact that from August 1989, when the government declared war on the drug barons, to December of the same year, the government made 497 arrests and confiscated property and weapons worth $250 million, while the coke princes killed 187 civilians and government officials, the drug barons also carried out 265 bombings and damaged property worth over $500 million.45

Assassination of Prime Minister Rabin

On November 4, 1995, 73-year-old Israeli Prime Minister. Mr. Yizak Rabin, was shot dead at a peace rally in Tel Aviv after he had addressed the rally that focused on peace between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, his assassin, a 27-year-old Jewish student in an Israeli University, said that he killed the Prime Minister in order to stop the Israeli - Arab peace process and to stop Mr. Rabin from giving Israeli land to the Arabs, especially the settlements in the Gaza strip.

Mr. Rabin had been the main moving force in the Israeli-Arab peace process, a right wing Jewish extremist group called IN claimed responsibility for the assassination, even though the assassin Mr, amir claimed that he acted alone.

United States Embassy Bombings

In August 1998, some terrorists bombed US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, killing over 16 Americans and 200 Africans.
West Jerusalem Bombing

In the early hours of Friday, November 6, 1998, a car bomb exploded in a crowded market street in West Jerusalem killing two persons and wounding over 16 others, it was regarded as a suicide bombing since the driver of the car died on the spot, the bombing was suspected to be aimed at disrupting the peace process going on then, as Palestinians and Israelis were about to sign a peace treaty.

World Trade Center Destruction

On September 11, 2001, two planes were hijacked by suicide bombers and made to crash into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York, USA, this led to the death of 6000 citizens of various nations of the world.

Bombing of London City

On July 7, 2005, people yet to be identified exploded bombs at several points in London leading to the sudden death of 57 people from different nations of the world, at least two Nigerians died in the bombing.

Algeria

The Algerian experience is very sad and instructive, the Islamic militants have been battling the nullification of elections by government, bombing places and slashing peoples' throats, the terrorist operations have made life unbearable, and property very unsafe in Algeria today, tourism has suffered great set backs, with a resultant loss of revenue to that country.

IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Terrorism has great implications for national security, apart from the killing of citizens and the destruction of lives and property, terrorism can subvert the operation of defence and security agencies, and this puts a nation in great danger, again, it can demoralize security forces, and for a nation to have demoralized security forces is bad omen for national security.

Terrorism can also lead to a break down of law and order and discourage investors both foreign and domestic, in this way, development and national productivity become threatened, since national leaders will always do their best to ensure the security of the nation, terrorism can stimulate the diversion of funds from socio-economic development to defence and security tending.

The country’s international image can also be adversely affected by terrorist activities and this, in turn, affects tourism and the revenue expected from it, terrorism also weakens government resolve and ability to govern effectively, and retards administrative efficiency and momentum of development.
Uses/Goals and consequences of terrorism

From the discussions in on the concept of terrorism above, it becomes obvious that terrorism, especially revolutionary terrorism, is at times desirable as an instrument of pursuing and achieving positive change in society, in this sense, terrorism becomes legitimate political violence and terror aimed at promoting the common good in the face of tyranny, autocracy or dictatorship, here, the terrorism is directed against the status quo and the political structure defending and promoting it.

Autocrats, dictators and tyrants use terrorism in negative ways to suppress and repress opposition and calls for change in order to preserve the status quo and the existing privileges, I must point out here too that governments at times have to use force legitimately to defend the state, life and property against criminal terrorists and unnecessary violence.

Criminal terrorists only pursue private gains, which may be material gains, revenge, or repudiation of the authority of a government, no matter how patriotic and legitimate it is.

The key aims of a terrorist are: to kill; gain publicity; seek revenge; force a change in policy or societal structure; or make money.

The consequences of terrorism may vary according to the source, objectives and amount of force applied. Generally, however, the following are the consequences of terrorism:

a. Physical injury and pain, especially from torture.
b. Death.
c. Mental agony from psychic terror, feeling of helplessness, etc.
d. Destruction of property, especially buildings.
e. Damage to infrastructural facilities like rail lines, airports, electricity installations, military installations, police posts, and tourism decline.
f. Diversion of public funds from socio-economic development to security tending, thereby retarding development.
   1. Abuse of human rights.
   2. Loss of revenue from extortion.

Counter terrorism measures

Here, I am not concerned with how autocratic, dictatorial or totalitarian regimes can counter progressive struggles aimed at liberating the masses of the people and improving their well-being, as Wilkinson observed:

“We should shed no tears for tyrants or brutal and repressive rulers who are confronted by revolutionary terrorists; they reap the whirl-wind of their own tenor”

I would rather think aloud on measures popular governments can take against (criminal) terrorists (national and international), as well as on how society can guard and struggle against state terrorism, the measures include:

a. The rule of law must be enthroned in society, and no individual or group of individuals must be allowed to be above the laws of the land, these laws must however be popular laws.
Legal sanctions must be in force and whoever violates the laws of the land should pay the price.

The judiciary must, with the support of the people, preserve fundamental rights and freedoms and protect society against arbitrary rule, police brutality (terror) and martial terror.

Terrorists must not in any way be allowed to wage battle against popular governments, nor must criminal terrorists be allowed to wage war against society in pursuit of their selfish private ends, for this purpose, both the police and the armed forces need to be trained and equipped accordingly, especially where terrorists apply guerrilla tactics. Government needs to develop the culture of never giving in to criminal terrorists but must dialogue with groups fighting for justice or liberation fighters even if they use terror tactics, the Dutch approach (dialogue) is thus recommended.

A good intelligence network is crucial to nip (criminal) terrorism in the bud, such an intelligence network must be well coordinated between the police, military and other units, strategic Spiritual Research (SSR) is crucial in this area as long as its findings are empiricised before official action is taken.

Positive social programmes as well as political, economic and social reforms relevant at any time in the history of society need to be carried out without waiting for revolutionary terrorism to move onto the scene to force the government’s hands, early voluntary government reforms will isolate terrorists from the population.

Security of premises, installations, airports and airlines must be ensured by applying electronic devices where necessary.

Punishment of convicted terrorists is crucial to serve as a deterrence.

In the case of international terrorism, the relevant treaty provisions should be followed, it must be borne in mind always that the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals did declare that the killing of hostages and the murder of non-combatants are crimes against humanity, also, the Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits the collective punishment of any community for actions committed by individuals in their private capacities, terrorists, it is known, have no official status in international law, thus governments treat them as they deem fit, however, governments must bear in mind that the fundamental causes of international terrorist actions “live” in the socio-economic and political problems that they have left unsolved at home, internation (criminal) terrorists should be extradited for trial and appropriate punishment, especially where political murder is involved.

The police and military need to establish special anti-terrorist squads, the military squad will be unleashed against any terrorist group that is heavily armed and ready to shoot and kill.

Governments and the society need, however, to always study each phenomenon of terrorism and apply appropriate solutions, prevention, it is said, is better than cure.

Research on known terrorists and terrorist groups, leading to their computerized data banks on them, are important.

Intensive propaganda, public enlightenment and education are useful instruments against criminal terrorists and other terrorists that do not pursue the collective goals of the people, these will tune the public into vigilance against unknown faces and strange movements and objects around them.

Above all, there is a need for a national anti-terrorist policy formulation to guide both citizens, government, and security agencies in this matter, for example, in Israel there is a policy prohibiting deals with terrorists, who are seen by law as criminals, such a policy promotes international cooperation against terrorism.
f. Where a government, such as that of Sani Abacha in Nigeria or Idi Amin Dada of Uganda or Fracois Duvalier (Papa Doc) of Haiti, emerges in any country, it is the duty of patriots to bring such a government down, by all means, to save the people and the country.

Table 2: The Weapons of Biochemical terror

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Anthrax</td>
<td>Biological, infectious disease. Spread mainly as powder form or as aerosol; very contagious</td>
<td>Respiratory failure, liver and death within a few days</td>
<td>Antibiotics help; if early treatment occurs, especially chloramphenicol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Plague</td>
<td>Biological, spread via vectors like fleas or lice</td>
<td>Ultimate death if untreated.</td>
<td>Vaccines help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Botulism</td>
<td>Biological, toxic, not contagious</td>
<td>Respiratory failure, blurred vision, weakness of muscles, dizziness, and death.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Shigella</td>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>Nausea, severe diarrhea, shock, delirium</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Cholera</td>
<td>Biological, bacteria, contains water to contaminate water sources or purify</td>
<td>Acute diarrhea, death</td>
<td>Antibiotics; water purification kits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>Biological, highly contagious, skin damage, death</td>
<td>Vaccine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mustard gas</td>
<td>Chemical, Gaseous agent</td>
<td>Causes blindness and death if inhaled.</td>
<td>Gas mask; chemical body suit; gloves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Hydrogen cyanide</td>
<td>Chemical, Gaseous agent</td>
<td>Respiratory failure, death</td>
<td>Gas mask; chemical body suit; gloves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Sarin</td>
<td>Chemical, Nerve agent, gaseous.</td>
<td>Respiratory failure, death</td>
<td>Gas mask; chemical body suit; gloves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Sonar</td>
<td>Chemical, Nerve agent, gaseous.</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Gas mask; chemical body suit; gloves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>CS (Tear gas)</td>
<td>Chemical, Nerve agent.</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Gas mask; chemical body suit; gloves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Phosgene</td>
<td>Chemical, Gaseous agent.</td>
<td>Respiratory failure, death if inhaled Excessively.</td>
<td>Gas mask; chemical body suit; gloves.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: continues

TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

To many Nigerian citizens terrorism may appear to be a new phenomenon given the experiences with hired assassinations, bomb blasts and plane hijacking since the June
12 crisis of 1993, but those with a sense of history know that the phenomenon is not new in principle; it has only recently graduated to a “professional” level.

This assertion is true because, as primary school children in the early 1960s, we heard of, and saw political thugs chasing opponents of their paymasters out of homes and murdering them, they burnt the houses of their paymasters’ opponents, and some of them were paid to kidnap, torture and kill, these are all acts of terrorism, the difference today is that the phenomenon has moved from thuggery, kidnapping and murder through armed robbery to bombing, hijacking and high-class political assassinations, table 3 at least shows as much, what pains this author is that despite the fact that terrorism began in this country from the first half-decade after independence, nothing effective is in place in terms of policy, specially trained and equipped forces, etc against the phenomenon, one other point worth noting in Nigeria’s terrorism phenomena is that, generally, no one claims responsibility.

Even with the several bomb-blasts that rocked the sense of security of the Nigerian nation, what citizens heard were accusations of mainly straw-men, arrests of people that could not be fully proven to be culprits, directives to police to unravel the mystery of bombers and bombings, appeals to the public to help the police, etc, but are the Nigerian Police fully trained, prepared and equipped for counter-terrorist operations? The answer is No! Our police like our military, are not new to terrorism, but they are not at home with it.

It must be made clear, however, that what Nigeria faced, especially from 1995 to 1998, was the phenomenon of state terrorism effected by the regime of the late General Sani Abacha in his bid for self-perpetuation in office and to terrorize citizens and his opponents, the nation paid dearly for this bid through a collapsed economy and an insecure and unstable society, indicating how terrorism can adversely affect a nation’s fortunes, the United States recent experience demonstrates this better, as discussed in the next section.

**TERRORISM AS AN EMERGING THREAT TO GOOD GOVERNANCE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY, PROSPERITY AND NATIONAL SURVIVAL: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES**

The United States of America is the most powerful (militarily) and richest country in the world today, it has the longest history in the running of democratie government based on regular free and fair elections, the rule of law, respect for human rights, public accountability, transparency as well as responsive and responsible tenets, thus, with all sincerity, the US can be said to manifest good governance, the country’s technological and industrial profiles also mark it out to be on the route of sustainable development, with one of the strongest and most sought after currencies in the world — the almighty dollar.

However, despite all these positive attributes, the US was attacked on September 11, 2001 by groups who decided to use hijacked passenger planes as missiles, this attack gave rise to the death of over 6000 people and to the destruction of the World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon, this singular terrorist attack led to a "declaration of a state of emergency in Washington, the interruption of commercial flights throughout the country for some days, the closure of the New York Stock Exchange, the closure of
50 of the 250 US missions all over the world, the evacuation of the US President and his family from the White House, a drastic reduction in tourist patronage, temporary drop in the value of the dollar, as well as a temporary sealing off of the air, land and sea borders of the United States.

As people in the US began to dread air travel, due to fear of hijacking, and shifted to traveling by road, the terrorists began slashing the throats of bus drivers while their vehicles were in motion, thereby occasioning road accidents, this again led to the closure of some large commercial bus companies, such as Greyhound for some days.

The issue is that if this type of terrorism is waged for 3-6 months, it can lead to the collapse of a nation’s economy with all the adverse consequences, it can threaten democracy since it may not be possible to hold elections when they are due, it can destabilize government through various means and method, and is capable of leading to the collapse of even a super-power nation.

This is why terrorism, especially the type the USA faced in September 2001, must be avoided by all means, if the USA does not handle the present terrorist crisis facing it with maturity, great tact and diplomacy, especially regarding matters concerning the Arab States the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Israël and Palestine, the seeds of the collapse of the US as a world power may be in the sowing and the way may be paved for the emergence of China as the next super power.

The present dimension of terrorism is different from what the world knew before, it seems to be systematic and determined and to be focused on the destruction of the United States with all the weapons that can be mustered, including biochemical terror, the American President, George Bush, confidently asserted, as quoted in *Time* magazine of September 24, 2001; “This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others, it will end in a way and at an hour of our choosing.” Let us hope so, however, my little knowledge of terrorism and the psychology of terrorists tell me that terrorism is not defeated by conventional warfare waged even by a superpower, new strategies are needed, including dialogue, confidence building and conflict resolution and policy review among others.

**THE MANAGEMENT OF TERRORISM IN CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS**

The implications of terrorism for a corporate organization, apart from physical destructions, is that terrorism scares away customers, slows down business, (production/services), and cuts down profit or revenue generation, when the interruption of the service/product of the organization is felt nation-wide, national disaster occurs.

The Management of terrorism by public institutions or private organizations can be carried out at three levels: Prevention, Situation Control, and Strategy Review, these three levels need more detailed discussion.
Preventive Measures

Preventive measures involve doing things to avoid being a terrorist target and putting in place all the necessary ideas, plans, contact lines and structures that will be needed to handle a terrorist attack, some of these are discussed below:

Measures For Avoidance of Terrorist Attacks

- Educating the public on the value of the organization to the individual person specifically and to the public in general.
- Installation of electronic security gadgets.
- Ensuring justice and fairness, as well as good treatment of staff.
- Occasional “sweeping” of premises by a trained unit for bombs and explosives.
- Assessing the nature and degree of threats in the area.
- Research work on known terrorists for easy recognition and surveillance, the police, government sources and intelligence units can be very useful in this direction.
- Constant vigilance by staff, and reporting of suspicious persons, objects, and movements within the company premises.

Measures For Handling Terrorist Attacks

- Making contingency plans of what is to be done, and by whom in case terrorist attack occurs, this also means mapping out different scenarios and how each can be handled.
- Putting in place structures for secret escape of staff.
- Constructing the building in a way that anticipates terrorist attacks and so makes for easy escape, evacuation, monitoring, etc.
- Providing evacuation facilities or entering into agreement with a body that can provide these at very short notice.
- Providing direct and secret alarm system and communication lines with the relevant law enforcement agencies, especially those specialized in terrorist operations.
- Training staff on what to do individually and collectively in case of terrorist attack, especially in the art of negotiation.
- Training the security men of the organization in anti-terrorist operations, they also need to be aware of certain terms (see Appendix 1) so that they can be more psychologically prepared to deal with terrorist attacks, be able to report findings more accurately, and carry out safe and effective anti-terrorist plans.
- Designing and putting into effect a Comprehensive Anti-Terrorist Security System (CATSS): mapping out lines of defence that can aid detection, and prevent the escape of terrorists if they strike, the design should include the use of barriers, electronic devices, locks and response forces.
- Evaluation of the CATSS as much as is practicable to ensure that it works, here, simulate an attack on fortified targets (houses, persons, safes, vehicles, oil flow lines, or oil rigs) as close as possible to the way terrorists would execute it, audit the system by examining security installations and questioning personnel.

It is also important to carry out what I term Constant Vigilance Maintenance Counter Terrorist Activities (COVIMACTA), these are meant to keep all personnel constantly
vigilant and always at a high degree of alertness and to ensure that security equipment and facilities are in proper working condition at all times, these COVIMACTA are:

- Giving high morale building attention to the security staff and other personnel so that they can always perform maximally when terrorism occurs. Life insurance is crucial here.
- Constant checks on security equipment and facilities.
- Using drills, training, and other simulating-exercises to get (security) staff used to their equipment and CATSS.
- Doing everything possible to ensure that if terrorists ever strike, they won’t have an easy access or exit, thus, identity cards, bags and vehicles are to be properly checked, patrols are also crucial.
- Constant collection and analysis of threat intelligence.
- Use of intruder detection equipment, alarm systems, etc.
- Checking beforehand areas that a target person or material will enter.
- Security men being very familiar with who or what belongs to a place or an office so that new faces can easily be detected and watched, while strange objects, explosives, weapons, as well as illegal surveillance devices can readily be detected.
- Security men being always on the alert and on stand-by, very close to personalities or structures being protected in order to ensure quick defensive action as and when necessary.
- Security personnel must always be punctual, giving and obeying law-ful orders.
- When a personality being protected is in motion, vehicles should be driven in such a way as to leave room for a quick escape in case of an attack.

Situation Control

101 At this level it is assumed that there is an actual terrorist attack, either in the form of bombing, hostage taking, etc, if there is an early warning, the first thing to do is to evacuate staff and critical property, then the whole premises can be combed, while the relevant government security agency is called in, this is where the management applies to a real situation all the security preparations made at the first level, once an act of terrorism is in progress (for example, an attack by bombing) orderly evacuation must follow, the police have to be called immediately, and then “ambulance” movement occurs either to hospital or from hospital and back, evacuation has to occur, where there is hostage taking in the building, negotiations must commence, and this means that communication facilities must be in place.

102 It is important at this point to highlight some aspects of Explosive Ordnance Disposai, when an actual bomb planting or bombing occurs, it is important that only bomb squads and similar organizations should be called in, to handle or dispose of any bombs or explosive devices that may be found, even when there is a bomb threat, only bomb squads should be quickly called in; security men not trained to handle, dispose of, or diffuse bombs should never be allowed to try such deadly things as fiddling with bombs.
Table 3: The evolution of terrorism in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acts of Terror</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1966</td>
<td>Reign of political brigadoon - kidnapping, murder, and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Armed robbery operations began.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>Reign of political brigadoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid 1980s</td>
<td>Maintenance of religious uprisings in Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993: October</td>
<td>Hijacking of Nigerian Airways Atha: AHI to Niger by the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994: Aug 15</td>
<td>Explosion of a device at the residence of then Transport Minister, Chief E. Bakare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994: Nov 17</td>
<td>Explosion at the arrival wing of Pres: Mohamed International Airport, Lagos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995: May 31</td>
<td>Bombing at 35th Battalion, Kiyavi State during the launching of the Kwara branch of the Family Support Programme. The Head of State's wife was to be present but was absent at the occasion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 3

Table 3: continues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acts of Terror</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996: Jan 18</td>
<td>Bombing at Duru Hotel, Kaduna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: Jan 26</td>
<td>Bombing at Mattam Airport, Kano.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: Feb 13</td>
<td>Explosion near the Zonal Police HQ in Zaria, injuring 100 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: April</td>
<td>Shooting of 400+ Mike at FUNYAC, Lagos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: April 13</td>
<td>Bombing at Haji Military Cemetery, killing and wounding several people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: May 23</td>
<td>Assassination of retired Rear Admiral T. O'kundede.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: June</td>
<td>Assassination of Mr. Kabiru Abdu in Lagos. Chief Niyango's Mr. Berger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Killing of 12 policemen and one soldier by 100 youths, leading to the sacking of the town by the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Youth in the Ngor Declaration on war of company's helicopter conveying military personnel. (They shoot the money but soon get arrested.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Shantytowns in Kaduna State, leading to the death of over 2000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001: Sept</td>
<td>Youth from Borno and Chad storms killing over 80 people and destroying beaded villages. 62 military killed in a military reprisal action against the killing of Zaki Bala, Jami: i in his residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Killing of 10 Nigerian soldiers by the Islamic militaries, leading to the outpouring of Zaki Bala as a military reprisal action against the killing of Zaki Bala in his residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002: March 3</td>
<td>Assassination of Dr. Harry Marshall, a facade of the All Nigeria People's Party, who defected from the ruling People's Democratic Party, when he was the national Vice President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002: Feb 9</td>
<td>Assassination of Chief S.D. Ikedi: National Vice-Chairman of BPP: South South Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004: March 4</td>
<td>Assassination of Chief A. Agogo, General Managing Director Nigerian Airways, member PDP Board of Trustees, while riding a car with seventeen women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategy Review

103 In a situation in which an actual terrorist attack has occurred, the management of the victim-corporate body has to take stock of what happened, how well the body reacted to and handled the situation, and how adequate the facilities put in place were, the essence is to get better prepared for the future as far as counter-terrorist measures are concerned.

104 It is, however, my view that the greater part of the work against terrorism has to be done by governments and not by corporate bodies and individuals, this is because the things that generate terrorism in a state or across national boundaries mostly arise from the policies, commissions and omissions of governments, apart from the get-rich-quick syndrome and the thugs and robbers produced by the social and economic hardships in the society, Nigeria before June 1993 was not a fertile ground for even criminal terrorists, Algeria is today not safe because of terrorist actions generated by the nullification of the result of an election held in 1991 and won by the Islamic Front Party.

CONCLUSION

105 What is the significance or implication of terrorism for the Nigerian armed forces, the police and the Nigerian state? For the armed forces and the police, terrorism spells out the need for proper training, equipment, and contingency planning for tackling any terrorist action, especially international terrorism requiring military involvement either in the air, on land, or at sea, for the Nigerian society, all citizens must be tuned and ready for necessary action, and must assist the law enforcement agents, when required to do so, to tackle any terrorist attack in the country, for the Nigerian government, in particular, terrorism emphasizes the relevance of good governance, justice and fairplay (especially in the sharing of political power, and distribution of national resources), good policies and the sustenance of democracy.

106 This is because (revolutionary) terrorism is a justifiable and internationally acceptable antidote to prolonged sectional marginalization, dictatorship, repressive rulership, and an unbearably oppressive socio-economic system, I must quickly add here, however, that the cost of terrorism to innocent people must always be evaluated and minimized, so that revolutionary terror aimed at dethroning autocrats and eliminating injustice
does not bring untold suffering to the innocent masses. Violence should therefore only remain as medicine to despotism or a bad constitution, not as its daily food.

It is also necessary for society to study and understand the terrorist so that both he and his activities can be predicted and controlled, terrorists are generally young people between 20 and 40 years who are well organized, well funded, skilled in military tactics and weapons manipulation and dedicated to their assignment, they may be angry and frustrated over one form of injustice or the other, or they may want to change the political system by force, a few may be school dropouts; some may be idealistic and some power hungry; others may just be motivated by the thrill of violence.

Finally, let me end with the quotations from Richard Clutterbuck, and Brian Jenkins, to Clutterbuck:

"...Terrorism is, with very few exceptions, the recourse of tiny minorities who know that they could never get the majority to accept their views, while dissent can be constructive and stimulating, when it gives way to violence it must not be tolerated, the majority have always had to be prepared to forgo some of their own comforts and when facing the challenge of people prepared to kill, but there is no rightful claim of a civil liberty to kill, wound, sabotage, impersonate or intimidate, the claim by a minority of the right to kill must never be allowed to override the right of the majority to live in peace."  

Jenkins sensitizes us on the issue of who should fight terrorism by asserting that terrorism:

"... is not the war the military (of national governments) was trained for, there are no massed armor formations pouring across a central front, no divisions on the march, no scramble of fighter aircraft, it is rather a hundred wars waged by elusive and ruthless foes."

The message is that each country needs to create, train and equip a special, ever-ready effective squad for anti-terrorist operations against (small) terrorist groups, i must also add here that Nigeria and other oppressed and exploited nations of the world must start doing their homework against what I term Advanced International Terrorism, as manifested by the misuse of military might by imperial world powers, in 2000, the US bombed Sudan and Afghanistan on the basis of allegation that both countries were backing terrorists, in 2003, the US illegally invaded Iraq, in the process overthrowing President Saddam Hussein, this invasion was based on a suspicion – for which subsequent investigations provided no transparent evidence – that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, these acts of US are as terrorizing and uncalled for as the nuclear bombings of Japan’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, as well as the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre, and July 7 2005 attack against London by Al-Qaeda groups, this view is strengthened the more by the fact that Pakistan, whose air space was violated in the 2000 bombing, is today an ally of the USA in its war against terror in Afghanistan, afghanistan, in turn, was an ally of the USA against the then USSR in the days of the cold war, in short, in defence of Afghanistan, the USA in 1980 imposed sanctions against the USSR for invading Afghanistan in 1979, the point must be made that most of these people called terrorists today, including Osama bin Laden, were all allies of the USA in the war against the defunct communist Soviet Union, and many of the training camps bombed in Afghanistan on the suspicion that they were terrorist training camps, were established in the days of the war against the USSR by Afghan Mujahideens with USA support, including training by the CIA, this whole affair is riddled with double standards and unjust foreign policy.
This call against Advance International Terrorism becomes more relevant as these imperial powers explore and colonize the known and hitherto unknown planets, sooner than expected, these powers will start using the Moon, Mars. Venus, etc to monitor, target and terrorize small nations, it may reach a stage where the small nations have to pay satellite-based meter-read fees or dues to get the sun’s rays for the photosynthetic processes needed by plants, without which there will be no food.

The solution lies in giving serious and patriotic thought to the security and development of poor nations, as well as adequately financing research and development, defence capabilities, and welfare of the people.

I wish to emphasise the point that the past terrorist experience of Nigeria, especially in the period 1994 – 1998, the long standing “terrorist” experience of Israel, the September 11, 2001 most horrifying terrorist attacks against the USA, and the terrible and barbaric attacks organize London city on July 7, 2005, out-standingly demonstrate that terrorism is a real and deadly threat against democracy, human liberty, sustainable development. good governance, personal and materiel prosperity, as well as national security in the 21st century, all hands therefore must be on deck to combat it, at the same time, better strategies other than military action should be employed to resolve the root causes of terrorism at the national and international levels, including dialogue, fairness and justice in resource distribution and in conflict resolution, just foreign policy, and just economie would order.

Much of the terrorism that has threatened international peace and security has emanated from the Middle-East crisis, the United Nations must now sit up and get that crisis resolved permanently before it generates the third world war, the Palestinians must get their independent homeland now. To this end, Israel needs to show a more transparent commitment to peace in the sub-region, (the August 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is a good beginning), while the Arab world must guarantee Israel’s right to a secure existence, all these can be handled in a negotiatedsequent, all hands therefore must be on deck to combat it, at the same time, better strategies other than military action should be employed to resolve the root causes of terrorism at the national and international levels, including dialogue, fairness and justice in resource distribution and in conflict resolution, just foreign policy, and just economie would order.

Finally, there are lessons to be learnt from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, that attack has a message for all nations, the members of the international community, and Nigeria, as rightly observed by Adam Rotfeld:

“The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States marked a watershed in the international security process, from the ruins of the World Trade Centre in New York, and the destroyed Pentagon building, grew the catalyst for the shaping of a new security system. Unresolved issues, clashes of interests, and conflicts began to be analysed from a different perspective, with new issues and priorities... although the unprecedented terrorist acts-of 2001 were directed against the United States, they were the impulse for a new reassessment and redefinition of the security policies by practically all states and major international security institutions, the attacks helped precipitate the shaping of a new-global security system, the attacks on the USA have shown that the norms, procedures, mechanisms, and institutions of the current security system are not sufficient for dealing with this kind of threat effectively, the international community-states, the United Nations and regional structures, including NATO-was caught off-guard, in spite of the fact that there had been some warning of an impending attack.”
Where does this message concern Nigeria today? It is in the area of reassessing threats and redefining our concept of national security to cover all dimensions, especially non-military threats, and then training and equipping our security and defence forces to meet the new challenges, this is more important today in the face of the ICJ October 2002 judgement which, in the footsteps of the infamous 1884/85 Berlin Conference, handed over Nigeria’s Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroun.

Anti-terrorism became globalization’s first war in the dawn of the 21st century, this author hopes that the second will not be the final weakening of Africa for recolonization, to begin with a collective white-led attack on and devastation of Nigeria in the guise of implementing the ICJ decision or supporting UN resolutions, such an attack can take any form from aerial bombardment through terrorism to peacekeeping of the Congo style (1960-64), even though our past leaders made the mistakes that paved the ugly way to the 2002 ICJ judgement, Nigerians must be ready to defend their fatherland, and the government must start now to prepare the citizens for any eventuality, however, war must be avoided by all means, because going to war with Cameroun will be playing into the hands of the enemy, providing them with the opportunity and weapons to humiliate destroy and dismember Nigeria, therefore, the current peaceful approach to the resolution of the Bakassi crisis with Cameroun should be maintained.

