Chapter Nine
Political party corruption in Nigeria and in France
p. 137-150
Texte intégral
Introduction
1Corruption is a very difficult concept to use in sociological studies (not to talk of cross-cultural comparative studies). First, it is virtually impossible to separate value content from its scientific study. The etymology of the word itself evokes decomposition and rottenness. Yet, it has a fairly clear positivist significance as a transaction involving illegal and/or improper exchange of money, material goods or personal human relations for authoritative decisions. It is in this context that James Scott made the distinction between the.parochial conception which derives from human affection, and market corruption which is a fairly straightforward commercial transaction.
2The basic problem in comparing political party corruption in Nigeria and France relates to the differences in the scope and nature of corruption in the two societies. In Nigeria, corruption has become so generalised and banalised over the past three decades that it has almost become a "legitimate" social transaction. To put it differently, the Nigerian state is developing into a "Patrimonial State" in which private appropriation of public resources and the commercialisation of public offices are being transformed into normative behaviour. In France, on the other hand, a specific combination of Jacobin and Weberian organisational principles has produced a highly centralised and bureaucratic state in which corruption is necessarily thrown under the table. The sociological environment of corruption in the two societies is therefore very distinct. Be that as it may, however, the limitation of our concern here to party corruption introduces a common denominator for comparison.
Political parties and corruption
3The nature of the modern state itself cannot but provoke corrupt practices. Its bureaucratic formalities and rigidities encourage corruption as a necessary oil to lubricate its wheels. It is in this sense that Becquart-Leclercq describes its functionalist role as one of loosening structural rigidities and broadening access to power.1 Secondly, the modem state, from the communist to the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, has become the greatest capitalist in history. Contrary to the expectations of the libertarian philosopher, John Locke, the sphere of operations of the state has not become limited. On the contrary, its scope has continued to widen over time.
4Karl Marx has shown convincingly that the emergence of the capitalist state in Europe was patterned in two historical stages. The first stage, which he called that of the "primitive accumulation of capital" (see Das Kapital), was a period of pillage by the rising bourgeoisie to enable it build up its initial capital, In the second stage, that of capitalist accumulation, the exploitation of free wage labour replaced force as the basis of accumulation. The capitalist state emerged, therefore, not only to protect the capitalist but also to nurture and expand his interests, n so doing, the state itself paradoxically evolved as the corporate body with the widest scope of human and material resources at its disposal. From an instrument to help capitalist pillage of social wealth, the state was also turned into an object of pillage because its coercive capacity to extract social surplus dramatically enhanced its potential to concentrate resources. From that point on, it became an objective centre for corrupt practices.
5The political party is one of the elements of the modem state that is most adept in corruption. Its very nature predisposes it to corrupt practices. As far back as 1919, Max Water showed in his analysis of parties that party cadres and party entrepreneurs carry out their actions with the objective of personal compensation in the form of posts and other material benefits.2 This means that the "normal" role of political parties is played out in an arena that is very close to corruption. In fact, Becquart-Leclercq has proposed that corruption is "the cement that binds elites and political parties".3
6Political parties operate in a context of intense struggle – the struggle for the retention of power or the struggle for the acquisition of power. Those who struggle to retain power have access to state resources as well as to the private resources of those seeking access to state resources, that is, political and economic entrepreneurs. They are predisposed to appropriate these resources because they are necessary tools to parties and/or individuals engaged in the struggle to conserve their power. In the case of those who are struggling to acquire power, they have their access to state resources denied or restricted and, realising that their objectives can only be realised through the acquisition of power, find themselves obliged to use all avenues (proper or corrupt) to guarantee their success.
Corruption in Nigeria
7In his analysis of corruption in the developing world, Colin Leys has drawn our attention to the problem posed by the origins of the state itself. Says he:
To many people, the state and its organs were identified with alien rule and were proper objects of plunder and they have not yet been reidentified fully as instruments for the promotion of common interests.4
8The history of the post-colonial state in Africa is characterised by a tendency that is quasi general. The new African ruling classes that have emerged have been more interested in pursuing their narrow class interests than the interests of the common people. This means that, for the mass of the people, the practice of ’’colonial plunder" has not changed. And if the class in power can plunder the state they have sworn to serve, then anybody else who has an opportunity to do the same is unlikely to have second thoughts.
