Introduction

The French savoir faire

1As far back as 1903, E. Fallot, a French colonial officer then posted to Tunisia, wrote a book on the specificity of French colonial policy in Africa and why it would outlive British colonial policy. Fallot defined the French conception of colonialism as:

Action exercised by a civilised people over people with inferior civilisations with the objective of gradually transforming them through developing their natural resources and improving their material and moral conditions of existence.

2France stood to gain two strategic advantages from this "civilising mission", Fallot continued. First, there was the fact that, as from 1890, France entered the epoch of negative population growth rate due to difficult social conditions in the country. However, "when transported to a different social milieu, the French regain their prolific capacity". Colonisation could therefore play a strategic role in future population politics. The second advantage was that colonialism "could furnish a current of commercial exchanges for France". Fallot concluded that, contrary to the holistic and long-term colonial vision of the French, "English colonial policies were less idealistic and more utilitarian than our own" and would therefore be more shortlived.

3Looking back at Fallot’s colonial philosophy with the benefit of the hindsight bequeathed by a century of practice, the unqualified conclusion is one of resounding success for French colonial policy, a success that was deepened rather than abated by the independence of her "ex-colonies" and which continues to grow from day to day. The speech of the French Prime Minister in New Caledonia (a French possession in the Pacific Ocean which has a strong nationalist movement) is a significant indication of this success. First the right-wing government of Jacques Chirac (1986-1988) brutalised and killed the spirit of the Melanesian nationalists, and then the subsequent government of Michel Rocard proposed a referendum on a possible move towards independence without sovereignty ten years after the referendum. And while the French are able to keep their former colonies within the "Community”, the British have almost completely lost out.

4The "idealism" of French colonial policy has turned out to be more "utilitarian” in the long run. After all, the existence of the "French family" has become a standard element of the international political system. To the consternation of Nigerians and Anglophones in general, France has not only succeeded in keeping her empire almost completely intact but is also expanding it towards other African countries. Tamar Golan poses the issue in a very graphic manner in an article entitled: "A certain mystery, how can France do everything it does in Africa and get away with it?" Similarly, Ambassador Mahmoud Yahya could not but conclude, while analysing how France fuelled the Nigerian civil war with the aim of destroying the territorial integrity of the country but reaped the greatest benefits of the post-war boom, that, although General Gowon had declared that there was no victor, no vanquished from the war, in fact France lost the war all right but won the peace.

5Still on the French success, the late Cecil Dennis, Liberian Foreign Minister during the Tolbert regime, explained to Tamar Golan that:

The former French colonies have a feeling of belonging to a family. Bad or good, maybe, but a family. We Liberians are orphans... When I go to the United States, I am accorded thirty minutes with the Secretary of State and I am given to understand that this is time taken off more important matters. There is no question of small talk or personal exchange. Of course, we receive financial assistance and are questioned about the democratisation of our regimes. This is all right and proper. But nobody understands that that is not enough, that we are alone and lonely, that we want to belong.

6If the Liberian settlers who were so "close" to their American patrons could be this envious of the closeness of the "French family", then it does pose a major question which requires some consideration.

7In creating the "French family", General de Gaulle not only established a "French Community" but also established a system of personal diplomacy by putting community affairs in the presidential portfolio rather in the Foreign Ministry. By so doing, French and African presidents were able to reinforce their image by the resulting high profile, summit diplomacy. (Gautron, 1986: 7)

8Charles de Gaulle had, since his famous Brazzaville speech of 1940, established a strong father image which involved rewards and punishments for good and bad "children" respectively. For the bad boys such as Reuben of Cameroun, Bakary or Niger, Touré of Guinea, Mba of Gabon, and Keita of Mali, the punishment was loss of power or destabilisation of the regimes or even death. The rewards obtained by the good boys were, and still are, French military and political support to remain in power.

9The system was operated by the all-powerful Jacques Foccart who remained Secretary for African Affairs in Paris for over two decades. Foccart established a wide network in the former colonies through, among other things, catering for all the requirements of the new African leaders, from security and the military sector to schools for their children. (Golan, 1981: 6) He and, by extension, the French state, was thus able to establish very close rapport, if not symbiosis, with these ex-French colonies. Since many of these countries are Nigeria’s immediate neighbours, the closeness of this rapport creates a lot of concern in Nigeria, a country very worried about France’s African policy.

