1We now consider it necessary to study Franco-Nigerian relations as an important aspect of Nigeria’s external relations since France has become one of Nigeria’s major political and economic partners. We should not forget, however, that the relations between the two countries are the product of the generalisation, on a continental scale, of the specific relations that existed between France and a part of Africa during the colonial period and which have been described by a commentator as "carnal relations"1 in order to illustrate the extent of their closeness, even though "carnal" normally carries a sexual connotation. Indeed, the point must be made that "Euro-African" relations are nothing more than an extension, on both the European and African continents, of relations that have their origins in the colonial history of France. In this chapter, therefore, we shall attempt to situate the present system of relations between Africa and the European Economic Community (EEC) in this historical context and highlight the consequences of that origin.

2Certain observations can be made with respect to the significance of the French origin of the current relations between Africa and the EEC. Firstly, France was the principal initiator of the EEC policy on association with Africa. Secondly, as a result of France’s role in initiating that policy, the EEC’s relations with Africa have been marked by the neeed to reconcile French interests with those of the other member states of the Community on the one hand, and the interests of Europe and Africa on the other. Thirdly, given France’s strategic role in the EEC and her position as a former colonial power in Africa, the Euro-African relationship has given rise to a situation in which France now plays a dominant role in African affairs, thereby raising questions about French influence in Africa. Fourthly, if it is true that, "for a variety of complex factors – historical, political, economic, cultural and military – France has succeeded in wielding greater influence in many African countries than the OAU",2 the contribution of the Lomé Conventions to this state of affairs must be emphasised since they legitimise the relations of particular African states with European powers. Finally, Euro-African relations raise several questions regarding the prospects for African development, African independence and the possibilities of South-South cooperation.

3These, then, are some of the issues to be treated in this study. We start with the colonial origin of the Lomé Conventions.

The colonial foundations of Euro-African relations

4Euro-African relations as we know them today can be traced directly to the fourth part of the Treaty of Rome, signed on the 25th of March, 1957, which instituted the EEC. In this section of the treaty, the six states agreed to associate to the Community all territories having special relations with each of the member states. By this arrangement, all the colonies and the overseas territories of the six member states constituted a zone of free exchange with the Community in return for which the six agreed to contribute to a special fund for the development.of the colonies and territories in question.

5Since then, the growth and development of Africa has been closely tied to that of the EEC, so much so that one can now argue, without much fear of contradiction, that, in certain respects, African events can be meaningfully studied and interpreted only in terms of European developments. We agree that such a hypothesis seems to constitute a negation of African autonomy. It seems to us, however, that it represents a far more realistic perception of Euro-African relations over the last two decades.

6Ever since the formation of the EEC, observers have continued to ask the question as to how a movement for economic and political union in Western Europe ended up by tying the European continent to Africa permanently. Any response to this question has to take into consideration the special relations which existed between France and her African colonies.

7In reality, the accord on association meant nothing more than an agreement by France to give up her economic monopoly in her African colonies in exchange for the contribution of the other member states to the economic development of these territories. In this connection, it is interesting to remember that, in 1957, all the six member states except the Federal Republic of Germany had colonies, and thus had constitutional and legal reasons for associating their overseas territories with the EEC. Their attitude on this issue was determined by their degrees of economic vulnerability in relation to their colonies and overseas territories.

8Those who have studied the economic ties between the European powers and their former colonies have all come to the same conclusion: France was much more closely integrated economically with its former colonies than all the other colonial powers and, consequently, could not tolerate an EEC from which these colonies and territories were excluded. In 1957, 6.6 % of France’s industry, 1.8 % of its agriculture, 46 % of its merchant shipping, and 57 % of its commercial aviation depended on its overseas territories, the majority of which were in Africa.3 The significance of these economic relations between France and her African colonies lay not only in the fact that they gave rise to strong French pressure for association but also because they dictated the type of association that was finally retained: that of a community of free trade between Europe and Africa.

9However, the special relationship between Africa and Europe created by the Treaty of Rome did not long survive the wind of political change that was blowing through Africa. Indeed, barely three years after the signing of that treaty, the majority of the African colonies gained their independence from France and the whole regime of association was open to dispute, more so because the original system had been negotiated between France and her European partners.

