Chapter Five
Nigerian and French perspectives on the South African question
p. 79-90
Texte intégral
Introduction
1Foreign policy is considered as a course of action adopted by governments or institutions. But, more often than not, some foreign policy decisions are taken without any course being charted. In view of this, a foreign policy could be defined in different ways. It could be considered as a formulation of desired outcomes which are intended to be consequent upon decisions taken by those who have the authority or ability to commit the machinery of the state and a significant part of its resources to that end. It could also be considered as a product of internal and external factors (Northedge, 1971). However, it could simply be a projection of a country’s values and aspirations.
2It is an accepted fact that Nigeria’s foreign policy demonstrates all these characteristics and even more. It has certain principles and objectives such as:
respect for equality of all states irrespective of their size;
respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states;
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; and
commitment to promoting African unity.
3To further accentuate these objectives and as a result of the demand for a review of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the Murtala Mohammed administration set up a review panel in 1975, headed by Professor Adebayo Adedeji. In its report, the panel stated the goals of Nigerian foreign policy as follows:
the defence of Nigeria’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;
creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world that will facilitate the defence, independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while facilitating self-reliance.
4These objectives have been considered rather ambitious and unattainable. However, the goals stated below could be said to have motivated Nigeria’s response to the apartheid problem and, to a certain extent, her relations with France:
promotion of the respect for human rights and especially the rights of the black man
the promotion of peace in the world
5Reinforcing these are the provisions of section 19 of the 1979 constitution which include: commitment to the total liberation of Africa and the promotion of African unity while preserving universal peace, as well as promoting friendship among people and states. There is also a total commitment to the fight against racial discrimination in all its ramifications.
6These goals constitute what have been called "the dreams and aspirations of Nigerian policy makers and their reactions to the internal and external environment". The question can be asked as to whether these dreams are not too vague and difficult to attain. That, however, is an issue which may need to be examined in another study. For now, we limit ourselves to an examination of Nigeria’s foreign policy as it relates to the South African question and her relations with France. Before going on to do that, however, we feel it is necessary first of all to consider the factors that determine Nigeria’s foreign policy in general. Such factors include the following (Aluko, 1981):
Internal determinants
7One of the major internal determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy is the country’s colonial heritage in the form of the colonial infrastructures inherited from the British colonial administration and which still characterise the pattern of Nigeria’s foreign relations, although there have been some modifications since independence. Another internal determinant is the domestic political pressure from public opinion, students, trade unions, etc. A third determinant is the ideological inclinations of the decision makers.
External determinants
8Here we can talk of the influence of the cold war environment on the foreign policy decision makers in Nigeria. The absence of Soviet influence under the Balewa administration is a good example of the extent to which East-West rivalry influenced Nigeria’s foreign policy. There is also Nigeria’s geographical location and size which determine her role in the West African sub-region and within the O. A. U.
9Another major determinant of Nigeria’s foreign policy (which is both an internal and an external determinant) is the nature of the country’s economy. Indeed, as many may agree, the nature of an economy dictates the socio-political structures existing within a society and that society’s response to certain developments within and outside it. In the case of Nigeria, the response of policy makers towards certain developments internally and externally is certainly influenced by the socio-economic relations that exist between her and the major world powers. The fact is that Nigeria’s is a dependent economy. Nigeria’s unfavourable position in the international economic exchange system which has based the economy on the production of raw materials, subjects her to continued revenue fluctuation and lack of economic independence. This instability is a major factor characterizing her relationship with the developed countries, France inclusive.
10This is not to say that Nigeria cannot take any initiatives in her relations with the major world powers. In fact she has, on certain occasions and especially on the South African question, demonstrated her relative ability to influence or induce changes in policy positions. We must agree, however, that this is not always true and that the degree of effectiveness is sometimes very minimal.