France’s African policy and its role as NATO’s gendarme

10France has developed a reputation as the gendarme of NATO not only because of its willingness to intervene in Africa on behalf of the Western alliance (as was clearly the case in Zaire in 1977/78) but also because of its political capacity to intervene. For example, the preparation for "Operation Baracuda" in the Central African Republic in 1979 included formal discussion of the intervention in the Franco-African summit and a juridical justification by the Commission of African Jurists (Gautron, 1986: 12). The French perspective must also be analysed, however, within the context of its own ambition to be a middle level power with significant relative autonomy in the international system. In this context, Daniel Bach has argued that Africa remains central to French policy because:

Africa remains the only area of the world where France retains sufficient influence as to guarantee its claims to middle power status in the international system. (1986: 75)

11There exists a basic ambiguity in French policy: its faithfulness in its commitment to the Western alliance is coupled with the desire to maintain relative autonomy both in its national defence system and in its foreign policy options.

12It will be recalled that, during the Second World War, France was defeated and its national pride shattered. French attempts to organise national resistance under de Gaulle were derided by the allied forces, especially the Americans. No wonder an irked Charles de Gaulle ordered French resistance forces to shoot at American soldiers trying to prevent them from getting a foothold in a part of the "Empire", that is to say, in Saint Pierre et Miquelon, a French possession off the Canadian coast. At the end of the war, the French were not invited to participate in the Yalta Conference. It was thus not surprising that, while joining the Western Alliance, the French refused to be integrated into its military structure. They also developed an independent nuclear force.

13A basic characteristic of the French world view is the desire and the the political will to maintain an empire. The French still keep ten of their ex-colonies as "integral parts of the French nation". These DOM-TOMs, as they are known (overseas departments and territories), stretch from the Pacific basin, through the Indian sea, to the South American continent and the Caribbean basin.

14Before raising specific problems that affect or have affected Nigerian/French relations, it is useful to highlight certain aspects of French African policy that are sources of worry to Nigeria. They are: the level of French economic control in Africa, her political influence, her military presence, and her active interventionist policy on the continent.

Economic control

15Right from the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, France was able to obtain a special dispensation which involved preferential treatment for its colonies. This widened the opportunities for enlarged trade grants and aid for these countries, a framework that was formalised after independence by Yaoundé Conventions I and II. This system made it possible for France to maintain its general control over its ex-colonies in a framework that kept the Anglophone (i.e. British and US) competition at arm’s length, at least for a time.

16In addition, the French evolved an elaborate system of coopération, with a special ministry to cater for their former colonies. This system involved, on the one hand, a general system of public transfers based on bilateral accords, loans and grants, and, on the other hand, extensive technical and cultural assistance operated by French experts or coopérants. At the institutional level, the currency and financial policies of these countries are tied to the French system through the franc zone. This elaborate system ensures and perpetuates a substantial amount of French control over the economies of these ex-colonies. The control is reinforced by the substantial political influence France has been able to sustain in these countries.

Political influence

17France, more than any other former colonial power, has been able to control the process of the transition of her colonies to neo-colonies. Richard Joseph has recorded how UPC nationalists in Cameroun were ruthlessly massacred in the 1950s and replaced by the more amenable Ahmadu Ahidjo. When, over two decades later, petroleum wealth lulled Ahidjo into opening an account that was outside the franc zone and into starting to open up to new influences, French doctors working for the SDECE (the then French secret service) were able to deceive him into believing that he had diabetes, lung problems and a threatening heart attack and should therefore vacate power (Ede, 1986: 178). In Niger, Djibo Bakary recounts how, when he won the 1956 elections, Governor Ramadier simply cancelled his name because "a communist representative cannot be tolerated in France" (Parti Sawaba, 1961: 20) and he was therefore replaced by Diori Hamani.

18For the type of responsible leaders tolerated by France, the example given by Maurice Delanney, former French ambassador to Gabon, is instructive. Ambassador Delanney recalls that, when President Mba was on sick leave in Paris, Vice-President Paul-Marie Yambit used to invite him "to find out what files he was supposed to sign or act on” (quoted in Pean, 1983: 63). If French experts are right in complaining that the Anglophones have a fixed impression that ALL leaders of the Francophone world are robots at the beck and call of Paris, the least that could be said is that a number of these robots have existed and some others are still to be found on the African continent.

