Developments Up To The Inauguration Of The Iju Waterworks

1The supply of potable water, like electricity, was an issue of great concern in nineteenth-century Lagos. Throughout that century, the inhabitants of the city depended upon spring and well water. Many Lagosians, as well as crews of passing ships, relied on spring water on the mainland. Sir John Glover, an early colonial governor of Lagos, introduced public wells to the city,1 but the quality of water from such wells was variable. Accordingly, the Colonial Surgeon recommended that samples of water from the public wells in the city should be tested regularly, because well water was in some instances contaminated with sewage water from cesspools located close to the wells. He, therefore, suggested certain remedial measures. First, there should be a margin of 150 feet between the well and the nearest house. Second, all public wells should be clay-padded or cemented. Third, water should no longer be drawn with a bucket and string; instead, each well was to be covered and water drawn from it with a pump. Fourth, a space of twenty feet diameter around the well should be properly bricked and cemented. Fifth, the wells should be cleaned at short intervals.2 Some of these proposals were easily implemented but others were not. For instance, the suggestion that wells be clay-padded or cemented was a costly or difficult innovation. The colonial governor was thus sceptical about the Surgeon’s recommendations. He stated that although the public well water supply of Lagos “may be far from being as pure as it is desirable it should be, and although I would wish to encourage everything that can be done to improve its quality, it must not be forgotten that enormous progress has been made since Sir John Glover sank public wells … between 1882 (sic) [1862] and 1864.”3

2Against this background, the supply of potable (piped) water to the city received urgent consideration by the colonial government. In a comprehensive report of May 1898, the Chief Medical Officer offered an overview of the situation and made the following recommendations.4 First, that the well water of Lagos was “bad”; conversely, good water could be obtained outside the town where experimental wells had been sunk. Second, rain water collected in well-made clean tanks and properly filtered would be the safest for drinking and cooking purposes. Third, whatever was the means of collecting water, it could only be made fit for human consumption by filtering and boiling. He then concluded with the controversial recommendation that Europeans, as well as the “the more enlightened and educated native”, should re-locate to “a more healthy site on the main land where good water can be obtained and where proper drainage could be instituted ab initio.”

3The last recommendation might appear unrealistic but it was a pointer to the future development of water supply schemes in Lagos. Attempts had been made to secure supplies of fresh water from Ikorodu and Epe but these were frustrated by the considerable distances and the various bodies of water that separated them from Lagos. As with the supply of electricity, the question of cost and the consumer’s liability came up for consideration by early 1899. The colonial governor noted that the introduction of a water rate was bound to encounter stiff opposition from Lagosians, given their “violent objection … to the introduction of any kind of municipal rate.” He was, however, sure that the opposition would be overcome, though this might entail recourse to “strong measures.”5

4Following unsuccessful attempts to find suitable sources of water in the Ikoyi Plains and at Apapa, the mainland became the inevitable alternative and the most appropriate site was Iju, to the north of Lagos.6 The Iju waterworks were located some 1,000 feet below the confluence of the Adiyan river and the Iju stream. The catchment area had a length of four and half miles and a width of one three-quarter miles. The government acquired (and fenced) an area of 151 acres of land, river and swamp surrounding the waterworks on a 999-year lease. The area was originally sparsely populated and there were only a few farms in the vicinity. The inhabitants were prohibited from washing or bathing in the rivers and the leased area was patrolled by the police.7 The waterworks were completed in 1910 and formally commissioned on 1 July 1915 by Nigeria’s Governor-General, Sir Frederick Lugard. Lugard explained that at a total cost of a little over £300,000, the scheme had an initial capacity of about two and half million gallons per day, sufficient for 115,000 persons, more than half the population of Lagos. It consisted of three giant engines which pumped 5,000 gallons of water per minute. A total of 200 fountains were provided all over the city and 250 hydrants were installed to provide water in case of fire.8

The Rating and Incidence of Tariffs on Water in Colonial Lagos

5From the mid-1910s to 1943, water from Iju was conveyed to Lagos via a cast iron main trunk with a diameter of 28 inches. In the latter year, the capacity of the plant was increased to six million gallons per day and another cast iron trunk with a diameter of 26 inches was laid to facilitate supply to Lagos. A third steel trunk main with a diameter of 42 inches was added in 1962. The waterworks was thus continuously upgraded to increase its capacity, which rose to 24 million gallons per day in 1965, 35 million gallons per day in 1973 and 45 million gallons per day in 1985. By the latter date, a 5,000 cubic meter reservoir was constructed at Ishaga to boost the capacity of the waterworks.9 From the beginning, potable water from the waterworks was intended for the European Residential Area at Ikoyi, but supply was gradually extended to the African community on the island. Accordingly, the first public standpipe was constructed at the junction of Bankole and Chapel Streets, in the Olowogbowo area of Lagos Island.10 A Lagos newspaper remarked in 1915 that potable water and “fine houses” were the key changes taking place in the city during this period.11 By the end of that year, it was being claimed that improved water supplies had begun to affect mortality rates in Lagos.12 By 1928, the water supply scheme served Lagos and its suburbs of Ebute Metta, Iddo, Ijora, Apapa and Ikoyi.13 The impression that potable water from Iju was widely embraced, though true to a great extent, masks the great controversy that surrounded the innovation.