At the same time, the Federal Government should show more serious concern on the issue of crushing poverty, the provocative rate of unemployment, hunger and cashlessness (especially of unpaid pensioners and workers), the idea held by the youths of this country today, to wit, that government does not care about them and their future, is dangerous. More dangerous is the belief of several young people that violence or armed struggle is the only language the government understands, this was recently expressed by Asari-Dokubo, the leader of the Niger-Delta People’s Volunteer Force. In the face of the small arms (freely) floating all over Africa, if the underlying causes of such beliefs and struggles are not quickly resolved, through just distribution of national resources, and power rotation, Nigeria is may be preparing for her own September 11, or even worse yet, disintegration, on this account, the Federal government and all Nigerian must not wish away the early warning information contained in the 2005 Report of the American National Intelligence Council no matter how distasteful it may be, the government needs to convene Nigerian experts to strategies how the unfavourable prediction about Nigeria collapsing or becoming a failed state by 2020 can be avoided.

APPENDIX I
The explosion that occurs in a bomb results from a chain of reactions of specific elements in its firing system, two types of such systems exist: Electric and Non-electric, these two types are made up of:

i. Activation Source: which is current from a battery or generator for the Electric; and heat or flame from a match or fuse lighter for non-electric.

ii. Firing Line: which is Wire for the Electric, and Fuse for the Non-Electric.

iii. Detonator: which is an electric blasting cap for the Electric type; and Non-electric blasting cap for the other.

iv. Explosive: which is high or low for both types.

Generally when an activation source charges the firing line, the detonator explodes, setting off the explosive charges, and the bomb carries out its destructive mission.

It is important for security officers to note that bombs can come in any manner or shape, a bomb is essentially an explosive firing system in a box or any container which can be in shoe; wooden box, metal box, biro, pipe, briefcase, ink pen, bottle, lunch box, flower container, thermos, or even envelope shape, it takes expert eyes to easily recognise a bomb.

Bombs can be activated in several ways such as:

i. 1. Chemical: where a chemical delay device activates the detonator.
2. Mechanical: where an alarm clock is wired to close a circuit at a particular time: or a key with a string attached pulls two flexible metal elements together effecting contact.

3. Motional: where a metal ball when the bomb is tilted making contact and closing circuit.

4. Frictional: where two abrasives spark when they rub together.

5. Electrical: whereaswitch is closed by lifting, pushing, or turning on a light switch.

Therefore to avoid activating a planted bomb, the following rules of thumb are necessary for all staff:

i. 1. Avoid cutting wires indiscriminately.
   2. Trace all strange wires as much as possible and make reports where necessary.
   3. Do not submerge in water objects you do not know.

a. If situation demand, always check your doors, windows, curtains, and rooms for strange wires, and objects.

b. Do not handle objects you are not sure of carelessly: and do not shake or tilt such objects.

c. Do not freeze or heat thermostatic devices
   1. Do not cut into packages such letters or parcels.
   2. Always report suspicious letters, parcel, and containers.

3. When objects are seen with high degree of suspicion or certainty, the location should be evacuated and isolated, then call and lead Explosive Ordinance disposal teams to the location; and where there is time, search for more devices carefully; open all doors and windows so that if an explosion occurs the effects will be minimal; disconnect utilities, remove flammable materials from the area, sandbags or very thick mattresses can be place around bomb areas.

a. In areas of suspicion, open doors, windows, cabinet drawers etc slowly, always watching out for trip-wires or booby traps are found.

a. When there is a bomb threat through phone or written messages, report, and preserve all materials like envelopes.

a. Screening machines should be used to x-ray suspicious envelopes or parcel.

NOTES

6. Alison Jamieson, Terrorism And Drug Trafficking in Europe in the 1990s, 1994
17. Hugo Reading, ibid.
19. Hugo Reading, Op Cit., E, Seligman (ed.).
25. Paul Wilkinson, ibid, p. 36.
31. E. Madunagu, Ibid., p. 22.
50. For details, see Daily Sun (Newspaper), October 19. 2004, p. 4.
The ugly phenomenon of terrorism has a long history, it hit the world like a thunderstorm in the 1970s, especially with the 1972 Black Septembist kidnapping of Jewish athletes during the Munich Olympic, and the plane hijacking that led to the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport in 1976 to free Jewish hostages, however, it was the September 11, 2001 attacks by suicide bombers against the United States that transformed terrorism into a new kind of warfare: they hijacked three separate civil aircraft and turned them into instruments of mass destruction by crashing them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the July 7, 2005 multiple bombing of London confirms to a great extent this new thinking of about terrorism.

In this article, Dr. Nwolise examines the terrorist phenomenon, providing a useful theoretical insight for understanding the concept in its various forms, including the politics surrounding the interpretation of the concept - what he refers to as the politics of nomenclature, the article perceives post-September 11 terrorism as a new kind of warfare, and a deadly threat to democracy, good governance, national development, and international peace and security.

In addition to its informative exploration of the goals and consequences of terrorism, the paper presents a new timely and interesting insight into how corporate organizations can manage and combat terrorism, the data on the evolution of terrorism in Nigeria since the 1960s show that the phenomenon is not new in Nigeria, but, in the words of the author, has only graduated to a professional crescendo in contemporary times, they will be very useful for researchers interested in the evolution of terrorism in Nigeria.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Political Sciences, University of Ibadan.
2. This marked the beginning of murder through letter bombs in Nigeria’s history.
Terror as a political weapon: reflections on the bomb explosions in Abacha’s Nigeria

Isaac Olawale Albert

AUTHOR’S NOTE
Note portant sur l’auteur

Introduction

1 Nigeria witnessed the most agonising moment in her political history between 1994 and 1997 when General Sani Abacha governed the country, the problem started with the annulment of the June 12 presidential election in 1993, which Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola was popularly acclaimed to have won, the hues and cries that followed the annulment forced the then Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, out of power on 26 August 1993, he handed over power to a hurriedly constituted Interim Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan. Some pro-democracy groups challenged the appointment of the latter and the new regime was declared an illegal outfit. General Sani Abacha, who was then the Chief of Army Staff, seized the opportunity to organise a palace coup against Shonekan, he thus became the Nigerian Head of State in November 1993, pro-democracy and human rights activists continued to call for the de-annulment of the June 12 election and for the hand-over of political power to Chief Abiola, these brought them on a collision path with the Abacha regime.

2 The most vocal of these pro-democracy groups included the National Democratie Coalition [NADECO], led by Chief Adekunle Ajasin and later, by Chief Anthony Enahoro, the other was the National Liberation Coalition [NALICON]. The two of organisation fought the Abacha regime using passive resistance, they campaigned for international
sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria as a way of curbing the excesses of the country’s military. None of them engaged in any physical violence.

3 The Abacha regime responded against the “opposition” in various violent forms, bombs exploded in some major cities in the country - Lagos, ibadan, onitsha, Kaduna and Ile-Ife. Some prominent Nigerians - Rear Admirai Babatunde Elegbede [Rtd.], Admirai Olu Omotehinwa, alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Chief Alfred Rewalne, Chief [Mrs.] Bisoye Tejuosho, alhaja Suliat Adedeji and Dr. Shola Omosola, to name just the most prominent - were assassinated by people suspected to be agents of the Abacha regime. Some other people narrowly escaped being killed, this category of Nigerians included Chief Abraham Adesanya, the leader of Afenifere, the pan-Yoruba cultural group; Chief Bola Ige, the current Minister for Justice, Alex Ibru, a former Minister for Internai Affairs, General Alani Akinrinade, a retired army officer considered to be “military commander” of NADECO; Chief Gani Fawehinmi, a popular human rights activist in Lagos; Air Commodore Dan Suleiman [Rtd.], one of the few Northern Nigerians in NADECO; Professor Omo Omoruyi, the former Director of the Centre for Democratic Studies, Abuja; Justice Omotunde Ilori, a prominent social critic; and Chief Abiola Opadokun, the Secretary of NADECO, a number of serving military officers were also targeted by the terrorists, the most prominent were Colonel Buba Marwa, the Military Administrator of Lagos and Lt. General Oladipo Diya, the Chief of General Staff [Deputy to General Sani Abacha].

4 The attacks on these people took two major forms. Some were attacked by hired assassins using automatic light weapons, and the others by explosive devices, our focus in this paper is on the latter, we have limited ourselves to the issues pertaining to bomb attacks because as it is impossible for us to study all cases of state terrorism during the Abacha regime at a single breath. Such an issue is better handled in a book project, in the light of this, the present paper takes a general look at the nature of the bomb attacks in Abacha’s Nigeria and poses the fundamental question: “Who were the terrorists and what did they want?” For a very long time it was difficult to say with any precision who the terrorists were and what they really wanted, the government pointed accusing fingers at NADECO and NALICON: the latter and other pro-democracy and human rights groups in the country blamed the bomb attacks and assassinations on the Abacha regime, the available evidence supports the position of the latter, this paper reviews the nature of the bomb attacks, the impacts are also discussed.

Définition of Terrorism

5 Terrorism is defined as “the systematic employment of violence and intimid” [Brown 1992: 32-58], Shultz [1978] too sees it as “…the threat or use of extra normal forms of political violence, in varying degrees with the objectives of achieving certain political objectives/goals”, to Stohl [1988:3] it is “the purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat”. Examples of terrorism include kidnapping, especially when employed on a consistent basis, bomb attacks, hijacking, arson, public execution, armed attacks, hostage-barricade situations, and other serious threats to life and property.

6 At the risk of oversimplification, terrorism could be said to have four main purposes. First, it is either organised by the “opposition” to discredit or and over-throw a regime or used by those controlling the institutions of power as a tool of political oppression.
Second, it is aimed at giving a “minority” group a voice in a society, within this context, Stohl [1988:5] noted agreeably that the “violence of the terrorist act is not intended simply to destroy but also to be heard. For a regime the terror is a message of strength, a warning designed to intimidate, to ensure compliance without the need to physically touch each citizen”, third, it could be used to win specific concessions through “coercive bargaining”, it is assumed here that the opposing party might not accept the position of the other party except force was employed, within this context some scholars refer to terrorism as the “diplomacy of violence” [Schelling 1966] and “coercive diplomacy” [George et al 1977]. Fourth, terrorism could be deliberately instigated to expose the true nature of a regime or an insurgent group. For example, an insurgent terrorist group could push a regime into taking certain actions that could make the regime become repressive, and hence illegitimate, in the court of [local and international] public opinion, on the other hand, a terrorist regime could use the reaction of the targeted group as an excuse for autocracy, arbitrary arrests, military build-ups etc.

Terrorism, whether at the national or international level, is usually targeted at state or business sector institutions and property which may be bombed or burnt; it may also be targeted at prominent political figures or members of their families, who may be assassinated, kidnapped or blackmailed, in this way, normal life is disrupted and the society is forced to reflect on the claims of the movement, the trouble with terrorism as a political tool is that, in more cases than not, the victims are not the actual targets but innocent members of the society, most of those who get killed by bomb-blasts are bystanders, shoppers etc.

Terrorists around the world use three methods for carrying out bomb attacks: planting bomb in a public property [building, aircraft, etc.]; physically throwing the explosive device at the target; planting the bomb in the body of the terrorist, the last method is terrorist himself is killed as the bomb or the object he seeks to use as an explosive device goes off, terrorists using this last method are known as “suicide bombers”.

The Political Antecedents and Dimensions of the Bomb Attacks

Until October 19, 1986 when Dele Giwa, Editor-in-Chief of Newswatch Magazine, was killed by a letter bomb sent to him by a yet-to-be-identified assailant, terrorist attack was assumed by Nigerians to be a game of the developed world that could afford the technology involved. Nobody ever imagined at all that Nigeria, too, could join the list of nations where political adventurers attack people and institutions with bombs, when the news of the death of Dele Giwa was therefore announced, the entire Nigerian nation was shocked and defiled, many literally saw it as the beginning of the end of the world, which the Bible and the Koran predicted. Several Nigerians were of the view that the government was behind the dastardly act; but only a few human rights activists, like Chief Gani Fawehinmi and Femi Falana, came out boldly to point accusing fingers at the government, they took the matter to court and lost. Since then the Nigeria Police have been “searching” for the killer[s] of Dele Giwa, the “frustration” of the police in their attempt to get to the root of the problem is reflected in a statement made on the incident in 1996 by the Police Public Relations Officer, Mr. Tunji Alapini: “There is no new development [in terms of dues to solving the murder], if there is any development...
we would let the world know it, but we have not closed the file.” This escapist statement contradicts the statement made by a senior police officer in 1986, immediately after Dele Giwa was killed, the officer said that only the military had the capacity for packaging the bomb and that only the Nigerian military could explain the source of the bomb [Tell, December 30, 1996:16]. Subsequent bomb attacks on individuals and on Nigerian cities occurred between 1994 and 1997, and the police were ostensibly unable to determine who was behind the attacks.

Terrorism assumed its second stage of maturity in Nigeria after 1993, following the annulment of the June 12 presidential election, which Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola was popularly believed to have won, the annulment was followed by riots in many parts of Nigeria, the rioters and the police and military men that confronted them were very brutal in dealing with one another. Several hundreds of people were killed on the streets of south-western Nigerian cities, the struggle was sustained by the activities of the many human rights organisations and oil workers unions in the country, as well as by the international community, which condemned the annulment in strong terms, when Babangida could no longer push his ambition to remain in office, he “stepped aside” in August 1993 and put in place an interim government led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, an industrialist.

Different forms of public protests greeted the Shonekan administration, the most outstanding was the highjacking of a Nigeria Airways Airbus A300 by a group of Nigerians who called themselves “Movement for the Advancement of Democracy” [MAD] led by one Jerry Yusuf, this was the first case of a plane hijack in the history of Nigeria, the hijackers claimed to be protesting against the annulment of the June 12 election, the Nigerian Airways plane was diverted to Niamey in Niger Republic, the hijackers demanded the de-annulment of the election, they later surrendered to law enforcement agents in Niamey and were each sentenced to eight years imprisonment, the boys were not released from jail until 2002. Chief Abiola, who at that point in time had not taken the decision to use non-constitutional means to claim his mandate, quickly denied any link with Jerry Yusuf and his MAD [Agekameh 1996:17].

The new administration continued to face a legitimacy crisis until it was overthrown in a palace coup led by General Sani Abacha in November 1993, the expectations of many Nigerians were that the Abacha administration would heal the wounds created by General Babangida by de-annulling the June 12 election and then quitting the stage, this was suggested in General Abacha’s maiden address to Nigeria, the man, however, had a different agenda, he overthrew the Shonekan administration for selfish reasons, this brought him on a collision course with the pro-democracy and human rights activists in Nigeria, as the government clamped down on public opinion and threw several public opinion moulders, like journalists, human rights activists and the supposed “opposition”, into long detentions without trial, a few Nigerians who saw themselves as having vital roles to play in shaping the future of the country went on exile and from there started organising themselves into various pressure groups, a few human rights activists who remained in the country to continue the struggle died mysteriously or were detained by the government on flimsy charges, it was within the context of such confrontational politics that bomb attacks became part of the political system in Nigeria.

The first bomb attack in Abacha’s Nigeria took place on May 31, 1995 at Ibrahim Taiwo Stadium in Ilorin during the state launching of the Family Support Programme initiated
by Mrs. Maryam Abacha [West Africa, 19-25 June 1995:960], the guests were already seated in the stadium. Suddenly an explosion was heard and people scampered for safety left and right, the explosion went off a few minutes before the commencement of the programme and the arrival of Mrs. Abacha, the explosions rocked the entire stadium, killing and maiming several people, most especially school children who had come to witness the occasion. No state official was hurt, but Major-General Karim Adisa - then Minister of Works - who had come to receive the first lady [in his capacity as an indigene of Kwara state] was so frightened that he took cover in an odd corner of the stadium, he wept openly after the incident and swore to bring the perpetrators of this “dastardly act to book”. Several people were arrested on account of this blast, but the arrests were based on mere suspicion rather than on facts, three of the arrested persons were released 18 months after, when the charges against them were with-drawn by the Attorney General of Kwara State [Ifowodo 1996:49].

At 10.20 p.m., on November 14, 1996, another bomb went off at the Domestic/International Airport link road in Lagos, killing Dr. Sola Omotshola, the Security Chief at the Murtala Muhammed Airport, and his cousin, Mr. Nelson Gbolahan Kasim [Alawode 1996:15], the bomb was popularly believed to have been planted in Omotshola’s official car, other bomb explosions recorded in 1996 included those at the Aminu Kano Airport in Kano; Durbal Hotel and the Defence Industries Corporation in Kaduna; the police zonal headquarters, Zaria; the “Mammy” market at the military cantonment, the Air Force base, and along Mobolaji Bank-Anthony Way, all in Ikeja. Lagos; and at Onitsha, Ile-Ife and Ibadan.

The last three bomb attacks in Abacha’s Nigeria were against three top military officers: Colonel Buba Marwa, the Military Administrator of Lagos State and General Oladipo Diya, Abacha’s deputy, the attack on Marwa took place in December 1996 as the Military Administrator was on his way to his office, as he made a detour close to the Sheraton Hotel and Towers on Mobolaji Bank Anthony Way, Ikeja into Opebi Link Road, a bomb exploded, ripping through the last car on Marwa’s convoy. Lance Corporal David Umoh, who was inside the unlucky vehicle, had one of his eyeballs plucked out, police Corporal Olusola, another occupant of the car, was fatally wounded A passer-by, akpata Collins, was also wounded. Six of the cars parked in the adjacent taxi park at the Sheraton Hotel were extensively damaged. Flying shrapnels damaged two rooms located on the fourth and sixth floors of the Sheraton, the police, who arrived at the scene later, reached the immediate conclusion that the fragments of the bomb were similar to those found at the spot where Omotshola was bombed, indirectly insinuating that NADECO and NALICON were responsible, almost 48 hours after the attempt on Marwa’s life another bomb went off at Alausa, a few metres from the Military Administrator’s office, wounding several civil servants and security men [Agekameh 1996:11-12], the bomb was said to have exploded around 7.55a.m, when a Lagos State Transport Company bus carrying about 65 men to work at the Lagos State Task Force on Environmental Sanitation, from the Ikeja military cantonment, climbed unto a refuse dump around Alausa, the bus in which the workers were carried was mangled, and so much was the impact of the bomb that a section of the tarred road in the vicinity was cracked, the wounded passengers included some soldiers.

The attack on Diya took place on December 13, 1996, he was billed to travel to Makurdi on that day for the burial of the mother of Major-General Lawrence Onoja, his principal
staff, he arrived at the Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport, Abuja, a few minutes late for the journey, as he was trying to board the aircraft, which would have conveyed him to Makurdi, a bomb went off, blowing one of the security operatives in the vicinity into shreds.

The last and third major bomb attack before the death of Abacha took place on September 2, 1997, the victim was the Military Administrator of Ekiti State. Seven people were wounded in the explosion, four of them seriously, the Military Administrator escaped unhurt, as usual, the pro-democracy movements in Nigeria were accused of being responsible for the incident.

Who were the Terrorists?

In some other parts of the world, it is common to find a group claiming responsibility for bomb attacks, in the Nigerian cases mentioned above, nobody claimed responsibility for anything. Nigerians were therefore left to guess what was really happening, this left room for all kinds of unhealthy suspicions.

As noted above, most of the bombs were targeted at military institutions, men and public officers, this might lead us to the cheap conclusion that the bombers must be civilians trying to intimidate the military out of power, this was the position that the Abacha administration consistently pushed, all the bomb attacks were blamed on either NALICON or NADECO, the Abacha administration consistently argued that the bomb attacks were a continuation of the “opposition’s plans to destroy the Nigerian state”. Each time a bomb went off anywhere, the police simply pointed accusing fingers at the opposition instead of conducting a thorough investigation, as the Civil Liberties Organisation said in one of its annual reports [Ifowodo 1997:49], the police worked more on suspicion than on facts in dealing with the terrorist attacks. Each bomb attack was followed the next day by a pro-Abacha public demonstration during which banners, which appeared to have been printed in advance, were displayed condemning NALICON, NADECO and pro-democracy activists like Professor Wole Soyinka and others.

It was popular knowledge among Nigerians, however, that the Nigerian military were responsible for the bombings, there were three possibilities. Some pro-democracy groups within the military could have been responsible for the bombings. General Abacha hid under this kind of excuse to retire several Southern Nigerian military officers, collectively referred to as “NADECO Officers”, the second possibility was that General Sani Abacha was responsible for the bombings, the bomb attacks, in that case, were targeted at making the opposition unpopular, having been presented to other Nigerians as being responsible for the bombings, abacha probably expected that the more the opposition became discredited the more popular his own regime would become, and the more reasons he would have to issue more damaging military decrees, the third possibility is that Abacha’s boys were responsible for the bomb attacks in their effort to make him more security-conscious and, therefore, amenable to different kinds of manipulations, we consider the second and third scenarios to be more credible, in other words, General Abacha and his boys were responsible for the bomb attacks.

The first grounds for suspecting that the government was responsible for the attacks were indicated in 1996 when Omotshola was killed, on November 28 1996, that is, two weeks after Omotshola’s death, Alhaji Abubakar Tsav, the Commissioner of Police for
Lagos State, addressed a press conference, during which he described Omotshola as a NADECO agent, according to Tsav, the bomb that killed him and Kazim was meant for a sabotage mission at the airport, tsav described Kazim as “a sabotage agent working for Wole Soyinka’s National Liberation Council, NALICON”. Narrating how the incident happened, the police boss noted:

“Analysis of where the bomb was placed indicated that it exploded inside the car, if it were placed at the bottom of the car...the whole châssis would have been mangled, on the contrary the châssis was still intact.. with the evidence before the security agencies, it is believed that Kazim was carrying the bomb on his laps on the way back to the airport when it exploded in his face, tearing his face into two.”

[Oladipo 1996; 16]

23 How did the police come to the conclusion that Kazim was an agent of NADECO and NALICON? The police claimed that it broke into Dr. omotshola’s office immediately after thé blast in the presence of his deputy, Mr. O.F. Adeboye, and found therein a travelling bag, a suit and a tie and Kazim’s passport, number B736’249, the bag allegedly contained some computer spare parts, letters addressed to General Alani Akinrinade [a former Chief of Defence Staff], a radio frequency counter and a dividend cheque from Trans International Bank, Ibadan for the sum of N34,670, written in Akinrinade’s favour, the police went further to describe Kazim as a “computer technologist with vast knowledge in bomb making”, at the end of the press conference, the police commissioner refused to take any questions from the journalists present.

24 Members of Omotshola’s family dismissed the police allegation, claiming that the former Chief Security Officer of the MMA had no relationship whatsoever with NADECO or NALICON. Mr. Kazim was described as his casual friend. Miss Omodele Omotshola, the 26-year-old-daughter of Omotshola raised a number of questions:

“Can a man who holds a doctorate degree in criminal justice be so daft as to keep such incriminating things in a public office? The whole thing is just like a poorly rehearsed set up. You said Kazim is a bomb expert, yet he placed the bomb on his laps, as an expert won’t he take precaution to ensure it didn’t go off or if explosion became inevitable won’t he throw the thing off before it exploded, was he a suicide bomber? I can’t get the logic...They searched the office on 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th of November more than four times why didn’t they dis- coveranything incriminating?” [Oladipo 1996; 16]

25 Some relations of Omotshola also confirmed what Omodele said and noted that nothing incriminating was found in her father’s office, about 35 items were taken away from Omotshola’s office. None of them included anything on bombs or explosives, the Commissioner of Police was asked by Oladipo [1996:16-17], during an interview, why it took the police the second search to find anything incriminating in Omotshola’s office, alhaji Tsav responded:

“I have not entered that office once myself, as soon as the blast occurred, we assigned men to investigate the case, the first and second teams went in with bomb disposai experts and the police, and that was it, what happened initially was that those that went in there initially were anxious to check the bags left behind by the man, they did not conduct a thorough search initially, but then we received additional information on the issue, it was then that they went again fully prepared for the task, and don’t forget that the place has been under lock and key since the incident, there are lots of junks in the office, but what really gave room for discovery of additional incriminating pieces of evidence was that when the police visited the office again they went with mine detectors, the mine detectors will find anything, and that was what allowed the police to get the additional information.”
By all indications, the police explanation was not neat; it thus supported the claims of Omodele that her father's case was a “poorly rehearsed setup”, as far as members of Omotshola's family were concerned, agents of the Abacha regime murdered the former Chief Security Officer of Murtala Mohammed Airport.

One of the journalists who were conducted round Omotshola's office reported that the place where the bombs were said to have been was too conspicuous for any police team not to have found them during the first search, it was also during the second visit by the police team that General Akinrinade's letters were discovered, where as Kazim's bag was searched and probably taken away as an exhibit during the first search.

General Akinrinade described the whole development as a police conspiracy, he claimed that Nigerian security officials had been intercepting his letters since he went on exile. Some of these mails, including the one on his dividend from the Trans International Bank, he claimed, must have been planted in either Omotshola's office or in Kazim’s bag to nail him, he asked, “When did letters sent through someone you don’t know become a proof of your guilt...I am not a member of NALICON and NADECO to which I belong is not NALICON's patron” [quoted in Alawode 1996:17-18].

Evidence collected from the attempt to bomb Diya’s plane in 1996 also suggest that agents of the Abacha regime were responsible for the bomb attacks during the period, as noted earlier, one of the security operatives that brought the explosive to Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport at Abuja died during the 1996 explosion, one other security operatives that had worked with the dead man suffered first degree burns but were still alive, Abacha boys soon took him to hospital where he was later “helped” to die, before his death, [and this is probably the main reason for his extermination] this man was reported to have told Major Fadipe, the Chief Security Officer to Diya, that they were sent by Major Al-Mustapha, the Chief Security Officer to Abacha, to plant the bomb in Diya's plane, the plane would have exploded 10 minutes into the flight TheNews 28 December 1998:32], Being a member of Abacha's cabinet, Diya himself knew where the bomb came from, in an interview granted to journalists immediately after the blast, he described himself as a “loyal officer” and wondered why such an evil thing should be targeted at him, what Diya was saying, in other words, was that such bomb attacks were only meant for disloyal people, this helped to confirm what Nigerians had been suspecting for a very long time: that most of the bomb blasts in Nigerian cities could be attributed to the military.

The picture of what was planned against Diya and of who was responsible for the bomb attacks in the past became clearer immediately after General Abacha died. General Abacha frustrated all efforts made by Diya and his Chief Security Officer to have the bomb attack probed, a few days later, General Abacha, who wanted to eliminate his deputy by all means, came back for Diya, the latter was accused of planning to overthrow the Abacha regime, he and some other officers were sentenced to death by firing squad, before the death sentence could be carried out, however, General Abacha died in June 1998. Diya and the others were later released by General Abubakar, the new Head of State, who was well informed about the treacheries and evil machinations of the Abacha era.

Long before Diya's 1996 case, some Nigerian journalists had always been speculating that the bomb attacks in Abacha's Nigeria were the handiwork of some fifth columnists rather than the human rights and prodemocracy activists that the regime was pointing
accusing fingers at, the most reliable evidence for this came from Colonel Mohammed Buba Marwa of Lagos State, who would have been killed in one of the attacks officially blamed on NADECO, he noted during a press interview:

“...with a fair degree of certainty I was pretty certain it was not NADECO, that was why I never accused them throughout the period the thing happened, i have been a student of revolutionary warfare, indeed, as a student at Staff College, I wrote about this in my faculty paper, in a revolutionary campaign, those who are supposed to be the revolutionaries, people who are trying to change the system, in general try to separate the bourgeoisie from the proletariat, because they always try to demonstrate that they are working for the masses. Now, the position of NADECO has been along those lines whether rightly or wrongly and within the military establishment they were determined also to gain the support of the soldiers who in this wise represent perhaps an equivalent of the masses; to demonstrate to them that their officers are cheating them and so forth. Now, I am not saying that it is a fact that officers cheat their men or anything, i am only laying out the strategy they use, if they use this strategy, they will not then by themselves attempt to alienate the men, and so, when the bombings started hitting at the soldiers, it was clear to me that this was not a NADECO strategy because they will not be hitting at soldiers, if they want to assassinate people, it will be the officers and if the buses carrying the soldiers from the cantonment in Ikeja to Lagos always pass the route, why single out the soldiers? You expect NADECO instead, to bomb the officers rather than the men, but you know it was the soldiers attached to Sanitation Task Force men that were bombed, it was such an accurate bombing because that is a peculiar and unique route that they used to take at a particular time not to mention my own case. You need a certain degree of military planning to demonstrate that was the right ambush point to do this type of thing, that was for a moment of little puzzling but clearly it pointed the arrow away from NADECO in my own judgement...These bombings would have been either from within the establishment it self, or they could have been by some arrangement, may be with some foreign supporters..Or they could be from the retired cadre”. [TheNews 24 May 1999:16]

In a lengthy interview granted to Tell Magazine [August 28, 2000], Colonel Yakubu Bako, former Military Administrator of Akwa Ibom State [under Abacha] provided some vital information that could be used to establish how and why the bombings in Abacha’s Nigeria took place, he was a member of Abacha’s kitchen cabinet and he contributed in no small measure to giving focus and direction to the Abacha regime, until he later tell out with Abacha, tell described him as “a self-confessed acolyte of Abacha”, he described Abacha as a gentleman until 1994 when NADECO gave him an ultimatum to resign, abacha was said to have become more deadly when the National Constitutional Confab, inspired by Late General Shehu Yar’Adua, gave him a deadline on which to leave office. “All these made Abacha to become a changed man...We tried to give him advice but Abacha had so many security ‘misadvisers’ who misadvise him for selfish interests” [Director 2000:15], those who wanted some favours from Abacha only needed to suggest an evil plan against NADECO and the pro-democracy movements, and things worked automatically for them, this was the beginning of the problem.