19The "French family" in Africa operates at two levels. The hard core (noyau dur), composed or countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Gabon and Cameroun that have a certain leverage on France due to their strategic locations, national resources, etc., and the outer core of ordinary Francophone countries. In 1984/85, for example, Mobutu of Zaire and Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire put a lot of pressure on France, culminating in virtual blackmail over the important Bujumbura Franco-African summit of December 1984, to renew its intervention in Chad. France had been unwilling to go back to Chad since the famous "Operation Manta" of June to August 1983 established a "no go zone" between the forces of Habre and Gaddafi on the 16th Parallel.

20An important aspect of French political influence in Africa is that it is expanding not only to non-French Francophones such as Zaire, Burundi and Ruwanda but also to Lusophone and Anglophone countries. Even Nigeria was attending the annual Franco-African summit on an observer status up till 1984. This wide-ranging French economic and political influence is reinforced by a significant military presence.

Military presence and intervention

21At independence, France was able to establish military cooperation agreements with most of its former colonies. These agreements covered the provision of arms and technical experts, the supply of strategic minerals such as uranium, lithium, and hydrocarbons and the establishment of military bases. Countries with military bases include: the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Mauritania, and Senegal. France also has troops in the Indian Ocean islands of Reunion and Mayotte.

22Apart from this military presence, France runs the civil and military intelligence, the telex, radio and telephone systems of these countries. This strategic control over intelligence and communications networks means that France has a high capacity to intervene directly, either to change political regimes or to prevent them being changed. When Hamani Diori had to go in 1974, for example, French communications experts left on a pre-planned hunting weekend trip, thus leaving the communications equipment available for use by Seyni Kountché and his men.

23We have already evoked the high level of interventionism that accompanied the granting of independence by France to members or her African empire. This tendency continued in the post-1975 era, with French interventions in the Central African Republic, Chad, Mauritania and Zaire. In addition, France is reputed to have a permanent intervention force, the Force d’Action Rapide or FAR, in Southern France which, in liaison with French military bases on the African continent, is said to be capable of intervening in any African country in four to five hours.

Conclusion

24In concluding this section, it should be noted that, as Gautron (1986: 6) has noted, French control over Africa has softened: the rules of the franc zone have been watered down to allow African countries access to credit facilities and permission to hold a part of their reserves in other foreign currencies; the military agreements have been redrafted to reduce the level of French control; and the Africanisation of the senior civil service has started in earnest. Be that as it may be, however, the level of French influence and control remains very high and, to that extent, France still poses a major challenge to any country that takes Africa as the centrepiece of its foreign policy.

The Paradox of Nigeria / France relations

25Relations between Nigeria and France from 1960 to present have been characterised by a major paradox: a long history of difficult political relations coexists with an even longer history of good economic relations.

Nigeria / France political relations

26In February, April and December 1960, France exploded three nuclear devices in the Sahara, in spite of the vehement protests by many of the then newly-independent African countries. In retaliation against the unfriendly act, Nigeria gave France 48 hours to close down its Embassy in Lagos and to pack out of the country in early January 1961. The French Embassy in Lagos was to remain closed until October 1965. Nigeria also banned French ships and aeroplanes from calling at our ports.

27General de Gaulle’s African policy was a major factor in fuelling Franco-Nigerian political contradictions. De Gaulle’s major preoccupation was the re-establishment and preservation of French imperial power which had been shattered during the Second World War. His major concerns, therefore, were political and strategic. In terms of Nigeria, de Gaulle was worried that the size and potential strength of the country might lead to a re-orientation or French West African countries away from France and towards Nigeria. Many of the hard-core francophone protagonists like Leopold Sedar Senghor had also, as deputies in the National Assembly, warned France about the break up of French West Africa and the danger of Nigeria being a new center of attraction (Bach, 1982). General de Gaulle and his cohorts therefore perceived Nigeria as a stumbling block to the preservation of their empire.

28This attitude resurfaced as from 1962 when Nigeria (following Britain) commenced negotiations with the EEC in order to obtain associate membership with the Community. France systematically opposed Nigeria’s admission, presumably on the ground that Nigeria should not enjoy certain privileges till then reserved mainly for francophone countries (Bach, 1982: 51). The accord with the EEC was not signed until the 16th of July 1966, two months after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and France.