9This is not to say that corruption in Africa in general and in Nigeria in particular owes its origin uniquely to colonial rule. All societies have endemic forms of corruption. Smith, for example, has identified different forms of corruption in precolonial and colonial Hausa society in Northern Nigeria.5 In fact, most of the jihads and reformist movements in the Western and Central Sudan in the 18th and 19th centuries were provoked by excessive ruling class political corruption. What colonialism did was to virtually "legitimise" corruption by transforming local sovereignty into colonialism and therefore something illegitimate. This illegitimacy meant that state resources appropriated were perceived more as patriotic action than as corrupt practices.
10Since independence, the class in power in Nigeria has had a very ambiguous attitude towards corruption. On the one hand, corruption is universally condemned and, at certain times, some of its practioners even punished. On the other hand, the practice of corruption in Nigeria has been so banalised that it has become a "normative" sociological behaviour.6
11It was in order to stem the steady rise of corrupt practices that the architects of the 1979 Constitution formally inserted the clause that the state "shall abolish all corrupt practices and the abuse of power".7 But, at the end of the Second Republic, Justice Uwaifo, one of the judges who tried politicians for corrupt practices, was forced to confess that the culture of corruption was so deep-rooted that it was virtually beyond solution. In his words:
The main reason for the culture of corruption we now see established in this country is the greed for wealth, the ease with which it can be made by deviousness and the public acclaim that is given to those known to have simply come by wealth. It is unlikely that this culture can be changed within the foreseeable future by the present available social apparatus for law enforcement or by an ad hoc approach to the issue of corruption.8
12In other words, corruption has become one of the respectable elements of the Nigerian way of life.
Corruption in France
13When the prestigious French scholarly journal Pouvoirs decided to do an issue on corruption in France in 1984, the editor reports that his project was confronted with widespread reticence, silence and, above all, ignorance. Either French nationals were unaware of the degree of corruption in their society or they were unwilling to admit that they suffer from a disease that has for so long been categorised as a Third World phenomenon.
14The fact, however, is that if corruption did not exist in France, then Article 177 of the French Penal Code would not have had to specify punishment for civil servants who solicit for, accept offers or promises of gifts or presents in order to perform or to refuse to perform functions they are paid to carry out9
15Léon Daudet in fact once argued that it was unrealistic to assume that corruption in France is an occasional act that occurs to this judge or to that journalist, insisting that it is "a method of government".10 it has also been argued that the fairly rigid and centralised political culture in France necessarily gives rise to a minimum level of corruption in the system because it guarantees "a certain zone of liberty and freeplay to counterbalance the totalitarian tendencies of the state and of political parties".11
16One of the striking aspects of French democracy is that the country’s political culture is much more permissive towards corrupt leadership when compared to similar liberal democracies such as those in Britain and the United States of America as the following example would illustrate.
17In 1987, the "Irangate" of the previous government was revealed by the press. A company, Luchaire, had been involved in illegal arms sales to Iran. This company which had incurred a net loss of 41 million francs in 1982, was able to declare a net profit of 50 million francs in 1986, thanks to arms sales to Iran. Other beneficiaries of the company’s newly improved situation were said to include close aides to the then Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu. Further details were not released because the deal had "implications for national security”.12
18Still on Iran, there is a second issue on which the imperatives of state security would not allow us know all the gory details. It concerns the secret deals regarding the release of French hostages in Lebanon. Just before the March 1986 elections which brought the government of Jacques Chirac to power, the soon- to-be-consecrated Prime Minister was reported to have sent emissaries to Mohamed Sadek, Chief Guardian of the Iranian Revolution, to block the then ongoing negotiations between the socialist Prime Minister, Laurent Fabius, and the Iranian authorities until he (Chirac) came to power. The prize he offered to Iran was a better deal in bilateral relations while he expected to benefit from the improved image that was bound to follow such a spectacular diplomatic success. And, as it turned out, Fabius never got the hostages released from Lebanon while Chirac did immediately he came into office. Not only did relations between France and Iran improve but, in addition, France suddenly decided to release 333 million American dollars from Iranian monies tied up in the country.