6At the inauguration of the scheme in 1915, Lugard had provided details of the cost of provision and maintenance of the facility. The annual maintenance, including interest and sinking fund, was about £20,000. While the greater part of this would fall on the public revenue, the rest was to be borne by the people through the payment of rates. Lugard gave the assurance that Lagos would not pay more than a quarter of the cost and that tenements whose capital value, including the land, did not exceed £50 would be exempt from payment. Those up to a capital value of £300 would pay on a graduated scale, the maximum being 20 shillings per month. Officials would pay for the water they used on a fixed scale.14

7However, as has been alluded to above, colonial officials anticipated opposition to the water rate. Given the people’s antipathy towards any form of taxation, opposition to the water rate became a major socio-political issue in Lagos during the inter-war years. As other studies have demonstrated, the issue polarized the indigenous community and combined with other issues to shape the politics of this period.15

8By an order under the Waterworks Ordinance of 30 March 1933, payments of the water rate were to be made in advance by equal half yearly payments on the first day of April and the first day of October. The rate was still five per cent of the annual value of the tenements. Tenements exempted from payment included those on which buildings had not been erected; cemeteries; government premises (where they were not leased to any person); places of worship; public recreation grounds and tenements with a value lower than £6.16 Water supply to defaulting customers was to be cut off, while unpaid rates were recovered by civil action in the courts. Another bye-law under the Lagos Township Ordinance (chapter 59) of 19 March 1940 fixed new water rates. Tenements in the first schedule attracted a rate of one shilling four pence for each pound sterling of their annual value. Those in the second schedule within Yaba Estate paid two per cent of their ‘‘unimproved value.”17

9Water was also supplied to merchant ships and government vessels which called at the port of Lagos. From January 1916, a rate of five shillings per 1,000 gallons or 1s 2.5d per ton of 240 gallons was levied at Iddo (Lagos), while at Port Harcourt the charge was two shillings for the same quantity of water. In May 1921, the Nigerian government increased the rates at Iddo to 8s 4d per 1,000 gallons.18 It would appear that the rates weighed heavily on shipping and this prompted Elder Dempster and Company Limited to plead for a reduction. At the rate of ten pence per 100 gallons, the firm paid £2,472:18:4d between June 1921 and June 1922. It hoped that reduced charges would encourage it to take larger quantities of water at Lagos since the size of its steamers was increasing.19 The government declined to reduce these charges, which were stated to be fair compared with those levied in other colonies, such as Sierra Leone. However, a sliding scale of charges was proposed to Elder Demspter to compensate it for any increase (in excess of 500,000 gallons per month) in its demand for water.20

10Further tariff changes were introduced in 1928 as follows. Water supplied from pipes on the wharves to vessels other than Government craft attracted a charge of 8s 4d per 1000 gallons while Government craft paid only 3s 6d per 1000 gallons. Shipping firms supplied from Government tugs or water barges paid a rate of 8s 4d per ton of 240 gallons. The apparently higher rates in the latter case was attributed to the need to cover costs: first, the actual costs of the water supplied by the PWD, and , second, the running costs and depreciation of the water lighter and tug employed in towing the lighter to and from the ships. However, as water was cheaper when supplied from the shore hydrants, virtually all the commercial vessels obtained their supplies from the wharf. The only concession was a reduction of charges on Her Majesty’s vessels from 8s 4d per ton to the same rate for 1,000 gallons.21 As an example of cost saving by the shipping lines, Elder Dempster and Woermann Linie opted to pay five shillings per 1,000 gallons as they used their own hoses from the metered stand-pipe on the wharf.22 Further changes were effected in 1934: vessels other than government craft paid 8s 4d per 1,000 gallons, the latter paid 2s 6d per 1,000 gallons, while firms using their own hose-pipes at their own wharves paid 5s per 1,000 gallons. This reflected a new policy that “the water should be sold as a commodity, the rate in principle being based on the cost of production (including interest and depreciation).”23

11In all, shipping took a substantial proportion of water supplied to the city of Lagos. The estimates of demand by commercial and shipping firms for 1934-35 were as follows: Elder Dempster (1,568,000 gallons); Woermann Linie (156,000 gallons); and United Africa Company (252,000 gallons), totalling 1,976,000 gallons. For the same period, a total volume of 13,284,000 gallons was supplied to H.M. ships and government craft in Lagos, compared with a total of 8,929,800 gallons to other ships.24

The Quality of Potable Water From the Iju Waterworks and Other Sources

12As the quality of water supply had been the primary motivation behind the introduction of the water supply scheme, it was only to be expected that the colonial authorities would pay attention to the quality of water supplied from Iju. Consequently, a weekly bacteriological examination of samples of water along the mains and in the city was undertaken and appropriate advice given to the consumers. In the event of burst pipes, the public were advised to boil all water drawn in the first twelve hours after the restoration of supplies.25

13The precaution was justified by an incident in July 1925, which was not uncommon, when a joint on the main on the Lagos side of Carter bridge cracked. This affected the water samples taken in Lagos which, upon examination, were found to be contaminated, presumably because the blown section of the main was located in “one of the most insanitary” neighbourhoods on the island.26 Such an occurrence would also necessitate a general flushing of the affected section of the mains.