The South African question
11In South Africa, racial discrimination and apartheid are employed principally for the social, economic and political exploitation and oppression of the blacks (an overwhelming majority in the territory) for the benefit of the white minority. Exploitation and oppression are made possible by the total militarisation of the white society (Wilmot, 1980). The government of South Africa has, as a result, constituted itself into an outlaw within the international system, thereby becoming an object of ridicule and condemnation. Indeed, it has been castigated outrightly as a source of danger to international peace and security (Ojo 1980). It is not surprising, therefore, to see that, for some decades, efforts have been made to change a policy that subjects the majority of the population to total exploitation by a minority because of racial differences.
12The South African problem can be traced to the 17th century when the Dutch East Indian company was established within the region. Finding the weather in South Africa favourable, the company established east of what is now called Cape Town and began to move inward. This inward movement later resulted in clashes with the native inhabitants. The latter were defeated because of the superior arms used by the Dutch traders, who maintained their superiority while the indigenous population (the ’Sans’ and ’Khoikhoi’) became more or less servants. In hierarchy, the Dutchmen were followed by the "coloured" (people of mixed blood) while Asians, who had been brought in from the Asian continent, ranked third. At the bottom of the ladder were the Africans. Before this stratification was achieved, however, there were series of frontier wars, which began in 1791, with the victory of the white settlers over the indigenous population. Reserves were later created, now called homelands, for the Africans.
13After the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, the Vareening Treaty, which was signed between the British and the Boers, made the enfranchisement of non-whites dependent upon the consent of the white minority (Davenport 1973). This gave the Afrikaners the opportunity needed to relegate non-whites to a subordinate position. To Mary Benson, the British victory "became the base of the ultimate ascendence of Afrikaner nationalism".1
14Emanating from these developments are such discriminatory acts as the Mines and Work act, which reserved certain categories of work for whites only; the Native urban area act which restricted Africans to segregated residential areas, was backed up by the Pass laws, one of the most dehumanizing acts promulgated to reinforce white supremacy, it did not allow movement of black persons either within white residential areas, or even within segregated black areas, except by possession of a regularly updated, constantly checked pass; and the industrial conciliation Act of 1924 which restricted the use of collective bargaining machinery to whites and coloured people only.2 These and other laws combine to prevent blacks from earning a decent livelihood and to keep them perpetually under-educated.3
15The system of apartheid has continued till today despite international condemnation and sanctions. But the efforts to combat it also continue. Quaison-Sackey notes that:
All have agreed that apartheid is a menace, that it is a disease, that it is a cankerworm, which must be uprooted (...) sanctions would serve as a sword of Damocles over the head of Union of South Africa.4
16Sanctions have indeed been considered and voted. But they have been undermined and made ineffective as a weapon to effect a change in South Africa. The lack of effectiveness of the sanctions has been attributed mainly to continued use of their veto power by France, Britain and the United States, in collaboration with other Western countries, and to the fact that their transnational corporations have continued to sustain the racist regime.
17Nigeria’s position has been one of total opposition to apartheid. The Nigerian foreign policy stand has not been as dynamic, consistent and straightforward on any other issue as that concerning apartheid in South Africa. Since independence, Nigeria has formulated what can be described as a leadership and ideologically oriented role on the question of racial discrimination and colonialism in Southern Africa. We remember that Jaja Nwachukwu said as far back as 1961 that:
I want to warn South Africa once more. We have managed to get it out of the Commonwealth. If South Africa persists in this behaviour, we may have to get it out of the world. Those who are interested in South Africa because of investments in mineral resources should begin to think twice. South Africa cannot continue to behave as it is doing, we are opposed to everything that the present South African Gouvernment stands for in respect of the treatment of the blackman in Africa.5
18They have tried to get South Africa out of the UN (where she still remains an observer) and some other international organisations. But that is as far as they have been able to go. It has not been possible to change South Africa’s behaviour. All that has been happening in South Africa has been cosmetic. Thus, the fight against apartheid persists.