19Moving from deals to diamonds, it is interesting to recall the consternation of the international press when it was revealed that President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had, while in office, received diamonds from his "dear cousin", the child-slaughtering Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing put up a brave face throughout the period of the scandal until he lost the Presidency in 1981.
20Still in the realm of jewels, the case of the Chaumet Brothers was even more staggering. It was revealed a few months before the 1988 Presidential elections that this famous Paris-basediewellery firm had been involved in illegal banking activities. The firm which possessed a large stock of jewels and had a very high turnover, had found that it was in a position to lend money at very high interest rates to highly placed individuals who, for one reason or another, could not face the rigours or "dangers" of traditional banking procedures. The revelation which came to light when the Chaumet Brothers had overstretched their resources and had to be declared bankcrupt, showed clearly that the Minister of Justice, Albin Challandon, was one of those who had participated in the illegal banking operations. Needless to say. Minister Challandon did not bother to resign over the affair and was protected by the Chirac government. That was not too sumrising, however, because his ministerial appointment itself had been widely reputed to have been due to the large amount of money (10 million francs) he was able to siphon from Gabon to the Chirac-led Gaullist party, the Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR), during his time as President of the petroleum company Elf Gabon.13
21It is quite clear, therefore, that in France, corruption, especially political corruption, is quite widespread. Be that as it may, however, it is also clear that the level of corruption in that country is not as high as it is in countries like Nigeria. In France, corruption has not completely permeated civil society and remains, at that level, fairly marginal, underhand and m fact palpably criminal. The opposite is the case at the level of political society. The point should be made, though, that general corruption in French society is probably under-reported and thus under-estimated.
Political party corruption in Nigeria
22Mokwugo Okoye, one of Nigeria’s foremost nationalists, wrote a poignant poem in 1955 in which he mourned the manner in which party politics and political power had rapidly corrupted his nationalist "comrades in struggle, so much so that he could not help lamenting:
How sad to hear that the enemy has claimed
A patriot so gallant and so justly famed [...]
Damn the corrupt present and in future my hope repose.14
23The conclusion he reached in his long Letter to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, now one of the classics on Nigerian nationalism, was to tell his former mentor (Zik) that: To you the struggle against imperialism is ended just because you have a section of Nigeria to rule.15 Okoye’s accusations concerning the sudden and spectacular rise of political corruption within the new power elite were to be confirmed in 1957 by the Report of the Fuster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry into Allegations Reflecting on the Official Conduct of the Premier of, and certain persons including Ministerial and other Public Officers, the Eastern Region of Nigeria.
24Political independence in 1960 did not give birth to the corruption-free Nigeria Okoye fervently hoped for. On the contrary, commissions of inquiry set up to probe the activities of the three Regional Governments found out that they were all neck deep in corrupt practices.16The change from the civilian regime of the First Republic to military regimes seems to have even worsened the level of corruption. Indeed, the panels of investigation set up after the July 1975 coup that brought the late General Murtala Mohammed to power revealed that the extent of corruption and nepotism in Nigeria’s body politic had reached exceptional proportions.
25To illustrate the extent of political party corruption in Nigeria, we shall limit ourselves to the activities of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) during the Second Republic.
26Tom Forrest has argued that the NPN was conceived and established as a party for the careful distribution of offices and rewards to regions, groups and individuals. A more appropriate name for the party would have been the Party for National Patronage. (p. 8) When they set up their government in 1979, the main criteria for ministerial appointments were monetary contributions and good connections with party barons.17 Competence was so irrelevant that when the ministerial nominations were submitted to the Senate for confirmation in 1979, their ministerial portfolios were not even mentioned.