14Although the results of examinations conducted in 1925 might not be representative of the trends during the 1920s, they suggest that the quality of water was often low. A series of analyses between 14 August and 14 September 1925 revealed that rainfall interfered with the source of raw water at the waterworks by introducing organic impurities. This was, however, compounded by the malfunctioning of the beds at Iju which caused inefficient filtration. Further investigations also showed that there were also local sources of contamination, as confirmed when samples from standpipes in Yaba produced good results while those from Lagos and Ebute Metta did not.27

15Local contamination in the pipes serving the city of Lagos generally resulted from burst or leaky pipes, laying of new pipes, or partial stagnation in a section of the pipe system which allowed microbes already in the water to multiply there. Hence, any sample taken from such a point would yield unsatisfactory results whereas the water supplied from Iju might be otherwise satisfactory. This was the case when the mains burst at Ebute Ero, Okesuna and Idumagbo on Lagos Island in early May 1926, and near Carter Bridge in February 1928.28

16Samples from Yaba on the mainland were usually taken as the control and they were generally satisfactory, whereas those taken on the island usually contained some form of contamination or the other for any of the reasons already stated. Samples taken at Ikoyi were contaminated by the laying of new pipes connected with the building operations in the emerging new town there.29 When, as was the case in most instances, samples from Yaba were found to be satisfactory, it was interpreted to mean that the water was good from the source at the Iju waterworks while samples taken in Lagos must have been contaminated locally. The Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, however, allayed fears in this respect: “The results of analyses of the Iju Water Supply have not been very satisfactory from a bacteriological point of view, but it is not considered that the amount of pollution present is likely to be dangerous to the general health of the inhabitants of Lagos.”30 Nevertheless, the government took steps to purchase chemicals and equipment for the chemical treatment and chlorination of the Iju Water Supply.

17It may be noted that the introduction of potable water did not lead to the abandonment of wells as a source of supply of water. In 1921, there were 2,679 wells in the metropolitan area, consisting of 1,478 in Lagos and 1,201 in Ebute Metta. However, 17 wells in Lagos and 76 at Ebute Metta were filled up in the year while 30 new ones were sunk in Ebute Metta during the year. The number of wells in Lagos fell by 23 to 2,656 (1549 of which were in Lagos itself) in 1922. In 1921, over 417 million gallons of treated water were supplied to the city, out of which the railways and shipping took 60 million gallons.31 As might be expected, well water did not compare favourably with treated water from Iju. When samples of water from wells and standpipes were examined in February 1927, though the latter showed a relatively high bacterial (coli) content, the well samples were “very bad,” necessitating instructions that they be closed, as they constituted “nuisances” under Section 7 sub-section 6 of the Public Health Ordinance.32 A consistently high rate of pollution was detected in the well samples examined in Lagos in early 1927. In contrast, samples from the standpipes were generally satisfactory all through May while there was a relapse in June.33

18Meanwhile, ageing pipes and frequent contamination continued to affect the quality of pipe-borne water in Lagos. The Director of Public Works suggested that, while a comprehensive scheme for relaying the mains could only be properly formulated after a town planning scheme was formulated, the repair of burst mains should be seized upon to ameliorate conditions inimical to the interests of the general populace and the activities of the Lagos Fire Brigade.34 With regard to contamination, officials concluded that “more effective filtration” was required, especially when the rains fell after an unusually long dry spell.35 The problem persisted, however, as a report of July 1927 stated emphatically that the examination of water samples from Lagos Island and Yaba showed that the quality was “not up to the standard at which a treated water supply should be maintained.” As the control sample at Yaba, located between the waterworks and the point of consumption, was contaminated, the treatment at Iju was considered “not so effective as it should be.”36 Yet, no case of epidemic was reported.

