1Environmental ethics is a recent development in the history of ethics and reflects the strengthening of the relationship between the discourse on the environment and the realm of ethics. It is a product of a change in environmental discussion as a result of the present environmental crisis. Hitherto, environmental discourse was basically a descriptive enterprise dominated by scientific disciplines. The central issue in the 20th century has changed from merely understanding the environment to the issue of sustaining it for the welfare of all its occupants, now and in the future. Sustainability raises serious normative questions that will make the ethical position relevant.

2 The concept at the centre of this new orientation in environmental discussion is sustainability. Sustainability or sustainable development means the use of the environment in such a way that the needs of the present generation will be met and that of future generations will be guaranteed (World Commission, 1978: 8). A sustainable society has been described as ‘one that can persist over generations, one that is far seeing enough, flexible enough, and wise enough not to undermine either its physical or its social system of support’ (Mellows et al., 1972: 6, quoted in Caldwell: 195).

3It is clear that sustainability is an ethical concept as Caldwell (1994: 195) said, ‘the very foundation of a viable sustainable development concept is grounded in an ethic of the relationship between humanity and its environment’.

4The concept of sustainability raises ethical questions and the way those questions are analysed and answered will determine the way people will relate to the environment. Roland Engel (1990: 18) affirms that

... the task on the agenda of the ethics of sustainable development is to reconceptualise our inherited moral ideas so that they can do justice to the full complexity of interactions between biological and social communities.

5Among the ethical questions raised by the concept of sustainability are these:

• What is the proper relationship between human beings and their environment? Should the relationship be guided by any sense of morality?
• Do our rights as human beings include the right to exploit the resources of nature any way we want? What are the limits of such rights, given the fact that rights always imply responsibility?
• Are we under any moral obligation to-– use our environment with caution for the sake of posterity and for the sake of the welfare of the present occupants, both human and non human?
• Do non human occupants of the ecosystem have rights which we are obliged to respect? If so, what criteria can be applied to determine those rights?
• What determines the standard of value? In a conflict between economic interests and moral duties in relation to the environment, which should be given priority?

6The responses to these questions have to a great extent defined the theoretical perspectives of environmental ethics. The theories that emerged as a reaction to these questions can be categorized into three orientations: anthropocentric, biocentric and ecocentric.

7Let us begin with anthropocentric theories. Anthropocentric theories of metaphysics, which find their roots in Western culture2 regard humans as the only beings with intrinsic value, an end which all other entities have been created to serve. This anthropocentric ethic is exemplified by the Kantian injunction:

Act so that you treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.

8In this maxim of Kant, the anthropocentric tendency is clear: humans are the only beings that possess intrinsic moral worth. Non humans are not moral patients and have only extrinsic moral worth; that is, they can only be treated with moral consideration, if the interests of a human being will be affected.

9Ethics has acquired a new biocentric orientation which is, in a way, a response to the present crisis of the environment. This is the assemblage of ethical theories that seek to make living things the centre of ethics. The argument of these theorists is that all living things, inasmuch as they suffer pain, be treated with moral consideration. This type of ethical standpoint was first popularized by the German physician and conservationist Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965). Schweitzer’s argument was that all living things, inasmuch as they desire well-being and happiness and want to avoid suffering, ought to be treated with moral consideration. He, therefore, advocated that our actions should always be guided by the desire to promote reverence for life.

10Other major philosophers who belong to this ethical orientation are Peter Singer who wrote Animal Liberation and Paul Taylor who wrote Respect for Nature. Singer argues for an acceptance of moral consideration for animals because they also strive to avoid suffering like humans, while Taylor argues for an extension of the moral community to include all beings that have intrinsic good and purpose – his own moral community includes trees and plants. According to Peter Singer, the act of morally discriminating against other living things, is termed speciesism3 which is comparable to racism and sexism.