27The NPN perfected a number of instruments for the systematic pillage of the nation’s economy. One of them was the distribution of import licences to party members rather than to companies that needed them for their activities. These companies were then obliged to buy the licences, adding 10 % or more to their face values. This form of graft ensured vast profits for party members and accelerated inflation for the mass of the people as companies increased prices to compensate for this new input into the system of production and distribution. This accelerated the economic crisis and led to the closing down of over a hundred companies for various periods.18
28Rice, a popular part of the staple diet, was also used to siphon off state funds. A Presidential Task Force on Rice was established by the NPN administration to import massive quantities of rice, most of which was distributed to party members. A 50 kilogram bag of rice which was unberthed at the Lagos port for 16 naira sold for 100 to 150 naira in the market. Since leading party members were usually allocated thousands of bags, the level of graft was especially high.
29In fact, it was quite clear that the political project of the NPN was the systematisation and coordination of corruption at the local, state and national levels. At the highest level, the appropriation of state resources was organised by the National Caucus of the party, composed of the country’s President, the party’s Chairman, the President of the Senate, and the Majority er in the National Assembly. A clear example of how they operated was provided by the Fougerolle saga.
30The national caucus of the NPN was said to have met two French representatives of the construction firm, Fougerolle, at the beginning of the Second Republic in Sola Saraki’s house in Ilorin.19 The meeting was called to settle pay-off deal to be payed by Fougerolle in exchange for the civil works contract in respect of the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Complex. The beneficiary of the pay-off deal was to be Sola Saraki, the party’s majority leader in the National Assembly, who had demanded for compensation to counterbalance a loan of over 7 million naira he had given to the party. The meeting was necessary because the party barons had earlier decided that Saraki would receive his pay-off through contracts offered by the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). The party later decided, however, to reserve public corporations (including NEPA) for exclusive pillage by the Vice President. Fougerolle was then offered as an alternative to Saraki.
31Fougerolle got the 329 million naira contract in September 1980 with the agreement that 7.5 % of the face value would be paid to Fougerolle (Nigeria) chairman, A. Sosanya who would keep 2.5 % and pass on the remaining 5 % to Saraki. However, when Sosanya collected the money from Paris, he gave Saraki only 1 million naira, keeping the rest for himself.
32Saraki had not actually used his own money to sponsor the NPN. He had taken a loan of 8.38 million naira from a Franco-Nigerian bank, Société Générale, of which he himself was chairman. Saraki later fell out with the NPN and was sued by the bank which wanted to recover its money. Saraki, in his defence, argued in court that it was a loan taken by the party rather than by himself as an individual and that, since the President (Shehu Snagari), Party Chairman (Adisa Akinloye), Party Financial Secretary (Bello Maitama), Party Secretary (Adamu Ciroma) and Presidential Campaign Director (Umaru Dikko) had all been involved, he could not be held personally responsible.20 This example shows very clearly that corruption in the NPN was not limited to occasional aberrations but was actually the party’s central project.
33The dramatic manner in which corruption developed through the contract syndrome prompted Balarabe Musa, former governor of Kaduna State, to describe the Nigerian polity thus:
Instead of a democracy in which you have in operation government for the people, by the people and of the people, you have a contractocracy in which government is for contractors, by contractors and of contractors. Politics is being reduced to a fight between one gang of greedy tycoons, each backed by their foreign business masters, and others, each waving some tribal or sectional banner to confuse and divide our people.21
34In fact, even the government became so alarmed at the contract syndrome that, in 1979, it appointed a Ministerial Committee to investigate the causes of the excessively high costs of government contracts. The Committee did reveal significant excesses but nothing was done to curb them. Instead, the NPN administration actually went ahead to appoint Presidential Liaison Officers, who were essentially patronage distribution directors, for all the states in the Federation.
Political party corruption in France
35Political party corruption is very rife in France and nobody, not even the politicians themselves, can contest that it is a major problem in the country. French political parties have become igh budget business organisations even if the "commodities" they sell are not supposed to operate following the rules of the market. In 1965, François Mitterrand needed only 1.5 million francs to contest the Presidential elections. By 1974, he needed 9 million francs to contest against Giscard d’Estaing and in 1981 he won on a budget of 80 million francs.22 For the 1988 elections, a law had to be passed by parliament limiting the budget of each presidential candidate to a staggering 140 million francs. However, in spite of the much-vaunted ’Consensus" in parliament to put a stop to the corrupt ways in which parties were funded, the law did not include expected procedures for the declaration and cross-checking of the assets of politicians. In fact, the Conseil constitutionnel had to draw the attention of parliament to the many loopholes that seemed to have been deliberately left in the law and call for many amendments.