19The quality of water supplied from Iju was variable during the late 1920s. Though the water was often discoloured, it was adjudged to be “of good quality.” Lagosians did not seem to share this optimism, as a newspaper account of February 1927 indicates with reference to the “inadequacy of the supply and quality of the Pipe Borne Water from Iju.” It stated that for “the past two years the supply … has been poor… It is annoying to a degree to have to wait for a bath the while water trickling through the pipe spasmodically.”37

20A major step towards ensuring the quality of water supply to Lagos was taken in 1928 by the proposal to establish an experimental plant at the Iju waterworks. The aim was to treat the source water at Iju for the following reasons: to eliminate bacteria and other organisms to make the supply safe and potable; to neutralize acidity and inhibit corrosion of the mains; to increase the rate of filtration and prolong the life of the filters; to remove colour and turbidity; and to provide physically attractive water. Laboratory experiments had shown that the acidity was caused by dissolved carbon dioxide, which could be removed by aeration, while the water could be clarified by coagulation with aluminium sulphate. A comprehensive report on this experiment was submitted in July 1929 by the Government Analyst.38

The Management of Demand for Potable Water

21There was a steady increase in the demand for and consumption of treated water in Lagos during this period. The figures for 1925 and 1926 approximated 527 million gallons for each year, while the quantity supplied in 1927 was 644 million gallons, an increase of 22.2 per cent on the previous year. The significant rise in the consumption of water in Lagos was attributed to an “abnormally dry season” and the closure of the wells in the city. The increased demand was reflected in an increase in the labour and coal charges at the Iju Pumping Station, for which an extra vote of £650 had to be created.39

22Occasional disruptions in supply were experienced by Lagosians during this period. One such resulted from the failure of a joint in a 24-inch main between Lagos and Iju on 20 April 1930. Supply was cut off for two days while the necessary repairs were undertaken. Limited stop-gap supplies were made available by motor transport during this period, presaging the recourse to water tankers in the last quarter of the twentieth century.40 Supplies were also disrupted for a few hours whenever the valves were being cleaned at the waterworks. There were other instances of disruptions in the supply, particularly when major works were undertaken in the city. These were usually for a few hours, such as when alterations were made in the new Denton Causeway in August 1933.41 Again, there were “two serious breakdowns in the water supply for Lagos Island” in the second half of 1936, which were attributed to “the settling of the ground on Denton Causeway.”42

23The major disruptions of 1936 had wider ramifications. As the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services pointed out, the failure of water supply to a crowded settlement like Lagos was a health hazard capable of causing an epidemic. This was on account of the large number of residents whose sewage disposal had come to depend on flushing with water. The Town Engineer confirmed that there were “extreme dangers of repeated failures of supply to the town now that so many people have installed water-borne sewage installations in their houses, and that the bulk of the latrines in Lagos are of the water-borne type.”43

24Moreover, as water had to be stored in households in such circumstances, there was the danger of yellow fever and the pollution of water in the mains “following negative pressures.” The Town Engineer therefore recommended the provision of a reservoir capable of twenty-four hours’ emergency supply to the city. The Director of Public works, however, allayed these fears, explaining that such disruptions would occasionally occur. He envisaged that the laying of a new main between Carter Bridge and the centre of Ebute Metta “will decrease the probability of interruption on that section - now the most critical of the supply mains - to negligible proportions.”44

25A related issue was the prudent management of supplies. It was observed in 1942 that demands for water supplies throughout Nigeria “have increased and are increasing.” Consequently, in order to reduce the strain on plant and curtail imports of chemicals and lubricants during the war, restrictions were placed on the use of water. The use of hose pipes for garden watering was forbidden, but watering cans could be used between 4.30 and 6.30 p.m. Every effort was to be made to avoid all waste, and leakages were to be rectified with despatch.45

26Further attempts were made to conserve water supplies in subsequent years. Posters were made to educate consumers on the need to report leaking taps to the water authority with despatch. Announcements were made by press notice and local radio and the following points were stressed:

1. Do not water gardens with mains water.
2. Cut down bath and washing water to a minimum and, after, use it for garden watering.
3. Do not flush W.C’s unnecessarily.
4. Do not allow staff to bath, wash themselves or household utensils under a running tap but use water sparingly in a basin or pail.
5. Report immediately all leaking taps, pipes, joints, W.C’s etc to the Superintendent, Lagos Water Supply, Broad Street. Phone 185.
6. Keep reminding everyone as some memories are so short and many persons get lax if not continually reminded.46

Spatial Expansion of Potable Water Supplies

27During the 1930s, the spatial expansion of water supply beyond the municipal area was a major issue that colonial officials had to grapple with. This followed requests by communities along the mains between Iju and Lagos: Mushin and Oshodi Stations which were important points along the railway line between Iddo terminus and Abeokuta. Individual and group requests from those places were hinged on economic and social needs, such as pig rearing. However, a case was made for Mushin to enjoy priority over Oshodi: “for political reasons the [installation of water supply at Oshodi] …should not be carried out until something has been done for Mushin where the position is of much greater public importance.”47

28At the end of the day, the pleas by colonial officials at the local level and by community leaders in Oshodi and Mushin did not sway the central government to extend treated water to those settlements. In February 1943, an official of the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) declared emphatically that “the Department’s policy (was) that the Iju supply should be reserved for the Township of Lagos only.”48 Yet, two water-selling stations had been opened at Agege and Ikeja. The leaders of the affected communities did not give up, however. At a meeting of the Ikeja Area Native Group Council with the Commissioner of the Colony in May 1946, the Reverend T.A.J. Ogunbiyi, a leading cleric and cultural nationalist, made a strong case for the Area. He asked for “more Water Supply in the Area and Electric Lights in the principal towns on the main-road i.e. Mushin, Oshodi, Ikeja, Agege and Agbado.”49