A careful analysis of how Colonel Bako came on a collision path with Abacha and eventually got imprisoned on a charge of possessing an unlicensed gun sug- gests how Abacha recruited most of the people responsible for the bombings in Nigeria during his regime:

“When Abacha trusted you, he gave you personalised assignments, and if you disappointed him, he would go to any length to deal with you, i can trace my problems with Abacha as beginning from 1994, when I was MILAD of Akwa Ibom,
one night, I was with him in Abuja, he gave me a list of NADECO officers in Akwa Ibom, he said that what he wanted was that when I got back, I should ensure that these people were rounded up, and that if it required signing of Decree 2 to keep them permanently in jail, we should do it..., but after waiting for so long till 1995 and I didn’t give him any news of any arrest or detention, not to talk of killing anybody in Akwa Ibom, he summoned me to Abuja in late 1995 and asked what was happening, abacha became very annoyed, initially my name was among the beneficiaries of Osborne Road [Ikoyi, Lagos] land allocation, but for this my name was removed”.

34 Abacha gave him another assignment:

“Chief Anthony Enahoro came to Akwa Ibom and, unknown to the chief, he was being trailed. So when he got to Akawa Ibom, the chief checked into Metro Hotel, Uyo, with a different name, immediately he checked in, I got a phone call from Abuja, and when I picked it up, Abacha was on the line, he said that he was aware that Enahoro was in Akwa Ibom, and that he came in with a bus, he instructed that I should make sure Chief Enahoro and the bus did not leave Akwa Ibom, and that since Enahoro checked into the hotel with a fake name, it could easily be denied that he was the one that got killed or burnt in Akwa Ibom State... I worked on a strategy to frighten the chief out of Akwa Ibom State, what I did was to call the director of the State Security Services [SSS], I sent one of my operatives to go and inform the SSS director that Chief Enahoro was in town, but he should not tell the man I sent him, he should claim he bumped into Enahoro personally, and when the SSS director was told, instead of coming straight to me, he went to Metro Hotel and confronted Enahoro saying, “As a prominent Nigefian, why sneak into Akwa Ibom State? What if anything happens to you, who will be responsible”... Enahoro checked out of Metro that same night... So, I phoned General Abacha that night, telling him that while I was preparing to carry out his instructions, Chief Enahoro checked out, he just banged the phone on me, and he never forgot that incident... And that could have been his reason for leaving me to float for 10 months after my removal as MILAD. I had no posting for 10 months.”

35 The third assignment was the last straw:

“Abacha was on the line and he asked me to come and see him immediately. I got to the villa and met him seating alone in the inner chambers. When I sat down, he asked me if I could recall the break into Bauchi prison last year [June 1996]. At the same time that incident happened, Gani Fawehinmi was in that prison. He now asked me what could have been the public opinion if, mistakenly, Fawehinmi was killed by the armed robbers. I told him that it could have been a major disaster because there was no way we could have explained ourselves out of it...Throughout my explanation, General Abacha kept quiet. Thereafter, he told me that a similar prison break-in should take place in Yola in that 1997. And that as a trusted personalised staff, he was giving me the role of leading the break-in, and I would be assisted by other people I would get to know later. He said that what he really wanted me to do was to break into Yola prison, kill one or two prisoners, release many armed robbery suspects and awaiting trial suspects, just like what happened in Bauchi prison, and most importantly, I must make sure General Olusegun Obasanjo, then in Yola Prison, was killed.”

36 Colonel Bako was provided with an Uzzi rifle for the assignment because his personal weapon, a Colt 45mm pistol that he brought back from US in 1983, was considered not fit for that kind of assignment. The killing range was just 200 metres. Sumaila Shaibu, one of the security men blown up in 1997 at the Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport during the attempt to bomb Diya, was asked to work with Colonel Bako on this mission. He must have been involved in several other bombing missions in the country before nemesis finally caught up with him.
Colonel Bako once more failed to carry out this assignment. As usual, he went round and round and came back with nothing “positive” to report to Abacha. He was later arrested during the Diya coup and accused of being in possession of the same pistol Abacha earlier saw him with, he was jailed for 10 years. The officers who carried out the bombings reviewed in this paper must have been more loyal people than Bako. The latter did not kill anybody because he had the kind of conscience that did not fit into the mould of the Abacha regime. He paid for it.

Another indication that some Abacha boys were responsible for the bomb attacks could be inferred from one other incident. In July 1997, there was the celebrated case of the arms and ammunition stolen from the armoury of the Directorate of Military Intelligence [DMI] in Lagos. This singular occurrence was believed to have sent shivers down the spine of General Abacha [Abubakar 1997: 20-25]. It was feared that the weapons could be used for plotting a coup d’etat or assassinating some prominent political figures in the country. Shortly after, six soldiers from the DMI were arrested with some bombs, bags of chemicals for manufacturing bombs and explosives, a detonator, high voltage dry cell batteries and over 200 live bullets, by July 25, 1997 the number of soldiers arrested in respect of the arms theft had risen to 15, the arms were said to have been used to carry out an illegal “military” operation at Ihiala, Anambra State. Some of the weapons were later recovered from Ihiala, the hometown of Chief Victor Okafor, alias Ezego [King of Money], a business man in Lagos.

What really happened? How did it start? A film on the exploits of Ezego, one of the kingpins of 419 [swindlers] in Nigeria, was watched by the Inspector General of Police, Alhaji Ibrahim Coomasie some time in June 1997. Most worrisome to the IG was the nature of the sophisticated weapons at the disposal of the suspected criminal and members of his gang. A contingent of 1’200 crack men, drawn from mobile police units in Benue, Plateau, Niger, Kaduna and Sokoto States was given the assignment of arresting Ezego. Six hundred of them were to “burst” his home at Ihiala and the rest were to go to Lagos where Ezego had most of his businesses. They were basically out to look for information on the sources of Ezego’s sudden wealth and to see if anything incriminating could be traced to him.

In the early morning of June 25, 1997 the security men stormed their targets. Several people were arrested with Ezego, they were soon released but Ezego was detained. He was later given a clean bill by the police and therefore released.

Immediately after his release, Ezego went after those he believed to have masterminded his harassment by the police, he was said to have planted some weapons at the backyard of one of them - Chuma Nzeribe, the plan was to implicate the man in illegal arms dealing, the military men sent to dump the weapons there were the same people that came to arrest Chuma, the mission could, however, not be carried to a logical conclusion because it was an “unauthorised operation”, the people at the DMI soon heard about it and the weapons were discovered to have been stolen from DMI. Ezego was detained by the Nigerian military. Within a short period, he was released. This was surprising. The Ezego case, if it had been faithfully followed, would have revealed where the various bombings in Abacha’s Nigeria were coming from, it would have revealed where the illegal bombs were obtained. Why should a civilian be found with bombs and still be released without any trial? All these happened during the Abacha regime when innocent Nigerians like Chief Olu Falae, Chief Durojaiye and
others were hounded into indefinite detention by the military on the suspicion of being responsible for the bombing of Nigerian cities, even when nothing was found on them.

Mr. Chuma Nzeribe of Umudike village, Ihiala, Anambra State, on whose compound the arms and ammunition were planted in 1997 petitioned the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission [HRVIC] sitting at Abuja in 2001, he alleged that some officers of DMI tried to assassinate him in August 1997. The officers, according to Chuma, planted bombs, explosives and live rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition in his house during the period, in the process of responding to these charges, more light was shed on what actually happened. Brigader Sabo, then Director of DMI, was summoned by the commission on the matter in June and July 2001. His successor. Colonel Stephen Idehenre was summoned in September, in the process of responding to the charges, both officers made statements that could be used to establish that the military were responsible for most of the bombings in Abacha’s Nigeria.

Brigadier Sabo claimed to be a student at the National War College when the atrocities were committed. He tried to blame the incident on Colonel Idehenre who acted in office for him. Sabo saw this as an opportunity to hit at some of his former bosses in office—most especially General Abdulsalami Abubakar [who succeeded Abacha as Head of State] and General Ishaya Bamaiyi, the former Chief of Army Staff. The two facilitated the retirement of Sabo immediately after Abacha died.

Insinuating that the majority of people that worked with Abacha participated in the atrocities of those years, he noted that it is a truism that some people relished in crises to make money during the ill-fated Abacha regime. They faked situations of insecurity and, thereafter, got imaginary suspects to deal with: “These people could create problem and then go and report to the system and thereafter ask for specific amount of money to quell it... but some of the violations were not done with the knowledge of Abacha. Some were done by people for their own aggrandizement but they did it in such a way to suggest they were fighting for the government. I wish he was alive to tell his side of the story” [Okolo 2001:53].

It was the turn of Colonel Stephen Idehenre [rtd.] to address the HRVIC on the Chuma-Ezego matter in September 2001. He told the commission that he had completed his term as the Acting Director when the alleged atrocities took place, idehenre used the opportunity to hit at his former boss. He accused him of being responsible for most of the atrocities committed during the Abacha regime, he alleged that one Colonel Majoyegbe, who worked for Sabo, masterminded the bombs and explosives allegedly planted in Nzeribe’s house. For planting the bombs, he claimed, Sabo was compensated with a Toyota Land Cruiser and Majoyegbe got the gift of a BMW car [Agekameh 2001:31].

Tell Magazine [September 24, 2001] later followed up the Chuma-Ezego case and came to the conclusion that the bombings in Nigeria were the handiwork of the Sabo-led DMI, the magazine made reference to a security report put together by a senior DMI officer [probably Colonel Idehenre] in 1996 which gave an indication of the involvement of DMI operatives in the attacks. A collective decision was reached at the organization, on the wake of the bombings, to mount night surveillance on certain routes in the Lagos metropolis considered to be targeted by the bombers. The next bomb attack took place at a place not covered by the surveillance team. The noose was further tightened and, with time, the bomb attacks moved out of Lagos to some other parts of Nigeria, suggesting that some people within the DMI were responsible for the attacks. The
security report on the Ihiala incident further pointed to the possible involvement of the DMI in the bombings that took place in different parts of Nigeria:

“The planting of the bomb at Ihiala had similar characteristics as all the ones earlier planted in Lagos, it was buried in a shallow dugout, the same way all the bombs that had exploded in Lagos since November 19, 1996 were buried.” [cited in Agekameh 2001:31]

The possible conclusion we can draw from the above is that the Abacha boys, whether on the instruction of their boss or because of their own insatiable need for gratification from their boss, were responsible for the bombings. NADECO and NALICON were implicated in the problem to paint them black. The existence and activities of these pro-democracy groups could, however, be a major reason why the Abacha boys found it so easy to convince their boss about the bombings.

**Impact on Governance and Urban Life**

Political terrorism follows three important paths: one, act or threat of violence, two, the emotional reaction to such an act or threat, and three, the social effects resulting from the acts and reaction [Walter 1969]. The impacts of the bombings in Abacha’s Nigeria are best seen in the emotional stress they created, as well as their social effects on decent urban life. The main goal of terrorists is to create fear in a society. Those responsible for the bomb attacks in the Abacha era excellently attained this objective. Nigerians were really afraid about where to visit and where not to, as they did not know where the next bomb would explode and who was, going to be the next victim.

The bomb explosions provided the Abacha regime with grounds for increased arbitrariness and political oppression. The regime presented the “faceless terrorists” as enemies of Nigeria and General Abacha and his boys as a group working for the survival of the Nigerian estate. Repressive political measures were explained as steps taken to protect the security of the Nigerian state. Arbitrary arrests thus followed each of the explosions. As noted earlier, the bomb explosions were blamed on some prominent human rights activists. In March 1997, the government formally charged Dr. Frederick Faseun [leader of Oodudua People’s Congress], Chief Olu Falae [former Federal Minister of Finance], Professor Wole Soyinka [who was on self-exile in America and Europe], Lt. General Alani Akinrinade [another exile] and a few other Nigerians for the bomb attacks. They were all accused of “conspiracy to levy war against the federal military government of Nigeria” and “causing explosions in various parts of Nigeria” [CNN March 12, 1997]. Faseun and Falae were already in detention. Wole Soyinka, who was contacted by the CNN, dismissed the charges brought against them as “an old familiar charge that’s now being dusted off to tie it in with this spate of bombings. This is a plot to liquidate us...Abacha is a psychopath, and a pathological liar...He knows he doesn’t have one shred of proof connecting me to these bombings.” Soyinka blamed the bomb attacks on the army: “I don’t know who is behind the bombs. He [Abacha] has created so much enmity in the army that I think the army could be responsible, it is very divided.”

Mr, Bagauda Kaltho, a Nigerian journalist, human rights activist, and the Kaduna Senior Correspondent of The News, was kidnapped on the 18th of January 1996 as a result of his write-up on the phantom coup of 1995. His article punctured the arguments of the Abacha military junta. He was detained at Abuja and Jos prisons and died in the process.
of being tortured, the information about Kaltho’s death was first announced by the Reporters Sans Frontières [RSF] of France. Until then, the government claimed to be unaware of what happened to Kaltho. The Huri-Laws, a human rights group in Lagos, filed a suit on 19th September 1998 [after the death of Abacha] to press for the release of Kaltho’s body and for official information on what killed him. On the same day, Zakari Biu, an Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of the Taskforce on Terrorism and Bombing, called a press conference at which he alleged that Kaltho was killed during a bomb explosion that took place at Durbar Hotel in Kaduna HURI-LAWS NEWSLETTER 1998:1]. The same Zakari Biu, a man popularly mentioned as being responsible for torturing political prisoners during the Abacha regime, had announced in the past that he did not know the identity of the “unidentified bomber” in Kaduna. To make his story look “acceptable”, he claimed to have found beside the bomber a copy of Wole Soyinka’s book, “And the Man Died”, this, in his calculation, meant that the bomber was sent by Soyinka. The question Nigerians have since been asking about Kaltho is: “Did the journal list come out from detention to carry out the Kaduna bomb attack?” What we are trying to insinuate here is that the bombings provided the Abacha boys with explanations for some of their murderous acts.

51 The bomb attacks also became a veritable vehicle by which the government diverted the attention of the people from substantive issues in politics. Each blast was reported and discussed in the NTA and Radio Nigeria news for several weeks, the television and radio stations, most of which were state-controlled, were either reporting the blast, the reaction of some selected Nigerians to it, the solidarity visits to the Head of State by one group or the other, or interviews with Nigerian security officials on when and how to catch the terrorists. All these were aimed at attracting sympathy for the government and condemnation for NADECO [and its “foreign collaborators”] which were considered to be the source of the problem. Through this kind of diversionary tactics Nigerians were led to forget about the fundamental issues in their nation’s development while “sympathising” with the Head of State “whose genuine efforts towards lasting democracy” were being thwarted by “subversive elements”.

52 During each of the solidarity visits to the Head of State, the visitors took time off to launch tirades on NADECO, on human rights activists in exile, like Professor Wole Soyinka and General Alani Akinrinade, and on American. United Kingdom and other western nations considered to be providing support for the terrorists with a view to either derailing the genuine efforts of Abacha towards democracy or to enslaving the black man a second time. At the end of such a “solidarity rally”, the State Administrator would make some well-rehearsed political statements and assure the demonstrators that their message would be delivered to the Head of State. For the next two nights this might form the main news item on the NTA 9 o’clock news.

53 The terrorist attacks provided grounds for greater arbitrariness by the Nigerian police and military. Those arrested for the bomb explosion in Ilorin had the case against them withdrawn in 1996 when it became obvious that there was no way of getting them convicted based on mere suspicion, in the letter withdrawing the charges against them, the Attorney-General of Kwara State noted that the “allégations against them were merely based on suspicion which no matter how strong cannot take the place of legal proof” [Ref. No. Justice/Leg.41 Vol.34/383]. The government arrested some NADECO members in Nigeria. Chief Olu Falae, the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, was one of those clamped into detention on the charge of being
responsible for some of the bomb attacks. Some prominent members of the organisation were also placed on the “wanted” list of the police. Those declared wanted included General Akinrinade, Chief Anthony Enahoro, Dan Suleman etc., professor Wole Soyinka of NALICON was also declared wanted on account of the bomb blasts in the country.

Security around several foreign consulates and international organisations in some major Nigerian cities - most especially Lagos - became tightened, this may have become necessary for two reasons. First, the embassies probably feared that the agents of Abacha could come and plant bombs in the premises as punishment for supporting the pro-democracy movements against Abacha. The embassies also probably feared that enemies of the Abacha regime could plant bombs in the embassies to further embarrass the Abacha government, people visiting the embassies were thoroughly screened with electronic devices to ensure that they were not carrying any explosive devices on their person. Two days after the car of Marwa of Lagos State was attacked in 1996, the United States called on its citizens to steer clear of the major airports in Nigeria during the rest of the year so that they are would not be victims of likely future blasts [Agekameh 1996:18]. In response, the Nigerian government started to point accusing fingers at the US as a major funder of the bombers. Following the 1995 blast at Ilorin, the Head of State, General Sani Abacha and his wife Maryam steered clear of state functions taking place in any part of south-western Nigeria. This part of Nigeria was believed to harbour the terrorists, between 1995 and 1997 when he died, Lagos or any south-western Nigerian town was a “no-go” area for the Head of State, at a point, he even stopped worshipping at the Central Mosque in Abuja. As Nigerians said, the Head of State was simply “holed up in Aso Rock”, haunted by his own ghost.

Our conclusion in this paper is that the bombings in Abacha’s Nigeria were carried by agents of the regime to protect themselves. These attacks took place in major Nigerian cities - Ilorin, Lagos, Kaduna, Onitsha - because of the plethora of potential targets - human and structural - that exist there and also because of the greater visibility of these cities and the kinds of socio-political activities in them. What was experienced in Abacha’s Nigeria is a textbook example of “establishment terrorism”, which may be defined as “the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, by an established political system, against both external and internal opposition” [Shultz 1978:11], in the years to come, more light will be shed on what actually took place during this dark period in Nigerian history, the contents of this paper are part of the historical reconstruction that has to be done.

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ENDNOTES

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ABSTRACTS

Nigeria witnessed the most agonizing moment in her political history, from 1994 to 1998, when the country was ruled by General Sani Abacha. The problem started with the annulment of the
June 12, the 1993 presidential election, which Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola was popularly believed to have won. The hues and cries that greeted the annulment forced Président Babangida to surrender power to Chief Earnest Sonekan on 26 August 1993. General Abacha seized power from Sonekan on 17 November 1993 and resorted to the use of state terrorism to contend with the challenges posed by the human rights and prodemocracy activists who fought for the de-annulment of the 1993 election. Bombs exploded in different parts of the country, these were blamed on NADECO and NALICON. This paper takes a critical look at the nature of the bomb attacks and poses the fundamental question: 'Who were the terrorists and what did they want?' A review of the attacks on some key individuals, including two military administrators and the Chief of Staff (General Diya), suggests to us that the agents of the Abacha regime were behind the bomb explosions, the bombs were meant to incriminate, implicate and intimidate pro-democracy and human rights activists, who were usually blamed for the attacks, the regime also used the explosions to validate its highhandedness against the 'opposition'. 
Escapee criminals and crime control in colonial southwestern Nigeria, 1861-1945

Paul Osifodunrin

AUTHOR’S NOTE

Note portant sur l’auteur

Introduction

1 Scholarly works on crime in Nigeria have not given much thought to the phenomenon of escape and its possible impact on crime control. Yet, nearly all criminals think of one or the other form of escape before or immediately after, perpetrating a criminal activity. A notable exception is Falola and Adebayo's study on theft and criminality in colonial Nigeria. However, while the authors made passing references to specific incidences of escape, they did not study it as a phenomenon to determine its impact on the rising rate of crime in their study area. Understandably, this was not their major focus. The present study examines the issues involved in the escape of criminals in southwestern Nigeria. It situates the incidence of escape within a wider context of police inefficiency and the criminals' intelligent recognition and exploitation of loopholes in the colonial justice system and procedures. Finally, it examines the workings of the extradition treaty between colonial Nigeria and Dahomey since 1876 as an official/bilateral/diplomatic response to nip in the bud the smart idea of committing crime in one country and running to another.
Conceptualising Escape

2 ‘Escape’

, as it is used here, refers to the various efforts put up by criminals before, during or after hatching and perpetrating a criminal act, to evade justice. An underlying presumption of this concept is that a plan of escape or an assurance of a possibility of escape is germane to and actually completes the cycle of a criminal activity. A criminal would consider a cycle of criminal activity completed only when he is able to escape justice. The phenomenon of escape suggests strongly that most criminals are rational beings to the extent that they often leave their regions of origin to perpetrate their nefarious acts in locations where they enjoy anonymity and from where they could flee in times of trouble.

3 Escape could be planned or embarked upon in reaction to a real or perceived danger of being arrested, in which case, the act of escape becomes spontaneous. Escape is also commonly regarded as a post-apprehension or post-conviction incident. Whichever way, the act of escape allows the escapee criminal a breathing space to delight in the achieved goal of his detected or undetected crime, which could be material or abstract, an example of the latter being vengeance.

4 Escaping from justice comes in various forms. First, it could be by way of defection of the criminal to areas outside the political jurisdiction of the authority in the area of the crime. It is also achievable through constant and almost perpetual movement from one area to the other, that is, the criminal condemns himself to a situation of no domicile fixé within the crime area. Others include jail breaking through the active co-operation of prison officials, relatives or the police, the changing of identity through the use of false beards, hair and moustache as well as answering to fictitious names. The thought of committing a criminal act undetected or of being able to beat the law when sought after, through one form of escape or the other, therefore induces confidence in and propels the potential and professional criminals into action. This is perhaps why bringing criminals to justice at all cost and making them face the highest sentence available for such offences remain for some people the most viable and potent way of curbing criminal activities.

5 Escape may also be considered in relation to the desire for death. A Yoruba adage captures it pithily: Iku yaju esin. When translated this would mean “death is preferred to disgrace”. Thus, an apprehended criminal could choose to commit suicide while awaiting trial and possible conviction. At other times a criminal could choose to die in action rather than reveal the secrets of his accomplices in crime because of his allegiance to an oath of secrecy or due to some other factors. When either of the actions above is taken, the criminal could be said to be exhibiting merely an extreme form of escape. This latter form of escape trivialises the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrence for crime. As will be shown later in the case of colonial Nigeria, criminals awaiting trial sometimes committed suicide. Suicide as a means of escape from justice may be interpreted as a defiance of the death penalty prescribed by the law and enforced by the state.

6 Escape is also derivable in situations where a high level of fear of criminals exists, resulting in docile complicity on the part of the public due to news and tales of reprisal attacks on those who dared to identify the culprits or acted as police informants. The fear of the criminal (a predisposition usually known to the criminal himself) confers on him an aura of invincibility. In such a situation, escape becomes associated not with the
criminal dodging the public but with the public avoiding him. The criminal, therefore escapes justice not because he is on the run but, rather, for the simple reason that the people avoid him by neither testifying against him nor co-operating with the police for fear of reprisals, realising that the police may not necessarily be around to give protection when trouble comes. Hence, the criminal gets more confident and “secure” with each successful criminal act, and the society is the worse for it.

Ethnic complicity in criminality may also provide a veritable means of escape for criminals, especially in situations where diverse ethnic groups co-exist. Thus, criminality is granted group protection. In most cases, this form of connivance could pitch one ethnic group against another since, in most cases, the victims of such crimes are usually members of other ethnic groups or hosts to settler groups. The Yoruba-Hausa disputes in Ibadan and Osogbo in the 1930s and 40s in colonial Nigeria attest to this. So do the recent Yoruba-Hausa and Yoruba-Ijaw crises in the Ajegunle suburb of Lagos in October 1999 and 2000 in the aftermath of the involvement of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) an ethnic Yoruba militia, in crime control.

Another phenomenon, the asylum use of the border lines by criminals, also became rampant in the formative years of British rule and was to remain so throughout the colonial period. In the post-independence era, and up till the present time, the trend has not abated since criminals from Nigeria and alien-criminals preying on Nigeria find refuge and ready markets for stolen goods, particularly automobiles, in neighbouring countries. During the colonial period, Dahomey was the destination for stolen bicycles, the theft of which was widespread in the adjoining British colony of Lagos. Smugglers have also filled and are still filling the gaps created by the unequal economic opportunities and opposing economic policies of Nigeria and her neighbours, thus permitting at the informal level what were/are forbidden at the formal level.

Criminality and Escape in the Pre-colonial Period

The little but enlightening documentation on the nature of crime in pre-colonial southwestern Nigeria presents two discernible outlines in which to understand the problem and, invariably, the phenomenon of escape during this period. First is the nature of the crime committed and the treatment of offenders in the period of political stability; second is the nature and treatment of crime during periods of societal upheavals. In the first category, individual criminality was rampant, while offences as well as punishments varied. For instance, offences of stealing were rife, though they were considered less severe than murder. This was reflected in the gravity of punishment attached to each of these offences during that period.

According to Karibi-Whyte, stealing, depending on what was stolen, attracted “mere ridicule or flogging or was not punished at all’ while offences such as adultery, disrespecting or assaulting a chief, and murder attracted “banishment, serious fines or sale into slavery”. In the second category, group criminality was of four types. The first, which also straddles the line of individual criminality and was more of a political crime, concerns the usurpation of the power of a monarch as typified by the story of Basorun Gaha whose entire household, save one person was executed for his treachery.

Of more relevance to our study here is the second form of group criminality which concerns the near criminalisation of the state, as exemplified by the activities of the
Egbe Onisunmanmi, “an armed robbery syndicate [formed by the political elite in Ibadan] to rob [within Ibadan and] in neighbouring areas...”¹⁰ “to obtain foodstuffs, livestock and other goods...”¹¹ “until the mid-1840s when Oluyole... succeeded in establishing a firm political system...”¹² Even at the emergence of Oluyole, what abated were internal robberies within Ibadan. External looting continued until the advent of colonialism. While it lasted, this form of group criminality was common and it was difficult to impose punishment on culprits since those involved belonged to the elite class who should enforce law and order.¹³ Elite involvement in criminality was much during this period and later became a source of concern to colonial administrators. The third category were groups of brigands, such as the “ogo were” (band of youths)–later corrupted into ogo were (band of mad men) -and the Jama’a, who were active in Oyo and were reputed to have caused great havoc and discomfort to people. Again, these two groups were initially political but later became self-serving.¹⁴

The fourth, which seems to have been greatly influenced by environmental factors, was piracy. Falola has described the activities of “Ode Omi” (water hunters) who changed from hunting fish to hunting “for women, cowries, liquor, arms and ammunition, and other goods”¹⁵ on the waterways. In the process of carrying out their nefarious activities, they “...abducted, raped and then dumped”¹⁶ their victims while they disposed of their loot, especially arms and ammunitions, to warring soldiers at reduced prices. Canoes, another important item often snatched, were sold or added to the raiding fleet. Yet there were other unstructured groups, mostly refugees, who took to occasional criminality pending their resettlement.¹⁷

Consequently, it is clear that a strong relationship existed between the crime situation and the political atmosphere in pre-colonial Yorubaland. While in peace-time individual criminality was common, during the period of instability, group criminality surfaced and has continued to grow because of the strength it derives from numbers. The insurrection of Afonja, the collapse of the Oyo Empire and the wars that followed had disruptive effects on the entire life of the people, including law and order. People were displaced from their homes; communities were destroyed, making relocation inevitable; and the means of livelihood were shattered. Crime through brigandage provided a means of survival, particularly for the members of the warrior class, who were trained in warfare and had been used to raiding and living on booty. This probably underscores the origin of the dictum ‘Ibadan, n’ibi ole ti gbe n’jare oluhun’ meaning ‘Ibadan’, where the victim is wrong and the thief right’. The origin of the dictum may not be unconnected with the marauding activities of its founding elites in the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed the unstable political situation made criminals, occasional or professional, out of people.