10In order to take the independence of the majority of the overseas territories and colonies into account the EEC negotiated the First Yaoundé Convention with eighteen of them in 1963. Renegotiations led to the Second Yaoundé Convention in 1969. These two conventions were similar to the original association clauses of the Treaty of Rome, allowing the African states access to the Common Market for their tropical products in exchange for the same rights for European merchandise in African markets. This was the famous principle of reversible preferences which would later become the principal bone of contention in Euro-African relations. Each of the two conventions also instituted its own European development fund meant to aid the associated states. Finally, the Yaoundé agreements provided for a number of joint institutions to administer the cooperation between the partners. Two of these need to be emphasized since they eventually became the key institutions of the Lomé Conventions. They are the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.

11Euro-African relations as they evolved under the Yaoundé Conventions raised three controversial problems. The first was the incapacity or inability of the two Conventions to stimulate an expansion of the exports of the African associated states to the Common Market. The effects of the Conventions on the economic development of the associated states can be said to be at best minimal and at worst negative. The second problem raised was that of the economic justification of reversible preferences between industrialised and poor countries and Nigeria’s violent opposition to them.4 Finally, within the EEC itself, the association of African states posed the problem of reconciling the need for decolonisation of relations with Africa and the choice between a regional and a global approach to its relations with the Third World.

12All these contradictions became fully evident when Great Britain joined the EEC in 1972, after several years of negotiations and of French opposition. The treaty of adhesion not only recognised the globalist character of the British colonial empire but also provided the possibility of associating with the Common Market for the former British colonies, alongside the original 18 associated states which had been joined by Mauritius in 1972.

The Lome Conventions and the development of Euro-african relations

13The adhesion of Great Britain to the Common Market changed the nature of Europe’s relations with Africa not only by increasing the number of potential candidates for a special relationship with the Community but also by forcing the EEC to rethink its policy of cooperation with the underdeveloped countries which were judged to be incapable of meeting the challenges of the times by the Commission of the Community. In the opinion of the Commission, it was necessary to define a policy which would, in the future, enable the Community to shoulder its responsibilities with greater coherence and efficiency.5 It was the search for such a policy of coherence to enable the EEC respond to the needs of the developing countries on a global scale that led the Commission to ask for greater financial and technical resources from the member states and a coordination of national policies of all the member states in order to avoid conflicts and incoherences among national policies in the field of development assistance.6

14More importantly, however, Britain’s entry into the eec raised for the Commonwealth states the problem of how to relate with the enlarged Common Market given their different levels of economic dependence on the British market and differing political attitudes towards association.7 In fact, the situation of the Commonwealth in relation to the eec was very varied indeed. There were, on the one hand, those states located in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean which were totally dependent on market guarantees furnished by the British government and which now needed safeguards for their sugar exports. On the other hand, there were the three East African states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda which were already associated with the eec as the result of a commercial agreement signed in 1968. Nigeria, for her own part, had negotiated and signed a commercial agreement with the eec but it was not ratified and was in fact cancelled by General Gowon8 Other countries like Ghana had no experience of direct relations with the eec.

15The enlarged Community thus offered an opportunity for all of Africa to re-examine its relations with the Common Market. The fundamental problem concerned the need to decide whether or not the Commonwealth African countries should negotiate individually with the eec or as a group and eventually what their attitude towards the original associated states should be. Through a series of complicated multilateral negotiations which were led by Nigeria,9 the African states not only agreed to unify their negociations with respect to the eec, but also succeeded in convincing the Caribbean and Pacific states to adopt their position.

16One important consequence of this continental unity was the OAU Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence of African States which sought to establish guidelines for relations between African states and the international community to promote African independence and economic development. The importance of this declaration lies in the fact that it ensured the unity of African states in the face of a united Europe, thereby eliminating the risk of internal divisions, and in that the principles it enunciated were to constitute the focal points of the long negotiations culminating in the Lomé Convention, described as a major confrontation between Europe and Africa from 1973 to 1975.10 These negotiations have generally been considered as the beginning of a new era in North-South relations. The experience of multilateral negotiations has been renewed twice since 1975: the Second Lomé Convention, signed in 1979, and the Third Lomé Convention, signed in 1984.

The principal provisions of the Lome Conventions

17The Lomé Conventions are rapidly becoming a system of international relations in themselves, naving passed from the First Convention in 1975 to the Third Convention in 1984, with a Fourth Convention now in preparation. However, this rapid progression in time and in nature notwithstanding, it is still possible to present the characteristics of the conventional instruments briefly.