29As late as 1954, pipe-borne water had not been extended to most of the areas outside the island. However, definite plans were made in that year to provide a skeleton distribution scheme to supply and lay mains, erect street fountains and other works at a cost of £42,500.50 The area lying between Agege Motor Road and the Railway line in Mushin was to receive priority attention at a cost of £9,450, though it was feared that the inhabitants of other areas of Mushin and Tinubu would resent their exclusion from the scheme. It would appear that the location of many of these neighbourhoods outside the municipal boundary was a major obstacle to the extension of the scheme to them. It was stated that an agreement had to be reached with the Ikeja Native Authority with regard to the payment for water supplied to those areas before that could be effected. Individuals in the Ikeja area still submitted applications through the District Officer (D.O.), Ikeja but not all were approved. The local colonial official expressed surprise on one occasion that “the latest private European venture, that of Cappa & D’alberto, has been provided with a water-supply which has been denied to worthy African applicants.”51

30The exchange of correspondence on this issue reveals that some African consumers outside the municipal boundary had made illegal connections, which were promptly disconnected. In the case of the European firm alluded to above, approval had been given by the Inspector-General of the P.W.D., apparently because of the scale of the firm’s operations in the area. All illegal connections outside the township boundary which were disconnected were not to be re-connected for a period of twelve months, and a second connection fee would have to be paid.

31A general policy statement on the extension of water supply beyond the Township was finally made in October 1954. Distribution mains were to be laid in the Mushin and Tinubu areas “in the very near future” to supply water to those areas. This raised the vexed issue of payment and the local government authority was expected to collect the water rate on behalf of the P.W.D. The P.W.D. stipulated that “until this agreement is reached a supply cannot be given to areas outside the Township Boundaries.”52 The Ikeja Native Authority was made the Prescribed Authority under section 2 of the Waterworks Ordinance on 30 December 1954. In that capacity it was to determine the rates to be paid by the people and to collect and transmit the proceeds to the Colony administration.

32From early 1955, approval was given for private metered supplies to be made to applicants in Mushin and Agege. The spatial expansion of treated water to the mainland continued during the year. The “present position”, the D.O. Ikeja noted in October 1955, “is that laying of three mains in the most densely populated parts of Mushin has gone ahead rapidly during the last two months, but the Director of Federal Public Works is still arguing as to how supplies should be paid for.”’53 The pressure for the extension of supplies across the Township boundary increased but many of the applications were rejected because the applicants lived in a different political entity.

33The Western Region, in which those communities were located, held discussions with the Lagos authorities to facilitate the extension of pipe-borne water to Mushin, Agege, Ikeja and Ajeromi District Councils. The lack of adequate supplies of water to those areas was said to have constituted “an embarrassment to the (Western) Regional Government.”54 The government, accordingly, appointed the Director of the Federal Public Works Department as Water Authority for the District Councils with effect from 21 June 1956. In July, it was decided to pursue the water supply schemes on the western side of the Ikorodu road in Mushin. The cost of minor distribution mains, estimated at £1,525, was to be borne by the Western Regional Government. An official noted that lack of water was “holding up the development of this area, and the capital cost is not unduly large.”55

34By the end of the colonial period, water supply had not covered several parts of the mainland opposite the island of Lagos. In the late 1950s, requests were still being considered in respect of Ajegunle, which was to be one of the most densely populated satellite settlements within the metropolitan area within a decade. However, until 1967 the area remained in the Western Region, on the fringe of the Lagos Municipal Area and was, therefore, denied water and other urban facilities available in Lagos on account of the political boundary between the Lagos Federal Capital Territory and the Western Region. But of equal importance was the limited capacity of the Iju waterworks. The Federal Minister of Works, Alhaji Inuwa Wada, noted in February 1957 that “the primary cause preventing the extension is the lack of capacity of the Iju Waterworks to meet further demands. Plans to increase its capacity ate now in hand and the successful completion of the programme should ensure that by 1960 sufficient water will be available for a metered supply to each of the four District Council Areas [that is, Agege, Ajeromi, Ikeja and Mushin].”56

35Meanwhile, efforts were also made to boost supplies to the city by erecting water reservoirs, as had been recommended by officials in the previous decade. Two steel tanks, each with a storage capacity of one million gallons, were fabricated in the United Kingdom and erected at Onikan. The existing storage capacity of six million gallons had become insufficient to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding city. It was, therefore, decided to increase the storage capacity “both as a precautionary measure to give at least 24 hours’ supply in case of a breakdown, and to maintain the pressure at peak periods of consumption.”57 By this time, the demand for water in Lagos was already exceeding eight million gallons daily. Although the waterworks could treat and pump nearly twelve million gallons of water over twenty-four hours, the maximum demand, starting from about 5.30 a.m. daily, was always “considerably in excess of the average” and the mains were ‘“no longer large enough to cope with peak requirements.”’58

36On the eve of independence in 1960, metropolitan Lagos was fairly well served by supplies from Iju. The quality of the water was variable but there was no report of an epidemic such as might be traceable to the poor quality of treated water. Wells continued to serve areas that had not been connected to the mains, mainly in the adjoining communities in the Western Region, though attempts were being made to extend the service to those areas.