An interesting feature of crime control, which seems to have moderated the peace time tendency by individual criminals to escape, was the upholding of the collective rather than individual responsibility for crime. As put by Akinyele:

“If anyone in a compound offended, the offence might be great or small, the principal chiefs like the Baale or the Balogun or the cil of chiefs would order the plundering or devastation of the offender’s compound, i.e., men, women and children met in the compound would be taken, clothes, cattle, domestic utensils and...all would be carried away never to be restored. Hundreds of houses were thus devastated and became desolate.”¹⁸

Tamuno also remarked on a similar form of group liability for crime when he noted that “…the extended family or kindred suffered for the wrongs of the members who
were under its protection.”

Thus, the escape of the culprit could not have totally impeded punishment, as the family would be held responsible. This was the context in which colonial rule was established. By 1849, Britain had assumed the role of a peacemaker in the Bights of Benin and Biafra with the appointment of a Consul to mediate between African merchants and traders of British origin. In 1851, the British had become entangled in the internal affairs of Lagos and, ten years later they annexed the island, from where they began a gradual but steady movement into the interior of Yorubaland.

The British annexation of Lagos had certain implications. Unlike before, when the King of Lagos held sway in spite of his weakness at enforcing the law on the growing heterogeneous population and his apparent lack of control over the existence of separate courts for the British traders and another for the returnees, British authority was now paramount, indicating a shift in the balance of power. While the British were active in Lagos and other parts of the Yoruba interior, the French were equally busy in neighbouring Dahomey, which was finally tamed with the deposition of King Benhazin in 1889. Before that period, other areas, such as Porto-Novo, Alladah and Whydah, had fallen under French control, giving rise to what has been described as the period of informal empire.

The subjugation of these states necessitated the application of foreign laws and their enforcement. This brought about certain changes hitherto unknown in these West African areas. Concerning criminal justice, the supremacy of European law became the model. As put pithily by Freeman, the First Governor of Lagos the “exercise of the power of life and death over... [colonial subjects was] the last seal on the stability of British rule.” Hence, the individual responsibility of an offender favoured in European law replaced that which underscored collective blame in the unwritten law of the African peoples.

One of the implications of this development, among others, was that African notions of justice, law enforcement and crime control became gradually subservient to those of the Europeans, both in Lagos and in the hinterland. Paradoxically, the supposed supremacy of British law did not translated into efficacy, even though the activities of the police and the courts during this period gave the impression that the new laws were being properly enforced. Some Sierra-Leonians who lived in Lagos at this time struck the right note on the true situation arising from the application of foreign laws on African soil when they noted that “The stricter system[s] of enforcement exercised by native governments in the interior [of Yorubaland] were superior to the lenient British system” that operated in Lagos. Thus, the early colonial status of Lagos and its poorly policed districts, in contrast to other parts of Yorubaland which were under British protection but enjoyed a level of autonomy in their legal system, made it (Lagos) a haven for slaves, slave criminals and other criminals fleeing from the hinterlands. For instance, burglars who were driven out of Abeokuta in the 1880s during the clampdown on their ranks by the Egba Government found it convenient to escape to Lagos, thus confirming a popular dictum: Eko gb 'ole o gb 'ole', that is, 'Lagos accommodates the thief and the indolent'.

Thus, the imposition of the new principle of individual liability for a crime committed had both positive and negative impacts on criminal justice. First, the new system came to respect the rights and liabilities of a criminal offender as distinct from that of his family. A criminal could now escape justice without the transference of criminal
liability to his family. Before long, Africans started exploiting this inbuilt leniency and other loopholes in the new legal system.

The Colonial Perspective

At the time of the British takeover, Lagos was a society in transition and the Yoruba interior in turmoil. As subsequent events bear out, it was easier for the British to occupy than to administer Lagos effectively. One of the problems that confronted the incipient administration was the issue of security and the protection of property. Before the occupation, Lagos had the reputation of welcoming strangers by stealing from them. A case in point was when certain Sierra-Leonian immigrants, on their way to Abeokuta, were robbed during the reign of King Oluwole.26

By October 1861 a small force had been set up to tackle the problem of insecurity. But the number was inadequate as there were 25 police constables to a population of about 30,000. Later, in 1862, expansion was made for a “police department of 1 Superintendent, 4 Sergeants, 8 Corporals and 100 Constables.” At the same time, a Police Court, a Criminal and Slave Court and a Commercial Tribunal were set up. By 1863, Lagos had two police branches—one civil, the other semi-military, the Armed Hausa Police. The latter, which was better organised and armed, was mostly used for military expeditions outside Lagos, even as far as the Gold Coast, to the neglect of local policing and crime detection among the dwellers on the Island and in the rural districts of Lagos. (By 1868, these numbered 35,000 and 75,000, respectively.) Consequently, the traditional elites, now influenced by the new laws, continued to play the role of law enforcers in several districts close to Lagos and its outlying areas. By 1895, the Civil Police Force was still being accused of inefficiency and complicity with criminals. In fact, it was said that the low wages payable to police officers attracted people of low status and shady character into the force.29

In Ibadan, it was difficult for the old ways to give way to the new. The involvement of the British in local affairs brought them in collision with the hitherto established norm of elite and ethnic-tinted criminality. In the absence of war, certain war lords turned their attention to looting within Ibadan itself, an act which the British and the people under the changing circumstances, could not condone. For example, the authorities tried and exiled Balogun Kongi, an influential Ibadan chief, who was accused of sponsoring and harbouring slave robbers of Hausa origin. The clash of laws and authority could also be seen in Watson’s description of the inconclusive trial of three Ibadan chiefs accused of the murder of a cowherd named Salu. While the Ibadan Council felt the payment of fines was good enough punishment, the British felt that the death penalty was the only punishment that was good enough for any murder case. Subsequently, the accused were transferred to Lagos Prisons. In another case in which the chiefs tried to perform their customary roles by ordering the summary execution of two murderers in 1900, the British were quick to condemn such an act. When Basorun Fajinmi was accused of the unlawful execution of the murderers without permission from the British, he was fined 100 pounds.31

Crime was better controlled in Egbaland, where the people enjoyed autonomy with the establishment of Egba United Board of Management (E.U.B.M) in 1865, the National Council of Egba (N.C.E) in 1898 and later, in 1902, the Egba United Government (E.U.G). Nevertheless, the Niger load and the other robberies made the colonial government
in Lagos to demand compensation. Local circumstances leading to the Ijemo riots hastened the British take over in 1914. It has been mentioned earlier that criminals were often driven out of Egbaland. The same could, however, not be said of Egbado, which seemed to have been the take off point, of most criminals who terrorised the outlying districts of Lagos during the colonial period. An agreement made in 1889 between the British and the French demarcated the frontier between Lagos and Porto-Novo from “the north of the Ajarra Creek northwards to the north parallel.” Subsequently, the British established protectorates over such border communities as Igbessa, Ipokia, Addo and Ajilete, up to Ilaro. Criminals, who often came from the neighbouring communities on the Dahomean side to rob and, when under pressure, retreated to their communities, converted the closeness of these villages to advantage. Among the Ijebu, colonialism was detested and a military expedition was required to impose it. Olukoju has explained the currency counterfeiting among the Ijebu during the colonial period as a form of résistance. What is important to emphasise here is that even when the counterfeiters felt that they were simply “using [their] brain[s] to survive” they would still “jump out of a moving lorry to escape arrest.” Escape from the long arms of the law was, undoubtedly, important for the continued distribution of the counterfeited currency.

Issues involved in the Escape of Criminals in Colonial Nigeria.

It has been said that the police in colonial Nigeria was more of an instrument of oppression than for crime prevention and control. Ahire argues that “the Nigerian Police Force was not set up to protect indigenous people from crime and other social problems, but rather to protect colonial commerce that involved the transportation of goods to the Nigerian coasts and thence to Britain.” He concludes that “the Nigerian Police Force in 1991 retains its strong colonial character”, which is designed to “coerce peasants and workers into compliance with the oppressive political and economic relationship established by colonialism.” Fourchard, who went further to contend that crime detection virtually does not exist in Nigeria, has recently repeated this line of thought. According to him, what is called crime detection is nothing more than a cosmetic approach to fighting crime, as seen in the formation of crime busting outfits, such as ‘Operation Sweep’, the ‘Rapid Response Squad’ in Lagos and, more recently, the nation-wide ‘Opération Fire for Fire’.

Arguably, Fourchard’s submission is far from being totally representative of the whole picture. While it is true that police brutality and oppression abounded during the colonial period and still exists now, efforts, however inadequate, were made to protect the lives and property of citizens against all odds. Indeed, Tamuno has noted that the gallantry of the Nigeria Police Force in the colonial period led to the busting of several criminal cases. However, the Civil Police, as distinct from the Armed Hausa Force, was a body bedevilled with a lot of teething problems that seemed to have become entrenched in the system and was transferred to its successor outfits. The major ones can be
categorised under broad headings, such as corruption, lack of adequate manpower and logistics.

28 The experience of Lagos, where modern policing started in colonial Nigeria, indicates that most of the early recruits into the police force were people of shady character. Public opinion in Lagos, from the 1860s through the 80s, and even after into the twentieth century, attests to this. This was one of the factors that made the police force so inefficient, making escape by criminals a pastime. Jailbreaks were so rampant that by 1915, when Lugard published the Criminal Code Bill, the issue of escape by criminals was listed as an offence in Section 15. Thus, aiding criminals to escape, permitting escape, negligence leading to escape and the harbouring of escaped criminals became punishable offences. It must, however, be mentioned that not all escapes involved official complicity, as indicated in the following narration by a prison official:

“I was unfortunate to lose 17 prisoners including 3 or 4 gang leaders on 28-01-1930 from Idi-Iroko N.C Lock, Up. The wife of one of the gang leaders passed a handcuff key in a loaf of bread unto him. He released himself and then the others and overpowered the constable on guard.”

29 Falola again captures aptly the desperation with which criminals sought to escape from justice:

“When caught, a thief did everything possible to discredit the evidence and the witnesses... cases of destruction of evidence and bribing witnesses not to appear in court were common, when this failed he struggled further to escape from police cell.”

30 Elite and ethnic complicity in criminal activities, rampant in the pre-colonial period, survived into the colonial period. Several chiefs were reported as collaborating with thieves for example, in the case of the Baale of Ago Sasa in 1930 and of another chief in Ede in 1931. The case of Balogun Kongi has been earlier mentioned. Kosoko’s piratical activities in Epe, though resistant in nature, is also worthy of note. Ahner Cohen has also beamed very illuminating light on the complicity of Hausa landlords, who hid Hausa criminals in Sabongari in Ibadan. These criminals fled to later Northern Nigeria.

31 People’s fear of the criminal was also a very important factor in his escape during the colonial period. Fear, as defined by Kaplan and Kaplan, “is the emotional reaction to danger”, real or imagined. Criminals were feared for several reasons. First, they did not hesitate to injure or kill their victims. Second, they were usually in large groups of thirty or more, a factor that intimidated people. Their mode of operation was another factor. They were usually bold enough to announce their arrival to their victims. A case in point was the incident that occurred in the Agege District in the 1930s when a robbery gang, after announcing its arrival to the villagers, ordered them to leave the environment or lie prostrate covering their faces. Resistance to these orders initiated a series of rebukes or reprisals, including severe beatings and, in some extreme cases, murder. The whole village was robbed this way and, with the availability of motor lorries, it was easy to cart away the stolen items.

32 An interesting feature of victimisation during this period was that being a victim was not usually a factor for rendering assistance to the police during an investigation. At a particular point, a man who gave information to the police was driven away from his home by other villagers, for he was considered to have further increased the possibility of a repeat attack by robbers. Again, the owners of the two lorries used in the Agege robbery were well known by the people, and even the police but nobody was willing to
testify that these lorries were indeed seen at the scene of the robbery. Had anyone testified, such testimony would have been admissible in a court of law. Eventually, however, with some good detective work, the police were able to arrest some of the culprits. These were later charged to court but, as noted by the prosecution, those who were prosecuted were not the gang leaders.59

**Extradition of criminals: Application of the Law and its Implications.**

33 The surrender by one sovereign state to another, of an individual accused or convicted of a crime is handled under international law by the process of extradition. To extradite means to officially send back somebody who has been accused or found guilty of a crime to the country where the crime was committed.60 It is always a process that is agreed to by parties under the terms of a bilateral or multilateral treaty.61 That between the French and the British in 1876 was bilateral, with a stated proviso that the normal diplomatic procedure would be bent for a less rigorous one to hasten the process of inter-colonial extradition.62 Under the agreement, persons suspected, convicted or charged with crimes such as murder, counterfeiting, uttering money, rape and several other crimes, including stealing or being in possession of stolen goods, were to be extradited.63 In addition, powers to authorise extradition were vested in the highest authorities in the two colonial territories, presumably to avoid confusion in the issuance of orders in external relations.64

34 That the treaty itself was signed in 1876, when the grips of the two colonial powers on their colonial territories were yet wobbly, suggests an early recognition of the advantages that the asylum value of the two unfolding frontiers conferred, particularly on criminals, and indicates clearly that the treaty was a product of partnership against these elements in the two colonised territories. In a wider context, the enactment of the treaty also concurred with the worldwide concern, beginning from 1831, to tackle common criminality.65 The treaty succeeded in harmonising the contrasting civil and common law approaches of the French and the British in the area of extradition. However, available records are silent on the workings of the treaty until the early twentieth century.

35 Meanwhile, like any other law, the application of the treaty came to depend on the several interpretations given to it by the two colonising powers. Thus the successes and failures of the law were dependent, to a large extent, on the understanding of the terms of the agreement by the officers directly concerned with the extradition affairs in the colonial territories and, more importantly, on the efficiency of the two police forces in the territories seeking and granting extradition.

36 In 1910 the British Government in Nigeria had cause to demand from the French in Dahomey the extradition of one James C. Vaughan, who was accused of larceny of postal materials before Police Magistrate R.J.B Ross in the Police Magistrate Court at Tinubu Square, Lagos.66 In the unfolding investigation that preceded the accusation, it was gathered that in 1909 the postmaster received a letter from one D.A.Tawoshe making enquiries concerning certain postal orders. Sequel to this letter, a mail was sent to the Postmaster General (PMG) in England requesting for clarification. In the P.M.G’s reply was a Postal Order No 23B 138779 for 15/-, originally made payable to Messr John
Piggot Ltd London, a name that had been scratched over and substituted with the name Ed. Chailiner, Manchester. Also admitted in evidence was a letter purportedly written by one M.A.Cole of Ed. Chailiner, However, Africanus Mylander, the Chief Clerk in the post office realised that the said letter had been written by the accused, James C. Vaughan, until then a clerk in the service of the post office at Ibadan. The writing tallied with that on the postal order. This discovery led to Vaughan's suspension and interrogation by the police.\[67\]

The investigating officer, an Assistant Superintendent of Police in Lagos, later confirmed the suspicion of Africanus, for he found out that the accused wrote the letter but signed it as M.A.Cole. Vaughan was brought before-the Police Magistrate, the case was called and then adjourned and Vaughan, benefiting from the respite provided by bail, escaped into the French territory.\[68\]

In another development, a guard at the railway station Truscott Jenkins Elliot, was accused of stealing Cash Bag No 3, property of the Lagos Government, containing the earnings of Abeokuta Station for 22 March, 1910. Amounting to £5. 15. 5.\[69\] As a train guard, it was part of his duties to collect such money bags from various stations and to deliver them to the accountant of the Lagos Railway at Ebute-Metta. But on this particular occasion, he collected the bags but did not deliver that of Ibara Station. The traffic inspector, L.P.Whisker, actually made the deposition that led to the issuance of a search warrant on Elliot’s house.\[70\]

In his evidence, the Paymaster of the Lagos Railway, stationed at Ebute-Metta, said he collected from Elliot cash bags from stations along the line, which he (Elliot) had brought. In all, he received 34 bags but there was none from Ibara station. On reporting this discovery to the stationmaster of Ibara and the Chief Accountant, it was found that the bag was duly handed over to Elliot and receipted for by him.\[71\]

The detective inspector of police at Lagos, Emmanuel Arthur Shyllon, who affected the search warrant on 29 March 1910, did not find the missing bag at the Ijero Street residence of the accused. Attending a departmental enquiry set up by the Railway, Elliot agreed that he received a bag of money from Clerk Shogbola at Ibara Station and gave a receipt for it but could not account for the loss. Interestingly, when the detective returned the next day for Elliot’s arrest on a charge of embezzlement, he had fled. Even though his house was put under surveillance for several weeks, the accused never showed up. On enquiry, it was learnt that he had fled to Cotonou, had changed his name to James Johnson and was already in the employ of a French company.\[72\]

In the two cases narrated above, the same procedure was followed for the purpose of their extradition. Normally, the request for extradition sets in motion a series of investigations on the part of those demanding and accepting to grant extradition requests. On the part of those hosting the request, the police, after being furnished with the necessary documents from the requesting country, would normally send detectives after such a criminal, or criminals as the case may be. In the event of their being apprehended, they are put in prison pending the completion of the process of extradition. In the two cases cited above, the process was duly followed, with two police officers from the Nigerian side, A.S.R Davies and Inspecter Shyllon, proceeding to Dahomey with letters duly signed by the Governor, and with court documents containing the charges brought against the fleeing accused, to convince the French authorities that the escapees were genuinely being sought for criminal and not for political reasons.
Two interesting and common issues about the two escapees was that both of them, within the short time of their defection to the French territory, had had their names changed and secured employment in French companies. In Dahomey, the search for Vaughan revealed that John Holt had employed him for onward transfer to Grand-Popo under the name Spencer. Elliot, under the name James Johnson, had started work in another company.

The authenticity of guilt established against the two culprits notwithstanding, they were duly interrogated. During the interrogation they made depositions that confirmed the allegations levelled against them by their government in a ‘proces-verbal’. It was only after this semblance of right had been accorded them, and other due processes followed, that the authorisation for extradition, delegated by the Governor-General of French West Africa in Dakar to the Governor in Dahomey, could be exercised and the culprits released to the representatives of the Nigerian government.

In early May 1913 a British subject, J. G. Cavalcante, was accused of abducting a girl by name Ibironke, whose age was put at between 13 and 15, and stealing the sum of £109 from her. That the girl was under-aged underscored the gravity of the offence, with the likelihood of imprisonment if the accused was convicted. In their separate statements at the Assizes, Ibadan Residency, the accused pleaded not guilty and denied having carnal knowledge of the girl or sealing from her. Several witnesses, including the uncle of the victim who initiated the arrest of the accused, however attested to the fact that she had been seen several times in the company of the accused in very compromising circumstances. On previous occasions, before her last visit that led to Calvacante’s arrest, she had spent nights in his house. Under cross examination the girl, who first denied any sexual relationship with the accused, later owned up to the facts, going further to say that the accused initially encouraged her to give a false testimony.

Perhaps the most credible evidence in the case was that of Richard Cameron Macpherson, a Medical Officer, on 22 May. In his evidence he stated that the girl was not a virgin and that there was evidence of forcible penetration of the vagina. He concluded that penetration probably took place for the first time within a period of six weeks. This fell within the period when Cavalcante’s last encounter with Ibironke on 10 May, which led to his arrest.

The long procédure favoured by the Anglo-Saxon Common Law, and its insistence on the innocence of the accused until proven guilty, seems to have aided in no small way the escape bids of many accused persons during the colonial period. Such accused persons usually abused the privilege of being on bail to abscond, and Cavalcante was not an exception. Perhaps sensing that his would be an open and shut case, and that his conviction was imminent in the light of the evidence of the Medical Officer and the truth of the matter as told by Ibironke, he decided to run away and, again, his destination was Dahomey. The same process of extradition was again commenced, with a letter from the Deputy Governor, O.G. Taylor, to the Governor of Dahomey requesting for the latter’s co-operation with one Inspector Nobre of the Southern Nigerian Civil Police Force, who was in charge of the case.

However, there were those escapees who did not wait for the inquisitional procédure to commence before fleeing or committing suicide. This was usually in very serious cases, such as murder, the punishment for which, throughout the colonial period, was death. Either by hanging or through shootings in public, and, later behind prison walls, the government sought to underline the gravity of such an offence. From all indications,
criminals got the message. This contention aptly fits the affairs of one Ogunbiyi in 1911, accused of murdering one Mowo at Okokomaiko in the Lagos Colony, and that of Mofunolorunsho, a British subject who hacked his wife to death in Ibadan. The first case was quickly concluded as the culprit committed suicide after escaping to Dahomey. Testifying in the District Court of Ibadan on 23 December 1914, one Akande, a witness in the second case told the court that Mofunolorunsho, a butcher by profession, used to live in Apampa's Compound and was married to an Iseyin woman named Jaratu, identified as the victim. According to him, two years before the date of his deposition, he saw the deceased run out of the accused's house into the street in the evening of that fateful day “with a deep cut across her stomach, with intestines hanging out.” Soon after, she died; but not before making a statement directed, apparently, to the culprit's father who had just entered the compound: “Look at the work done by your son.” This incident is one out of several cases of passionate crimes committed in colonial Nigeria.

The Mofunolorunsho case was one of the criminal cases that drew attention to the central role of good detective work in the success or failure of the extradition treaty. Particularly, it indicated that the onus for providing adequate information on the wanted criminal lay, first and foremost, with the police in the country demanding extradition. Thus, an extradition might be stalled and made unproductive if preliminary investigations on the whereabouts of the escapee are not precise, as shown in the Mofunolorunso affair.

On January 4, 1915 Constable Ojo of the Ibadan Police Force, armed with the necessary documents to substantiate the charge against the accused, proceeded to Dahomey. Preliminary investigations had been working on the lead that the accused was living at Itakete (probably Sakété), a town in the French territory, about 12 miles from Porto-Novo. However, in following the lead, the search by the French Police yielded little result as no butchers found at the Ibadan Compound in the aforementioned town fitted the description of the escapee.

On 19 January 1916, the Secretary General “chargé de l'expédition des Affaires Courants et Urgentes” had cause to write to the Governor of Southern Nigeria on the issue, noting that the offender's identity may not have been fully known. In his words “… il n'existe dans cette localité aucun indigène du nom du Mofunolorunsho qui d'ailleurs est un nom de fétiche qui ne saurait à lui seul fournir d'indication suffisante.” As a mark of the readiness of his government to co-operate fully with the British, he advised the Nigerian government to consider sending, if any, the alias' of the accused. The response of the British indicated that they were at a dead end regarding coming up with fresh information on the accused.

The Dahomey factor as an impediment to crime control in colonial Nigeria however went beyond that of a refuge for escapee criminals, as it also served as the based from which criminals operated in Nigeria. For example, in the 1920s and 30s, most of the criminals operating from the Egbado area of Nigeria were said to be from Dahomey or were people with relations from there. They were portrayed in 1930 as French ex-convicts, and Tofisade, alias Hegbere, from Dahomey was their leader. The police, the public and administrators were said to be in agreement that the most dangerous criminals were the aliens whose major strength lay in their ability to escape by shifting their location with ease. The police on the other hand, had a phenomenal task chasing
after these criminals. Even the close watch at the borders could not prevent the infiltration and escape of criminals from Nigeria.

By 1945, not only criminals but also stolen goods were being tracked down by the members of the Nigeria Police Force, ably assisted by their French counter-parts. Of prime interest was the theft of bicycles and their sale in Dahomey. Between 6 and 15 October 1945, the joint efforts of the two police forces yielded results, leading to the arrest of twenty persons in possession of stolen bicycles and their subsequent extradition to Nigeria. However, the lack of information on the nationality, background and social status of the extradited criminals made further analysis difficult.

As noted earlier, the introduction of European rule brought about the introduction of new laws and engineered various social changes through which the Europeans sought to control, more than ever before, the daily life of Africans, subjecting them, they claimed, to the rule of law. In some cases there were resistances, made noticeable through armed revolts or migrations, to protest perceived injustices that arose from law enforcement. This was particularly the case with the Yoruba residing in French Dahomey, who immigrated into Nigeria at several times between 1911 and 1945. It must be borne in mind that the Yoruba exodus was politically motivated, unlike the issue of escape, which is treated here in relation to individual movements that were criminally motivated.

It is generally agreed that the French were stricter than the British counter-parts in the administration of their colonies. This probably because of a number of peculiar features in their style of administration: the policy of assimilation; the learning of their civil law, which holds an accused person guilty until proven innocent; the indigénat; forced labour and forced conscription. Naturally, therefore, escaping from British colonial territory into one controlled by the French runs contrary to conventional wisdom. Yet a set of people preferred the French territory. In this set were criminals or suspected criminals accused of various offences on the British side. Thus, the interesting scenario that ensued was that while émigrés moved from the French territory into that of the British because of the “strains and stresses” in the French colonial administration, the escapees from the British side moved into that of the French, not necessarily because they felt they would get better treatment there, but to escape punishment. If anything, the French indigénat and its impatience with procedures were meant to punish certain crimes speedily, without recourse to normal adjudication.

It is, therefore, not unlikely that the change from a kind of law that favoured collective responsibility and restitution, and that brought into focus not just the offender but also his family, to one which emphasised accusation and punishment for the sole offender in the absence of any proven cases of aiding and abetting, was a factor in the defection of criminal offenders across the border in the hope that their cases would be “forgotten”.

**Conclusion**

This essay has examined the phenomenon of escape and its implications for crime control in colonial Nigeria. It has shown that criminals actually took advantage of the in-built leniency in the British criminal justice system to evade justice. Thus, the granting of bail and the upholding of innocence until guilt is proven hampered crime
control. The abandonment of group for individual liability for a crime committed also
did much to encourage the escape of offenders. It was also noted that the society, as a
result of fear, ethnic and elite complicity in crime, granted group protection to
criminals and by so doing ensured the continued growth of criminal activities. A
similar pattern of escape from justice is still apparent in Nigeria forty-four years after
independence.

The need to tackle an aspect of this problem involving extra-territorial escape led to
the Anglo-French Extradition Treaty of 14 August 1876. By this act, the strong desire to
combat a common menace took precedence over the traditional Anglo-French rivalry
and led to this inter-colonial cooperation at the highest governmental level. From all
indications, the treaty was an extension of the influence of one sovereignty into the
territory of another, based on the principle of reciprocity and a clear demonstration of
the preparedness of the colonialists to bury old age hatchets to assure overt control
over their subjects.

In spite of their differences, the law which operated within the French and British legal
systems drew attention especially to the opportunities offered by the overlapping of
national laws through interaction and interdependence that could be mutually
harnessed and made beneficial in the area of maintaining public order within each
other’s territories. The point needs to be stressed that the workability of the law, as
contained in the treaty, was to a large extent dependent on the readiness of the two
powers entering into the convention to play the game according to the rules, since
there was no central or independent machinery to ensure the compliance of the two
parties with the convention.

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NOTES


2. Escape should not be confused with the concept of escapism. which highlights the process or processes of retreating from or allowing reality to slip away through such pastimes as day dreaming, wishful thinking, or indulgence in certain attitudes and habits. For more details see. Tuan, Yi-Fu(1998). *Escapism*. Johns Hopkins University Press.


8. Justice Karibi-Whyte is of the opinion that group criminality was unknown in customary criminal law. If this is true then it raises an obvious question as to when this form of criminality started in Nigeria. It has been strongly suggested in this essay that group criminality, using southwestern Nigeria as a case study. emerged in the period of social upheavals and seems to have been well suited


11. Ibid
12. Ibid.
13. Karibi-Whyte, Criminal... See also Note 8 above.
14. Falola. “Brigandage...”, pp. 84-95
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid. p.85
24. Ibid.
26. King Oluwole ruled Lagos between 1834 and 1841 and was alleged to have been privy to the robbing of Sierra-Leonian immigrants who landed at the port of Lagos on their way to Abeokuta. The 265 immigrants were said to have got to Abeokuta empty-handed.
27. Tamuno. The Police... pp. 1-40.
28. Ibid.
33. See Biobaku, Egba... p.71. There is the need for more research to unravel the nature of this robbery.
34. Ethnic complicity was again alleged in these robberies. Fingers were pointed at the warrior chiefs. i.e. the Ologun.
35. Falola and Adebayo. Culture... pp.195-212. Also Tamuno. The Police.... pp. 213-214. The involvement of secret cults in crime was actually underlined by Tamuno. The Atinga Cult, which came from Dahomey, infiltrated the Egbado area of Nigeria and was actually involved in criminal activities.
37. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.


47. Tamuno. The Police...


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid. p. 213.