18It can be reasonably argued that the First Convention laid the general framework and the principles for acp-eec cooperation which have been modified, consolidated, enriched and enlarged in subsequent conventions. A discussion of the provisions of the Convention can therefore be divided into two broad parts: the foundations of the agreement, laid in 1975, and its enlargement and strengthening by the two recent Conventions.

19Three provisions of the First Lomé Convention have generally been recognised as its distinguishing elements. These are: the non-reciprocity provisions, the stabilisation of export earning from primary products, and industrial cooperation.11 Firstly, the Community broke with tradition and offered certain African tropical products free access to the Common Market without the necessity of reciprocity, a principle which had long governed relations between the eec and Africa. Secondly, the Lomé Convention recognised the need to take measures to counteract the constant fluctuations of prices of African products on the world market. It therefore included a system of stabilisation for the export earnings of African states known as stabex.12 The fact that only certain agricultural raw materials such as cocoa, tea, and coffee could benefit from the system and the complicated nature of its operating mechanisms have led some observers to ask the question as to whether stabex was not actually designed as an alibi for international exploitation.13 This problem has given rise to some interesting studies but it may still be necessary to underline the fact that criticism of the stabex mechanisms and of the other provisions of the Convention have been at the root of the expansion and development of the Lomé Conventions.

20The third aspect of the Lomé Convention that marked a departure from traditional relations between Africa and the EEC was the chapter on industrial cooperation in which the EEC not only recognised the importance of industrialisation to economic development but also undertook to encourage and provide assistance for the industrial development of the ACP states (Articles 26-39). The significance of this chapter of the Convention for Nigeria cannot be overemphasised. In fact, the provision on industrial cooperation was a special demand by Nigeria and was drafted by a Nigerian.14 Negotiated on the eve of the inauguration of Nigeria’s Third National Development Plan, the Lomé Convention was expected to provide a remedy for the acute shortage of manpower in the field of industrial and technical skills in the country. As the plan document points out:

21The successful implementation of a development plan depends not just on the availability of financial and other capital imputs, but more importantly on the adequacy of trained manpower in the various occupations.15

22In the context where Nigerian institutions could not satisfy this need for adequately trained manpower, the cooperation agreement with the eec was one of the possible ways of implementing the recommendation by the drafters of the plan that Nigeria

negotiate with friendly foreign countries, specified number of places in their universities and colleges of technology for qualified Nigerian students who will be offered scholarships by the Nigerian government to pursue courses of study in areas of acute manpower shortage.16

23Consequently, one of the principal direct consequences of the Lomé Convention was the signature of technical cooperation agreements between Nigeria and different EEC countries for the training of technical manpower.

24To these three principal aspects of the First Lomé Convention, we must add the traditional provision for European financial assistance to the acp states as well as the measures designed to encourage regional economic cooperation and integration among the acp states. Finally, the First Lomé Convention created a number of joint institutions to administer acp-eec cooperation. These are the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors, and a Joint Parliamentary Assembly (Articles 69-80).

25The Second and the Third Lomé Conventions have generally strengthened these areas of cooperation while introducing new aspects. The reforms have concentrated mostly on improving access of ACP products to the Common Market, encouraging ACP exports by export promotion and increasing the number of products which benefit from export stabilisation.

26The reform of stabex has taken the form of an increase of the original number of products from 12 to 48 and the revision of the dependence and activation thresholds from 7.5 to 6 %. A system of production support for minerals, known as sysmin, has also been instituted since the Second Convention, as well as a reform of the industrial cooperation arrangement. In addition, the areas of cooperation have been significantly enlarged in the last Conventions. There is now cooperation in the fields of agriculture, desert control, fishing, and transport. Other subjects like cooperation in the field of cultural affairs have contributed to expand acp-eec relations.

From economics to politics: the politicisation of Euro-African relations

27Cooperation between Africa and Europe has taken a more and more political turn, moving away from its original economic and commercial objectives. The explanation for this is not far to seek. Politics and economics are too closely related to be separated over a very long period. In fact, the use of trade and aid as instruments of foreign policy in contemporary international relations is such that the Lomé Conventions cannot constitute an exception, especially since, as observers all tend to agree, the Convention represents an attempt to reconcile the divergent national interests of the participating states. What makes the Lomé process even more prone to political pressure is the enormous difference between the actors as far as the power they wield is concerned. What we have is a confrontation between the weak and the strong.