Developments since the 1960s

37The expansion of potable water supply in Greater Lagos did not proceed rapidly till 1967 when Lagos State was created. Consequently, the communities on the urban fringe were formally merged with Lagos, thus facilitating the extension of amenities to them. However, before then the laying of a third trunk main from Iju in -1962, through the Ikeja Industrial Area, had extended supply to the residential areas along the Ikorodu Road/Airport axis. This development effectively connected the developed areas east of the metropolis with the Lagos urban water supply.59 By 1970, 80 per cent of the population of Surulere on the mainland had “adequate potable piped water supply”, while the remainder depended on well water.60

38However, while in the post-Independence era potable water services were gradually being extended across the metropolis, wells continued to be an important source of supply in the suburban communities. A detailed study of Shomolu, a growing suburban community of 500,000 persons (1963 census), in 1970 reported that “[m]ost of the inhabitants … use well water and water supplied by street fountains. Only a few rich landlords provide their tenants with pipe-borne water in their compounds or houses.”61 The use of well water in that community, and in similar places on the mainland, was informed by two considerations. First, there was no hope of the Lagos Water Supply Board extending supplies to those areas in the foreseeable future. Second, it was popularly believed that well water was more tasty than water from Iju waterworks and that it contained curative properties.

39In reality, the quality of the well water was often questionable. In the aforementioned study, samples taken from nine wells constructed before 1935 (some 35 years before) were analyzed and gave significant results. Though the wells were all bricklined inside and reinforced with concrete outside, they were located between five and forty feet from pail or pit latrines. Buckets with ropes were used to draw water from them. Laboratory analyses produced the following findings about the well water samples compared to treated water from Iju. First, physical analysis indicated that the former was more acidic than treated water. The implication of this was that acidic water caused stomach upsets and corroded containers and pipes. Second, chemical analysis of the water samples showed that wells yielded softer water than the treated one and also contained a higher iron content, which gave a bitter taste to the water. Softer well water was, however, advantageous for saving soap during domestic use. Third, results of bacteriological analysis showed that well water samples suffered from faecal contamination.62

40It is worth noting that from the days of Administrator/Commissioner of the Colony to the era of the Minister of Lagos Affairs, up to 1967 when Lagos State was created, the supply of water to Lagos had been the responsibility of the national government. Hence, the Lagos State Water Board, subsequently renamed the Lagos State Water Corporation, supplied potable water to the city and the state. The exponential growth in the population of the city, which over-stretched the capacity of Iju waterworks, necessitated the establishment of another waterworks at Ishasi, drawing on the River Owo. Constructed between November 1974 and December 1975, it was completed in time for the Festival of Black and African Arts and Culture (FESTAC), which took place in 1977.63 With a capacity of only four million gallons of water per day, it was intended to serve the Festival Village, now known as FESTAC Town, during that global festival.

41Further developments took place during the short-lived Second Republic (1979-83) when the government of Alhaji Lateef Jakande constructed ten mini-waterworks across the state at a cost of N50 million. This was the thrust of its “Rapid Development of Water Supply” programme.64 Seven of these, constructed between 1981 and 1983, served metropolitan Lagos and each had a capacity of up to three million gallons per day. They were located in Agege, Shasha Village, Shomolu, Aguda, Apapa, Isolo and Amuwo-Odofin. The government also embarked on the gigantic Adiyan waterworks project, the largest of its kind in Africa. The sheer cost and size of the project necessitated the involvement of funding bodies such as the World Bank. Unfortunately, the economic crisis that led to the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the mid-1980s, and the seizure of power by the military, militated against the completion of the project as scheduled. Table 3.1 below shows the capacities, by 1987, of waterworks in Lagos State, most of which served the metropolis.

42In spite of the high total daily production (Table 3.1), the water supply situation in Lagos was becoming critical, in response to population explosion in the metropolis, as indicated in Table 3.2 below. By 1985, only 47 per cent of the inhabitants of the Lagos metropolitan area had access to potable water “at reduced level of service.”65 The point ought to be stressed that all the while, the provision of potable water remained the responsibility of the government. The Lagos State Water Corporation, established by the Lagos State Water Corporation Law, Cap. 108 of 1986, was vested with the tasks of controlling and managing all waterworks and groundwater in the state; establishing, managing, controlling and developing new waterworks for the public; ensuring the supply of adequate and potable water throughout the state at reasonable charges; and encouraging, from time to time, the conduct of research for the purpose of carrying out its functions.66

43During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the city experienced a serious shortfall in supply which has been made good by alternative sources of water. The most important alternative source has been the supply of water by operators of water tanker services, who retail water to consumers, moving up and down streets and from door to door. Apart from commercial water tankers, there are also those operated by private firms and public institutions to alleviate the hardship of their staff.