36The electoral process itself is riddled with corrupt practices and some specialists claim that France has one of the most fraudulent electoral systems in Europe.23 Among the tactics used are tampering with the electoral lists and ballot boxes, under or over counting and straight-forward graft. There is now a proposal that from 1991, all ballot boxes must be transparent to cut out some of the more obvious types of fraud such as stuffing ballot boxes.
37There are many forms of political party corruption prevalent in the French system. The type most often referred to y the press is the so-called fausses factures. It simply involves businessmen issuing "fake receipts” for services rendered or goods delivered to their political collaborators, while no work had been done and no goods bought. This enables accounts to be balanced While vast sums of money are being siphoned off from the state. Percentage cuts for construction contracts are also very common. In 1988, for example, 18.5 million francs was offered by the state as aid for the construction of low cost housing. Those who received such grants are said to show appreciation one way or another.
38The system of grants to associations by local councils is another way of encouraging corrupt practices. As mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, for example, has about 1.5 billion francs to distribute as grants to associations each year which he shares out to his political friends.24 While moral questions could be raised against this practice, it does not really constitute corruption in a legal sense. The Law of Association of 1901 which is still in vigour simply requires that for an association to be legal, it needs a declaration signed and deposited at the Council by at least two people. And since councils are allowed to distribute grants to associations as and when they deem fit, the transaction itself is legal even if the close political links between leaders of associations that receive large grants and council leaders are often very close and thus raise questions of political propriety.
39What is very striking about political party corruption in France is that it is so similar to the situation in Third World countries such as Nigeria. The French Prime Minister, for example, is entitled to a large, non accountable security vote (fonds secrets) to be used for clandestine "security" operations, from tapping telephone lines to providing prostitutes for foreign guests. In 1987, the Prime Minister’s security vote was 391 million francs. Since these monies are not accounted for, it is assumed that a part is kept aside by incumbent Prime Ministers for a rainy day or for the next electoral campaign.
40The case of insider trading following the purchase of the American packaging company, American Can, by the French state-owned company, Pechiney, did involve obvious even if still "unproved" corrupt acts, exposed largely by the Security Exchange Commission of the United States. What is known is that, on the 4th of November, 1988, the French cabinet was informed of the intention to buy American Can and the following day, people close to President Mitterrand and his Finance Minister Pierre Bérégovoy such as Patrice Pelat, close friend to Mitterrand since 1942, and Max Theret, former baron of the socialist newspaper Le Matin, used Swiss, Caribbean and Lebanese banks to buy large shares of the soon-to-be-purchased company and made huge profits after the purchase was made public.25 So far, only the Finance Minister’s secretary, Alain oublil, has been sacrificed and investigations on the details of the insider trading are yet to reveal the inner culprits.
41One of the most revealing cases of political party corruption in recent years is that of the association "Carrefour du développement", established by the Ministry of Cooperation in 1983 to help maintain good Franco-African relations.26 The Association was established by the Minister of Cooperation, Christian Nucci, because it enabled his Ministry disburse funds for projects and nations that could not be funded publicly without having to go through the rigours of normal bureaucratic accounting procedures. Between 1984 and 1986, the Association disbursed 50 million francs worth of state funds, 10 million of which were not accounted for in any way. One of the main projects it was used for was the December 1984 Bujumbura Franco-African summit. Among the bills paid for by "Carrefour du Développement" were contracts for mercenaries hired to augment security forces, equiping and furnishing hotels and bribes paid to customs officers to facilitate the transport of 2200 cars from the port of Mombasa to Bujumbura.
42"Carrefour du Développement" was also used to fund covert operations in Chad in what is known as the "Pre-Manta" operations to check Libyan intrusion into Chad in 1983. This use was necessary because, at that time, the French government had not officially decided to support Habre’s ailing forces, a decision it was to take a year later with "Operation Manta"
43The "Carrefour" story got into the open because the incoming government of Jacques Chirac in 1986 wanted to use it to embarrass their socialist predecessors. To achieve their objective, the new right-wing government got the Secretary to the Minister, Yves Chalier, to release details of corrupt practices to them, in return for which he was given a "true fake" passport by elements of the police and was smuggled out to Brazil. This scandalous and miscalculated move by agents of the state was then used by the socialists to turn the scale of public anger against the right-wing government.
