Chapter One
Nigeria and France: Problems of the comparative method
p. 1-9
Texte intégral
Introduction
1Because of purely practical and material rather than scientific or methodological problems, traditional comparative analyses have remained bounded, usually adopting an essentially descriptive country-by-country approach to the examination of selected political institutions, in countries that in most cases share common political, administrative, social and economic values, or that have similar political institutions. Fortunately, this trend has evolved for the better in the contemporary period. This is because, from an initially limited area approach in which comparative studies were composed of case studies of individual states or studies of states that resemble rather than differ in several significant ways, there appears to be an evolution towards the comparative examination of political issues and political problem areas in states that appear at first so different and thus in principle "non comparable".
2It is evident that this new generation of comparative works, to which the present volume attempts to add a modest contribution, improves in considerable ways our appreciation and understanding of the workings of political institutions and the various configurations of politics (or the game of power) in several ways. The most important is that they enlarge our vision of the subject of politics by bringing into focus several variables that influence or can influence the real mechanics of politics using data generated from supposedly dissimilar political environments.
3The addition to existing knowledge which the comparative analysis of political structures, forms of political behaviour and political problem areas provides should, however, not lead one to conclude that such intellectual exercises are without problems. Even if studying institutionally, culturally, economically and socially different political communities expands the frontiers of comparative politics, it also introduces and generates a number of critical problems which are methodological as well as substantive. Our intention in these introductory remarks is to examine the problems that accompany inter-cultural comparative works, using as our base France and Nigeria. This examination will be done in three sections. In the first section, we shall look at the possibility that exists for embarking on a comparative analysis of France and Nigeria as well as the desirability of embarking on such an enterprise. In the second section, we shall look briefly at the major problems that stand in the way of cross-cultural comparative political analysis in general and those that pertain directly to our two units of study. The third and final section will be the conclusion where we shall summarize our major thinking.
Comparing France and Nigeria
4According to James Bill, comparative politics is fundamentally the study of political forms and processes in two or more than two political contexts or environments.1 Such an exercice is geared towards the search for variables that inform the workings of comparable political institutions and forms the range of variation of these variables in different environmental or political settings, and the consequences of these variations in the workings of the political institutions being examined.
5In embarking on comparative analyses of political issues, structures and problem areas in countries such as France and Nigeria, we need to acknowledge two general things. The first is the individuality of each of the states. Each of the states has its distinct peculiarities which are the logical emanations of its peculiar political history, its particular political problems, and the particular climate under which supposedly identical political structures function in each state. The second is the commonality of a number of political structures and processes in both states. That, in both states, there are particular and identifiable structures that aggregate and articulate political interests and that there is an identifiable government in both states charged with authoritative decision making form, among several other characteristics, part of the common traits of both political systems.
6It is possible to undertake a comparative examination of the French and Nigerian political systems along these two lines. In other words, one can undertake a comparative analysis both of the individuality of the French and Nigerian political systems and of their commonality. The first type of comparative analysis would be geared essentially towards explaining the differences in the physiognomy and dynamics of the French and Nigerian states and could inform theory building on such issues as why different political systems have different political needs, why these choose particular models of distributing power and other political resources, etc. On the second level of comparison, one can attempt to appreciate the different degrees to which identical political phenomena occur or function in both states. At this level, several themes and phenomena exist. Patron-client relationships, the workings of political parties, center-periphery relations, and problems of local government are some examples of these.
7In reality, one cannot compartmentalize comparative studies into such distinct clusters as we have sketched above because ingredients of both must usually obtain in any serious comparative work. In other words, the differences as well as similarities in the workings of political structures and types of political processes must guide any comparative work on France and Nigeria. That it is possible to undertake such an enterprise cannot be doubted. However, is it desirable to embark on a comparative study of the Nigerian and French States?
8We think it is, for several reasons. The most important is that it will be intellectually and scientifically satisfying. This is because even though France and Nigeria constitute rather dissimilar political configurations in appearance (in terms of their dominant political cultures, their political psychologies, elite beliefs, values and behavioural patterns, their authority structures, their levels of economic development and their socio-cultural make-up), it is desirable to compare them for a very simple reason. It is only by a detailed and systemic analysis of a number of structures common to them that one can learn to what extent and under what circumstances hypotheses about their differences hold true.
9Secondly, it is useful to compare the functioning of political institutions in Nigeria with identical institutions in more developed and consolidated state systems such as France. This is because Nigeria is still largely engaged in political engineering, searching for ways to stabilize and to rationalize its political institutions. She is, for example, presently engaged in a sensitive demilitarisation exercise whose final objective is to establish a Third Republic in 1992 with elected political actors at the local, state and federal levels. Nigeria thus has a lot to gain from a comparative study such as ours because this study would, among other filings, lay bare the various factors that have facilitated the development and stabilization of "modern" political institutions in such "older" democracies as France.