53. Cohen. Custom....


55. N.A.I... Comcol 507. “Serious Crime. Lagos Districts”.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.


62. Reference to the existence of the treaty can be found in Porto-Novo. Republic of Benin at Des Archives Nationales. Quando (D.A.N.Q.). IF 57/ 360 “Extradition de criminels d’origine nigériane réfugiés au Dahomey. 1911”. The original treatv. however. should be at the Archives of the Minister for foreign Affairs in France (Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères)

63. D.A.N.Q.-. 1F 57/ 360.“Police...”.

64. D.A.N.Q.. 1F 58/ 365.”Police...”.

65. Bassiouni.. International, p. 4. The author identified four periods in the history of extradition


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.


ENDNOTES

1. I thank most sincerely the French Institute for Research in Africa, Ibadan, and the French Embassy in Nigeria for the scholarship award in 2001, which enabled me to study in France for almost three years.

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ABSTRACTS

The ability of a criminal to evade justice is dependent to a large extent on the attitude of the larger society towards the issue of criminality. While most people express the desire for a crime-free society, only a few actually strive to combat crime. This essay suggests that ethnic complicity, police inefficiency, undue emphasis on technicalities in applying the law, and the fear of criminals, all combine with jail breaking and escape from justice to entrench criminality.
The second Liberian peace process and the problem of post conflict peace building in West Africa: some contending issues and interests

Gani Yoroms

AUTHOR’S NOTE

Note portant sur l’auteur

INTRODUCTION

1 In 1997 it was thought that the general election, which brought Charles Taylor to power, had put paid to the endless conflict in Liberia and the danger of it spreading to the rest of West Africa. Indeed the 1997 election had many assumptions, among which were:
   i. the creation of official access for Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader, to ascend to power with the hope that it was the best option left to end the conflict;
   ii. ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was to remain in Liberia for some time to disarm, demobilise, train, reorganise and reintegrate the rebels into the national Armed Forces of Liberia which should be virile in order to ensure political stability and security in the country and in the sub region at large;
   iii. at the end of the conflict, Economic Countries of West Africa States (ECOWAS) would engage in a self-assessment on how to strengthen its hold on sub-regional security.

2 These assumptions were shattered as soon as Charles Taylor ascended to power. He began to implement the hidden agenda, which he had when the conflict started in 1989. His intention was not only to rule Liberia but also to control regimes in the sub-region...
and build an empire for himself in the Mano river basin région. So, first, he refused to honour the mandate allowing ECOMOG to remain in Liberia to perform the post-war reorganisation of the Liberian military. Secondly, he reciprocated the gesture, which the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had rendered to him while he was fighting to take over power in Monrovia. On assumption of office, he quickly supported the RUF to destabilise Sierra Leone in order to pave the way for Cpl Fodeh Sankoh to rule in Freetown. It was clear that Taylor was pursuing this course, because he was fingered in all the conflicts that occurred in the Mano River basin region and the entire West African sub-region as a whole.

In turn, within Liberia itself, rebels that did not accept Charles Taylor’s leadership decided to return to the bush to continue the war. Thus, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD, became the main rebel groups challenging Taylor’s authority. Subsequent differences among the rebels led to the emergence of the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, MODEL, among others. This was the genesis of the second phase of the conflict in Liberia, which ECOWAS Mission In Liberia (ECOMIL) was deployed to resolve. ECOMIL was an interposition force, which was expected to give way to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as from October 1, 2003. As part of the deployment of 50,000 UNMIL forces, which would be in phases, ECOMIL forces were expected to change their caps to UN blue beret by October 1, 2003.

FROM ECOMIL TO UNMIL

On August 4, 2003, a vanguard interposition force known as ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), numbering about 3,500 troops, was deployed to Liberia. Nigeria contributed 1,500 troops to the vanguard. There were troops from some other member states of ECOWAS. The mandate of ECOMIL includes:

- establishing zones of separation (ZOS) between the parties to the conflict;
- facilitating the functions of the Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) in accordance with the Accra Agreement on Cease-fire and Cessation of hostilities;
- taking necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of personnel of the force and of humanitarian agencies;
- forming the nucleus of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and preparing the ground for its deployment.

As a vanguard interposition force, ECOMIL was not supposed to enforce but to guide or keep peace. The intervention by the UN forces was likely to contain any attempt by the warring factions to maintain control over their territories. Their initial refusal to cooperate with the regional peacekeeping force led to series of fightings and abuses of human rights among the rebel factions and the government troops, and the refugee problem increased.

The ECOWAS decision to send in ECOMIL stemmed from the Accra “Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on the situation in Liberia.” at which ECOWAS pointed out that it was not ready to intervene unless there was a ceasefire, guaranteed funding and logistics. Nigeria’s President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, also argued that the Liberian crisis was not a problem to be solved by ECOWAS alone. According to him, Liberia is also a part of the comity of nations. Therefore, the international community had an obligation to intervene or support
ECOWAS in both financial and material terms. The ECOWAS position, and indeed that of Nigeria, resulted from the scathing remarks that were made when it first intervened in the initial conflict in Liberia. Despite expenses to the tune of $12 billion and the loss of more than 1,000 Nigerian soldiers, the international community did not give any credit to ECOWAS or to Nigeria. Taylor rode on the criticisms, which ECOMOG received, to order it out of Liberia when he ascended power. ECOMOG led by Nigeria, departed from Liberia without accomplishing the final mission of the peacekeeping process. This was why the international community became wary about getting involved in the second leg of the Liberian Conflict.

However, the replacement of ECOMOG with ECOMIL raised a new and critical issue on the status of ECOMOG as spelt out in the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. First, the renewed conflict in Liberia was the result of deliberate manipulations by Taylor, which led to the withdrawal of ECOMOG in the first instance, making it impossible for it to complete its initial mandate. Second, the discrediting of ECOMOG is an acceptance of the fact that its performance has shown that African nations and organisations are not yet ripe to keep peace on the continent unless extra-regional powers are involved. Arising from these complexities, the formation of ECOMIL, with the purpose of reinforcing an international stabilisation force (ISF), casts further doubt on the operability of the new ECOWAS Mechanism, which had been institutionalised as the ECOWAS peace keeping organ in West Africa. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS never showed any active interest because of the sub-regional contradiction. Liberia was lucky to have ECOWAS intervening for the second time, as Côte d’Ivoire never had the opportunity of receiving a regional peace support operation.

However, in the case of the current Liberian conflict the ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary, General C. A. Diara, explained that doubts on the operability of the new ECOWAS mechanism were unfounded. According to him, ECOMOG still remains the umbrella of the regional peace keeping force, as spelt out in the ECOWAS Mechanism. What ECOWAS has done is merely to copy the United Nations which codenames its peace keeping exercises according to specific operations. Like the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, so the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia, ECOMIL, is situated within this context.

There are contending issues and interests that have been lubricating the Liberian conflict. It is important if these interests are identified for the purpose of understanding the essence of the renewed interest in the ECOMIL/UNMIL intervention in Liberia.

CONTENDING ISSUES AND INTERESTS

There are competing interests over contentious issues in the Liberian conflict. The principle interested parties include Charles Taylor, Guinea, the United States and ECOWAS. It could be recalled that previous interests in the conflict were from Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, among others. Though these interests might still be visible in one form or another, the current focus has been on Taylor, the US, Guinea and ECOWAS. However, the important issue is how these interests impact on Nigeria’s ability to carry on with the ‘burden of the community spirit’. Let us now look at some of the interests and issues involved.
Charles Taylor

Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, started the crisis that has ravaged Liberia and the sub-region since the eve of Christmas in 1989. He has held the Liberia peace process to ransom, even when it was thought that stage-managing him to power would ease the conflict. Instead, he used his position as the President of Liberia to curb a regional alliance of contiguous countries through the perpetuation of conflict on Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. He benefited from resources that were generated from the conflicts in Sierra Leone to purchase arms for maintaining these conflicts in the sub-region. Recently, on 8 August 2003, ECOMIL intercepted a plane loaded with arms at Robertsfield Airport, which were meant for Taylor’s government. ECOMIL refused to release the airplane to Taylor, and it was flown to Nigeria. The increase in arms purchase was part of Taylor’s delay tactics to prolong the war to his advantage.

Indeed, Taylor has not been a promise keeper. He cannot be trusted. He has not lived up to expectation and is notorious for disrespecting agreements reached in chanceries. Nevertheless, he has reached the crossroad, being noted as an international criminal. When he broke jail in the US he realised that there was no longer a hiding place for him. However, he had two options. The first option was for him to foment a crisis with tremendous regional impact, which would make him a force to reckon with. Or secondly, in the course of his belligerence, he might, by sheer luck, become a president of Liberia. This was the initial step he took when he found his way to Libya where he, together with his group of rebellious Liberians was trained to invade Liberia in 1989. But his over-ambition overturned all he could have achieved during the tenure of his presidency.

Meanwhile, freedom doesn’t seem to be on his side as the International Criminal Court sitting in Freetown has indicted him for the heinous crime of genocide and resource-theft in the Sierra Leonean conflict. It is further speculated that he eliminated Major Johnny Paul Koromah and Sam Bukarie, the key Sierra Leonean witnesses, to make good his case. But his case is even made worse with the death of Corporal Fodeh Sankoh. The United States, one of the main sponsors of ECOMIL, has insisted that he must face the International Criminal Court of Justice. In addition, one of the conditions given by the rebel groups in Liberia was that Taylor step out of office as the president of Liberia, a position the US supports.

Though Charles Taylor got some lawyers to defend him in court, he wanted the charges dropped as a precondition for his exit from power. He also tied up his exit to the presence of an international sub-regional peacekeeping force, which observers believed was one of his delay tactics. Nevertheless ECOMIL has since been deployed. And for the first time Taylor, who had no other delay mechanisms, agreed to step out of office on 11 August 2003. But his fear remains how to guarantee the security of his teeming supporters, especially the soldiers and the Americo-Liberians, from his vengeful rivals and opponents, especially the LURD of Mandingo stock. He also fears for his personal security: his aides, who might lose out in the emerging arrangement, may decide to eliminate him. It is in view of this that Taylor continues to remote-control the politics of Liberia while in exile in Nigeria. This has also raised some serious fears in Monrovia among the rebels and also the legitimacy of Moses Blah’s government. Though a new
transitional government has taken over from Blah since 14 October, it is hoped that Taylor would keep his new pledge of commitment to peace in Liberia.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian government has expressed its displeasure with Taylor for teleguiding the politics of Liberia from his exile home in Calabar. Even so, pressure groups, including the Nigerian Union of Journalists, have threatened to take the president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, to court for granting Taylor asylum in Nigeria. Their threat was over the killing of two Nigerian journalists that went to cover the Liberian civil war in the 1990s. Because of these threats, Taylor also considered the option of taking up asylum in South Africa where he owns property. Later he also contemplated going to Libya. However, reason prevailed on him to take the Nigerian option because the Nigerian President had given a strong warning to the international community against any undue pressure for his release. The decision against going to South Africa might be due to the likelihood of South Africa succumbing to international pressure to hand him over to the international Criminal Tribunal. The Libyan option was also not feasible because it might worsen Libya’s reputation since that country had been under UN sanctions over its support for the terrorist bombing of a US airplane in 1988.

**LURD and MODEL**

The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) are the main rebel groups opposed to Charles Taylor’s presidency. They believe that Charles Taylor never won any election to rule Liberia but came to power through a special arrangement by ECOWAS. Therefore, the operability of the 1986 Constitution under Taylor’s presidency was questionable.

Indeed, post-election gains were undermined by Taylor, necessitating the rise of new opposition on April 12, 1999 when an unknown rebel group attacked Voinjama, a northern town in Lofa County. The intention of the insurgent group, according to their sources, was to remove weapons concealed in this Mandingo town during the 1996-1997 partial disarmament exercise, an exercise that Taylor did not allow ECOMOG to complete. The attack led to the death of 50 civilians while 32,000 were rendered homeless. This group was later identified as the Liberian Coalition for Reconciliation and Democracy (LCRD). Most of its actions are linked to Liberians resident in the US. The attacks spread as Taylor began to lose his stronghold around the country. Though Charles Taylor accused Guinea of supporting the rebels, he rallied his NPFL ex-combatants, with the support of Fodeh Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other armed units, to fight back the rebels who were advancing from Lofa County towards the capital, using refugees as a human shield. The LURD has not only acquired arms but has captured and maintained its stronghold in the Freeport and strategic supply routes in Monrovia.

MODEL, a splinter of LURD, is in control of the strategic Buchanan area. They have been involved in looting, raping and intimidating innocent civilians to ensure that ECOMAS fails to deploy its forces and, even if they are deployed they may find it difficult to enforce the peace. They maintain a common ground with LURD, insisting on Charles Taylor’s exit from power. They will only stop hostilities when Taylor leaves, and they promise to hand over strategic strongholds to ECOMIL once it is in control of Monrovia. However, it is difficult to believe the rebels, for they seek relevance in their attempt to
seize power or to maintain a bargaining balance in the control of state power. With the final exit of Taylor and the interposition by ECOMIL the rebels have only relocated their bases as fighting continues in the suburbs and in the counties. LURD’s leader, Conneh Conteh, has established his base in Tubmanberg, some 50 km from Monrovia. It is suspected that Liberians resident in the US the sponsored the attack. Contrary to their promises to support ECOMIL once Taylor finally exits from power, the rebels are still engaged in fighting and in the violation of human rights.

Guinea

19 Guinea is one of the countries bordering Liberia from the north. Its main ethnic group, the Mandingo, are also found in Liberia. In the first conflict the Liberian Mandingos had contended for power under ULIMO-K founded by Alhaji Koromah. In fact both the Mandingo and Khran ethnie groups founded ULIMO together but they parted ways and a faction came under Roosevelt Johnson The Johnson faction became ULIMO-J. The two ULIMO factions later folded-up, after the 1997 elections. However, given Charles Taylor’s intransigence, these factions metamorphosed into LURD, with their base in Guinea. Indeed Guinea has been a buffer zone for both ULIMO-K and LURD, justifying its action by pointing to pockets of opposition in the territory traceable to Charles Taylor’s support.

20 It is believed that Guinea is also involved in supplying arms to LURD. The source of some rockets fired at a residential suburb of Monrovia is being traced to Guinea. LURD is being used as cannon fodder for the protection of Guinea’s border with Liberia. The Guinean leader, Lansana Conteh, has been noted to be a rabid fighter of Taylor since the inception of the Liberian crisis for fear that Taylor may overrun his country.

The United States

21 Apart from the historical link the United States has with Liberia, there is no other profound connection between the two countries, whether economical and political. In the first phase of the Liberian conflict the United States paid little attention to the resolution of the crisis. In 1993 a statement from the State Department issued by Herman Cohen declared that the US was not going to send its troops to shoot at Liberians nor be shot at by Liberians. Even when the American Friends of Liberia (AFL) pleaded with the State Department to mediate in the conflict, and not necessarily by military intervention, it was clear to them that Liberia was not of vital interest to the US government as it was not ready to play the rôle of mediator in Liberia. This was the initial US declaration of non-interest in the Liberian conflict”

22 Thus, ECOWAS was left with the burden of resolving the conflict amidst international politics at the United Nations. It is, however, a surprising that pressure has been put on the United States lately to intervene in Liberia at a critical period in which it is contending with the death of its soldiers on Iraqi soil. Thus the US does not seem to be anxious to be committed in an intractable conflict like that of Liberia. Her experience in Somalia had show n that its participation in the resolution of conflicts in Africa should only be by proxy. This might be one of the reasons why it came up with the ACRI/ACOTA or Operation Focus Relief (OFR). Hence, the pressures on the US and the
insistence by ECOWAS and Nigeria that they can only intervene in Liberia if funds and logistics were guaranteed are dependent on some variables that define the US interests.

At the Dakar meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, July 22, 2004 Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, General Martin Agwai broke the ice by promising the deployment of Nigerian troops within a week once the logistics were in place. The United States grasped the offer (as she was not willing to send her troops) by offering $10 million immediately. Earlier on the US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had, on July 27, 2004 pointed out that a US expeditionary force would only enter Liberia under a condition of ceasefire. And later it was added that if ECOWAS deployed her troops, a US amphibious task force would be dispatched to the Monrovia Coast to provide cover. The US Military Assistance Team visited Liberia, prior to any military intervention, to assess the levels of support and determine needs and strategy.

As noted, the United States has not been enthusiastic about resolving the Liberian conflict. If anything, it has in one way or the other, through its military assistance to Guinea, allowed arms to find their way into rebel hands. Meanwhile, what is worrisome is the careful way the United States is monitoring and measuring the progress of ECOMIL in order to claim the credit. The United States Ambassador to Liberia, John Blaney, has been seen moving about with the force commander. This is a public expression of a US presence in Liberia, though it makes no serious commitment in the deployment of troops. However, despite the brief US presence in Monrovia, the 200-man US amphibious ship deployed to Liberia in August has been recalled to the US in anticipation of the intervention of the UN multinational force by 15th October 2003.

This action by the US itself does not augur well for the peace effort, as the UN forces have not yet been firm on ground. It is a demonstration of the fact that the US has no serious interest in Liberia, in spite of its historical connection with that country. Whatever interest it has shown is the result of the efforts of a few Liberians resident in the US who penetrated the State Department. Their efforts have drummed up some US interest in Liberia, in spite of the critical moment the US facing in Iraq. What the US has done in response to their efforts is to give legitimacy to their demand that Charles Taylor should leave office. It also provided some logistics and financial support for ECOMIL. However, given the attitude of the US, ECOWAS and Nigeria must begin to take the burden of regional peace keeping seriously rather than depending on extra-regional support.

**Côte d’Ivoire**

Côte d’Ivoire was the original propeller of the conflict in Liberia when it supported Charles Taylor in 1989. The splinter group of LURD, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), is currently based in the western part of Côte d’Ivoire. With the approval of MODEL, the Ivorian government allowed the French Chief of Defence Staff into the MODEL enclave. Gbagbo’s government is prompting MODEL on the grounds that Movement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) is not only connected to Biaise Campaore of Burkina Faso but also to Charles Taylor, who has supported it to topple the Abidjan government. It is not unlikely that the recently uncovered coup plot in Burkina Faso is linked to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Taylor’s exit has not altered the configuration because what has happened in Monrovia was only a change of guard with Moses Blah as President.
ECOWAS

From the analysis so far, the formation of ECOMIL is demonstration of the failure of ECOWAS in the initial ECOMOG operation in Liberia. If this is true, it is also important to argue that ECOMIL is a redemptive measure for Nigeria/ECOWAS to right the wrong which they were accused of perpetrating in the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Therefore, in doing so it is only proper to ensure that the ECOMIL intervention must be properly planned. This was the basis of the ECOWAS insistence on an enabling environment for the intervention, that is, the support from the international community for funding and logistics. Given the humanitarian crisis on the ground, it was, wrong for ECOWAS to have given in to the dictates of the United States by also demanding for an incredible conditionality: a ceasefire before sending in the West African troops. A crisis of this nature invites peace enforcement and not peacekeeping. As much as the US pays the piper, the tune should not be dictated wholly without the consent of the other partners that also pay for it. This point is important in the light of what happened in Sierra Leone. Despite the overwhelming presence of the Nigerian contingent in UNAMSIL, the United Kingdom took the glory because it was able to supply the logistics.

Other European nations

Some other European Nations played tremendous roles in exacerbating the regional conflicts in West Africa. They benefited from the resource exploitation in exchange for arms transfer to inflame the conflicts. These included diamond, iron ore and timber, among others. France benefited from these resources so much that, together with Italy, it blocked a UN resolution on arms embargo against Liberia. Ukraine is very notorious in arms transfer to the sub-region. This has contributed greatly to the spread and sustenance of the conflict.

The United Nations

In the light of the emerging development, the United Nations has begun to show a great deal of interest in the Liberian crisis. Stakeholders are all expecting the multinational UN force in Liberia by 15th October 2003. About 50,000 UN troops are expected to replace the 3,500 ECOMIL troops. Before then, on 1st October, the ECOMIL troops had replaced their caps with the UN blue berets.

The United Nations has worked with sub-regional and regional organisations elsewhere outside Africa, especially NATO in Bosnia. It is expected also that the UN, with the support of the US, will give ECOWAS and Nigeria the moral, legal and logistics support to perfect what was not accomplished in Liberia in the initial phase of the conflict, owing to scepticism from the international community.

NIGERIA’S GEO-STRATEGIC INTEREST

There are two important factors that determine Nigeria’s geo-strategic interests in West Africa. The first is that Nigeria’s size and population must be guarded jealously.
Therefore, any threat to her first geo-strategic interest necessarily influences the second fact, namely, that by its sheer size and population it is incumbent on her to provide leadership in the sub-region. And though Nigeria may not be a superpower, the leadership it provides makes it a leading force in the sub-region. This has informed the series of interventions by Nigeria at diplomatic, military and economic levels. ECOMOG has been sponsored by Nigeria since 1990 to the tune of N12 billion. Nigeria also lost up to 2,000 troops in the course of the exercise. Moreover, Nigeria has spent up to N8 billion from the start of the work of the ECOMIL forces in Liberia. Nigeria cannot afford to fold its arms as the regional conflict rages on.

Since independence Nigeria has assisted other African countries in both internal and external conflicts. Those that have been supported by Nigeria in this regard are Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola South Africa, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, among others. Unfortunately, despite this assistance and support Nigeria has been faced with hostility and disdain. She has neither any influence on these countries nor has she been respected by them. It has become necessary for Nigeria, to begin to have an architectural design on how to resolve conflicts and maintain peace in the sub-region.

THE PROBLEM OF POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN WEST AFRICA

The issues and interests raised so far have implications for post-conflict peace building in West Africa. And in spite of sacrifices made towards resolving these conflicts they tended to remain largely unappreciated. As pointed out. Nigeria has been in the forefront, alongside other member states of ECOWAS, in managing and resolving the conflicts. Thus, while the experience of the initial intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone through ECOMOG is still fresh in our memory, the burden of the second effort through ECOMIL has also been shouldered by Nigeria.

The main contentious issue is that the peace support operations that have been undertaken in West Africa do little to reduce the effect of the conflicts, which they were expected to resolve. Thus, most of the conflicts in the region remain unresolved in spite of the enormous human and material expenses incurred. This is because the nature and character of the operations suffer from peacekeeping muddling process. It is difficult to establish the parameter for peace building when conflicts are unresolved. Even when conflicts seem to have been resolved there are severe shortages of materials and infrastructure that affect the process of peace building, either because the institutions are weak or they are non-existent. For instance, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building cannot be effectively pursued when borders are porous and small arms and light weapons find easy entry into the region.

In the course of this peacekeeping muddling process in Liberia, the unresolved conflict has now necessitated a renewed effort through ECOMIL. In Sierra Leone, the supposedly resolved conflict is yet to be concluded, as the country is still contending with the problems of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In Guinea Bissau, the short intervention by ECOMOG in 1999 failed to achieve its initial purpose, and this had led to a coup in that country recently. Similarly, the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire suffered from procrastinations by ECOWAS member states, which necessitated France's
intervention. Thus, in no single conflict theatre in the sub-region has the conflict been resolved on an enduring and satisfactory basis.

As it is now, all the efforts so far made by ECOMOG and now by ECOMIL/UNMIL, will hardly meet the expectation of peace keeping if there is no proper understanding of the contradictions and contending issues that have thwarted the peace processes. These contradictions include the problems of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement of refugees and humanitarian issues. Other important issues include infrastructural reconstruction and recovery assistance; rebuilding the security sector; restoration of good governance; and indeed the entire processes of post-conflict reconstruction that have been neglected during and after peace-keeping operations in the sub-region. It is, therefore, imperative that a first-hand study should be undertaken on these issues in each of the countries in question, so as to illuminate post-conflict peace-building challenges and properly focus the Nigerian government’s contributions to peace building in the sub-region. There must be a concrete approach towards the capacity building of institutions for post conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

POLICY ACTIONS

The successful implementation of the peace process in Liberia is dependent on Nigeria. Nigeria has a leadership role in ECOWAS. It must be seen to be demonstrating this in West Africa. Following the Liberian crisis, Nigeria has for the past 15 years forged a peaceful coexistence in the region. However, this effort has not been properly focused on post-conflict peace building. In spite of this criticism, the second phase of the crisis should make Nigeria evaluate her role in ECOMOG and indeed in West Africa, by taking a firm stand on critical issues. Her current democratic credentials should endow her to do this.

Given the foregoing discussion, Nigeria must take some actions. These include:

i. A fundamental reformulation of her role in West Africa and how to position herself in the light of her national interests.

ii. Ascertaining the fundamental principles of peace missions and reflecting whether her interventions in the regional conflicts were necessary and how or what she has gained in the process, without being consumed by the obstacles militating against the peace support operation.

iii. Understanding the nature and character of the rebellion and rebel groups in Liberia that have become eternal to the logic of hostility between ethnic nationalities.

iv. Reconciling contending interests in West Africa and the influence of regional and international power blocs/Hegemons.

v. Post conflict reconstruction of Liberia in tenus of good governance and democracy, civil society and confidence building, and

vi. Strengthening ECOWAS as a regional organ for enforcing regional peace and stability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Nigeria needs to take a serious and realistic interest in the sub-region. Though the realistic approach might be costly, the future reward will certainly be worth-while in
view of her status in the sub-region. This is important because Liberia from all angles, is a collapsed state. It has to be reconstructed with support from Nigeria and the international community. Nigeria must be seen to be involved seriously in the process of post-conflict peace building in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and the Mano river region. The case of Liberia is much more crucial because the peace in the sub-region is tied up with the outcome of the conflict in Liberia. Liberia has been at the forefront in generating the premier conflict that has devastated the sub-region for the last fifteen years.

If Nigeria must be involved she must take the lead on all major decisions and actions. Nigeria started on a good note when she sent troops immediately under ECOMIL and also provided a safe exit for Charles Taylor, despite the burden that came with that singular decision. Nigeria must be seen to be doing something different by going beyond these levels.

The concrete recommendations here include:

a. Nigeria should, first, be seen to be involved in initiating a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction and peace building process in Liberia which would require nothing less than 100 billion. This process may take on the pattern which Mozambique, East Timor and Cambodia went through when they were confronted with similar conflicts. This can be done by mobilising international support. A special national team made up of credible lobbyists should be constituted to seek the support of the international community for a comprehensive post-conflict peace building process in Liberia. This effort will cover all spheres of Liberian national life: political, economic, social, military, humanitarian and administrative, among others. This is important if Liberia is to be restored to its past glory.

b. Ensure that the international community considers a long period of 5-10 years of interim government in Liberia under the comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction peace process. This will mean involving various professionals that can be mobilised from West Africa and abroad to assist in the reconstruction process.

c. The National War College should be tasked to carry out a comprehensive research on ECOMOG/ECOMIL operations and the post-conflict reconstruction and peace building with which Nigeria has been involved since the start of the crisis. It is important for the government and people of Nigeria to properly appreciate the sacrifice being made in regional peace and security in West Africa. The National War College occupies a central position in West Africa as a regional training institute for the strategic level of command. It certainly should provide a guide for policy in the sub-region.

CONCLUSION

In sum, this paper attempts to create a deeper understanding of the regional conflict in West Africa in the minds of stakeholders. This is done by properly putting the contending issues and interests in perspective. The pivot of the discussion is that Nigeria has its geo-strategic interests at stake in the West African sub-region. The security of the region is tied to Nigeria’s geo-strategic (security) interest. Hence, whatever happens in the sub-region definitely affects Nigeria’s economy, security, politics and foreign policy. Although Nigeria’s domestic economy is too overstretched to take care of the regional concerns, nevertheless Nigeria’s domestic interests are tied up to her regional security interests. To meet these challenges, peace and security in Liberia, and indeed the entire sub-region, are paramount.
NOTES

5. The Deputy Executive Secretary General of ECOWAS General Diara made this explanation at the Round Table Workshop on the Liberian conflict held at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, August 14, 2003 when the author raised the issue with him.
7. See WANEP Website:www.wanep.org.
8. Ibid.