The civil war

29Exactly a year after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, a new area of conflict was to arise: the Nigerian civil war. Pierre Pean (1983: 71-83) reveals that, as far back as 1963, General de Gaulle and Jacques Foccart, his African affairs Professor Smart,1 had dispatched Lt-Col. Bichelot, a French secret service officer, to Abidjan where he was to work with Houphouet-Boigny on the Nigerian desk, under the close supervision of Jean Mouchean-Beaupre, a close de Gaulle aide. Thus, by the start of the war, the French were ready. In July 1967, the French army dispatched a B-26 bomber to Enugu. In October 1967, Maurice Delanney, the French Ambassador to Gabon, sent Ojukwu four secret service advisers under the command of Col. Fournier. On July 13 1968, the first French plane loaded with arms and ammunition landed at Uli air strip via Gabon, and this continued for months at a daily rate of about 20 tons.

30The Red Cross was mobilised to participate in the arms shipment and, to simplify matters, Col. Merle, the French Military Attaché in Gabon, was also made President of the Red Cross. On the international scene, the French government openly campaigned for Biafrian "self determination" and sponsored organisations to do the same. They also sponsored mercenaries to fight in Biafra. Although they did not officially recognise Biafra, they did all in their power to help realise the Biafran dream. However, this golden opportunity they had to break up the Nigerian Federation had limited success because even some of their close allies such as Laminzana of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Diori of Niger refused to follow their line, thus limiting the axis to Paris, Libreville and Abidjan.

Rapprochement

31The coming to power of Georges Pompidou in June 1969 was to provide an occasion to resolve the conflict. With the imminent victory of the Federal side in the war, Pompidou was worried about adverse consequences for French investments in Nigeria. His own African policy was tilted less towards maintaining French aid to the Francophone countries and more towards promoting French private investments. He therefore signed an agreement with Gowon in which France was to stop official support for Biafra and to reduce military aid to them. In return, they got an assurance that their investments in Nigeria would not suffer at the end of the war. Between the end of the war and 1974, petroleum sales to France resumed. In fact the volume of French imports from Nigeria quadrupled within this period (Bach, 1982: 58).

321973 was a watershed marking the take-off of French involvement in the Nigerian economy. In that year, a French minister, André Bettencourt, visited Nigeria, the first such visit since independence. What was important about his visit was that he came with a delegation of the patronat français, that is, barons of industries who were interested in doing business in Nigeria. In that same year, the Peugeot project was started at Kaduna and a credit agreement for 110 million French francs was made available. However, Nigeria later declined the offer because its terms were not as favourable as competing ones. It was the boost in economic activities that led Senghor to complain bitterly in 1974 that France was more dynamic in Nigeria than in Francophone countries (Bach, 1982: 52). Not surprisingly, the dimensions of the conflict were soon to assume a regional form.

33Indeed, in 1971, the Ivorian and Senegalese Presidents announced their intention to form an economic community on the basis of the Customs Union of West Africa involving Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Dahomey and Mauritania. President Pompidou supported this move, arguing that the Francophones in West Africa should always act as a united block against Nigeria. Meanwhile, the war had sensitised Nigeria to the dangers of French intervention in the region and the possibilities of circumventing that danger. Nigeria, with the help of Togo, therefore started working towards the formation of ECOWAS as a forum for the economic integration of the whole region.

34Thus, despite the fact that economic relations between Nigeria and France started growing rapidly as from 1973, the political relations between them remained conflictual. There were, as a result, moves to reduce the areas of conflict and to improve relations. This led to the signing of a 5-year Economic and Technological Agreement between the two countries in 1979. The fact that France had reduced its hostility towards ECOWAS no doubt helped in oiling this agreement. France had also undertaken in 1976 to train 1,500 technicians for the execution of Nigeria’s Third Plan. Since 1975, Nigeria has remained France’s most important economic partner in sub-Saharan Africa.

35In 1981, François Mitterrand came to power in France with a socialist majority. This led to general expectations that there would be a shift away from the Gaul list policy of promoting imperial French dominion. Those who had this expectation did not realise that Mitterrand had been historically central to the evolution of that policy as French Minister for the Colonies in 1950, Minister for French Overseas Territories in 1951, subsequently Interior Minister in 1954-55, and Minister for Justice in 1956-57. Having played an important role in the formation of the French Empire, therefore, he was unlikely to preside over its liquidation. In outlining his African policy in 1981, Mitterrand contended that Africa is the continent that is still easily within the means of France, the continent where 500 men could still change the course of history (Bayart, 1984: 53). He then affirmed that France would play a role in conformity with her historical grandeur, and that, in so doing, the best option was that of continuity (Bayart: 108).