19Nigeria has been regularly opposed to the practice of apartheid in South Africa since independence in 1960, irrespective of the regime in power. Every government has denounced the system in private and in public. Apartheid is perceived as morally outrageous and, politically and philosophically, an indefensible sin against humanity, seen as an absurd theory of racial superiority maintained through a police state under which blacks have been indiscriminately imprisoned and murdered (Obiozor 1984). Nigeria has tried, along with other African countries within the United Nations and other international forums and bodies, to persuade the world to see apartheid as a threat to Africa and to international security.
20These efforts which started yielding fruits in the early 1960s, include United Nation’s actions against South Africa, its condemnation of the racist policy in resolutions, and the establishment of certain committees to handle certain questions this has raised, e.g. the UN special committee against apartheid of which Nigeria has, for some time now, been the chairman.6 However, it has been considered that peaceful alternatives have been exhausted. In fact, at the world conference for action against apartheid in August 1977, General Obasanjo, then Nigeria’s Head of State, stated as follows:
We shall no longer watch the racists of Pretoria devise improvements to their machinery of terror and repression. We shall no longer just be outraged. We must act to destroy the system of apartheid and move it from our midst.7
21The South African question has demonstrated Nigeria’s ability to exert her independence and credibility within Africa and beyond. It has also demonstrated, through examination of Nigeria’s position on apartheid, her ability to consolidate her national interest and self image. As stated by Sinclair, the issues of southern Africa served to create a tangible focus for the diplomatic energies of those African states struggling to come to terms with the realities of their domestic and international post-colonial predicaments (Sinclair 1983). But he forgot to add that the South African issue has always brought to light the abilities of African states to be united and the capacity of Nigeria to pursue her political objectives for he failed to take into account the important relationship that exists between the perception of policy-makers of their environment (external or internal) and their policy objectives.
22From the foregoing, it is evident that Nigeria has always been firm in her position on the South African question, a position she continues to maintain. She has also contributed to efforts to make South Africa an international outcast and to focus on apartheid as one of the greatest moral issues of our time. She has joined progressive forces in making the need for sanctions (economic, etc.) imperative in an effort to combat apartheid.
The French Connection
23The decision of the French government to instal a nuclear center for the racist South African regime in exchange for "rands stained with blood" is a purely mercenary attitude vis-a-vis Africa, as Oliver Tambo once said. He went further to say that "the French must know it is also against their government that we are fighting". Winnie Mandela too has said that "France is the friend of our enemy, hence the enemy of our people" (Taillefer, 1980).
24The relationship between France and South Africa dates back to the 17th century but it developed rapidly under the Fifth Republic. The French presence in the enclave can be defined in terms of machines, technicians and capital sent to Johannesburg or Pretoria. It can also be measured in terms of share holders in the industries. These clearly demonstrate the nature of the South African economy which is the sum total of the interests of France, USA, Britain, West Germany, Israel, Canada, and their allies.
25With the arrival in power of the Nationalists in 1948, several laws were established to make for the expansion of capital and investment. The creation of domestic investment assists in the attraction of direct foreign investment. The profits derivable from these investments make South Africa important to several Western capitalist countries. The strategies of imperialism aid the government to maintain its exploitation of the majority black population, in defiance of the entire international community. This facilitates the continuation of the gimmicks of international capitalism in that part of the world.
26The years following the installation of the Nationalists witnessed the arrival of the French firms Air Liquid (1948), Bank of Indochine (1949), socea (1950), and Thomson C. G. E., Peugeot and Total at the beginning of the 1950s. The 1960s also witnessed close French collaboration with Pretoria, to the detriment of Rhodesians and Namibians. The first contracts for the sale of arms were signed despite the Shapeville massacre of March 1960. Since then, the French government has continued to equip Pretoria and to collaborate with her in building nuclear reactors and armament. France abstains from or votes against all resolutions and decisions that are considered hostile to Pretoria. During the Giscard years, relations became more official and, despite an arms embargo, Paris continued to trade in arms with Pretoria. The socialist government has not changed the French position, as was earlier expected. The change has been more rhetoric and cosmetic. However, the issue of South Africa has witnessed an increase in the concern the people and media have shown about the case. Nevertheless, some groups (social, political, and non-political) are actively engaged in efforts to make sure the French government continues to assist and trade with South Africa.