ENDNOTES


ABSTRACTS

The conflict in Liberia has taken a new dimension. There is now a growing international reawakening on how to resolve the conflict. Again, Nigeria has found herself in the critical position of having to bear the burden of insecurity in the sub-region. What are the implications
of this for Nigeria and her interests in the sub-region? In the light of this, the paper first attempts to identify the contending issues and interests in the Liberian conflict, which have affected other parts of West Africa. Secondly, the paper argues that this has implications for post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in West Africa. Thus, using the Liberian case, the paper identifies the problems with post-conflict peace building in West Africa. On the basis of this, the third section tries to provide some policy actions by making concrete recommendations for post conflict peace building in West Africa.
Globalisation of Pentecostalism in Africa: evidence from the Redeemed Christian church of God (Rccg), Nigeria

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AUTHOR’S NOTE

Note portant sur l’auteur

Introduction

1 The processes of globalisation that became evident in the late twentieth century have often been conceived as emanating from the West and spreading out-ward to other parts of the world. Like all generalisations, this conception is one-sided and ignores details, both historical and social. While it is the case that certain of these processes, particularly those dealing with politics, economics, science and technology, are deeply entrenched in historical processes that can be traced to the West, there are others that flow from Non-Western societies. Some scholars have insisted that Africa appears to be part of the half of the world that is not globalized’ (Cooper 2001:207). Paul Gifford (1998: 324) for example, claims that ‘afro-pessimism’ is the dominant mood for Africans who have lost ‘self-confidence’ in the current global arrangement. Gifford is not alone in this grim assessment of the African situation. Similarly, Castells (2003:127) believes that Africa is no longer a ‘third world’, but a ‘fourth world’ considering its marginalisation from the information economy. In Samuel Huntington’s (1996: 47) reckoning for example. African heritage does not amount to a distinctive civilisation comparable to ‘Asian civilisation’ or ‘European civilisation’. If indeed the contemporary global situation will be shaped by interactions and conflicts ‘along the cultural fault
lines separating civilizations’ (Huntington 1993: 25), then Africa may deserve the marginal status accorded it. However, this perspective focuses mainly on the dominant structures of African states and the international system, to the neglect of individual, local experiences and interpretations. Construing globalisation as processes of intensified interpenetration and interaction of cultures, civilisations, political and economic structures of diverse lifestyles shows that Africa has a long history and experiences of its gradual evolution. (On this fact, see the brilliant arguments of the Ghanaian historian, Emmanuel Akyeampong 2000).

However true the above picture of Africa may be, there is a growing recognition of Pentecostalism as a strong globalising force to reckon with in many non Muslim African societies (Berger 2000; Hunt 2000; Kalu 2000; Corten & Marshall Fratani 2001; Martin 2002; Jenkins 2002). Even when this point is made, some scholars see the rapid expansion of Pentecostalism as an instance of globalisation from above or from the centre to the periphery from the ‘first world’ to the third world’. This view evaluates social transformation in Africa in line with Western models of modernity. Such a view is not only simplistic, it is equally a generalisation that glosses over significant cultural details and uniqueness. Much like the globalisation discourse itself, the specific details of the dynamics of African Pentecostalism and its expansion and patterns of influence in different societies are often glossed over. Evident in the works of pioneers in this field of research, such as Roland Robertson (1992; 2001) and Peter Beyer (1994; 2001), is a high level of abstraction and generalisation that often confounds rather than enlightens the condition of primary social/religious actors. As Marfleet (1997:193) rightly asserts, most global accounts exclude the specific. Consistent with its emphasis on large issues, global theory strains to a higher level of generalisation and “empirical” matters are rarely a concern. The result is that global perspectives on religion strongly discourage contextual understanding.” Our case study is designed, therefore to fill in this felt need for cultural and social details in the discourse of the interface between globalisation and contemporary religious (pentecostal) practice, especially in Africa.

The New Pentecostalism: Its Emergence

The crash of oil prices in 1981 and the subsequent imposition in 1986 of the International Monetary Fund-World Bank negotiated Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP), with its attendant austerity measures, brought about far reaching changes in the Nigerian society. The new economic realities brought about currency devaluation, massive retrenchment of workers, fold-ups of companies and factories, as well as a high graduate unemployment rate. To the midst of legitimacy crises of a bankrupt military leadership, social decay, state failure, massive corruption, endemic graduate unemployment, environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region, unprecedented abuse of human rights and crippling poverty of many amidst the scandalous wealth of a few, new pentecostal churches and ministries prospered and proliferated’ (Ukah 2005a). A significant feature of the new churches was its leadership that was made up of university- and college-educated young men (and in a few cases, women) who were self-assertive, upwardly mobile, articulate individuals. They were also well versed in the use of modern mass media technology. These leaders liberally injected a massive dose of secular learning acquired in such disciplines as economics, political science, marketing and advertising into church teachings, practices, organisation and
administration. An influx of audio tapes, vidéocassettes, magazines and books written by both American and local pentecostal leaders on ‘church marketing’,2 prosperity, wealth, deliverance techniques and other ‘techniques of the self’ (in the elegant phrase of Michel Foucault, quoted in Ellis and ter Haar, 2004: 166) and the spirit inaugurated an era of popular Pentecostalism. The new religious brand promised to help its adherents negotiate the massive social, political and economic transformations going on in the country.

A further downward turn in the political and economic circumstances of the country in the 1990s manifested in the emergence of more ministries and churches (Peel, 2000; Ayegboyin and Ukah 2002). As large businesses and factories folded up because of the high cost of doing business, new churches took over the vacated office spaces, erected massive billboards, printed high quality wall size posters of their leaders, and embarked on an enterprise of proselytising new frontiers. The popularity of Pentecostalism became infectious as older churches (indigenous and mission established) renegotiated their public and doctrinal identity by incorporating new doctrines and grafting new practices in order to compete effectively in the emergent religious market.

Pentecostalism is the most popular religious movement in Nigeria. Although very little statistics exist to give an accurate impression of how it has expanded, what is publicly observed is that it has achieved a strong social presence, inserting itself forcefully into the religious economy of Nigeria and designing several strategies to create and maintain a market niche. Pentecostal symbols inundate Nigerian marketplaces and public spaces, sporting arenas, mass media, and educational institutions. Companies and other businesses are increasingly restructuring their public image according to the latest religious fashion,3 and the national legislature is embroiled in controversies whether or not churches need to pay taxes since these organisations have metamorphosed into economic firms designed for profit making. The real reason for the attempt to introduce the payment of taxes by religious organisations in the country is the realisation that religion is the fastest growing industry in Nigeria and the second most popular export (after crude oil). Its influence in the marketplace of culture is unequalled in the country, as the hugely popular Nigerian home videos indicate (Ukah 2003; 2005b). Many older religious groups have come to reposition and adjust to the wider market by tapping into the pentecostal style of doing business and retaining its market advantage. Today, Nigerian Pentecostalism is both a religious practice and a commercial and popular culture.

The repositioning of Nigerian Pentecostalism as a popular culture and commercial culture is one reason it has expanded so rapidly both within Nigeria and outside the country. One group that effectively reconstructed its identity in the 1980s in order to accommodate the changing economic, social and political vicissitudes of the period is the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG). The importance of RCCG in the sacred market of Nigeria is that it redefined what a successful religious group has to be and introduced new trends that other lesser-known churches have now followed. In a world of mass culture, success is usually mimicked, and the RCCG has had its fair share of (poorly) clowned versions. The RCCG is arguably the fastest growing pentecostal church in Nigeria. It is also, on its own admission, the richest. In the last two decades, this church has altered its self-understanding as its public posture has become aligned with...
commercial practice. In subtle but interesting ways, it has reinvented itself in line with popular aspirations of mainstream society particularly in response to changes in other facets of society. It has as well strained to meet the aspirations of the youth.

The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG): A Brief History

The Rev, Josiah Akindayomi an estranged prophet and Apostle in the Cherubim and Seraphim (C&S) church, founded the RCCG. Born in 1909, Josiah became a traditional healer before converting to the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1927. After four years in the CMS, he joined the just established C&S movement in 1931. Josiah was literate in Yoruba but not in English. He rose to the rank of prophet and Apostle in the C&S but formed a small band of followers around him called Egbe Ogo Oluwa, the Glory of God Fellowship. In 1952, he had some problems with the leadership of the C&S movement and was consequently ex-communicated for insubordination to authority.

He transformed his small band into a church and changed the name to The Redeemed Christian Church of God, claiming that it was a name divinely revealed to him. This last name was chosen after five other previous names. viz.: Church of the Glory of God (Ijo Ogo Oluwa); ii) The Redeemed Church (Ijo Irapada); iii) The Redeemed Apostolic Church; iv) Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa (Nigeria Branch); and v) The Apostolic Faith Mission of West Africa (Adekola 1989; Ukah 2004; Adeboye 2005a). For four years (1956-1960), this church was affiliated to the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) of South Africa, a relationship that was terminated after Nigeria gained political independence.

The church grew slowly, and when Josiah died in November 1980 there were 39 small parishes, all in Lagos and its environs, with a total membership of less than a thousand.

Before the founder died, however, he nominated a university teacher, Enoch Adejare Adeboye with a doctorate degree in Mathematics, as his successor. Adeboye had only spent seven years as a member of this church, and was himself only 39 years old when he took over the reins of power in January 1981. Some older pastors of the church felt short-changed by the founder’s action and the church splintered into factions. After a period of turbulence, the new leader set before himself the task of turning around the fortunes of a church that was aptly described by one of its senior pastors as ‘a tribal church’.

In order to underscore the import of the transformation that the new leader introduced, it is necessary to describe the type of congregations he inherited. The parishes of the RCCG in the 1970s and early 1980s, later called the Classical Parishes, were the Holiness type of congregations with the posture of a pietistic movement. Thus, it was forbidden for women to wear trousers, earrings, face make-ups or visit the hairdressing salons to style their hair. They had to cover their hair during services or whenever they were in the church premises. In addition, they were not allowed to ride on motorcycles, for this was adjudged unworthy of a ‘Christian sister’. The founder of the church considered it unworthy of a Christian sister to indulge in any of these activities. There was a strict dress code for all who came into the church’s premises.

The congregations of the church were very small and were located at the back streets of Lagos and its environs. Services were conducted in Yoruba (with translations into English in some parishes) and electronic instruments and bands as well as local drums.
were forbidden. Virtually all ‘worshippers [were] wrapped... in tears, groaning in prayer'. The weekly crying service sessions earned the classical parishes the nickname of *ijo elekun*, meaning, the weeping church. Another significant feature of the pre-1980 RCCG was the church’s attitude to money: it took no collection of offerings during services. The leader-founder of the church believed that ‘money should not separate people from God.’ The principal source of its revenue, according to the son of the founder, was the collection of tithe or gifts from members. Adherence to a strict ethic led to the screening of members’ occupations to ensure that they conformed to an approved list of economic activities. Members were not allowed to take up employment in alcohol or tobacco producing, distributing or marketing companies, the armed forces and police. According to the founder’s deputy, these activities were considered to be ‘at variance with the doctrines of the church’.

These parishes represented an apocalyptic, or rather, prophetic, movement as they prepared and waited for the coming of the end of the world which the Parousia would herald. Made up of mainly disempowered and uneducated members, the church saw itself as a pilgrim movement, just passing through this vale of tears, in the world but not of the world, and so, not loving the things of this world, for it is passing away but the love of God abides forever (1 Jn 2.15, 17).

Aside from the challenges of schism, Adeboye faced many other problems, some of which were:

- The doctrines and practices of the church alienated the youth; hence, the church became ‘a church of elderly people, a bundle of people who were in the main illiterates, people who were not educated in a modern way’.
- The church was poor and for many years could hardly raise enough money to pay the meagre salaries of its clergy.
- The church was seen as socially and economically unprogressive, particularly concerning the prohibition of certain types of occupations.
- Because of all the above, the church was having difficulty attracting and keeping well-educated, young, upwardly mobile professionals.

### Diversification of Religiosity

In response to the above situation, the new leader set out to alter the structures and social character of the church. However, he met with entrenched resistance to change from an older group of pastors and members who had a rigid understanding of church life. Rather than risk a possible rebellion by both his pastors and followers, Adeboye in 1988 created a new type of parish and called it the *Model Parish*. The new parishes, in contrast to the older ones, permitted all the things that were previously outlawed. In addition they were located at such strategic but ‘profane’ places as hotels, nightclubs, cinema halls, highbrow city centres and other places where ‘worldly people’ were found. Prospective members were instructed to ‘come as you are, for the Lord will touch you as we minister to you. Let them come to Jesus as they are, whatever the painting on their heads or faces or on their hair, whatever the disposition or garments they are putting on. At the end of the day when God is through with them, their lives would be changed, rather than say they should not enter the church’.

Unlike the Classical Parishes, services in the Model Parishes were (and still are) accompanied by electronic musical instruments and western drums and band and
conducted mainly in English with no translation into Yoruba. The vision behind the Model Parishes according to a senior pastor of the church, ‘was to reach the younger folk, graduates, upwardly mobile executives, which the older folk (meaning the Classical Parishes) could not have done due to a lot of limitations’. Through the Model Parishes, the church started taking offerings during services. Gradually, the church was monetised through increased financial demands on its members in the form of tithes fees and levies offerings of many kinds (thanksgiving, freewill, seeds, etc.) and donations.

These two types of parishes still coexist. While Classical Parishes emphasise holiness the Model Parishes emphasise modernity, prosperity, and exhibit images of wealth as an index of grace and salvation. They symbolise what is best in the material world, bring home to people such icons of high modernity as new media and global consumption appetites modern forms of packaging and marketing of (religious) services and products. The ‘success’ which is usually attributed to the Model Parishes could be construed as a lowering of the strict standards that governed the conduct of personal life in Classical Parishes. Removing restrictions over membership acted like a discount on a purchase. It stimulated and sustained demand. The people who trooped into the church were taught overtime to increase their expenditure, time, conviction and commitment in the cause of the church.

Members of the Model Parishes are in the main influential, border-spanning networkers, mobile middle class men and women who criss-cross Nigerian society and try to extend their connections all over Africa and the world. The rapid increase and expansion of the Model Parishes soon became the driving force for the local multiplication of parishes as well as the founding of parishes in Europe and North America (Ukah 2005c). The dynamics generated through the Model Parishes aptly captures Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s (1995) four trends of the processes of globalisation, viz: mobility, simultaneity, bypass and pluralism. The new parishes are pragmatic and cosmopolitan in outcome, emphasising product packaging, ‘powerful delivery of the message’, astute salesmanship and creative media use.

**Elite Groups**

As a result of the high quality of membership (in terms of education, occupation and the social and material resources that flow from these) that streamed into the church through the Model Parish experiment, the church set up some elite groups through which to consolidate and optimise the resources at its disposal. Members of these elite groups soon became articulate carriers and conveyors of the church’s ideas and practices to different parts of the world. Relevant to the globalisation of RCCG were two such groups. The first group, created in 1988, is a students’ body known as the Redeemed Christian Fellowship (RCF). It is the youth wing of the church concentrated within tertiary institutions of learning in the country. The RCF was, and still is, the recruiting group for university-educated and mobile manpower for the church. As students graduate from colleges and universities, they disperse to different locations, carrying with them the ideas and practices they have learnt from the church. The first wave of transnational expansion of RCCG was the direct efforts of members of the RCF. The first parish of RCCG outside Nigeria was founded in 1981 in Accra, Ghana, by a Ghanaian who studied in Nigeria; the first parish in the United Kingdom was founded in...
1989 by a former student\(^2\) and the first parish in the United States was founded in 1992 by a Nigerian student who was completing his education at Western Michigan University (Ukah 2004: 279-284; 2005e; Adogame 2004).

The second group, the Christ the Redeemer’s Friends Universal (CRFU), was established in 1990 to garner financial and human resources from the very wealthy in the society. Members of this group must have a minimum educational qualification of National Certificate of Education or must be accomplished professionals in their field of endeavour. The CRFU targets people of influence and affluence, people in positions of authority and power. The RCCG in its new phase of expansion, much like many other pentecostal groups in the country, deliberately and systematically skims more of the cream of society than the dregs’ (Stark & Bainbridge 1985:395). Through this category of persons in the CRFU, the church aims at the social and economic conversion of Nigeria.

**Media Use**

The RCCG very early in its post-founder’s era recognised the power of the mass media. In the 1980s the church started to commodify the sermons of its leader, first in audiocassettes and, later, in videocassettes. It is a common practice in the church today that sermons are turned into books. Video Compact Dises (VCDs) and Digital Video Dises (DVDs) which are marketed in all its parishes in and outside the country. These popular culture materials are advertised as:

“points of contact for prosperity, security, survival of family, unity of church, peace and progress in Nigerian [sic] and miracles, signs and wonders. [The] ministrations and prophecies of Adeboye [as codified in the tapes and books] will turn your shame into glory.”\(^2\)

Through one of its companies, Transerve Disc Technologies Ltd (formerly Transerve Nigeria Limited) the church controls more than 60% of the importation of blank audio and videotapes into Nigeria, as well as the distribution and marketing of locally produced musical audio tapes and VCDs. Christian video-films and American audio-visuals of evangelical sermons and movies (see Ukah 2003). The popular Redemption Camp of the church is an important marketing outlet for popular pentecostal audio-visual materials. A veritable marketplace of material religion, the Camp represents an industrial plant of popular Pentecostalism in Nigeria.

Through the Redemption Television Vlinistry (RTVM) established in the early 1990s, the church’s programmes are broadcast on more than twenty-eight local television channels as well as on a satellite television channel. Further the RCCG has numerous radio programmes that cover the entire southern Nigeria.\(^2\) The RCCG is the only church in Nigeria with an Outside Broadcasting Van (OBV) purchased at the cost of 42 million naira (circa €300,000.00) designed to hook up with any satellite television station anywhere in the world for the distribution of high quality sounds and images from the church. The church also sells the live broadcasting rights of its crusades to global media groups such as Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Service (CBS) and Lagos-based Minaj International Broadcasting (MBI). In early 2005, the church established a new cable and satellite television station called the Dove which disseminates the presence, images and ideas of the church and its leaders to a global community of followers and seekers.
The use of the Internet forms a potent strategy for many pentecostal churches in Nigeria who put the collection of technologies to diverse uses. For the RCCG, the Internet serves as a tool of evangelisation that enables its voice as well as its activities to be seen and heard globally. There are three distinct Internet projects in the church. The first is the RCCG Internet Project based in Houston, Texas, which provides free email facility, chat, official directories of parishes and provinces, Bible study materials and testimonies site for its audiences, members, and cyber visitors. This facility also markets the books, audiovisuals of sermons and other ritual events of the church to a wider audience as well as solicits funds for the evangelical work of the church. The second is the CommCentre (short for ‘Communications Centre’) based in Lagos which promises to carry the word of God by cybermedia to all men, all races, in all places. It offers consultancy services to the different parishes in Nigeria on how to exploit Internet and satellite technologies for church programmes. The third is RCCG Internet Strategy, based in London. Through these means, the RCCG mobilises religious membership and sentiment as well as funds. Also, through the Internet, the RCCG’s claim to be a global organisation is asserted and demonstrated. While its national and international headquarters are in Nigeria, its media and technical headquarters are decentralised: in Lagos, Texas and London.

Aside from the above, the RCCG is in the forefront of pentecostal advertising in Nigeria (Ukah 2002). Advertisements for its major programmes usually begin six months or one full year ahead of time. During this time, different parishes of the church, parachurch groups, corporate organisations, such as banks, mobile phone service providers, manufacturers of consumer goods, pioneer the advertisement drive. They do this by erecting massive and attractive billboards: they print and paste wall size posters, sponsor radio and television announcements, put out printed vests pin-ups branded tennis caps and car stickers. In addition to these management/marketing strategies, the leadership organises several forums with big businesses where the programmes are sold to the business community and their financial assistance solicited. By informing the companies of the different ways in which they can benefit from participating in the religious events, these organisations are inveigled into making “promissory notes” and other forms of financial and logistics commitments to the church. Through a form of mass marketing of its programmes, the church boasts of expending more than 400 million naira in hosting a three-day event in 2000.

Global Business

One of the salient features of Nigerian Pentecostalism is the restless and almost ceaseless circle of activities of vigils, crusades, conventions, anniversaries, prayer sessions and deliverance programmes. Many churches have evolved such programmes as encapsulation strategies through which they create a unique world for their followers and shield them from influences from other churches and superstar pastors (Rambo 1992). Moreover, the programmes constitute formidable competition and profit making devices that attract people into religious places. Through three routinised programmes, the RCCG brings together, on a regular basis, several thousands and sometimes millions of people in one location for up to seven days. The first programme is the Holy Ghost Service (HGS): it is a night vigil that holds on the first Friday of each month. The second is the church’s annual convention that holds for one week in early
August of every year and, finally the Holy Ghost Congress which is an annual event that holds for one week in December.

These events are held at the church’s expansive Redemption Camp (RC), purchased in 1983. This Camp now covers more than ten square kilometres and houses some of the important institutions of the church, such as its Bible School, a university, two presidential villas, as well as guest houses for political leaders and dignitaries, supermarkets, a bakery, a gas station, three banks, etc. These three programmes have been exported to Europe and North America where they are organised on regular bases.

Representing the church’s international headquarters, the RC is the global production and distribution centre of Nigerian Pentecostalism. It is here that local subjects and ideas are produced and disseminated to different parts of the world. Activities held here are indeed media events that are sometimes broadcast live on global media. Some of these programmes involve the performance of traditional Yoruba praise chants (oriki) and poetry (ewi). These performances are always mass produced on audio and videocassettes, CDs, VCDs and DVDs and marketed all over the world through the church’s branches, bookstores and the Internet.

It is a formal church practice to hire the best hands in the marketing and advertising industries to package and sell its programmes to corporate organisations from within and outside the country. Through its professional media and marketing specialists, the RCCG sources for sponsorship through business deals with global companies such as Unilever plc, Unisom, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble plc, Nestlé Foods plc, Nigeria Breweries plc, City Express Bank Nigeria Limited, Global Bank plc, 7up/Pepsi Bottling Company. Furthermore, a range of banks and insurance companies are actively involved in marketing the church’s events. Two of these banks have built their branches within the RC. These companies and the RCCG are allies in promoting each other: the companies donate huge sums of money to the church, provide skilled and technical manpower and the organisational expertise required to host large crowds, as well as provide electricity power generating equipment in exchange for marketing their products and services during the events.

Discussion

The RCCG has moved from a ‘tribal church’ of 39 parishes of about 1000 people in 1981 to 10,000 parishes (as at August 2005) in 90 countries (managed by 11,000 ordained pastors): 8,500 of the parishes are located in Nigeria and 1,500 are outside the country.

As at January 2005, there are in the United Kingdom and Ireland (RCCGUK) there are 181 parishes while in North America (RCCGNA), there are 228 parishes (Adogame 2004; Ukah 2005e). Apart from increasing exponentially, the RCCG according to its own admission, is the richest pentecostal church in Nigeria. The church has made its wealth by commoditising the knowledge of its leader and aggressively marketing this globally. By its own admission, the RCCG is by far the richest pentecostal church in Nigeria. The history of the RCCG is illustrative of the dynamics of the contemporain processes of globalisation and localisation. Increased diffusion of ideas, images and money has forced the RCCG to frequently restructure in order to be better positioned to respond to rapid changes in the religious market as well as global religious diffusion and transformation. The church has been characterised since the 1980s by the
dynamics of adaptation and flexibility. Its history illustrates a significant feature of modern institutions that must adapt and innovate or wind up. For institutions that are experiencing rapid change, ‘constant effort to adapt supposedly ensures success’ (Brown 2003:704). Changing in changing circumstances becomes a survival strategy. Constantly negotiating change becomes a reflection of religious institutions in a globalising world, a factor of living in a modern, but uncertain, society. This demonstrates graphically the very character of the instability of modernity, religion and globalisation. Attenuating doctrines, as is evident in the Model Parishes of the RCCG therefore, is the spin off of the constraints created by the constant pressures to keep up with the ever-changing world’ (Brown 2003:721).

For the RCCG and its new paradigm leader, divine revelation is not static or finished: it does not exclude change. As a fact, most of the recent shifts in doctrines and practices have been premised on freshly transmitted revelations to the leader of the church as the guiding principle for action in a new world order. As it were. God too recognises that change is necessary in order to avoid extinction or fossilisation. A central catalyst in bringing about change is money. This realisation is at the root of the church’s current monetisation practices: it partly accounts for its overwhelming appeal to the rich (who would want to remain rich) and to the poor (who strive to become rich). As globalisation processes speed up, religious organisations, companies and industries have merged strategies and expectations directed toward the realisation of the promise of globalisation for all who are will-ing to embrace extreme market capitalism through change and flexibility.

It is pertinent to observe that the incorporation of business schemas and strategies in pentecostal repositioning eschews ethical considerations of corporate practice and conduct. While churches expand and deepen their market share, the social and economic climate remains hostile and sometimes even violent. The emphasis on money as an index of success as proponents of the prosperity message’ insist on (and Adeboye is one of them. see Ukah 2005a) has fostered widespread ethical abuses in individual and group conduct (Adeboye 2005b). The doctrine that success must be measurable, which pitches members of the clergy against one another in a cutthroat competition to recruit, mostly the wealthy members of the society, desensitises church workers to the importance of ethical conduct. Clergy malfeasance, which is on the rise in Nigeria, becomes the price paid for the endless pressure to find new ways of expansion and of making profit.

While the leadership sought to restructure the church from within by creating the Model Parishes, in order to attract and retain quality persons who would be trained to become high performing church executives as well as generate internal mobility, it also commenced a painstaking process of doctrinal reorientation. In order to compete effectively in the emerging religious market of the 1980s and 1990s, a church that was originally apocalyptic in its outlook soon began to incorporate pragmatic doctrines that pandered to the luxuriant emotions of the middle classes. According to the new teaching, as the new leader propounded it:

“God is not poor at all by any standard, [for], the closest friends of God [in the Bible] were wealthy people [...] God is the God of the rich, and his closest friends are very wealthy [...] The rich are friends of the rich, and the poor are friends of the poor. Therefore God decided to befriend the rich.”
To the poor, they must become rich, because ‘[b]irds of the same [sic] feather flock together’ and poverty is an evil as well as a curse that brings hatred and destruction in its wake.39 This sort of teaching was adapted to the financial profile of the church and its target audience. The RCCG embraced a utopian doctrine of material abundance in the 1980s that was in tune with the promises of proponents of globalisation who see in the cluster of processes of interconnectivity the cure for humanity’s contemporary malaise particularly poverty.40

The RCCG developed the commercial possibilities of religious crusades in Nigeria. In addition to being religious events, crusades, congresses, night vigils, etc. are activities sponsored by commercial organisations to enable them to market their wares and services. Aside from the church’s self-packaging as a commercial possibility, the symbiotically reinforcing and mutually benefiting relationship with economic institutions represents a new transformation as well as manifestation of Nigerian Pentecostalism in the era of globalisation. By the resultant commodification of religion, it is easy for it to travel and be dispersed to different locations. More importantly, through its new doctrines and practices, the church makes itself attractive to corporate organisations, particularly those in the manufacturing and provision of consumer goods and services. As a globalising movement, the RCCG ruptures the distinction between the sacred and the profane, this-worldly and other-worldly, pastoring and profiting; its unspoken slogan, exploit the earth but focus on heaven41, aptly illustrates this point. Modern media have furthered the church’s objective of culturally dominating the local religious economy. The church’s obsession with new technologies of mass communication is a survival strategy of keeping up with new competitors, breaking new grounds, deepening its market share as well as fighting to take other churches’ customers and clients.

Because the RCCG is expanding rapidly, with the likelihood of pastors being transferred from local parishes to foreign lands, the church has had to network with pentecostal institutions in Asia, Europe, North and South America to train some of its key personnel in understanding the demands of global religious transformations and transcultural religious trends. Such training enhances the prestige and the capacity of religious producers to compete effectively locally and globally.

One significant feature of the Nigerian religious economy, aside from its diverse and unregulated structure, is competition. Mutual rivalry among pentecostal churches has driven some to solicit for assistance from the business community for them to have an edge over others. Professional salesmanship has become a necessary skill for a new generation of pastors who now must strategise and package their products among other competing popular cultures. Part of this strategic repositioning has created specialisation within the pentecostal industry as some pastors insist they are wealth-inducing experts, others specialise in casting and binding the devil and his minions, others in working miracles of many forms, yet others, like Helen Ukpabio of Liberty Gospel Church, claim to have a commission to liberate people from witchcraft and sorcery, while T. B. Joshua of the Synagogue of All Nations has a divine mandate to cure HIV/AIDS, cancer and other terminal diseases (see Maier 2002). All these reflect the increasing global specialisations that are conditioned by regional competences, availability of raw material and cheap labour, as well as areas of perceived need of the society.
Conclusion

Cultural globalisation is redraing the contours of religious beliefs and practices. As globalisation increases in intensity in Africa, the interface between the religious sphere and the economic sphere enlarges the religious marketplace. As Karla Poewe (1989) observed over a decade ago, charismatic Christianity ‘is a religion of change’. This change is not only cultural, as she maintained, but also economic, as the teachings and practices of many pentecostal churches and leaders in Nigeria demonstrate. The history of the RCCG demonstrates the ability of Pentecostalism (and other religions in general) to domesticate and negotiate change in order to remain relevant to both individuals and corporate organisations. Through the pursuit of change, Pentecostalism blurs boundaries between the sacred and the secular, the religious and the economic, prophecy and profit. In so doing a new culture is invented which promises rapid transformation, personal and collective. Whatever political rhetoric of change Nigerian Pentecostalism espouses is still something of the future, difficult to access for the moment. At the moment, however, the face of religion in general, and Pentecostalism in particular, is very different from what it used to be two decades ago. This confirms Hunt’s (2002: 185) assertion that Pentecostalism in Africa today is not [...] the same movement that impacted on the continent in the 1920s... ‘(cf. Gifford 2004).