36Not surprisingly, therefore, President Shagari did not find the French very appreciative of the huge contracts his regime gave them. In fact, when President Shagari was to visit Paris in March 1982, President Mitterrand preferred to send Mrs. Georgina Dufoix, Minister for Social Affairs and National Solidarity, to receive him at the airport. This designation of a junior Minister to meet the Nigerian President led to the cancellation of the scheduled visit and was indicative of how seriously the French took Nigeria (Akinterinwa). That same year, five Nigerian soldiers were killed by Camerounian troops and, in the conflict that arose, France was said to have sent two planes filled with arms, including ground-to-ground missiles, to Cameroun to enable it face Nigeria (Akinterinwa). These two unfriendly acts raised interesting questions, especially since that year (1982) was one of the best for French business in Nigeria.

37Franco-Nigerian political relations were not to improve significantly until 1984 when there was an exchange of Ministerial visits and the signing of a cultural agreement between the two countries. There was also a lot of consultations between them over the question of the withdrawal of French and Libyan troops in Chad. After the Claude Cheyson / Ibrahim Gamban exchange of ministerial visits in March and September 1984, the Babangida regime pursued the line with the visit by Roland Dumas to Nigeria in November 1985 and that of Bolaji Akinyemi to Paris in January 1986. This rapprochement does not represent a resolution of the basic political contradictions raised above. But it probably represents their containment.

French presence in the nigerian economy

38Since 1973, there has been a phenomenal growth of the economic exchanges between Nigeria and France. As a matter of fact, in 1979, a 5-year economic and technological agreement was signed by both countries. The agreement involved:

1. the joint creation and management of industrial enterprises;

2. the promotion of development projects of common interest in areas of:
   

1. 1. telecommunications

   2. housing

   3. agriculture

   4. roads and ports

   5. consultancy services

   6. exchange and sales of licences for scientific and technical know-how

   7. provision of facilities for feasibility studies and research

   8. execution of pilot projects in areas such as energy, production, geological survey and rural development.

39Although this agreement expired in 1984 and still has not been renewed, economic relations have continued to grow.

40The major areas of economic exchange between Nigeria and France are in the construction and manufacturing sectors, oil exploration and exploitation, banking, commerce, geological surveys and the agro-allied sector. Among the major French concerns in Nigeria are: SCOA, CFAO, Elf Aquitaine, Peugeot Automobile, UBA, IBWA, Société Générale, Michelin, Fougerolle, Bouygues, Dumez and Total. In 20 years (1962-1982), the volume of exchange between Nigeria and France multiplied by 100 in current prices and by 30 in constant prices (Moniteur officiel du commerce international, p. 20). In 1984, France became Nigeria’s principal commercial partner, with a 1.3 billion dollar commercial deficit for France (National Concord, 7th November 1985). In that year, France bought over $2 billion worth of oil from Nigeria. France is today the second largest foreign investor in Nigeria with a total net in vestment of over $500 million. Franco-Nigerian companies also provide employment for over 100,000 Nigerian workers (Guardian, 2nd November 1985).

Trade relations

41In 1985, France exported goods worth 4.944 million French francs to Nigeria and imported goods worth 15.286 million francs. That gave France a commercial deficit of 10.342 million francs. Petroleum represented 99.39 % of French purchases from Nigeria in 1985. These figures mean that, in 1985, Nigeria was the eleventh major supplier to France and the second African supplier, while France was Nigeria’s most important supplier of goods and services. While Nigeria supplied petroleum to France, she got motor cars, industrial products, sugar and cereals in return. Thus, in 1985, France was Nigeria’s third most important commercial partner after Great Britain and the Federal German Republic, thereby beating the United States.

42Her performance was even better in 1984 when she beat Germany to take over the second position. In fact, in 1984, France became Nigeria’s first customer (ahead of the United States) and second supplier (next to the United Kingdom) with trade figures of 2.7 billion naira (Directory, p. 11). The structure of the trade was the same as that of 1985, with petroleum representing 99.39 % of French imports. Total French imports were worth 19,767 million French francs while exports were worth 7,942 million French francs (Afro-Trade, p. 39). French exports to Nigeria included Peugeot CKD parts (35 %), agricultural and industrial products, building materials, engineering equipment, etc. The only major different item in 1984 was the purchase of four Airbus 310 aircraft by the Nigeria Airways. The tables below show the major categories of these imports from France.

Tabel 1: French exports to Nigeria (in billions of Franch francs)2

Table 2 : Franco-Nigerian trade (in billions of French francs)

43The table below shows the trade flows between Nigeria and France between 1977 and 1983.