44Examples of corrupt practices in France seem to be quite abundant. The point should be made, however, that the changes in government in 1981, 1986 and 1988 played a role in bringing into the open revelations about these practices. It would be seen that the fact that, before then, a solid Gaullist or Gaullist-Liberal Alliance had remained in power for so long meant that a lot of corrupt practices could be kept under the table due to the complicity of the corporalist leadership.
Conclusion
45The concern in this study has been to indicate that the objectives and activities of political parties lead them more often than not towards corrupt practices. In the Nigerian situation, corruption is very widespread in the society at large and political parties are often constituted with the aim of looting the public treasury. In France, corruption is not very widespread in tne general society, although the actual level of corruption might be significantly underestimated. As far as the French political parties are concerned, however, the level of corruption is palpably high. The lesson that could be drawn from the comparison is that assumed differences in ethos between developed and developing countries might be more representative of prejudice than empirical reality.
Notes de bas de page
1 Jeanne Becquait-Leclercq, ’Paradoxes de la corruption politique", Pouvoirs no.31,1984, p. 21.
2 Max Weber, Le savant et la politique (Paris: Plon, 1957), p. 156.
3 Becquart-Leclercq, op cit, p. 21.
4 C. Leys, "What is the Problem about Corruption?”, The Journal of Modem AJrican Studies, 3,2, 1965, p. 224.
5 M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, no.4, 1964.
6 See Femi Odekunle (ed), Nigeria: Corruption in Development (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1982).
7 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 15,5.
8 Newswatch, 13th April, 1987.
9 L. Fougère, "Les voies et moyens de la corruption", Pouvoirs no.31, 1984, p. 13.
10 Fred Kupferman, "La corruption dans la République”, Pouvoirs no.31 1984, p. 9.
11 Becquart-Leclercq, op cit, p. 21.
12 "L’Argent secret des elections", Les dossiers du Canard, Paris, 1984, p. 35.
13 P. Péan, Affaires africaines (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 242.
14 Mokwugo Okoye, A Letter to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1979), p. 38.
15 ibid, p. 96.
16 For a number of insights into the scope and nature of corruption in Nigeria, see Femi Odekunle (ed), op cit.
17 For a more detailed analysis of the NPN, see our "L’Accès & l’Etat: classes sociales, elites, factions; une étude du National Party of Nigeria", Ph. D. thesis, University of Bordeaux, 1991.
18 Yusuf Bangura, "The Nigerian Economic Crisis” in P. Lawrence (ed), World Recession and the Food Crisis in Africa (London: James Cuny, 1986), p. 52.
19 These revelations were made by Saraki himself and published in Newswatch on 25th August, 1986. Subsequent revelations in court cases and commissions of inquiry confirmed their validity and showed in a clear and unambiguous manner that leading political figures formally sat down and negociated pay-off deals with foreign and local companies.
20 Sunday Times (Lagos), 10th March, 1987.
21 Y. B. Usman, "Middlemen, Consultants, Contractors and the Solutions to the Current Economic Crises”, Studies in Politics and Society, no.2, October 1984, p. 21.
22 Dossiers du Canard, op cit, p. 32.
23 For details of confirmed tactics of electoral fraud see the special investigation in Libération of 16th of February, 1989 and the accompanying television programme on the second channel of French television (Antenne 2) of the same day. For an interesting case study of electoral fraud by the French Communist Party in Ivry-Sur-Seine, see Communisme no. 18-19 of 1988.
24 For details, see Les Dossiers du Canard, op cit, p. 15.
25 Libération, 31st January, 1989.
26 For a detailed report of the general story and specific acts of corruption, see the dossier in Jeune Afrique of 23 December, 1987.
Auteur
Studied at the University of Bordeaux where he wrote a thesis on political party corruption in Nigeria. He is presently lecturing at the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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