As our discussion of the RCCG indicates, pentecostal capitalism is an emerging phenomenon in Nigeria. It is being entrenched with the help of local and global companies and industries. In the situation in which Nigeria (and much of Africa) still is today, this emergent religious market is already exercising a stronghold on Nigerian pentecostal and corporate cultures. The processes described in this paper are features of Pentecostalism the world over as a totalising system, a system of either/or: either one is on the side of God and brings in one’s resources to support God’s cause, or one is against God and his growing number of ministers and their lieutenants and therefore on the side of the Devil (Garner 1998). The increasing monetisation of Pentecostalism, while it has visibly enriched church owners and leaders, has also empowered a good number of struggling Nigerians living in difficult circumstances to connect to global desires, tastes and quests, as well as communities. Nigerian Pentecostalism, as its trendsetter (the RCCG) has shown, is now a veritable force and part of a multifaceted process of religious globalisation as well as global capitalism. The achievements of the RCCG are better appreciated against the backcloth of pervasive waves of protracted sociocultural, economic and political changes buffeting Africa in general and Nigeria in particular.

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NOTES

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2. George Barna’s A Step-by-Step Guide to Church Marketing: Breaking Ground for the Harvest (1992) remains a popular textbook for many Nigerian church-owners more than a decade after it came out. It is still available in many pentecostal bookstores scattered all over southern Nigeria.

3. Many companies begin the day’s work with a formal prayer session in which every employee is expected to participate in. In addition to this some have formed ‘lunch time prayer meeting’ during which both employers and employees engage in fervent supplications for the prosperity of the firm. In order to publicise this kind of ‘corporate spirituality’ some of these firms sponsor religious events in addition to displaying pentecostal symbols in their offices or even on their products.


5. The fieldwork upon which this section of the paper is based was carried out in Nigeria between April and July 2001 and again between July and November 2003. Data from this fieldwork formed the core of my PhD Dissertation (Ukah 2004). The research was part of a larger study carried out under a collaborative research project on Local Action in the Context of Global Influences in Africa’ based at the University of Bayreuth. Germany, I acknowledge the support Professor Dr.
Urich Berner, my PhD supervisor at Bayreuth, and also that of Sonderforschungsbereich Forschungskolleg 560 during the period of research and writing up my dissertation.


7. The primary problem was the growing popularity of the Circle of God society and the refusal of Josiah to subordinate the group s activity to the C&S authority. For details on this issue, see (Ukah 2004a).


9. He was born into an Anglican family, reaffiliated to RCCG in 1972 and obtained his PhD from the University of Lagos in 1975.

10. Personal interview with Pastor Johnson Funso Odesola. Redemption Camp. Lagos. 01.06.01


13. Ibid.


20. There is a third strand of parishes called the Unity Parishes which were initiated in 1997 to harmonise the social and religious features of the first two strands. This latest strand has not met with much success as did the Model parishes.

21. For a rigorous examination of the diversification of parishes in the RCCG from the perspective of Strategic Management, see Ukah. 2005d.


24. Personal interview with Pastor Shyngle I. J. Wigwe. Redemption television Vlinistry (RIVM) Office. Redemption Camp. U6.08.02. He is the Director of RIVM.

25. See www.reeg.org


27. Some of these items are actually sold to the public, particularly members. Thus, they advertise as well as bring in revenues for the church.


29. Many of these ritual programmes hosted by pentecostal churches are often held on the first Friday of each month. The choice of this time is informed by the fact that wage earners have just received their pay for the month. The hosts of these events expect their followers and clients to pay up their tithes as well as make handsome offerings during the “interdenominational service”.

30. The HGS holds in London every three months and is called ‘Festival of Life’ (FOL). According to an insider, the choice of this nomenclature was for Strategic/logistic purposes. to play down
the evangelistic motive of the programme and make the programme more appealing to prospective attendees. FOL is thus considered in more benign caption than 'evangelistic crusade' or other such aggressive labels. The name is reminiscent of the Jewish feast of Chanukah, an eight-day festival beginning on the 25th day of Kislev in December. This festival commemorates the rededication to Judaism of the Temple in Jerusalem in 165 BC after a period during which it had been used for the worship of Greek gods under Antiochus Epiphanes (See http://fp.thebeers.f9.co.uk/chanukah.htm [accessed 03.10.04] and also http://www.christiananswers.net/dictionao/dedicationfeastofthe.html [accessed 03.10.04]. The church claims that through these programmes, God will re dedicate Nigeria on a path of global relevance in bringing humankind to Himself. (For details on these programmes, see Ukah 2004:217-234).

31. The banks have devised special products for the church such as high interest loans for 'church planting,' acquisition of property and equipment.


33. The church has acquired some 142 hectares of land in London for its UK Convention and in the United States of America. it has spent about US$3 million on the acquisition of some 500 acres of property in Texas to construct a 10,000 seater sanctuary and Prayer Camp.

34. Pastor Joel Oke. 'Tragedies of Mission Opportunities'. Catalyst. vol. 1. no. 3. (October 2002). p. 27 (Catalyst is RCCG's Mission Magazine produced by the church's Directorate of Missions. Lagos).

35. Personal interview with Pastor Deiana Adeleye-Olusae. RCCG National HQ. Ebute-Metta. Lagos. 14.05.2001. The RCCG assesses its pastors for promotion by, among other things, the amount of money they collect each month as tithes, offerings and gift and the number and quality of membership. For more on the prerequisites of ordination in RCCG see Ukah 2004. pp. 127-129.


37. Pastors rarely attempt to probe the sources of the moneys that are brought into the church as tithes gifts and offerings. Consequently, armed robbers, fraudsters, corrupt politicians and businesspersons bring some of their loots into the churches with the hope of gaining forgiveness and image laundry.

38. E. A. Adeboye. Pastors rarely attempt to probe the sources of the moneys that are brought into the church as tithes gifts and offerings. Consequently, armed robbers, fraudsters, corrupt politicians and businesspersons bring some of their loots into the churches with the hope of gaining forgiveness and image laundry. How to Turn your Austerity to Prosperity. (Lagos: CRM Books. 1989). pp. 2-3

39. Ibid. p. 6

40. Although originated in the United States of America, the prosperity religion is itself a trend in the global resurgence of religious ideas and practices which has gained popularity in many parts of the world today (Coleman 1993: 2000; Harrison 2005)

41. This is the motto of a pentecostal church in Lagos as advertised on a billboard along Kudirat Way Ikeja. Lagos.

ENDNOTES

1. Department for the History of Religions, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
ABSTRACTS

The préoccupation with the globalisation discourse in recent times has often over- looked events in Africa as marginal to broad processes of global transformations. Africa is seen as a continent with a ‘recipient culture’, with little to contribute to the rest of the world. The turmoil that gripped Africa in the last three decades of the twentieth century brought with it socio-cultural changes. One aspect of these changes for many societies of non-Muslim Africa was the emergence of Pentecostalism as one of the most dynamic movements as well as a formidable force of change. In Nigeria this brand of religious participation is altering not just the way individuals reconstruct their self-understanding; it is also changing the social and economic practices of groups and corporate organisations. Using the Redeemed Christian Church of God, which is arguably the largest and fastest growing pentecostal church in Nigeria, as a case study this paper describes the différent ways in which the pentecostal movement in Africa has embraced global change as well as become a vector of change for the wider African society and beyond.
Demand for modern health care services and the incidence of poverty in Nigeria: a case study of Ilorin Metropolis

Gafar T. Ijaiya and Raji A. Bello

AUTHOR'S NOTE
Note portant sur l'auteur

Introduction

1 The lack of adequate health care services and the inability of individuals within a given society to acquire modern health care services at affordable rates have led to the deterioration of the health status of individuals, in Nigeria, it is common to see health institutions with no drugs and with dilapidated structures, the dwindling income and purchasing power of individuals, coupled with the high cost of drugs and of treatment, combined to keep health care services out of the reach of many, the effects are high infant and maternal mortality, increase in the death rate, reduction of life expectancy and of the productive capacity of the people, absenteeism at work, low output, low income, and poverty, for instance, an infant mortality rate of 81 per 1000 live births was recorded in 2001, while the maternal mortality rate was 1000 per 100,000 live births in the same year, an under-five mortality rate of about 133 per 100,000 live births and life expectancy at birth of about 52 years were also registered (ADB 2003).

2 To what extent are the above findings true with respect to the situation in Ilorin metropolis? This paper examines the link between the demands for modern health care
services and the incidence of poverty in Ilorin metropolis, [using the probability of patronage by the sick to any modern health care centre].

In the next section of the paper, a conceptual overview of poverty and the demand for modern health care services are discussed, section three provides a brief background of the study area and the methodology, section four presents and discusses the results, the conclusion and recommendations are contained in the last section.

**Conceptual Issues: Poverty and The Demand For Modern Health Care Services**

4 *Poverty: Definition, Measurement, Causes and Consequences*

5 According to Narayan (2000), poverty is lack of material well-being, insecurity, social isolation, psychological distress, lack of freedom of choice and action, unpredictability, lack of long-term planning horizons, because the poor are continually trying to survive in the present, low self-confidence and self-esteem.

6 Schubert (1994) saw poverty as either absolute or relative or both, absolute poverty is the kind which is true at all times in all societies, for instance, there is a minimum level of income necessary for bare subsistence, relative poverty relates to the living standard of the poor to the standards that prevail elsewhere in the society in which they live.

7 Related to the definition of poverty are the measurements of poverty, according to Foster, et, al (1984) the most frequently used measurements are: (i) the head count poverty index, given by the percentage of the population that live in a household with a consumption per capita less than the poverty line; (ii) the poverty gap index, which reflects the depth of poverty by taking into account how far the average poor person’s income is from the poverty line; and (iii) the distributionally sensitive measure of squared poverty gap, defined as the means of the squared proportionate poverty gap which reflects the severity of poverty.

8 The importance of the measurement of poverty is to know who is poor, how many people are poor, and where the poor are located, Levy (1991) stresses that in measuring poverty two tasks have to be taken into consideration: (i) a poverty line must be determined, this is set at $275 and $370 per person a year for the extremely poor and for the moderately poor, respectively; and (ii) the poverty levels of individuals have to be aggregated, to determine the poverty line, two methods are employed: (a) the use of nutritional intake, which is set at 2,500 calories per head per day: Recently the use of income as a basis for determining the poverty line has lost much of its relevance, because the method of calculation was not adapted to the new economic trends resulting from a high rate of inflation, the prevailing high increase in interest and exchange rates and devaluation, thus the use of consumption-expenditure is now advocated, according to Aigbokhan (1997) total consumption-expenditure is preferred to income because it is usually better reported in household budget surveys, furthermore, there is the important theoretical consideration that expenditure reflects better the long-term permanent income and life cycle consumption pattern because it is usually stable and devoid of short-term fluctuations, moreover, if expenditure data are used for welfare analysis, there is a compelling advantage: the poverty line can be derived from the data and need not be adopted from other surveys.
Recent studies by the UNDP advocate the use of the Human Development Index (HDI) and Capability Poverty Measure (CPM), according to the UNDP (1998) HDI combines three components in the measure of poverty, these include: life expectancy at birth (longevity); educational attainment; and improvement in the standard of living, determined by per capita income, the first relates to survival-vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, the second relates to knowledge-being included or excluded from the world of reading and communication, the third relates to a decent living standard in terms of overall economic provisioning, on the other hand, CPM focuses on the average state of peoples’ capabilities by reflecting on the percentage of people who lack basic or minimally essential human capabilities that are ends in themselves needed to lift one from income poverty and to sustain strong human development.

According to the World Bank (2001), poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihood, hunger and malnutrition, ill health, limited or lack of access to education and other basic services, increased morbidity and mortality from illness, homelessness and an inadequate, unsafe and degraded environment, and social discrimination and exclusion, it is also characterized by the lack of participation by the people in decision making in civil, social and cultural activities that affect their lives.

The causes of poverty can also be viewed from the problems of urbanization, according to Ward (1999) the factors that cause poverty in most urban cities can be linked to the inner urban decay caused by poor urban public facilities because most infrastructure assets have been allowed to run down through lack of maintenance and investment, facilities have broken down because local administrations have had insufficient resources and inadequate skills to maintain them, in addition, many amenities have been unable to cope with the increasing demands being placed on them, it is also observed that the local authorities, over the years, have cut expenditure on infrastructure development and raised tax rates, these policies are counter-productive since these encourage the private firms to migrate; thus reduces employment, it allows the burden of taxes to fall disproportionately on a residential community less free to move, since the capacity (and willingness) of private households to pay the increased levies is minimal, the quality of social services, particularly education and health, has drastically fallen, this places poorer families at a disadvantage and encourages the richer and better educated families to move out or to resort to the private provision of such services.

Discussing the consequences of poverty, Narayan et al (2000) observed that because of poverty, most households are crumbling. While some households are able to remain intact, many others disintegrate as men, unable to adapt to their failure to earn adequate incomes under harsh economic circumstances have difficulty accepting that women are becoming the main breadwinners, the result is often alcoholism and domestic violence visited by men on women and a break-down of the family structure. Women, by contrast, tend to swallow their pride and go out into the streets to do demeaning jobs or anything it takes to put food on the table for their children and husbands.

Aku et al (1997) also observed that with mass poverty there tends to be a general loss of confidence in constituted authority (thereby generating disrespect and rendering government policies ineffective); political apathy among contending forces; and
disillusionment with respect to societal objectives and peoples’ responsibilities towards the attainment of those objectives.

Poverty Trends in Nigeria

The causes and consequences of poverty discussed above are relevant to the poverty situation in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the incidence of poverty was 28.1 percent in 1980 but increased to 88.0 percent in the year 2002, as indicated in Table 1, this percentage increase represents in absolute terms 86.0 million people out of an estimated population of about 116.4 million people.

The poverty situation in Nigeria also has a regional variation, for example, within these periods the poverty rate was higher in the northern agro-climatic zone (40 percent) compared with the middle and southern zones (38 percent and 24 percent, respectively) (Francis, et, al 1996; FOS 1999), similarly, Nigeria’s rank in the Human Development Index in the year 2000 remained low (0.452), 148th out of 174 countries (ADB 2003).

Table 1: Estimated Total Population and Rate of Poverty in Nigeria (1980-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated Total Population (in millions)</th>
<th>Absolute No. of Poor People (in millions)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
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<td>77.9</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>38.5</td>
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<td>95.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>55.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>67.0</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>111.3</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>114.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>116.4</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demand for Modern Health Care Services

According to the New Book of Knowledge (1980), when a person’s body is well, when his mind is sound and active and he feels in good spirits he is said to be in good health, in other words, health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defined it as the sound-ness of the body and the condition in which its functions are duly and efficiently discharged.

Demand for health care services is therefore what people select from the array of possible choices, given their own perception of their health condition and their socio-economic circumstances (Overholt and Saunders 1996), bitran and Mclnnes (1993) saw the demand for a particular type of health care service as the quantity of that service that people are willing to obtain as a function of the characteristics of the individuals (for example, their perception of need, their income, location and insurance coverage) and the characteristics of all the providers (for example, price, location, quality).

Related to the above definitions are the factors that determine the demand for health care, according to Bitran (1994) the main factors that determine the demand for health care services include: illness incidence rate, out-of-pocket price, household income, population size and distribution. He further elaborated that the demand for health care from provider / for each unit of time ($Q_j$) includes the product of two probabilities or proportions as follows: $Q_j = H \times Pr_1 \times Pr_2$, where: $H$ is the number of people With a health problem for each unit of time (for example, one month), $Pr_1$ denotes the proportion of people, among those with a health problem, seeking care outside the home, and $Pr_2$ is the proportion of people who choose provider $i$ among those who seek care outside the home, both $Pr_1$ and $Pr_2$ are assumed to be the functions of the out-of-pockets price faced by the consumer, the travel distance to the provider $i$ and the consumer’s income. ($Pr_1$ and $Pr_2$ are obviously functions of many other variables, such as education, type of health problem, etc.).

Overholt and Saunders (1996) also observed that the demand for health care services depends on the following factors: (i) the individual’s perception of illness, which depends on other circumstances such as urbanization and schooling, that is, whether a person is literate and what level of education that person has attained are important factors on how an individual perceives illness; (ii) prices and incomes, indicating that as the price of a service or commodity goes up, purchase and consumption declines, and as the income of the people increases, the goods or services they are able to purchase and consume also increase; and (iii) the quality of the services provided and the influence of competitors. With respect to quality, as it increases, the demand for health care services increases (quality having a positive effect on demand), for competitors, the extent of competition within the health sector can influence relative prices and quality options, for instance, if a competitor increases its price, two simultaneous effects take place, first fewer people seek care in the market, second, among those seeking care, a smaller proportion chooses the provider that raised its price.

The World Bank (1993b) reiterates that the individual’s ability to demand for health care depends on his income and his level of schooling, beyond the individual household every society’s health care services are affected by the national income and by that
society’s ability to acquire and apply new scientific knowledge, these depend on the level of schooling of the population.

21 As an indicator of poverty, the inability of some individuals to demand for health care or to have access to health care has taken its toll on their quality of life, life expectancy and mortality rate, as observed by Narayan (2000), the inability of the poor to have access to health care is not surprising, quite often they do not go for treatment if they are sick because they are usually faced with personal considerations of distance, availability of transportation, time required to travel, fear of death while traveling, and the cost of transportation and treatment, they also have to consider the potential problems at the treatment centres: shortages or lack of drugs, staff absenteeism and callousness, and ineffective treatment, all or some of these considerations can combine to act as disincentives in any given situation, and they are amplified by uncertainties at every step.

22 The World Bank (1995) provides an empirical instance of where the overall demand for health care (broadly expressed in terms of self-medication and of the frequency of medical care contacts with public and private providers) is somewhat lower among the poor by citing the case of Vietnam, a number of factors are said to be the causes of decline in the demand for health care services in Vietnam, one factor is the deterioration in the quality of government health services resulting from the compression of public expenditures in the late 1980s, large proportions of health facilities have become dilapidated to the point of being unusable for want of equipment and medical supplies, at the same time salaries of health personnel have declined in real terms, leading to low morale and productivity, another factor is the increase in the costs of access to health services as a result of the introduction of user fees.

23 In Nigeria, the problems of underutilization and under supply of health facilities and personnel have for long undermined the quality of health care services, these problems can be traced to the following: (i) compensation problems, especially in the public sector where wages and salaries are low, consequently, morale and motivation are negatively affected; and (ii) Poor management, weak supervision and unsatisfactory training, poor management is reflected in the creation of numerous categories of health personnel whose functions overlap or are ill defined, large numbers of low-level functionaries and the absence of standard managerial procedures, dwindling income and purchasing power of most people, coupled with the high costs of drugs and treatment, have also put health services out of the reach of many people, most of them poor, the effects of these are high infant and maternal mortality rates and low life expectancy at birth, for instance, in Nigeria the life expectancy at birth in 2001 was 52 years, 20 years less than that of Mauritius (ADB 2003).

Study Area and Methodology

Study Area

24 The study area covered some parts of Ilorin metropolis, Ilorin metropolis is located some 300 kilometres from Lagos and 500 kilometres from Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, on latitude North 8° 30' and longitude East 4° 35' of the equator, the city is situated in the transition zone between the forest and savanna regions of Nigeria, currently, the city is the capital of Kwara State of Nigeria and has an estimated
population (by the 1991 census figure) of about 572,178 people (Adedibu 1988; NPC 1993)

**Methodology**

**Data Source**

25 In addition to the use of secondary data, a survey aimed at generating primary data on the influence of poverty on the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis was conducted between the months of August and December 2003 through the administration of copies of the questionnaire and participatory assessment method, the questionnaire was structured after the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study which, among other things, provides a comprehensive measure of welfare and its distribution and describes the pattern of access to and the use of social services, the participatory assessment method was used to obtain information from key members of the household on their perception of the impact of poverty on the demand for modern health care services (see Grootaert 1986; Robb 2000).

26 A stratified sample method was used to select the respondents, to obtain an unbiased selection of samples, the study area was divided into eleven-sample units based on proximity, ecological, socio-cultural and economic variations, in accordance with the sample units, the structured questionnaire was distributed to about 600 respondents, out of which only 510 responded.

27 The issues raised in the questionnaire include the background of the respondents, (i.e, their marital status, educational status, occupational status, household size and composition), the income of the respondents, their perception of illness, prices of health care services, time required to travel and wait for health care services, quantity or amount of health care services consumed, judgment about the quality of services and the characteristics of the medical provider.

28 In line with most recent works on poverty, the poverty analysis in this study was based on a money-metric measure of utility and welfare, for the measure of utility and welfare, the total household consumption-expenditure was used as a measure of household welfare and for determining the poverty line, the analysis also took into consideration differences in needs due to the differences in household size and composition: it therefore used household expenditure per adult equivalent as the welfare measure, there are wide choices of adult equivalent scales and different scales used in different countries, the most commonly used is that of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) because of its simplicity of use and wide popularity. This scale is expressed as follows:

29 \[ EXP_{eq} = \frac{EXP}{n^{0.7}} \]  

30 where:

31 \[ EXP = \text{total household expenditure} \]

32 \[ n = \text{household size} \]

33 \[ 0.7 = \text{exponential formation representing other adults in a particular household} \] (Glewwe 1990; Grootaert and Braithwaite 1998).
A cut-off point needs to be selected to serve as a poverty line across the distribution of real household expenditure per adult equivalent, an absolute line such as $1 a day (Purchasing Power Parity PPP$) was used in identifying the poor and non-poor (World Bank 2001).

The next stage in the analysis of poverty in the study area is the use of the popular P-alpha class of poverty measures introduced by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke in 1984. The index is defined as:

\[
P_{\mu} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{q} \left(\frac{z_{i} - y_{i}}{z_{i}}\right)^{\mu} \quad \text{…………. (2)}
\]

where:

- \(n\) = number of people
- \(q\) = number of poor people.
- \(Z_{i}\) = poverty line
- \(Y_{i}\) = total consumption-expenditure of individual \(i\)
- \(\mu\) = poverty aversion parameter.

The poverty aversion parameter (\(\mu\)) can take any positive value or zero, the higher the value, the more the index weights the situation of the poor i.e, the people farthest below the poverty line, of specific interest are the cases where \(\mu = 0, 1, 2\). If \(\mu = 0\) the index becomes:

\[
P_{0} = \frac{q}{n} \quad \text{………… (3)}
\]

which is the simple head count poverty rate, i.e, the number of poor in Ilorin metropolis as a percentage of the total population, as a useful first indicator it fails to pay attention to the depth (or gap) and severity of poverty in the metropolis, to arrive at the depth of poverty and severity of poverty one needs to look at the extent to which the expenditure of the poor in the metropolis falls below the poverty line, this is customarily expressed on the “income gap ratio” or “expenditure gap ratio” which expresses the average shortfalls as a fraction of the poverty line itself, i.e.:

\[
\frac{z_{i} - y_{i}}{z_{i}} \quad \text{………… (4)}
\]

where \(y_{i}\) is the average income or expenditure of the poor in the metropolis.

A useful index is therefore obtained when the head count poverty ratio is multiplied by the income or expenditure gap ratio, thus corresponding to:

\[
P_{1} = \frac{q}{n} \left(\frac{z_{i} - y_{i}}{z_{i}}\right) \quad \text{………… (5)}
\]

which reflects both the incidence and depth of poverty, these measures have a particularly useful interpretation because they indicate what fraction of the poverty line would have to be contributed by every individual in the metropolis to eradicate poverty through transfer, under the assumption of perfect targeting.

The severity of the poverty index is the mean of the squared proportion of the poverty gap expressed as:

\[
P_{2} = \frac{q}{n} \left(\frac{z_{i} - y_{i}}{z_{i}}\right)^{2} \quad \text{………… (6)}
\]
This index allows for concern about the poverty of the poor people through attaching a greater weight to the poverty of the poorest ones among them than to those just below the line.

In determining the demand for modern health care services, the product of the number of people that are sick and the probability of the number of people that sought for modern health care services outside their homes, multiplied by the total number of people in the households are used and expressed as:

\[
\text{Demand}_{ijt} = \text{Population}_{it} \times \text{Incidence of illness} \times \text{ProbSeek}_{ijt} \times \text{ProbChoose}_{ijt} \ldots(7)
\]

where:

- \(\text{Population}_{it}\) = the number of people in \(l\) in time period \(T\)
- Incidence of illnesses and injuries is expressed for time period \(T\)
- \(\text{ProbSeek}_{ijt}\) = the probability that individual \(i\), with a self-perceived health problem will seek care outside the home, it is expressed as a function of price and travel time of all providers and the individual’s characteristics.
- \(\text{ProbChoose}_{ijt}\) = the probability that individual \(i\), with a self-perceived health problem and seeking care outside the home will choose provider \(j\) is expressed as a function of provider \(j\)’s price and travel time and the person’s characteristics (see Bitran and Mclnnes 1993).

In the course of the analysis a multiple linear regression analysis of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) was used to test if any relationships exist between the incidence of poverty and the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis.

**Model Specification**

In specifying the model, emphasis was placed on whether the incidence of poverty has any significant influence on the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis, the model is therefore formulated as:

\[
\text{DMHCs}_t = f (\text{POV}_t, \text{HHC}) \ldots(8)
\]

With \(\text{HHC} = f (\text{Hhs}_t, \text{Occ}_t, \text{Eatt}_t) \ldots(9)\)

When equation (9) is substituted to equation (8)

\[
\text{DMHCs}_t = f (\text{POV}, \text{Hhs}_t, \text{Occ}_t, \text{Eatt}) \ldots(10)
\]

With a multiple linear relationship such as:

\[
\text{DMHCs}_t = b_0 + b_1 \text{InPOV}_t + b_2 \text{Hhs}_t + b_3 \text{Occ}_t + b_4 \text{Eatt}_t + U \ldots(12)
\]

where:

- \(\text{DMHCs}_t\) = the demand for modern health care services
- \(\text{InPOV}_t\) = log of the incidence of poverty proxied by per capita consumption-expenditure per adult equivalent of a poor individual head of household.
- \(\text{HHC} = \) vector of some household characteristics which are \(\text{Hhs}_t, \text{Occ}_t, \text{and Eatt}_t\).
- \(\text{Hhs}_t = \) household size of an individual head of household.
- \(\text{Occ}_t = \) occupational status of an individual head of household.
- \(\text{Eatt}_t = \) educational attainment (years spent) of an individual head of household.
\[ b_0 = \text{the intercept} \]

\[ b_1, \ldots, b_4 = \text{estimation parameters associated with the influence of the incidence of poverty and the vector of household characteristics on the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis.} \]

\[ U = \text{disturbance term or other variables not included in the model.} \]

To estimate the model, a multiple regression analysis is used in order to reflect the explanatory nature of the variables, to verify the validity of the model, two major evaluation criteria are used: the a-priori expectation criteria, which are based on the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of the variables under investigation; and (ii) statistical criteria which are based on statistical theory, which is referred to as the First Order Least Squares (OLS), consisting of R-squared \( (R^2) \), the F-statistic and the t-test, the R-squared \( (R^2) \) is concerned with the overall explanatory power of the regression analysis; the F-statistic is used to test the overall significance of the regression analysis; and the t-test is used to explain the significance of the contributions of the independent variables to the dependent variable (Oyeniyi 1997).

Drawing from the model, our a-priori expectations or the expected effects of the independent variables (POV, Hhs, occ, and Eatt) on the dependent variable (DMHCS) are:

\[ \text{POV}_1 < 0; \text{Hhs}_1 > 0; \text{Occ} >; \text{Eau} > 0, \text{an indication that an increase in poverty in Ilorin metropolis is expected to reduce the demand for modern health care services, and an increase in household size, better occupation status and higher education status are expected to increase the demand for modern health care services, the test was conducted at the 5 percent level of significance.} \]

**Results and Discussion**

**Incidence of Poverty in Ilorin Metropolis**

In estimating the indices of poverty, this study uses the adult equivalent scale to measure the well-being of individual respondents in the metropolis by their total consumption-expenditure and by their household size. Having established the individual’s consumption-expenditure, a cut off point that serves as the poverty line (using one dollar a day as the consumption-expenditure of the whole population under study) was established at N2,431.00 per month per adult equivalent, from this the popular P-alpha class of poverty measures was used in determining the incidence, the depth and the severity of poverty in Ilorin metropolis.