28The first attempt to introduce a purely political dimension into the Lomé Convention was during the negotiations of the Second Convention when the European Council of Ministers decided to link the disbursement of financial aid to ACP states to the level of their preceived respect for fundamental human rights and individual liberties. This decision renewed the controversy over the conditionality of European aid which had been settled in 1973 by the OAU resolution on Cooperation, Development and the Economic Independence of African States. This recommended that all foreign aid, no matter its form or origin, should be in the interest of the recipient states only and not carry with it political conditions.

29However, the general hostility of the ACP states to this move did not prevent the issue from resurfacing during the negotiations of the Third Lomé Convention when a new source of controversy was added to that on human rights. This had to do with the question of policy dialogue recommended by the Commission of the eec as one of the means of ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of Community assistance to African states, given the failure of two decades of development cooperation with Africa where the economic situation has considerably worsened in the 1980s. Considered as a concept, the dialogue on policies means nothing more than the need for prior consultation between the Commission of the eec and the ACP states in order to determine the priority areas for assistance to these states. The establishment of national economic priorities is not only an economic problem, it is also a political and ideological issue of capital importance. Thus, since by implication, policy dialogue effectively meant the participation or the eec in fixing the national priorities of the ACP states, it was not surprising that the reaction of the ACP states was hostile.

30However, one of the consequences of the European attempt to introduce a political dimension into its relations with the ACP states has been to bring to the forefront the question of relations between the member states of the Community and the Republic of South Africa on the one hand, and the problem of apartheid on the other. The EEC has not only been obliged to clarify its position on the political and military situation in the Southern Africa sub-region,17 but also to accept the inclusion of the struggle against apartheid in the Convention as a trade-off for a provision on the respect for fundamental human rights.

An evaluation of Euro-African relations

31Given the complex character of these relations, they are quite difficult to evaluate, all the more so as the results of any such evaluation are likely to vary depending on whether the relations are examined by the institutions or the EEC, the Europeans, or the Africans; and, on the political or economic point of view from which the relations are examined. Given the multiplicity of actors on the ACP side and their differing interests with respect to the Lomé Conventions, it is not likely that a global evaluation will do justice to the specificity of each individual case.

32With respect to Nigeria, for example, the Lomé Conventions have had quite positive effects on her diplomatic relations. However, the economic benefits the country has derived from them have been minimal. In his review of Nigeria’s relations with the EEC under the First Lomé Convention, Asobie has considered the gains so insignificant that he did not hesitate to recommend that Nigeria should withdraw from the Convention altogether.18

33In spite of all the differences between the ACP countries, however, it is our considered opinion that there already exist a number of identifiable trends in Euro-African relations. Opinion is divided between those who see them as a major contribution to the development of a new international economic order19 and those who see them as a perpetration of European colonialism in Africa under a new guise or as a form of "collective neo-colonialism".20 The first school of opinion considers the very existence of the Lomé Conventions as a manifestation of EEC’s desire to contribute positively towards a new international economic order, especially given the absence of meaningful dialogue between the industrialised and underdeveloped nations on a global scale. In addition, the unilateral concessions by the EEC (on free access to European markets for African products, increased financial aid, industrial cooperation, etc.) are considered to be proof of this desire on the part of the Europeans. From this perspective, the principal problem of the Lomé Conventions consists of rendering their various mechanisms and instruments more efficient, one of the preferred solutions being to increase the financial resources available for the attainment of stated objectives. In theoretical terms, this perspective falls under either the decolonisation approach, as proposed by Professor Zartman.21 or that of inching towards interdependence, advanced by Gruhn.22

34The common element in these differing ideas is the fact that Euro-African relations in the context of the Lomé Conventions constitute a progressive movement from a situation of complete African dependence on Europe to that of increased autonomy or interdependence. While it can be doubted that the relationship established by the Lomé Conventions is qualitatively different from those established by the Yaoundé regime, it is not at all evident that these relations have evolved from lesser to greater autonomy for Africa as Zartman has supposed. With the current crisis the African continent is going through and the constant efforts of the EEC to link its financial aid to political conditions, one can ask whether Africa has not really become more dependent on Europe than it was before the signing of the First Lomé Convention.