TABLE 3.1: AVERAGE PRODUCTION FIGURES FROM WATERWORKS IN LAGOS STATE, 1987

44Based on this writer’s personal experience from 1987 to 1996 at Ilupeju, one of the oldest middle class residential estates in Lagos, it can be asserted that such alternative suppliers, corporate and private, provided the bulk of water consumed within the estate. This was also the case in other parts of the city, particularly during the dry season, or when water mains were damaged by road construction firms, or when the waterworks had any technical problems.

TABLE 3.2: PROJECTED POPULATION AND WATER DEMAND IN LAGOS, 1985-2005

45It may be stated, however, that water shortages, though general all over the city, vary in intensity from locality to locality: some areas are better served than others. An important source in all parts of Lagos is the private boreholes and wells sunk by landlords. As in the case of power generators, there has been a proliferation of wells and boreholes, particularly the latter, since the 1980s. These complement water tankers and the public supply and are most crucial during the dry season, when acute shortages are quite common. It has not been possible to obtain precise figures of the volume of water supplied by commercial water tankers, especially as the business has a long pedigree. A few examples will illustrate the cost and importance of this alternative source of water supply. In 1980, water was sold in Agege and Ajegunle, where most people lacked access to piped water, at the rate of 25 kobo per bucket or tin.67 At Isolo, residents of the low-cost housing estate claimed that by 1988 they had spent N1.6 million per year on the purchase of water from tanker operators.68 In addition, “Hausa” water hawkers supply individuals and families belonging to the low income group, especially in the high density areas of Lagos.

46An equally important source of public water supply in Lagos since the closing decade of the last century is packaged water, popularly known as “pure water.” This refers to supposedly treated water in small plastic packages which are retailed on the streets, particularly at motor parks and similar public places. While the quality of such water has always been open to question, there has been no outbreak of an epidemic that might be attributed to the consumption of impure or contaminated “pure water.” However, there are indications that the quality of “pure water” sold in Lagos may not conform to the highest standards of purity.

47A recent study by Dr. Udoma Mendie of the College of Medicine, University of Lagos, entitled “Cyclical Growths of Contaminants in Drinking Water Packaged in Polythene Bags”, reached startling conclusions. Laboratory analyses of 100 polythene pouches of “pure water” from ten producers showed that they were all contaminated by various microbes, among which were: Staphylococci (3%); Bacillus species (70%); Escherichia coli (8.2%) Pseudomonas species (7%); and Klebsiella aerogenes (11.8%). There were no traces of salmonella or Shigella species. Mendie’s survey revealed that most of the producers of “pure water” carry out their operations under very unsanitary conditions; the workers are deficient in personal hygiene and do not use protective clothing and face masks. In addition to the danger of improper and unhygienic preparation, there was the peril of leaching of additives from the polythene pouches into the water. The researcher recommended that producers must ensure that the strictest sanitary conditions are met while the final product should be analyzed, with particular reference to microbial content.69

48That said, there has been no clear association of any outbreaks of epidemic with “pure water” as such. This contrasts with the outbreak of typhoid and cholera viruses and the detection of “dangerous levels of mercury” in the Lagos University Teaching Hospital water supplies in 1979. A total of 80 people had died of typhoid in 1989 and over a thousand received medical treatment. This was attributed to the contamination of water by sewage near a burst pipe.70

49Fortunately, concerned about the alarming rate of the sale and consumption of sub-standard, and even, counterfeit, drugs and food, the Federal Government has established the National Agency for Food and Drugs Control (NAFDAC) to enforce quality control according to set standards. Although the Agency seems to have attracted much publicity on account of its great success in dealing with importers and makers of fake drugs, it has been equally active in dealing with the makers of “pure water.” The latter are required to register their products and subject them to appropriate tests before they can be registered and endorsed for sale to the public.

50NAFDAC’s quality control measures are quite stringent, as can be gleaned from the requirements stipulated for prospective investors in the commercial water production business. The comprehensive guidelines include such specifications as the depth of boreholes (not below sea level); distance of borehole from septic tanks (thirty meters); methods of water purification and disinfection; location of factory; standardization of equipment and packaging materials and qualifications and health of personnel. Officials of the Agency carry out routine and unscheduled inspection of premises and prosecute makers and hawkers of sub-standard packaged water, especially brand without a NAFDAC Registration Number. The sanctions include a fine or jail sentence and the forfeiture of impure or defective packaged water, which is promptly destroyed.