Banking sector

44French investments in Nigeria’s banking sector did not begin until 1949 (50 years after the British began investing in this sector) when the Banque Nationale de Paris founded the British and French Bank (later renamed the United Bank for Africa) in Lagos. It is today the third largest bank in Nigeria. The second French bank to join the Nigerian financial scene was Banque pour l’Afrique Occidentale which opened a branch in Kano in 1959. The bank was incorporated in 1969 as the International Bank for West Africa (IBWA) and is the fourth largest in Nigeria. In 1974, with the increased tempo of economic relations with France, three French banks jointly established the French Banking Bureau which is today the representative office of Banque Paribas. Other French banks in Nigeria are Société Générale, Merchant Banking Corporation (Banque Paribas), and Commercial Bank (Credit Lyonais). Banque Nationale de Paris also has a representative office in Lagos.

45The table below summarises the French presence in Nigeria’s banking sector.

Table 4: French presence in Nigeria’s banking sector4

46French banking investments in Nigeria exceed 40 million naira, with the aggregate assets of Nigerian banks with French affiliates totaling 7.5 billion naira. This figure represents 25 % of the combined assets of all commercial and merchant banks in Nigeria. They held 6.0 billion naira in deposits and their portfolio of loans and advances are worth 2.5 billion naira. They employ 10,000 people in their branches in the country.

47The French presence in Nigeria’s financial sector is thus very pronounced. Banks, it is known, play a critical role in terms of determining investment patterns as well as arranging deals for foreign purchases, transfer of profits and resources, etc. There is no doubt that the French have made very good use of their financial institutions in the country to further their interests.

Industrial sector

48CFAO and SCOA started as French trading posts in Nigeria during the colonial era and are today among the largest commercial conglomerates in the country. CFAO was established in Nigeria in 1902 as a trading company. It has a capital of 26 million naira and, in 1984, made a 15 million naira net profit on the basis of a 302 million naira turnover (Moniteur, October 1985, p. 122). It has 38,000 Nigerian shareholders who own 60 % of the shares while 40 % is held by CFAO France. Among its subsidiaries are: CFAO General Import, Structor, Qualitex, CFAO Motors, Electro Hall, Transcop, DPI Limited, Galvanising Industries Limited, Passat Industries, Dumex Pharmaceuticals, Nippen Industries, and Nigerian Motors Industries.

49SCOA started its operations in Nigeria in 1926 and, in 1984, made a net profit of 11.4 million naira on a turnover of 390 million naira. It has a capital of 32 million naira and employs 3,630 people. 40 % of its shares are owned by SCOA France while the rest are distributed among thousands of Nigerians. SCOA is the third largest industrial and commercial concern in the private sector in Nigeria. It has an assembly plant for Peugeot pick-up vans in Lagos which, in 1980, had a production level of 7,000 units. Its other activities are spread over agriculture, energy, electronics, housing equipment and tools, textiles, and plastics. SCOA is also a countertrader dealer.

50The Peugeot assembly plant at Kaduna is the single largest French investment in Nigeria. It started its operations in Nigeria in 1974 and, in 1984, made a profit of 15.4 million naira with a turnover of 493.6 million naira. It has a capital of 14.5 million naira and employs 3,654 Nigerians. 40 % of its shares are owned by Peugeot France, 50 % by the Nigerian government, and 10 % by some of its distributors. The French automobile industry occupies a prominent position in the Nigerian vehicle sector. In 1977, 1978, and 1979, 31.6 %, 28 % and 31.3 % respectively of the cars plying Nigerian roads were of French origin. By 1979, the figure had jumped to 56.2 %.

51In 1962, Michelin started a tyre manufacturing factory at Port Harcourt. It made a profit of 2.2 million naira in 1984 on a turnover of 60.2 million and employs 1,972 people (Directory, p. 176).

52There are many other French manufacturing concerns in Nigeria but these are the major ones, except for those in the oil sector. In conformity with the pattern and nature of the economic activities of industrialised countries in the Third World, the level of their involvement in industry is not as significant as their investment in commerce or in the execution of contracts. Even when they invest in industry, however, the level of local value added is very low since they are involved mainly in the assembly of goods imported from their metropolitan headquarters.

Petroleum sector

53As has been mentioned previously, crude oil sales are the fulcrum of Franco-Nigerian economic relations as Nigeria supplies France about 10 % of her oil needs. French interests in Nigeria’s oil industry are maintained through Elf Aquitaine, Schlumberger and Total, with Elf playing the most significant role. When the going was good, Elf enjoyed a production quota of 1 million barrels a day from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). It started its operations in Nigeria in 1962 and had a turnover of 302 million dollars in 1984 (Directory, p. 179). It has a capital of 5 million naira fully owned by the French.