27Several reasons have been given for the French interest and collaboration with Pretoria. These include the strategic importance of Pretoria to France, since a number of the mineral resources she needs for her strategic industries come from South Africa. For example, she imports from South Africa 56 % of her granite needs, 18 % of her coal, 4 % of her iron, 25 % of her manganese, 30 % of her chromium, 30 % of her ferro-chromium, 14 % of her antimony and 15 % of her nickel. But, if she wished, these could be imported from other countries. She could, for instance, import platinum from Zimbabwe, manganese from India, Ghana or Brazil, chromium from Mozambique, etc.
28We should not fail to note that France is the largest supplier of arms to South Africa. Her continued relations with Pretoria are also explained by the geographically strategic position and potentials of South Africa in the face of the so-called communist menace to the security of oil route of the Indian Ocean.
Contradictions
29There are enormous contradictions inherent in the French policy towards South Africa and her desire to maintain good relations with other African states. This is something that started under De Gaulle, when France got the opportunity to forge necessary ties with South Africa in the wake of the UN sanctions of 1964, at a time when the United Kingdom, which was the sole arms supplier to Pretoria, yielded to the pressure of world public opinion to halt arm supplies to the apartheid regime. As soon as the labour government of Harold Wilson decided to discontinue arms sales to Pretoria, De Gaulle stepped in and French companies started negotiating substantial arms sales to South Africa, in utter disregard of the UN embargo. Avion Marcel Dassault, manufacturer of the Mirage, was particularly instrumental in the new deals. Indeed, the South African Minister of defence, Mr. Fouche, visited Paris in June 1965 to conclude the deal for the French aircraft Mirage III EZ Intruder. By 1966, the South African Air force had ordered 16 Super Frelon helipcopters. The 1970s saw Pretoria buying military equipment and sophisticated military hardware worth about 100 millon dollars every year. This has continued unabated.
30During the De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing eras, French policy in Africa went through an evolutionary process. While the De Gaulle period witnessad a preoccupation with the politically strategic importance of Africa, the policy during the Giscard years placed more emphasis on the economic aspect of relations with Africa.
31To De Gaulle, Nigeria constituted a threat to France’s influence in the West African region because of Nigeria’s ecohomic and human resources. This motivated French support for Biafra in the 1960s (Bach 1982). This was also demonstrated under the Pompidou regime when the French government encouraged the establishment of a rival regional economic organisation so as to reduce the influence of Nigeria (and the Anglophones in general) in the region, in case of a possible creation of ecowas (Economic Community of West Africa States). However, Pompidou tried to create a rapproachment between France and Nigeria. On assuming power, he started by watering down French support for Biafra and criticism of the federal government. A total re-evaluation came with the economic boom in Nigeria as a result of the increase in the production of petroleum, leading to a situation where a high percentage of French imports from Africa came from Nigeria.
32In 1974, French investment constituted 6 % of total foreign investments in Nigeria, after the Peugeot Assembly Plant project in Kaduna had been concluded. Under Giscard d’Estaing, these developments were greatly increased because of his regime’s search for new foreign markets. Nigerian scholars and technicians went to France on educational programmes in thousands, a sign of the improved relations between France and Nigeria.
33But the relationship was also characterised by conflicts arising from the South African issue. By 1974, the French Government had begun to give underground aid to unita and, in 980, she became the fifth most important partner of South Africa, behind West Germany, u. k., usa, and Japan. France’s increased importance to South Africa came as a result of the 1976 contract awarded to a French consortium, framatome, for the building of South Africa’s nuclear power station. This 50 million pound sterling contract for the power station at Koeberg, 20 miles north of Cape Town on the Atlantic sea board, came at a time of growing debate over South Africa’s nuclear potential. Given the fact that the oau had declared Africa a nuclear free zone, Nigeria was very critical of French involvement in this sector of South Africa’s economy.