35Other writers have pointed out the importance of the EEC as a model for the development of regional integration efforts in Africa even though, in certain areas (such as the predominance of Heads of State in regional organisations), it is Africa that is furnishing the EEC with a model.23

36The positive evaluations of Euro-African relations are however contradicted by recent studies on the impact of the Lomé Conventions on the economic development of the ACP states which show both that the successive Conventions have failed to stimulate ACP exports to the Common Market and elsewhere and that these countries have actually lost a significant part of their share of the world market. For example, African exports passed from 2.5 % of world trade in 1970 to 1.6 % in 1982, a decline of 50 % in ten years,24 in spite of measures included in the Lomé Conventions meant to stimulate trade.

37The negative impact of the Lomé Conventions on the economic development of the ACP states confirms the view that the Conventions are deficient not only in a purely technical sense but also structurally. It is only when African relations with Europe are seen either as a form of structural imperialism25 or as unequal relations26 that their character can be clearly explained. Viewed from this perspective, the arguement becomes that, by institutionalising relations between industrialised, ancient colonial pOwers and their basically agricultural former colonies, the Lomé Conventions cannot but work to the advantage of the stronger partners, given the inherent asymmetries of power in their relationship.27 Such an outcome is nothing but the logical working out of the laws of social reproduction on an international scale. In other words, the ACP states are condemned to continue producing agricultural raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods from the EEC. The tendency of the member states of the Community to use the safeguard clauses of the Lomé Conventions in the past in order to restrict ACP exports of manufactured goods has tended to confrim this hypothesis. But the critics of Euro-African relations from this point or view go beyond the negative impact of these relations on African economic development. The undesired consequences of Euro-African relations touch also on the prospects for African autonomy, inter-African cooperation and South-South cooperation on the one hand, and the possibilities of instituting a new international economic order on a world scale on the other.

38In this study of France, Africa and the EEC, the fundamental political thesis being defended is that by institutionalising the relations between Europe and Africa on a continental or regional basis, the Lomé Conventions reduce the margin of autonomy of African states with respect to Europe in general and serve as a means of legitimising the influence of particular European powers, especially France, in Africa.

39The first point to note is that the Lomé Conventions serve as a general justification for the maintainance of all types of relations (economic, political and military) between African states and the European powers. Thus, the Lomé Conventions, instead of encouraging the search for and application of African solutions to African problems, foster mimetism among African leaders and governments. Some authors have no doubt erred in trying to attribute most of Africa’s current development problems to this single concept. However, there is no doubt that the blind attempt to copy European ways of doing things, especially in the fields of administration and economic development, has aggravated the problem of scarcity of resources and of adaptation of administration to local conditions. Another issue raised by the existence of the Lomé Conventions has to do with the question of why the links between one or several African countries with this or that European power should give rise to criticisms from other African countries when at the same time there is an overall cooperation agreement binding Africa to Europe. Such criticism is nothing but hypocritical.

40In the same way that the Lomé Conventions encourage and cultivate a Euro-centnc view among African states, they also work against meaningful economic and political cooperation among African states and African regional organisations, especially if these organisations reproduce colonial linguistic blocs such as those found in the West African sub-region. This situation persists in spite of the formal dispositions in the Lomé Conventions aimed at encouraging regional integration. Thus it has been recently demonstrated that, even without the current economic crisis, the OAU Plan of Action adopted in Lagos in 1980 had very little chance of being implemented because of conflicting francophone and anglophone nationalisms in Africa.28

41On a global level, it can be shown that the Lomé Conventions constitute an obstacle to the establishment of a new international economic order by encouraging the division of underdeveloped countries into antagonistic blocs: those who enjoy privileged treatment and those who have to fend for themselves on the international market. In this respect, one can raise the question as to whether, instead of drawing their importance from the absence of such dialogue, the existence of the Lomé Conventions is not partially responsible for the stagnation of the North-South dialogue. The divisive effect of the Lomé Conventions on underdeveloped countries is heightened by the fact that, since the majority of the least developed countries (LDCs) are found in Africa, the EEC, by the use of its aid programmes in their favour, succeeds in blunting the urgent need for structural change at the systemic level. In this perspective, the role of France in Euro-African relations becomes very significant. In fact, it can be argued that it is by the instrumentality of France that Europe continues to exercise a dominating influence in Africa.

