Conclusion

1The success of the Bénin experiment has led to countries, elsewhere in Africa, adopting the mode of the national conference, both as a sincere attempt at democratic transition and as a cover up to their real motives. In Nigeria in particular, commentators and political analysts have interpreted the success of the democratic movement in Benin as a logical by-product of a sovereign national conference. They therefore maintained that the only way to stifle the unceasing cry of pro-democracy activists in the confusion of the post-annulment situation of 1993 was to have a sovereign national conference. As might be expected, the Abacha regime was opposed to this move and did all it could to ensure that the constitutional conference it convened was not sovereign in character. This caused contention, which led to a boycott of the conference by a significant bulk of the political opposition. Thereafter, the opposition claimed that the conference could not resolve the political logjam or usher in democracy, because it was not sovereign.

2The lesson that Nigeria has apparently drawn from the Bénin experience is that a sovereign national conference produces political democracy, while a non sovereign conference does not. Our analysis suggests however, that this view is not necessarily true. There have been situations where a sovereign national conference has resulted in political democracy, as in Benin, and others where it has not, e.g., in Togo and Zaire. In addition, there have been cases where a non sovereign conference has produced a representative government such as in Mali; and others where it has been manipulated to suit the incumbent, as in Gabon.

3It seems clear, therefore, that the success in Benin was due to the coalescence of other factors. Three major actors have crucial roles to play in the national conference – the incumbent, the army, and the economy. A sovereign conference cannot by itself guarantee a successful transition to democracy. If Nigerians had grasped this lesson and taken it to heart, perhaps the history of the constitutional conference and its consequences might have been radically different. What is true for Nigeria is true for other African states who have tried the Benin model.