51The precise volume of the “pure water” business is unknown; but this may be estimated from the large quantity of waste generated by consumers of this product who litter the streets of the city with empty sachets. The important point is that the mere existence of this booming business is an indirect admission that official sources of treated water supply are inadequate to serve the teeming population of metropolitan Lagos. It should be conceded, however, that this enterprise has brought relief to travellers and participants in various social and political activities, especially wedding and funeral parties, political rallies and religious crusades. The handy packets enjoy an unassailable advantage of convenience and cost over other brands of packaged water, particularly the more reputable bottled water, such as SWAN or RAGOLIS. The sale of packaged water has since become a booming business in the city, thus validating the Yoruba saying, “Aponmitan kii p’ofo” (the water hawker does not sustain a loss).

52A notable development in the last few years has been the involvement of the private sector in the supply of potable water. Under the LSWC Private Sector Participation (PSP) programme, companies were to build and operate waterworks all over Lagos State. This was on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis. Private investors were expected to build waterworks in particular areas and distribute water to consumers for a period of ten to fifteen years before handing the waterworks over to the state government. This approach to water supply was informed by the staggering cost of supplying water to the rising population of the state, which was beyond the means Of the government. Such operators would charge economic rates to cover the cost of their operations.71 By 1998, the monthly cost of supplying water to Lagosians totalled N106.6 million: cost of chemicals (N60 million); electricity bills (N15 million); workers’ salaries (N6 million); maintenance of equipment and running costs (N15.6 million); and other costs (N10 million).72

53It was not until the civilian administration of Bola Tinubu took over power from the military administration of Buba Marwa in May 1999 that the idea of involving the private sector in the supply of water became official policy. The new administration opted for privatization in view of the scarcity of investible government funds in the face of competing demands from other sectors of the economy, such as education, health and roads. It argued that the notion of water as a “free social good” was no longer sustainable, given the cost implications of the entire process of abstraction, treatment, transmission and distribution of potable water. At its inception, the government was confronted with a situation where, on the one hand, a vast majority of the inhabitants of the state did not have access to pipe-borne water, and, on the other hand, the government was saddled with “a heavy burden and a chronic drain on the State’s coffers.”73

54The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was, therefore, invited to assist as Financial Adviser in the government’s effort to privatize the water sector of the economy. The long-term goals of the Private Sector Participation (PSP) programme included the development of the infrastructure for water and the extension of supply to the entire population in an efficient and cost-effective way without laying a fiscal burden upon the State. The intention of the government was to achieve the privatization of water supply, through a learning process, by engaging private investors. The ultimate aim was to make the LSWC a regulatory body of all investors. In that capacity, it would undertake, among others, the setting of tariffs and quality of potable water in the state.74

55Eventually, the LSWC came under private sector management in 2001 with the following objectives:

• To bring technical and management expertise and new technology into the sector;
• To improve economic efficiency in the sector in both operating performance and the use of capital investment by adopting commercial principles and practice;
• To inject large scale investment capital into the sector or gain access to private capital markets to free government funds for other projects;
• To make the sector more responsive to customers’ needs and preferences.75

56There was strong opposition to the PSP programme as it was feared that the state’s assets were being mortgaged. The government was therefore constrained to undertake an aggressive campaign of enlightenment to allay such fears. The scheme of private sector management of the LSWC took off in 2001 and was able to achieve a 47 per cent increase in profit in the first year of operation. Audited accounts of the Corporation showed that, compared with a profit of N 338.36 million in 2000, the returns for 2001 totalled N 496.79 million. It earned a revenue (including water sales and government subvention) amounting to N 1.54 billion in 2001 compared to N 1.1 billion for the previous year. The water output increased from 339.32 million litres in 2000 to 377.66 million litres in 2001.76 Yet, much remains to be done. The Corporation, which has a pile of debts to settle with the World Bank and the Federal Ministry of Water Resources and Rural Development, still needs between $1.8 billion and $2 billion, spread over fifteen years, to update existing projects and ensure the optimal provision of water. Ten new micro waterworks are under construction, but the erratic electric power supply and pipeline vandalization continue to disrupt water supplies to consumers.

57In summary, the water supply situation in Lagos leaves much to be desired. It appears as if the state government is incapable of meeting the water requirements of the millions of inhabitants of the metropolitan area. But this shortfall is being supplied by private sector operators. However, there are serious misgivings about the quality of the “pure water”, well water and borehole water upon which many inhabitants of Lagos have come to rely. This is in view of the fact that much of Lagos is barely above sea level and this makes the quality of retailed water generally suspect. Moreover, the unregulated proliferation of private boreholes is regarded as a threat to the stability of the state’s water table, which experts claim might subside if exploited beyond a certain limit.

58This chapter has shown that the majority of Lagosians have perfected self-help survival strategies in the face of the urban water supply crisis during the period covered by this study. Urban transport, another concern of inhabitants of the metropolis, also has its peculiar crises: notably, the perennial traffic jams, not least during the early morning and late evening rush hours; the unruly behaviour of commercial and private drivers, and the wide gap between supply and demand. These and other dimensions of urban transport are examined in the next chapter.