10The third justification for a comparative study such as ours is that, despite their seeming differences, Nigeria and France furnish two very interesting examples of modernising states. We do not believe that modernisation is a linear process that stops when a country becomes industrialised. In reality, we distinguish two levels of modernisation. The first is pre-industrial and is associated with the search by "developing" countries such as Nigeria for the structures that will permit them better utilise their social, human, economic and political resources to exist as organic political entities as well as respond to the needs of their people. The second is post-industrial modernisation, associated with the acquisition of the institutional aptitude by developed countries such as France to better react to socio-political changes produced in their industrialisation. It is important to compare these two modernising states not only because that would enable us to better understand the process of political modernisation but also because, as pointed out by Almond, a comparison of Western and non-Western political systems brings out sharply the "latency" of the typical non-Western political system in contrast to the overtness of Western politics, and thus improves our knowledge of the different ways that political systems perform essentially similar functions.
11However, the fact that it is desirable to undertake a comparative examination of selected themes in Nigeria and France hardly substracts from the enormous problems that accompany such an attempt. Most of these problems are general since they relate to all cross-cultural comparisons. These general problem areas have been well documented by S. Finer.2 Others are constraints that appear more specific to the comparative analyses of themes relating to Nigeria and France. We shall attempt a brief summary of these problem areas in the following section.
Some difficulties of cross-national comparative studies with specific reference to a France-Nigeria analysis
12Comparative politics is most important but equally most difficult. It is perhaps because of the difficulty involved that there remain several dark alleys in the study of politics especially in the explanation of the multiplicity of forms and patterns of political structures and political behaviours even in political communities that share several fundamental political values and ties. It is also most probably because of the problems involved in comparative politics that a great majority of the traditional comparative works remain in reality monographic.
13Finer has identified three major constraints to serious cross-national comparative studies. The first constraint relates to data generation for comparative purposes. Usually the data base that should serve comparative cross-national studies is not sufficiently vast to provide a comfortable platform for understanding the complex ways identical political institutions serve differently in political systems. This problem of data generation has several dimensions.
14First there is the question of access to data. States fall into different categories in this respect. In some states, especially in the Western world, it is relatively easy to obtain needed information for political analysis. But, in others such as Nigeria and most other developing countries, there appears to be a deliberate attempt, particularly on the part of government officials, to frustrate data collection on governmental processes and issues. Whereas there is a culture of academic research in some states, with attempts being made to facilitate research through the release of needed information (access to information may be limited only if it has a high security dimension), in others, this culture is lacking. Were we to place Nigeria and France on the "closed-open" continuum to which Finer makes an allusion in his discussion of this dimension of the problem of data generation, there is no doubt that Nigeria would be at one extreme (the "closed" pole) of this continuum while France would be at the other.
15The second dimension of the data generating problem identified by Finer is the difficulty of measuring data which makes it relatively taxing to collect "comparable" data in different political contexts. This problem relates essentially to that of defining the concept or problem one is treating comparatively and the operational indicators which will then guide data collection. For a comparative study of contemporary France and Nigeria, this problem is pertinent since different types of institutions in the two countries might perform similar or identical political functions. For example, in terms of articulating and aggregating political interests, one can limit one’s data generation in France to duly constituted political parties or groupings. In Nigeria, apart from similar institutions, one also needs to generate information on other less formalised but most important groupings such as tribal associations, town unions and development associations for which there are hardly any comparable institutions in France. In other words, and as correctly pointed out by Finer, the indicators that one might choose to measure a given variable across nations might be faulty or "imprecise".
16The third dimension of the data generation problem relates to a point we raised earlier, that is, the individuality of political systems. Some political issues, problems and events may be peculiar or specific to particular states. One can thus either find that one cannot make them amenable to comparative treatment or that, as again pointed out by Finer, comparative analysis of them would be "inappropriate". There is no way, for example, that one can compare traditional authorities in Nigeria with similar institutions in France because these do not obtain in the latter. The fact that some of the peculiar characteristics of both states directly influence the workings of political forms that are being compared complicates in no small way the "completeness" of the information being used to inform one’s analysis.
17The second set of constraints to cross-cultural comparisons identified by Finer relates to how to establish order on the multiplicity of the background variables that influence directly or indirectly the subject of politics in different countries. This problem has several dimensions. The first relates to the sheer size of the various factors that directly or indirectly shape given political forms and processes in different countries complicating the explanation of differences or similarities in their texture in more than one political system. The second relates to the difficulty of measuring the influence of each of the factors chosen in different political systems. The third is that several of the indicators used to measure specific variables in politics are in reality subjective and specific to the Western world. Their use, especially in comparative works between Western and non-Western societies, is thus highly limited.