54Total started a petroleum marketing company as far back as 1956. It made a profit of 26 million naira in 1984 on a turnover of 346 million naira (Directory, p. 194). It has a capital of 33.75 million naira, 60 % of which is owned by the French. It has recently started to diversify and owns a factory for the manufacture of liquified petroleum gas in Ibadan. It also recently ventured into mecnanised agriculture with a 6,000 hectare maize farm in Oyo State.

55Schlumberger is a concern in the oil-fields construction sector.

56The French also did show interest in the liquified natural gas project, although they seem to be rather reticent about it now that Nigeria’s payments capacity does not seem to be improving.

Construction

57In recent years, French civil engineering firms have become particularly successful in their operations in Nigeria. At the end of 1980, almost half of the contracts awarded for the construction of Nigeria’s new capital at Abuja were won by French firms. The following are the major contracts won:

1. 170 million naira contract for the construction of the Abuja international airport, won by Dumez in 1980;

2. 60 million contract for the construction of a water supply dam at Abuja, won by Spie-Batignolles;

3. 27 million naira contract for the construction of one thousand housing units, won by Auxiliaire d’Entreprise (SAE); and

4. 426 million naira contract for the construction of another type of one thousand housing units, won by C. K. Renaud.

58The French also won the following major contracts in Ajaokuta:

1. 180 million naira for Dumex;

2. 330 million naira for Fougerolle; and

3. 2 million naira for Sofre-Mines.

59At Aladja Steel Mill, Dumex won a 60 million contract for the construction of public buildings and access roads while SEFRI won a 90 million naira contract to build the Ikeja Sheraton Hotel. The French national railways also won a 46 million naira contract for the engineering works on the Port Harcourt-Ajaokuta rail line, although the contract has now been suspended. Between 1976 and 1978, the French contractor SCE won contracts worth over 150 million naira for various road projects.

60The rip-offs involved in these huge contracts were such that the official monitor of International Trade in France, (MOCI) announced in 1982 the "great rain of contracts" available in Nigeria which, between 1978 and 1981, were worth 16.5 billion French francs. The Monitor then went on to advise that, although the cost of entry (les coûts d’approche) into the Nigerian market was high, the benefits were worthwhile. The type of cost they were talking about might very well have been related to things like the revelation at the Uwaifo investigation panel of a 21.8 million naira gratification given by Fougerolle for a 329 million naira contract from the NPN administration (Guardian, 15th January 1986). The revelation that this bribery was discussed and received by the caucus of the then ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria, shows the extent to which multinational corporations have bought the Nigerian leadership and are therefore capable of making this leadership serve their interests. The caucus of the party, it should be recalled, was composed of not only the Party Chairman and Secretary but also the President himself and the most notable of party notables. This means that what has been responsible for the remarkable success of French business in Nigeria might not be proven efficiency or better tenders but better political connections.

Conclusion

61This fairly extensive survey of French presence in the Nigerian economy demonstrates that the question of French omnipresence in Africa is central, not just in the Francophone part, but also in virtually all other parts of the continent. Another study in this volume has raised the strategic questions posed for Nigeria by the French presence in South Africa. It remains for us to examine the strategic questions posed by French presence in our country and in the countries surrounding us.

Nigeria’s Strategic Interests

62Ultimately, the strategy of any country revolves around its capacity to harness and develop its human and natural resources to enable it cope with threats, blackmail, sabotage, aggression, etc., be they internal or external. Our concern here, however, is not in the domain of "grand strategy" but simply that of identifying a number of strategic preoccupations generated by France’s African policy.

63The communiqué of the All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy defined the first two objectives of Nigerian foreign policy up till the year 2000 a.d. as:

1. The defence and promotion of Nigerian sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national independence.

2. The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa which will secure the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence of all African countries and their total liberation from imperialism and all other forms of foreign domination (emphasis ours).

64The centrality of Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives, coupled with her opposition to foreign domination on the continent, makes France, a major power in Africa, sui generis, a major problem in Nigerian strategic thinking. Professor Gambari has described it as a conflict between an African power (Nigeria) and a major power in Africa (France).

65Nigeria, which has at least 25 % of the African population and 55 % of the population of West Africa, sees its claims and aspirations towards a. continental role whittled away by French omnipresence in Africa.