As indicated in Table 2, the head count poverty index (0.68) represents 68 percent of the respondents with a consumption level below the poverty line, thus 68 percent of them lived in households that are poor since their adult equivalent consumption-expenditure fails below the poverty line (N2, 431.00 per month).

Within the same period the poverty gap index was 0.45 (representing 45 percent of those whose average consumption-expenditure falls below the poverty line), this gap is referred to as the poor’s degree of misery, it represents the percentage of expenditure required to bring each person below the poverty line up to the poverty line, the severity of poverty index was 0.20, this represents 20 percent of the poorest of the poor in the town whom policy makers must pay attention to in the distribution of the
standards of living indicators, such as health care services, clean water, sanitation, food and income generating activities.

In summary, therefore, the use of these three (3) measures of poverty clearly indicates that the rate of poverty in Ilorin is relatively high when compared with the total population of poor people in Nigeria (56 percent), according to data provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the African Development Bank in 2000 (see OECD/ ADB 2002).

Table 2: Poverty Incidence, Depth and Severity in Ilorin Metropolis (in Percentage °%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>No. of Poor Household based on N2,431.00 Poverty line</th>
<th>Poverty Head count Index P₁ (in %)</th>
<th>Poverty Gap Index P₂ (in %)</th>
<th>FDT P₂ index (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>510</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authors’ computation

Table 3: Regression Results of the Demand for Modern Health Care Services and the incidence of Poverty in Ilorin Metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Co-efficient and t-values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (t)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln POVi (t)</td>
<td>-2.63 (-0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HhsI (t)</td>
<td>1.23 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occi (t)</td>
<td>2.01 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etti (t)</td>
<td>3.21 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F )</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

t-values are in parenthesis
The results of the regression analysis conducted at the 5 percent level of significance are presented in Table 3.

A look at the model shows that it is fairly good because it has an $R^2$ of 0.51, this shows that a 51 percent variation in the dependent variable (demand for modern health care services) is accounted for by the explanatory variables (the incidence of poverty and the vector of household characteristics of the respondents that are poor), while the error term takes care of the remaining 49 percent, these are variables in the study that can not be included in the model because of certain qualitative features, at the 5 percent level of significance the calculated F-statistic, that is 9.5, is greater than the tabulated F-statistic (4.. 349 degrees of freedom) valued at 3. 2.

In terms of the individual independent variables, the coefficients and the associated t-values show that (at the 5 percent level of significance) the increase in poverty is inversely related to demand for modern health care services: and the increase in household size and better occupational and higher educational status are directly related to the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis, this satisfies our a-priori expectation, which states that the more the rate of poverty the less the demand for modern health care services; the greater the household size, the better the occupational and the higher the education status of the people, the more their demand for modern health care services when they are ill, statically none of the independent variable is significant, this conclusion therefore conforms with the views of other researchers, such as Overholt and Saunders (1996), Bitran (1994) and the World Bank (1995) namely, that the demand for modern health care services depends, among other factors, on the price of the health care services provided and the income of the individual that needs it, as the price increases, the purchase and consumption of these services decline, and as the income of the people increases, the services they are able to purchase and consume increases. When they are poor and lack adequate income to purchase modern health care services, their demand reduces.

Drawn from the perception of some of the respondents, their inability to seek modern health care services can be linked to their low level of income in relation to the costs of treatment, according to some of them, at times the cost of treatment itself can be expensive but in many cases there are other hidden costs that add to the overall financial burden of health care services, these hidden costs include expenses incurred in travelling to a place where health care can be received and the psychological costs due to waiting time, costs are also incurred from bribes that must be paid to some health workers in order to see a doctor or nurse, or in order to ensure adequate treatment.

Conclusion and Recommendations

An empirical study of the impact of poverty on the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis was carried out by the use of a collection of household data and regression analysis, the findings show that the incidence of poverty is inversely
related to the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis, an indication that the more people find themselves in poverty, the less their demand for modern health care services whenever they are ill.

To make modern health care services accessible to the poor will therefore require government’s heavy investment in primary health care services at the community level, the nature of investment should first give consideration to the people’s responsiveness to the services provided by involving them in the design and implementation of the health policies, coupled to this, the government should try as much as possible to reduce waste and inefficiency in the delivery of the health care facilities by spending less on personnel relative to drugs, supplies and maintenance of equipment.

Since one of the factors that impede most people’s demands for modern health care services is income, the government should continue to subsidize the delivery of modern health care services (most especially primary health care) to the poor, given its basic objectives of efficiency and equity. However, the provision of subsidies should take into consideration a strong targeting mechanism that will not only identify those that are poor but also reach them and monitor the services provided to them, in addition, the government should provide an enabling environment for households to improve and to utilize modern health care services, the government should involve non-government organizations, community-based organizations and individuals in the provision of modern health care services to the less privileged in the society.

The government at the local, state and national levels should make adequate provisions for portable water and sanitation facilities at the homes of the poor and in the environment where they live, at least for the purpose of preventing diseases that would make them want to visit modern health care centres.

Good governance, which encompasses accountability, openness and transparency, must be allowed to thrive in the delivery of modern health care services to the poor, this in fact is essential in order to check and guard against the diversion of modern health care facilities and resources for personal use by persons in charge of the delivery of these facilities.

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NOTES
1. The World Bank provides $1 and $2 per day per person for eore poor and moderate poor respectively, this method is also referred to as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (see World Bank 1993a).

2. The sample units include Oja oba, pakata, kuntu, gambari, balogun Fulani, tao, basin, fate, tanke, Oloje, Okelele, and Okesuna

3. Note that even if children dominate the household 0.7 is still used with the assumption that the children will one day become adults

ENDNOTES
1. Department of Economics, University of Ilorin.
ABSTRACTS

This paper examines the impact of poverty on the demand for modern health care services in Ilorin metropolis, the study, carried out using a structural questionnaire to 510 heads of households, reported that 349 of them are poor, based on these samples, the ability of the heads of households to seek modern health care service was also examined, the data were analyzed by multiple linear regression, the regression results show that the incidence of poverty in Ilorin metropolis is inversely related to the demand for modern health care services, this indicates that the poorer the people, the less they are able to demand for modern health care services when they are sick, the paper further suggests measures that will enable the poor in Ilorin metropolis to have access to modern health care services prominent among them are the provision of subsidies by the government and greater commitment in the delivery of modern health care services.
Introduction

1 In Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, colonial rule and its exploitative economic exegesis distorted the growth of indigenous entrepreneurs. African entrepreneurs did not give up easily and, by the 1920s, they too were experimenting with company formation in an attempt to mobilise more capital.1 The penchant and tenacity for entrepreneurship influenced many Africans to explore their potentials in other spheres of commerce involving less competition with European firms. In Nigeria, indigenous entrepreneurs were the first to import and operate commercial motor vehicles, to market sewing machines and build cinemas. Indigenous entrepreneurs were quick to perceive and exploit the commercial prospects created by the urban expansion, the colour bar or racial prejudice and the passion for western entertainment. In the post Second World War nationalist movement, many Nigerian entrepreneurs used their economic power to support political groups. The business career of Daniel Oguntolu Sanyaolu depicts the binary intersection of economic and political force deployed by African entrepreneurs in the quest for social change.

2 The career of Sanyaolu provides a unique study of the Nigerian merchants in the early colonial period. As an innovative entrepreneur he pioneered large scale enterprises in import/export trade and in urban services (hotel and supermarkets).2 Sanyaolu played significant roles in the colonial economy as a produce buyer, agent and government
representative. He mobilised the formation of the Yoruba Community Association in Kano and used opposition party politics in defence of his business interests. Sanyaolu was born at Ijeun Abeokuta in 1896. He had his elementary education at Abeokuta, from where he proceeded to Lagos. In Lagos, he continued his education to acquire college training. The driving force towards his private business and his penchant for the nationalist movement were influenced by the inherent contradictions of British economic imperialism that impinged on the development of indigenous entrepreneurship.

**Sanyaolu as a business magnate**

3 Sanyaolu's career presents a typical example of African workers in European firms who, having acquired the necessary enterprising skill and capital, opted for self-employment. In 1915 he joined Lagos Stores Limited, a Liverpool merchandise company, as a clerk. He was transferred to Kano in 1916 and subsequently became a trader. In 1918 Sanyaolu established Olude Stores. He traded in local commodities and foreign goods. The Olude Stores was located at K13 Sabon-Gari Reservation Area. Sanyaolu's exit from the wage labour economy was principally influenced by economic and cultural factors. Between 1917 and 1919, the West African economy, and Nigeria's in particular, witnessed the increasing formation of cartels characterised by big business mergers, take-overs, inter-firm agreements, interlocking share holdings and the promotion of new subsidiaries for the monopoly control over supply for raw materials as well as price control.

4 Indeed, the mergers were a direct result of the economic crisis caused by the First World War, which generated new trading patterns and reallocation of resources from peacetime production to the war effort. In addition, bankruptcy engendered by the destruction of trading patterns and productive capacity made trade relatively unprofitable to most firms.

5 In 1917 Miller Brother and the African Association arrived in Kano following the liquidation of their partnership with the Niger Company. By 1919 the two firms, in collaboration with F. and A. Swancy of London, formed African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited. In the same year, the A and ETC Limited purchased Lagos Stores Limited, a pioneer firm in the groundnut trade.

6 These mergers displaced some of the Nigerian staff, who subsequently utilised their skill and capital in produce purchase, commodity trade and general merchandise. Before the establishment of Sabon-Gari market in 1918, there were more than eight Yoruba store owners in the Sabon-Gari Reservation Area. They were former employees of multinational firms. Their profit ranged from £6 to £200 per year. In a large measure, the economic policy thrust of the colonial social formation had a tendency towards monopoly. It undermined the foray of indigenous entrepreneurs into the mainstream of finance, production and distribution. The success of some of the Nigerian entrepreneurs depended critically on their willingness to make a transition from wage labour and reinvest their savings in sole proprietorship ventures. They were equally driven by the desire to retain or recapture their self-reliance within the framework of the colonial economy.
In 1934, Sanyaolu made a pioneering attempt to challenge the monopoly of expatriate firms, such as G. B. Ollivant, in the import-export trade by expanding the Olude Stores to become the first known supermarket and general merchandise store in Sabon-Gari Kano. He relocated from K 13 Sabon-Gari Reservation Area to expansive premises at 65/67, Church Road (now Awolowo Avenue). The premises were bought over from Holy Trinity School which relocated, in 1934, to its present premises at Tundun Wada Road, Sabon-Gari. The Stores dealt in imported general goods, including cutlery, household utensils, beverages, office equipment, electronics and bicycles. It was also involved in beer/wine sales and distribution. The retail outlet created by Olude Stores in the immigrants' neighbourhood was attuned to their taste and income. Small peddlers of groceries in the outlying residential areas did their purchases at Olude Stores. The short-lived economic boom of the mid-1930s had afforded Sanyaolu the opportunity to expand his enterprise by rendering services in the mortgage business. He became a government auctioneer, contractor, estate and commission agent.

He also became a produce (groundnut) buyer. He acted as a broker, buying produce from itinerant Hausa and Yoruba traders and selling it to the export firms. He employed about 15 clerks and labourers. He advanced goods and money to other traders who mortgaged their houses and lands for loans.

Olude Stores was also involved in the export of leather goods, purchased principally from Kano markets through his agents. Within Nigeria, Olude Stores was one of the approved cattle dealers. It railed cattle to the southern parts of Nigeria, specifically to Ibadan and Abeokuta, in exchange for foodstuffs, especially gari and yam flour.

With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, there was a great increase in the demographic density of Sabon-Gari Kano due to the influx of immigrants who came to Kano to work as clerks and labourers in the barracks built for the American, British and French soldiers. From 560 plots in 1936, the number of plots increased more than two-fold to 1,472 in 1939. In such a unique environment and commercial centre, there were virtually no relaxation centres in Sabon-Gari. Kano. The British colour bar was also an impetus. Residential and racial segregation in the colonial era were two interrelated factors that facilitated Sanyaolu's investment in recreation services. Educated Africans were prohibited from patronising the European Clubs established exclusively in the Government Reservation Areas (GRAs). It was as a result of these, one supposes, that Sanyaolu in 1939 established the first hotel in Sabon-Gari, named Colonial Hotel. He established and operated recreation and liquor businesses in the low income migrant neighbourhood without much competition, mainly because European entrepreneurs were reluctant to invest in African neighbourhoods plagued by a low spending capacity, disease and crime. Therefore, as long as racial inequality and racial segregation were not moderated, Sanyaolu's business continued to flourish in the immigrant neighbourhoods serving Southern Nigerian and West African customers.

The hotel was established as a branch of his commercial enterprise, occupying four plots at No. 23 Yoruba Road (now Ogbomoso Avenue) in Sabon-Gari. It was commissioned on 2nd April, 1940 at a grand ceremony attended by representatives of the Kano Native Authority (N.A.), including the Ma’aji the Alkali, Rev. S.O. Odutola and a colonial officer, Mr. E.P. Millan, who was a special guest. The hotel employed a resident musical band called Harlem Dandies Orchestra led by Mr. GA. Ikomi, a trumpeter. Musicians from Yorubaland, especially Yusuf Olatunji, Waidi Adio, Haruna
Isola and, much later, King Sunny Ade, Dele Abiodun frequently entertained at the hotel.

11 The Colonial Hotel had a cinema hall. The hotel has been the only hotel in Kano where Yoruba films have been periodically shown since the 1940s. The hotel promoted the films of Hubert Ogunde, Duro Ladipo, Baba Sala, Iso Pepper and many others. These services enhanced the popularity of the hotel and Yoruba culture. The hotel engaged the services of Hakuri Stores, which specialised in catering and hotel services.

12 For the Yoruba in Kano, Colonial Hotel was a social and commercial rendez-vous in the process of community formation. Many Yoruba taxi drivers utilised the hotel as taxi park. Passengers from the Kano railway station went directly to Colonial Hotel to hire taxis and also to meet their kinsmen. This transaction pattern had also created a niche for the Yoruba in the urban transport industry. The hotel facilitated the formation of Yoruba township unions, friendship clubs and cultural organisations. These unions and organisations included Egbe Omo Egba, Ijebu Young Men, Owu Nationals, Ekiti Parapo, Egba Mutual Society, Lisabi Club, and the Yoruba Central Welfare Association. These associations were founded in the early 1940s, with pioneer meetings at the hotel. The ethnic associations were indeed arenas of capital mobilisation and employment for artisans and small-scale entrepreneurs who had no access to finance in the colonial economy. Ethnic/town-ship associations were established to assist newcomers and to eliminate some of the logistics problems encountered by pioneer migrants. Reciprocally, it was the patronage of these socio-cultural organisations that formed part of the income generated by the hotel.

13 For many African entrepreneurs in the colonial era, the major impediment to business expansion was access to capital. A systematic attempt was made by the expatriate banks to keep indigenous entrepreneurs out of business by denying them loans. Though the banks accepted deposits from Africans, they considered them unworthy for credit facilities. In 1933, the National Bank of Nigeria Limited was established by Yoruba entrepreneurs, namely, Dr Akinola Maja, Chief T.A. Doherty and H. A. Subair.  

14 The bank was incorporated in Nigeria as a public company with a nominal capital of £576. The main aim of the bank was the provision of short-term finance or credit facilities to indigenous enterprises. Yet some entrepreneurs initiated other avenues for capital mobilisation through social networks and informal lending schemes. In 1941, D.O. Sanyaolu invited shareholders of Olude Store, who also served as directors of the company, to contribute to the expansion of business activities. They were Chief J.S. Adebayo, an Egba Yoruba produce buyer and trader, Mr. Aloba, an Ijebu-jesha trader, and Mr. Benjamin O. Sanyaolu (D.O. Sanyaolu’s younger brother). The Company opened branches in Lagos and Ibadan. It purchased two Chevrolet lorries and two cars for convenient transportation of goods and personnel.

15 The increase in the capital base of Olude Stores and the subsequent business expansion boosted Sanyaolu’s income. By 1943, Sanyaolu’s personal income was £350. He paid a tax of £83.  

16 In the period 1951-1952, Sanyaolu had surpassed other Yoruba traders, earning the highest annual income (£550) and paying a tax of £16: 18.  

17 In 1952, Olude Stores was one of the 23 Licensed Buying Agents for the Nigerian Groundnut Marketing Board.  

18
the 1957 produce season an agent of Olude Stores. Alhaji Sarkin Bai, purchased over 224 tons of groundnuts for Olude Stores at Kiyawa. By 1956/59. Sanyaolu’s income had increased to £1,900, the highest income in Sabon Gari, Kano. He was closely followed by Mr. F.E. Okonkwo, an Igbo transporter, whose income was quoted as £1,800 during the 1956/59 tax assessment.

At independence in 1960, the management changed the name of Colonial Hotel to “Paradise Hotel.” By this period, Sanyaolu’s business pattern also changed. He discontinued with produce (groundnut) purchase due to the northernisation policy of the Groundnut Marketing Board that encouraged and financed Hausa traders who were hitherto underrepresented in the trade. The Store concentrated on beer distribution. Olude stores was a major distributor of Top Larger Beer, produced in Kano by North Brewery. Small-scale beer distributors from other areas in Metropolitan Kano purchased 500 to 600 cartons each loaded in lorries.

Sanyaolu as a community leader and nationalist

The need for enduring connections to attract business or defend an enterprise against political interference led to politicking, expediency and pragmatism. At the formative stages of the nationalist movement, Nigerian merchants were the vanguards against British rule. Market-sharing agreements and price regulation by the expatriate trading firms provoked nationalist sentiments among the Nigerian business community. For example, in the 1930s incipient entrepreneurs and produce buyers, such as T.A. Odutola of Ijebu Igbo, S.O. Gbadamosi of Ikorodu and J.O. Fadahunsi of Ilesha, were active members of the Nigerian Youth Movement in Lagos which actively resisted the Cocoa Pool of 1937. Obafemi Awolowo, who became a party leader and Premier of Western Nigeria (1954-1959), began his political career as a transporter. In 1937, he organised the motor transporters’ strike in the defunct Western Region to protest the imposition of a licence fee by the colonial government to prevent undue competition with the Nigerian Railways. Indeed, indigenous entrepreneurs applied political pressure on the colonial state for reforms of the neo-patrimonial economic structure.

Sanyaolu’s politics were practised on two fronts: he was an Egba Yoruba patriot and a nationalist. As an Egba patriot he was the founding father of the Egba ethnic associations in Kano. He brought members together. He founded the Egba Mutual Society. Owu Nationals and Egbe Omo Egba in the late 1930s. They were cultural organizations aimed at improving the welfare of Egba nationals by forming a communal identity in Kano. The ethnic associations created prospects for accumulating business capital, training and information principally offered by the established entrepreneurs. In 1947, Sanyaolu founded Lisabi Club – the Egba Yoruba National Club which incorporated all Egba people and units. During his chairman-ship, the Lisabi Hall at Ogoja Avenue, Sabon-Gari was bought in 1954.

In 1949, he was awarded a traditional chieftaincy title, the Jaguna of Ijebu Abeokuta for his commercial prowess and community service.

He took a special interest in the physical, commercial and political development of Sabon-Gari Kano. He was politically influential. In 1933, he was a founding member of Sabon-Gari Representative Board. The Board was established by the British, principally to make the Sabon Gari community take charge of developmental processes
in the area. Sanyaolu was one of the few persons nominated for the post of both the executive head as well as president of the Sabon-Gari mixed court in 1938, after the death of Mr. G.E. France. He rejected the offer in order not to affect his business.

22 Sanyaolu was an executive member of the Plot Holders’ Association, Sabon-Gari Kano. In August 1940, he was appointed as an unofficial member of the Assessment Committee on Township Rates Appointment. Through motley social networks, Sanyaolu had seeming control over his business environment.

23 On 19th May 1943, Olude Street (now Ogbomoso Avenue) and Sanyaolu Street were among the first twelve streets named in Sabon Gari. These were to honour him for his political, social and economic contributions to the development of Sabon-Gari. He was one of the founding fathers of the first pan-Yoruba cultural group in Kano, the Yoruba Central Welfare Association (Egbe-Omo Oduduwa) in 1942. He offered the association two plots of land where Oduduwa Hall was built.

24 In Kano, Sabon Gari was the political fortress of progressive elements in the march to Nigerian independence. In a community predominantly inhabited by Southern Nigerian immigrants, members of the opposition political parties were drawn beyond ethnic and regional boundaries, thereby defying the British divide et impera policy.

25 Sanyaolu was a member of the opposition and radical political parties. He was the leader of the Action Group in Kano and led most of its campaign strategies by distributing party pamphlets, memos, flags and identity cards. Sanyaolu was also a supporter of the Northern Nigerian opposition party (the Northern Elements Progressive Union). His engagement in nationalist politics influenced the use of his hotel for campaigns and meetings. In the political arena, Colonial Hotel facilitated the advance of opposition politics in Northern Nigeria. Political meetings and nationalist campaigns of the post Second World War era were held at the hotel. The historic visit of Herbert Macaulay (1864-1946) (Hero of Nigerian Nationalism and founder of the first political party in Nigeria – The Nigeria National Democratic Party, formed in 1922) to Northern Nigeria was concluded with a speech at the Colonial Hotel, where he later collapsed and died while descending the hotel staircase on 7th May, 1946.

26 On November 19th 1950, Mallam Aminu Kano (leader of the Northern Elements Progressive Union) delivered a lecture on the British policy of indirect rule at the Colonial Hotel. Mallam Aminu Kano utilised the hotel to deliver an anti-British public lecture: “The Colonial Government Should Import More Machinery and Less Whiskey.” At the first general conference of NEPU in April 1951, Sanyaolu, popularly regarded as the leader of the Yoruba community in Kano was a guest. He urged NEPU (radical) politicians to “... unite with the Southerners in order to achieve emancipation.”

27 In 1953, Chief S.L. Akintola’s campaign tour of Northern Nigeria on “Nigeria’s self-government by 1956” was scheduled to take place at the hotel. The campaign tour was the proximate cause of the first Kano riot of May 1953 and so the campaign could not hold. In the ethnic violence that ensued, Sanyaolu was a member of the peace and reconciliation committee appointed to mobilise the Sabon-Gari community for calm and tranquility. Under the premiership of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sanyaolu served as the representative of the Yoruba in Kano in the Northern Nigeria House of Assembly in Kaduna. His participation in policy making and legislation not only protected the interests of the Yoruba in Kano but promoted peaceful-coexistence between the
migrant and the host communities. Nevertheless, Sanyaolu’s involvement in politics decisively dissipated his entrepreneurial drive, the corollary of which manifested after his death.

His death

28 On October 27th 1960, Sanyaolu died at the age of 64. His death had adverse effects on the company. Mr. B.O. Sanyaolu, his younger brother and a shareholder of the company, took over the leadership. In the early 1960s, the importation of household items and electronic equipment stopped due to inadequate capital. The store concentrated on beer distribution, staple foodstuffs, control of Paradise Hotel and other estates owned by the company in Kano. Mr. B.O. Sanyaolu died in June 1969. Mr. Aloba, a shareholder, took over control of the company. He concentrated on beer distribution, foodstuffs trade and leather goods. By 1975, the company was directed by Mr. J.S. Adebayo, another shareholder. During his tenure, the beer distribution that was hitherto operated on a very large scale was reduced to skeletal activities as a result of insufficient capital and low patronage arising from competition with Igbo and Yoruba traders. Mr. Adebayo died in the early 1980s.

29 Representatives of each of the shareholders assumed the management of the company, but company records were rarely documented for strategic continuity and accountability. Commercial activities at the Olude Stores collapsed due to mismanagement, and Paradise Hotel was leased out. Indeed, mismanagement has always been an irrefutable factor in the collapse of many African enterprises after the death of their proprietors. Succeeding managers of such businesses often lack the required zeal, orientation or strategy to sustain them. In addition, family feuds over the bequeathed businesses has often led to their being shared or squandered rather than continuity of investment.

30 In May 1984, Chief Alfred Afolarin Ogunmuyiwa, a former sales representative of Odutola Tyresoles, Kano rented the hotel for N200000 per year remitted to Olude Stores. In 1988, he built shops round the hotel for rentage to Igbo and Yoruba auto spare-part dealers in order to generate more revenue.

Conclusion

31 The life and work of Chief D.O Sanyaolu depicts the commercial exploits of Yoruba entrepreneurs in the colonial economy. Having acquired capital and skill, he quitted the services of Lagos Stores to become an independent trader. As an entrepreneur, he invested his capital and expertise to launch new commercial frontiers in the expanding Kano economy by establishing a super store and a hotel. He advanced credit to other traders who aided his commercial progress and later emerged as wealthy traders themselves. Sanyaolu epitomized Yoruba communal identity in Kano. He spearheaded the formation of ethnic associations among the Yoruba migrants and played the role of a father figure. His Paradise Hotel has continued to play significant roles in promoting cultural and communal activities among the Yoruba in Kano. As a community leader, Sanyaolu made unrelenting efforts to provide social infrastructures in Sabon-Gari,
Kano and his home town in Abeokuta. The business empire he bequeathed remained profoundly uncompetitive arising from managerial ineptitude.

NOTES

3. NAK\KanoProf\4292: Report on Native Reservation: Kano Township – List of Small Stores Holders in Sabon-Gari Before the establishment of Sabon Gari Market in 1918, p. 17.
8. Interview with Pa Oladele Awoloto, 77, in December 1999 and April 11. 2000 at No. 5 Tundun Wada Road, Kano, Pa Oladele came to Kano in 1920.
9. NAK\KanoProf\6123A: J.S. Adebayo, Plot No. K13, mortgaged his land to Olude Stores due to a business transaction, interview with Chief C A. Giwa, a former produce buyer who auctioned about 3 houses for Olude Stores due to inability of the owners to balance account in a poor harvest year 14th May. 2000 at No. 9, Ogbomoso Avenue, Sabon Gari, Kano.
10. NAK\SNP\17: 14739A Vol I: Hides and Skins Regulations: List of Approved Cattle Dealers.
13. Interview with Mr. A.O. Sanyaolu, 57. (son of Mr. B.O. Sanyaolu) at No. 35 Ogbomoso Avenue, Sabon Gari, Kano on 25th August 2000 and Olude Stores Limited 1959 Calendar.
15. RDC\BUK\Kano N.A. \ 13: Control of Tax Assessment Kano City: List of the most famous tradesmen in Sabon-Gari Market 1948
16. KHCB\NAP\Kano\343\355\5,000: Rich Traders – Sabon – Gari Income Tax Assessment 1951-1952.
19. Interview with Chief J.A. Sotayo, 72, Managing Director of Olumo Hotel, Odutola Street, Sabon Gari, Kano on 12th April. 2000. He was a former employee of Olude Stores.


25. Interview with A.O. Sanyaolu.

26. NAK \Kano Prof \Sabon-Gari Kano \ Plot Holders: Petitions 1945-1953.

27. KHCB\LAN\10\60: D.O, Sanyaolu –Licensed Auctioneer.

28. KHCB \LAN\28\Vol. 111: Assessment Committee on Township Rates Appointment 1940.

29. A. Bako, 1990, A Socio Economic History... pp. 182-83.


31. A. Abba. 1993, the Politics of Mallam Aminu Kano... p. 4.

32. Interview with Alhaji (Dr.) Maitama Sule at Dawakin Kano, July 2002.


ENDNOTES

1. Centre for Research and Documentation, Kano, and Department of History, University of Ibadan.

ABSTRACTS

The career of Daniel Oguntolu Sanyaolu offers a unique study of the African entrepreneurs in the early colonial period. As an innovative entrepreneur he pioneered large-scale enterprises in the import/export trade and in urban services (hotels and supermarkets). Sanyaolu was an ardent supporter of radical nationalist political parties including the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Action Group (A.G), as well as one of the leaders of the Yoruba community in Sabon-Gari, Kano. The business career of Sanyaolu depicts the binary intersection of economic and political forces deployed by African entrepreneurs in the quest for social change. This paper underscores three major features of entrepreneurship in colonial Nigeria: First, the resilient culture of independence and prospects for profits made many entrepreneurs to quit wage labour and invest in commercial ventures that provided services that were not necessarily in competition with European enterprise. Second is the nexus between ethnic identity, politics and entrepreneurship. During the colonial era entrepreneurs were vanguards in the reconstruction of their ethnic identities to advance commercial interests and social networks. They combined politics with business in order to create wider horizons for their commercial activities and to attempt to break the yoke of European monopoly by supporting nationalist movements. Third is
the challenge of sustainability of businesses after the demise of the pioneer founder(s). Many businesses have collapsed due to family squabbles and intrigues among networks of relations, staff and shareholders as well as lack of separation between ownership and management, which induces mismanagement. The paper concludes that after the demise of the owner(s), the business empire pioneered by Sanyaolu neither made the generational leap nor the capital accumulation that could guarantee its expansion.