34These contradictions and conflicts marking Nigeria-French relations on one hand and Franco-African relations on the other did not hinder the economic involvement of the French in Nigeria. Indeed, subsidiaries of French companies (CFAO, SCOA etc.) are engaged extensively in the Nigerian economy. In 1975, there were about 15 French concerns in Nigeria. By 1983, however, the number had increased to about 170, 108 of them being sudsidiaries of France-based companies. These companies are in the engineering, banking, insurance, telecommunications and industrial fields. Petroleum constitutes the bulk of Nigeria’s exports to France. Nigeria however remains France’s second most important African trade partner, behind Algeria but ahead of Morocco, Ivory Coast and Gabon. France continues as Pretoria’s major supplier of arms and nuclear inputs.
Conclusion
35It is evident that imperialism has found itself, in South Africa, unable to reconcile its strategic interests in Namibia and South Africa with the need to condemn apartheid. Although apartheid is altogether morally indefensible, it is inextricably bound up with imperialist interests, as imperialism needs a strong South African state to support its global struggle against socialism, represented by the Soviet Union and its allies. (Hansen 1987). The situation in South Africa highlights the relative dominance of imperialist policies in the region and also accentuates the main features of imperialism as identified by marxists.
36Nigeria was critical of French policy on liberation movements and race relations in Southern Africa, and especially of French involvement in the economy of South Africa. The arming of South Africa by France no doubt calls for a total review of Nigeria’s nuclear policy. Nigeria’s capacity in terms of her intellectual, military, scientific and economic resources, makes it possible for her to become a nuclear power in future. Indeed, the existence, since the 1970s, of nuclear research centers at the University of Ife and the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, of uranium deposits in Bauchi, of the Nigeria Uranium Company (numco), and of strong relations with Niger (which has abundant reserves of uranium), all combine to make it possible for Nigeria to become a nuclear power if she so wishes. Inasmuch as Nigeria needs to constitute herself into a force to be reckoned with in international politics, therefore, her capacity to constitute a deterent to South Africa’s military and nuclear capability is a necessity. Assistance in this field could be guaranteed by the relationship that exists between Nigeria and usa, ussr, India, Pakistan, Canada and even France. It is a known fact that an offer to this effect was made some years back by Paris (Vicard 1983).
37Finally, Nigeria and other African countries must continue to challenge those countries that help to strengthen Pretoria. Nigeria should continue to support the UN Resolution 435 on Namibia. Namibia is a strong area of potential cooperation in South Africa. In terms of manpower, minerals, and security, Namibia and Nigeria, with Brazil, Angola and other countries, could constitute a South Atlantic treaty organisation, for the control of the sea-lanes in the South Atlantic. Nigeria, through these, could demonstrate more strongly her ability to back up her riches and economic capabilities with policies and well defined principles.
Notes de bas de page
1 Mary Benson (1966) The Struggle For A Birthright. Penguin, London, p 19.
2 T. R. Darenport, (1973) South Africa: A Modern History. George Allen and Unwin, p. 176-177.
3 Some of these Acts promulgated by the Nationalist Party since coming into power in 1948 include: Separate Universities Act of 1959, Separate Amenities Act of 1953, Public Safety Act of 1953, Terrorism Act of 1967 etc.
4 UNGOAR, 15th Session, 981st meeting, April 18, 1961. No.39.
5 UNGOAR 11th Session, 1031st meeting, October 10, 1961.
6 There are about 156 resolutions condemning the regime, as at January 1984.
7 G. A. Obiozor, Apartheid And Nigerian Foreign Policy. Nigeria Forum (NIIA) January/February 1984., p 41.
Auteur
Studied at the University of Bordeaux where he wrote a thesis on Namibia. He now lectures at the Department of History, Political Science and International Relations, Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey.
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