66All of Nigeria’s land neighbours (Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroun) are Francophone countries with substantial French presence and control. The borders between Nigeria and these countries were drawn arbitrarily during the colonial conquest and borderline ethnic groups have been arbitrarily cut into two.-The border communities have, however, not been too mindful of this separation and cousins, spouses and even friends on the two sides continue their normal social and economic exchanges, irrespective of the juridical line of division. The porous nature and the ethnic composition of the borders poses a number of potential problems for Nigeria:

1. ethnic irredentism;

2. the refugee influx and arms traffic in case of civil wars in neighbouring countries like Chad;

3. subversion with the use of neighbouring countries as bases.

67As France has fairly strong influence in these countries, French support for any of these possibilities could have serious consequences for Nigeria.

68The French, for their part, have been perceptive of the geopolitical significance of ethnic overlap between Nigeria and her neighbours. The analysis of Senator Bong, special French envoy to Niger in 1958, with regards to the "Hausa factor" is quite instructive. Explaining why Djibo Bakary must not be allowed to lead Niger to independence, the Senator said that:

One must be mad to think that we, the French, shall let Niger go (referendum of opting out of the French Community). In losing Guinea, we lost its wealth. That could be replaced. But if we lose Niger, we lose Algeria and we would open possibilities for Nasser. We would allow the creation of a great Islamic state from Lagos to Algeria’s borders... Djibo Bakary is not only an agent of international communism, he is also a fanatic muslim of the Sanussiyya brotherhood. He is in connivance with Nasser and the Englishinstigated Nigerian leadership. (Parti Sawaba, 1961: 38-39).

69If, since 1958, the Hausa population of Niger, just like the Hutu of Burundi, have been kept, out of political positions and out of the army, the reasons might not be unconnected with the fears expressed by Senator Bong.

70Linked to these geopolitical concerns is the problem of regional economic integration, to which Nigeria is committed. Although French and Francophone opposition to the formation of ecowas has now been liftea, the cost (the formation of ceao, a rival Francophone formation) is very high, because commitment to the realisation of the objectives of ecowas is very limited.

71It must also be reiterated that the significant French presence in the Nigerian economy itself is a potential instrument for leverage or even blackmail.

72Of course, French military presence in Africa and her high capacity for rapid intervention is another obvious threat to Nigerian security. Her close cooperation with South Africa in the area of the development of military hardware is also inimical to Nigeria’s strategic interests.

73If, however, in spite of these areas of concern, the rapprochement between Nigeria and France has been maintained for over a decade, it must be because the Nigerian state finds the diversified investments, trade flows and contracts, as well as the few areas of political cooperation offered by France, to be issues of overriding importance. The centrality as well as complementarity of energy resources (petroleum, gas and possibly uranium) between the two countries is an obvious pointer in this direction.

SAP and the future of Nigeria / France relations

74In concluding this chapter, it is worthwhile highlighting the impact the current economic crisis in Nigeria could have on the relations between the two countries. Nigeria, like most other African countries, is currently implementing an International Monetary Fund-inspired Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The result is that the level of public expenditure, foreign currency and imports has declined considerably.

75This means that the rosy economic relations between Nigeria and France are now entering a bleaker epoch. Taking the example of France’s major investment in Nigeria, Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (pan), its sales have declined from over 60,000 cars in 1982 to 24,000 cars in 1986 and finally only 6,973 cars in 1987, while its workforce has reduced from 4,600 in 1981 to 1,800 in early 1988 (afp Bulletin, 2nd April, 1988). In fact, ap France, the French technical partner in PAN, has threatened to withdraw from the company.

76As for contracts, the era of "a rain of great contracts" is over. But more important is the fact that even payments for contracts already executed are no more guaranteed. In fact, Nigeria and France are presently at loggerheads over payments for civil works executed at the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Company where "French officials have made it clear that early settlement of the Ajaokuta dossier was necessary to avoid difficulties in other areas of our economic cooperation" (Vanguard, 14th April 1988).

77Be that as it may, the decline in economic relations between the two countries in itself is unlikely to precipitate a deterioration in political relations for, after all, French companies have still not been paid the remaining monies for their contracts and for their commodities imported into the country and, in any case, France is one of the countries that has helped in imposing SAP on Nigeria. Being short of answers, maybe we could end by posing a question: will the paradox earlier raised ever be reversed and the economic relations between Nigeria and France accompanied by improved political relations?