11By far, the most adequate cluster of theories which embrace environmental ethics are those categorized as ecocentric. Ecocentric theories take the position that the focus and frontiers of environmental ethics should include all constituents of the ecosystem. The ecocentric theories of nature are holistic and include all entities, however small or trivial, since they are members of the ecosystem. The assumption is that value cannot be predicated on one member of the system, but on the totality of the ecosystem, and any entity in as much as it is part of the system is considered as valuable within the whole.

12Ecocentric ethics received its greatest inspiration from the patriarch of environmental ethics, the American forester, Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), who developed an ecocentric theory of ethics in his book: A Sand Country Almanac. Leopold’s position is that ethics can only respond to the challenge of environmental conservation if land – that is the totality of the ecosystem – becomes the end of morality rather than man. He says:

We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect (1949: ix).

13According to Leopold’s ethic, a good action is one that ‘tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Leopold, 1949: 224-225).

14The reasons for giving preference to the ecocentric orientation over other ethical orientations should be clear. The ecocentric orientation supports environmental sustenance. This orientation redefines the whole ethical community; morality is no longer predicated on human interests alone but has become directed to the totality of the ecosystem and its essence. Most especially, the important traasformation that this new orientation has achieved is that it has redirected the focus of ethics from the individual to the whole. An ecocentric view, in contradistinction to an anthropocentric view, makes us realize the inadequacy of individual-oriented moral values. Defining the ecocentric orientation, Regan says:

In place of the pervasive ‘atomistic’ emphasis in moral theory, these critics would have us develop a ‘holistic’ vision, a vision that locates ultimate value in systems rather than in the individuals who comprise them. It is, on this view, the – balance, sustainability diversity, integrity – the beauty, even of tnore or less large ecosystems or communities of living things – that should be the focus of our moral thinking (1984: 34).

15What are the implications of the ecocentric view on die quest fcr environmental sustenance? In redefining the focus of morality, egocentric orientation will redirect the culture of humanity, particularly the relationship of humanity to the environment. Actions that adversely affect the environment are condemnable in this new dispensation, not because they will affect the health of human beings or the pursuit of good life, but because they will affect the natural stability of the environment. For example, a swimmer who helps a drowning child has performed a morally commendable action not only because of the good he has done to the child, but also because he has protected the stability of the ecocommunity that would have been affected by the death of the child. The action of the swimmer is as commendable as the action of the environmentalist, who prevents the levelling of a valley or the destruction of a forest.

16We can see now that if all actions that affect the environment are considered to have moral implications and are encouraged or discouraged – depending on whether they are considered environmentally good or bad – the objective of having an environment that can sustain its inhabitants can be attained. If acts like tree cutting, bush burning, the use of pesticides, and the destruction of wildlife receive moral condemnation like dishonesty, stealing and murder, human beings will change their attitude to the resources of nature.

17The final theoretical issue that remains undefined is intergenerational responsibility. In this respect, certain questions have been raised, such as: Do we owe any responsibility to future generations? Do such future generations have rights that we ought to respect? Some claim that future generations can be denied their rights because of the ignorance of the nature of future generations (Baier, 1984: 219). It has also been argued that the lack of knowledge about future generations does not absolve us from moral responsibility to them. By mere analogy, we can imagine what future generations would be like and what would be in their interests. We can know that ‘they, like all of us, have interests in a good earth and in a good tradition guiding us h living well on it without destroying its hospitality to human life (Baier, 1984: 243). The indeterminate nature of future generations is not an excuse to disrespect them. As Feinberg says ‘the vagueness of the human future does not weaken its claim on us in the light of the nearly certain knowledge that it will after all be human’ (Feinberg, 1982: 409).

18The future of humankind and other species in the world depends on pursuing an environmental ethic that will take into consideration not only the needs, interests and happiness of the present generation of species, but that of the future. Every society owes the global community a responsibility to take charge of its own environment and to relate to the natural resources with moral consideration. It is this position that is defended in relation to the African community.