42First of all, of all the former colonial powers of Europe, only France has maintained a close network of relations with its ex-colonies in Africa, relations that take various forms: monetary integration, cooperation agreements in the cultural and technical fields, and, more importantly, pacts of military cooperation and defence. In certain respects, relations between France and its former colonies have remained so close that an analyst once raised the question as to what type of independence Francophone states in Africa really enjoy.29 France has instituted its own system of Euro-African international relations founded on the Franco-African summits, which have not only perpetuated the close relations that existed between France and its colonial territories but have also outlived changes of regimes both in France and Africa30

43One important characteristic of the Franco-African summits is their rapid extension from a core number of French-speaking states to include Portuguese-speaking and English-speaking states. Thus, between 1973 when the summit was instituted and 1985, the number of participating states has risen from 10 to 35. Among the participants at the 1985 summit were Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In this inherent capacity of the Franco-African diplomatic system to incorporate non-French-speaking states, it serves as an effective diplomatic instrument for France and poses a major threat to the survival of the OAU. At crucial moments during the history of the organization, many African states have had to decide between the O. A. U. annual summit or the Franco-African summit. Such a decision becomes

44It can be argued that, by the precise use and application of some or all of these instruments, France has become the most influential diplomatic actor on the African political scene. In this capacity as predominant actor, France has multiplied its military interventions in Africa, notably in Chad, Zaire, and Togo. While the image of France as the "gendarme" of Africa has gained ground, the question still is how France can do what she likes in Africa and get away with it.

45If the hypothesis advanced here (that the existence of Euro-African relations at the continental level serves to legitimize French military, diplomatic and economic activity in Africa) is accepted, one important consequence follows. The search for a reduction of French military influence in Africa must begin with a questioning of this basis of legitimacy. It is in this respect that the leadership role Nigeria plays when it comes to issues concerning African unity and the transformation of North-South relations is perhaps inconsistent with its participation in the Lomé Conventions. For, if theories of the role of perception in international relations are anything to go by,31 it is not likely that actors engaged in long processes of negotiation, consultation and concertation will be in a position to appreciate correctly the contradictions between their interests as the representatives of an African power and those of France as a European power in Africa.

46In other words, it can be argued that the existence of the Lomé Conventions helps to mask the fact that, in Africa, France and Nigeria as political actors are mutually opposed because of their differing strategic and national interests and objectives. The Lomé Conventions therefore the expansion of French influence in Africa by three means. Firstly, by serving as an overall instrument of legitimation of Euro-African relations in general. Secondly, by providing a context of interaction where this influence can be exercised as in the various forums of the acp-eec concertations: the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors, and the various delegations of the eec in acp states. Finally, the processes of interaction themselves end up by creating an identity of views and perceptions which can be readily transferred from the area of economic cooperation to the field of diplomatic strategy.

47With the benefit of hindsight, it is now possible to understand why the French government could not accept a European Community from which its colonies would be excluded, for such a Community would have severely affected long-standing French interests in Africa.

Conclusion

48Certain conclusions can be drawn from this general survey of Africa’s relations with the EEC under the the Lomé Conventions. First of all, we must acknowledge the fact that the Conventions represent the continuation of a long history of close relations between Africa and Europe, motivated mostly by French interests in Africa. Secondly, the Lomé Conventions represent an attempt to reconcile the interests of several partners having divergent economic and political interests. Consequently, Euro-Afncan relations are likely to remain a subject of debate for a long time, depending on who is analysing them and from which point of view. Thirdly, given this general framework of cooperation between Europe and Africa, it will always remain hypocritical to question the role of particular European powers in Africa. A solution to foreign and particularly French interventions in Africa cannot fail to take into account this overall legitimizing role of the Lomé Conventions. Indeed, can specific relations between African states and European powers be modified without questioning the overall framework of Euro-African relations?

49Finally, it can be pointed out that the high-profile role played by France on the African diplomatic and political scene is in conformity with the multi-functional role which Africa was supposed to play in French international relations: first as part of a larger Franco-African community, secondly as a privileged partner of France in the international system, and finally as one of the group of underdeveloped countries which should benefit from French generosity.32