18Several examples of these problem areas can be cited in relation to a comparative analysis of the French and Nigerian states. The sheer number of factors that influence political behaviour in both countries would emanate from their different historical antecedents (one was a colonising power while the other was a colonized state), from their different socio-cultural compositions, and from their different levels of economic development. The difficulty of measuring the real influence of a particular variable or factor in the workings of both political systems can be manifested in several ways. A perfect example of this is the role of formal political leadership in political decision-making in both countries. The weight attached to formal authority structures in the workings of both states differs radically between Nigeria and France. Whereas they have shown an astonishing capacity for resisting pressure from the civil society in France, in Nigeria, the visible political authority appears, to all intents and purposes, to work in concert with, and sometimes for, very strong informal centres of power in the civil society. The analysis of political authority in both states would, therefore, need to acknowledge the differential capacity of formally constituted authority structures in both states to obtain compliance from the civil society with minimal costs.
19A third major constraint to cross-cultural comparative politics is the institutional and normative conditions that inform the workings of identical political institutions in different states. The difference between types of political systems (modern/traditional), between forms of political organisation (federal, unitary, confederal), between types of political regimes (monarchical, military, democratic or constitutional) only serve to complicate the comparison of political issues, events and forms across national boundaries. This is because, as was pointed out by Finer, comparative government has to contend with norms, institutions and behaviour. The number of variables that need to be touched upon in trying to analyse chosen political processes and events is thus correspondingly high.
20This question of differences in the normative and institutional conditions obtaining in different political states affects a study such as ours. Indeed, the fundamental differences in the type of state that obtains in Nigeria and France (one is federal and the other is unitary) and the type of regime (one has been predominantly military and the other non-military) result in a situation where the political institutions do not follow the same logic in their actions. An attempt to embark on any comparison in this context might thus appear over ambitious if not ill informed.
21A second major way in which this factor can affect our study is that, whereas most of the norms that inform the workings of political institutions in France can easily be identified and examined, in Nigeria some of these norms are not easily analysable. For example, there appears in Nigeria to be some form of coexistence, if not marriage, between soundly established governmental authority (whether under civilian or military regimes) and informal but strong traditional rulership institutions. The types of linkages that unite traditional rulers with even legitimately elected political authorities are not easily discernible because of the nature of the data sought as well as secrecy on the part of government officials on their real relationship with traditional authorities.
22Apart from the three categories of constraints we have been discussing, we can identify some other secondary constraints to comparative works on Nigeria and France. First, there is the relative "totalness" of politics in Nigeria and its relative "partialness" in France. The Nigerian society appears to be over politicised, so much so that there is usually no frontier between politics and other sectors of human endeavour in the country. An analysis of politics in Nigeria is thus relatively wide since it eats into economic, social and cultural territories. In France, on the other hand, the boundaries appear to be more distinct. The relatively high level of political consciousness among French citizens and the individualism that characterizes the French society form some of the factors that explain the relative facility with which the frontier between politics and other sectors of societal life is maintained in France. In embarking on comparative examination of political processes in both countries, therefore, one needs to acknowledge the fact that the texture of political life differs markedly in both countries. How to determine those dimensions that are comparable and those that carry relatively similar weight in the workings of both systems thus becomes problematic.
23A second major difficulty in comparing Nigeria and France is the apparent "artificiality" of the structure of the Nigerian state, as against the relative "naturalness" of the French state. The artificiality of the Nigerian State produces its apparent fragility. This fragility may constitute a serious constraint m comparative works such as ours because political institutions similar to those in France (political parties, elected political bodies, etc.) have so short a lifespan in Nigeria that it would be "artificial" to attempt to compare their workings in any serious manner with those of French institutions. The high incidence of military coups in Nigeria, for example, manifests the apparent artificiality and fragility of the Nigerian state and state power.
Conclusion
24We have attempted to sketch and justify the possibilities that exist for expanding the frontiers of comparative politics by using as units of study the supposedly radically different political communities of France and Nigeria. We have similarly identified the major constraints that accompany such an exercise which emanate from problems related to the generation of sufficient data on the two states for comparative purposes, problems related to the sheer scale of variables that need to be referred to in explaining political forms and processes in both States, and problems related to the differences in the political norms and values of both states. Irrespective of these difficulties, we have argued that it is intellectually and scientifically satisfying to examine common problem areas and issues in two states as different as France and Nigeria, essentially because of the numerous ways that Nigeria, still engaged in the search for stable political, social and economic structures can benefit from "older" but modernising states such as France. Irrespective of the many serious obstacles that stand in the way of works such as this, they can help us better appreciate the specificity of the problems of individual states and the universality of some other problems and processes. If for no other reason, that is enough to make any comparative attempt worthwhile.
Notes de bas de page
Auteur
Specialises in Local Government Studies. He attented the University of Bordeaux and is now on leave of absence from the Department of Local Government Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
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